Network Governance through Resource Dependence Theory: 
A Case Study of Illicit Drug Policy in Thailand

A Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
In the Faculty of Humanities

2012

PATAMAWADEE JONGRUCK

Institute for Development Policy and Management 
School of Environment and Development
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPYRIGHT STATEMENT</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction ................................................. 16  
1.2 Research rationale ......................................... 16  
1.3 Research focus .............................................. 19  
1.4 Theoretical background ................................... 21  
1.5 Research aims and objectives ........................... 22  
1.6 Research methodology ...................................... 23  
1.7 Contributions of the research .......................... 23  
1.8 Organisation of the thesis ............................... 23  

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction ................................................... 26  
2.2 Evolution of public administration .................... 26  
2.3 Overview of network governance ......................... 28  
2.3.1 Defining governance ..................................... 28  
2.3.2 Defining network governance ........................... 31  
2.3.3 Conditions for network governance formation ... 35  
  2.3.3.1 Resource interdependence .......................... 36  
  2.3.3.2 Goal congruence ..................................... 36  

1
2.3.3.3. Perception of advantage of networking .................................................. 37
2.3.3.4. Trust ........................................................................................................ 39
2.3.3.5. Coercive pressure ..................................................................................... 39
2.3.3.6. Contextual factors ................................................................................... 40
2.4 Identifying gaps from previous empirical research ........................................... 40
2.4.1 Strategies of article selection and analysis .................................................... 41
2.4.2 Findings from literature review ..................................................................... 42
2.4.2.1 Topics of studies ......................................................................................... 42
2.4.2.2 Quantity of studies ...................................................................................... 53
2.4.2.3 Network governance studies in developing countries contexts .................. 55
2.5. Summary of gaps from network governance literature ..................................... 58
2.6 Justification for the adoption of resource dependence theory in this research ...... 59
2.7 Resource dependence theory .......................................................................... 60
2.7.1 Theoretical propositions ................................................................................ 60
2.7.2 Central concepts of RDT .............................................................................. 62
2.7.2.1 External environment .................................................................................. 62
2.7.2.2 Dependence on environment ...................................................................... 62
2.7.2.3 Managing environment .............................................................................. 65
2.7.3 Application of RDT in empirical studies ......................................................... 65
2.8 Summary of the chapter .................................................................................. 67

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................ 71
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 71
3.2 Research questions and the conceptual framework .......................................... 71
3.2.1 Research questions ....................................................................................... 72
3.2.2 Research framework ..................................................................................... 72
3.3 Philosophical assumptions of the research ...................................................... 75
3.4 Research methodology ....................................................................................... 76
3.4.1 Mixed methods .............................................................................................. 76
3.4.2 Case study ..................................................................................................... 77
3.5 Case selection .................................................................................................... 79
### 3.5.1 Selection of policy area ................................................................. 79
### 3.5.2 Selection of study location ............................................................. 80

### 3.6 Data collection methods ................................................................. 80
#### 3.6.1 Questionnaire survey ................................................................. 81
##### 3.6.1.1 Questionnaire design and pilot study ........................................ 81
##### 3.6.1.2 Sampling strategy and response rates ........................................ 83
#### 3.6.2 In-depth semi-structured interviews ........................................... 85
##### 3.6.2.1 Informant selection ............................................................... 88

### 3.7 Data analysis .................................................................................. 90
#### 3.7.1 Analysis of quantitative data ...................................................... 90
#### 3.7.2 Analysis of qualitative data ........................................................ 90

### 3.8 Quality of the research .................................................................. 91
#### 3.8.1 Validity and reliability of the research ........................................ 91
#### 3.8.2 Ethical considerations ................................................................. 91

### 3.9 Summary of the chapter ................................................................. 94

### CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY PROFILE ........................................ 95
#### 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 95
#### 4.2 Thailand: country profile ............................................................. 95
#### 4.3 Illicit drug situation in Thailand .................................................... 97
#### 4.4 Development of illicit drug policies in Thailand ......................... 99
#### 4.5 Profile of Chiang Mai province ..................................................... 105
#### 4.6 Illicit drug situation in Chiang Mai .............................................. 108
#### 4.7 Summary of the chapter ............................................................... 109

### CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS .................. 111
#### 5.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 111
#### 5.2 Characteristics of respondents to the questionnaire survey ........ 111
#### 5.3 Resource dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies ........................................ 114
##### 5.3.1 Collaboration with state agencies ........................................... 114
##### 5.3.2 Non-state organisation resource dependence on state organisations ........................................ 115
5.3.2.1 Analysis by type of resource ................................................................. 118
5.3.2.2 Analysis by dimension of dependence..................................................... 120
5.3.2.3 Total resource dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies ... 121
5.3.3 Summary of non-state organisation resource dependence on state agencies ... 122
5.4 Resource dependence of state agencies on non-state organisations .......... 123
5.4.1 Collaboration with non-state organisations .............................................. 123
5.4.2 State agency resource dependence on non-state organisations ............... 124
5.4.2.1 Analysis by type of resource ................................................................. 128
5.4.2.2 Analysis by dimensions of dependence .................................................. 129
5.4.2.3 Total resource dependence on non-state organisations .......................... 131
5.4.3 Summary of state agency resource dependence on non-state organisations ... 131
5.5 Comparison of resource dependence between state and non-state organisations 132
5.5.1 Degree of resource dependence .............................................................. 132
5.5.2 Magnitude of resource dependence ......................................................... 134
5.5.3 Distribution of resource dependence ....................................................... 135
5.5.4 Symmetry of resource dependence ......................................................... 136
5.5.5 Summary of overall resource dependence .............................................. 136
5.6 Summary of the chapter ............................................................................. 137

CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS ........................................... 138
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 138
6.2 Characteristics of interviewees ................................................................. 138
6.3 Perception of state agency resource dependence on the non-state sector ....... 141
6.3.1 Perceived importance of resources from the non-state sector ................. 141
6.3.2 Magnitude of resource exchange with the non-state sector ....................... 146
  6.3.2.1 Magnitude of exchange with non-profit organisations (NPOs) ............ 147
  6.3.2.2 Magnitude of exchange with communities ........................................... 148
  6.3.2.3 Magnitude of exchange with private sector ........................................ 150
6.3.3 Knowledge of alternative sources ......................................................... 152
6.3.4 Access to alternative resources .............................................................. 155
6.3.5 Influence on the non-state sector to provide resources ........................................ 157
6.4 Non-state sector perceptions of resource dependence on state agencies .......... 160
  6.4.1 Importance of resources from state agencies .............................................. 160
    6.4.1.1 Importance of state funding ................................................................. 160
    6.4.1.2 Importance of state knowledge and information ..................................... 163
    6.4.1.3 Importance of state legitimacy support ................................................... 165
  6.4.2 Magnitude of resource exchange with state agencies .................................... 168
    6.4.2.1 Magnitude of financial resource exchange ........................................... 168
    6.4.2.2 Magnitude of knowledge and information resource exchange .............. 173
    6.4.2.3 Magnitude of legitimacy support exchange ......................................... 175
  6.4.3 Knowledge of alternatives ............................................................................. 178
    6.4.3.1. Alternatives to state financial resources .............................................. 178
    6.4.3.2. Alternatives to state knowledge and information resources ............... 180
    6.4.3.3. Alternatives to state legitimacy support .............................................. 181
  6.4.4 Access to alternatives .................................................................................. 183
  6.4.5 Influence on the provision of resources ....................................................... 186
    6.4.5.1 Influence on the provision of funding ................................................... 186
    6.4.5.2 Influence on provision of knowledge and information ........................... 189
    6.4.5.3 Influence on provision of legitimacy support ......................................... 190
  6.4.6 Summary of non-state sector resource dependence on the state sector ........ 192
  6.5 Summary of the chapter ................................................................................ 192

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .............................................. 196
  7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 196
  7.2 Revisiting the research aim and the research framework .................................. 196
  7.3 Discussion of the key findings ....................................................................... 199
    7.3.1 Resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations .... 199
    7.3.1.1 Summary of findings .............................................................................. 199
    7.3.1.2 Discussion of findings .......................................................................... 201
    7.3.2 Interactions between state and non-state organisations ............................ 207
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Terms and definitions of network governance by different authors

Table 2.2 Summary of main topics being studied in network governance area and authors

Table 2.3 Summary of network governance articles in developing countries

Table 3.1 Cronbach’s alpha scores of pilot questionnaires: Analysis by sector and dimensions of resource dependence

Table 3.2 Participating state organisations and response rates

Table 3.3 Participating non-state organisations and response rates

Table 3.4 State agencies informants in terms of in-depth interviews

Table 3.5 Non-state organisations informants in terms of in-depth interviews

Table 3.6 Summary of research questions and research methods

Table 4.1 Estimated numbers of people involved and at risk of being involved in the illicit drug trade prior to 2001

Table 4.2 Statistics after implementation of the ‘battle against illicit drug’ policy in 2003

Table 5.1 Characteristics of the respondents in the questionnaire survey

Table 5.2 Collaboration between non-state organisations and state agencies

Table 5.3 Percentage of non-state responses for each questionnaire item

Table 5.4 Average resource dependence scores of non-state organisations

Table 5.5 Summary of resource dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies

Table 5.6 Collaboration between state agencies and non-state organisations

Table 5.7 Percentage of state agency responses to each questionnaire item

Table 5.8 Average resource dependence scores of state organisations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.9</td>
<td>Average dependence scores of state agencies on non-state organisations</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.10</td>
<td>Overall resource dependence scores of state and non-state sector</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.1</td>
<td>Characteristics of the interviewees from state agencies</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.2</td>
<td>Characteristics of the interviewees from non-state organisations</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.3</td>
<td>Summary of findings from qualitative data</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.1</td>
<td>Summary of state agencies’ resource dependence: comparison of quantitative and qualitative findings</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.2</td>
<td>Summary of non-state organisations’ resource dependence: comparison of quantitative and qualitative findings</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.3</td>
<td>Summary of key findings and conclusions according to research questions</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure 2.1 | Percentage of articles categorised by continent as of December 2008........................................................................................................ 54 |
| Figure 2.2 | Percentage of articles in developed and developing countries as of December 2008........................................................................................................ 55 |
| Figure 3.1 | Research conceptual frameworks........................................................................................................ 74 |
| Figure 4.1 | Map of Thailand........................................................................................................ 96 |
| Figure 4.2 | Map of Chiang Mai Province........................................................................................................ 106 |
| Figure 5.1 | Comparison of overall resource dependence scores between state and non-state sectors........................................................................................................ 133 |
| Figure 5.2 | Magnitude of resource dependence........................................................................................................ 135 |
| Figure 5.3 | Distribution of resource dependence........................................................................................................ 136 |
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOT</td>
<td>Airport Authority of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Bank of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOCD</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Provincial Operation Centre against Illicit Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODI</td>
<td>Community Organisations Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOPA</td>
<td>Department of Provincial Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCR</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>Manchester Evening News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Network Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPOs</td>
<td>Non-profit organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSC</td>
<td>Office of Civil Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONCB</td>
<td>Office of Narcotics Control Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Office of Provincial Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT</td>
<td>Resource Dependence Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, public policy making and implementation in some European and North American countries have been in the form of networks of public, private and voluntary sector organisations. The changing nature of governance, to governing with and through networks, is known as ‘network governance’ (Rhodes, 1997). Nonetheless, it is ambiguous if network governance is a global phenomenon or merely applicable to the developed world context. Since the evidence of network governance from developing countries is hitherto scarce in the literature, this research, therefore, fills the current knowledge gap by examining network governance in Thailand. The research explores and explains the presence (or absence) of network governance in Thailand through Resource Dependence Theory, using illicit drug policy implementation in Chiang Mai province as a case study. A quantitative survey (N = 217) and a qualitative semi-structured interview (N = 31) were employed to accumulate primary data. The findings reveal that governance in the case under consideration had not shifted towards networks. Although it was found that there is a moderate degree of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations involved in the policy, it was not sufficient to verify the existence of network governance. This was because power asymmetry existed in the relationship, with the state sector being the power-advantaged one. State agencies avoided collaborating with the non-state sector due to the fear of an expected loss of autonomy, whereas non-state organisations did not perceive resources from the state sector as being of critical importance. Thus, network governance was mainly absent from this case. This research joins broader intellectual debates that network governance is not a global phenomenon but rather a case-specific one, which suggests that public administration scholars should take the distinctiveness of context into account. Moreover, this study contributes to the illicit drug policy making in Thailand by recommending that deregulations of some bureaucratic rules and cross-sector organisational learning are vital to facilitate network governance.
DECLARATION

I, Patamawadee Jongruck, hereby, declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

i. Copyright in text of this thesis rests with the author (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) who owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and he has given the University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, and whether in hard copy or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Design and Patent Act 1998 (as amended) and regulations issued under it, or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “intellectual property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in the thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure publication, and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy which can be accessed on http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibraries/policies/intellectual-property.pdf, in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, the University Library’s regulations available on its website which can be accessed on http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations and in the University’s policy on the presentation of Theses.

v. Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may take place is available from the Head of School of Environment and Development.
DEDICATION

To my parents, Surachai and Waraluck Jongruck,
who have devotedly served the Thai public sector for all of their working lives
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Christopher Rees, for taking me under his supervision at the very last stage of my PhD journey. I am greatly indebted to him for his commitment, encouragement, and support in every aspect. His decent professional approach has inspired me to follow in his footsteps when I return to Thailand as a lecturer. I also would like to acknowledge the contribution of my initial supervisor, Dr. Willy McCourt; specifically, he identified the subject of network governance as a suitable focus for the thesis. I am grateful to Mr. Derek Eldridge for the compassion and care which he always gave to me. I am indebted to the IDPM discipline coordinator and every member of the PGR administration staff for their valuable guidance and assistance.

It was an honour for me to receive a full scholarship from the Royal Thai government to do my Master’s and doctoral degrees in the UK. Without their financial support, I would not have been able to pursue my dream to study abroad and be a university lecturer. I am also very thankful to all participants of this study, for their valuable time and the information they gave me.

I would like to express my highest gratitude to the Forest Hermitage and Ajahn Manapo Bhikkhu for organising the meditation retreats during the years of my stay in the UK. The Dhamma has been indeed an oasis of my soul. I could not have completed my PhD journey without the kind support and encouragement from friends who have been like my family during the time I was away from home: Dr. Panom Gunawong, Dr. Pasakara Chueasuai, Piyawadee Rohitarachoon, Dr. Theeranuch Pusaksrikit, Dr. Orapak Reamthong, Dr. Benchta Thongnuanchan, Songserm Thanakornpinthong, Prush and Prathana Sa-nga-ngam, Dr. Richard Boateng, Dr. Philipp Haas, Kittimon Jirakittidul, Phantarak Pookphan, Petch Sajjacholpunt, Jirakiat Jirarattanachan, Vittawat Dolbandarnchoke, Sukanya Ibbotson, Tamthai Dilokvidhyarat, and Suchot Nimitraht.

Lastly, I would like to express my wholehearted gratitude to my family – Dad Surachai, Mum Waraluck, Brother Teerapat, Uncle Chawalit, Aunty Sripen, Aunty Warunee - for their endless love, understanding, and support in every way from the day I was born until now. I am so grateful that they have been patient for my success, and that they never lost faith in me. I would like to tell them that I have all the glory today because “you are the wind beneath my wings”.

15
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Network governance research has been growing in importance and magnitude in Public Administration and Public Policy for the last two decades (Lewis, 2011). In a network mode of governance, public and private actors interact to create co-operation and consensus with significant autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 1997:15). Using the illicit drug policy implementation in Thailand as a case study, this research aims to examine the nature of governance in Thailand in order to explore the extent to which Thailand has shifted from hierarchy to network governance. This chapter provides a background and overview of the thesis. It begins with the rationale as to why this research should be carried out. It then presents a research focus and a brief theoretical background to the research. The aims, objectives and significance of the study are also addressed as well as the methodology used to conduct the research. Lastly, the organisation of chapters in this thesis is outlined.

1.2 Research rationale

In early August 2011, at the time of finishing this thesis, the UK experienced one of the worst riots of the decade (The Economist, 2011). The riot started in the capital city and sparked copycat riots in other big cities, namely Bristol, Birmingham, Liverpool and, finally, Manchester. In Manchester, more than a hundred premises were damaged and looted (BBC News, 2011a). More than hundred-fifty fires were started in the city centre and Salford (MEN, 2011a). A city centre spokesman considered this disorder to be ‘one of the worst days in Manchester’s history’ (MEN, 2011b). The police officers arrested forty-seven people on the night of the riots (ibid). However, the number dramatically increased to over 250 people during the following day as the Greater Manchester Police launched the ‘Shop a Looter’ campaign calling on the public to identify individuals who
attacked people and property on the riots night (Greater Manchester Police, 2011). However, only a few hours after the riots, a thousand of local people spontaneously gathered in the city centre to clean up the mess following the looting (Guardian, 2011). The city council launched the campaign ‘I Love MCR’ to help regain the spirit of the community and it got vast attention from businesses, the community, and celebrities (Manchester City Council, 2011). This recent incident in the UK is one example which clearly illustrates that we are now living in the world of networks, regardless of whether they are good or bad ones.

Networks are also witnessed in other areas ranging from micro issues, such as treating the seriously mentally ill (Provan and Milward, 1995), executing programmes for family planning (McFarlane and Meier, 2001), to macro ones, such as managing the national and international systems of finance (Cassell and Hoffmann, 2009).

Despite the empirical evidence demonstrated above, that it is now the era of networks, in the academic world scholars in public administration have also been paying more attention to the phenomenon of networks (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). We have witnessed the transformation of governance mode from hierarchical to networks in many European and North American countries, such as in the United Kingdom (Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996, Rhodes, 1997), the Netherlands (Kickert et al., 1997), other EU countries (Bovaird et al., 2002) and the United States (O’Toole, 1997, Goldsmith and Eggars, 2004). This is largely because society has become more complex and the scope of social problems has gone beyond the responsibility of a single organisation (Kooiman, 1993). The process of policy making has become more complex and involves various actors and levels of governance. Public services are delivered by inter-organisational networks such as Inter-governmental Cooperation, and the Public-private Partnership (Klijn, 2008). Scholars have recognised the empirical phenomenon of the state adapting to its external environment, where power is dispersed among interdependent actors in the late twentieth century to create ‘network governance’ (Rhodes, 1997).
Network governance (NG hereafter) denotes ‘public policy making and implementation through a web of relationships between government, business and society actors’ (Klijn, 2008).

Although the existence of NG in many European countries is apparent (Klijn, 2008), the evidence of NG in less developed countries, where the socio-economic context is entirely dissimilar from that of more advanced economic countries, is still limited. It is rather naïve to assume that NG is a global phenomenon since the development of NG is specific to each context (Rhodes, 2000). This research argues that it is vital to examine the existence of NG in developing countries, rather than presuming that it already exists before moving on to study further issues concerning NG in developing countries.

NG is believed to have emerged as a response to complicated social problems in modern society (Kooiman, 2000). Klijn (2008) mentions that ‘...it is only through collaborative action that the societal problems can be resolved’. In other words, NG is considered to be the best way of handling chronic societal problems or, in the words of Rittel and Webber (1973), ‘wicked problems’. According to Clarke and Stewart (1997), ‘wicked problems’ refers to problems that are beyond the capacity of one agency to resolve and that require a broad systematic response across organisational boundaries and the engagement of citizens and stakeholders in public policymaking and implementation. We have witnessed that the NG approach is employed in developed countries to solve wicked problems in many policy areas, for example; environment, health care, education and social security. Nonetheless, we have limited empirical evidence of how ‘wicked problems’ have been managed in developing countries and to what extent the problem has been handled by the NG approach.

Due to the shortage of empirical research about NG in developing countries, this research proposes that it is important to study to what extent and how the NG approach is employed to tackle wicked problems in developing countries for two reasons.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Firstly, NG might be a suitable governance model for developing countries because governments in these countries tend to have low performance due to economic constraints, political crises and inadequate leadership skills (UNDP, 2009). Incorporating other actors from outside the governmental realm may yield advantageous outcomes. Besides, managerial reform or New Public Management (NPM) reform does not seem to suit every developing country (Schick, 1998; McCourt and Minoque, 2001). Thus, NG may be an alternative for public policymaking and implementation in less developed countries.

Secondly, studies conducted in Western countries found that the NG approach has a positive impact on managing wicked problems (Beuren et al., 2003); therefore, knowing how such issues are handled in developing countries can possibly help to improve the way that these problems are tackled and can, eventually, reduce the incidence of ‘wicked problems’ in developing countries.

In spite of the important reasons outlined above, studies into the extent and practice of NG in developing countries are still limited when compared to those in developed countries. Thus, it is essential for scholars in public administration to shed more light on NG issues in developing countries.

1.3 Research focus

This research fills in the knowledge gaps mentioned above by exploring to what extent and how the NG approach has been employed in solving ‘wicked problems’ in developing countries. A literature review of NG studies in developing countries suggests that the health care policy is the policy area that has been paid the most attention (Kaboyakgosi and Mpule, 2008; Larbi, 2005; Tantivess and Walt, 2008; Zheng et. al, 2010). Thus, more evidence from other policy areas is needed.
Illicit drugs are considered to be one of the ‘wicked social problems’ which still prevail not only in developed societies but also in developing countries. To solve this problem effectively, collaboration from various actors and levels of governance is required. There is evidence in the United States which illustrates that the illicit drug problem can be better managed by the NG approach (Percival, 2009). However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the use of NG in the drug policies of developing countries has not been studied in any real depth before.

Thailand is one of the developing countries where there is a serious illicit drug problem. One of the reasons for this is because the northern region of Thailand is part of the ‘Golden Triangle’ area, which is considered to be one of the world’s greatest drugs producing areas. The illicit drug smuggling and usage have been increasing over the past three decades and have greatly affected the country’s development and the quality of Thai people’s lives in many ways (ONCB, 2010). A survey conducted by Assumption University, Thailand in 2010 revealed that the spread of illicit drugs is the crime that the concerned respondents the most, with a percentage 10 percent higher than that for murder and robbery crimes (Thairath, 2010). Moreover, a survey conducted after the national election in July 2011 by Suan Dusit University illustrated that drug policy is the policy that constituents paid the most attention to. A dramatically high percentage of respondents (97.5 percent) expected the new government to solve the drug problem (Thairath, 2011).

Despite facing a critical drug situation, the drug policy governance in Thailand has largely been dominated by state agencies since Thailand is known for its strong bureaucratic system (Riggs, 1966). In the late 1990s, the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), a special purpose agency responsible for the drug policy, published a report stating that the governmental mechanism alone was insufficient to manage the drug problem in the country. Therefore, the agency has encouraged participation amongst stakeholders, particularly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and communities (Petchsuksiri, 2001). It has been more than a decade since the report was
first published. However, it is still unclear whether drug policy making and implementation in Thailand has moved away from the bureaucratic system. This makes Thailand an interesting case-study in which to examine the possibility that NG is employed in managing wicked problems in developing countries.

1.4 Theoretical background

In order to examine the extent to which NG is employed in managing drug policy in Thailand, the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978) (RDT hereafter) is adopted as a theoretical framework. This is because resource interdependence between state organisations and the organisations outside of government is a fundamental condition for NG to emerge (Rhodes, 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). In other words, the resource interdependence between the state and non-state organisations is the key to discovering if NG exists in developing countries.

Interdependence between organisations is at the heart of RDT (Saidel, 1990; 1991). Pfeffer and Salancik proposed in their book (1978) that the premise of RDT is that organisations must struggle to survive. In order to survive, organisations must be effective, which means organisations must meet the external standard of performance. However, it is rather rare that any organisation could entirely fulfil all of the necessary conditions for achievement of an action or a desired outcome. Thus they acquire resources from their environment, which is composed of other organisations. The organisations thus depend on their environment for resources in order to be effective and survive. However, dependence on environment creates uncertainty for organisations. Organisations typically attempt to reduce uncertainty by managing the environment. Negotiating with their environment by establishing inter-organisational collaboration is one of the strategies that organisations can employ to reduce external uncertainty.
A review of literature on RDT found that the theory has been applied in various research areas, particularly in the business sector, for example: buyer-supplier relations (Goitom, Lutz and Ghauri, 2004; Eggert, Ulaga and Hollman, 2009); board of execution (Brown, 2005; Bauer, 2006; Gabrielsson, 2007; Chen et al., 2009); organisational change (Erakovic and Wilson, 2005; 2006) and inter-organisational relations (Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003; Beth and Jeffrey, 2007; Cumming, 2009). Nonetheless, its application to studies in the public sector and inter-sectors is very rare, especially those conducted in developing countries. This research extends the application of RDT to inter-sector relationships between the state and non-state sectors in a developing country which is a crucial knowledge gap that needs to be filled.

One assumption of this research derives from the RDT perspective which states that the likelihood of NG emerging depends on the extent to which organisations recognise their resource dependence on the environment. As Gray (1985:921) writes, “...without the acknowledgement by the stakeholders that some fundamental interdependence exists, collaborative problem-solving efforts make no sense”. Namely, the more the state and non-state organisations perceive that they have resource dependence on each other, the higher the possibility that collaborative action will be established and the higher the chance that NG exists. This particular assumption will be explored in this research.

1.5 Research aims and objectives

This research aims to examine the nature of governance in Thailand in order to explore the extent to which Thailand has shifted toward NG.

The objectives of this research are:

1. To provide empirical evidence, from an RDT perspective, of the presence (or absence) of NG in developing countries using Thailand as a case study.
2. To propose practical suggestions for policy makers to improve the drug policy making and implementation in Thailand.
1.6 Research methodology
To address the research objectives, this research employed a single case study approach (Yin, 2003) and used both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative method contained questionnaire surveys, whereas the qualitative approach consisted of in-depth interviews. The data obtained from the quantitative method was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The data obtained from the qualitative approach was transcribed and selectively translated into English and then analysed by themes according to the research questions. The translation was proved by two Thai university lecturers proficient in translation in order to ensure the reliability of the data.

1.7 Contributions of the research
This research makes two major contributions. First, in terms of academic contribution, this research fills a gap in previous research by providing empirical evidence of NG in a developing country for which such research is currently lacking. Moreover, it extends the application of RDT to explain inter-sectorial relationships in a developing country. Secondly, in addition to the academic reasons mentioned, understanding the presence (or absence) of NG in developing countries can be helpful to practitioners. Understanding the current nature of governance can help policy makers to tailor policies that encompass this and provide appropriate training and skills for civil servants. Moreover, based on the assumption that NG is more compatible in managing complex social problems, understanding the fundamental conditions for NG to emerge can help encourage and sustain the networks in public policy so that the problems can be more effectively managed and the people can obtain a better quality of life.

1.8 Organisation of the thesis
The body of this thesis consists of seven chapters as follows: Chapter One provides an introduction to the research. It starts with the research rationale, followed by the research focus. It then provides a concise theoretical
Chapter One: Introduction

background and the aims, and objectives. Importantly, the significance of this research is also discussed.

Chapter Two presents a review of the relevant literature. It contains two major sections. The first section explores existing literature on NG, while the latter section provides a review of RDT. The review of NG encompasses an overview, including definitions, characteristics and debates on the topic, after which empirical studies of NG in developing countries are discussed. The second part of the chapter presents a literature review on RDT. Fundamental concepts of the theory are discussed at the outset, followed by a review of the application of the theory in previous empirical studies. This chapter concludes with identifying the gaps in previous research and discusses implications for the study.

Chapter Three presents the research framework and research questions derived from the literature reviewed in the previous chapter. It also clarifies the methodological approaches employed in this research, including the research philosophy, research strategies, rationale of case selection, data collection methods, analytical processes and research validity and reliability.

Chapter Four offers information regarding the case study of drug policy in Thailand. This chapter begins with general information about Thailand and its drug policy over the past decade. General information about Chiang Mai, a province selected as a case study, is given in order to provide a background to the case being studied.

Chapter Five reports the study’s findings derived from the quantitative analysis. The degree of resource dependence of state agencies on non-state organisations, and vice versa, derived from the questionnaire survey is reported. Then the comparison of resource dependence of both sectors is presented.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Chapter Six reports the study’s findings derived from qualitative approach. The resource dependence of state agencies on non-state organisations and vice versa, together with the interactions of both sectors in illicit drug policy is reported.

Chapter Seven, the final chapter of the thesis, discusses the findings derived from both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Furthermore, its implication to policy making in Thailand is also addressed. The chapter concludes with the limitations of the research and some recommendations for future research are also provided.
2.1 Introduction

The purpose of the literature review is to provide background of knowledge of the area of study and identify the gaps from previous research. This chapter is composed of two main parts. The first part concerns the review of the network governance (NG) literature, which is the core area of this study. The rise of NG in the area of public administration and management is grounded at the outset. Then, general concepts of NG, namely definitions, characteristics, conditions for network formation and its pros and cons, are reviewed to provide a conceptual background of NG. After that, the empirical studies of NG over the past decade are examined to identify gaps from extant literature. The second part of the chapter concerns the review of resource dependence theory, which is employed as a theoretical perspective in order to examine the NG phenomenon. General concepts of the theory are reviewed, together with the empirical research that applied the theory as a theoretical framework. The chapter concludes with the gaps identified from the literature review.

2.2 Evolution of public administration

The traditional model of public administration, which is characterised by hierarchical structure, direct service provision of governments, separation between administration and politic, and emphasis on public sector values, was a dominant paradigm of public administration for most of the twentieth century (Hughes 1998, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Until the late 1970s, the long-standing concept of traditional public administration was strongly criticised in various ways. According to Olsen (2005), those critiques are, for example, the rigidity and inflexibility of bureaucracy, provision of monopolised public services, which led to a lack of choice, lack of responsiveness to people’s needs, and inefficiency and ineffectiveness. The public sector had been
perceived as a problem itself and it, therefore, needed to be improved (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).

In the late 1970s, there were significant responses to the problems of traditional public administration in some Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand. The public sector reforms in the 1980s refuted the hierarchical approach and emphasised market mechanism and managerialism. It was later named ‘new public management’ (NPM) (Hood 1991), while other authors address this type of reform differently by calling it market-based public administration (Lan and Rosenbloom 1992) and entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The main characteristics of NPM are summarised as follows: business-style management; efficient resources use; performance and output orientation; customer-oriented management; managerial decentralisation to managers; use of market mechanisms; purchaser-provider split; and disaggregation of units (Hood 1991, Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Pollitt 1993, Dunleavy and Hood 1994, Ferlie et al. 1996, Minogue 1998). In short, NPM is a reform that employs a market mechanism and managerialism approach to solve the problems brought about by bureaucratic tradition.

However, after two decades of supremacy, NPM had been criticised on several aspects. Firstly, NPM is likely to weaken public sector values such as diminishing security in employment, promoting self-interest and corruption (Dunlealy and Hood 1994). Secondly, the efficiency gains from NPM reform are uncertain (Batley 1996, Pollitt 2003b). Over emphasising on particular cost reduction might help to gain short-term efficiency but it may also undermine long-term benefits. Moreover, the introduction of competitive principles as the approach to gain efficiency can lead to conflicts rather than collaboration, as organisations that intensely focus on achieving their targets might be less willing to co-operate with others (Lawton 1998). Lastly, NPM led to the fragmentation of public sector institutions. NPM has altered the monolithic and multi-purpose ministry into small and specialised agencies. This may create a more flexible, leaner and faster public sector but it may cause difficulties in integrating policies and
services, as well as making accountability and monitoring more complicated (Lawton 1998).

According to Rhodes (1997), the consequence of the structural fragmentation of NPM reforms was that public organisations were forced to coordinate with other organisations: not only the public ones but also those outside the public sphere, in order to deliver public services. The changing nature of public management in the UK was recognised as governing with and through networks. Rhodes (1997) later labelled this new mode of governance as ‘network governance’.

Similar phenomena were found in other European countries such as the Netherlands (Kickert 1997), France (le Galès 2001), Switzerland (Wälti and Kübler 2003), and Italy (Cepiku and Meneguzzo 2007). The studies on NG have been prosperous over the past two decades across Europe and the United States (Klijn 2008). Yet, it is impossible to truly comprehend the concept of NG without grasping its background.

**2.3 Overview of network governance**

NG is part of the broader term ‘governance’. Some authors use the term governance and NG interchangeably (Rhodes 2007). However, in this study, NG is differentiated from the term governance. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the definitions of these terms at the outset.

**2.3.1 Defining governance**

Governance has gained an increasing amount of attention in recent academic literature (Jackson and Stainsby 2000, Klijn 2008). Almost every area in public administration appears to go under the notion of governance (Frederickson 2005). However, the term governance is a slippery one that is interpreted differently among authors (Torfing 2006). At a broad level, governance can refer to a mode of social coordination (Kooiman
Peters and Pierre (2000) focused on the institutional aspect of governance and regard governance as an umbrella term that covers the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing. Kickert et al. (1997), on the other hand, emphasise the process aspect and define governance as directed influence of social processes, which covers all kinds of guidance mechanisms that are connected with public policy processes. Lynn et al. (2001) tend to limit their focus of governance to the official authority and define governance as regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of the publicly supported goods and services.

Pierre (2000) also emphasises the state role but denotes that governance has a dual meaning. He mentions that ‘...On the one hand it refers to the empirical manifestations of the state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century. On the other hand, governance also denotes a conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social system and for the most part, the role of the state in that process...’ Pierre (2000: 3). The range of governance definitions above demonstrate that governance can mean different things to different people, thus it is important to identify what governance actually is and how it differs from other related terms.

Governance is distinguished from other related terms, such as governing and government. According to Kooiman (1993) governing refers to all activities of social, political and administrative actors that purposefully guide, steer, control or manage societies, while governance is a pattern which emerges in a socio-political context as a result of interacting actions of those actors. Regarding the distinction between government and governance, Rosenau (1992) refers to government as activities backed by formal authority, whereas governance embraces both informal processes and non-governmental actors. Börzel (2010) suggests that the essence of government is hierarchy based on statehood, whereas governance refers to the involvement of both governmental and non-governmental actors in the provision of common goods through
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

non-hierarchical coordination where the governmental actors do not use their cohesive power to intervene in the coordination mechanism.

Despite the attempts to distinguish the definition from other related terms, governance is variously employed on different occasions where ‘several usages have little or nothing in common’ (Rhodes 2007: 1246). Scholars attempt to classify the usage of governance into groups. Rhodes (1997), for instance, clustered the usage of the term into seven groups, as follows: 1) Governance as corporate governance, 2) Governance as the New Public Management, 3) Governance as Good Governance, 4) Governance as international interdependence 5) Governance as a socio-cybernetic system, 6) Governance as the new political economy and 7) Governance as networks.

Nevertheless, Ansell (2002) suggests that these usages of governance provided by Rhodes can be grouped into two major categories. The first connotation tends to emphasise on the fiscal responsibility, efficiency, and accountability of organisations, which include governance as corporate governance, New Public Management and Good Governance in Rhodes’s work. The other four usages of governance - international interdependence, socio-cybernetic systems, new political economy, networks - convey the meanings of the shift from the state-centric model of governing to the one where activities, authority, and the power of governing are distributed to wider actors than in the past and the state can no longer entirely control the outcomes of those activities. In other word, governance in the sense of second connotation of Ansell refers to a process of coordinating and conciliating multiple actors.

Kjær (2004) also cluster the usage of the term governance into five groups: 1) Governance in public administration and public policy 2) Governance in international relations 3) Governance as EU governance 4) Governance in comparative politics and 5) Governance as good governance of the World Bank.
In this research, governance refers to the usage in public administration and public policy areas (Kjær, 2004). It focuses on the shift of governing mode from state-centric to a new mode of governing where powers are dispersed among interdependent actors, which refers to governance as networks in Rhodes’ (1997) classification.

The term ‘network governance’ will be employed since it best describes the governing pattern characterised by networks (Rhodes 2008). In other word, network is an adjective that identifies a certain type of governance to prevent the confusion with other usages of governance. However, it should be noted that there are some other terms which convey close meanings to NG, for example, governance networks (Klijn 2008, Torfing 2006), collaborative governance (Emerson et al. 2011) but this research opts to employ the NG term because it is a comprehensive term and widely acknowledged by a number of scholars, particularly in Europe.

2.3.2 Defining network governance

Application of the network concept is not new in the public administration area. Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) mentioned that has been applied in the intergovernmental literature since the late 1970s (for example Scharpf et al. 1978; Wright 1978). However, it has gained explicit attention from public management scholars since the early 1990s in policy network literature (for example Knoke 1990; Powell 1991; Kenis and Schneider 1991; Mash and Rhodes 1992; van Waarden 1992; Kassim 1993).

Network concept has later been widely applied in several topics within the field of public administration and public policy. Rhodes (2006) suggests that the usage of network in public administration and policy studies can be grouped into three main schools, namely network as interest intermediation; network as interorganisational analysis; and network as governance.

The interest intermediate school uses network to describe government policymaking and, thus, also known as the policy network school. Policy network refers to: ‘sets of
formal and informal institutional linkages between government and other actors
structured around shared interests in public policy making and implementation’ (Rhodes
2008). Its assumption is that public policymaking takes place in a complex interaction
processes between interdependent actors who all have their own goals and strategies
but are dependent on each other to achieve the desired public policy outcomes (Löffler
2006). This school focuses on the inclusion and exclusion of interests in policymaking
process, emphasising the power relations among them. Rhodes and Mash (1992) classify
types of policy network along the continuum into six types, according to membership,
integration, and institutionalisation dimensions. The policy community lies at one end
and the issue of network is at another. The policy community is characterised by tight
and closed membership with frequent interactions where the network members are
highly integrated and institutionalised. In contrast to the issue network, it is
characterised by open access of membership and low levels of integration and
institutionalisation.

The second school that employs the concept of network is interorganisational analysis.
This approach emphasises the power structure and characteristics of networks rather
than the interactions between individuals within the networks. In other words, the focal
actors in this approach are formal organisations, not individual actors in networks. A
network mapping technique (Scott 1991) is often employed to map the links between
organisations (Knoke et al. 1996)

The last approach is network as governance. This approach focuses on the relationships
between governmental, private and voluntary sectors and the impact of the changing
state and societal relations on the way society is governed. Pierre and Peter (2005: 6)
wrote that to understand the NG is to understand ‘the nature of state-society
relationships in the pursuit of collective interests’. The state and non-state actors have
become more dependent on resources from each other to achieve their goals. The
resource interdependency between these actors sustains the network and creates the
power relations between them. This research considers itself as part of the governance
school because the main objective of the research is to examine the relationships between the state and non-state actors so as to understand governance regime in a particular context.

Growing awareness of NG in many countries, particularly in Europe and North America (Klijn 2008), has stimulated more attention to NG. However, the definition of NG finds little congruence among authors (Rhodes 2007). European scholars tend to use NG to describe the changing roles of the public sector and government in public policymaking and implementation. Rhodes (1997), for example, referred to NG as a new mode of governing by and through networks. Network is one among other forms of governance, such as bureaucracy and market. While authority and rules are the mechanism for bureaucracy and competition and prices are for the market, the network form of governance is characterised by trust and diplomacy. He also defined NG as having the following characteristics:

1. Interdependence between organisations which are broader than government, including non-state actors;
2. Continuing interactions between network members due to the need for resource exchange and negotiation for the shared purposes;
3. Game-like interactions rooted in trust and agreed rules of the game;
4. Degree of autonomy from the state, which means networks are self-governing.

The self-governing element is arguable. Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) disagreed with the self-governing concept and identified six founding characteristics of governance networks as follows:

1. Actors are mutually dependent in terms of reaching objectives;
2. Dependencies create sustainable relations between actors;
3. Dependencies create some veto power for various actors;
4. The sustainability of interactions creates and solidifies a distribution of resources between actors;
5. In the interactions, rules are formed and solidified, which regulate actor behaviours;
6. Resource distribution and rule formation lead to a certain closeness of networks for outside actors.

Klijn (2008) also limited the NG definition to the public sphere and defined it as public policymaking and implementation through a web of relationships between government, business and society actors. He summarised the empirical phenomenon of NG as a complex decision-making processes, service delivery delivered by multiple organisational networks, and partnerships and alliances between public and private organisations.

American scholars, on the other hand, tend to perceive NG as broader than relations between state and non-state sectors, as opposed to European scholars. Provan and Kenis (2008), for instance, define NG as any groups of three or more legally autonomous organisations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal. Emerson et al. (2011) use the term collaborative governance and define it broadly as ‘the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, level of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished’. Their definition encompasses not only formal, state-initiated relationships, as defined by Ansell and Gash (2008), but also embraces any kinds of multi-partner relationships, regardless of the sector. For example, collaborative governance can mean joined-up government where the state agencies come to work together or hybrid arrangements such as public-private partnerships or private-community partnerships. In other words, the term collaborative governance does not necessarily involve public sector organisations in the partnership arrangement, while NG tends to encompass public organisations. Table 2.1 summarises the definitions of NG that has been provided by scholars.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Table 2.1 Terms and definitions of network governance by different authors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition and characteristics of network governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes (1997)</td>
<td>Governance/Network governance</td>
<td>Governing with and through networks. It is characterised by interdependence between organisations, continuing interactions, game-like interactions, and autonomy from the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klijn (2008)</td>
<td>Governance networks</td>
<td>Public policymaking and implementation through a web of relationships between government, business and society actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provan and Kenis (2008)</td>
<td>Network governance</td>
<td>Groups of three or more legally autonomous organisations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerson et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Collaborative governance</td>
<td>The processes and structures of public policy decision-making and management that engages people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, level of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

This research takes the same position as most European scholars and focuses on the changing roles of the state in public policymaking and implementation. The definition of NG in this research is derived from the definitions of scholars above and defined as ‘a distinct pattern of governing that the public policies are formed and implemented through networks of government, business and society actors. These actors are interdependent and continuously interact’.

2.3.3 Conditions for network governance formation

A number of approaches and theories have attempted to explain inter-organisational network formation, for example organisational sociology, game theory, organisational economics, industrial marketing and purchasing, population ecology, institutional theory, social network approach and resource dependence theory. Some of these approaches partially overlap and partially compete (Ebers 1997). This section summarises some of the key factors from the above literature that have been found to be important to the emergence of inter-organisational networks.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.3.3.1. Resource interdependence
Although there is extensive literature on interorganisational collaboration, resource interdependence is among the most important contingencies that are related to cooperative behaviour of organisations (Teece 1992, Haagedorn 1993, Lundin 2007). According to the exchange theory perspective (Blau 1964, Lavine and White 1961, Scharf 1978), organisations are assumed to be rational in terms of decision-making. In order to survive, organisations need to be effective and, in order to be effective, organisations require resources to achieve their objectives (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Nevertheless, in situations of resource scarcity or performance distress, organisations are ‘forced to enter into more cooperative activities with other organisations’ (Aiken and Hage 1968) in order to gain access to the needed resources and reduce their dependence on other organisations or enhance their competitive position (Ebers 1997). The possibility of collaboration will be higher in the situation of mutual dependence, where organisation A needs resources from organisation B and vice versa (Lundin 2007). Moreover, the recognition of interdependence by stakeholders is also perceived to as an important basis for collaboration, as Gray (1985) states that ‘without acknowledgement by stakeholders that some fundamental interdependence exists, collaborative problem-solving efforts make no sense’. However, organisations will avoid taking part in collaborative activities when the costs of collaboration exceed the benefits and involve a loss of autonomy (Lundin 2007).

A number of empirical studies support the idea that resource interdependence increases interorganisational collaboration, for example those of Levine and White (1961), Reid (1964), Van de Ven and Walker (1984), Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), Lundin (2007).

2.3.3.2. Goal congruence
Goal congruence is also one among other antecedents that are widely recognised in interorganisational collaboration literature. O’Toole (2003: 239) wrote that ‘a shared
interest can be a powerful facilitator of cooperation, whereas diverging objectives may decrease cooperation’. According to this perspective, interorganisational collaboration takes place in order to pursue common goals or interests (Oliver 1991). However, Schermerhorn (1975) argued that the congruence in different levels of goals can have different consequences on collaboration. He argued that the similarity of official goal level can imply competition, since it involves specific input and output. However, the similarity of goals at the operative level can enhance the possibility of cooperation. In short, interorganisational collaboration seems to be more likely where the official goals are complementary and operative goals are common.

Many empirical studies confirm the relations between goal congruence and collaboration. Levine and White (1961), for instance, reported that agreement on goals is an important part of interorganisational relationships. Schmidt and Kochan (1977) studied the community organisations and local offices of the US Training and Employment Service and found that the compatibility of goals was positively associated with cooperation. O’Toole (1983) also indicated a similar finding. In his study of the interorganisational implementation of labour market policies in Sweden and Germany, he found that common interests increase cooperation among local actors.

2.3.3.3. Perception of advantage of networking
Another antecedent of interorganisational networking commonly mentioned in literature is the perceived positive outcomes or value expectancy (Schermerhorn 1975). Before stakeholders embark on collaboration, they must believe that collaboration will produce some positive outcomes (Schermerhorn 1975, Gray 1985). According to Oliver (1990), the expected benefits of interorganisational collaboration, motivating organisations to take part in collaborative activities, are efficiency, stability and legitimacy.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Efficiency refers to when organisations achieve higher input or output ratios through collaboration (Oliver 1990). Ebers (1997) pointed out some advantages in terms of efficiency that the organisations can obtain from collaboration with other organisations where interorganisational networking can increase their revenue because organisations can get together against common competitors or reduce competition by turning opponents into allies (Porter and Fuller 1986). Moreover, Ebers also indicated that interorganisational collaboration can reduce costs because of the economies of scale that result from joint research, marketing, and production (Håkansson and Snehota 1995). In some circumstances, organisations can minimise their governance cost by coordinating their activities (Hennart 1991).

Stability is another expected advantage of interorganisational networking. It refers to the situations where organisations can better forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty affecting their activities (Oliver 1990). Collaborating with other organisations can help them to gain access to complementary resources and therefore reduce the uncertainty affecting their activities (Ebers 1997). Besides that, collaboration can help to reduce risks especially when organisations embark on risky projects or innovations. Through collaboration, organisations can spread financial and other risks (Contractor and Lorange 1988).

Interorganisational networking can also enhance legitimacy because organisations can establish or improve their reputation, image, prestige, or congruence with prevailing norms (Oliver 1990). The study of Schermerhorn and Shirland (1981) found that interorganisational collaboration among hospitals was related to concern for their image. In the case of new organisations, collaborating with known organisations helped them to increase their legitimacy (Wiewel and Hunter 1985).

Despite the expected positive outcomes mentioned above, Raab (2002) also indicated the benefits from the process of networking itself. He emphasised the advantages of informal communication in network mode, which enables actors to communicate in a
pragmatic way and allows them to exchange trustworthy, reliable information and tactical knowledge with each other. Moreover, informal communication shortens the time needed to make decisions. Additionally, informal communication becomes more important as the actors face more uncertainties and the process becomes more dynamic and more conflict ridden.

2.3.3.4. Trust
Trust is another contingency that is found to have a positive impact on interorganisational collaboration. Smith et al. (1995) noted that ‘although research has identified many determinants of cooperation, virtually all scholars have agreed that one especially immediate antecedent is trust.’ A number of studies in the business sector confirmed this statement. Zand (1972) analysed data on business executives and found that increased trust was related to a higher chance of cooperation. The study of Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) also indicated a similar result. Their analysis of insurance agencies found a positive relationship between mutual trust and cooperation. Muthusamy and White (2005) studied the alliances between firms in the United States and discovered that trust had a positive effect on the knowledge transfer between organisations. In terms of public organisations, Bardach (1998) also found similar results in his research on policy implementation, showing that mutual trust is important in terms of allowing agencies to work together.

However, Lundin (2007) discovered a rather different finding from previous research, which is that mutual trust alone cannot enhance cooperation. Trust and goal congruence must exist simultaneously, whereas trust and resource interdependence were found to be independent from each other.

2.3.3.5. Coercive pressure
Apart from the voluntary motives mentioned above, interorganisational networking can also be mandated by powerful institutions such as government or third party organisations (Schermernhorn 1975, Oliver 1990). Organisations can establish linkages
with other organisations in order to meet necessary requirements (Oliver 1990). The formation of mandated interorganisational relationships is largely determined by the anticipated consequences of non-compliance (Leblebici and Salancik 1982). The interorganisational networks formation under the mandated condition is fundamentally different from the voluntary one in terms of explanation and consequences. Thus, it is important to take this determinant into account.

### 2.3.3.6. Contextual factors

Apart from the voluntary and mandated conditions outlined above, contextual factors are also important for the network formation. Raab (2002) indicated that the institutional precondition is important for the development of policy networks. Research has revealed how certain political, legal, cultural, industry and regional environmental conditions impact on the likelihood of network formation (Ebers 1997). These institutional factors are, for example, density of organisations that could participate in the process (Raab 2002, Ebers 1997); prior structural embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999); cultural norms (Schermehorn 1975, Ebers 1997); age of the organisation (Guo and Acar 2005) and social and personal ties (Larson 1992, Ebers 1997). Besides that, the presence of central convenors (Provan and Milward 1995, Raab 2002) and the possession of legitimacy of convenors (Gray 1985) are also important to the formation of networks.

### 2.4 Identifying gaps from previous empirical research

The preceding sections provide a general background of NG. This section intends to provide an overview of empirical research on NG that has been done over the past decade. The first sub-section provides the strategies of article selection and analysis. Then, an overview of the topics being studied is presented, followed by a comparison of quantity of research conducted in the context of developed and developing countries. This section concludes with some gaps from previous research and the implication of those gaps on this research.
2.4.1 Strategies of article selection and analysis

The survey of articles was done in two phases. The first phase was conducted in January 2009. The search covered the articles from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2008. The purpose of the literature review in this phase was to identify gaps from previous literature. The second phase was done in June 2011 and covered the articles between 2009 and 2010. The purpose of this phase was to cover the up to date articles in the field of NG. In both phases, the articles were selected from two databases namely: ABI-Inform (Proquest) and EBSCO. The selected databases cover most social science journal articles and other types of published papers, such as theses, conference proceeding, working papers, and governmental documents. The selection of keywords for the article search was a challenging issue since the concepts and boundaries of the NG are vague and consist of several related terms. The keywords that were used for the search were: “network governance”; “policy network”; “networks” and “public sector”. It should be noted that there are some other related vocabularies that could produce more article results, such as state and non-state relations, public-private partnerships, multi-sector collaboration, interorganisational relations. Nevertheless, the keywords employed in this research produced more specific results on NG than other keywords.

The method above generated initial results of 791 articles. The titles and abstracts were, then, scanned to identify articles that are relevant to the concept of NG in public administration. This resulted in a library of 85 references, where the full-text was retrieved for the analysis. The articles were, then, examined and categorised into two main groups: those concerning general concepts of NG and those concerning the empirical research. The number of articles falling into the former category was 38 and the latter was 47. As this section concerns empirical research on NG, 47 articles were closely examined using a ‘content analysis’ approach. This approach provides ‘a relatively systematic and comprehensive summary of the overview of the data set as a whole’ (Wilkinson, 1997). The following section presents the findings from the analysis.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.4.2 Findings from literature review

2.4.2.1 Topics of studies

As mentioned, the scope of NG studies are broad, so it is helpful to organise what has been accomplished in previous research so that the researchers can understand the broad picture and posit their works in the area of study. The selected articles were categorised into four main groups according to the recurring themes, namely: network formation, structures of networks, network management, and impacts of networks.

Network formation

The first fundamental question on the studies of NG is how does it take place? Surprisingly, the review found only one article concerning the determinants of NG formation. Graddy and Chen (2006) studied three factors which influence the size and scope of the community-based networks. Those determinants are organisational factors, programmatic needs, and environmental characteristics. The findings suggest that the availability of potential partners, the scope of required services, and the ethnic homogeneity of population are the key determinant of network size. Factors analysis is an approach used in this study.

Structures of networks

A number of studies focused on structures of networks and determinants of network structures. Regarding the structure of networks, Ansell (2000) examined the features of European regional development strategies and institutions in Western Europe. The findings suggested strong characteristics of networked polity as the regional development authorities engaged in both vertical and horizontal networks. However, Considine and Lewis (2003) studied the extent to which the new modes of governance - corporate, market and network - influenced the work orientations of the frontline staff in four countries (Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and New Zealand) and found that the corporate market hybrid and the network type have become significant service delivery norms in the studied countries. Nonetheless, structures and numbers of networks were found to be different across activities and strategic
processes in the study of Agranoff and McGuire (1998), who examined the structure of horizontal intergovernmental networking in local economic policy in 237 cities. They argued that various types and numbers of networks exist within the policy-making realm of a single city, which required different capacities of management from that of a single organisation.

Networks were not only witnessed in the public sector in developed countries. In the context of developing countries, Kaboyakgosi and Mpule (2008) found the transformation of HIV/AIDS policy in Botswana from traditional public administration to networks. They recognised the evidence of the government sharing their resources and roles with other actors. However, the transformation led to some concerns about loss of accountability and coordination problems.

Besides the studies on the changing mode of governance in regard to networks, a number of scholars paid attention to the determinants of network structures. Huang and Provan (2006) employed resource-based theory to examine the pattern of interactions of five sub-networks in the mental health service. The findings suggested that the patterns of interaction among organisations in networks tended to be dependent on the organisations controlling the resources and the nature of the resource.

Political context is another factor that scholars paid attention to in regard to its effects on network structures. Kriesi et al. (2006) studied the impact of macro political contexts - the EU, domestic, and policy-specific – in terms of the power structures of three policies in seven Western European countries. The study revealed that the European context heavily influenced the policy-specific power structure in the sense that the supranational actors became the most important policy specific actor. The study also pointed out the importance of the complex interactions of country and policy-specific actors in order to understand the power structure in a country-specific network. Outside the EU context, Rodriguez et al. (2007) examined how the political context and
governance mechanisms adopted affected the evolution of mandated networks in healthcare in Canada. They found that multiple types of governance mechanisms needed to be mobilised for effective collaboration in mandated situations; only clan-mechanism was not adequate. In a developing country context, Koranteng and Larbi (2008) found that the politics within the decentralisation policy did influence the policy design, implementation and outcome of the decentralisation policy in Ghana.

Roles of actors in networks
NG involves variety of actors who plays different roles in networks. Their roles and interactions are very important to networks. A number of studies focus on the roles of key actors in networks.

Governments and central agencies
The role of government has been reduced in the networked polity as per Rhodes’ (1997) narrative of ‘governing without government’. Nevertheless, Bache’s study (2000) argues that this statement may be sound in explaining the institutional transformation at the Westminster level. However, he found that strong and crucial roles of government remained in network policy at the local level in the case of Yorkshire and the Humber.

The emergence of NG has changed the roles of government and central agencies to concentrate on managing external relations and internal network operations (Mitchell and Shortell 2000). This requires government and central agencies to extend their toolkit to both a macro and micro level (Keast and Brown 2002). The macro level includes gaining the correct attitudes and values, providing legitimacy for network actions and ensuring systems and procedures are able to respond. This role, in other words, is designed to prepare the ground for networks. The micro level concerns adoption of the new ‘leadership role’ in order to be able to facilitate shared vision, clarify mutual expectation and establish effective communication mechanisms. The challenging roles of governments and central agencies are, therefore, designed to keep balance between guidance and control in network management.
The empirical studies of Keast and Brown (2002) on the role of central governments and agencies found that the vertical link with the central agencies in networks is as equally, if not greater, important to the horizontal link at the periphery. Lack of high-level support and formal authorisation may result in difficulties pulling the project together.

Nevertheless, there are a number of empirical studies that have found that the roles of the government have not been changed. Teisman and Klijn (2002) analyse the policymaking on the expansion of the Rotterdam harbour and illustrate that governments are not prepared to adjust their roles to network arrangement. This type of policymaking is not based on multi-organisational policymaking. Keast et al. (2004) also found a congruent finding. They studied service delivery networks in Australia and found that the government has not changed the way they do business because working through a network structure involves high risks. They also call for practitioners to change their attitudes on the expected outcomes of NG.

Local governments
Local authorities have an important role in steering networks.Pennen (2005) suggests three types of steering and focuses on the different roles of local government and private sector players in terms of steering the networks. Yang and Callahan’s (2007) study offers another perspective on the role of local government in encouraging citizen participation in the public sphere. They find that the most important factor that has an impact on the initiation of citizen involvement in governmental affairs is the attitude that managers hold toward the value of participation.

Civil servants
Civil servants can play different roles in the process, varying from very proactive to more reactive. In a proactive role they can be considered as brokers of intergovernmental relations, while reactive protagonists prefer traditional hierarchical roles (De Rynck and Voets 2006: 75).
Politicians

Local politicians can play important roles in encouraging the formation of networks and steering policy networks, as presented in the case of Rennes, France (Le Gales 2001). After the emergence of NG, it can lead to changing perceptions and roles of politicians. Sørensen (2006) reports that Danish politicians’ perceptions are shifting from sovereign rulers toward metagovernance.

Other important roles of politicians in governance networks relate to broad policy settings (Kearney and Scavo 2001 cf. Yang and Callahan 2007: 251) and policy implementation involvement (Svara 1999, Nalbandian 2004 cf. Yang and Callahan 2007). However, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 109) and De Rynck and Voets (2006: 73) argue that, in most literature, politicians rarely participate in policy network processes, but that they play the important role at the end of the process by approving the proposed solutions. However, Edelenbos and Klijn (2005) found that, in almost all cases in their study, local politicians are strongly involved in the processes of networks. Moreover, politicians can encourage their constituents to participate in administrative processes (Yang and Callahan 2007: 251). Besides that, politicians who intend to appear responsive to their electorates will call for greater transparency and accountability in government (ibid).

Hendrik (2002) defines two streams of politicians’ roles: hard variant and soft variant. The hard variant refers to politicians who only intervene in networks when necessary, while the soft variant ones are more managerial by, for example, creating preconditions or rules of the game. However, Tiesman (2000) states that the role of politicians differs across different stages of the decision-making process and depends on the policy issue. This statement is found to be relevant to the case in the study of De Rynck and Voets (2006). They argue that suggesting that there is a single stable role of politicians in the whole process of networks may be misleading (ibid: 74-5).
Le Gales (2001) examines urban political elite roles in encouraging the formation of policy networks in Rennes, France. He finds that networks in the case study reflect existing structures of power and hierarchies. Such urban political elites possess the resources that can encourage cities to aggregate different networks, but that this role is still limited.

**Political parties**

The role of the political party is often neglected in the literature (De Rynck and Voets, 2006: 73). Yang and Callahan (2007: 252) perceive that the involvement of political parties will constrain citizen involvement since they might perceive party involvement as dirty politics. Therefore, political parties will not have a strong role in encouraging citizen involvement in networks. However, De Rynck and Voets (2006) argue that local policies or projects can be a battlefield among political parties. This is because each party will try to gain benefits from the success or failure of the policies or projects, at the expense of competitors. In their empirical study, on the other hand, they found strong support, rather than competition, for the project from all major political parties in the local area. This support is seen by, for example, lobbying the cabinet for funding or smoothing the regular procedures. The supportive roles of the political parties can contribute highly to the success of the project.

**Non-profit organisations**

Non-profit organisations also play strong roles in NG. Van Slyke (2003) suggests that the non-profit organisations have a ‘networked relationship’ with government as they serve on boards, attend meetings and can enhance relationships with both elected and civil servants. They have not only strong roles in encouraging citizen participation in the networks but they are also able to stimulate the government to seek engagement from the citizenry because of their networked relationship with government.

The important non-profit organisations that have increasingly gained importance in public policymaking and service delivery are religious organisations. The empirical
evidence shows that they can help to improve citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in public affairs (Wood 2000 cf. Yang and Callahan)

**Media**

The media can play a positive role in citizen participation in networks by disclosing the problems, providing relevant information, opportunities, and speaking on behalf of the public (Graber 2003), thus shaping debates on public policy (Callahan and Schnell 2001). Chomsky (2000) illustrates that the government’s influence is strongest when officials and media owners share interests and value. On the other hand, Yang (2005) finds that governments finding fault with the media tends to decrease the degree of citizen involvement initiation.

**Business organisations**

Business groups can greatly influence local public affairs because they act as financial backers for local politicians. Normally, business actors are interested in participating in economic development policies. However, in the US, they have recently started to play an important role in community services as well (Yang and Callahan 2007: 252).

**Citizens**

Bingham et al. (2005) argue in their study that citizens are also involved in new governance as toolmakers and tool users. Bovaird (2007) also presents the changing roles of citizens in NG. He presents the cases of user and community coproduction in public services, which is beyond their engagement and participation. In Brazil, Gomes and Gomes (2008) also found evidence of local population involvement in municipality policymaking. However, Yang and Callahan (2007) illustrate that the role of individual citizens is not apparent. Citizen engagement can be illustrated through mediating by actors such as businesses or non-profit organisations. Individual citizens tend to participate in networks only when their direct interests are at stake or they need to be involved because they lack the power to resist. But, in the latter case, individual participation will be less effective. Also, King and Stiver (1998) and Vigoda (2002 cf. Yang
and Callahan 2007) reveal that many administrators fear that responding to individual needs may decrease organisational effectiveness.

**Network management**

The section above illustrates that the structure of networks are complex and involve various actors. It thus requires different management from the hierarchy and the market mode of governance. It is necessary to support interactions around complex issues in a network setting by employing coordination and steering, which is a concept of ‘network management’ (Pennen 2005). Studies of network management are designed to better understand the emerging context of networks (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2007) as recognition of the importance of network management is increasing. As a result, there are a number of literatures on this issue.

Scholars in the United States have conducted the majority of the literature on network management, but it has also increasingly gained attention from European scholars. The underpinning assumption of network management is that networks are not self-organising, which is a concept that is widely accepted in Europe. However, recently, some literature has suggested a view against the assumption of self-governance. For example, Schout and Jordan (2005) argue that networks at the EU level are not self-organising and they call for an emphasis on the important role of network management.

Meier and O’Toole wrote several articles on network management. Their focus is particularly on the relations between network management and organisational performance by using the data from several hundred school districts in Texas for a five-year period. They employed nonlinear, interactive and contingent models of management. Their 2001 article (Meier and O’Toole 2001) found that network management was not only related to overall organisational performance, but it also had positive impacts even in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Their subsequent article in 2003 (Meier and O’Toole 2003) presented that management matters in policy implementation but that its impact was often nonlinear. Another article (O’Toole and
Meier (2004) extended their 2001 study by exploring the influence of the structural features of relevant intergovernmental networks and the networking behaviour of top managers on the performance. They found that managerial networking, managerial quality, and selected stabilising features contribute positively to performance. Goerdel (2006) tested O’Toole and Meier’s model and found that proactive management, who are defined as managers who initiate contact with network actors frequently, tends to increase organisational performance. Juenke (2005) also replicated and expanded Meier and O’Toole’s (2001) results. He found that networking has a much larger impact when one controls for experience with the system. Moreover, management tenure interaction with networking will result in greater outcomes and managers may find alternative ways to affect outcomes other than working through their networks. Agranoff and McGuire (2004) study intergovernmental management in the U.S. and argue that bargaining and negotiating is essential for network management. Herranz Jr. (2007) extends the studies of network management by considering sector-based differences. He provides the evidence that sector-based differences within a network matter because they provide strategic opportunities and constraints for managers involved.

**Impact of networks**

The impact of NG is one of the issues that have scholars paid the most attention to. The review found the effects of NG on several dimensions, for instance, accountability, legitimacy, community engagement, development, corruption and policy outcome.

A number of articles examine the democratic values of networks. Most of the studies are based on the debate concerning whether NG deteriorates democratic values.

Carroll and Carroll (1999) studied the characteristics of policymaking in economic, environmental, and education policies in Mauritius and their effects on legitimacy and policy capacity. They found that policymaking in the case of Mauritius was characterised by ‘civic networks’ and such networks had a positive impact on the legitimacy and capacity of government.
Bogason and Musso (2006) also found that there were positive results on the impact of networks. He found that NG stretches the traditional political institutions to increase the wider involvement of multi-sectors and citizens. It can promote deliberation, improve flexibility and responsiveness in service provision. Nonetheless, NG also raises the issues about equity, accountability and democratic legitimacy. There is a need to encourage the delegation of power.

Considine (2002) compares two types of accountability - vertical traditional and horizontal - in Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in the contexts of networks. The research shows that there is a high degree of regime consistency across the two dimensions. Accountability was viewed as a vertical issue in New Zealand and the UK, while Australia and the Netherlands created new accountability domains by employing the lateral entry of private contractors.

Wälti et al. (2004) test the criticisms of governance on democracy using the case of drug policy in Switzerland as a case study. The first criticism concerns the argument that governance may lead to a loss of accountability. The empirical findings reveal that there is little evidence that support this argument since they often involve decision-makers who are accountable to public and parliamentary processes. The second criticism is that such governance reduces citizen involvement and jeopardises community building. They also found empirical evidence against this statement. They argued that the added value of governance can mediate and overcome particularistic interests, enhance community building and harmony and provide forums of exchange and mutual learning.

Regarding the impact of networks on organisational performance, Pope and Lewis (2008) evaluate the effectiveness of ten partnerships in Victoria, Australia. They found that the majority of networks in the case study reflect the characteristics of effective partnerships, as mentioned in the literature. The effective partnership, thus, implies effective organisational performance.
Dedeurwaerdere (2005) analyses the contribution of NG to sustainable development. He argues that the concept of governance that is solely based on self-organisation is not adequate for implementing sustainable development policies. He uses the case of a Sustainability Impact Assessment to illustrate that the creation of appropriate institutions for social learning on the trade and sustainable development would enhance the credibility, legitimacy and saliency of network institutions.

Larbi (2005) studied the impact of task networks, institutional environments and organisational interdependence on the autonomy of the decentralised organisations in the health and water sectors in Ghana and Zimbabwe. He found that the degree of autonomy of the decentralised organisations depends on the task network and the power relations between actors. However, the level of autonomy could hardly be implied as being related to organisational performance.

The impact of networks can be negative, as presented in Choi (2007). He critically analyses the causality of network structure and administrative corruption in Japan. He finds that a rigid and exclusive NG structure, without proper checks and balances, may cause corruption in administrative and political systems as in the case of Japan. The articles reviewed above are summarised in the following table.

**Table 2.2 Summary of main topics being studied in network governance area and authors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network formation</td>
<td>Graddy and Chen (2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Source: Author’s construct

The review of literature summarised in Table 2.2 indicates that the area of network formation has been paid far less attention than other topics in this field of NG. One of the explanations might be because NG has emerged in western countries contexts for more than a decade. However, this review only dated back to 1999, thus, the network formation studies published before 1999 were not covered. Also, the network formation topic can be considered as part of other literature, such as collaboration, interorganisational relations, and partnerships that the employed keywords did not cover.

2.4.2.2 Quantity of studies

The selected articles concerning empirical studies of NG were grouped into seven categories according to the continent they were conducted on. The review found that more than sixty per cent of the studies were conducted in North America and Europe with thirty four per cent of the former and approximately twenty eight per cent of the latter. The percentage of NG studies in other parts of the world was far less than those in North America and Europe. Approximately eleven per cent of the studies were conducted in the Asia and Pacific regions. The percentage was the same as those studies conducted in the cross continental setting. Approximately nine per cent of the studies were conducted in Australia. The research done in Africa was approximately seven per cent and the smallest amount was the research done in a Latin American setting, with approximately two per cent. Figure 2.1, below, summarises the percentage of NG studies according to the continent of study.
Figure 2.1 Percentage of articles categorised by continent as of December 2008

Source: Author’s construct

The articles were also categorised by the level of economy in those studied countries according to the IMF classification (World Economic Outlook, 2011). The figure between the studies conducted in developed and developing countries was dramatically different. Approximately eighty nine per cent of studies were conducted in the developed countries contexts; whilst only eleven per cent was done in the setting of developing countries. Five articles found that were conducted in developing countries are: Carroll and Carroll (1999), Gomes and Gomes (2008), Koranteng and Larbi (2008), Larbi (2005), and Kaboyakgosi and Mpule (2008). Figure 2.2 compares the percentage of the studies in developed and developing countries.
2.4.2.3 Network governance studies in developing countries contexts

It is apparent from the literature review presented above that a quantity of NG research in developing countries contexts are very limited compared to those of developed ones. In the second phase of the review, the article search was extended to more specific journals of the developing world, namely: African Development Review, Latin American Politics and Society, Asian Journal of Political Sciences, and Journal of Asian Public Policy. Moreover, Google Scholar was used to do the search. The keywords employed in the search were: “network governance” AND “developing country”, “policy network” AND “developing country”. The title and abstract of the resulting articles were scanned and five articles were found to be relevant. When combined with five articles found in the earlier search, it generated ten articles altogether about NG in developing countries.

The network formation topic was also found to be limited in the developing countries context. Krueathee et al. (2010) conducted the only article in this review that examined the determinants of network formation in developing countries. They studied the determinants of policy networks formations at local government level in Thailand. The studied factors were institutional settings, programme/task difficulty, management capacity, local political climate, and socio-economic contexts. They found that the most influential explaining factors were task difficulty and management capacity, whereas the resource dependence and past experiences of leaders were not statistically significant to the network formation.

However, most of the studies in developing countries illustrated characteristics of NG, particularly in terms of healthcare policy. Kaboyakgosi and Mpule (2008) also found that the HIV/AIDS policy in Botswana resembled the policy networks where the state and non-state organisations engaged with each other and often shared resources. The policy network in terms of healthcare policy was also evident in China, as illustrated by Zheng et al. (2010). Similar evidence was also found in Thailand, as Tantivess and Walt (2008)
studied the antiretroviral therapy policy and found that the policy is shifting toward policy networks in both formation and implementation processes. Although they found that the state agencies had a strong role, the non-state actors also played extremely important roles in the policy processes.

On the other hand, Luzi et al. (2010) found contrasting evidence in the case of water policy in Egypt and Ethiopia. They revealed that governmental agencies occupied central positions in networks and the intersectoral cooperation was weak. Moreover, the connectedness to the non-state actors was limited.

The review above shows that the evidence of NG in developing countries is uncertain since the majority of studies that found network characteristics were those that were focused on healthcare policy, whilst the evidence from other policies seemed to be unclear. Thus, there is an immediate need to extend the study of NG in other policy areas. Table 2.3 below provides summaries of the studies conducted in developing countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carroll and Carroll</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Characteristics of governance and its impact on legitimacy</td>
<td>Policy network and civil society</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Economic, education and environment</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomes and Gomes</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Involvement of stakeholders in policymaking</td>
<td>Stakeholder theory</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Local government policymaking</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudalah et al.</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Impact of policy network on capacity building</td>
<td>Institutional theory and capacity building</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Road construction</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaboyakgosi and Mpule</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Changing mode of governance and its impact on accountability</td>
<td>Policy network and accountability</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Health (HIV/AIDS)</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koranteng and Larbi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Politics of policy network and its impact on policy design</td>
<td>Policy network</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Decentralisation policymaking</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 Summary of gaps from network governance literature

This research found some main gaps from the review of previous NG literature as follows.

Firstly, the review of topics of studies found that the studies under the network formation topic were limited compared to other topics and thus further studies are required in this topic. Better understanding of this topic is important in order to address the challenge and efforts in creating partnerships and improving performance of public services.

Secondly, the obvious gap in this review was the lack of empirical evidence support from developing countries. This requires scholars in public administration and management to do further research in developing countries contexts in order to fill this gap. The
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

evidence from developing countries can provide more comprehensive insights about NG and whether the evidence of NG is a global phenomenon.

Thirdly, in spite of a limited number of studies in developing countries contexts, most of the empirical evidence was derived from healthcare policy. As such, it is important to extend the scope of studies in developing countries contexts to other policy areas.

Lastly, while requiring more attention on the network formation issue, only one article by Krueathep et al. (2010) examined the determinants for network policy formation in a developing country. Despite the outstanding values the research of Krueathep et al. contributed to the field of NG in developing countries, their work is a framework-based research, with a framework that was drawn from social exchange theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory. Heeks and Bailur’s (2007) research suggested that there is a need to go beyond framework-based research and develop more theory-based research. This type of research allows for more explanatory power and better opens the experience of developing countries to the cross-national comparison (Sheldon and Jun 2007).

2.6 Justification for the adoption of resource dependence theory in this research

Based on the gaps above, this research aims to fill these gaps by examining the conditions for network formation in a developing country context. As reviewed earlier, various approaches and theories have attempted to explain inter-organisational network formation, for example organisational sociology, game theory, organisational economics, industrial marketing and purchasing, social exchange theory institutional theory, social network approach and resource dependence theory (Grandori and Soda 1995, Ebers 1997). Choosing an appropriate theoretical framework is critical; yet, it is also not an easy task. In doing so, we need to consider the previous review of conditions for network formation. Literature has suggested that interdependence is a fundamental
condition for collaborative behaviours (Grey 1985, Baughn and Osborn 1990, Teece 1992, Haagedorn 1993, Lundin 2007). Although the decision to initiate relations with another organisation is commonly based on multiple contingencies (Oliver 1990), resource interdependence was found in Lundin’s study (2007) to be sufficient to create collaboration on its own. Thus, this study focuses on interdependence contingency as a fundamental condition for NG formation.

Interdependence is at heart of resource dependence theory (RDT). The theory has been applied in many empirical studies across a variety of research domains such as strategic management, mergers and acquisitions, leadership, boards and co-optation, and organisational collaboration (Hillman et al. 2009). However, the application of RDT in the area of public administration and management is rare. It can be seen from the literature review of NG mentioned previously that only the article of Huang and Provan (2006) employed RDT to examine the network structure in health and human services areas. None of the studies of NG in developing countries has applied RDT as a framework of study. Therefore, RDT is considered as an appropriate theoretical framework for this study, since it can fill in the gaps of previous NG research and extend the application of RDT to the public sector realm.

The following section provides a theoretical background and explores the fundamental concepts of RDT and its applications.

**2.7 Resource dependence theory**

**2.7.1 Theoretical propositions**

Resource dependence theory (RDT) was comprehensively developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in the book “The External Control of Organisations”. It proposed that “organisations are constrained and affected by their environments and that they act to attempt to manage resource dependencies” (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 33). The premise of this argument rests on a number of assumptions. Firstly, the ultimate goal of
any organisation is to survive. Organisations will survive as a result of their effectiveness in responding to the external environment, particularly the interest groups that organisations depend on for resources.

Secondly, the dependence of organisations on the external environment exists because the internal resources of a single organisation are insufficient to achieve their organisational purposes. According to Mindlin and Aldrich (1975), one of the reasons for this is because of organisational differentiation and specialisation. They mentioned that “differentiation and specialisation within the organisational population lessen the possibility of any single organisation achieving self-sufficiency, thus requiring most organisations to enter into transactions with others to obtain resources that cannot be generated internally”. In other words, resource acquisition is assumed to be the motivation for interorganisational interactions (Aldrich 1976).

Thirdly, although the environment can provide the resources necessary for organisations to overcome their internal limitations, the theory also assumes that the valued resources in the environment are scarce. The scarcity of needed resources, as a result, poses uncertainty in terms of organisational resource acquisition (Pfeffer 1978, Ulrich and Barney 1984, Aldrich 1976).

Fourthly, to overcome the uncertainty in resource acquisition derived from the environment, organisations, therefore, employ strategic actions to manage said environments. The organisation is believed to act in either of these actions: minimising their dependence upon others in the external environment or maximising others’ dependence upon them. This illustrates that organisational behaviours are influenced and constrained by the external environment. The environment is, therefore, not only the enabling factor but also a constraining factor.

Lastly, success in managing the environment results in effectiveness in responding to the external environment and, therefore, the organisations survive.
Based on the fundamental premises above, there are three main concepts of RDT, which concern external environment, dependence on environment and managing environment. These three pillars of RDT will be explored thoroughly in the following section.

2.7.2 Central concepts of RDT

2.7.2.1 External environment

Environment plays a significant role in RDT. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 1) mention in their book that: “to understand the behaviour of an organisation you must understand the context of that behaviour—that is, the ecology of the organisation.” As mentioned in the previous section, the survival of the organisation depends on the effectiveness of the organisation in responding to the demands from the environment. In order to respond effectively, organisations must be able to assess the environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 66-68) propose interrelated dimensions of organisational environment including: structural characteristics of environments; relationships among social actors; and the results of those interactions. They explain that the structural characteristics, namely concentration, munificence and interconnectedness determine the relationships among social actors. Those relationships are conflict and interdependence. The relationships among social actors, then, result in uncertainty faced by the organisations.

2.7.2.2 Dependence on environment

Dependence is another element that is central to the concept of RDT. The dependence of the organisation on the environment determines the organisation’s behaviours. Dependence exists when “one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary for achievement of an action or a desired outcome” (Handfield 1993: 290). Van de Ven (1976) proposed that organisations enter relationships because of their dependence on resources from other organisations and inter-organisational relations occur when two or more organisations exchange resources among each other. In other words, resource interdependence is a necessary starting condition for inter-
organisational relations. Without resource interdependence, inter-organisational collaboration is unlikely to emerge.

Three factors determining the degree of dependence of one organisation on others, according to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), including: the importance of the resource; the discretion of the interest group over the needed resource allocation and use; and the concentration of resource control.

**Determinants of organisational dependence**

The first determinant is concerned with *resource importance*. The resource importance refers to the extent to which the organisation requires that resource for continued its operation and survival. The importance of resources is comprised of two dimensions, namely: relative *magnitude of exchange* and *criticality of resource*. The magnitude of dimension can be measured by evaluating the proportion of total inputs or total output of the exchange. The second dimension concerns the criticality of the input or output to the organisation. Criticality refers to the ability of the organisation to continue operating without the resource or in the absence of the demand for the output. The fact is that the important resource is central to the survival of the organisation, so the instability of the important resource can threaten the existence of the organisation and the coalition members. The management role is to, therefore, minimise the chance of the important resource becoming too short.

The second determinant of organisational dependence is the extent of *discretion of the organisation over the allocation and use of resource* possessed by other groups. The discretion is the ability to influence the allocation and use of resources. The discretion over the resource is important since it implies the power of the organisation and it is crucial in a situation where resources are scarce. Discretion can be varied in terms of degrees of the basis for control. The first one is *possession*. Possession is a form of absolute control of resource such as knowledge. *Ownership* is also a means of possession but it is not absolute, rather, it depends on the consent of others in the
social system. Without owning the resource, one can control the resource by regulating the access to the resource. For example, the executive secretary has relatively high power due to the ability to control the access of others to the boss. Another basis of control concerns the actual use of resource and the ability to control its use. For instance, the demands of the employee groups are frequently satisfied according to the use and control of use basis. Lastly, the basis for control can derive from the ability to make rules and regulations on the possession, allocation and use of resources. This source of control implies the concentration of power.

The third determinant of organisational dependence concerns the concentration of resource control. It means the extent to which the focal organisation can gain the same resources from the alternative sources.

The higher degree of dependence of one organisation on the external environment, the higher responsiveness is required to satisfy the external demands. RDT assumes, however, that organisations will attempt to reduce their dependence on the external environments, or in other words, increasing their power over other contingencies in the environment, while attempting to increase the dependence of others on them, or reducing others’ power on their organisations (Hillman et al. 2009). Attaining either one of these actions will change the organisational relations and therefore affect the organisation’s power.

In order to minimise their dependence, or increase the dependence of other organisation on them, RDT proposes that organisations have to manage their environment by employing strategic actions to overcome the uncertainty and dependency derived from the external environment. The next section will discuss possible reactions that organisations use to manage the environment.
2.7.2.3 Managing environment

According to Pfeffer and Salacik (1978), organisations are believed to embark on one of the following three strategies to cope with interdependence:

1. **Absorbing the environment**: the focal organisation seeks to control resources to minimise dependence on other organisations by using growth and merger strategies.
2. **Creating the environment**: the focal organisation attempts to use greater power of the social system to control interdependence through legal means such as laws or social sanctions.
3. **Negotiating the environment**: the focal organisation establishes collective structures of inter-organisational action such as normative coordination, joint venture, co-optation, association and coalition.

NG is considered as the negotiating the environment strategy to overcome the uncertainty posed by the external environment since it is a form of social voluntary collaboration (Powell 1996).

2.7.3 Application of RDT in empirical studies


The theory recognition has been so extensive that the book of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 2003) is regarded as the most frequently quoted work in the citation study of
Üsdiken and Pasadeos (1995). Moreover, Nienhüser (2008) assessed the ability of the theory in explaining organisational behaviours and concluded that RDT can well explain the behaviour of organisations.

RDT is particularly powerful when explaining the collaborative behaviours of organisations (Gray and Wood 1991, Grønbjerg 1993, Harlan and Saidel 1994, Guo and Acar 2005). From an RDT perspective, collaboration is a strategic response of organisations to external environmental uncertainties, which constrain organisations to achieve their goals. It helps to increase organisational resources or reduce the need to compete for resources (Gazley and Brudney 2007). RDT has, by and large, been applied to examine the collaboration between business organisations (Hillman et al. 2009). Only recently, has RDT been applied in non-profit and public sector organisations (Gazley and Brudney 2007).

Saidel (1991) conducted one of the early studies that applied RDT to examine the relationships between state agencies and non-profit organisations in New York State. Saidel (1991) proposes three types of resources that non-state agencies depend on the state agencies for, which are revenues, information, and political support or legitimacy access, whereas state agencies depend on service delivery capacity, information, and political support from non-state organisations. She examined the interdependence of the state and non-profit organisations in three dimensions, as proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), namely importance of resources, availability of alternatives, and ability to pressure for provision. She found interesting findings that the resource interdependence across sectors and service areas was strong and symmetrical.

Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009) also employed RDT to examine the level of dependence of small and medium tourism enterprises (SMEs) on resources from the Finnish Tourist Board. They refined the dimensions of resource dependence into five dimensions, which are perceived importance, magnitude of exchange, knowledge of alternatives, access to alternatives, and influence on provision of resources. They found a moderate level of
overall dependence but found differences among different types of organisations.

RDT concept was also employed to explain the relations between NGOs and state agencies in France by Cumming (2009). In contrast to the previous studies of Saidel (1991) and Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009), Cumming employed the assessment of environment concept of RDT to explain the poor relations between the state and NGOs in France.

The review of the empirical studies above illustrated that RDT concepts have been employed to examine the interorganisational relations from various aspects. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, RDT has never been applied to examine interorganisational relations in the context of developing countries before. This is an important gap that this research aims to fill. The following section illustrates how the RDT perspective can explain the NG formation by proposing a conceptual framework and research propositions for this study.

### 2.8 Summary of the chapter

This chapter began with the review of the literature relating to NG. In this research, NG refers to a distinct form of governing such that public policies are formed and implemented through a network of government, business and society actors. It is evident that governance in several countries in Europe and North America has shifted towards NG (Klijn, 2008). Several conditions account for NG, such as trust, goal congruence, and resource dependence. In terms of these conditions, the review demonstrated that resource dependence appeared to be a key condition for NG. NG was believed to be beneficial in several ways, one of which was that it was considered as the best way to manage ‘wicked problems’ in modern society (Ferlie et al., 2011). However, NG is not without its criticisms. There were some concerns about the democratic values and accountability of NG (Catlaw, 2009; McGuire and Agranoff, 2011).
The review of empirical studies on NG between 1999 and 2008 revealed two major gaps. Firstly, a majority of scholars focused their attention on the roles and interactions of actors within networks, whereas the study of the conditions for NG was rare. Secondly, statistics showed that approximately 90 percent of the NG studies were conducted in developed countries, whilst the experiences of developing countries tended to be understudied. Thus, there was a real need for studies with regard to NG in a developing country context. This study, therefore, fills this major gap by focusing on NG in a developing country context.

The review of previous NG studies in developing countries found that the evidence relating to NG was controversial in that some scholars claimed that governance in some developing countries had shifted towards NG, whereas others refuted such a claim (i.e. Luzi et al., 2008). The review also pointed out some major gaps in NG studies in a developing country context. Firstly, most of the studies examined NG in health care and with regard to environmental policies. Thus, the study of NG should be extended to other policy areas. Secondly, a majority of the NG studies in developing countries relied on framework-based research, with the policy networks framework of Marsh and Rhodes (1992) being employed by a majority of scholars. However, Heeks and Bailur (2007) suggested that there was a need to go beyond framework-based research and develop more theory-based research because it has more explanatory power and better opens the experience of developing countries to a cross-national comparison (Sheldon and Jun, 2007). Thirdly, regarding the methodological issue, the review pointed out that the qualitative approach was dominant in NG studies in developing countries. More studies on quantitative and mixed methods were encouraged.

In terms of the three main gaps in NG research in developing countries mentioned above, this research fills each gap as follows. Firstly, the review suggested that the study of NG should be extended to other policy areas apart from health care and environmental policies. Thus, this research selects the illicit drug policy as a policy area for the study. The illicit drug problem is considered to be a ‘wicked problem’ in modern
society. As mentioned earlier, NG is believed to be the best form of governance to tackle such problems. Thus, it is interesting to know how the illicit drug problem has been managed in developing countries, and whether NG is employed to handle the illicit drug issue in developing countries. Thailand is a developing country where the illicit drug problem is critical (UNODC, 2010). More detail of the illicit drug problem in Thailand will be provided in Chapter Four of this thesis. Although there have been two studies on NG in Thailand, neither of them focused on the illicit drug policy. Hence, this research fills the first gap by extending the study of NG to the illicit drug policy in Thailand.

This research fills the second gap in that theoretically-based research has been used. This was done by employing, for reasons explained in this chapter, the resource dependence theory (RDT) as its theoretical framework to examine NG in terms of illicit drug policy in Thailand. Pierre and Peters (2005) suggested that to understand NG is to understand the nature of state and society relationships in the pursuit of collective interests. In NG, the state and society are dependent on each other for resources as a means of achieving their goals (Rhodes, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2005). Resource interdependence between state and non-state sector is, therefore, a key condition for state and non-state organisations to come together to form and implement public policies. Resource interdependence lies at the heart of RDT. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) originally suggested three determinants of resource dependence including the importance of the resource, the discretion of the interest group over the needed resource allocation and use and the concentration of resource control. However, these determinants were refined to five elements in the study by Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009) namely: perceived importance of resources, magnitude of resource exchange, knowledge of alternatives to resources, access to alternative resources, and influence on provision of resources. The resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations creates the power relationship between them (Pierre and Peters, 2005). Thus, the examination of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations could suggest the likelihood and sustainability of NG. The detailed framework of this study is presented in Chapter Three.
Last, but not least, this research fills the methodological gap left by previous NG research in developing countries by employing mixed research methods. The mixed methods approach is chosen to be a research methodology with regard to this study since it allows the researcher to achieve both breadth and depth of NG understanding, and allows the findings to be triangulated (Creswell, 2003). Further details on methodological issues will be explored in the following chapter.
3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research methodology and methods employed to examine the research questions. The chapter begins with the research questions and the conceptual framework of the current study. It then goes on discuss the research methodology. The philosophical assumptions of the research are posted at the outset, followed by a discussion of the choice of research methodologies, which in this case are mixed methods and case study. The rationale for selecting the case and for the sampling strategies is discussed next. It then presents the methods for data collection, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The procedures for the data analysis are demonstrated. Finally, the chapter concludes with a consideration of the quality of the research, including the issues of validity, reliability and ethics.

3.2 Research questions and the conceptual framework

As discussed in the introductory chapter, this research aims to examine the extent to which state and non-state organisations in Thailand depend on resources from each other, and how this resource interdependence impacts on the presence (or absence) of network governance (NG) in the country. As explained later in this chapter, in order to address some of the current gaps in knowledge about NG that were identified in the literature review presented in Chapter Two of the thesis, the decision was taken to pursue a number of issues and questions through the collection and analysis of context-specific primary and secondary data. The research questions addressed by these context-specific research activities are presented below.
3.2.1 Research questions

According to the gaps identified in Chapter Two, the research questions are addressed as follows:

1. To what extent, and how, did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration depend on resources from one another?
2. How did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration interact?
3. How could the presence (or absence) of NG in the case under consideration be explained?

3.2.2 Research framework

Modern society appears to become pluralistic rather than homogenous that different social groups exhibit different aspirations, values, and perspectives (Head and Alford, 2008). Modern social problems have become ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973:160) that they are essentially resistant to a clear and agreed solution. According to Weber and Khademian (2008), ‘wicked problems’ can lead to resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations for several reasons. Firstly, such problems are unstructured. This can be a problem because they are hard to identify and there is little consensus on the causes of such problems and on solutions to the problems. Therefore, public managers and officials need to draw on broad knowledge and skills from within the state realm and from outside it. Secondly, the ‘wicked problems’ comprise interconnected subsets of problems that cut across multiple policy domains and levels of government, and thus they generate high degrees of uncertainty (Van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan, 2003). To reduce uncertainty, involved organisations need to share resources on the premise of collaboration, not command and control. Lastly, the ‘wicked problems’ are relentless, since solving such problems inevitably causes effects on other policy areas. Thus, there needs to be a continuous exchange of resources between involved organisations with regard to problem solving.
Therefore, ‘wicked problems’ are likely to create resource interdependence between state agencies and non-state organisations.

To examine the degree of such resource interdependence, this research adopts Saidel’s (1991) approach. Saidel’s framework is appropriate for this research because she examined resource interdependence between two groups of organisations in terms of two-way dimensions, whereas other study, such as Cumming, 2009, examined resource dependence of a focal organisation on other organisations in one direction only. The degree of resource interdependence allows us to understand the symmetry of resource dependence relationships between state and non-state organisations, which is a vital condition of NG. This research, therefore, examines both the degree of state organisations’ dependence on non-state organisations, and the degree of non-state organisations’ dependence on state agencies.

Regarding the types of resources that both sectors depend on with regard to each other, Saidel’s (1991) proposes three types of resources that non-state agencies depend on with regard to state agencies. These are funding, information, and legitimacy access, whereas state agencies depend on service delivery capacity, information, and political support from non-state organisations (Saidel, 1991).

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) originally propose three determinants of resource dependence, including the importance of the resource, the discretion of the interest group over the needed resource allocation and use and the concentration of resource control. However, Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009) refine the dimensions of resource dependence into five dimensions - the perceived importance of the resource, the magnitude of resource exchange, the knowledge of alternatives, access to such alternatives and the influence on the provision of resources. This research relies on a refined version of Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009) because it clearly differentiates the perceived importance of resources from the magnitude of resource exchange, which are categorised in the same dimension as in the original version. The author is of the
opinion that the perceived importance of resources and the magnitude of resource exchange apparently convey different conceptual meanings and, therefore, they should not be grouped into one category. Thus, the five determinants of resource dependence suggested by Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009) are adopted in this research.

The degree of resource interdependence between the two sectors and their interactions in terms of resource exchange can imply the presence (or absence) of NG (Rhodes, 1997). The conceptual framework of this study is presented in Figure 3.1.

**Figure 3.1 Research conceptual frameworks**

```
\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node[draw] (Wicked) {‘Wicked’ policy problems};
\node[draw, below of=Wicked, xshift=-2cm, yshift=1cm] (RI) {Resource interdependence};
\node[draw, left of=RI, xshift=-4cm] (State) {State agencies};
\node[draw, right of=RI, xshift=4cm] (NonState) {Non-state organisations};
\node[draw, below of=RI, yshift=-2cm, xshift=-2cm] (NG) {Network governance};
\draw[->] (Wicked) -- (RI);
\draw[->] (State) -- (RI) node[anchor=east] {Funding, information, and legitimacy access};
\draw[->] (NonState) -- (RI) node[anchor=west] {Service delivery capacity, information, and political support};
\draw[->] (RI) -- (NG);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
```

Source: Inspired by Rittel and Webber (1973); Pfeffer and Salancik (1978); Saidel (1991); Rhodes (1997); Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009)
By applying this framework to one of the ‘wicked policy problems’, namely illicit drug policy, it would help enhancing the understanding of the presence (or absence) of NG in Thailand. The detail of how this framework is operationalised will be explored later in this chapter.

### 3.3 Philosophical assumptions of the research

Before moving on to how the research questions and framework posted above were tackled, it is important to be aware of the philosophical position that this research adopted at the outset. Philosophically, this research posits itself in between the two continuums of positivism and interpretivism. The researcher neither believes that the world is an absolute unity and that there is an explicit truth that we can observe and measure as suggested by the positivists (Bryman, 2008), nor does she perceive that the truth is entirely a function of the mind as suggested by the interpretivists (Creswell, 2003). Furthermore, the researcher believes that there is no one best way to understand social phenomena, and thus several methods can be employed to provide the best insight to knowledge building and answering the research questions. Therefore, the mixed methods approach is chosen to be a research methodology with regard to this study, since it allows the researcher to expand her understanding by switching from one research method to another (Creswell, 2003).

Some scholars suggest that the research paradigm that is most compatible with the mixed methods approach is pragmatism (Creswell, 2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2005). This philosophical stance is not committed to either the positivistic or the interpretivistic approach. Pragmatists believe that the meaning of truth is to be determined by the experiences or practical consequences of belief in or use of the expression in the world (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2005). In other words, the pragmatic position focuses more on problems than on the methods of inquiry (Bryman, 2004). Therefore, pragmatism is considered to be a philosophical stance that is compatible with the mixed methods approach. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) suggest that the pragmatism research assumption is advantageous in several ways.
Firstly, it offers an intermediate position in terms of both philosophical and methodological aspects. Secondly, it also offers a practical and outcome-oriented method of inquiry which can lead to further action and the elimination of doubts. Lastly, it offers a choice of methodological mixes which allows researchers to better answer their research questions. In public administration, Shield (1998:196) suggested that the pragmatic philosophical assumption is particularly useful since ‘...it resonates with practitioners; capturing their voice and experience’.

To summarise, this research adopts the pragmatism philosophical assumption since it allows the researcher to mix both quantitative and qualitative research methods to better answer the research questions. Moreover, it also allows the perceptions and experiences of the stakeholders involved in public policy to be heard. The following section deals with the mixed methods approach as a research methodology.

3.4 Research methodology

3.4.1 Mixed methods
The research methodology employed in this study is a mixed methods approach. Mixed methods research is defined as ‘...the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration’ (Johnson et al., 2007). The rationale associated with mixing quantitative and qualitative methods are varied. Bryman (2008) conducted research into the reasons which explain why researchers combine quantitative and qualitative approaches, he identified eighteen such reasons.

The rationale for mixing the two methods in this research is mainly to answer the different research questions. The first research question attempts to explore the extent of resource interdependence between the state and non-state sectors, and the research employs a quantitative approach to quantify the degree of resource interdependence perceived by participants in each sector. The quantitative findings give
explicit answers to the research question. However, the qualitative approach is also employed to investigate the extent of resource interdependence between the state and non-state sectors, in order to achieve greater validity through triangulation. The second research question aims to explain the degree of resource interdependence. The qualitative approach is more suitable to the nature of this research question, and therefore it is integrated into the study because it can help to explain the findings derived with regard to the previous research question, in order to ensure greater knowledge building.

Sequential exploratory strategy was used for conducting the research (Creswell, 2003). According to Creswell (2003), the purpose of this strategy is, to ‘...use the qualitative results to assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of a primarily quantitative study.’ The research design is therefore separated into two main stages. It begins with a quantitative method approach in the form of a questionnaire survey. The second phase of the data collection process involves a qualitative method, in the form of in-depth, semi-structured interviews. More details of the questionnaire survey and the interview techniques will be provided in the data collection section (Section 3.6).

3.4.2 Case study

Apart from the mixed methods approach employed in this study, a case study approach is also utilised. Yin (2003) considers the case study as a research method or technique, whereas Stake (1995) considers that it is not a choice of methodology, but rather is a choice of ‘object of study’. This research utilises Yin’s notion of the case study. The case study approach allows the researcher to explore individuals or organisations, simple through complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programmes (ibid). Yin (2003) suggests conditions under which a case study approach should be considered, namely when the aim of the study is to answer “how?” and “why?” questions, when the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviours of the research participants, when the researcher wants to cover the contextual conditions of the phenomenon and when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clear. This research
utilises a case study approach because it aims to explore and explain the NG phenomenon. Moreover, this phenomenon is inevitably separated from the context in which it takes place. Therefore, it is appropriate for this study to employ a case study approach as its research methodology.

The purpose of the study is also to provide a rationale for the use of a case study design. Yin (2003) categorises the types of case study as explanatory, exploratory and descriptive. He also differentiated between single holistic and multiple-case studies. Stake (1995), on the other hand, identified types of case studies as being intrinsic, instrumental and collective. This study employs a single case study. Although some scholars perceive that a single case study provides a poor basis for generalisation (Yin, 2003), others argue for the utilisation of a single case study. Taylor and Bogdan (1998:93) argue that ‘The number of cases studied is relatively unimportant. What is important is the potential of each case to aid the researcher in developing theoretical insights into the area of social life being studied’.

Specific to the public management area, a single case study was argued by Barzelay (1993) to be particularly useful as he stated that ‘Single case studies can yield several kinds of results, each of which should be valued by anyone who seeks to improve collective problem solving through such activities as politics, management, production, and professional inquiry.’ (Barzelay, 1993: 306)

In his article, despite arguing that a single case study can improve how people frame and solve problems arising in the same factual context, Barzelay (1993) explicitly demonstrated the capability of the single case study in terms of producing empirical generalisations regarding administrative rationality, professional treatment, and normative reasoning.

Besides adopting a single case study approach, this research considers a case study as being an instrumental type. According to Stake (1995), an instrumental case study
examines a particular case to provide insight into the issue under consideration or to refine a theory. In other words, an instrumental case study plays a supportive role in helping to facilitate the understanding of other issues and plays a secondary role (ibid). In this study, the case of Thailand is selected to gain an insight and an understanding of governance in developing countries, and to extend the use of RDT to examining public sector organisations.

The concept of the case study approach outlined above is different from ‘a case’ in itself. Miles and Huberman (1994) defined a case as ‘…a phenomenon of some sorts occurring in a bounded context’. The case is, therefore, a unit of analysis. The following section illustrates the rationales employed for case selection.

3.5 Case selection

3.5.1 Selection of policy area

Literature review illustrated that the NG is likely to emerge to solve complex, or ‘wicked’ policy problems. The illicit drugs problem is considered to be one of the most prevalent and damaging social problems in modern societies. The evidence from the United States illustrates that the illicit drug problem can be best managed by the NG approach (Percival, 2009). However, it is unclear that the illicit drugs problem in developing countries has been managed through NG since, based on the review of the literature, this topic has not been extensively examined before.

The illicit drugs problem is a critical issue for Thailand and this policy has been prioritised by almost every government over the past three decades (ONCB, 2011). The drugs problem is complicated by nature, and the situation has become increasingly severe recently. For the drug policy to be successful, the government alone may not be able to accomplish this task. It requires the involvement of other actors outside government. Thus, it is contended that the NG model may be suitable for managing the drugs policy.
The drugs policy involves four main activities, namely prevention, prosecution, treatment and administration (ONCB, 2007). This research examines all these activities in terms of the process of implementation at a provincial level, and leaves aside the policy formation process at the national level. In short, the policy area which is selected in this research is drug policy implementation at the provincial level. The next section provides the rationale for selecting the location of the case study.

3.5.2 Selection of study location

At the time of the study, Thailand consisted of seventy-six provinces. The illicit drugs problem in Thailand is critical because Thailand is situated close to the ‘Golden Triangle’ area, which is considered to be one of the world’s biggest heroin and opium producing areas (ONCB, 2009). The northern region of the country is connected to the ‘Golden Triangle’; therefore it is the area of Thailand in which the drug problem is most critical. Chiang Mai is one of eight provinces in the northern region of Thailand. The drugs smuggling and drug abuse rate in this province is high (ONCB, 2009). Between October 2008 and February 2009, approximately 51.24 people per 100,000 populations in Chiang Mai were found to be involved in illegal drug abuse (ONCB, 2009). Thus, given that the drug problem in Chiang Mai is critical, Chiang Mai was chosen to be the province of the study. More detail of the drugs policy in Thailand and Chiang Mai will be provided in Chapter Four.

3.6 Data collection methods

As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, this research employs a mixed methods approach. This section provides information regarding the techniques related to data collection, namely questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews, employed in this study. The research utilises a sequential explanatory research approach (Creswell, 2003) where the questionnaire survey was initially conducted, followed by the interviews. The following sub-sections outline the data collection procedures in detail.
3.6.1 Questionnaire survey

The aim of conducting a survey is to examine the extent of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations involved in drug policy implementation in Chiang Mai. This technique allows the researcher to cover a relatively large number of cases with a given amount of resources, and potentially increases the degree of objectivity (Bryman, 2008). The use of a self-completion questionnaire can also reduce the biases resulting from the face-to-face interaction. As a result, it is a method that, arguably, has been favoured by the majority of scholars in the organisational behaviour domain (Brown, 1995).

3.6.1.1 Questionnaire design and pilot study

The questionnaire survey was based on the study framework presented earlier in this chapter in section 3.2.2. Two sets of questionnaires were developed. One is for respondents from non-state organisations, while another is for respondents from state organisations (See Appendices 1 and 2 respectively). The questionnaires for both the state and non-state organisations relied on the Likert scale technique (Likert, 1932) which consisted of 7 rating scales according to the degree of agreement with the provided statements. Score 1 indicates strong disagreement with the provided statement and 7 indicates strong agreement with the provided statement.

The questionnaire items used to measure the degree of resource dependence were derived from the types of resources that state and non-state organisations depend on with regard to each other, as identified by Saidel (1991). She proposes that non-state organisations depend on three types of resources from state organisations, namely funding, information and expertise, legitimacy support, and access to the policy process. State organisations, on the other hand, depend on three types of resources from non-state organisations, namely service delivery, information and expertise, and legitimacy support. Each type of resource was measured against five dimensions of resource dependence as proposed by Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009). These are the perceived importance of the resource in question, the magnitude of resource exchange,
the knowledge of alternatives, access to such alternatives, and the ability to influence the provision of resources.

This approach led to the creation of fifteen questionnaire items for both the state and non-state organisations. Thus, the content coverage and wording used in the questionnaire items were derived from various sources including Saidel (1991) and Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009). The questionnaires were initially constructed in English, and then they were translated into the Thai language. The translation was done by a Thai native speaking university lecturer majoring in English translation, and it was cross-checked by another Thai lecturer in the same department.

Before carrying out the main quantitative research fieldwork, the proposed questionnaires were tested in a pilot study. The pilot study was conducted in one of the provinces in the northern region which was geographically and demographically similar to the main site of the study, Chiang Mai province. The purpose of the pilot study was to test the reliability and comprehensiveness of the questionnaire items. The piloted questionnaires contained open-ended questions to gauge the opinion of the respondents with regard to the comprehensiveness of the questionnaires in terms of both content and language use. The pilot study was conducted in May, 2010.

Fifty and thirty pilot questionnaires were distributed to respondents from state and non-state organisations respectively who were involving in drug policy implementation. The return rates of the questionnaires were 86 percent for the state group, and approximately 83 percent for the non-state group. The uncompleted questionnaires were excluded, and the final number of questionnaires for the pilot study analysis was forty from the state agencies group and twenty from the non-state respondents.

The analysis of the questionnaires’ reliability was undertaking using reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha). An alpha coefficient score which is greater than .70 is normally considered to be acceptable in social science research (Peterson et al., 1991).
The analysis found that the reliability coefficients of the piloted questionnaire of the state group ranged from 0.71 to 0.77 and from 0.68 to 0.80 for the non-state group as presented in Table 3.1 below. The reliability coefficient scores of both groups were close to or above .70. These are acceptable coefficients levels in terms of applying the questionnaire to larger samples.

Table 3.1 Cronbach’s alpha scores of pilot questionnaires: Analysis by sector and dimensions of resource dependence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State organisations</td>
<td>S-importance</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-magnitude</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-alternative</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-access</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-influence</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state organisations</td>
<td>N-importance</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N-magnitude</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N-alternative</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N-access</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N-influence</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(State organisations N = 40; Non-state organisations N= 20)

Source: Author’s construct

The questionnaires were then distributed to the respondents in the main study site, Chiang Mai province. The following section presents the sampling strategy and the respondent characteristics.

3.6.1.2 Sampling strategy and response rates

Sampling strategy was employed to ensure that a representative sample of the population was obtained (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Creswell (2003) suggests different types of sampling techniques. This research employed the stratified sampling technique. According to Creswell (2003), the stratified sampling technique uses a random sample from identifiable groups (strata). This technique ensures that specific groups are represented in the samples by selecting individuals from each stratum.
In this research, the strata were the organisations or groups involving in drugs policy implementation in Chiang Mai province. The organisations were identified by the Office of Narcotics Control Board officers and through the review of documents such as governmental decrees, minutes of meetings and local newspapers. The survey took place in May and June, 2010.

As regards the state organisations, the questionnaires were distributed to 200 individuals in thirteen government agencies that were identified as being involving in drugs policy implementation in Chiang Mai. The response rate was impressive at 72.5 percent, in that 157 questionnaires were returned. However, there were twelve questionnaires that were invalid. Hence, a final total of 145 questionnaires were obtained for analysis. Table 3.2 provides the number of respondents and the response rate with regard to the state organisations.

Regarding the non-state organisations, 100 questionnaires were distributed. Forty of them were distributed to community groups, whereas each of the business organisations and the non-profit organisations were provided with thirty questionnaires. The response rate of this group was 73 percent, as 73 questionnaires were returned. One of the returned questionnaires was discarded due to a lack of completion. Thus, 72 questionnaires were used for analytical purposes. Table 3.3 provides the number and response rates of the non-state group.

Table 3.2 Participating state organisations and response rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participated agencies</th>
<th>Number of distributed questionnaires</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Response rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Office of Provincial Administration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Office of Provincial Social Development</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Human Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Office of Public Health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Office of Probation and</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6.2 In-depth semi-structured interviews

Regarding qualitative methods, the study employed the in-depth semi-structured interview technique to collect the empirical data. The guide of interviews was developed on the ground of Pfeffer and Salancik’s work (1978). They suggested that three factors determine the dependence of one organisation on another. The first determinant is the importance of resource. The second determining factor of the resource dependency is the extent to which the interest group has discretion over the
resource allocation and use. Thirdly, the extent to which there are few alternatives.

The initial dependence concept of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) was recently further developed by Seppälä-Esser et al. (2009). According to Seppälä-Esser and colleagues, the degree of resource dependence is determined by five factors: perceived importance of resource; magnitude of exchange; knowledge of alternative resources; access to alternatives; and an organisation’s ability to influence an external provider’s decisions regarding its resource allocation. The interview questions were developed based on these five dimensions (See Appendix 3).

McCracken (1988) pointed out that the interview technique gives the opportunity to step into the minds and lives of other people, to see and experience the world as they do themselves. An interview is a particular useful method for a researcher who has well-defined interests or framework of study, yet who is experiencing time constraints. Interviewing makes the most efficient use of a researcher’s limited time (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998). Thus the interview method is considered as a ‘favoured digging tool’ on the part of social researchers (Benney and Hughes, 1970 in Taylor and Bogdan, 1998).

The in-depth interview technique was used in this study. It is “...a face-to-face encounter between the researcher and informants directed toward understanding informants’ perspectives in their lives, experiences, or situations as expressed in their own words” (Bogdan and Taylor 1998: 88). Semi-structured interview questions were chosen because the structured interview was believed to be inflexible, and did not allow the interviewees to include additional issues, whereas a completely unstructured interview might lead to very fragmented data. The semi-structured interview was viewed as an appropriate method because the main topics were targeted through specific questions, while it also allowed other relevant issues to be captured as they arose (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). Moreover, Saunders et al. (2000) suggest that the semi-structured interview technique is suitable for research in which the research questions are either complex or open-ended. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) added that the technique is
particular useful when the research involves sensitive issues, and there is a need to comprehend the informants’ attitudes. Given that the nature of the research questions are complex, and that there is a need to enquire into the perceptions of the informants with regard to the resource dependence of their organisation on other organisations, this research relied upon the semi-structured interview method.

Despite the usefulness of the interview method, this technique is not without its limitations. Taylor and Bogdan (1998) pointed out two main limitations of the interview method. Firstly, people say and do different thing in different situations. Thus, the researcher cannot assume what the interviewees say during the interview will be the same as they might say in other situations. Secondly, there is a possibility that the interviewers might misunderstand the informants’ language. Moreover, informants may be unwilling or unable to express many important issues.

Being aware of such potential shortcomings, the researcher applied several practices to minimise the negative effects during the interview process. Firstly, the interview questions were framed in such a way that the respondents would comprehensively understand what was being asked by avoiding questions that involved theoretical concepts. Long and leading questions were also avoided. Secondly, at the beginning of the interview, the researcher explained the purposes of the study and emphasised the issue of confidentiality. Given that the study needed the full account of the interview, audio recordings were necessary. Consequently, permission to record the conversation was sought at the beginning of the interview. Thirdly, during the interview process, the researcher was careful about her verbal and non-verbal responses to the respondent’s answers, since these might affect the informant’s responses. Lastly, sensitive questions were kept to near the end of the interview so that the informants would have time to build up some degree of confidence in the researcher (Healey and Rawlinson, 1994).
3.6.2.1 Informant selection

Both the purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed to select informants for the interviews. According to Maxwell (2005), the purposive sampling technique is considered where “…particular settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately to provide information that cannot be gotten well from other choices” (Maxwell, 2005:88). The informants of this study needed to be purposefully selected, since not everyone could give answers about resource dependence in terms of the drugs policy in Chiang Mai. A certain number of state officers and non-state actors are involved in the drugs policy process. Thus, it was impossible for the study to make use of the probability sampling technique. Maxwell (2005) outlined the advantages of the purposive sampling technique in that it helps the researcher to achieve representativeness and capture heterogeneity in the study population. Moreover, it is useful to examine critical cases since it enables the researcher to compare critical cases.

The snowball sampling technique was also employed in searching for information-rich key informants. This technique means getting to know key informants, and having them introduce the researcher to others potential informants (Patton, 2002). The total number of informants was not determined at the outset of the research. The interviews were stopped after the theoretical saturation was reached. According to Eisenhardt (1989: 545), theoretical saturation is the point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing phenomena seen before.

The interviews were conducted between June and August, 2010. There were a total of thirty-one interviews in this study. Twenty-nine of these were recorded with the permission of the informants. The total number of informants was thirty-three. Sixteen interviews were conducted with state agency informants, while fifteen interviews were conducted with interviewees selected from the non-state sector. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarise the number of interviews and interviewees in state and non-state organisations respectively.
### Table 3.4 State agencies informants in terms of in-depth interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State organisations</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Number of recorded interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Office of the Narcotics Control Board: Upper Northern Region Quarter</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Office of Provincial Defence and Administration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Local Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Office of Public Health</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Army Special Operation Force: Northern Region Quarter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Office of Labours and Social Welfare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Office of Provincial Social Development And Human Security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

### Table 3.5 Non-state organisations informants in terms of in-depth interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-state organisations</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Number of recorded interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Community leaders</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-profit organisations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Business organisations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Academics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Media</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct
3.7 Data analysis

3.7.1 Analysis of quantitative data

Given that this research combined both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection, the process of data analysis was comprised of two main stages. The data from the questionnaire survey was analysed first. The statistical data analysis was computed using SPSS for Windows (version 15.0). Descriptive statistics including means and standard deviations were computed to find the extent of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations. The extent of resource interdependence was analysed both in terms of overall interdependence levels between the two sectors, and each type of resource within the respective sector. Outlying findings derived from quantitative data analysis were noted in order to seek further explanations related to the collection of qualitative data.

3.7.2 Analysis of qualitative data

The qualitative analysis stage involved the transcription of the recorded interviews and the examination of field notes where audio recording was not permitted. Where requested, the transcripts were sent to the informants to verify the accuracy of the information. Three interviewees requested a full transcript, while two of them requested a summarised transcript.

Thematic analysis was employed to analyse the interview transcripts and the field notes. Thematic analysis refers to the interpretation and categorisation of the raw data into a theme-based pattern (Kellehear, 1993). The purpose of this process was to group similar events under a similar heading or classification (Strauss and Corbin, 1988). The themes of analysis were derived from the research framework. Both the interview transcripts associated with both state and non-state organisations were categorised according to the types of resources they depended on with regard to the other sector, leading to five dimensions of dependence. Given that the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, it was possible for new themes to emerge. Interesting
statements or responses which were beyond the research framework but which could yield more insights to the study were also noted, particularly those that could help the researcher to understand the reasons behind the resource interdependence of the two sectors.

The analysis was conducted manually. The coding process was conducted by the researcher and a research assistant who was trained to understand the research framework. The transcripts coded by the coders were cross-checked and discussed where the coding was incongruent.

The coded transcripts and the field notes were then translated from Thai into English. Financial and time limitations were the main reasons for not translating the full transcripts. The translation was conducted by a Thai university lecturer majoring in English translation and was re-checked by another Thai lecturer from the same department, to ensure the accuracy of the translation.

3.8 Quality of the research

3.8.1 Validity and reliability of the research

The quality of research involves the issues of reliability and validity. The reliability of a piece of research is “...the extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same answer however and whenever it is carried out” (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 19). The reliability issue was tackled in terms of the quantitative data collection by conducting a pilot study before commencing the main fieldwork. As reported above, the internal reliability of the questionnaire was tested by means of reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha). The reliability of the qualitative data is a more contentious issue. However, care was taken to ensure a degree of consistency of measurement in relation to the qualitative data. For example, this research employed translation experts to undertake the translation of interview transcripts and field notes. Moreover, during the qualitative data analysis process, another coder was employed to perform the coding
along with the researcher. This allowed the data to be cross-checked. These processes are to ensure a relatively high level of research reliability.

Validity of research means accurate data (Kirk and Miller, 1986). Yin (2003) proposed three types of validity - construct validity, internal validity and external validity. Construct validity is ensured when the researcher conducts a sufficiently operational set of measures, and the data were collected without any researcher bias (Yin, 2003). To achieve this type of validity, Yin (2003) suggested that the researcher could employ multiple sources of evidence during the data collection process. Consequently, this research employed the triangulation of data derived from quantitative and qualitative approaches to ensure the validity of the research (Patton, 2002).

The triangulation of methods enhances the validity of the research by helping the researcher to avoid misinterpretation of data derived from a single method (Denzin, 1978). By employing thematic analysis of the qualitative data, it allowed the researcher to systematically contrast the findings with the quantitative data. Silverman (1993) highlights that the use of quantitative and qualitative triangulation is advantageous, since each approach has its own limitations and therefore combining two methods in one piece of research can minimise the limitations inherent in each approach.

Moreover, the research also benefited from the complementarity of combining the quantitative and qualitative approaches. The questionnaire survey allowed the researcher to reach a larger number of participants, which could enhance the generalisability of the research and therefore enhance its external validity. The qualitative method allowed the researcher to obtain rich data that could produce ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) of the NG phenomenon in the case study, which could then complement the statistical data derived from the quantitative approach. In short, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods allowed the researcher to obtain both wide-ranging and in-depth data with regard to the phenomenon.
3.8.2 Ethical considerations

In addition to the validity and reliability issues that ensure the quality of the research, ethical issues were also concerned. It is crucial for researchers to not only consider what is good for them or the research project, but also what is good for the informants. Bryman (2001) suggested three ethical issues that the researchers should be aware of, namely the potential harm to participants, informed consent and the invasion of privacy.

In this research, the confidentiality issue was addressed in the cover letter of the questionnaire, and the personal information section was framed in such a way that it was impossible to identify the respondents in order to ensure their privacy. The report of the quantitative findings did not reveal the identity of the respondents. In terms of the qualitative method, McCracken (1988) points out some possible risks that qualitative methods can pose for the respondents. For example, the interview can be time consuming, privacy endangering, and intellectually and emotionally demanding. This research handled these issues by addressing the confidentiality and privacy issues at the beginning of the interview. The permission to record the interview was also sought at the outset. The participants were allowed to refuse to answer some questions that they felt violated their privacy, and they were also allowed to withdraw from the study at any time, if they found themselves no longer willing to participate. Regarding the qualitative data presentation, this study maintained the level of anonymity of the interviewees by addressing only the organisations they represented. In addition, each individual informant was numbered according to the order of the interview. For example, ONCB1 refers to the first interviewee from the Office of Narcotics Control Board. This form of presentation helps the readers to differentiate the perceptions of respondents from different types of organisation, yet offers a high level of confidentiality in terms of the respondents’ identification.
3.9 Summary of the chapter

This chapter has specified the research questions and has explained the conceptual framework which has been applied to this research. Furthermore, the methodology and methods of study have been presented and discussed. The research questions and the methods of inquiry are summarised in Table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6 Summary of research questions and research methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. To what extent, and how, did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration depend on resources from one another? | - Questionnaire survey - Interviews | - 145 questionnaires issued to state organisations  
- 72 questionnaires issued to non-state organisations  
- 16 interviews with state agency personnel  
- 15 interviews with non-state organisation personnel  |
| 2. How did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration interact? | - Interviews | - 16 interviews with state agency personnel  
- 15 interviews with non-state organisation personnel  |
| 3. How could the presence (or absence) of NG in the case under consideration be explained? | - Questionnaire survey - Interviews | - 145 questionnaires issued to state organisations  
- 72 questionnaires issued to non-state organisations  
- 16 interviews with state agency personnel  
- 15 interviews with non-state organisation personnel  |

Source: Author’s construct

In the following chapter, a discussion with regard to the fieldwork context within which this research was conducted will be presented.
CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY PROFILE

4.1 Introduction

The methodology discussed in Chapter Three is applied to the case of illicit drug policy in Chiang Mai province, Thailand. This chapter provides the background to the case study. It begins with a profile of Thailand to provide a general background. The recent illicit drug situation in Thailand is then presented in order to provide a better understanding of why the illicit drug policy in Thailand should be studied. The attempts to tackle the illicit drug problem by state and non-state sectors are also discussed. Lastly, we provide a general profile of Chiang Mai province, which was the location of this study, and its drug situation.

4.2 Thailand: country profile

Thailand, or the kingdom of Thailand, is a unitary state in South East Asia. It is bordered to the north by Laos and Myanmar, to the east by Laos and Cambodia, to the south by the Gulf of Thailand and Malaysia, and to the west by the Andaman Sea and Myanmar, as presented in Figure 4.1. Its total surface area is 513,115 km², which makes it the 50th largest country in the world in terms of total area (BBC news, 2011b). The capital city of Thailand is Bangkok. As of March 31st 2011, Thailand is divided into 77 provinces, including Bangkok. Each province is divided into districts, and the districts are further divided into sub-districts. The country composes of 878 districts and 7,255 sub-districts (DOPA, 2011a).

Thailand’s population is approximately 63,878,267 as of 31st December, 2010 (DOPA, 2011b). About 75 percent of the population is ethnically Thai, 14 percent is of Chinese origin, 3 percent is ethnically Malay, and the rest belong to minority groups (BOT, 2011). Theravada Buddhism is practiced by 93.8 percent of all Thais. Muslims make up 5.2
percent of the population and 0.7 percent belong to other religions. The country’s official language is Thai and the currency is the Baht (ibid).

Figure 4.1 Map of Thailand

Source: BBC News (2011b)

Regarding its political system, Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, a system of government in which a monarch is guided by a constitution whereby his or her rights, duties, and responsibilities are spelled out in written law or by custom (CIA, 2011a). The country transformed from an absolute monarchy to a democracy in 1932 (Chareonmuang, 2003). Since 1932, Thailand has had 18 constitutions and 12 coups, the most recent of which was in 2006 (Uwanno, 2007).
Despite its political turbulence, between 1985 and 1995, Thailand had one of the world’s fastest growing economies with an average growth rate of 8 to 9 percent per annum (World Bank, 2011). However, the country was severely affected by the Asian financial crisis between 1997 and 1998. The Thai economy took off again from 2000 to 2007, when the growth averaged 5.6 percent per annum (ibid). The global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 severely cut Thailand’s exports, and the GDP growth decreased to 2.2 percent in 2009. In 2010, Thailand’s economy expanded by 7.6 percent, which was its fastest pace since 1995 (CIA, 2011b). Due to Thailand’s progress in terms of social and economic development, despite facing a number of economic and political challenges, in July 2011, the World Bank upgraded Thailand’s income categorisation from a lower-middle income economy to an upper-middle income economy (World Bank, 2011).

4.3 Illicit drug situation in Thailand

The rapid social and economic growth of Thailand over the past two decades has not only brought benefits to the country. It has also increased a number of social problems. The illicit drug problem is one of the critical social problems that Thailand has encountered as a consequence of social and economic development (ONCB, 2010b). Moreover, Thailand’s geographic condition has accelerated the illicit drug problem since it is situated in one of the world largest drug producing sites along the Thai-Myanmar-Laos border, famously known as the ‘Golden Triangle’ (ONCB, 2009b).

According to the UNODC World Drug Report (2010), Myanmar is considered to be the world’s second largest drug producer, after Afghanistan. The report stated that Myanmar was the core manufacturer of opiates, especially heroin, methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type stimulants. In 2009, the country produced 330 tons of opiates, which accounted for 17 percent of global cultivation. Between January and September 2010, more than 44 million pills of methamphetamine were seized in Thailand, while over 22 million pills were seized in Laos.
Even though most of the opiates and amphetamine-type stimulants were produced in Myanmar, the UNODC (2010) revealed that they were destined for the international market, particularly East and South-East Asia.

Given that Myanmar was one of the largest drug producers in the world, Thailand, as a neighbouring country, suffered from illicit drug problems in several ways. Firstly, Thailand had been used as the crossroads for drug smugglers, given that the country is connected to the Golden Triangle area and its logistic infrastructures are well-developed (UNODC, 2010).

Furthermore, Thailand has also suffered from the spread of illicit drugs domestically. A recent survey conducted by the Assumption University in September 2011, with over 12 million samples, reported that approximately 1.7 million youths aged 12-24 years had used illicit drugs, excluding alcohol and tobacco, over the past three months. Cannabis was reported as the most common illicit drug among young drug users and was used by approximately 890,000 people, followed by methamphetamine by approximately 650,000 people. The report revealed the shocking fact that the youngest methamphetamine user was aged 7 (Thairath, 2011). It could be said that Thailand’s illicit drug problem was the most severe in South East Asia because of the multiple dimensions of the issue mentioned above.

Despite the harm of illicit drugs on drug users as individuals, the illicit drugs problem also has a negative impact on society. For example, it is considered as a burden on the whole legal system, including the police, the legal profession, the judiciary and the penitentiary system. It also leads to huge public spending in terms of prevention, suppression and rehabilitation associated with the illicit drug issue. It also affects the country’s development by undermining human resources, especially teenagers, who are considered to be the nation’s future. Furthermore, the spread of illicit drugs tarnishes the country’s image and reputation, resulting in distrust on the part of foreigners in terms of their safety in the country (ONCB, 2010a). Therefore, almost every single
government has adopted various policies and strategies in order to curb the illicit drugs problem. The following section illustrates the development of Thai governments’ attempts to control the illicit drug issue.

4.4 Development of illicit drug policies in Thailand

Due to the fact that Thailand has encountered a severe illicit drug problem, Thai leaders have attempted to control this problem by employing several strategies. The strategies and policies concerning illicit drugs in Thailand can be summarised in five major phases, according to the ONCB (2004a). These will be presented chronologically as follows:

1). Spread of opium and legalisation of opium trade and use (Prior to the 1960s).

The history of illicit drug control in Thailand can be dated back to the 17th Century, when the first law against smoking opium was enacted. Later on, in the mid-1800s, the opening of free trade with China resulted in the widespread use of opium among Chinese in Thailand, which led to opium being delegitimised. Nevertheless, illegal opium trafficking remained pervasive. In 1855, Thailand signed the Bowring Agreement with the United Kingdom which resulted in the unlimited import of opium by firms receiving state concessions. However, the illegal trafficking of opium was still rife, making it difficult for the state to contain the problem. In 1871, the state changed their policy by revoking concessions and becoming the sole authority over selling and smoking opium by issuing licenses for stores selling opium. In 1906, the Department of Royal Opium was established and, in 1913, the first state opium factory was built. Since 1909, there were attempts internationally to resolve the opium crisis. Thailand had participated by joining the International Opium Commission in 1909 in Shanghai. In the 1920s, the state forced opium stores to sell their opium back to the government. After the transformation from absolute monarchy to democracy in 1932, the UN endeavoured to confine the growing of opium for solely medicinal and scientific purposes. Therefore, the government proclaimed their policy of ending the selling and smoking of opium. In summary, in the early period, the problem of illicit drug use resulted from the widespread importation of opium. The state therefore attempted to resolve the issue by legalisation, in order to control the distribution and smoking of opium.
2). Opium growing in the ‘Golden Triangle’ area and the flood of international support (between 1960s and 1980s).

Until the late 1950s, opium was used as one of the ingredients to produce heroin. There were many heroin producing sites along the Thai-Myanmar-Laos border, which is famously known as the ‘Golden Triangle’. Heroin was distributed around the world from here, which is why the ‘Golden Triangle’ has been dubbed as one of the world’s largest heroin factories. Hill tribes in Northern Thailand, therefore, started to grow opium extensively. In 1961, for the first time Thailand established a committee, the Central Narcotics Control Board, responsible for the control of illicit drug issue in the country in particular. In 1966, research showed that Thailand produced 145.5 tons of opium annually. The illicit drug problem situation in Thailand, therefore, changed from one of opium trafficking from outside the country, to domestic opium growing in the Northern region.

Assistance from foreign organisations started in the early 1970s. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control initiated the Crop Replacement and Highland Community Development Pilot Project in 1973. Statistics showed that foreign aid on the drug issue increased substantially in the 1980s. The Thai government at that time was aware of the critical drug situation and therefore declared the illicit drug policy as an important policy agenda in 1980. The government policies emphasised the execution of drug producers and drug traffickers, and provided treatment for users and addicts.

In summary, since the 1960s, the situation of the illicit drug problem in Thailand changed dramatically, from Thailand being the destination of opium trafficking to the supplier of heroin. Governments during that time, therefore employed a state-led approach to eliminate opium growing sites in the highland of the Northern region, and destroyed the heroin manufacturers along Thailand-Myanmar-Laos borders. The role of international support was evident during this phase.
3). Rapid spread of methamphetamine and a paradigm shift of illicit drug management (between 1990s and 2000s).

Rigorous suppression of opium and heroin along the Thai-Myanmar and Laos borders, together with hostilities among minority groups in Myanmar, resulted in the shortage of opium and heroin. Former heroin manufacturers therefore opted for producing methamphetamine instead. As a result, in the early 1990s, methamphetamine spread rapidly and widely into communities. The survey by the ONCB in 1995 revealed that illicit drugs were found in 40 percent of the sampled communities (ONCB, 1995).

The Asian financial crisis between 1997 and 1998 aggravated the drug situation in Thailand because some people turned to illicit drugs as an escape from the problems of daily life, and some became drug traders to overcome their financial problems. The spread of drugs, especially methamphetamine, during this period was so severe that the government alone could no longer cope with it. Thus, the government at that time initiated a pilot project to promote multi-sectoral work to enhance the capacity of communities in four provinces to prevent and control drug problems. This ran from 1997 to 2000. The success of the pilot project led to a paradigm change in illicit drug management from a state-led approach to a community-based approach. In 2000, the government declared that communities should be the centre of illicit drug management, while government and state agencies would act as supporters rather than implementers. However, the success of illicit drug prevention and control in terms of the community-led approach was not clearly evident.

In short, the wide spread of methamphetamine during the 1990s led to a paradigm shift in terms of illicit drug management in Thailand. The government at that time attempted to go beyond the state boundary, and encouraged the involvement of the non-state sector, particularly community groups. However, successful outcomes were in doubt.
4). Illicit drug policy as a national agenda (between 2001 and 2009).

The drug situation in the 1990s was very severe. The ONCB estimated that approximately 20 million people (about one third of the population) were involved or at risk of being involved in the illicit drug trade (ONCB, 2001). This is as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Estimated numbers of people involved and at risk of being involved in the illicit drug trade prior to 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Drug convictions between 1999-2001</td>
<td>875,117 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Addicts undergoing addiction treatment between 1999-2001</td>
<td>96,092 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. People involved in drugs prior to 2001</td>
<td>Approximately 5 million people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Drug addicts with severe addiction prior to 2001</td>
<td>Approximately 300,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Drug users out of curiosity prior to 2001</td>
<td>Approximately 400,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Drug dealers’ target groups</td>
<td>Approximately 17 million people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Influential persons involved in drugs</td>
<td>7,516 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Minor drug dealers</td>
<td>Approximately 80,000 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONCB (2001)

Due to the critical illicit drug problem, the government, led by Thaksin Shinnawattra, declared war on illicit drugs in 2001. It was the first time that illicit drug issue had been highly prioritised by the government. The government at that time focused on a suppression strategy, while the prevention aspect was not prominent. Thus, the role of the state agencies seemed to become dominant once more over this period. The government’s attention on illicit drug issue during this period resulted in the conviction of a higher number of alleged drug offenders, drug users and addicts, as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Statistics after implementation of the war against illicit drug in 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prosecuted producers and dealers</td>
<td>50,026 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Surrendered producers and dealers</td>
<td>43,624 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of drug addicts</td>
<td>322,289 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Number of addicts undergoing rehabilitation</td>
<td>324,436 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assets seized from drug dealers</td>
<td>6,835 million baht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Number of civil servants involved in drugs</td>
<td>569 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONCB (2004b)

The number of drugs manufacturers and traders were decreased due to the severe suppression during the war against drugs. However, Thailand faced continuous political turbulence until 2009 after the coup deposed Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in 2006. Thus, the illicit drug problem expanded again. As shown in Table 4.2, there were approximately 400,000 drug users in 2003. However, in 2007, the number had increased dramatically to about 570,000 and reached 605,000 in 2008 (Thai Health, 2009).

In 2009, the government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva took office, and the illicit drug issue was again highly prioritised. However, the Abhisit government placed emphasis on the prevention aspect rather than on suppression, because the increasing number of drug users showed that the suppression aspect alone was not effective. Thus, the government in 2009 announced the so-called ‘five-fence strategy’ policy (ONCB, 2010b). The term ‘fence’ here signifies the construction of safeguards or means of prevention of the drug problem. Besides, it also included the inauguration of activities and the implementation of processes for the public sector and civil society which allowed them to efficiently mutually participate. The so called ‘fence’ includes; the ‘Border Fence’, the ‘Community Fence’, the ‘Societal Fence’, the ‘School Fence’, and the ‘Family Fence’.

These ‘five-fence strategy’ can be summarised as follows:

1) Border Fence: Responsible for patrolling and intercepting drug trafficking along the border. Moreover, they also set up a volunteer team in each village along the
border in order to monitor the situation, defending against illicit drug using aggressive strategies, seeking intelligence, and also cooperating with neighbour countries in terms of intelligence, suppression and co-patrolling.

2) Community Fence: The government had a lucid commitment to promote community involvement as a major mechanism in solving social issues. The government intended to enhance the role of community leaders in monitoring the trade and use of illicit drugs, in order to filter the illicit drug problem. Their jurisdiction included apprehending sellers and sending illicit drug users to rehabilitation centres.

3) Societal Fence: This strategy concentrated on adolescents. In recent years, it has been found that illegal nightclubs, unlicensed student accommodation, snooker clubs, football and horse betting, and internet and game cafés all had a high potential for luring teenagers into illicit drug use. Thus, the Societal Fence was created to organise society by expanding positive activities such as sports, music, and creativity centres. In addition, they would also have leading teams in each province to be the engines of organising society; members were, for example, teacher leaders, parents, teenagers groups, as well as village leaders.

4) School Fence: Lead by the Ministry of Education, this group had the responsibility for surveying and creating a database for information about sellers, users, addicts, and those at risk of using illicit drugs. Teachers were the main factor, responsible for monitoring teenagers and giving them appropriate advice. This would be done via recreational activities such as sports, music, art, and even ethical camps. Furthermore, they would support the creation of a network of parents and the community.

5) Family Fence: An imperative strategy for solving the illicit drug issue because whenever the family institution is strong, the nation’s foundation will also be
strong. The Ministry of Social Development and Human Security intended to support the creation of family development centres in communities. This programme would help educate parents and relatives about how to combat the illicit drug problem, and would be aimed at families in which one of the members is associated with illicit drug use, including those who have been detained or were receiving rehabilitation.

Apart from the ‘Five Fences’ strategy, legal action to suppress drug trading organisations, which is in the responsibility of the Royal Thai Police, were also implemented. Moreover, the Ministry of Health also enhanced the rehabilitation programme.

The development of an illicit drug policy in Thailand illustrates the attempts of the leaders and the government to control and prevent illicit drug use in the country. The leaders of the Thai state employed several strategies to manage the illicit drug problem, such as legalisation related to the drug trade and drug use, and the rigorous suppression of drug producers and dealers. However, the state-led approach seemed to be insufficient. Recently, governments have paid more attention to the participation of the non-state sector in the promotion of illicit drug policies, particularly the community group. However, the role of the non-state sector with regard to illicit drug policies was still doubtful. Therefore, the empirical study of the roles of state and non-state organisations in the illicit drug policy in Thailand is needed.

4.5 Profile of Chiang Mai province

This section provides a general background of Chiang Mai province due to the fact that it was the location of the study under consideration. Chiang Mai is the second largest province in the country in terms of both socio-economic development and geographical area (Chiang Mai Provincial Governor’s Office, 2011). Its surface area is approximately 20,107 km². However, 80 percent of the area is mountainous. The northern border of the province shares a 227 km. border with Myanmar. The population of Chiang Mai is
approximately 1.67 million as of 30th November, 2010 of which approximately 229,382 people are members of hill tribes who reside in the highland areas (Chiang Mai Provincial Governor’s Office, 2011).

Chiang Mai is one of the best-known tourist destinations in Thailand. The Thailand Tourism Authority (2010) estimated that Chiang Mai earned approximately 40,000 million baht (£800 million) from tourism in 2009, with approximately 5 million tourists, both Thai and foreigners (ibid).

**Figure 4.2 Map of Chiang Mai Province**

![Map of Chiang Mai Province](image)

Source: Chiang Mai Provincial Governor’s Office (2011)

Chiang Mai province is composed of 25 districts, 204 sub-district and 2,066 villages. There are over 400 public agencies located in the province including 165 central ministry provincial offices; 34 provincial administration offices, and 211 local government offices (ibid).

Among these public agencies, eight of them were directly involved in illicit drug policies, according to the five-fence strategy in 2009-2010. These agencies are as follows:
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY PROFILE

1) Narcotics Control Office Region 5 (Upper Northern region) is in charge of formulating regional plans with regard to illicit drug policies in the upper northern region, coordinating and facilitating other public agencies and other organisations regarding illicit drug policies, evaluating illicit drug control programmes and projects (Narcotics Control Office Region 5, 2011a).

2) Chiang Mai Provincial Operation Centre against Illicit Drugs is a centre which is responsible for gathering illicit drugs-related information from every public organisation in Chiang Mai province, convening monthly meeting of the committee, and enhancing the participation of communities and civil societies in illicit drug prevention (CMOCD, 2011).

3) Northern Region Special Operation Force (Pha Muang Force) is in charge of stopping the drug trafficking from neighbouring countries along the borders of the northern region of Thailand, including Chiang Mai (Pha Muang Force, 2011).

4) Office of Provincial Administration is in charge of illicit drugs control in nightclubs and bars, controlling the anti-social behaviour of youths and increasing the number of positive activities.

5) Provincial Office of Primary Education is responsible for illicit drug control and anti-drug activities in educational institutes.

6) Provincial Office of Social Development and Human Security is in charge of educating families about illicit drugs and strengthening the capacity of families to prevent children and youths from becoming involved in illicit drug activities.

7) Chiang Mai Provincial Police Force is responsible for drug smuggling seizure and reducing the negative impact of illicit drugs on society.
8) Provincial Office of Public Health is in charge of treatment and rehabilitation of users and addicts.

Regarding Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), there are approximately 104 NGOs based in Chiang Mai. These can be divided into 8 major groups namely: 18 NGOs working with children; 14 NGOs working with disabled people; 14 NGOs working with HIV/AIDS sufferers; 14 NGOs working in mental development; 17 NGOs work in the area of well-being; 6 NGOs working with elderly people; 6 NGOs working with women; and 15 NGOs working on other issues (Chiang Mai Provincial Governor’s Office, 2011).

### 4.6 Illicit drug situation in Chiang Mai

According to the Narcotics Control Office Region 5 (2011b), Chiang Mai is one of the provinces in which the illicit drug problem is critical. It suffers from the illicit drug problems in four major ways.

Firstly, it is a major gateway for drug trafficking from Myanmar to Thailand. This is due to the fact that it shares a 227 kilometre border with Myanmar. Most of the border area consists of a natural border. With over 30 natural entry points to Chiang Mai from Myanmar, there is high possibility for drugs to be smuggled from Myanmar into Chiang Mai. In 2010, the ONCB reported that over 60 percent of methamphetamines seized in Thailand entered the country via the Chiang Mai-Myanmar border (ibid).

Secondly, Chiang Mai was once the largest opium growing site in Thailand. The ONCB reported that between 2008 and 2009 approximately 1,650 km² of opium growing site was found in Thailand, of which 1,406 km² (about 80 percent) were in the highland areas of Chiang Mai (ibid).

Thirdly, Chiang Mai was used as a doorway for the distribution of illicit drugs to other countries. Its logistical infrastructures are well-developed compared to that of the
neighbouring countries. For example, it has an international airport which has direct flights from and to China, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, Myanmar (Airport Authority of Thailand, 2011). Thus Chiang Mai has become a major route for drugs being transferred to other countries (Narcotics Control Office Region 5, 2011b).

Lastly, Chiang Mai had suffered from the spread of drugs in the ‘heartland’ area. The most common drugs are methamphetamine, opium, heroine and ecstasy. Methamphetamine is mostly used among students and factory workers, while heroin and opium are commonly used among hill tribes (ibid). The reason for the spread of illicit drugs in Chiang Mai is because it is the centre of social and economic development of the northern region. Chiang Mai is the educational hub of the northern region of Thailand. There are 10 higher educational institutes/universities, 8 vocational colleges, 8 international schools, 140 private school and 893 government primary and secondary schools. There are approximately 387,831 students in the province (Chiang Mai Provincial Governor’s Office, 2011). It has 2,262 factories with 43,713 workers (ibid). Chiang Mai is also a main tourist destination of Thailand. As a result, it has over 100 nightclubs and bars in town (ibid). Given these facts, Chiang Mai is a high potential market for illicit drug traffickers, and thus the spread of illicit drugs is severe in the centre of the province.

Due to the aforementioned problems, Chiang Mai is considered as the province in which the illicit drug situation is most severe (Narcotics Control Office Region 5, 2011b). Thus, it is an interesting case to study how this ‘wicked problem’ has been managed, and whether or not the process can be characterised as NG.

4.7 Summary of the chapter

This chapter provides a general profile of Thailand and the development of its illicit drug policies, in order to illustrate the attempts by its rulers and governments to control the illicit drugs from the past to the present. The review shows that the illicit drug problem has long been ingrained into Thai society, and that governments have employed several
strategies to manage this problem. The state-led approach seemed to be weakening, at
least in rhetoric, over the past decade. Moreover, this chapter provides an overview of
Chiang Mai province as the selected location of study, together with its uniqueness in
terms of the illicit drug situation. How the parties involved in the illicit drug policy in
Chiang Mai interrelated and interacted will be explored in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

CHAPTER FIVE
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the quantitative findings obtained from the questionnaire survey. The chapter is composed of five main sections. The first section introduces the respondents’ profiles in order to explore the characteristics of the samples in this study. Then the first research question is answered by an overview of non-state resource dependence on state agencies. The second research question is addressed by exploring the resource dependence of state agencies on non-state organisations. Then the third research question is addressed by a consideration of the resource dependence of non-state organisations on state organisations. The last section summarises the research findings obtained from the quantitative analyses.

5.2 Characteristics of respondents to the questionnaire survey
This section presents the characteristics of the respondents in order to demonstrate the socio-demographics of the samples. The analysis was based on 217 completed questionnaires, 145 from state agencies and 72 from non-state organisations. The personal characteristics of the survey participants are presented in Table 5.1. Overall, the majority of respondents were male with 65 percent, while the percentage of female respondents was 31 percent. Four percent of the respondents did not report their gender. The gender proportions between the state and non-state groups were similar, with a dominance of male respondents, - 69 percent and 65 percent for state and non-state organisations respectively - while women represented 31 percent of the state sector respondents and 35 percent of the non-state sector respondents. The nature of drug policy might account for the dominance of male respondents in the surveys. In the public sector realm, most of the state agencies involved in illicit drugs issues had a male-dominated manpower structure such as the Royal Thai Police Office (94 percent);
Ministry of Justice (68 percent); and Ministry of the Interior (55 percent) (OCSC, 2008). As a result, this male-dominant structure is reflected in the gender proportion of respondents in this study.

Regarding the age of the participants, a group of people aged 41-50 represented the majority of respondents in the state sector with 36 percent, whereas the majority of participants from non-state sector were a group of people aged over 51 years with 33 percent. The youngest group (under 30 years of age) constituted the smallest proportion in both sectors, with 15 and 12 percent in the state and non-state sector respectively.

In terms of the affiliated organisations, the state agency respondents were asked to fill in their current organisation. There were altogether 13 participating public agencies. The number of questionnaires from the Office of Provincial Administration was apparently high, with approximately 30 percent of total state agency questionnaires, because it had 25 district offices under its hierarchical supervision. However, the respondents from the public agencies which were more specialised and not directly involving in the illicit drug policy, for example Office of Public Relations and Office of Culture, constituted the smallest proportion in this survey with approximately 2 percent. The participants from the non-state organisations were also asked to name the organisations or group that they represented. The non-state organisations were then grouped into three types, namely community, non-profit organisations (NPOs) and private sector. The percentage of respondents from the community was highest with nearly 53 percent, whereas the respondents from the private sector were the minority with 18 percent. One of the reasons why the private organisations contributed the least number of participants in the survey was that only a few business organisations were involved in drugs policy activities, while far more numbers of communities involved in this policy. The summary of respondent profiles is outlined in Table 5.1 below.
### Table 5.1 Characteristics of the respondents in the questionnaire survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-Demographics</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Non-state</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of participants</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of participants</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliated organisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.) Office of Provincial Administration</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29.65%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.) Office of Provincial Social Development and Human Security</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.) Office of Public Health</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.77%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.) Office of Probation and Corrections</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.52%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.) Office of Community Development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.77%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.) Army Special Operation Force (Pha Muang force)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.96%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.) Local Governments</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.52%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.) Office of Labours and Social Welfare</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.52%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.) Chiang Mai Provincial Police Force</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.) Office of Educational Affairs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.65%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.) Office of Culture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.) Office of Public Relations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.) Office of the Narcotics</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.10%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 5.3 Resource dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies

The aim of this section is to address the first research question: to what extent do the non-state organisations work with state agencies in terms of drug policy? And to what extent do the non-state organisations depend on various types of resources from non-state organisations?

### 5.3.1 Collaboration with state agencies

The non-state group questionnaire begins with the exploration of relationships with state agencies (see Appendix 1). Interestingly, all non-state respondents reported that they worked with at least one state agency with regard to drugs policy, as presented in Table 5.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of non-state organisations which worked with state agencies</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impressive finding that 100 percent of non-state respondents reported that they worked with at least one state agency had a significant implication for the presence of NG in the case under consideration. However, the finding derived from this question was rather superficial. The study therefore went on to examine the resource dependence of the non-state organisations on the state agencies, in order to obtain a
CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

deepen understanding of the relationship between non-state and state organisations in this case study.

5.3.2 Non-state organisation resource dependence on state organisations

The second section of the questionnaire explored the dependence of non-state organisations on resources from state agencies - namely funding, information and expertise, and legitimacy - in terms of five dimensions of dependence. The resource dependence of non-state organisations was calculated by the average scores for each of the 15 items in the questionnaire (see Appendix 1).

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the questionnaires for non-state organisations relied on a Likert scale technique which consisted of 7 rating scales according to the degree of agreement with the provided statements. Score 1 indicates a ‘strongly disagree’ opinion to the provided statement, and 7 indicates a ‘strongly agree’ opinion to the provided statement. Table 5.3 provides the percentage of responses in each questionnaire item in order to provide a broad picture of the responses by the non-state group respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire items</th>
<th>Percentage of response (n)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Funding from the state agencies is vitally important for the operation of the</td>
<td>2.8% (2) 2.8% (2) 6.9% (5)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drug policy programmes of our organisation</td>
<td>2.8% (2) 22.2% (16) 18.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.4% (32) 100% (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. We receive funding from State agencies to operate our drug policy programmes</td>
<td>12.5% (9) 5.6% (4) 11.1% (8)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.8% (15) 13.9% (10) 12.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.6% (17) 100% (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. There are NO suppliers that can provide us with funding other than state agencies</td>
<td>11.1% (8) 13.9% (10) 9.7% (7)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.2% (21) 20.8% (15) 9.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.6% (4) 100% (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. We have NO access to funding from sources other than state agencies</td>
<td>13.9% (10) 12.5% (9) 19.4% (14) 26.4% (19) 13.9% (10) 6.9% (5) 6.9% (5) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. We CANNOT influence the state agencies to allocate funding to our organisation to operate drug policy programmes</td>
<td>8.3% (6) 12.5% (9) 22.2% (16) 12.5% (9) 9.7% (7) 9.7% (7) 25.0% (18) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Information and expertise**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Information and expertise of state agencies is vitally important for the operation of the drug policy programmes of our organisation</td>
<td>0% (0) 8.3% (6) 8.3% (6) 12.5% (9) 16.7% (12) 22.2% (16) 31.9% (23) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. We use the information and expertise provided by state agencies in the operation of our drug policy programmes</td>
<td>2.8% (2) 6.9% (5) 8.3% (6) 18.1% (13) 27.8% (20) 19.4% (14) 16.7% (12) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. There are NO suppliers of information and expertise needed in the operation of our drug policy programmes other than state agencies</td>
<td>0% (0) 4.2% (3) 5.6% (4) 25.0% (18) 18.1% (13) 19.4% (14) 27.8% (20) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. We have NO access to information and expertise about the operation of drug policy programmes from different sources other than state agencies</td>
<td>4.2% (3) 6.9% (5) 8.3% (6) 36.1% (26) 11.1% (8) 19.4% (14) 13.9% (10) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. We CANNOT influence the decision making of state agencies to provide the information and expertise needed in the operation of our drug policy programmes</td>
<td>2.8% (2) 20.8% (15) 12.5% (9) 22.2% (16) 12.5% (9) 13.9% (10) 15.3% (11) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legitimacy**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Being authorised by state agencies is vitally important for our organisation to gain legitimacy to run our drug policy programmes</td>
<td>9.7% (7) 6.9% (5) 13.9% (10) 5.6% (4) 19.4% (14) 12.5% (9) 31.9% (23) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. We have been authorised by the State agencies to</td>
<td>12.5% (9) 16.7% (12) 6.9% (5) 15.3% (11) 16.7% (12) 9.7% (7) 22.2% (16) 100% (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
operate our drug policy programmes

| 13. There are NO sources of legitimacy other than the authorisation of state agencies in the operation of our drug policy programmes | 19.4% (14) | 9.7% (7) | 9.7% (7) | 15.3% (11) | 15.3% (11) | 16.7% (12) | 13.9% (10) | 100% (72) |
| 14. We CANNOT gain legitimacy to operate drug policy programmes from sources other than state agencies | 23.6% (17) | 6.9% (5) | 11.1% (8) | 19.4% (14) | 18.1% (13) | 11.1% (8) | 9.7% (7) | 100% (72) |
| 15. We CANNOT influence the decision making of state agencies to authorise our organisation to operate drug policy programmes | 6.9% (5) | 11.1% (8) | 8.3% (6) | 16.7% (12) | 19.4% (14) | 12.5% (9) | 25.0% (18) | 100% (72) |

Source: Author’s construct

The frequency of the respondents noted above was utilised to calculate the scores in terms of resource dependence. The conceptual meaning of the minimum scale (1) was absolute independence and the maximum scale (7) was absolute dependence. The interpretation of the dependence scores was based on Saidel’s (1990) approach, by which the dependence scores were classified into three groups, namely low level of resource dependence (1.00 to 3.00); moderate level of dependence (3.01 to 5.00); and high level of dependence (5.01 to 7.00). The average scores in terms of dependence for each type of resource, each dependence dimension, and the standard deviation are presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Average resource dependence scores of non-state organisations (n=72)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of dependence</th>
<th>Types of resource</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Information /expertise</th>
<th>Legitimacy /policy access</th>
<th>Three types of resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M  SD</td>
<td>M  SD</td>
<td>M  SD</td>
<td>M  SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Importance</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.71(High) 1.578</td>
<td>5.32(High) 1.625</td>
<td>4.83(Moderate) 2.055</td>
<td>5.28(High) 1.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of exchange</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.50(Moderate) 2.007</td>
<td>4.86(Moderate) 1.568</td>
<td>4.25(Moderate) 2.101</td>
<td>4.53(Moderate) 1.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of alternatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.86(Moderate) 1.664</td>
<td>5.26(High) 1.453</td>
<td>4.03(Moderate) 2.089</td>
<td>4.38(Moderate) 1.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to alternatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.62(Moderate) 1.988</td>
<td>4.57(Moderate) 1.608</td>
<td>3.74(Moderate) 1.999</td>
<td>3.88(Moderate) 1.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence on provision</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.32(Moderate) 2.036</td>
<td>4.24(Moderate) 1.803</td>
<td>4.68(Moderate) 1.919</td>
<td>4.41(Moderate) 1.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total resource dependence</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.40(Moderate) .988</td>
<td>4.85(Moderate) .836</td>
<td>4.30(Moderate) .087</td>
<td>4.52(Moderate) .561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

The following section will discuss in more detail the findings shown in Table 5.4, in terms of types of resource and dimensions of dependence.

5.3.2.1 Analysis by type of resource

1). Funding from state agencies

As shown in Table 5.4, the study found that the non-state respondents perceived that funding from state agencies was highly important to them (5.71). In comparison to other types of resources, the respondents perceived that funding from state agencies is the most important resource. However, despite perceiving the high level of importance of funding from state agencies, the dependence on the other four dimensions, namely magnitude of exchange, knowledge of alternatives, access to alternatives, and ability to influence the provision of resources, were moderate. As a consequence, the non-state
respondents perceived that their overall dependence on funding resources from state agencies was moderate (4.40).

2). Information and expertise from state agencies

With regard to the information and expertise resource, the respondents reported that such resources from the state agencies were highly important to them (5.32). Despite perceiving this, the non-state respondents perceived that the magnitude of information and expertise received from state agencies was moderate (4.86). However, when it comes to knowledge of alternative dimensions, the respondents reported that their dependence on this dimension was high (5.26). This implied that the respondents acknowledged the least alternatives to information and expertise from state agencies. Nonetheless, they perceived that their ability to access these alternatives and their ability to influence the provision of information and expertise on the part of state agencies was moderate (4.51 and 4.24 respectively). The responses with regard to all dependence dimensions resulted in a relatively high dependence score with regard to the information and expertise resources of the state agencies (4.85).

3). Legitimacy from state agencies

Regarding legitimacy from the state agencies, the non-state respondents perceived a moderate level of dependence with regard to all five dimensions of dependence. The respondents perceived that legitimacy from state organisations was moderately important to them (4.83). The magnitude of legitimacy that they derived from the state agencies was moderate (4.25). Incongruent with the previous dimension, the respondents perceived that the availability of, and access to, alternative sources of legitimacy was moderate (4.03 and 4.36 respectively). The respondents also perceived that they could moderately influence the state agencies when it came to providing them with legitimacy (4.68). The total dependence on legitimacy and policy access was, as a result, moderate (4.30).
5.3.2.2 Analysis by dimension of dependence

1) Perceived importance of resources from state agencies

The non-state respondents generally perceived a high degree of importance with regard to three types of resource from state agencies (5.28). Funding from state agencies was perceived as the most important resource at a substantially high level (5.70), while the legitimacy and access to policy process was perceived as being moderately important to them, and therefore was considered as the least important resource on the part of non-state respondents (4.80).

2) Magnitude of resource exchange with state agencies

With regard to the magnitude of exchange dimension, the non-state participants generally perceived that the magnitude of resource exchange with state agencies was moderate (4.53). They reported the highest magnitude of exchange in terms of information and expertise resource (4.86), while they regarded the legitimacy and policy access aspect as being the least important (4.25).

3) Knowledge of alternatives to resources from state agencies

Regarding the knowledge of alternatives, the findings illustrate that the non-state respondents perceived that they had the least alternatives for information and expertise as reflected in the highest dependence score (5.26). However, they recognised that they had the most alternatives for funding as shown in the lowest dependence score (3.86). In general, the non-state respondents perceived that the availability of alternatives to resources from state agencies was moderate (4.38).

4) Access to alternatives to resources from state agencies

The findings in terms of the access to alternatives were congruent with the previous dimension that the non-state respondents reported the least access related to alternatives to information and expertise (4.57) and the most access to the alternatives to funding (3.62). In general, the non-state respondents perceived that their ability to access alternative resources was moderate (3.88).
5) Ability to influence the provision of resources

Regarding the ability to influence the provision of resources, the non-state participants perceived that they could have the most influence on the provision of information and expertise as reflected in the lowest dependence score with regard to this item (4.24). Nonetheless, they perceived that they had the least influence on the provision of legitimacy as illustrated in the highest dependence score (4.68). In general, the respondents perceived that their ability to influence the state agencies in terms of providing resources was moderate (4.41).

5.3.2.3 Total resource dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies

The results in Table 5.4 show that the non-state respondents perceived that the dependence on each type of resource from state agencies, namely funding, information and expertise, and legitimacy and policy access, were moderate. Moreover, the total dependence score in terms of all type of resources was 4.52 which indicated a moderate level of resource dependence on the part of the non-state organisations in terms of resources from state agencies. However, the respondents perceived that they were most dependent on information and expertise from the state agencies (4.85), whereas legitimacy from the state counterpart was regarded as the resource that they were least dependent on (4.30). In summary, the non-state agencies were dependent on resources from state agencies to a moderate extent, regardless of the type of resource. Table 5.5 summarises the resource dependence with regard to each type of resource, and the total dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies’ resources.

Table 5.5 Summary of resource dependence of non-state organisations on state agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of resources</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Dependence level</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and expertise</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>1.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total resource dependence</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct
CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

To summarise, although the study initially found impressive collaborative behaviour in that 100 percent of the non-state respondents reported that they worked with at least one state agency with regard to drug policy, the further examination of state and non-state relationships in terms of resource dependence, found that the non-state organisations perceived there to be a moderate level of dependence with regard to every type of resource from the state agencies.

The findings with regard to the resource dependence of non-state groups imply that although non-state organisations in this case collaborated with state agencies in implementing the drug policy programmes, they remained relatively dependent on the state. In other words, the moderate level of resource dependence suggested that the non-state organisations participating in this study had substantial autonomy over their resources. However, the findings from the non-state sector are not sufficient to reach the conclusion that NG exists in this case study. Thus, the dependence of state agencies on resources from non-state organisations also needs to be explored.

5.3.3 Summary of non-state organisation resource dependence on state agencies

In order to answer the first research question, to what extent do the non-state organisations depend on resources from the state agencies?, this research explored the perceptions of non-state respondents with regard to their dependence on state agencies’ resources through the 15 item questionnaire. The total number of respondents from non-state organisations was 72. The questionnaire begins with an exploration of their collaboration with state agencies with regard to drug policy programmes. 100 percent of the non-state respondents reported that they worked with at least one state agency.

Regarding the extent of resource dependence on state agencies, the study found that the non-state organisations perceived that they were most dependent on information and expertise from the state agencies, whilst least dependent on legitimacy from state
agencies. However, the average scores with regard to resource dependence on state agencies in every type of resource were at moderate levels. In other words, the participating non-state respondents in this study perceived that their dependence on state agency resources was moderate, regardless of the type of resource.

5.4 Resource dependence of state agencies on non-state organisations

To explore the existence of NG, this study argues that examining only the one-way resource dependence relationship is inadequate. This study proposes that, aside from exploring the resource dependence of non-state organisations on state organisations, it is necessary to examine the opposite situation. In other words, the resource ‘inter’ dependence is the key to understanding the NG phenomenon.

The aim of this section is to address the second research question: to what extent do state agencies work with non-state organisations in terms of the illicit drug policy? And to what extent do the state agencies depend on resources from non-state organisations?

5.4.1 Collaboration with non-state organisations
The study began with an examination of collaborative relationships between state agencies and non-state organisations, in a similar manner to the examination of non-state organisations presented in Section 5.3.1. As shown in Table 5.6, the proportion of state respondents who reported that they worked with at least one non-state organisation was as high as 98 percent, whereas only 2 percent of the state group respondents reported that they never worked with any non-state organisations in the case under consideration.
Table 5.6 Collaboration between state agencies and non-state organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of state agencies who worked with non-state organisations</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>142 (98%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

Although the percentage of state agency respondents who reported that they worked with non-state organisation was impressively high, such contact was relatively superficial. Thus, this study further examined the degree of resource dependence of the state agencies on non-state organisations.

To examine the degree of resource dependence, the respondents who reported that they did not work with any non-state organisations were excluded from the analysis because this study aims to understand the underlying condition for the collaborative behaviours between state and non-state organisations. As a result, the number of questionnaires that remained for the resource dependence analysis was 142.

5.4.2 State agency resource dependence on non-state organisations

The questionnaires for examining the resource dependence of the state agencies on non-state organisations relied on the Likert scale technique, in a similar vein to the non-state group (see Appendix 2). The questionnaire consisted of fifteen items with 7 rating scales ranging from 1 to 7. A score of 1 indicates that the respondent’s ‘strongly disagree’ with the provided statement, and a score of 7 indicates that the respondent ‘strongly agree’ with the statement. Table 5.7 provides the percentage of responses for each questionnaire item, in order to provide an overview of responses from the state agency participants.
### Table 5.7 Percentage of state agency responses to each questionnaire item (n=142)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire items</th>
<th>Percentage of response (n)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service delivery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Drug policy programmes delivered by non-state organisations are vitally</td>
<td>1.4% (2)</td>
<td>1.4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>important for the operation of the drug policy programmes of our organisation</td>
<td>5.6% (8)</td>
<td>12.0% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.8% (38)</td>
<td>31.0% (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.8% (31)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Most of the drug policy programmes of our organisation are delivered by non-state</td>
<td>7.0% (10)</td>
<td>19.7% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisations</td>
<td>24.6% (35)</td>
<td>28.2% (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.1% (20)</td>
<td>4.2% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1% (3)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. There are NO suppliers that can deliver the drugs policy programmes other than</td>
<td>2.1% (3)</td>
<td>10.6% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-state organisations</td>
<td>19.0% (27)</td>
<td>34.5% (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.8% (31)</td>
<td>8.5% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5% (5)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. We have NO access to service delivery of drug policy programmes by other sources</td>
<td>2.8% (4)</td>
<td>6.36% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apart from non-state organisations</td>
<td>20.4% (29)</td>
<td>36.6% (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.9% (34)</td>
<td>7% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8% (4)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. We CANNOT influence the decision making of non-state organisations on the</td>
<td>2.1% (3)</td>
<td>6.3% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provision of the drugs policy programmes</td>
<td>18.3% (26)</td>
<td>21.8% (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.9% (41)</td>
<td>18.3% (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2% (6)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information and expertise</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The information and expertise of non-state organisations is vitally important</td>
<td>2.8% (4)</td>
<td>4.9% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for the operation of the drug policy programmes of our organisation</td>
<td>12.0% (17)</td>
<td>19.7% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.8% (48)</td>
<td>20.4% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3% (9)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. We use the information and expertise provided by non-state organisations in the</td>
<td>4.9% (7)</td>
<td>8.5% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operation of our drug policy programmes</td>
<td>14.1% (20)</td>
<td>33.8% (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.9% (34)</td>
<td>9.9% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.9% (7)</td>
<td>100% (142)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>(Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>There are NO suppliers of information and expertise needed in the operation of drug policy programmes other than non-state organisations</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>We have NO access to information and expertise needed in the operation of drug policy programmes from different sources other than non-state organisations</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>We CANNOT influence the non-state organisations to provide the information and expertise needed in the operation of the drugs policy programmes</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>The participation of non-state organisations is vitally important for our organisation to gain legitimacy to run the drug policy programmes</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Non-state organisations always participate in the operation of drug policy programmes</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>There are NO sources of legitimacy other than the participation of non-state organisations in the operation of the drug policy programmes</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>We CANNOT gain legitimacy to operate drug policy programmes from other sources apart from non-state organisations</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>We CANNOT influence non-state organisations to participate in the operation of the drugs policy programmes</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The frequency of the respondents noted in this table was utilised to calculate the scores in terms of resource dependence. The conceptual meaning of the minimum scale (1) was absolute independence while that of the maximum scale (7) was absolute dependence. The interpretation of the dependence scores was based on Saidel’s (1990) approach, which the dependence scores were classified into three groups namely: low level of dependence (1.00 to 3.00), moderate level of dependence (3.01 to 5.00) and high level of resource dependence (5.01 to 7.00). The average scores with regard to dependence on each type of resource, each dependence dimension and the standard deviation, are presented in Table 5.8.

**Table 5.8 Average resource dependence scores of state organisations (n=142)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of resource dependence</th>
<th>Types of resource</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service delivery capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information/ expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy/political supports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Three types of resource</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Importance</td>
<td>5.42 (High)</td>
<td>1.311</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.63 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>4.69 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.474</td>
<td>4.91 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of exchange</td>
<td>3.44 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.365</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.13 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.413</td>
<td>4.36 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.568</td>
<td>3.98 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of alternatives</td>
<td>4.03 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.298</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.81 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.414</td>
<td>3.32 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.307</td>
<td>3.72 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to alternatives</td>
<td>4.05 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.14 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.329</td>
<td>4.36 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.396</td>
<td>4.19 (Moderate)</td>
<td>.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence on provision</td>
<td>4.41 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.369</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.25 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.384</td>
<td>4.92 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>4.53 (Moderate)</td>
<td>1.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total resource dependence</td>
<td>4.26 (Moderate)</td>
<td>.610</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.19 (Moderate)</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>4.33 (Moderate)</td>
<td>.888</td>
<td>4.26 (Moderate)</td>
<td>.605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's construct

The following section will discuss the findings shown in Table 5.8 in terms of types of resources and dimensions of dependence in more detail.
5.4.2.1 Analysis by type of resource

1) Service delivery by non-state organisations

The respondents perceived that service delivery by non-state organisations was highly important to the implementation of the drug policy programmes (5.42). Despite perceiving the high importance of service delivery by non-state organisations, the magnitude of the drug policy programmes delivered by non-state organisations was moderate (3.44). Moreover, the respondents also perceived a moderate choice of alternatives (4.03) and their access to those alternatives was also moderate (4.05). Furthermore, the respondents also perceived that they could exert a moderate level of influence (4.41) on the decision making of non-state organisations to provide service delivery. In sum, the total dependence of the state agencies on the service delivery by non-state organisations was moderate (4.26).

2) Information and expertise from non-state organisations

The state respondents perceived that information and expertise provided by non-state organisations was moderately important to them (4.63), unlike the service delivery that they perceived as being highly important to them. As a result, the magnitude of information and expertise exchange between the two sectors was also moderate (4.13). Besides that, the respondents perceived that the access to alternatives with regard to information and expertise of non-state organisations were moderate (3.81 and 4.14 respectively). Also, they perceived that their ability to influence the provision of information and expertise was moderate (4.25). In general, the state respondents perceived a moderate level of dependence on the information and expertise of non-state organisations (4.19)

3) Legitimacy from non-state organisations

Regarding the legitimacy from non-state organisations, the respondents perceived that it was moderately important to them (4.69) and the magnitude of exchange was also moderate (4.36). Furthermore, they also perceived that the alternatives and access to alternatives of legitimacy from non-state organisations were moderate (3.32 and 4.36)
respectively). However, they perceived that they could hardly influence the non-state organisations’ decision making to provide legitimacy to them as illustrated in the relatively high dependence score (4.92). In general, the state respondents perceived that they were moderately dependence upon the legitimacy resource from non-state organisations.

5.4.2.2 Analysis by dimensions of dependence

1) Perceived Importance of resources from non-state organisations
As presented in Table 5.8, respondents from the participating state agencies perceived that the service delivery capacity of the non-state sector was the most important resource available to them (5.42), while they perceived that the information and expertise of the non-state sector was the least important (4.63). The total average score of the perceived importance dimension indicated that the state agencies perceived a relatively high importance of resources from the non-state sector as illustrated in the relatively high dependent score, which was nearly 5.00 (4.91).

2) Magnitude of resource exchange with non-state organisations
Despite perceiving the service delivery capacity of the non-state organisations as the most important resource, the state agencies reported the least magnitude of exchange with regard to this type of resource (3.44). This finding is surprising given that although the state agencies perceived that the service delivery capacity of the non-state sector was important to them, the service delivery done by the non-state organisations in terms of drugs policy was marginal in the state agencies’ view. The legitimacy and political support was the resource that they perceived as having the most magnitude of exchange with the non-state sector (4.36). However, the magnitude of exchange of all types of resources was at a moderate level (3.98).

3) Knowledge of alternatives with regard to resources from non-state organisations
Regarding the findings with regard to the state agencies’ knowledge of alternatives, the highest dependence score in this dimension was the service delivery capacity (4.03),
whereas the lowest dependence score was with regard to the legitimacy resource (3.32). The interpretation of findings suggested that state agencies perceived the least alternatives to the service delivery capacity of the non-state sector, whilst they acknowledged the most alternatives with regard to the legitimacy resource. The overall resource dependence score with regard to this dimension was moderate (3.72), which implied that the participating state agencies perceived that they had quite substantial alternatives to resources from non-state organisations.

4) Access to alternatives with regard to resources from non-state organisations

The access to alternatives aspect was opposite to the previous dimension in that respondents reported the highest dependence score with regard to the legitimacy resource (4.36), while the lowest score related to the service delivery capacity (4.05). The findings were rather surprising in that while they perceived the greatest degree of availability of alternatives related to the legitimacy resource, they perceived that those legitimacy alternatives were difficult to access. Nonetheless, despite perceiving the least availability of alternatives to the service delivery capacity of the non-state sector, the state agencies reported that they could gain access to these service delivery alternatives quite easily.

5) Influence on provision of resources by non-state organisations

Regarding the ability to influence the provision of resources, the state agencies reported that they were most dependent on the legitimacy resource from the non-state sector (4.92). This means that they could have little influence on the non-state organisations when it came to providing them legitimacy, which in this case was the participation in the drug policy programmes. However, they perceived the least dependence on the information and expertise resource (2.78), which implied that they could substantially influence the non-state organisations when it came to providing them with information and expertise. The overall dependence on this dimension was moderate (4.53)
5.4.2.3 Total resource dependence on non-state organisations

The results in Table 5.8 show that the state respondents perceived that the dependence on each type of resources from state agencies, namely funding, information and expertise, and legitimacy and policy access, was moderate. Moreover, the total dependence score with regard to all type of resource was 4.26, which indicated a moderate level of resource dependence on the part of non-state organisations on resources from state agencies. When each type of resources was examined more closely, the respondents perceived that they were most dependent on legitimacy from non-state organisations (4.33), whereas information and expertise from such organisations was regarded as the resource that they were least dependent on (4.19). In summary, the state agencies were dependent on resources from state agencies to a moderate extent, regardless of the type of resource. Table 5.9 summarises the resource dependence in terms of each type of resource, and the total dependence of state organisations on non-state organisations’ resources.

Table 5.9 Average dependence scores of state agencies on non-state organisations (n=142)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of resources</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Dependence level</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and expertise</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total resource dependence</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>.605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

5.4.3 Summary of state agency resource dependence on non-state organisations

To address the research question ‘to what extent do the state agencies depend on resources from the non-state organisations?’ , the study explored the dependence of state agencies on three types of non-state organisations due to the assumption that
each type of non-state organisation had a different function and nature, therefore
generalisation of non-state organisations may lead to misleading results.

The questionnaire first explored the relationship between state agencies and business
organisations. The analysis found that 98 percent of respondents reported that they
worked with non-state organisations on drug policy programmes. The state respondents
perceived that their resource dependence on their non-state counterpart was
moderate, regardless of the type of resource.

When the resource dependence of state agencies by type of resource was further
examined, the findings illustrated that the state agencies perceived that they were most
dependent on legitimacy and political support from non-state organisations, while they
perceived that they were least dependent on the information and expertise resource.

5.5 Comparison of resource dependence between state and non-
state organisations

This section aims to provide the answer to the third research question which asked ‘to
what extent are state and non-state organisations dependent on resources from each
other?’ According to Saidel (1991), overall resource dependence can be considered with
regard to four aspects, namely the degree of resource dependence, the magnitude of
resource dependence, the distribution of resource dependence and the symmetry of
resource dependence. Each dimension is presented in the following four sections. By
understanding the overall resource dependence between state and non-state
organisations, it can help to enhance our understanding, and our ability to predict the
possibility of NG in the case study.

5.5.1 Degree of resource dependence

Overall resource interdependence suggests how much each sector perceives their
interdependence with regard to resources from another sector. The degree of resource
dependence was calculated by the average sum scores of all items in the questionnaires for each sector.

The result from the analysis above shows that both state and non-state organisations perceived there to be a moderate level of resource dependence upon each other. However, the non-state organisation groups were slightly more dependent on state agencies’ resources, with a dependent score of 4.52, whereas the dependent score of the state group was 4.26.

Table 5.10 and Figure 5.1 present the degree of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations in the case of drug policy implementation in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Table 5.10 Overall resource dependence scores of state and non-state sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Means of overall resource dependence</th>
<th>SD.</th>
<th>Degree of dependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>.634</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

Figure 5.1 Comparison of overall resource dependence scores between state and non-state sectors

Source: Author’s construct
Apart from measuring in terms of degrees of resource dependence, the overall resource dependence can also be measured by the magnitude of resource (Saidel, 1991).

### 5.5.2 Magnitude of resource dependence

According to Saidel (1991), the magnitude of resource dependence refers to how much interdependence exists in a particular relationship. It is equivalent to the sum of dependence in the relationship explored by Bacharach and Lawler (1981).

The magnitude of resource dependence can be measured by adding the dependence scores of the two sectors. The magnitude of dependence could be classified into low magnitude of resource dependence (2.00 to 6.00), moderate magnitude (6.01 to 10.00) and high magnitude (10.01 to 14).

In this study, the magnitude of interdependence was 8.78, resulting from the sum of overall resource dependence scores of the state and the non-state sectors (4.26 and 4.52 respectively). Thus, the extent of interdependence that existed in the state and non-state relationship in this study was moderate.

Alternatively, the magnitude of interdependence could also be reported in terms of percentages. The maximum magnitude of dependence (score 14) would be 100 percent, while the minimum magnitude (score 2) would be 0 percent. On this basis, the magnitude of interdependence in this case (score 8.78) was approximately 63 percent.

The percentage of magnitude of resource interdependence at 50 percent indicates the balance between resource dependence and resource autonomy (Saidel, 1991). The magnitude of dependence in this case was 63 percent which suggests that the state and non-state relationships in this case tended to be relatively dependent on each other in terms of resources.
Figure 5.2 Magnitude of resource dependence

![Magnitude of resource dependence graph](image)

Source: Author’s construct

5.5.3 Distribution of resource dependence

The distribution of resource dependence refers to the relative dependence of one party on another in a relationship (Saidel, 1991). In other words, the distribution of dependence implies how dependent the state agencies are on non-state organisations compared to that of the non-state organisations on state agencies. The measure of distribution is calculated by the ratio of one party’s dependence to the magnitude of resource dependence in the relationship.

The dependence score of the state agencies was 4.26 compared to the magnitude of resource dependence of 8.78. The state agencies contributed approximately 49 percent (48.52 percent) of the total resource dependence in the relationship, whereas the resource dependence score of the non-state organisations was 4.52 thereby contributing approximately 51 percent (51.48 percent) to the resource dependence in this relationship. In other words, the state agencies perceived that they were 49 percent dependent the non-state sector for resources, whereas the non-state organisations perceived that they were 51 percent dependent on the state for resources. Interestingly, the percentages of dependence of these two sectors were nearly equal, which suggested a mutual dependent on each other for resources.

Figure 5.3 presents the relationship of the distribution of resource dependence of the state and non-state sectors in this study.
CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Figure 5.3 Distribution of resource dependence

Source: Author’s construct

5.5.4 Symmetry of resource dependence

Saidel (1991) proposed that the distribution of resource dependence implied the symmetry or asymmetry of resource dependence between two parties. She defined symmetry relationship as “...situations in which two or more organisations are equally dependent upon one another for the resources each has access to or controls” (Saidel 1991: 550. Emphasis in the original). Based on this definition, the results from this study reveal that the resource dependence between the state and the non-state sector was nearly equal, with non-state organisations being slightly more dependent upon the public sector for resources, than were the state agencies dependent on the non-state organisations.

The findings of this research are relatively similar to the findings of Saidel’s study (1991) which was that the state agencies and non-profit organisations in New York were equally dependent for resources upon each other. The symmetry of resource dependence has a substantial impact on the quality of the interorganisational relationship (Anderson and Weitz (1989) cf. Ganesan, 1994) and the existence of NG in the case under consideration.

5.5.5 Summary of overall resource dependence

This section presents a comparison of resource dependence between the state and non-state sectors. The findings show that both state and non-state organisations which participated in this study, perceived nearly the same level of resource dependence upon each other. However, the non-state organisations were slightly more dependent on
state agencies’ resources. The magnitude of resource dependence existing in the relationship was approximately 63 percent suggested that the two sectors were substantial dependent upon each other for resources. Besides that, the study found a nearly equal distribution of resource dependence, in that the ratio of distribution was 49:51 percent. The distribution of dependence suggests a symmetrical relationship between non-state organisations and state agencies in this case study.

The overall resource dependence findings suggest that the relationship between state and non-state organisations in this case can be considered to be one of mutual interdependence, which is the fundamental requirement for NG. Additional implications of mutual resource interdependence on the presence of NG will be further considered in the discussion chapter.

5.6 Summary of the chapter

This chapter has presented the findings obtained from the quantitative approach. The findings reveal that the state and non-state organisations in this case were mutually dependent on each other for resources. Participating non-state organisations were most dependent on information and expertise from state agencies, whereas the state agencies were most dependent upon legitimacy and political support from their non-state counterpart. The findings yield some important implications with regard to NG in the case under consideration which will be further considered in the discussion chapter. Although the findings from the quantitative data lend useful insights into the resource dependence relationship between state and non-state organisations, it does not provide information on how and why the state and non-state organisations interacted in such a way. The qualitative findings can enhance our understanding that the quantitative approach alone cannot fulfil.
CHAPTER SIX

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has illustrated the findings in terms of the quantitative data that, generally, the resource dependence between the state and non-state sectors was not symmetrical. This chapter further examines the resource dependence between the two sectors from the qualitative stand. Moreover, the interactions between the state agencies and the non-state organisations in implementing the illicit drug policy are also explored. This chapter comprises of three major parts. Firstly, brief characteristics of participating interviewees are provided at the outset. It then explores the resource dependence from the perceptions of state officers. Lastly, the non-state agency’s views are examined. The structure of each section is guided by five dimensions of resource dependence, namely: perceived importance of resource; magnitude of resource exchange; knowledge of alternatives; access to alternatives; and influence on provision of resource.

6.2 Characteristics of interviewees

Total number of the participating interviewees in this study was thirty-three interviewees. Sixteen of them were the representatives from eight public agencies, whereas seventeen interviewees were representatives from non-state organisations. Male interviewees were dominant in both sectors with nearly sixty-nine percent of the state group and nearly sixty-five percent of the non-state one. A majority of interviewees in both sectors were aged 41-50 with fifty-six percent of the state group and fifty-eight percent of the non-state organisations. The informants from the ONCB were dominant in the state group. The reason was because the ONCB is directly responsible to the illicit drug policy; therefore higher number of informants was eligible to participate in the research. With regard to the non-state group, the number of
interviewees from local communities was highest because this group was more active in drug policy than other types of non-state organisations.

To maintain the confidentiality of the informants, this research employed the abbreviation of the affiliated organisations to represent the interviewees. Each individual interviewee from each organisation was numbered according the order of interview. For instance, five interviewees from the Office of Narcotics Control Board were coded as ONCB1 to ONCB5. The socio-demographic data, the affiliated organisations and the abbreviations of each organisation of the state agencies and the non-state organisations were summarised in Table 6.1 and 6.2 respectively.

Table 6.1 Characteristics of the interviewees from the state agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-Demographics</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 51</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliated organisation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Abbreviations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Narcotics Control Board: Upper Northern Region Quarter</td>
<td>(ONCB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Provincial Administration</td>
<td>(OPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governments</td>
<td>(Localgov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Public Health</td>
<td>(Health)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Special Operation Force: Pha Muang Force</td>
<td>(Military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Office of Labours and Social Welfare (Labour) 1 6.25%
Office of Provincial Social Development And Human Security (Social) 1 6.25%
Chiang Mai Provincial Operation Centre against Illicit Drugs (CMOCD) 1 6.25%
Total 16 100%

Source: Author’s construct

Table 6.2 Characteristics of the interviewees from the non-state organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-Demographics</th>
<th>Non-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 51</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliated organisation</strong></td>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>(Commun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit organisations</td>
<td>(NPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business organisations</td>
<td>(Private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>(Academic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>(Media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct
6.3 Perception of state agency resource dependence on the non-state sector

This section explores how state agency representatives perceived their resource dependence on non-state organisations in each dimension. The following section explores the perceptions of the state officers on the importance of resources from non-state organisations.

6.3.1 Perceived importance of resources from the non-state sector

Findings from the interviews revealed that a number of state informants appeared to recognise the importance of resources from the non-state sector. They gave several reasons for their perception that non-state organisations were important to them.

Firstly, they believed that drug problems had become far more pervasive than before, and the state sector could not manage the problems effectively. A senior officer reasoned why the non-state sector should be involved in the drugs policy:

“The drugs problem, nowadays, has emerged to a great extent and it cannot be solved solely by public agencies. We have learned from past experience that the state-led approach is hardly successful given that people are affected directly by drug problems. Therefore, people also should play vital roles in solving this problem.” (ONCB1)

Secondly, some officers recognised the limitations of the public sector or bureaucracy, which gave reason to why the non-state sector was perceived as important. A senior officer in the ONCB explained:

“The public sector alone cannot solve the drugs problem. As I said earlier, there are many barriers in the bureaucracy; firstly, changes of the head of the province or key persons in charge of the drugs policy can alter the ways policies are implemented. Furthermore, public agencies usually work in a bureaucratic way, for example, they stop work at 4.30 pm, but the nature of a drugs policy is not like that. It requires devotion, sacrifice and determination and non-state agencies possess these (qualities). This is the difference between the state and non-state agencies.” (ONCB3)
Another officer echoed the views of the previous one in that bureaucratic practices were still dominant in many public agencies. However, he pointed out that these practices were seen as unsuitable for solving drug problems:

“The state agencies work by following the rules...and the functions are fragmented according to the organisational key missions of each agency. However; in reality, the drugs problem needs to be viewed in a holistic way, which the public agencies are not able to do.” (ONCB1)

The third reason why non-state agencies were perceived as playing important roles in the drugs policy was because several state officers recognised the benefits that the non-state sector could offer. In terms of service delivery, for instance, a state officer perceived that non-state organisations could help reduce the costs and workload of public agencies. A health officer selected, for example, a drug addiction treatment centre operated by a group of local people in a remote area of Chiang Mai, where the founder member was a former drugs-user. She pointed out the benefits of a community-run treatment centre:

“It (the centre) helps to reduce our workload substantially because it decreases the number of patients who come to the hospital. The hospital services are not without costs and they add to the workload of the staff, right? This (the service provided by the community) helps greatly in saving the government expenses.” (Health1)

Aside from the economic benefits, the service delivered by non-state organisations also could help to improve state agency performance. The same officer went on to clarify:

“In the past, the major problem was discontinuous treatment; there were a lot of patients dropping out. The reason was that the patients, especially those who were hill tribe, did not have money to travel to the hospital. Sometimes the nurses had to give them money to travel back home, otherwise they would sleep in front of the hospital without anything to eat, which was not good, right? It is better now, as we can go and give them drug treatment in the community centre. Our travel cost is only for two nurses,
which is much lower than that for patients who travel to see us. Thus, now, the drop out rate has been greatly reduced.” (Health1)

Apart from contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of state agencies, another informant also perceived that the service delivery run by the non-state sector could supplement the services not provided by the state. One of the officers brought up this point:

“The NGOs do a lot of work by filling the gaps in the public service delivery. They provide the services that the state agencies are reluctant to give, for example, the services concerning HIV/AIDS treatment or the harm reduction for drug users. They also carry out activities that are socially sensitive such as cleaning needles shared among injecting drug users. These kinds of issues are not accepted easily by government agencies without pilot projects, and they are too risky to include in the national agenda.” (ONCB1)

Besides the perceived importance of the service delivery in the non-state sector, some of the interviewees also mentioned the importance of the information and knowledge provided by non-state agencies. The community was perceived as an important source of information for public officers. The following statements illustrate the importance of information on prosecution activities from the community.

“Villagers who live in border areas can keep their territory under surveillance for us. They can tell us if there are strangers who come to stay in their villages. This is important for our investigation.” (Military2)

“Now it is more difficult to stop drug smugglers because they use new communication technologies and the trading approaches have become more sophisticated. This is the reason why we need the community. People can give us clues as to what happens in their communities.” (Localgov2)

In addition, the non-state sector was perceived as important to state legitimacy because the involvement of non-state organisations could provide checks and balances in the policy implementation process. The perceived importance in this dimension was brought up by one officer:
“It is essential for civil groups to get involved in the drugs policy processes because we can monitor the work of each one. At least one can learn lessons from working together and then we can adjust in order to achieve the goals.” (CMOCD1)

However, it is crucial to note that although a number of state respondents appeared to have recognised the importance of resources from the non-state organisations in several dimensions, none of them reported that those resources were ‘critical’. From the meaning of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), no respondents reported that they were unable to continue working in the absence of resources from the non-state sector. They perceived that they could still achieve the goals with resources from within the realm of state, but that might require more endeavour, as one officer mentioned:

“The non-state partners are important to us. Not that we cannot achieve the goals if we work on our own, but it will be more exhausting to accomplish them.” (Social1)

Although several of the above statements uncritically demonstrated the importance of resources from the non-state sector, as stated by many state officers, some evidence also illustrated many cases of negligence by state agencies regarding the importance of non-state resources. Firstly, a lack of awareness on the importance of non-state resources was reflected in the number of non-state representatives on narcotics control committees, at both the national and provincial level. In the national policy formation process, most, if not all, members were selected from senior government officers. An ONCB officer revealed:

“At the national board of narcotics control, we want stakeholders outside the state agencies to become members, but the government prefers state officers such as military officers or police officers. As a result, the policy was formulated only from the state officers’ perspectives.” (ONCB1)
At the provincial level, the ratio between non-state representatives on the board and state officers was dramatically wide and the former were invited to join board meetings only occasionally. A CMOCD officer informed:

“The provincial board committees consist of heads and representatives of the line agencies operating in the province; approximately 40 agencies. The board is huge as you can see; almost 100 people attend the meetings. We also invite two representatives from the non-state sector. However, if the meeting concerns confidential issues, we will not invite them. They will be invited when we need their help, especially with prevention issues.” (CMOCD2)

Secondly, the lack of perceived importance of the non-state sector is illustrated by cuts in non-state organisation subsidies. A senior officer of the ONCB told this researcher:

“The subsidies for non-state organisations were less than 1 per cent of the budget we allocated for public agencies. Recently, the government cut these subsidies by 70 per cent and increased the budget on prosecution activities.” (ONCB4)

Lastly, several officers perceived that the resources within the realm of state were sufficient for them to accomplish their tasks. Therefore, the resources from non-state agencies were not necessary. A couple of statements illustrated this point.

“They (other public agencies) do have enough resources to do the job. There are hierarchical mechanisms from central ministries down to sub-district levels. I mean state agencies can do the job on their own without begging for resources from other sectors.” (ONCB3)

“It is good if they (non-state sector) can support us, but in general, I am satisfied with the resources we have at the moment. I think we have been doing okay.” (CMOCD1)

Another officer agreed with the sufficiency of resources within the state sector. However, he pointed out that better management was needed.
“If you ask me whether we have sufficient resources to do the job, the answer is yes. However, those resources are allocated to a number of state agencies and each of them receives a small amount of resources. Each agency does the job separately. It is like each of us has different constructing tools, that is to say you have an axe, I have a saw, others have nails etcetera. How can we build a house if we do not gather all those tools together?” (ONCB5)

In summary, although several state officers, participating in this study, seemed to recognise resources offered by non-state organisations as important, they did NOT appear to consider them as critical for most state agencies, since they perceived that the job could continue even without them. Furthermore, the research also found some controversial indications, which suggested that the importance of non-state resources was neglected by state agencies on many occasions.

6.3.2 Magnitude of resource exchange with the non-state sector

The relative magnitude of exchange can be measured by assessing the proportion of total inputs or that of total outputs accounted for by the exchange (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In this study, the magnitude of resource exchange between the state and non-state agencies can be understood as the extent of resources that the non-state organisations contribute to the inputs and outputs of the drugs policy in comparison to those of the state agencies, notably from the views of state officers.

The data from the interviews suggested that public sector participants perceived that they had relatively low magnitude of exchange with non-state organisations. In other words, they perceived that the non-state sector hardly contributed to the inputs or outputs of the drugs policy in Chiang Mai. More details of the magnitude of resource exchange between the state agencies and each type of non-state organisation are presented forthwith.
6.3.2.1 Magnitude of exchange with non-profit organisations (NPOs)

Starting with the NPOs, this research found that the magnitude of resource exchange with them in the drugs policy was relatively marginal from the views of state officers. Several officers reported a small number of NPOs that focused purely on the illicit drug issue, as illustrated in the statements below.

“There are a lot of non-state groups that work on child issues, but they are not focused directly on the illegal drug issue. Most of them focus on protection from child abuse; and those that work on illicit drugs in children are very rare.” (Social2)

A military officer reaffirmed this point:

“I notice that there are very few NPOs that work on the illicit drugs problem, not only in Chiang Mai, but all over the country. There are some non-profit groups that provide drug user treatment, but I have not seen any that were established purely for anti-illicit drug purposes, which is very strange indeed. It may be because they are concerned about their life security. I have worked with many NPOs in environmental and human rights areas, but not the anti-drug ones.” (Military2)

As mentioned by the military officer above; there were some NPOs that provided treatment services to drug users. A public health officer informed that there were six NPOs that provided treatment programmes for drug users in Chiang Mai; three of them were Christian organisations and the others were from Buddhist temples. The informant gave examples of the service delivery carried out by the Buddhist groups:

“Temple A has a rehabilitation centre for ex drug users who are transferred to the temple for job training after being released from hospital. Hospital B is another example, where rooms are allocated to Buddhist monks so that they can conduct religious treatment programmes for drug users. It is like moving the temple into the hospital. Hospital B is different to hospital C, which transfers drug-related patients to temple D. This temple acts as a ward of the hospital and is better than the hospital because it gets many donations from the public. The hospital can only support with some medical supplies.” (Health1)
However; this researcher was told that none of these NPOs were authorised officially by the Ministry of Public Health. The informant explained:

“Actually, drug-user treatment requires professional standards and the requirements of the Ministry of Public Health are very high. One of the Christian organisations applied for an authorised rehabilitation centre, but it failed. However; we recognise that these groups of people have good intentions to help their communities; they do not want money or anything. Thus, what we can do now is assign local hospitals to where these treatment centres are located and support and monitor their programmes.”(Health1)

Although the service delivery performed by the non-state organisations was found to be limited at the time of this study, an ONCB officer had the positive view that the magnitude of exchange with non-state organisations would increase in the near future, as he commented:

“Recently, a couple of NPOs came to us and informed that they were interested in anti-illicit drug activities. In the past, the NPOs did not want to deal with the illicit drug problems because they were worried about their safety. I told them that in fact it was not dangerous at all. They can work with children, doing prevention or treatment activities. We do not want them to be secret agents or fight against the drug traffickers because they are not trained and we will not train them to do that.” (ONCB2)

6.3.2.2 Magnitude of exchange with communities

Besides the limited roles of NPOs in the anti-drug issue, this researcher was told that the low magnitude of exchange also held true in community groups. Their anti-drug roles were perceived as limited merely to their own families, and support from governmental authorities was crucial. One of the officers from the Office of Provincial Administration mentioned the role of the community in the drugs policy:

“In fact, all the community can do is preventing merely their family members from getting involved with illegal drugs. They cannot get together and fight against the drug traders because it is too dangerous for them. They might be shot dead if they do that. Those who are anti-drug volunteers in the village were guided by the state. Without the back up of the state, they would never have the courage to run anti-drug activities.” (OPA1)
Another officer reaffirmed that service delivery carried out by community groups in Chiang Mai was rare. She reasoned that Chiang Mai is a big province in which drug problems have been severe. Civil groups were more concerned about their security and left the problems for the authorities to deal with. She mentioned:

“In provinces like Chiang Mai, where illegal drug problems are severe, it is difficult for communities to form groups that can fight against drug trafficking within their domain. This is because involvement in drug issues can be life-threatening. Unlike the HIV/AIDS issue, no one gets killed for fighting against AIDS, but the anti-drug issue is not like that. If anyone is very active in fighting against drugs, they can be threatened by the traffickers and no one can secure their safety. Thus, we find very few cases where communities are active in drug issues.” (ONCB3)

Although the magnitude of exchange with communities in the service delivery area appeared to be limited, other officers perceived that they could gain information from them. As a local government officer informed:

“Our narcotics control department provides a form for health care volunteers to survey drug situations in their communities monthly. Furthermore, our community coordinators also do monthly investigations, and then report the situation to us, as to whether or not the number of drug traffickers and drug users in their communities had increased from the previous month. Then we submit this data to the ONCB and the Provincial Internal Affairs Department.” (Localgov1)

However; when it came to forming the policy, the community group had little chance of providing information for the policy makers. At the national level, an ONCB officer commented that, in theory, there were channels for civil society to voice its demands to the policy makers. However; in reality the policy was formed according to the priority of an elite group, and the voices of the people went unheard. The ONCB officer revealed:

“Although there are many channels through which people can voice their problems and demands, the policy makers prefer not to listen to them. The opportunity for civil society representatives to sit on the national board of narcotics control depends on the preference of the government or minister in
charge. Some governments were more open to civil society, but most of them were not because they did not like to be criticised by outsiders. In fact, formation of the drugs policy in Thailand is still characterised as an elitist model.” (ONCB1)

Also at the local level, community demands did not seem to be recognised, as a local government officer admitted that municipal plans were formulated internally without participation of the communities.

“The plan was written from our perspectives because it must be prepared in advance. For example, I have to write next year’s plan by the end of this fiscal year. However; the communities do not understand bureaucratic procedures. They told us verbally that they want this, or they want that, but when we ask them to write a detailed proposal, they never do it. Thus, we cannot integrate their activities into our plan.” (Localgov1)

In terms of legitimacy, it seemed that the ONCB was the only state agency to exchange with non-state groups in this dimension. At the time of this study, the ONCB attempted to organise a referendum for the stakeholders outside the realm of state to evaluate the previous drugs policy. One of the participants informed:

“This month, we will arrange a referendum, or something like a focus group discussion, and we will invite the stakeholders from outside the government such as civil society, academics, NPOs, etcetera to evaluate and comment on the drugs policy over the past ten years. Then, we will put their comments and suggestions into a new road map.” (ONCB1)

6.3.2.3 Magnitude of exchange with private sector

Regarding the magnitude of exchange with the private sector, some officers informed that they were provided with the service delivery and information from it. One of the military officers said that he worked with a local entrepreneur, who specialised in organic agriculture, to provide villagers in border areas with the knowledge of growing organic vegetables. The private sector offered knowledge and a venue to train the
villagers, while the military provided transportation, meals, and materials for the trainees. He told this researcher:

“We always wanted to promote a sufficiency economy to the villagers in border areas of Chiang Mai, so as they do not involve themselves in illegal drug trading. I was lucky to meet this group of people (the local organic farmers) by chance and they were more than happy to work with us. We, the soldiers, do not have agricultural knowledge, so we need to find a tool in local communities. Other state agencies also might possess the same knowledge, but they seem too busy to train the villagers.” (Military1)

Apart from obtaining the service delivery, another respondent reported that she recently received information from private firms. She pointed out:

“Now we have more collaboration with the firms. They will report to us if they suspect drug smuggling in their factories. Then, we will pass information on to the ONCB for closer investigation.” (Labour1)

Despite the service delivery and information obtained from the private sector, this case study found a number of officers who perceived that most of the private sector still contributed little to the drugs policy. This point is illustrated by the following statements:

“I think we have not reached the private sector yet because we are restricted by Thai social norms. We used to think that we should take a step further to work with private companies, but sometimes we have to keep our distance. However; recently, we have worked with some local malls and supermarkets. They offered to take part in anti-drug activities, so we joined them and they provided financial support and venues for events. However; this kind of collaboration is piecemeal. They cooperated occasionally.” (ONCB4)

“As you know, the private sector does not want to be involved in this kind of issue because it may be a disadvantage for them. For example, clubs are obliged not to sell alcoholic drinks to people who are under eighteen years old or they must report if there is drug abuse in their place. But they will calculate if following the rules causes them more harm than good. Only awareness of corporate social responsibility is not sufficient for the private sector to take part in the drugs policy.” (ONCB1)
“We rarely use the local media, as you know they do business for money.” (ONCB4)
“I hardly work with private companies. I was asked only once to evaluate a factory that participated in the drug-free factory project and that was it. After that this project was called off.” (Localgov1)

In summary, the magnitude of resource exchange with non-state organisations, regardless of their types, was relatively low. One of the ONCB officers concluded:

“I think sixty percent of output on the drugs policy was accomplished by line agencies, thirty percent by local governments. The residual comes from the output of other sectors.” (ONCB5)

6.3.3 Knowledge of alternative sources

This section explores the awareness of alternative resources from the viewpoints of state agency participants. The findings from the interviews revealed that most of the participating officers believed that other state agencies were alternative sources to the non-state sector, especially when they lacked internal resources. The following examples support this finding.

In terms of financial support, the ONCB used to receive funding from international organisations, but this support was cut off. Thus, the main source of funding now is from the government.

“In the past, there were many international projects. We used to obtain a lot of funding from foreign organisations. However, these days that support has decreased dramatically. Most of the funding now is from our government. There is very little foreign money.” (ONCB3)

In terms of service delivery, the ONCB used to spend a great deal of money on hiring private media companies to produce anti-drug advertisements. However; due to budget constraints, the ONCB perceived that they could use the services of state-owned media companies as alternative sources to private ones. Nonetheless; the quality of service
obtained from the alternative may not have been equivalent to that from private companies, as an ONCB officer commented:

“If we cannot hire private companies, then our alternative options are state-owned ones because they are obliged to serve governmental agencies. However; the quality of production from state-owned companies is not very good. It is dull, straightforward and uninteresting when compared to productions from private companies.” (ONCB2)

Another officer also perceived that an alternative source of information and knowledge was available in other state agencies, as one of the interviewees mentioned:

“Although there are a number of organisations that work on family issues, we often invite a team from a strong family learning centre in a neighbouring province to train families that participate. They are a group of public health staff members who gather to develop knowledge of how to build a strong family. Thus, we utilise their know-how because our staff does not have adequate knowledge on this issue. Some of them cannot even deal with the problems in their own family.” (Social1)

Local governments were perceived to be a great alternative of funding to other state agencies, from which officers mentioned the importance of local government funding in drug policy implementation in short budget circumstances.

“What we asked for most from the sub-district local governments was funding. Our budget was very limited. Thus, the financial support from local government was really important.” (Military2)

“We do not have a regular budget to run treatment programmes for drug users. Therefore, when we organise the programmes, we have to ask for financial support from other public agencies such as the ONCB and local governments.” (Health2)

Local government representatives reaffirmed that they gave financial support to other state agencies.

“We allocated a great deal of our budget to support district offices and the provincial police force...it was a lot of money. The budget we provided to
external public agencies was much greater than that we used internally.” (Localgov1)

“We always support other state agencies, for example, we sponsored the training of village security volunteers, organised by the Department of Provincial Administration for 130,000 baht (approximately £2,500). We also subsidised the local health units, under the Ministry of Public Health, for drug user treatment programmes. If any state agencies within our area need support, we can provide them with funding. Furthermore, we also support groups of people in communities that are active in organising anti-drug activities.” (Localgov2)

However; not every local government could provide resources to other agencies, as some of them also faced resource constraints. In this case, the local governments also sought alternative resources from other state agencies. One of the local government officers mentioned:

“The budget for our department will be cut by seventy percent next fiscal year. I think we will have to cut out some programmes and adapt the remaining activities to fit with the budget. Additionally, we will join other agencies when they run training programmes. Some local governments can allocate the budget to buy drug testing kits, but we cannot afford to do so. Thus, what I will do is writing to the ONCB and the Provincial Public Health Office to ask for their support.” (Localgov3)

In addition, some of the interviewees appeared to have limited knowledge of alternatives, and they seemed unwilling to seek them. As one of the participating military officers commented:

“The budget system today is different from the past. In the past, we had a lot of budget and it was adequate. Under the new budget system, they provide us with very little and expect us to seek other sources of funding by ourselves. I doubt that we can find such funding sources. We work for the government, so why do we have to beg others for money? I use the word beg because, for example, I really want to train teenagers in rural villages who now say ‘please give me some money.’ I do not think it is right. We do our job and we are not corrupt or anything. The government should provide adequate budget rather than make us beg from others.” (Military2)
Given that most of the participating state officers referred to other state agencies as their alternatives when their internal resources were inadequate, it could be implied that most of them perceived that the resources necessary for implementing the drugs policy were concentrated within the realm of state. In other words, state officers, who participated in this study, believed that the alternative resources they needed were controlled by other public agencies. In addition, the fact that most officers were not aware of many alternatives other than state agencies, or some officers did not view seeking alternative resources from other organisations as necessary, might result from not recognising the importance of resources from outside the state sector, as mentioned in preceding sections. Therefore, those officers did not pay attention to finding alternative resources. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stated, ‘a resource that is not important to an organisation cannot create the situation of dependence, regardless of how concentrated the control over it is or regardless of its importance. Unless the resource is controlled by relatively few organisations, the focal organisation will not be particularly dependent on any of them’.

6.3.4 Access to alternative resources

In the previous section, most of the state agencies recognised that alternative resources from the non-state sector were available also in other state agencies. This section explores how the state representatives perceived accessibility of those alternatives. The findings seemed to be varied in this dimension. Some officers perceived that they could access alternative sources easily. For example:

“*The financial support from local government is really important. We rarely encounter problems when asking for their support. They always give what we want.*” (Military2)

“I can say that I have no problems at all working with other public agencies, the private sector, or local governments. This is because everyone is aware that the family problem is a critical social problem. Therefore, every agency is willing to help us. We always get what we requested. Seriously, we got everything we asked for.” (Social1)
However; other agencies perceived that accessing alternative sources created some difficulties. For instance, the ONCB officers perceived that the state-own media could be an alternative to the private media. Nonetheless; accessing the alternative was not without cost and they complained as follows:

“My friend was a head of a public relations department, but we could not get free advertising from the government TV channel. We were charged like others. In fact, they should not charge us since we are all public agencies and they should be more concerned about social responsibility, not making money from us.” (ONCB1)

“We have to compete with the business advertisements, especially those for alcoholic beverages, but none of the government media would help us free of charge. We asked them nicely if they could produce the advertisements for us without any charge, but they refused and told us to pay them. With a limited budget, we could not afford to spend a lot of money.” (ONCB3)

Furthermore, although local governments were perceived as alternative sources of resources for many state agencies, accessing them was not without problems. As some of the officers commented:

“In the past, local governments were obliged to subsidise 5 percent of their total budget to other state agencies in anti-drug related programmes. Now that the regulations have changed, most local governments spend around 80 percent of their budget on anti-drugs programmes and activities organised by themselves, and then the residual budget is allocated to subsidise other state agencies. The budget left for us has been very little.” (CMOCD1)

Another officer echoed these difficulties in accessing local government budgets. She mentioned that politics within local governments was the obstacle.

“The local governments have never subsidised our programmes. I wrote a proposal to ask for their financial support to organise treatment camps for drug-users, but they rejected it. They wanted to run the programmes by themselves. However; the treatment programmes required professional medical standards, and local governments are not authorised to run such programmes. There are a lot of politics going on regarding local government budget spending and we do not want to get involved in it. If we do not get the subsidy, we just do not run it (the treatment programme).” (Health2)
CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

The same officer continued commenting:

“Other local governments are even worse; they do not allocate budgets to support anti-drug programmes. We tried to persuade them to set up a drug prevention centre, but they were reluctant because the president was not interested in drug-related issues.” (Health2)

In short, this study found that although most participants perceived that other state agencies could be alternative sources of resources, accessing them was not always easy as there might be some institutional barriers and politics involved, as presented above.

6.3.5 Influence on the non-state sector to provide resources

This section explores the ability of state agencies to influence the non-state sector to provide the needed resources. The perceptions of the state participants in this dimension were varied. Some of them perceived that they could influence non-state organisations to provide the resource they needed. An officer from the Office of Provincial Affairs perceived that state agencies could have influence on the involvement of the non-state sector in the drugs policy. He mentioned:

“Actually the communities always wanted to solve the drug problems by themselves, but it is too dangerous for them to do so. Thus, when the state agencies led them, they immediately responded to government demands.” (OPA2)

Another officer from the same office also perceived that the strength of commitment from the non-state sector was influenced by the state agencies.

“I noticed that where the head officers were active in drug policy, the non-state volunteers also had strong commitment. They were encouraged by the official leaders, like the head of the village or the local government president.” (OPA1)
In addition, some officers perceived that the state agencies could employ laws and regulations to influence the non-state organisations to provide them with resources. She gave the example:

“The factories must follow the drug prevention and alleviation laws. We could also provide some guidance to them in making company policies and regulations relating to drugs.” (Labour1)

Nevertheless, where no laws were stated, it was difficult for governmental agencies to impose influence on the non-state agencies, as an ONCB officer mentioned:

“Although we are the main agency responsible for drug issues in the country, we do not have power to force them [non-state agencies] to do what we want. We can only make suggestions that they should get involved in the drugs policy or integrate their resources with others. But if they do not respond we cannot do anything.” (ONCB3)

Another officer emphasised the point that state agencies could not make the non-state sector provide what they wanted. As she pointed out:

“If they [the firms] do not want to participate in the drug-free factory project, we cannot make them join because they are not obliged by laws or regulations.” (Labour1)

On the other hand, an ONCB officer perceived that although there was room for state agencies to influence - if not manipulate - non-state agencies, they should not do so because the non-state organisations did not like to be controlled, especially by the government, and it might discourage the collaboration between the two sectors. He pointed out:

“When the ONCB provides any kind of support to the non-state agencies, we should not think that we own them. We should recognise their identities. We invited them to work with us, not serve us. We should not command them or act as their masters just because we provided them subsidies. They also have other sources of funding, both domestics and international.” (ONCB2)
In short, different agencies had various perceptions on their abilities to influence the provision of resources from the non-state sector. The organisations with strong bureaucratic culture, such as the Office of Provincial Affairs, tended to perceive that they could influence the non-state agencies more than others. However; the officers from other agencies believed that they could hardly make non-state agencies provide them with resources if there were no stated laws or regulations.

6.3.6 Summary of state sector resource dependence on the non-state sector

In summary, the state officers who participated in this study perceived that they depended little on resources from the non-state sector. It was evident that although they mentioned the importance of resources from the non-state sector, those resources were not critical, as work would continue even without them. Furthermore, a low magnitude of exchange between the state and non-state sector was found. The state officers perceived that, in general, non-state organisations contributed to the inputs and outputs of the drugs policy to a small extent. Regarding the knowledge of alternative resources, the majority of participating state officers perceived other state agencies, particularly local government, as alternatives to the non-state organisations. However; accessibility to these alternatives was found to be somewhat difficult for a number of agencies. Lastly, this study found that the state officers had different perceptions toward their ability to influence provision of resources from non-state organisations. Laws and regulations were recognised as meaningful instruments for governmental agencies to influence non-state organisations to provide needed resources. In conclusion, this research found evidence of low dependence of the state on the non-state sector in the case of drug policy implementation in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The perceptions of non-state agencies on their dependence on state agency resources are explored in the following sections.
6.4 Non-state sector perceptions of resource dependence on state agencies

This section presents the perceptions of representatives from the non-state sector. The question was raised as to how non-state sector participants perceived their dependence on state agencies in each dimension of resource dependence. The findings are illustrated in the following sub-sections. The perceived importance of resources from state agencies is explored next.

6.4.1 Importance of resources from state agencies

Starting with the perceived importance dimension, this study found various assessments among different types of non-state organisations on the importance of resources from governmental agencies. Perceptions of non-state representatives on the importance of each type of resource sought from state agencies are presented in the following sections.

6.4.1.1 Importance of state funding

Regarding the private sector, this research found that private companies might not recognise the importance of funding from state agencies. This was because those involved in anti-drug activities, allocated their company budget to support their actions. The evidence is supported by the following conversation.

[Question: Can you run your anti-drug activities without the state agencies’ financial support?]

“Of course, if they do not support us we can do the activities with our own budget.” (Private2)

A manager of another company also said that they had adequate funding to run activities on their own, but they would not mind receiving support also from state agencies. As she told this researcher:
“Regarding financial support, we are not arrogant, but we preferred to say no, thanks. We have enough resources. They would do better to allocate [money] to other factories which do not have enough funds to run their activities.” (Private1)

“If they [the public agencies] want to help us in terms of financial support, they are welcome to do so. It does not mean that if we have sufficient budget; we refuse their support. We are willing to take it if they really want to give it.” (Private 3)

The above statements illustrate that financial support from state agencies was not critical to the private sector, since by their perception they could continue anti-drug activities using their own resources.

While the private sector appeared not to see much importance in state funding, representatives of NPOs recognised its significance, especially when international funding was absent. One of the NPO representatives mentioned:

“It is very important to have financial support from the government. When we did anti-drug crop growing projects in remote areas, we invested a lot of money on transportation and organising long-term and sustainable activities. Funding from international bodies was uncertain; therefore, the support from state agencies was significant for us to run the projects.” (NPO4)

However, the findings from the community group were rather different. They seemed to value financial support from the state more than the other two organisations mentioned. Representatives of the community perceived that state funding was important, and one of them viewed that it was very critical to the existence of anti-drug networks. As he pointed out:

“If there is no financial support from the ONCB, I am afraid that the strength of the community networks will be weakened. Do not forget that now everything has become capitalistic, we cannot expect the communities to act without support from the state. I think that if the government does not
support us for 4-5 years; the networks we have built up will definitely die out.” (Commun3)

Other interviewees also mentioned the importance of financial support from state agencies, in that:

“Financial resources or funding from the state is important. It is a fantasy to think that communities should get involved in drug policy without any support from the state.” (Commun2)

They went on to explain the reasons why state funding was important to the community:

“With our own budget, we can organise only a few activities. Funding from state agencies creates more opportunities for local people to participate in anti-drug activities, since then we can do more extensive and intensive work.” (Commun2)

Another participant added:

“Financial support from the state helps strengthen our activities. Without government support, our activities are limited because we have a small amount of money.” (Community5)

However, the above participants showed different views on how critical state financial support is. Although they agreed with the importance of state funding, they appeared to have different points of view on critical aspects. The following statements illustrate this point.

“Whether the state agencies provide us with financial support or not, we will keep on doing our activities. However, if we are supported by governmental funding, it will help us to create more activities to a greater extent.” (Commun5)

“Given the fact that the drug problem is a community one, once it takes place, it affects everyone in the community. Thus, I think the community will
continue doing anti-drug activities even though we do not receive financial support from the government.” (Community2)

In summary, this research found different perceptions among non-state organisations on the importance of state financial resources. The private sector appeared to attach little importance to state funding, since it believed it had sufficient internal resources. However, NPOs recognised state funding as more important, especially when international sources were absent. The communities seemed to recognise the importance of state funding the most. Some of them even perceived that state financial support was critical to the survival of community networks.

The perceptions of non-state organisations on the importance of knowledge and information are explored next.

6.4.1.2 Importance of state knowledge and information

Although the private sector did not seem to recognise the importance of state financial support, this research found that it valued the importance of knowledge and information resources from state agencies. As one of the participants mentioned:

“I think what we need most from state agencies is knowledge and information. When our employees had problems concerning drug issues, we consulted with the Office of Labour Protection and Welfare. We sometimes received posters or CDs from the ONCB. These kinds of information helped to increase awareness for our employees about drug issues and prevented them from getting involved with drugs.” (Private1)

Apart from consultation and information concerning drugs, state agencies were perceived as able to provide training to the private sector. As another representative of private companies said:

“They [the state agencies] often asked us if we want any help from them, and I said that we want them to provide training for our employees when business is low.” (Private2)
“In district committee meetings, police officers usually share information with committee members, on such matters as the number of drug-related cases or situations of drugs spreading in the area. We can benefit from this information by keeping our factory under surveillance.” (Private 2)

However; the perception of NPOs was rather different. They believed that the knowledge and information they possessed were adequate and state resources were supplementary to their own. This idea is presented in the following statement:

“We have enough knowledge and experience of how to run drug prevention activities in tribal villages. We have our own media, but we use some top-down media provided by the ONCB to enhance our capacities because some of the villagers can understand Thai.” (NPO1)

Perception of the community group on the importance of knowledge and information from state agencies was rather different from that of the private sector and NPOs. It seems that they failed to recognise very much importance of state knowledge and information. Some of them perceived that general knowledge from state agencies was neither practical nor applicable to their communities. As a community representative commented:

“They [community dwellers] told me that they do not want to participate in training provided by state agencies anymore. They have attended several training sessions and meetings organised by the state, but still, the drug problems in the community have not been solved.” (Community2)

Furthermore, a community representative pointed out state officers who often suggest that communities follow bureaucratic rules and regulations. As he mentioned:

“When district officers came to us, they often told us to do this, and that, so that when the office of the auditor general investigated, we would not be jailed because of breaking regulations. I understood that they had good intentions, but they were too strict with the bureaucratic regulations. We did
things in our own way; sometime the documents might not be completed, but we did not mean to be corrupt.” (Community4)

In addition, the community preferred to use its own sources of information because it did not trust state officers. A community representative told this researcher:

“We have our own community spies who will inform us about suspicious persons or situations. We cannot trust the police; they are not reliable. We prefer to use our own agents.” (Commun1)

In short, this study found that the private sector seemed to recognise the importance of state knowledge and information the most, while the NPOs perceived it as complementary to their own resources. The community group appeared to give the least importance to this resource from state agencies. Besides the community believing that it possessed better knowledge than state agencies, it also rejected restrictions from the bureaucratic approach imposed by state officers. Furthermore, some communities also perceived that they had their own sources of knowledge and information; therefore, they did not rely on state agencies.

6.4.1.3 Importance of state legitimacy support

Findings from the interviews suggested that the NPOs and community groups seemed to view legitimacy support from state agencies as important to them, while the business sector appeared to believe that state legitimacy support was of hardly any consequence. An example of how unaware private companies were of state legitimacy support is illustrated by the following statement:

“The state agencies often asked us if we still did drug inspections in our factory. They offered this or that state agency to help us do the inspections, but we told them no, thank you. We have done drug inspections on a regular basis and we do not need any help from state agencies.” (Private1)
On the contrary, the findings from the community group were rather different. They recognised the importance of legitimacy support from state agencies. As one of the community representatives mentioned:

“If we identify our target groups, we will find a partner such as a hospital to operate a treatment programme. The hospital is very important because our centre has not been authorised as an official treatment centre yet. If something bad happens, we will definitely have a hard time. Thus, we need to cooperate with the hospital.” (Commun2)

Another community representative mentioned that rewards given by the government were to symbolise a person, recognised by them, who worked to fight against drugs. This recognition from the state benefitted such people in many ways, as he mentioned:

“This jacket was awarded to me by the former prime minister as a person of the year in fighting against drugs. I wear it every time I contact external bodies, particularly state agencies. It is a symbol that represents me as an ordinary person who helps the government to fight against drugs and it encourages me to keep on doing anti-drug activities.” (Commun4)

He went on to suggest that the government should identify people who are active in fighting against drugs. He mentioned the importance of recognition from the state as follows:

“If I have identification from the state, it will help facilitate my work a lot, especially when contacting state agencies. For example, I look rather unhealthy, and people might think I am a drug user and disrespect me. But if I have this government identification, it will show that I am working against drugs. This is not for my own benefit, but for that of my work.” (Commun1)

Despite knowing the importance of legitimacy support from state agencies, some community representatives did not perceive that this resource was critical to them, as this one pointed out:
“Actually, I am not worried about having an authorised centre. But if we can get one it would be good because then it would be easier for us to contact other state agencies apart from the ONCB. In fact, it is not a serious matter.” (Commun2)

Nonetheless, an NPO representative commented on the identification issue by stating it was sensitive and the state needs to be cautious in dealing with it. He commented:

“Symbolic legitimisation by the state can be a two-edged sword; it has both negative and positive effects. While it represents allies to the state or recognition from the state, such identification can be misused easily by many people. This, as a result, will create more harm than good in the communities.” (NPO4)

Some members of the NPO group viewed legitimacy support from state agencies as important and necessary for them to operate their activities. One of the NPO representatives mentioned:

“It is necessary to have official support from state agencies. Given that there are a number of state agencies in the field, where we run our projects, it is important that we have official letters from them to show that we share the same goals to develop the communities.” (NPO3)

An NPO representative from one of the religious groups reaffirmed that legitimacy support from the state could help to facilitate their projects in the field.

“When most state officers in the field know that we are a religious organisation, they often doubt us and won’t collaborate. But state agencies that can contact and inform their officers of our position before we commence the projects tend to be more collaborative.” (NPO2)

However, not every NPO representative perceived that legitimacy support from state agencies was preferable. One of them pointed out that relying on the state authority could yield some drawbacks. As she reasoned:
“If we claim that we work with state agencies, local people might suspect that we are secret agents for the government or we might have some hidden agendas that will make it more difficult to access communities. Thus, we prefer not to rely on any state agencies. I am happy to work without the authority back up.” (NPO1)

Briefly, this study found that the private sector appeared not to recognise much importance of legitimacy support from state agencies. However, the community group took the opposite view, but did not see this resource as critical to them. This study found divergent findings in the case of NPOs, as some of them viewed state legitimacy support as necessary, while others perceived it as likely to create difficulties.

This section presented the perceptions of non-state agencies on the importance of resources from state agencies. The following section explores the magnitude of exchange between the two sectors from the views of non-state organisation representatives.

6.4.2 Magnitude of resource exchange with state agencies

6.4.2.1 Magnitude of financial resource exchange

This study found evidence of funding the private sector for running anti-drug activities. A participating company representative informed that some financial support had come from state agencies for ‘number one’ activities.

“The Provincial Public Health Office and Labour Office allocated some budget to support our activities. Sometimes, state agencies invited us to participate in their activities and they paid for our transportation and meals.” (Private2)

Although the business sector received some financial support from state agencies, the amount was relatively small. The company was left responsible for the rest of the costs for anti-drug activities. A company representative informed:

“We got some financial support from the Provincial Public Health Office, but it was not enough. Mostly, the company had to pay for extra expense.” (Private4)
Another participant from the business sector responded in a similar way by stating that the company provided sufficient financial support to run their own anti-drug activities and, therefore, did not need support from state agencies.

"The state agencies have asked if we need their financial support. We are not arrogant, but I think their money would be distributed better to companies that lack internal support." (Private1)

The above statements illustrate that the magnitude of financial resource exchange between state agencies and the private sector was low. Nevertheless, this study found that in the case of NPOs, the magnitude of financial resource exchange had increased over the past few years, since funding from international bodies had decreased dramatically. As a participant from a religious NPO informed:

"Now our main sources of funding are from domestic agencies, particularly the ONCB. We urged the churches we are connected to, to come together and approach the ONCB with a proposal. We now receive some funding from the ONCB. I think a number of civil organisations receive it as well." (NPO4)

Another NPO representative echoed that the magnitude of exchange with state agencies has become more intense over the past few years. As he mentioned:

"Recently, I have had more connections with them [state agencies] because of funding. Foreign donors used to ask me why our organisational income was all from foreign sources. They were curious to know that if the drug situation in the country was very critical, why our own government did not give any support to us. Later on, the international bodies withdrew their financial support and so now the ONCB is our major source of funding." (NPO3)

Despite the increasing magnitude of exchange, the continuity and amount of state funding were relatively uncertain. As a couple of interviewees mentioned:
“The funding from the ONCB was on a yearly basis. Once one year finished, we had to find new sources in case we could not get ONCB funding in the following one. Last year, we did not get funding from ONCB, but we were lucky in receiving money from the IOGT (a Swedish NPO). Then, this year we received funding from the ONCB again.” (NPO2)

“Last year we received around 200,000 baht (approximately £4,000) from the ONCB, while some other organisations received about one million baht. But this year all the NPOs received an equal amount of funding, which was around 30,000 baht (approximately £600). It is ridiculous that the budget for non-profit and civil organisations has been cut by 60 or 70 per cent from last year.” (NPO1)

The uncertainties of state financial support have discouraged the NPOs to collaborate with the state sector. As one of the NPO representatives complained:

“We used to have funding from the state, but now it has been cut dramatically. To be honest, I am really disappointed. As far as I know, they transferred the budget that used to support non-state organisations to state agencies involved in law enforcement. This makes me feel discouraged sometimes.” (NPO1)

The same informant went on to say that NPOs did not receive sufficient financial support from state agencies.

“State budgets are often shared among state agencies themselves. The non-state sector very rarely received those budgets. I think that if the state really wants us to get involved, at least they should allow us access to their resources, even partially. I do not mean that money is everything, but the state agencies should learn that they cannot just take from us without sacrificing anything. When we work for international organisations, at least they provide us with some money. If we get a lot of funding, then we do a lot of work; but if we get a small amount of funding, we do less work. Thus, state agencies should realise that nothing tangible can be achieved if they do not provide us with enough resources.” (NPO1)

Another participant commented that the government promoted involvement of a third sector merely as rhetoric. In practice, he perceived that the government did not sincerely support non-state agencies, as he complained:
“The government claimed that they wanted to promote participation of the non-state sector in the drug policy; however, in practice it was unclear how the budget would be allocated. We all volunteered to help the government, but we also need support from them to run our activities. However, what happened was; non-state committees were appointed by the provincial governor without any monetary support. How can you expect this committee to work?” (NPO4)

Regarding the financial resource exchange between state agencies and the community, this study found that the magnitude of exchange between them had increased over the past few years. As one of the community representatives informed:

“In the past, we were never given money from state agencies, and we had to create activities by ourselves. Now we feel confident in doing our job because we are supported by state agencies.” (Community5)

The ONCB was perceived as a major source of funding to the communities. The examples below illustrate that the community groups received a significant amount of funding from the ONCB.

“Now, the ONCB has become a major source of funding for not only state agencies, but also civil organisations and NGOs. They all come to the ONCB. It seems like they are now in the ONCB network.” (Commun4)

“We had the idea of opening a drug users treatment centre in our village because there were a number of villagers who were addicted. Then we proposed our idea to the ONCB. We requested 5-years financial support, but made the condition that they follow our proposed plans, which they agreed to do. Therefore, initial funding was received from the ONCB to operate the centre.” (Commun2)

After the treatment centre was established, this community received further financial support from the ONCB.

“The head of the ONCB’s regional office raised the question of how we would support people who passed our treatment programmes and stopped using
drugs. I told him that we must provide them with vocational support. Thus, I wrote a proposal to them and we received funding of 200,000 baht (approximately £4,000). We divided the money into two equal portions. The first part was spent on educating patients who had recovered, while the residual money was utilised to set up the former drug user fund. “ (Commun2)

However, the same community representative pointed out that funding from the ONCB was unpredictable. As he told this researcher:

“We did not receive funding at all in 2009, even though we submitted the proposal for that fiscal year. The budget was transferred to this year instead, which means that we actually have not received funding for this year’s activities.” (Commun2)

Apart from the ONCB, local governments were also perceived as a source of funding for many communities. However, obtaining financial support from local governments could be problematic because it was highly affected by the preferences of local politicians. The following statement from a community representative illustrates this point:

“We received financial support from the previous municipal executives to renovate the Family Development Centre. But then the new ones came to our office and did not support our activities at all. The renovated centre is still closed because we do not have the budget to run it. We cannot ask for support from the incumbent government. As you know, our value depends on who we are working for.” (Commun5)

In summary, the findings above illustrated that the magnitude of financial resource exchange between private companies and state agencies was low. Furthermore, this study also found that the magnitude of exchange between NPOs and state agencies, the ONCB in particular, has increased over recent years. This finding was congruent with the magnitude of exchange between the community group and state agencies, with more communities receiving increased funding from the ONCB and local governments. However, some of the non-state participants complained that state financial support
was unpredictable in terms of accessibility and quantity. The magnitude of knowledge
and information resource exchange is explored in the following section.

6.4.2.2 Magnitude of knowledge and information resource exchange

This section presents the findings on the magnitude of knowledge and information
resource exchange between the state and non-state sector. This research found that the
private sector had a high magnitude of exchange in this type of resource. In terms of
knowledge, a private sector representative reported that a lot of training from state
agencies was given, as illustrated by the following examples:

“When we won the Excellent Drug-free Factory Award, we obtained a lot of
training because the government paid much attention to drug issues, and we
had to keep up with them.” (Private1)

She added that the company invited speakers from public agencies to train their staff.

“When we had spare time, we would invite related officers to train our
staff.” (Private1)

Another participant from a different company also pointed out:

“When public organisations had their training, we would send our staff to
participate. They organised the training occasionally, probably every year,
and our staff would join them.” (Private2)

Apart from training, private companies also sought advice from state agencies. As one of
the former’s representatives mentioned:

“When we have difficulties, we consult with the Labour Welfare and
Protection Office, Labour Force Office, and ONCB.” (Private1)

In addition, the private sector was given educational material, for instance:

“The ONCB supported us with drug posters or CDs. Furthermore, we also
asked for documents from the Public Health Office.” (Private3)

In terms of information, the private sector publicised the news obtained from public
agencies in its companies.
“When we receive any news from the public sector, we post it on the bulletin board for the staff to see. In addition, we never fail to inform the committee of drug-related news at any monthly meeting.” (Private1)

This study found a relatively low magnitude of knowledge and information exchange with the communities. Only one community representative mentioned that they obtained this exchange from state agencies by way of consultation:

“When we first knew that one of the patients was infected with HIV/AIDS, we went to the hospital and asked for their advice about how to help an infected person.” (Commun4)

Besides that, a community representative reported that he also invited speakers from public organisations to educate the patients.

“Our speakers are from various organisations including both the public sector and my community networks. For instance, officers from the Office of Social Development and Human Security talk about human rights and ID card issuance. Those from the Public Health Office speak about primary health care and lastly, the police introduce basic laws.” (Commun4)

The findings from the NPO group were similar to those of the community in that the magnitude of exchange in this aspect was low. In terms of knowledge, NPOs also received training from the ONCB, as one participant mentioned:

“The ONCB did not abandon us; they still invite us to seminars. They know what we are working on. They used to invite us to attend seminars once or twice a year, but in the past two years invites have become more frequent, maybe because of closer cooperation.” (NPO3)

Besides that, another NPO representative mentioned that NPOs co-host a radio programme with the ONCB.

“Recently, we asked the ONCB to co-host a radio programme for local people. Despite receiving no budget, we still maintained the programme.” (NPO4)
Although the study found some evidence of knowledge and information exchange between NPOs and state agencies, the magnitude was low. The following section presents the findings in terms of legitimacy resource.

6.4.2.3 Magnitude of legitimacy support exchange

The private companies that participated in this research reported some extent of legitimacy support from state agencies. One of the interviewees informed this researcher that private companies relied on state legitimacy to gain access to broader public agencies.

“It is like our company is under their [the District Office] umbrella. For instance, if we invite certain public agencies to introduce knowledge about drugs to our employees, we might not get full cooperation. However, if a public agency invites itself on our behalf, it tends to give more cooperation. Therefore, we rely on public agencies as a distribution channel.” (Private1)

In addition, the company can get authorisation from state agencies when it is a drug-free company and bring about a good reputation, as the same interviewee mentioned:

“We became aware of drug problems in our factory in 2001, when we started to run anti-drug activities there until now. It was a coincidence that the Office of Labour Welfare and Protection introduced the Drug-free Factory Programme in 2003 and they invited us to join it. They thought that what we did was awesome. However, we had to meet their criteria for being a drug-free factory, such as have literal policies on drug issues, a board of directors and activities. Since then, our factory’s repetition of being outstanding in the drug-free programme has been recognised by the public, especially among state agencies.” (Private1)

Another company representative also pointed out that recognition from state agencies improved the company’s image, although it did not contribute directly to company business.
“Receiving many awards concerning drug issues has improved our factory’s image. Obviously, this does not increase our sales, but it ensures that people who work for us would be safe from drugs.” (Private3)

Regarding the magnitude of exchange with communities, most community representatives reported receiving legitimacy support from various state agencies. One of them informed that most of the anti-drug community networks were led by the official heads of villages:

“The heads of villages in our district will be the central pillars of most community networks. The other groups always have their own work. They are too busy to do activities, but fighting against drugs is part of the official leaders’ duties.” (Commun3)

Another interviewee reported that one of the factors contributing to the success of fighting against drugs was support from local officers.

“The success of our anti-drug activities is because we have cooperation from state officers. When we have any trouble, we can ask for help from the district governor. For example, if things go beyond our capability, the government officers will come in.” (Commun5)

Additionally, he reported that although the community treatment centre did not receive official authorisation, it was supported by government hospitals, as he said:

“Our centre is not authorised for rehabilitation; however, we are part of the local hospital. We feel more secure when we are part of the hospital because when an unexpected tragedy happens, such as a patient dies or is seriously ill, we are assured of support from the local hospital. Furthermore, being part of the hospital creates sustainability for us. No matter how many times the hospital director is changed, we can rest assured that they will give us support, since we are part of the hospital.” (Commun5)

Despite the substantial magnitude of exchange between the community group and state agencies in terms of legitimacy support, this study found controversial evidence in the case of NPOs. The NPO representatives reported that they rarely need legitimacy
support from state agencies and they perceived more harm than good from getting it in terms of legitimacy.

This researcher was informed by one of the NPO representatives that NPOs hardly ever got support from public agencies. As he mentioned:

“I seldom coordinate with public agencies. We tried to coordinate with the Public Health Office, but hardly had any progress, as they regarded themselves as having a lot of other work. Some units responded negatively despite the fact that the issue is related to them. Considering the police, we do not normally work with them because the people are afraid of the police and also the army. If connections get too close with them, the people might think that we are working for the police, and then they would close up on us. Thus, we chose not to coordinate with the police. (NPO3)”

This participant reasoned that since some of the local officers were involved in drug trading, local people did not trust public officers

“We are reluctant to collaborate with official leaders. If we investigate thoroughly, we find they are involved in selling drugs. Hence I do not dare to ask for help from them.” (NPO3)”

Other NPO representatives echoed the view that they preferred not to reveal their relationship with state agencies, as it would prevent the involvement of local people, as illustrated by the following statements:

“When we work, state officers often go with us, but we hardly work together. We cannot work closely with the public sector, due to the fact that local people have negative perceptions of state officers. And otherwise we would lose our credibility.” (NPO1)

“We cannot tell the people that we work with the ONCB because they still have negative attitudes toward public officers. By revealing that we work with public agencies can preclude the people’s participation. For instance, in areas where drug problems are critical, people would not cooperate with us if they know that we work with the public sector.” (NPO2)
The findings above revealed that the private sector and community groups appeared to have some degree of magnitude in terms of legitimacy support resource exchange with state agencies. However, in the case of NPOs, it appeared that the magnitude of exchange in this dimension was low, due to negative attitudes towards state agencies from local people who worked with NPOs. They perceived that having very close relationships with state agencies would give a negative reputation to their organisations, as the public sector, in many cases, was reputed to be corrupt. Thus, NPO representatives voiced no need for legitimacy support from state agencies. Apart from acknowledging the perceptions of non-state sector representatives on the importance and magnitude of resource exchange with the state, awareness of alternative resource sources is another dimension, which determines the dependence of two sectors and is explored in the coming section.

6.4.3 Knowledge of alternatives

6.4.3.1. Alternatives to state financial resources

According to interviews with private sector representatives, this research found that they recognised two main alternative sources of funding apart from financial support from state agencies. Firstly, they perceived their ability to raise funds by themselves. Secondly, their company would provide financial support if they did not receive sufficient funding from state agencies. These alternatives are illustrated in the following statement:

“\textit{The company supported 50 percent of all the funds we used in the ‘to be number one’ activities (the anti-drug programme) and the rest came from fund raising. Fund raising was done via selling products such as our ‘to be number one’ t-shirts; waste funds were obtained from selling recycled products; and funding came from management of the company’s canteen.}”

(Private2)
Although the community group reported that their perception on the importance of state agency funding was high, it also seemed to acknowledge alternatives as a back up in case state financial support ceased. Some of the community mentioned fund raising as an alternative for raising money, as presented in the following statement:

“Now, the ONCB does not give us financial support, so we have to fund ourselves by, for instance, fund raising. Some people might use donated money for their personal use, but we do not. We spend it on new activities.” (Commun4)

Another community representative mentioned that some funds came from selling products. He informed this researcher:

“I raise chickens in the centre, and when each one weighs 1 kilogramme, I sell it; otherwise we could not sustain our centre. If we do not have extra sources of income, what will we do if we do not get financial support from the government? (Community2)”

Apart from fund raising on their own, community representatives also reported seeking support from other organisations. As affirmed in the following statement:

“We asked for support from the Community Organisations Development Institute (Public Organisation). We need their support to provide us with VCDs and leaflets for introducing our newly opened Community Learning Centre because we did not get support from the municipality.” (Community1)

However, another interviewee had the opinion that although they could find alternatives to state funding, the commitment to anti-drug activities from those sources would be less than that from the money received from state agencies, especially the ONCB.

“There are other sources of funding, but their creditability would be less than that when receiving funding from the ONCB. As money received from the ONCB works directly on drug issues, we feel obliged to spend it on anti-drug activities.” (Community3)
CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

NPOs, particularly religious organisations, seemed to find more alternative sources of funding than the other two groups mentioned earlier. Some of them reported that they earned money from goodwill donations.

“We raise money at the local parish every Sunday.” (NPO4)

Furthermore, a local religious organisation was partially funded by their national association.

“When we are assigned projects from state agencies or elsewhere, we go to a Christian organisation, which would fund us according to our plans.” (NPO4)

Some religious NPOs reported that they obtained funding from abroad.

“We would ask for financial support from British, American, and Swedish Christian organisations.” (NPO3)

In summary, the non-state organisations participating in this study perceived that their alternative sources of funding included self funding, fund raising, and seeking donations from both domestic and international organisations.

6.4.3.2. Alternatives to state knowledge and information resources

Regarding knowledge and information resources, this study found that private sector representatives perceived that they could obtain these resources on drug issues from the Internet. As they mentioned:

“I always read and research about drugs on the Internet. It makes me wonder sometimes, why I am so obsessed with drug issues.” (Private1)

“If we do not get information from state agencies, we can search on the Internet by ourselves.” (Private2)

A community representative reported that communities set up their own scouts, who inform leaders of any suspicious circumstances in their neighbourhood. They do not rely on police information, as she mentioned:
"We use our own community scouts to investigate drug circumstance in the community. No one knows about this because we hide the fact that we are looking for drug smugglers in our community. The scouts can disguise themselves as street cleaners, street vendors, etc. No one suspects that they are drug investigators. Police officers are not reliable. Most of them are involved in selling drugs. Therefore, we prefer to use our own agents.” (Community5)

The NPO group seemed unable to see many alternatives of knowledge and information resources, maybe because it felt self-sufficient. Some of the group even believed that they had superior knowledge and information than state agencies. Therefore, they did not try to find alternatives and none of the NPO respondents mentioned them. The following section explores the alternatives to legitimacy support from state agencies.

6.4.3.3. Alternatives to state legitimacy support

As presented earlier, private companies participating in this study perceived legitimacy support from state agencies as important, but not critical. This study also found participants who believed that domestic support from company executives was an alternative to legitimacy support from state agencies. It would appear that they gave more significance to support of internal legitimacy than that of state agencies. As a firm’s representatives mentioned:

“We do not pay attention to them [state agencies] because what we gain from doing this [anti-drug activity] is a higher performance from our employees. Regardless of how many governments change, we will continue doing this activity. Public agencies sometimes hold back because the government does not prioritise drug issues. But then if new governments come into office, and they emphasise on drug matters, public officers would become enthusiastic in promoting anti-drug activities again. Therefore, we just continue doing our job, even without state support.” (Private4)

This person also pointed out that support from the company’s board of executives was more important than state support to run activities. As she informed:
“The company’s policies on drug issues have been established in certain ways. No matter how many rotations of MDs, the policies will not change. The board of executives at our parent company abroad is even more concerned about the illegal issues in the factory. Thus, they told me to continue anti-drug activities in our factory.” (Private4)

Another interviewee from a different company echoed this view by stating that internal legitimacy was an alternative support to state legitimacy and the former was more important:

“Drug issues have been included in company policy since the firm’s establishment. The president has personal concerns about illegal drug issues, and he therefore embraced them into company policy. He has been very supportive and has participated in every activity, for example, he pledged on May Day that our employees would not be involved with drugs, which he would fight against.” (Private2)

Regarding perception of the NPO group, one of their representatives informed this researcher that state legitimacy could be replaced by personal affiliations and he valued the latter more. As he mentioned:

“Some of the former ONCB officers told me that the reason why they still work on drug issues with us is because they see us as their relatives. Our relationship is family-like in that they come to join us because of their fervour. It is much more meaningful than any governmental policies or orders.” (NPO2)

A representative from the community group perceived that social values and norms were alternatives to state legitimacy. As she mentioned:

“We do not have any authority to punish drug users or drug smugglers. I have been thinking of how we should deal with these people without involving the authorities. I have found that traditional values and norms in Thai society are the answer. We have the monarchy and Buddhism that tie our community together. The generous and kind-hearted characteristics of Thai people are also keys to solve the problems. For instance, some of the drug users in our community were captured, and when they were released, we used our community funds to support their educational expenses. After
that, they changed their behaviour and stopped using drugs because they were grateful to us for giving them opportunities." (Community1)

This section presented the non-state organisation’s awareness of alternative resources to those from state agencies. The following section illustrates their perceptions on accessibility to those alternatives.

6.4.4 Access to alternatives

Despite seeing the availability of alternatives, accessibility to them is crucial in determining the dependence of non-state organisations on the public sector. As illustrated in the previous section, the private sector perceived their alternatives as financial support and fund raising from the company. They also believed that they could access these alternatives. The representatives of participating private companies mentioned:

“We have never encountered financial difficulties in doing anti-drug activities because the executives are very supportive. Our company is a foreign one and foreign executives are very concerned about illegal issues, as they would bring a bad reputation to the company. Therefore, they always support us in our anti-drug activities.” (Private 1)

Another company pointed out that perception of its leaders was the key factor to accessing financial support.

“The board of executives knows the importance of drug problems in the factory and, of course, they do not want their company to be in trouble. Therefore, they facilitate our anti-drug activities.” (Private 3)

However, not every private company could access company resources for money to spend on anti-drug activities. Representatives from participating companies mentioned that only a small number of private companies in Chiang Mai actively fight against drugs, with the major reason being lack of company financial support. The following statements illustrate this point:
“No matter how we present our activities to other factories, we are often told that they cannot emulate our actions because of financial constraints. Some factories told us that even buying sports equipments for their employees is scrutinised by their executives, who must calculate whether purchases are economical and efficient. Luckily, I work for a foreign company; otherwise it would be difficult for me to run anti-drug activities.”[Private1]

The same participant went on explained:

“Thai people often think that dealing with drug problems is the responsibility of the authorities and they leave it to them. Since they believe it is not their concern, they do not invest their resources in supporting anti-drug activities in their companies.”[Private1]

Another participant reaffirmed that most of the private companies in Chiang Mai faced difficulties in accessing financial resources for anti-drug activities.

“I think it is partly because anti-drug activities are not without costs. We have spent quite a substantial amount of money on these activities, which many companies are not prepared to do. Furthermore, some executives do not understand the benefits of doing such activities. We were invited to talk to some executives about our experiences and benefits from doing anti-drug activities in our factory, but they were hard to persuade.” [Private2]

This interviewee summarised the current situation:

“In the current situation, companies that are active in fighting against drugs continue the work, while those that are unenthusiastic remain inactive. There are companies that can access resources, while others cannot. However, in comparison, far more companies are inactive than active.”[Private2]

While the NPO group acknowledged a number of alternatives, it recently seemed to face more difficulties in accessing those for funding. Several interviewees mentioned that accessing foreign funding had become more difficult. One of them explained that this was because the donors had moved their interests away from drug issues.
“We are trying to find financial support. Some international organisations used to sponsor us, but now they have stopped as they are no longer interested in drug issues. Recently, the human rights issue has become popular in Europe, and drug and treatment issues are being forgotten.” (NPO1)

Another participant pointed out that foreign donors also face financial constraints and cannot provide as much support as before.

“We have been funded by the Parish Church, but now they also receive less funding. At the moment, half of our budget is from the Danish Church, but the other half we find from elsewhere.” (NPO2)

Another NPO representative commented that this was partly because Thailand was no longer considered as a poor country. The following statements illustrate this point:

“Many international NGOs used to support us, but after the announcement that our country had become a Newly Industrialised Country (NIC), they began to stop funding us. Thus, at the moment, our main source of funding comes from the ONCB.” (NPO3)

“Now we are related to state agencies more because of funding. We used to be funded by international NGOs, but for the last decade, international donations to Thailand have been decreasing dramatically. Every NGO in Thailand faces the same problem because donors now assess our country as well off, thus, they move their projects to our neighbours.” (NPO4)

“There are some foreign organisations that have been working with us for a long time. About two decades ago, we obtained several billion baht from them, which was a large amount of money at that time, but now a one million baht donation is considered enough.” (NPO2)

The Community group seemed to face the same difficulties as NPOs in accessing alternative funding. A community representative informed this researcher:

“This year we will get funding from the Office of National Anti-Corruption Commission, but we have not received it yet, since there are many protests going on in their office, which is being moved to a temporary one. I was
informed that the process of funding approval might be delayed for several months. “(Community1)

Another interviewee mentioned:

“At the moment, the ONCB does not provide funding for us because of a misunderstanding at the national board. They allocated more money to support law enforcement activities, but allocated only a small amount of budget to facilitate community activities. However, the ONCB is open to us seeking financial support from other sources. For example, if we get support from the Office of National Anti-Corruption Commission, we can integrate the drug issue with corruption. We do not have difficulties, but a number of communities reflect that they could not access alternative funding.”(Community2)

“We no longer receive financial aid from the ONCB regional office, since we get funding from another foundation. Then, this year [2010] we did not receive any funding from either source. I heard that the latter organisation had some internal conflicts, which resulted in the suspension of financial aid.” (Community4)

The findings above illustrated that private companies participating in this study did not encounter problems in accessing alternative funding. However, a majority of companies perceived difficulties in accessing financial resources and were therefore inactive in anti-drug activities. On the other hand, the NPO and the community groups appeared to find access to alternative financial resources more challenging. The following section explores the ability to influence provision of resources from state agencies.

6.4.5 Influence on the provision of resources

6.4.5.1 Influence on the provision of funding
Apart from the accessibility of alternatives, the ability to influence the public sector to provide resources also determined the resource dependence between it and the private sector. To begin with, the private sector perceived that it could hardly impose influence on state agencies to provide funding. An interviewee gave an example of unreliable funding from state agencies in the ‘to be number one’ activity:
“As far as I know, the money for supporting the ‘to be number one’ activity is allocated from the provincial budget. It is not supported by the central agencies. The provincial office does not include the activity in the provincial plans, thus, they cannot sponsor us directly. They have to seek a residual budget from other projects to support us, which, as a result, varies the amounts of subsidies each year, and therefore it is hard for us to plan our activities in advance.” (Private 2)

Regarding the influence NPOs could impose on state agencies to provide financial resources; this study found that NPO representatives believed their influence on state agencies worked to a small extent. The following statements indicate this point:

“When requesting financial support, we could do nothing if state agencies opted not to give us anything. We just kept silent and tried again later. So far, we have made two requests and received roughly 100,000 baht on both occasions. Actually, they never gave us the full amount that we asked for. For example, if I asked for 300,000 baht, they would give us only 200,000 baht.” (NPO4)

Another interviewee gave an example of his inability to influence state agencies to provide him with needed welfare.

“One of the officers in my centre got hit by a car because he was chasing a patient who had run away from the centre. We spent nearly 100,000 baht on his treatment costs by using our centre’s budget. We requested support from the ONCB many times for this, and everyone in the ONCB office knew about it, but they did not bother to give us any help.” (NPO2)

However, on some occasions NPOs could influence provision of funding, as the same NPO representative reported:

“When I first proposed this project to the ONCB, I told them how I worked. I said if you deem it productive, then support me. However, when they told me to follow their framework, I could not do it. I went on to say that they should support us, not give us orders; otherwise, they do not have to give us financial aid. Then they gave me the funding as requested.” (NPO2)
With regards to the community group, its representatives found it very hard to influence provision of funding. One of the interviewees gave an example of spending cuts in community financial support at the national level:

“Last year, the budget for subsidising activities in the communities was cut by roughly 60-70 percent. You know why? It was simply because the minister did not believe in the capacity of civil society. The ONCB proposed a certain amount of budget for community support, but it was cut by 70 percent and transferred to public agencies, particularly the military and police force. It is ridiculous isn’t it? One person could restrain the participation of people in the whole country.” (Community4)

The same interviewee went on to mention that it was not fair for the people that the budget was cut to support their activities.

“We pay taxes to the government for them to solve social problems for us, but now the problems have become more severe and the government alone cannot deal with them. So, civilians have come in to help the government do its work, and we asked it to facilitate resources. But rather than thinking that we had come to help them, the government considered this our responsibility and cut our resources. We not only pay taxes, but also come to help them do their job, so I do not think it is fair to cut community financial support.” (Community4)

Another community representative echoed the same view, and mentioned that he could hardly persuade public officers in the locality to provide community financial support, as he mentioned:

“It is impossible to persuade district officers to allocate budgets to communities within the area to run their own activities. There is no way that the officers will give away their budget to others. They organise activities by themselves, and then arrange the opening and closing ceremonies by senior civil servants and take pictures. That is all the state agencies do.” (Community3)
In short, this study found that all non-state organisations found it hard to have influence on the provision of funding from state agencies. The ability to influence the provision of knowledge and information is explored next.

6.4.5.2 Influence on provision of knowledge and information
Starting with the private sector, one of its representatives believed that she could influence provision of knowledge and information from local offices, since she had a good relationship with them. As she mentioned:

“People in the Labour Force Office all know me. I have good connections. They often invite me as a speaker and every time we ask for cooperation, they always respond positively. When I requested documents or leaflets they provided them instantly.” (Private1)

On the contrary, an NPO representative reported that he could not do the same. He gave an example of a co-project with the Public Health Office in which officers would not apply the NPO approach.

“I opened a treatment centre in the border area of Chiang Mai, but the local Public Health Unit there insisted that I follow their approach. I could not convince them to use mine, so I did only one job and that was the last time I worked with them.” (NPO2)

He went on to give another example of failing to get cooperation from the Public Health Unit:

“I contacted the Public Health Unit in the village to say that our treatment programme did general health checks for patients. We asked for only one officer to come and help us in the mornings, but the head of the unit did not allow his subordinate to do this because he considered it not part of the job.” (NPO2)

NPO representatives not only perceived that they could not influence state agencies at the local level, they also considered it even more difficult to influence them at the...
national policy making level. Another interviewee also believed that it was difficult for non-state agencies to influence the contents of a drug policy. As he mentioned:

“I do not know what to say to them because we are not state agencies. It is not our responsibility to tell them what to do. I already have a lot of work on hand. Even if I suggested what they should do, they would not believe me anyway.” (NPO4)

A participant of the community group also pointed out how hard it was to influence the provision of knowledge and information. She told this researcher about her experience of being excluded from municipal meetings or events relating to drug issues.

“We are ready to work with the municipality, but they have never invited us to join their meetings or events. They informed every other community in the municipality except ours. They asked for the opinions of every community leader, but never came to me. However, I do not care. I just keep on doing my job. I am thinking of having a meeting within our community conducted by ourselves.” (Community5)

6.4.5.3 Influence on provision of legitimacy support

The last type of resource provision that non-state agencies could have impact on is legitimacy support from state agencies. The private sector’s apparent success in influencing provision of legitimacy is illustrated by evidence from a company that received several awards from government. As a company representative mentioned:

“All public agencies know that our company puts great emphasis on drug issues. We won various honours including the Excellent Drug-free Factory Award and we were winners of the ‘to be number one’ project. Our General Manager was awarded the certificate by Her Royal Highness Ubonratana and the former Prime Minister.” (Private1)

On the other hand, it seemed that the NPO group faced more difficulties in influencing provision of legitimacy. One of its representatives gave an example of its failure to obtain legitimacy support from the ONCB.
“We want endorsement from state agencies, not only for the centre, but also our staff. However, the ONCB has always managed to avoid giving us the credentials.” (NPO2)

Another participant also reported difficulties in convincing local officers to support the NPO’s work.

“It largely depends on the interests of an individual officer. If one is not interested in drug prevention or treatment issues, he does not pay any attention to what I have done at all. But the current district chief officer is quite supportive. However, we cannot rely entirely on local officers, since they also have their own duties. For example, I asked for support from the district security force to help look after our treatment programme, but they could not come because they had to watch over the political unrest at that time.” (NPO3)

The situation for NPOs was similar to that in the community group, as they both perceived that they could not influence provision of legitimacy from state agencies. One of the community group members said:

“It is very difficult to set up a group of people to negotiate with the public sector. Various organisations and groups have tried to establish civil organisation several times, but they failed.” (Community5)

Another interviewee mentioned the attempts of civil groups to transform their civil networks into public organisations in order to have more bargaining power with state agencies.

“We wanted our civil networks to become a public organisation, but it needed to be legalised by parliament, which would be a long process. Thus, we made proposals and had discussions with the Minister on several occasions. But when the proposal reached the Domestic Security Office, it was simply rejected, and all we could do was nothing but accept the decision.” (Community3)
In short, this study found that apart from one participating private company, non-state organisations perceived that they faced difficulties in imposing their influence on provision of legitimacy support from state agencies.

6.4.6 Summary of non-state sector resource dependence on the state sector

To summarise this study’s findings, it was found that different groups of non-state organisations had relatively varied perceptions toward their dependence on state resources. The Private sector appeared to perceive that they did not rely largely on resources from the state. However, the other two groups of non-state organisations; NPOs and communities, both tended to believe that they had more resource dependence on state agencies, but to differing degrees. The NPO group appeared to have less resource dependence on the public sector than the community, due to the fact that the former saw more available alternative resources than the latter. However, NPOs have tended to become more dependent on state resources, as accessibility to alternatives has become more difficult recently. Furthermore, most non-state organisations, which participated in this study, tended to perceive that they had no influence on provision of resources from the state sector.

6.5 Summary of the chapter

This chapter presented findings from qualitative data collection. The first part of it illustrated the perceptions of state officers’ perceptions on their resource dependence on the non-state sector. This research found that most state officers participating in this study tended to perceive that they hardly depended on non-state agencies for resources. However, the findings of the non-state sector appeared to be varied among different groups of organisations. NPO and community groups perceived more dependence on resources from state agencies rather than the private sector. The brief findings from this chapter are summarised in table 6.3 below. The implications of these findings on the emergence or existence of NG, as well as public management in Thailand and other developing countries, are discussed in the following chapter.
## Table 6.3 Summary of findings from qualitative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Dimension of dependence</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Magnitude</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>Perceived as important but not critical</td>
<td>Small number of NPOs working on drug issue, and they also perceived the low capacity of the community group</td>
<td>Some services could be done by other state agencies</td>
<td>Were not privileged from using state agency services</td>
<td>Some agencies could have influence, while some others found it was difficult to do obtain this</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information and expertise</td>
<td>Valued information from community groups but not from other non-state organisations</td>
<td>Obtained knowledge and information from community group</td>
<td>Obtained knowledge and information from other public agencies</td>
<td>Experienced some difficulties in obtaining information from other public agencies</td>
<td>Hard to influence if no laws or regulations stated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Rhetorically perceived as important but not put into practice</td>
<td>Only ONCB perceived that they gained legitimacy from non-state actors</td>
<td>None of participants mentioned alternatives in this respect</td>
<td>None of participant mentioned alternatives in this respect</td>
<td>Hard to influence if no laws or regulations stated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All resources</td>
<td>Ideologically perceived as important but not critical, and limited evidence of actions</td>
<td>Perceived that non-state contributed little to drug policy</td>
<td>Other state agencies, especially ONCB and local government, were perceived as alternatives</td>
<td>Accessing other public agencies’ resources could sometime be difficult</td>
<td>Where no law permitted, they could hardly influence the non-state sector to provide resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

193
### Chapter Six: Qualitative Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Dimension of dependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Business organisations were least dependent, whereas community groups and NPOs were more dependent. However, it was not critical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information and expertise</td>
<td>Business organisations were highly dependent on this resource, while community groups and NPOs were less dependent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>legitimacy</th>
<th>Business organisations were least dependent, whereas community groups and NPOs were more dependent but it was not critical.</th>
<th>Moderate extent of exchange with business organisations and community groups, but low magnitude of exchange with NPOs</th>
<th>Private sector perceived that legitimacy from within their organisations was an alternative, while NPOs perceived that personal affiliation was an alternative. Community groups perceived that social values and norms could be alternative.</th>
<th>Accessibility to legitimacy of business organisations depended on firms’ policies and leaders’ values. NPO and community groups seemed not to recognise the difficulty in gaining access to alternatives with regard to legitimacy.</th>
<th>Private sector could have substantial influence, while NPOs and community groups could have little influence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All resources</td>
<td>Business organisations highly regarded knowledge and information of state agencies, whereas the community groups and NPOs tended to perceive that state funding was important to them. All non-state organisations seemed not to value legitimacy support.</td>
<td>High magnitude of exchange in terms of funding with community groups and NPOs, while the magnitude of information and expertise was high with business organisations. Extent of legitimacy exchange was moderate in business and community groups, while it was quite low in NPOs.</td>
<td>All non-state organisations seemed to have alternatives to resources from state agencies.</td>
<td>Business organisations seemed to have most accessibility to alternative resources, however depended on the firm’s policies. NPOs and community groups had difficulties in accessing alternative funding.</td>
<td>Business organisations could have influence on the provision of knowledge and information and legitimacy, while NPOs and community groups could have little influence on all resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the key findings of the research in terms of the research questions and provides the implications of the findings with regard to the presence of NG in Thailand. The contributions of the research, together with its limitations and suggestions for future research, are also presented. Finally, this chapter ends with the conclusions emanating from this research.

7.2 Revisiting the research aim and the research framework

Before moving on to a discussion of the findings, it is important to revisit the aim and objectives of this study. The aim of this research, as illustrated in Chapter One, is to examine the nature of governance in Thailand in order to explore the extent to which such governance has shifted toward NG.

Why does governance in Thailand matter? This research was initially inspired by the evidence from the literature review in Chapter Two, which in many cases in developed countries, particularly in Europe and North America, governance has shifted towards a network form of governing. However, the empirical evidence from developing countries was relatively sparse compared to that related to developed countries.

NG in this research is defined as a form of governing such that public policies are formed and implemented through networks of government, business, and society actors (Klijn, 2008). But why do these actors come together to formulate and implement public policies? Several reasons account for the emergence of NG such as the failure of traditional bureaucratic systems (Bogason and Musso, 2006; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004), the nature of social problems which have become more sophisticated (O’Toole, 1997; O’Toole and Meier, 2004) and resource

In terms of the outlined explanations, this researcher, however, assumes that resource interdependence between the state and non-state organisations is a fundamental condition for NG to emerge. As Gray (1985:921) commented “Without the acknowledgement by the stakeholders that some fundamental interdependence exists, collaborative problem-solving efforts make no sense”. Hence, as illustrated in the latter part of Chapter Two, the resource dependence theory (RDT) was chosen to be the theoretical framework of the study with regard to exploring the NG phenomenon.

In the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the RDT proposes that organisations must struggle to survive. In order to survive, organisations must be effective and to achieve organisational effectiveness require certain resources, but resources from within the organisation are often inadequate. Thus, organisations need to acquire resources from external sources. However, necessary resources are believed to be scarce, and therefore organisations need to employ strategies to manage their environment in order to obtain the required resources. Establishing collective structures, as a negotiated environment strategy, is one of the strategies that organisations can employ to overcome the resource inadequacy posed by the environment. Interorganisational collaboration is likely to be established when two or more parties are mutually dependent on resources from one another. A symmetry resource interdependence relationship between two parties encourages the collaborative behaviour of organisations, whereas an asymmetrical relationship can discourage collaboration (Anderson and Weitz, 1989).

In the case of NG, resource interdependence between state agencies and non-state organisations is a fundamental condition for NG (Rhodes, 1997). Thus, the resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations was examined to imply the presence (or absence) of NG in Thailand.
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The network form of governance is claimed to be superior to other forms of governance. One of the prominent advantages of NG is that it is claimed to be the best way to handle complicated issues or ‘wicked problems’ in modern society (Ferlie et al., 2011). In Thailand, there are several issues that are considered to be anti-social. However, the illicit drug problem is one of the most critical problems that had been prioritised by most governments over the past three decades since it affects Thai society in many ways (ONCB, 2010b). Thus, this research has particularly focused on drug policy in Thailand.

Having provided the rationale for the study above, the objectives of this study were determined as follows:

1. To provide empirical evidence, from an RDT perspective, of the presence (or absence) of NG in developing countries using Thailand as a case study.

2. To propose practical suggestions for policy makers to improve the drug policy making and implementation in Thailand to suit the nature of governance.

In order to achieve the aim and objectives of the study, this research selected drug policy implementation in Chiang Mai province, Thailand, as a case study.

A set of research questions were formulated as follows:

1. To what extent, and how, did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration, depend on resources from each other?

2. How did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration interact?

3. How could the presence (or absence) of NG in the case under consideration be explained?

The key findings of each research question are presented accordingly.
7.3 Discussion of the key findings

7.3.1 Resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations

This section provides a summary and a discussion of key findings to the first research question.

‘To what extent, and how, did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration depend on resources from each other?’

7.3.1.1 Summary of findings

To answer this research question, both quantitative and qualitative research methods were employed as methods of inquiry. The findings from the quantitative data, as presented in Chapter Five, suggested that employees of both state agencies and non-state organisations who participated in this study perceived that they were moderately dependent on resources from another sector. The non-state sector, however, was slightly more dependent on resources from state agencies. The non-state organisations perceived that they were most dependent on information and expertise resources from state agencies, while they were least dependent on legitimacy support from the state sector. On the other hand, the participating employees in the state agencies perceived that they were most dependent on legitimacy support from the non-state sector, while they were least dependent on information and expertise from the non-state organisations. The magnitude of resource interdependence, which refers to how much interdependence exists in this relationship, was about 62 percent. The distribution of resource dependence, or the relative dependence of one party on another in the relationship, was 48.5 percent with regard to the state group and 51.5 percent with regard to the non-state group.

The findings in terms of the distribution of resource dependence allowed us to assess the relationship’s symmetry or asymmetry. In this case, the study suggested asymmetrical relationship between state and non-state organisations, which the non-state organisations were more dependent on resources from state agencies.

The findings derived from the qualitative research methods were, interestingly,
different from the findings derived from the quantitative method approach. As illustrated in Chapter Six, the study found that a number of the state officers who participated in this study perceived that they possessed sufficient resources and were dependent on resources from the non-state sector to only a limited extent.

Although the state agencies reported the importance of resources from the non-state sector, these resources were not critical, as work would continue even without external resources from non-state agencies. Moreover, the state officers perceived that the resources from non-state organisations contributed relatively little to the inputs and outputs of the drugs policy. In addition, a majority of the participating state officers perceived that the alternative sources of resources from non-state organisations were other state agencies, particularly local government. However, accessibility to these alternative public agencies was somewhat difficult for many of them. Laws and regulations were recognised as meaningful instruments for governmental agencies to exert influence over non-state organisations to provide needed resources; nevertheless, not every agency could utilise them effectively.

From the findings above, it can be concluded that the participating employees of public agencies recognised the resource dependence on non-state organisations, but noted that it was to a limited extent. This was because resources from non-state organisations were not recognised as being critical to them, that the contribution of the non-state sector’s resources to the drug policy was little, that other organisations within the state realm were perceived as alternatives to non-state organisations’ resources, and that the state agencies could utilise law and regulations as tools to influence non-state organisations to provide resources.

With regard to the non-state organisations’ dependence on state agencies’ resources, the qualitative approach found that different groups of non-state organisations had varied perceptions with regard to their dependence on state resources. Business organisations perceived that they hardly rely on funding from the state. However, they were most dependent on information and expertise from state agencies. The NPOs, on the other hand, tended to become more dependent on
state funding, since the alternative sources of funding from international agencies have become increasingly scarce. The community groups appeared to be most dependent on funding and legitimacy support from state agencies, since they did not recognise many alternatives to these resources apart from public agencies. It should be noted that the employees of most participating non-state organisations tended to perceive that they could hardly exert influence on state agencies to provide them with necessary resources. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide summaries of the findings in terms of both quantitative and qualitative data.

7.3.1.2 Discussion of findings

The quantitative findings illustrate that the extent of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations was moderate, approximately 62 percent. This finding was very similar to that of Saidel's study (1991). In her study, Saidel found that the extent of resource interdependence between state agencies and nonprofit organisations in New York State was about 60 percent. She suggested that although the finding illustrated substantial interdependence, it also indicated that each sector had relatively considerable autonomy over their resources.

Exorbitant magnitude of interdependence would consequently affect the autonomy of organisations in the relationship. Thus, it can be concluded that, in this case, there was a moderate magnitude of interdependence, thus both sectors maintained substantial autonomy over their own resources.

Regarding the distribution of resource dependence, this study also found similar findings to Saidel’s study (ibid) that non-state organisations were slightly more dependent on resources from state agencies than vice versa. The distribution of resource dependence suggested a relationship of near symmetry of resource interdependence between the two sectors. Saidel (ibid) commented that a symmetrical dependence relationship might affect the autonomy over resources within each sector, since some autonomy was inevitably lost due to the existence of interdependent relationships. However, Anderson and Weitz (1989) pointed out that the symmetry or asymmetry of resource interdependence had an impact on the
quality of interorganisational relations. They suggested that while asymmetrical dependence led to a less stable relationship which was likely to break up over time, symmetrical resource interdependence was likely to lead to collaborative behaviour on the part of interdependent organisations.

Interestingly, in terms of types of resources, the research found that the state agencies perceived that they most needed legitimacy support from the non-state sector, while they were least dependent on information and expertise from that sector. The non-state sector on the other hand, was most dependent on information and expertise from the state agencies, while least dependent on legitimacy support.

These findings appear to be different from those of Gazley and Brudney (2007) who found that governments seemed to offer financial resources to the nonprofit partner, while nonprofit organisations offered specialised expertise to the government partner. They noted that this exchange was consistent with the ‘hollow state’ concept, by which public services were outsourced to the non-state sector. However, the evidence of this study suggests a rather different situation that most public services in this case are largely delivered by state agencies, whereas the magnitude of service delivery by non-state organisations is limited. The fact that the governmental sector in this study needed legitimacy support from the non-state organisations more than expertise from them, suggested that the state agencies maintain their strong roles with regard to this policy, and legitimacy support from the non-state sector was required to merely legitimate their actions.

Considering merely the quantitative data, one might conclude that there was a high chance of NG to be present in the case study since the quantitative findings suggested nearly symmetry resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations which is a crucial condition for NG to emerge (Rhodes, 1997, Klijn, 2005). However, when the qualitative research was undertaken to triangulate the findings from the quantitative research, somewhat different results were obtained.
The qualitative findings showed that neither state agencies nor non-state organisations regarded resources from the other sector as being critical to their organisations. Although perceived as important, they considered the resources from the other sector as supplementary resources to their own resources, and they could continue to do their job even if the resources from the other sector were absent. In their opinion, it would be better to have the resources from other sector but they could do their job and survive without them. This qualitative result was rather in contradiction to the quantitative findings that showed a relatively high level of perceived importance of resources from the other sector.

Moreover, the qualitative research also found that the employees in the participating organisations in both sectors preferred to go seek alternatives within their own area of activity, if there were some available, rather than cross the sectoral boundaries to acquire resources from the other sector. The state agencies perceived that the necessary resources were available in other public agencies and local government. Legitimacy support from the non-state sector was found in the quantitative finding as the resource the state sector was most dependent on. However, the qualitative findings indicated that the need for legitimacy support was a consequence of coercive pressure from central government. If not mandated, they would value the legitimacy support from the non-state sector less.

The qualitative findings of this study support the idea of Casiaro and Piskorski (2005) who perceived the importance of resources and the availability of alternatives as determining conditions for inter-organisational collaboration. Given that the employees of the participating organisations did not recognise the criticality of resources from the other sector, and that there were some alternatives available, it can be conclude that the likelihood of NG being present in this case was less.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Research methods</th>
<th>Dimension of dependence</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Magnitude</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Perceived as important but not critical</td>
<td>Small number of NPOs working on drug issue, and they also perceived the low capacity of the community group</td>
<td>Some services could be done by other state agencies</td>
<td>Were not privileged from using state agency services</td>
<td>Some agencies could have influence, while some others found it was difficult to obtain this</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Valued information from community groups but not from other non-state organisations</td>
<td>Obtained knowledge and information from community group</td>
<td>Obtained knowledge and information from other public agencies</td>
<td>Experienced some difficulties in obtaining information from other public agencies</td>
<td>Hard to influence if no laws or regulations stated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Rhetorically perceived as important but not put into practice</td>
<td>Only ONCB perceived that they gained legitimacy from non-state actors</td>
<td>None of participants mentioned alternatives in this respect</td>
<td>None of participant mentioned alternatives in this respect</td>
<td>Hard to influence if no laws or regulations stated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Ideologically perceived as important but not critical, and limited evidence of actions</td>
<td>Perceived that non-state contributed little to drug policy</td>
<td>Other state agencies, especially ONCB and local government, were perceived as alternatives</td>
<td>Accessing other public agencies’ resources could sometime be difficult</td>
<td>Where no law permitted, they could hardly influence the non-state sector to provide resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct
Table 7.2 Summary of non-state organisations’ resource dependence: Comparison of quantitative and qualitative findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Research methods</th>
<th>Dimension of dependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>Magnitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business organisations were least dependent, whereas community groups and NPOs were more dependent. However, it was not critical.</td>
<td>Business organisations perceived low magnitude of exchange, while community groups and NPO groups perceived a moderate extent but the trajectory of exchange had been increasing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information and expertise</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business organisations were highly dependent on this resource, while community groups and NPOs were less dependent</td>
<td>High magnitude of exchange with business organisations but it was low in community groups and NPO groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business organisations were least dependent,</td>
<td>Moderate extent of exchange with business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All resources</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Business organisations highly regarded knowledge and information of state agencies, whereas the community groups and NPOs tended to perceive that state funding was important to them. All non-state organisations seemed not to value legitimacy support.</td>
<td>High magnitude of exchange in terms of funding with community groups and NPOs, while the magnitude of information and expertise was high with business organisations. Extent of legitimacy exchange was moderate in business and community groups, while it was quite low in NPOs.</td>
<td>All non-state organisations seemed to have alternatives to resources from state agencies.</td>
<td>Business organisations seemed to have most accessibility to alternative resources, however depended on the firm’s policies. NPOs and community groups had difficulties in accessing alternative funding.</td>
<td>Business organisations could have influence on the provision of knowledge and information and legitimacy, while NPOs and community groups could have little influence on all resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct
7.3.2 Interactions between state and non-state organisations

In the previous section we explored the resource interdependence between state and non-state sectors as a fundamental condition for NG, and found nearly symmetrical resource interdependence between them. This implied that there was a high chance of NG being present in the case under consideration. However, the qualitative research suggested that the respondents did not recognise resources from another sector as being critical for their organisations, and that there were some alternatives available which they could make use of. Given these conditions, this section explores the interactions between the state and non-state organisations as a response to the interdependent conditions provided earlier. This section aims to answer the second research question: ‘How did state and non-state organisations involved in the illicit drug policy implementation in Chiang Mai province, Thailand, interact? Were their interactions considered to be NG?’

7.3.2.1 Summary of the findings

These questions were addressed by the qualitative research. The study found that, firstly, interactions between state and non-state organisations were based on mandated rules and regulations from the central government. There were regulations from the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) which stated that at least two representatives from the non-state sector must be appointed in the provincial illicit drug control committee, together with nearly 50 representatives from state agencies. One of the non-state representatives was from the NPO established by the ONCB; another one was a senior editor from the local press. They were formally appointed to be part of the committee, and they received formal invitations for the monthly committee meeting. However, the representative from the NPO admitted that he only went to the meeting once and found that the meeting was dominated by state officials and his voice and opinions were ignored. He perceived little use of such a meeting. On the other hand, the local press representative attended every meeting he was invited to. However, most of the time he acted as a passive participant and had few chances to voice his opinion.
The state officials who acted as one of the committee members also revealed that the non-state representatives were not invited on many occasions, particularly when the meetings concerned security and confidential issues. The non-state agencies also revealed a similar situation in terms of information exchange, in that they would reserve important information to themselves, and tried to avoid revealing it to the state officials. This fact revealed that both the state and non-state actors did not genuinely trust each other.

Secondly, the research found a clear separation between the state and the non-state realms in the case under consideration. The state agencies tended to operate most of the drug policy programmes on their own. Although some funding was provided to non-state organisations to support their illicit drug control activities, joint activities between state and non-state organisations were rare. The non-state organisations, nonetheless, also tried to avoid receiving funding from the state agencies, given that some funding sources from international bodies were available. This was because they did not want to be bound by bureaucratic rules and regulations. Moreover, they did not want state officials to interfere with their work.

Lastly, the study found that non-state organisations were not recognised as being equal partners to the state agencies. They seemed to be passive agents who obtained resources from state agencies and provided resources for state agencies when they were requested. Many non-state participants in this study reported that they were treated like subordinates to the state officials.

7.3.2.2 Discussion of findings

The aforementioned interactions suggest that the interactions between state and non-state organisations in this case study were, by and large, influenced by central government mandates, the communication between them was formal, and the interactions were not based on trust. Moreover, the separation between state and non-state boundaries were clear, and the roles of the non-state actors in terms of the illicit drug policy were limited. These interactions were such as to make it reasonable to conclude that the governance of the illicit drug policy in this case study was not recognised as NG according to the definitions provided by

The finding suggests that the state played a dominant role with regard to drug policy, and therefore the governance in this case was not considered to be NG. The findings are congruent with several studies which suggest that governments tend to continue to do their jobs (Goodwin and Grix, 2011; Hysing 2008, 2009; Capano, 2011).

7.3.3 Explanations of network governance absence

The findings of the study suggest some degree of resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration. However, the investigation of state and non-state organisations’ interaction in this case indicated that it was not characterised as NG. This section provides explanations for the absence of NG in the case under consideration, and thus addresses the third research question: ‘How can the absence of NG in the case under consideration be explained?’

As discussed in Section 7.3.1, the quantitative finding illustrate that the magnitude of resource interdependence between state agencies and non-state organisations in this case was moderate, at approximately 62 percent. The relative dependence of state agencies on non-state organisations was approximately 48.5 percent, whereas the relative dependence of the non-state organisations on state agencies was approximately 51.5 percent. The qualitative research found that the state agencies perceived that the resources from non-state organisations were supplementary to their own resources, which implied that the resources from non-state sector were not critical to them. The magnitude of resource exchange with non-state organisations also seems to be limited. Moreover, the participating state officers perceived that alternative resources were available from other public agencies. In addition, the state agencies could employ laws and regulations as tools to influence non-state organisations to provide them with the necessary resources. Taking the quantitative and qualitative findings together, it can be concluded that the resource dependence relationships in this case were characterised as being moderate in magnitude with regard to dependence, and that there was
an imbalance of power between state and non-state organisations, in that the state agencies were less dependent on non-state agencies than was the case in reverse.

Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) studied the impact of mutual dependence (or, as regarded in this case study, the magnitude of dependence) and power imbalance on constraining the absorption strategy of an organisation. Their concept can be applied to explain the absence of NG in the case considered in this research. They suggest that the conditions of high mutual dependence and an imbalance in power, as found in this case, create two competing forces in the relationship. On the one hand, the power-advantaged party recognises the dependence on resources on the part of the lower-power party, and therefore attempts to stabilise the flow of resources provided by the power-disadvantaged party. On the other hand, the higher-power party will also be reluctant to embark on constraining absorption, since by doing so, they would lose their bargaining power advantage.

They also mentioned an additional effect of high mutual dependence and imbalanced power on the relationship, in that it would create an obstacle to the successful negotiation of exchanges. Power imbalance often hinders conflict resolution and therefore reduces the frequency of exchange between actors (Lawler and Yoon, 1996). Moreover, under the power imbalance conditions, information flows between potential exchange partners are likely to be obstructed (Giebels, De Dreu and de Vliert, 1998) and such obstacles tend to increase the frequency of confrontational behaviours such as the tendency to make more demands of, make fewer concessions to, and use coercive tactics against the potential partner (Lawler and Bacharach, 1987). Taking these facts together, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) conclude that actors are less likely to develop mutual satisfactory exchange relationships under imbalanced power conditions.

In the case of high mutual dependence, like the current study, Casciaro and Piskorski (ibid) proposed that the obstacles to negotiated exchange affect both parties, not only the power-disadvantaged one, to losses of exchange benefits and risk of failing to come to an agreement.
at all. They also noted that the obstacles to negotiated exchange created by power imbalance may be severe under the conditions when both parties aim to gain benefits from the exchange, and the power-disadvantaged actor becomes particularly intolerant of the demands of the power advantaged actor.

The effects of high mutual dependence and imbalanced power provided by Casciaro and Piskorski (ibid) could be applied to the absence of NG in this case study. Even though the study found a relatively high magnitude of dependence between state and non-state organisations, it was not sufficient to lead to NG, because of the imbalance of power between the state and the non-state organisations.

Although participants from the state sector, which was the power-advantaged party in this case, recognised the dependence of their organisations on resources from non-state agencies, they were reluctant to include the non-state sector in drug policy making and implementation, because they feared losing their control power over the policy output and outcomes. They preferred to collaborate with non-state organisations only when necessary, or when required by central government mandates, so that they could balance the two forces, one of which demanded that they collaborate with the non-state sector, and the other which demanded that they maintain their superior bargaining power in the relationship. Thus, we witnessed a limited degree of collaboration between state agencies and non-state organisations in this case study.

Given that the state party was the higher-power actor in the relationship, they often make coercive demands on the non-state party, particularly the demands to follow the bureaucratic rules and regulations and to achieve a targeted performance. Non-state organisations with more alternative resources, such as business organisations, would be less tolerant of the state agencies’ demands and, thus, the negotiation for resources exchange was likely to be unsuccessful. As a result, collaboration between state agencies and business organisations was rarely seen in this case study. Nonetheless, where the alternatives to state resources were limited, the non-state organisations tended to be more tolerant of the state’s coercion. The
NPOs, for example, have recently tended to become more tolerant of the bureaucratic demands, since their alternative sources of funding have become scarcer, whereas the community groups seem to be most tolerant of the state demands, since they are perceived to have limited access to alternatives to state agencies’ resources compared to other types of non-state organisations. As a consequence, we witnessed the greatest degree of collaboration between state agencies and community groups. However, the motivations of non-state agencies to collaborate with state agencies in this case were not sufficient to create NG.

In summary, this study argues that the statement that ‘If organisation A needs resources from organisation B and organisation B needs resources from organisation A, there is a good chance that cooperation will take place’ (Lundin, 2007: 653) was oversimplified. To achieve a comprehensive understanding of interorganisational relationships, one should also consider the power imbalance that exists in such a relationship, and which could have negative effects on the collaborative interactions between the potential partners.

In this study, both state and non-state organisations recognised a relatively high degree of resource interdependence. However, the asymmetrical or imbalanced power that existed in the relationship diminished the possibility that cross-sector collaboration would take place. This was due to the fact that the state agencies were reluctant to embark on collaboration with non-state organisations since they feared the loss of autonomy and control of the policy output and outcomes. Moreover, the imbalance of power also allowed state agencies to exert excessive demands on non-state organisations. However, under the condition that alternatives were available, the non-state party would be less tolerant of such coercive demands and, thus, they could opt for non-collaboration with state agencies. As a consequence, NG was absent from the case under consideration.

Aside from the explanation of the absence of NG from the RDT perspective discussed above, there were some other reasons that could also account for the absence of NG in this study. Firstly, trust has been identified by several scholars as being an important antecedent to
interorganisational collaboration (Lundin, 2007). Blau (1964) noted that trust is an important condition for the exchange of resources to occur. However, trust between state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration seemed to be weak. Therefore, a lack of mutual trust could be another condition that accounted for the absence of NG.

Secondly, share interest can be a powerful facilitator of collaboration, while diverging goals may diminish collaboration (O’Toole, 2003). Nonetheless, in this case, the goal congruence between state and non-state organisations to eliminate illicit drugs in the province was doubtful. The state agencies seemed to pay more attention to serving government policies, rather than being concerned with the well-being of people in the province. Where illicit drugs issue was prioritised by the government, the state agencies appeared to be more enthusiastic in achieving drug elimination goals. Without genuine goal congruence between the state and the non-state sectors, the development of NG in this case would be hindered.

Last but not least, institutional constraints also acted as a barrier to closer relationships between state and non-state organisations. Van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan (2011) found in their study, that although the actors acknowledged their interdependence, institutional barriers, cognitive differences, and the dynamics of interactions could block engagement in joint actions. In the current study, the institutional constraints included, for example, bureaucratic practices of the state agencies, disparate values and attitudes, and small and dispersed non-state agencies which focused purely on the illicit drug issue.

The absence of NG in the case under consideration was intensively discussed from the RDT perspective, together with other possible perspectives. A summary of the findings to each research question are presented in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Summary of key findings and conclusions according to research questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. To what extent, and how, did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration depend on resources from each other? | Quantitative data:  
- The magnitude of resource dependence between state and non-state organisations was moderate.  
- There was nearly symmetrical resource interdependence between state and non-state organisations, where non-state organisations were slightly more dependent on the resources from the state agencies than vice versa.  
- State organisations were most dependent on legitimacy and political supports from non-state organisations, while they were least dependent on information and expertise resources.  
- Non-state organisations were most dependent on information and expertise from state agencies, while they were least dependent on legitimacy support.  
| Qualitative data:  
- Although both state and non-state sectors perceived that resources from the counterpart sector were important, they was not critically important, as they could continue their work without the resources of the other sector  
- State agencies perceived that they possessed sufficient resources to carry out their tasks and they could find alternative resources from other state agencies.  
- Different types of non-state organisations were dependent on resources from state agencies to a different extent.  
- The non-state organisations were aware of flux and uncertainty in terms of obtaining resources from state agencies. Therefore, they tended not to rely on state agencies’ resources if there were some alternatives available.  | The findings suggested that there were positive conditions for NG in this case in that resource interdependence was found between the two sectors.  
The findings from the qualitative research illustrated rather different facts from the quantitative research. Given that both sectors perceived that resources from the other sector were not critical to them and they could find some alternatives to those resources, the possibility for NG to be present in this case was lessened.  |
### CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. How did state and non-state organisations in the case under consideration interact?</th>
<th>Qualitative data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Relationships between the state and non-state organisations were based on formal rules and regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication between state and non-state organisations was mostly formal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There were clear boundaries between the state and the non-state sector in this case. Although some funding was given to the non-state organisations to run illicit drug control activities, the joint activities between state and non-state organisations were rarely seen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State agencies tended to avoid collaborating with non-state organisations because they were aware of the loss of autonomy as a consequence of collaborating with non-state organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-state organisations were not recognised as equal partners. They seemed to be passive agents who obtained resources from state agencies and provided resources for state agencies when these were requested.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. How could the absence of NG in the case under consideration be explained?</th>
<th>Qualitative data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Although there was a relatively high magnitude of resource interdependence, it did not lead to NG, because there was an imbalance of power in the relationship.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Goal congruence and trust appeared to be weak in this case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional constraints hindered the possibility of NG in this case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interactions between state and non-state organisations in this case implied that NG was not present in the case under consideration. The empirical findings from this study support the idea that government still continues to play a dominant role in the public policy sphere, and governance in this case did not shift toward network form as illustrated elsewhere. Merely examining the extent of resource interdependence between two parties was not sufficient to understand the NG phenomenon. Power imbalance in the relationship should also be considered. Moreover, other factors should be taken into account.

Source: Author’s construct
7.4 Implications of the research for illicit drug policy in Thailand

The findings of the research lead to the conclusion that the illicit drug policy in Thailand was not managed through NG. The finding of this research were different from evidence found elsewhere, in which drug issues were managed through networks of state and non-state organisations, for example, in the UK in the case of cannabis reclassification (Acevedo and Common, 2006), the Swiss drug policy (Wälti et al., 2004), and drug policy implementation in California, USA (Percival, 2009).

Nonetheless, Wälti et al. (2004) raised concerns about the democratic accountability issue of NG in managing drug policy. Being aware of the democratic accountability issue, the author still believes that NG is the best form of governance when it comes to managing the illicit drug problem. The important question is that how can NG be encouraged in the Thailand context?

One possible way is to minimise obstacles to NG. The study found that bureaucratic rules and regulations are one of the main obstacles to NG in Thailand. Thus, the deregulation of unnecessary bureaucratic rules would probably help to reduce the barriers to NG in Thailand.

Moreover, the facilitating conditions for NG should also be encouraged, particularly trust and goal congruence between state and non-state organisations. A coercive approach was found to be unable to encourage sustainable networks because it was not based on a voluntary will to collaborate.

But can trust between state and non-state organisations be built? This definitely takes time, and organisational learning is important. In this case, the research found that the ONCB apparently demonstrated a positive attitude and developed good skills in working across-boundaries, but this was rarely any seen in other public agencies. Thus, reformers could encourage other public agencies to learn from the ONCB.
Networking skills trainings are also necessary for state officials. The study found that many of the state participants demonstrated a will to work with non-state organisations, but they did not know how to approach the non-state actors and go beyond the bureaucratic practices.

In summary, this research suggests that, in order to encourage NG practice with regard to the illicit drug policy in Thailand, the policy makers should be aware of potential obstacles, and encourage the facilitating conditions for NG. The deregulation of unnecessary bureaucratic rules is one of possible way of reducing barriers of NG. Moreover, this research suggests that most public agencies should learn to work across-boundaries, with the ONCB acting as a rather good example. Last, but not least, training in networking skills for state officials is a critical need if we want NG to take place in the study under consideration.

7.5 Summary of the research contributions

This research fills several current academic gaps. Firstly, it provides empirical evidence of NG in the context of a developing country. This is important since there is limited similar work in the current literature compared to evidence from developed countries. Secondly, RDT has applied as a theoretical framework to explain the phenomenon of NG in developing countries. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there have been no similar studies to date. Lastly, in terms of methodology, this research has extended the application of mixed methods in the area of NG which hitherto has been dominated by qualitative research. The findings based on different research methods, have complemented each other, and have lent better insight to the research topic.

Aside from the academic reasons mentioned above, this research also offers practical contributions to practitioners. The deregulation of some bureaucratic rules and the provision of appropriate training skills for state officials are encouraged in order to facilitate NG in the case under consideration. Moreover, based on the assumption that NG is more compatible when it comes to managing complex social
problems, understanding the fundamental conditions for NG to emerge can help encourage and sustain networks in public policy, so that the problems can be more effectively managed and the people affected by such policies can obtain a better quality of life.

### 7.6 Limitations of the research and suggestions for future research

Despite the several contributions that this research offers, it is not without its limitations. Firstly, this research relied on a single case study which limited the power of generalisation and the ability to make comparisons. Future researchers might consider doing multiple case studies. Secondly, this study examined the NG phenomenon from only one theoretical perspective, which was RDT. Other perspectives or theoretical approaches such as institutional theory, transaction cost theory, principal-agent theory, game theory, and cultural theory, should also be considered for a better understanding of NG, particularly in the context of developing countries. Thirdly, the scale of study was rather small due to limited time being available and limited financial resources. A larger scale of study is encouraged in future research. Last, but not least, there are many research topics under the umbrella of NG which remain to be considered. For example, the impact of the presence or absence of NG on policy performance in developing countries, the comparison of facilitating and hindering conditions with regard to NG between developed and developing countries, and the application of NG in other policy areas such as climate change and natural disaster management. This research is one among only a few that has explored the NG phenomenon in developing countries. There is much more room for further research on NG, particularly in the developing country context.

### 7.7 Concluding remarks

This research joins a broader debate on the changed nature of governance, whether or not the new form of governance that is characterised by networks, or so-called NG, which has surpassed the traditional form of governance. Changes in governance mode were examined through the resource interdependence
relationship between state and non-state organisations. The analysis suggests that even though resource interdependence between state and non-state sectors exists, the power imbalance between them, together with institutional and cognitive barriers, constrains their joint actions. Therefore, the change to NG in the under consideration case was not clearly witnessed. The research findings also suggest that government and state agencies continue to do their jobs and retain their dominant roles. Thus, the statement ‘governing without government’ is not applicable to this case.

7.7.1 Personal note

Some scholars suggest that the network mode of governance is the best way to handle ‘wicked problems’ that are pervasive in modern societies (Ferlie et al., 2011). However, others warn that new forms of governance may not always be better, more effective, more efficient, or even more democratic than the old ones (Capano, 2011). My position in this debate is that I believe that no governance mode is necessarily superior to any other. Any mode of governing yields both positive and negative outcomes. Although the shift to NG is not always desirable, I do believe that modern forms of governance are definitely needed in the situation where ‘wicked problems’ are pervasive, and NG has a strong potential to contribute to better public management in the Twenty-First Century.
Bibliography


220


IMF (2011) *Advanced Economies List*. World Economic Outlook, April 2011, p. 173


234


ONCB (2004a) ‘25 Years of Determination to Fight against Illicit Drugs’ Office of Narcotics Control Board Publication, Bangkok. (In Thai)


ONCB (2010b) ‘Office of the Prime Minister’s Statement: Operation of Sustainable Illicit Drugs Alleviation under the five-fence Strategy’ Office of Narcotics Control Board Publication, Bangkok. (In Thai)


Appendix One: Questionnaire for non-state group

Dear Respondent,

I am a PhD candidate at the Institute for Development Policy and Management, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. In accordance with the PhD research project conduction, I am writing to request for your benevolent assist for my doctoral dissertation by voluntarily filling this questionnaire. I am currently working on the research project which aims to study the relationship between the Non-state Organisations and Public Sector within the realm of Drug Policy in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Your responses will be kept strictly confidential and only applied in academic analysis only. Besides, the data processed will be presented as the entire population without any specific quotation to any particular respondent. If you have any further enquiries regarding any aspects of this research, please contact the researcher without any hesitations at 084 151 7364.

I am highly grateful for your assistance in this research.

Yours faithfully,
Patamawadee Jongruck

Structure of questionnaire

The questionnaire composes of 3 sections as follows:

Section 1: Relationships between your organisation and state agencies

Section 2: Personal information of respondent

Section 3: Additional opinions
Questionnaire for non-state organisations

Section 1: Relationship between your organisation and state agencies

Has your organisation ever worked with any state agencies in drug policy?
(    ) No, why?..........................................................................................................
(    ) Yes, please identify the state agencies you have worked with
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

If No, please proceed to section 2
If Yes, please tick (✓) in the boxes below according to the degree of agreement to the statements on the left-hand column. The least agreement to the statement is (1) and the most agreement to the statement is (7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship with state agencies</th>
<th>Degree of agreement to statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1     2     3     4     5     6     7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Funding**

1. Funding from the state agencies is vitally important for the operation of drug policy programmes of our organisation

2. We receive funding from the State agencies to operate our drug policy programmes.

3. There are suppliers that can provide us funding other than state agencies

4. If needed, we have access to funding from different sources other than state agencies

5. We can influence the state agencies to allocate funding to our organisation to operate drug policy programmes.

**Information and expertise**

6. Information and expertise of state agencies is vitally important for the operation of drug policy programmes of our organisation.

7. We use the information and
| expertise provided by state agencies in the operation of drug policy programmes |
| 8. There are suppliers of information and expertise needed in the operation of drug policy programmes other than state agencies |
| 9. If needed, we have access to information and expertise about the operation of drug policy programmes from different sources other than state agencies |
| 10. We can influence the decision makings of state agencies to provide the information and expertise needed in the operation of the drugs policy programmes |

**Legitimacy**

| 11. Being authorised by the state agencies is vitally important for our organisation to gain legitimacy to run the drug policy programmes |
| 12. We have been authorised by the State agencies to operate drug policy programmes. |
| 13. There are sources of legitimacy other than the authorisation of state agencies in the operation of the drug policy programmes |
| 14. If needed, we can gain legitimacy to operate drug policy programmes from different sources other than state agencies |
| 15. We can influence the decision making of state agencies to authorise our organisation to operate drug policy programmes. |

**Section 2: Personal information of respondent**

Gender: ( ) Male ( ) Female

Age: .................

Position: ...............................................................................................................................

Affiliated organisation: ........................................................................................................

Total period of working..........................year(s)

Period of working in current organisation.........year(s)
Section 3: Additional comments

Thank you very much for your kind cooperation
Appendix Two: Questionnaire for state group

Dear Respondent,

I am a PhD candidate at the Institute for Development Policy and Management, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. In accordance with the PhD research project conduction, I am writing to request for your benevolent assist for my doctoral dissertation by voluntarily filling this questionnaire. I am currently working on the research project which aims to study the relationship between the Public Sector and Non-state Organisations within the realm of Drug Policy in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Your responses will be kept strictly confidential and only applied in academic analysis only. Besides, the data processed will be presented as the entire population without any specific quotation to any particular respondent. If you have any further enquiries regarding any aspects of this research, please contact the researcher without any hesitations at 084 151 7364.

I am highly grateful for your assistance in this research.

Yours faithfully,

Patamawadee Jongruck

Structure of questionnaire

The questionnaire composes of 3 sections as follows:

Section 1: Relationships between your organisation and non-state organisations

Section 2: Personal information of respondent

Section 3: Additional opinions
Questionnaire for state agencies

Section 1: Relationships between your organisation and non-state organisations*

*Note: non-state organisations include business organisations, non-profit organisations, and community.

- Business organisations refers to private owned and for-profits organisations such as firms, enterprises, factories, estates, media, or other private owned business etc.

- Non-profit organisations refer to the organisations that are: legally founded for public interests and not-for-profit purposes; have their own policies and administrative structures; not part of governmental organisations although founded or funded by the government. The non-profit organisations are, for example, International and domestic Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), foundations, religious institutions, political parties etc.

- Community refers to groups of people in particular locality that gathers, either formally or informally, for the purpose of their local interests in particular

**Has your agency ever worked with any non-state sector in drug policy?**

(    ) No because...........................................................................................................................

If No, please proceed to section 2

(    ) Yes, please identify the state agencies you have worked with

.................................................................................................................................................................

If Yes, please tick ( ✓ ) in the boxes below according to the degree of agreement to the statements on the left-hand column. The least agreement to the statement is (1) and the most agreement to the statement is (7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship with non-state organisations</th>
<th>Degree of agreement to statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1   2   3   4   5   6   7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Service delivery**

1. Drug policy programmes delivered by non-state organisations is vitally important for the operation of drug policy programmes of our organisation

2. Most of the drug policy programmes of our organisation are delivered by non-state organisations
3. There are NO suppliers that can deliver the drugs policy programmes other than non-state organisations

4. We have NO access to service delivery of drug policy programmes by other sources apart from non-state organisations

5. We can NOT influence the decision makings of non-state organisations on the provision of the drugs policy programmes

**Information and expertise**

6. Information and expertise of non-state organisations is vitally important for the operation of drug policy programmes of our organisation

7. We use the information and expertise provided by non-state organisations in the operation of drug policy programmes

8. There are NO suppliers of information and expertise needed in the operation of drug policy programmes other than non-state organisations

9. We have NO access to information and expertise about the operation of drug policy programmes from different sources other than non-state organisations

10. We can NOT influence the non-state organisations to provide the information and expertise needed in the operation of the drugs policy programmes

**Legitimacy**

11. Participation of non-state organisations is vitally important for our organisation to gain legitimacy to run the drug policy programmes

12. Non-state organisations always participate in the operation of drug policy programmes
13. There are NO sources of legitimacy other than the participation of non-state organisations in the operation of the drug policy programmes

14. We can NOT gain legitimacy to operate drug policy programmes from other sources apart from non-state organisations

15. We can NOT influence the non-state organisations to participate in the operation of the drugs policy programmes

**Section 2: Personal information of respondent**

Gender: ( ) Male  ( ) Female

Age: .....................

Position: ..............................................................................................................................

Affiliated organisation: ...........................................................................................................

Total period of working ...................year(s)

Period of working in current organisation ..........year(s)

**Section 3: Additional opinions**

________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

*Thank you very much for your kind cooperation*
Appendix Three: Guide of interviews

I. Interview questions for interviewees from non-state organisations

1. General in formation of the interviewees
   1.1 Please introduce yourself: i.e. name, age, affiliated organisation, position, length of work in this organisation.
   1.2 What are your roles/ your organisation’s roles in the illicit drug policy?

2. Resource dependence on the state agencies
   2.1 What are the state agencies that you have been working with so far in the illicit drug policy?
   2.2 How did you initially get to work with these public agencies?

   Funding
   2.3 Did you receive any funding from the state agencies? If so, how much and from what agencies? If not, why?
   2.4 When you need the financial support from the state agencies, did they always provide you the requested amount of funding? If so, how did you manage to do that? If not, why?
   2.5 If you did not get the financial support from the state agencies, could you still do the job? How? Why?
   2.6 Were there any other organisations that you can obtain funding other than the state agencies? What were those organisations?
   2.7 How did you find accessing to those alternative sources of funding?
   2.8 Do you think the state funding has any impacts on you organisational performance on the drug policy? If so, how? If not, why?

   Knowledge and information
   2.9 Did you or your organisation receive the training or information relating to the illicit drug policy from the state agencies? If so, to what extent and from what agencies? If not, why?
2.10 When you need the information or knowledge from the state agencies, did they always provide you the requested information and knowledge? If so, how did you manage to do that? If not, why?

2.11 If you did not obtain the information and knowledge from the state agencies, could you still do the job? How? Why?

2.12 Were there any other sources that you can obtain knowledge and information other than the state agencies? What were those organisations?

2.13 How did you find accessing to those alternative sources of knowledge and information?

2.14 How do you think the knowledge and information from the state agencies has impacts on you organisational performance on the drug policy? If not, why?

Legitimacy/policy access

2.15 To what extent did you or your organisation have a chance to participate in the illicit drug policy process? If so, how and with what state agencies? If not, why?

2.16 When you or your organisation wanted to participate in the illicit drug policy process, did the state agencies always provide you a chance to do so? If so, how did you manage to do that? If not, why?

2.17 If you did not have a chance to participate in the illicit drug policy process, could you still do the job? How? Why?

2.18 Were there any other alternatives that you or your organisation could obtain the access to the illicit drug policy process? What were those organisations?

2.19 How did you find accessing to those alternative sources of policy access?

2.20 How do you think the access to the illicit drug policy process has impacts on you organisational performance on the drug policy? If not, why?
II. **Interview questions for interviewees from state agencies**

3. **General in formation of the interviewees**

3.1 Please introduce yourself: i.e. name, age, affiliated organisation, position, length of work in this organisation.

3.2 What are your roles/ your organisation’s roles in the illicit drug policy?

4. **Resource dependence on the non-state organisations**

4.1 What are the non-state organisations that you have been working with so far in the illicit drug policy?

4.2 How did you initially get to work with these non-state organisations?

**Service delivery**

4.3 Did your organisation have any services/programmes relating to the illicit drug policy being delivered by the non-state organisations? If so, to what extent and what were those non-organisation? If not, why?

4.4 If you need the non-state organisations to deliver the services relating to the illicit drug policy, did they always response to your request? If so, how did you mange to do that? If not, why?

4.5 If you did not get the service delivery from the non-state organisations, could you still do the job? How? Why?

4.6 Were there any other organisations that can deliver the services other than the non-state organisations? What were those organisations?

4.7 How did you find accessing to those alternative sources of service delivery?

4.8 Do you think the service delivery by the non-state organisations has any impacts on you organisational performance on the drug policy? If so, how? If not, why?

**Knowledge and information**

4.9 Did you or your organisation receive the knowledge or information relating to the illicit drug policy from the non-state organisations? If so, to what extent and from what organisations? If not, why?
4.10 When you need the information or knowledge from the non-state organisations, did they always provide you the requested information and knowledge? If so, how did you mange to do that? If not, why?

4.11 If you did not obtain the information and knowledge from the non-state organisations, could you still do the job? How? Why?

4.12 Were there any other sources that you can obtain knowledge and information other than the non-state organisations? What were those organisations?

4.13 How did you find accessing to those alternative sources of knowledge and information?

4.14 How do you think the knowledge and information from the non-state organisations has impacts on you organisational performance on the drug policy? Why?

**Legitimacy/political support**

4.15 To what extent did you or your organisation have a chance to participate in the illicit drug activities organised by the non-state organisations? If so, how and with what non-state organisations? If not, why?

4.16 When you or your organisation wanted to participate in the illicit drug activities operated by the non-state organisations, did the non-state organisations always provide you a chance to do so? If so, how did you mange to do that? If not, why?

4.17 If you did not have a chance to participate in the illicit drug activities operated by the non-state organisations, could you still do the job? How? Why?

4.18 Were there any other alternatives that you or your organisation could obtain the political support apart from the non-state organisations? What were those organisations?

4.19 How did you find accessing to those alternative sources of policy access?
4.20 How do you think getting political support from the non-state organisations has impacts on your organisational performance on the drug policy? Why?