Crossing Borders: The Implications of Labour Migration on Well-being for the Rural Households in Northeast Thailand

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2011

JOON-HO MAENG

Institute for Development Policy and Management

SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
# Table of Contents

Table of Contents .......................... 2  
List of Tables ................................ 5  
List of Figures ................................ 6  
List of Photographs ....................... 6  
Abstract .................................... 7  
Declaration .................................. 8  
Copyright .................................. 9  
Acknowledgement ........................... 10

## 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction ........................... 11  
1.2 Objectives of the Study ............... 14  
1.3 Research Questions ................... 16  
1.4 Conceptual Framework ............... 18  
1.5 The Role of Migration in Development Process in Asia 21  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis ............. 28

## 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction ......................... 31  
2.2 Theories of International Migration: An Overview 33  
   2.2.1 Classical Theories ................. 33  
   2.2.2 Structuralist and Marxist Theories 37  
   2.2.3 Other Theories .................... 41  
2.3 Remittances ......................... 45  
   2.3.1 Micro-impacts .................... 47  
   2.3.2 Macro-impacts .................... 50  
2.4 Impacts of Remittances on Poverty and Inequality 53  
   2.4.1 Remittances and Poverty .......... 53  
   2.4.2 Remittances and Inequality ...... 56  
2.5 Migration, Remittances and Gender .... 59  
2.6 Impacts of Migration and Remittances on Development 63  
   2.6.1 Micro-level ...................... 63  
   2.6.2 Meso-level ...................... 65  
   2.6.3 Macro-level ...................... 67  
2.7 Conclusion ............................ 70

## 3 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THAILAND

3.1 Introduction .......................... 76  
3.2 Political Economy of Thailand in Migration Context 77  
   3.2.1 Trade and Market ............... 77  
   3.2.2 Disparities in Growth ............ 81
List of Tables

Table 3-1 GDP per Capita and per Capita Growth Rate in Southeast Asia, 2006  78
Table 3-2 Selected Social Indicators of Thailand and Neighbouring GMS Countries  79
Table 3-3 Thailand Poverty Head Count Ratio Classified by Region, 1996-2006  83
Table 3-4 Demographic Indicators for Selected East and Southeast Asian Countries, 2007  85
Table 3-5 Officially Deployed Overseas Thai Workers, 1997-2007  94
Table 3-6 Sex Ratio of Overseas Thai Workers, 1999-2007  96
Table 3-7 Education Levels of Overseas Thai Workers, 1999-2007  97
Table 3-8 Occupations of Overseas Thai Workers by Sex, 2002-2007  98
Table 4-1 Top Ten Districts Experiencing International Labour Migrants by Sex  111
Table 4-2 Distribution of Targeted Household Samples by Villages in Selected Districts  112
Table 5-1 Characteristics of International Migration from Northeast Thailand by Sex of Migrants  127
Table 5-2 Destination Regions for International Migration by Sex of Thai Migrants  128
Table 5-3 Reasons for Migration by Destinations and Sex of Thai Migrants  134
Table 5-4 Economic Reasons for Migration by Characteristics of Migrant  135
Table 5-5 Consultants Concerning Migration Decision  137
Table 5-6 Persons Consulted Regarding on the Migration Decision by Characteristics of Migrants  138
Table 5-7 Comparison of Local Income between Households with and without Migrants  139
Table 5-8 Channels of Migration by Migration Helpers  140
Table 5-9 Channels of Migration by Characteristics of Migrants  141
Table 5-10 Source of Money Used by Migrants for Migration Fees  142
Table 5-11 Percentage Distribution of International Migrants by Relationship to Household Head  144
Table 5-12 Socio-Demographic/Economic Characteristics of Households with/without Migrants  146
Table 6-1 Predictions for the Effects of Variables on the Probability of Remitting from Migrants  155
Table 6-2 Descriptive Statistics of Male and Female Migrants and Their Origin Households  160
Table 6-3 Logistic Regression Models of whether Migrants Remitted to Their Origin Household  163
Table 7-1 Mean (S.D.) Characteristics of Households with and without Overseas Labour Migrants  171
Table 7-2 Regression Equations Coefficients (S.D.) predicting Household Income  174
Table 7-3 Regression Equations Coefficients (S.D.) predicting Household Objective Well-being  177
Table 7-4 Regression Equations Coefficients (S.D.) predicting Household Subjective Well-being  179
Table 7-5 Components of Household Income and Household Well-being Differentials  181
Table 7-6 Poverty Lines and Poverty Incidence in Thailand, 1988 to 2002  183
Table 7-7 Impacts of Migrant Remittances on Income, Poverty and Inequality  186
Table 8-1 Parents’ Absence and Its Effect  203
List of Figures

Figure 1-1  Conceptual Framework for the Study 20
Figure 3-1  Poverty Head Count Ratio and Number of Poor in Thailand, 1990-2006 82
Figure 3-2  Proportion of Poor Households by Economic Activity in Thailand, 2006 82
Figure 3-3  Demographic Transition in Thailand, 1965-2050 85
Figure 3-4  Estimated Annual flow of Workers from Asia to the Middle East, 1977-1996 89
Figure 3-5  Number of Overseas Thai Workers by Region, 2007 95
Figure 3-6  Number of Overseas Thai Workers by Age Group, 2007 96
Figure 3-7  Remittances of Overseas Thai Workers, 1997-2007 100
Figure 4-1  Map of Thailand and the Location of the Case Study Area 109
Figure 4-2  Map of Udon Thani Province and the Volume of International Labour Migrants 110
Figure 4-3  The Location of Survey Villages in Udon Thani Province, Thailand 112
Figure 4-4  Map of Case Study Village in Muang District, Udon Thani 115
Figure 8-1  Children’s Opinion about Changes in Their Lives When Their Parents Work Abroad 204

List of Photographs

Photograph 4-1  A Main Dirt Road 114
Photograph 4-2  Pick-Up Truck and Skylab 116
Photograph 4-3  The Various Types of Houses in Udon Thani, Northeast Thailand 117
Abstract

This thesis looks at the relationship between labour migration and socio-economic well-being of the rural households in the communities in Northeastern Thailand, and provides one of the few detailed case studies of the costs and benefits of labour mobility within Southeast Asian labour market system. This research aims to deepen our understanding of the implications of labour migration at micro-level. More specifically, the study aims to examine ‘how much such labour migration and remittances do support the rural households and their family members left-behind?’ by seeking a holistic assessment based on well-being perspectives with mixed-methods approach.

To appreciate this question, we must first understand that there has been rapid economic development and change in Thailand over the past decades, and Thailand is now a leading economy in Southeast Asia that is evolving into a global and regional migration hub for outgoing, incoming, and transiting migrants. The rural communities in Northeastern Thailand, however, have experienced economic and environmental marginality, and as a result, have developed an institutionalised and self-sustaining migration culture after the Vietnam War in 1975. Yet existing research does not tell us much about what are the consequences of the labour migration on well-being for the households in this area. The research explores associations between remittance behaviours and gender difference using sex-disaggregated data, measures dimensions of poverty alleviating effects on the three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indices, and assesses economic well-being of the rural households (on the basis of differing participation in labour migration) and non-economic well-being of the family left-behind.

On the evidence of this research with various levels of significance in regression analyses, international labour migration and remittances have several implications on rural households in Northeastern Thailand. Firstly, the results show that women and migrants from poorer households behave more altruistically, while men and migrants from richer households behave more contractually. These heterogeneities in remittance behaviours also linked to the asset accumulation patterns for migrants’ own future well-being and related to inheritance culture of the rural Thais. Secondly, labour migration is a rational economic strategy of rural households to combat poverty and to improve economic well-being. The analysis reveals clearly that the entire income gap and most of the gap in economic well-being between households with and without migrants can be accounted by availability of remittances. However, the remittances also increase economic inequality (i.e. disparities in well-being) among households in the communities as well-known. Finally, the absence of adult children (for the elderly) or parents (for children) because of international labour migration does not create major disruptions of the non-economic well-being of the family members. The possibilities for frequent correspondence, returns, and the economic benefits of migration contribute to cushion the negative impacts of migration. Most of all, the extended family system plays a decisive role in functioning as a support mechanism.
Declaration

I, Joon-Ho Maeng, hereby, declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Copyright

The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproduction”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of the thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.
Acknowledgement

Throughout my life, I have received a warm hearted encouragement and love more than I deserve from a number of people. In this respect, this study is not an exception. Without their devoted love and support, I could not have finished even the first chapter of this thesis. At this moment, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to them.

Above all, I would like to give my thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Sarah Bracking, who has given me the most invaluable insights and guidance in the whole process of this study. Her insightful comments and instructions have been always sufficient to quench my thirst for knowledge. I also appreciate my second supervisor, Dr. Hulya Ulku, who continuously stimulated my intellectual curiosity and facilitated my thinking process.

I would like to say thanks and best wishes to all of my friends at Manchester, in particular, Dr. Woojin Kang and members of Korean Grace Church who has encouraged and supported me throughout my PhD duration. I have enjoyed enormously being with them and their names will always stay fresh and vivid in my memory.

This study would have not been possible without the support of Mr. Jorge Carrillo-Rodriguez. He has introduced me many key persons for my fieldwork research and helped me to do lots and lots of bothersome works.

Last but not least, I would like to convey my thanks and love to my wife Heejung and beloved June-young who make me feel the happiest husband and daddy in the world; and to all my family members, especially for my parents who support me sincerely from the beginning of my study in UK and show their affection all the time. Words are not enough to express my utmost thanks. Finally, I would like to praise my God who led me this far and showed His mercy and grace on me in the time of need.
1 Introduction

1.1 INTRODUCTION

“When you are poor, you have to go.” (62-year old female, explaining why two of her four children had left their village to find jobs in overseas)

“In my youth, we liked to go work in the rice fields to help our households. All our friends did the same. Now children go to school for many years and they don’t want to do agricultural work.” (58-year-old male)

“Most of young return migrants stated that they want higher income and new lifestyle. Even if their households still have land for cultivation or have the ability to buy new land, they think working in rice fields is somewhat out-of-fashioned.” (Migration official, TOEA Office in Udon Thani)

These three quotations are drawn from the fieldwork undertaken in Northeast Thailand in year 2008, and reflect the differentiated and complex contexts within which human mobility occurs. Looking across the rich literature on migration in Asia and beyond, it is clear that migration has multiple causes and results (Chantavanich, 2001).

Migration may be propelled by poverty, and encouraged by wealth; it may reflect resource scarcities at the local level, or be an outcome of prosperity; it may be embedded in economic transformations, or better explained by social and cultural changes; it may
narrow inequalities in source communities, or widen them; it may tighten the bonds of dependency between migrants and their origin households, or it may serve to loosen or break these bonds; it may help to support agricultural production, or it may be a means to break away from farming altogether. As Waddington (2003) make clear in their review of the literature on migration choice, there are very few generalisations that can be drawn from the array of literature and evidence.

International migration has become an integral and inevitable feature of globalisation, and it has become a structural and permanent element of societies and economies (United Nation, 2007). The movement of people across borders in search of better economic opportunities or safety is a long-standing characteristic of societies in the world today. Temporary (or circular) labour migration is the predominant type of labour migration found in Asia, whereby millions of left-behind families are maintaining a better living in their home countries (Piper, 2004). Remittances and interactions among migrants as they travel, between migrant workers and others in the destination areas and back home are a source of development for families and communities of origin. The relationship between migration and development, that is, whether out-migration stimulates development or hinders development for sending countries, has been a prolific domain of migration research since the beginning of the debate in the 1970s (see Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Hugo, 2003; Cohen, 2005; Parnwell, 2005; De Haas, 2005, 2007).

Although the debate over the relationship is almost three decades old, most existing analyses still focus exclusively on economic development. Piper (2004) argues that the economist bias that characterises much of the discourse on the migration-development
nexus masks the potential for broader development implications of migration for the migrants and their families.

This study attempts to advance the migration-development debate by emphasising the role of migration in promoting socio-economic well-being at the household level. More specifically, drawing on fieldwork data, this research documents the relationships between migration and development by showing how migration and remittances create a condition that affects economic and also non-economic well-being of households. The study attempts to push migration-development debates beyond the realm of economic development by a close consideration of family dynamics. Migration outcomes affect, first and foremost, families in developing countries (Pflegerl et al., 2003). This is because migrants are socialised to see the principles of ‘for the sake of the family’ at the cost of personal narrow interests. To them, remittance bears explicit social meaning and is “embedded in social relations of kinship” (Goldring, 2004: 820). Studies of migration have shown that any assessment of the impact of out-migration on sending communities cannot be understood outside of the context of the households in the developing world (Asis, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Wong et al, 2003).

Asis (2003) maintains that the migration of individuals in the developing world is part and parcel of family strategies for survival or mobility. Population mobility is not an accident – it occurs in and across economic, social and cultural spaces with particular reasons and with particular outcomes. She emphasises the impact of migration on Asian families in relation to sending and receiving countries. Yeoh et al also highlight that “the principle of ‘for the sake of the family’ or ‘all in the family’ – a principle which mobilises family members to work towards common interests and is one of the mainstays of the ideology of
Asian familialism – is clearly embedded in the Asian migration process” (Yeoh et al, 2002:27). As Grasmuck and Pessar (1991: 15) argue, “it is not individuals but households that mobilise resources and support, receive and allocate remittances, and make decisions about member’s production, consumption and distribution activities”. Therefore, this study deems it crucial to focus on the household as a unit of analysis for investigating the implications of international labour migration.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study is set forth in the pluralist frameworks as we will see in section 1.4. The study rests on the basic premise that migration of a family member is often livelihood strategies for households, based on their own cost and benefit calculations.

The main objective of the research is to deepen our understanding of the impacts of international labour migration and remittances on the households of origin in the rural Thai context. More specifically, the study aims to examine how much such migration and remittances affect the well-being of households and their livelihoods in rural society both in economic and social aspects. This research tries to understand the dynamic interactions between macro and micro levels within the context in which international migration takes place. Using primary and secondary data sources from Northeast (Udon Thani province) Thailand, the study attempts to extend our knowledge about international migration and its impacts on rural villages.
The approach for the main research question will be four-fold. The first part analyses the main features of international population mobility from Northeast Thailand. It investigates the important characteristics of out-migration as well as those of households which have experienced the out-migration of their members.

Second, shifting attention to individual out-migrants, this research examines the significance and difference of selected factors associated with migrants’ remittance behaviour between male and female. In recent years, along with increased population mobility, many developing countries have experienced a feminisation of migration streams. Growing evidence indicates that women often constitute a significant part of the flows and that women also migrate to seek better opportunities (United Nations, 2002). However, gender analysis in shaping remittance behaviour and its connection to migrants’ well-being is very limited. This research should contribute to filling important knowledge gaps concerning sex differentials in migration and remittance behaviour and their ultimate consequences for the households of origin.

Third, focusing on households, the study appraises the impacts of remittances on the living standards including poverty, inequality and economic well-being of households. In many developing countries, sending money home is a common behaviour of temporary and/or permanent migrants. Yet, comparatively little research has been done to analyse the overall effects of migration and remittances on poverty, inequality and the well-being at micro level – even the scale of migrant remittances is quite huge, there is no consensus on the effects of these earnings on rural poverty and the socio-economic well-being of the households. If migration were a livelihood strategy for poor households, as the migration theories posit, remittances may constitute a significant portion of income for those
households that receive them, and have a poverty reduction effect and increase economic well-being of the households.

Fourth, the study explores the social aspects of international migration in rural household context. There is still a limited understanding on the social impacts on the family left-behind caused by migration. Fewer studies have progressed to investigating in details, this study attempts to establish such a link between labour mobility and social issues since migration is not merely the movement of individual migrant but there are family members who stay in origin households. The analysis is focused on especially the two immobile family members – the elderly and the children.

This study utilises both quantitative and qualitative data. The choice of the country is appropriate, as international migration has been a major component of population dynamics in Thailand. As described in Chapter 3, the country has experienced a high level of labour migration over the past few decades. Flows have been to various international destinations, especially its adjacent regions in Asia, in association with Thailand's economic development. The principle source of data to be used in this study is the fieldwork-based household survey and interviews. More details on data are presented in Chapter 4.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis looks at the relationship between labour migration and socio-economic well-being of the rural households in the villages in Northeast Thailand. The central research question for this study is “how much international labour migration and remittances do
support the rural households and the family members left-behind in terms of well-being?”

By seeking a holistic assessment based on well-being perspectives with mixed-methods approach, the study will examine the following research questions:

Labour Mobility and Its Linkage to Well-being

- What are the main patterns of international labour migration from Northeast Thailand and its links with the well-being effect (i.e. is there any evidence that shows the migrants’ destination and its relation to their household’s well-being?)

Remittances Behaviour by Gender and Migrants’ Future Well-being

- What patterns are examined in money transfer between migrants and households, and how are these patterns related to theoretical approaches on remittances behaviour?
- Is there any difference in remittances behaviour between male and female migrants, and if so, what drives them to behave differently in relation to different well-being effects?

Migrant Remittances and Economic Well-being

- How much the remittances sent by migrants boost household economic well-being?
- Is there a significant effect on poverty and inequality between households with and without migrants due to remittances?

Labour Migration and Non-economic Well-being

- Are there any other (both in positive and negative) impacts on family members left-behind besides material well-being caused by out-migration?
• What are the socio-cultural changes in households that take place as a result of international labour migration in terms of well-being?

1.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) emerged in the 1990s (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999), mainly within the American research context as a response to developmentalist and neoclassical theories and structuralist theory (see Chapter 2 for more details). Such approaches seemed too rigid and determinist to deal with the complex realities of the migration and development interactions. NELM offered a much more subtle view of migration and development, which links causes and consequences of migration more explicitly (de Haas, 2005).

Stark (1991), in particular, revitalised academic thinking on migration from the developing world by placing the behaviour of individual migrants within a wider societal context and considering the ‘household’ – rather than the individual – as the most appropriate decision-making unit (Taylor, 1999). This new approach models migration as the risk-sharing behaviour of households. Better than individuals, households are able to diversify resources such as labour in order to minimise income risks (Stark, 1991). This approach integrates motives other than individual income maximisation that play a role in migration decision-making. Migration is perceived as a household response to income risks since migrant remittances serve as income insurance for households of origin (Lucas and Stark, 1985). This can theoretically explain why people migrate even in the absence of substantial income differentials.
In addition to its contribution to more stable and secure household livelihoods, NELM scholars argue that migration plays a vital role in providing a potential source of investment capital, which is especially important in the context of the imperfect credit (capital) and risk (insurance) markets that prevail in most developing countries (de Haas, 2005). Such markets are often weakly developed and inaccessible to non-elite groups. Hence, migration can be considered as a livelihood strategy to overcome various market constraints, potentially enabling households to invest in productive activities and improve their livelihoods (Taylor et al., 1996; de Haas, 2005).

NELM has striking conceptual parallels with the ‘livelihood approaches’ that evolved as of the late 1970s among geographers, anthropologists and sociologists conducting micro-research in developing countries (Lieten and Nieuwenhuys, 1989). On the basis of their research, they argued that poor people cannot be seen only as passive victims of global capitalist forces (as neo-Marxist and dependency approaches tended to do), but also as trying to actively improve their livelihoods within the constraining conditions in which they live (Lieten and Nieuwenhuys, 1989). This view points to the fundamental role of human agency. From this perspective, migration is seen as one of the main elements of strategies to diversify, secure and improve livelihoods.

This conception comes rather close to the premises of NELM, and both approaches can be integrated and situated for this study, if migration is seen as part of a broader ‘household livelihood strategy’ to diversify income sources and overcome social, economic and institutional development constraints in places of origin. In line with the propositions of NELM and livelihood approaches, the scope of this study supports and assumes that (different from conventional view of migration), in most cases, migration is typically not a
desperate response to destitution – a last resort to escape from extreme conditions of poverty and unemployment – but a deliberate attempt by households to spread income risks, to improve their social and economic well-being, and to generate in better life from remittances in the long-run.

As you can see from the diagram below (Figure 1-1), it summarises the accumulated insight into the various mechanisms through which migration can affect development in migrant sending areas in the short to medium term.

![Figure 1-1 Conceptual Framework for the Study](image)

**Source:** Adapted and modified from Ellis (2003)

Migration is seen to contribute positively to the achievement of secure livelihoods, and to the expansion of the scope for poor people to construct their own pathways out of poverty. It does this by ameliorating seasonality and risk, reducing vulnerability, enabling investment in a range of livelihood assets (land improvements, education, livestock etc.),
and providing the poor with more of a chance to gain a first purchase on virtuous spirals out of poverty (Ellis, 2003). This conceptual framework draws on and combines insights derived from the new economics of labour migration as well as livelihood approaches, and is used for the study here.

1.5 THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN ASIA

Although migration research in East, Southeast and South Asia has explored migration and development questions (Asis and Piper, 2008: 431), an examination of the development impacts of migration beyond remittances is oddly missing. Interestingly, in the 1990s Asia witnessed the turnaround of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China from emigration to immigration societies. Also by the 1990s, even as emigration continued, China and India started to attract investments and transfer of knowledge from their overseas populations. All four economies had to contend with underdevelopment and brain drain in an earlier period, and as was characteristic of the discourse in the 1960s and the 1970s, the departure of professionals and the highly trained was presumed to contribute to their under-development (Lee, 2005). The transformation of these countries is described briefly below.

The Republic of South Korea was a sending country of international migrants, including workers, up until the 1990s (Lee, 2005). Its turnaround and subsequent rise as the world’s eleventh largest economy transpired between the 1970s and 1990s. The deployment of workers and the generation of remittances, however, were not major factors in its turnaround; in fact, labour migration was not actively pursued by the state as a strategy for
development. Apart from temporary migration, emigration was significant partly because of economic reasons, and partly because of political reasons (the country was under martial law from 1961 to 1987). Among those who left was the middle-class whose departure was perceived as “betrayal” by those who remained (Jeong, 2008). By virtue of the strong ties between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, many Koreans in the fields of engineering and the sciences availed of scholarships for post-graduate education in the United States of America (Kim, 2006). Prior to the 1970s, many of the Koreans who received PhDs in the sciences and engineering opted not to return home, a period of brain drain. Kim (2006), however, suggests that it was not a classic brain drain because the Korean government did not invest in the post-graduate training of its nationals in the United States of America. The government embarked on industrialization, launched land reform, supported agriculture and rural development, invested in education, and implemented a population program as part of a concerted strategy to achieve development. It also invested in research and development and worked towards value-added production. International migration contributed to development via the leading role played by overseas-based scientists, managers and entrepreneurs in moving the country into higher level production. Thanks to incentives offered by the government, many scientific talents returned (some returned temporarily) to lend their expertise. The founding of science parks supported research and development and also served to entice the return of scientific talents. Aside from industries, returning scientists were also recruited as faculty members in Korean universities. The return of many PhD holders contributed to the expansion of tertiary education in the country. While it may be advanced that the return and/or expertise of Korean scientific talents between 1980 and 1997 boosted the country’s development, economic development itself was a factor in the return of scientists and engineers (Song, 1997). Later, political reforms – the return of electoral democracy in 1987 and the election
of Kim Dae Jung as president in 1992, the first civilian president since 1961 –advanced the democratization process, which invited more return migration, visits and engagement of overseas Koreans. Following the Asian financial crisis in 1998, emigration trends picked up and a resurgence of brain drain has been noted (Kim, 2006).

Taiwan Province of China has been described as a “classic case” of brain drain at one time (e.g., O’Neill, 2003). During the 1970s and 1980, some twenty percent of college graduates left to pursue advanced studies abroad. Prior to its economic takeoff, the government prioritized basic education, which limited the number of institutions offering higher education, resulting in the migration of young Taiwanese to pursue further studies abroad. By the late 1980s, a rising economy and with the end of martial law, many migrants returned home armed with training and/or business expertise gained abroad. The government saw the potential contributions of involving the returnees and the expatriate population as sources of expertise and as links to the international community. The government involved migrants and its overseas population in the formulation of migration policies; it provided incentives to returnees; and it supported research and development. The government developed the Hsinchu Industrial Science Park, the equivalent of Silicon Valley, which helped launch Taiwan’s technological development (O’Neill, 2003; see also Saxenian, 2002). Here, the role of the government in involving the migrant population and investing resources to facilitate their contributions cannot be overemphasized. In addition, political reforms were also part of the change that encouraged the return of migrants and the participation of overseas Taiwanese in contributing to (and benefiting) from Taiwan’s ruse as an economic success story.
Throughout most of its history, Chinese society did not regard emigration in a positive light (Le Bail and Shen, 2008). It was only in the early 20th century when a more positive view of migrants came about brought about by the support given by overseas Chinese to the nationalist movement. When China adopted communism in 1949, migration (both internal and international) was restricted until the introduction of reforms in 1979. The government then sought to re-establish links with the overseas Chinese by inviting them to invest in China. The growth of the Pearl River Delta region was fuelled by investments from overseas Chinese. It has been suggested that in the early years of the reforms, lacking knowledge about the outside world, the overseas-based Chinese were an important social capital for China (Leung, 2008). International migration resumed, tentatively at first, but gaining popularity over the years. Among those who were allowed to leave were students, many of whom were supported by the government, for the purpose of gaining expertise to help China catch up with the rest of the world. Student migration became worrisome when many did not return. Fears of repression in the wake of the Tiananmen uprising in 1989 discouraged scholars from returning to China. From the 1990s, the government introduced various measures to encourage return migration (for details, see Zweig and Fung, 2004). The government reoriented its regard for its national abroad, viewing them as resources instead of losses, and redirected its efforts to maintaining links with them (Wescott, 2006; Zweig and Fung, 2004). In 2001, several ministries came up with a major policy document encouraging overseas-based Chinese to “serve the nation” (wei guo fuwu) even if “they don’t return to the nation” (hui guo fuwu). The interest of Chinese scientists and professionals to contribute to the development of the home country cannot be solely attributed to patriotism but is also inspired by China’s emergent economy. To promote high technology industries, the government set up 53 nationally recognized science or industrial parks and offered incentives for such ventures (Smart and Hsu, 2005: 53). Smart and Hsu
(2005) suggest that China’s aspiration to develop high technology industries is not only aided by its links with Mainland-born scientists and engineers overseas but also the links with scientific talent and entrepreneurs in Taiwan Province of China. They also maintain that the role and style of networks have changed – in early reform China, kinship and hometown ties were important in attracting labour intensive industries; in the current context, ties among classmates and professional/technological associations are the new bases for social networks in high technology industries.

India has a sizable migrant worker population overseas (mostly in the Middle East), whose labour migration dates back to the 1970s. In general, the role of the central government in international labour migration has been minimal; it is only in recent years when it has taken a more active role in addressing protection issues. The State of Kerala has been a dominant player in international labour migration, although recently, other states have also taken the same path. The development impacts of this migration are seen largely through remittances and the use of remittances by recipient households. Although the economic benefits of overseas employment are considerable, concerns over the social impacts of labour migration point to social costs. Despite India’s long experience in international labour migration, part of the story of India’s rise as an emerging economy is attributed to the development of the ICT sector by the investments and talents of overseas Indians and returning Indian nationals. In the 1960s and 1970s, India can also be posited as a classic case of brain drain, when many scientists, engineers, doctors and professionals left; by the 1990s, it became a classic case of brain gain, when ICT experts reproduced Silicon Valley in Indian shores. The government has recently taken an interest in linking with the “Indian diaspora,” estimated at 25 million, seeing it as a partner in advancing India’s march to development.
The transnational connections in the transformation of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China into migrant-receiving societies and the examples of investments and brain gain recently experienced by China and India suggest that migration does not bode a total loss for origin societies. Even in cases of permanent settlement, as long as the links to the origin societies are nurtured those who left can continue to be part of their origin societies. Migrants can, in fact, have a distinct role as bridges between the origin societies and the outside world. In distilling lessons from these four cases for the origin countries in the region, several details must be borne in mind. In all four cases, the state pursued development as the main goal. Thus, even when brain drain was underway, this did not detract them from pursuing needed reforms to achieve their development goals. The deployment of workers was not a centrepiece policy of their development strategies. In all four cases, the acknowledged gains from migration were mostly from the “elite migrants” – scientists, ICT experts, managerial gurus, entrepreneurs and investors – who participated in the transfer of knowledge and/or invested in key industries. The close interface between the transfer of knowledge schemes and industry is also notable, a match that was guided by a policy framework aimed at promoting development. The gains from migration in these cases were not inevitable. Patriotism or giving back may have motivated migrants to contribute to the development of their home countries, but it can be argued that the promise of development holds its own attractions. All the case studies also highlight the importance of political reforms. Economic reforms and development plans were pursued in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China under martial law. In the case of China, although market reforms had been underway from 1979, it has not abandoned central planning. The government had to open up more democratic spaces. The reform of the hukou system (which controlled internal migration in the country by tying rights to residence, employment and services according to urban or rural residence) and granting
protection to migrant workers in China’s urban areas are among the notable changes in China in recent years.

Based on available data, research on transnational solidarity involving migrants or migrants’ associations and homeland counterparts is still in its infancy. Available data suggest that the funds generated by migrants associations are rather modest, the impacts tend to be local or place specific, success stories are not that many, and the migrants or migrants’ associations that are heavily involved tend to be the permanent settlers. Examples of successful migrants’ investments and transfer of knowledge beyond the cases of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, China and India are rare or they have yet to emerge. In all four exemplars, the migrants who acted as agents of change, particularly as agents of development, were mostly scientific talents, investors and entrepreneurs. Moreover, the migrants-turned agents of development were mostly permanent settlers who had privileged positions in the countries of destination. This contrasts with the profile of most migrant workers in the Asian context who are predominantly in less skilled occupations and whose working and living conditions are far from ideal. Under more favourable conditions, migrant workers can earn decent wages which enable them to send remittances that can uplift their families’ economic status. Under less favourable conditions, workers’ rights can be violated, their well-being jeopardized and their capacity to support their families is eroded. Under these circumstances, other than remittance transfers, the potentials for social remittances, investments and transfers of knowledge are rather remote.

Labour migration in Asia, however, is an unfinished story, and international migration is dramatically increasing in terms of size and scope in this region. Asia may pull off another
miracle in managing labour migration, and it is possible that migration may play as a trigger for regional economic integration and development strategies in near future.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis is divided into nine chapters. This chapter has introduced the objectives and frameworks of the study. It also provided research questions and justifications, and briefly reviewed the role of migration in development studies. The other chapters are structured as follows.

Chapter two reviews the existing literature on international migration. The literature on the relationships between migration-development and migration-remittances are the central focus of this chapter, indicating that more research is needed to understand this relationship properly in terms of micro level effects and regional patterns of complexity. This chapter does two things. First, in order to facilitate the meaningful theoretical interpretation of the often conflicting findings from separate empirical studies, a brief historical overview of the theoretical debate on the issue around migration is presented. The second part will review of literature on migration and remittances and their impacts on development.

Chapter three provides the background and outward flows of labour migration from Thailand. While this chapter aims to provide an overview of international migration issues related to the country, only selected facets of international migration are prioritised. Thus, this chapter covers mainly on those that move abroad for voluntary and labour purposes.
Chapter four introduces the data and methodology employed in this study. Thailand has experienced a substantial growth in international labour migration, however, little is currently known about which groups are affected most by the movements and how people adjust to changes caused by migration at micro-level. Thus, the small scale data in conjunction with available larger scale data-set can provide more detailed insights on people’s movements and their implications. This chapter presents the research designs adopted for fieldwork and also provides the background information of the villages in the case study area.

Chapter five briefly reviews findings about the social and demographic characteristics of migrants and migration, suggesting some common patterns but with important differences depending on individual characteristics. This descriptive chapter also identifies the characteristics of households having out-migrants, in comparison with those households not having migrants, and serves as the basis for understanding of remittances behaviour which will receive direct focus in the following chapters.

Chapter six examines patterns of remittances between rural Thai households and migrants in abroad and considers how different these patterns are related to expected remittances behaviour theories by gender in terms of migrants’ own well-being when they return. This chapter builds on the previous literature by taking a gendered approach to testing the altruistic and contractual approaches to remittances.

Chapter seven explore the consequences of international migration on economic well-being for the rural households in Northeast Thailand. It measures the impacts of remittances on households in terms of more quantitative measures to what extent international transfers
can affect household income, poverty, inequality, and well-being in rural society. By comparing households with and without migrant workers in abroad, this chapter estimates the extent to which remittances explain disparities in household income and economic well-being.

Chapter eight discusses the impacts of international migration on non-economic well-being of the households. While numerous migration studies have already recognised that migration is not merely the business of the individual but also involves and affects the migrants’ families, fewer studies have progressed to examining in detail the circumstances of those left-behind and how their lives have been reshaped in a complex manner by the departure of key household members. This chapter is focused on understanding of international labour migration and the well-being of households rather than mobility itself, and it seeks to focus on the impact of international migration on two distinctly immobile; the elderly and the children who are being left-behind by migrants in terms of social aspects.

Lastly, in Chapter nine, the findings will be summarised and discussed with the broader literature on regional development, transnational labour markets and migration. Implications for policy issues and further issues for future research are also highlighted.
2 Literature Review

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Population mobility is part of the process of socio-economic development, and history of migration is the history of people’s struggle to survive and to prosper. Increasing levels of migration, especially large and continuing population flows from rural areas in many developing countries, have prompted an intense effort to understand the causes and consequences of human migration (IOM, 2006).

Over the past 30 years, many people argued that migration was receiving insufficient attention in the development studies literature, and in policy making (de Haan, 2006). Whereas standard economic theories (Taylor, 1999; Skeldon, 2002; Castle and Miller, 2003) emphasise the advantages of a free flow of labour, development studies tends to look at migration with a great deal of reservation (de Haan, 1999).

Much has changed since, with increasing research particularly on international migration, a key question however remains ‘whether and how this increased recognition of the significance of migration has generated country-specific case studies?’, including debates on socio-economic development and poverty reduction in countries (de Haan, 2006). This question is prompted by two observations. First, despite the flourishing of recent migration studies such as Human Development Report (2009), findings particularly regarding on country-specific case studies are very rare. Second, conclusions about the role of migration
and remittances in development differ hugely. On the one hand (in positive aspects), there is an assumption that movement of labour – as part of a well-functioning integrated labour market – would lead to the elimination of disparities (by elimination of wage differentials according to neoclassical theory) and poverty reduction through international remittances as income sources. Adams and Page (2005) concluded that an increase of 10 percent in a country’s share of international migrants leads to a 2 percent decline in one dollar-a-day poverty. International remittances too are shown to have a strong impact on reducing poverty. However, in words of Adams and Page, these estimates are made with assumptions regarding data, and I believe no evidence that the correlation shows causation.

On the other hand (in negative aspects), there are both empirical and theoretical objections against the idea that migration would lead to reducing disparities in development. Ellerman’s (2003) impression is that ‘much of the literature is excessively optimistic about the impact of north-south migration on the South’. For example, temporary labour migration such as by ‘guest worker’ in Germany has not stimulated development in the sending regions. It is not impossible for such migration to be beneficial, but empirical evidence tends to show, for example, that the ‘best practices’ are over-represented among migrants (Ellerman, 2003). What this polarisation suggests that the migration–development nexus is unsettled, despite the ever increased attention to migration, and the migration debates should strike a balance between the positive and negative aspects of developmental impacts.

The developmental impact of remittances has generally inconclusive. In an overview paper on the relationship between migration and inequality, Black et al. (2004) highlighted that international migration carries significant risks and cost, and that it does not always reduce
the inequalities as intended by the migrants. Migration and inequality exert mutual influences, the relationship depends strongly on the type of migration, and a hierarchy of migration possibilities and opportunities. These are suggested that the issues on migration-development, particularly in poverty reduction and inequality are vary and case specific and still needs to be understood within the contextual specificity.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the leading contemporary theories of international migration and to explore the questions about the role of migration in development. I begin by examining theories that account for why international population flows persist across space and time. Rather than favouring one theory over another, I seek to understand each model on its own terms. This chapter does two things. First, in order to facilitate the meaningful theoretical interpretation of the often conflicting findings from separate empirical studies, a brief overview of the theoretical debate on the issues around international migration is presented, and the following sections, as the second part, will review of literature on remittances and its impacts on development.

2.2 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: AN OVERVIEW

2.2.1 Classical Theories

Neoclassical Economics

Probably the oldest and best-known theory of international migration was developed originally to explain labour migration in the process of economic development (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976). According to this
theory and its extensions, international migration is caused by geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labour. Countries with a large endowment of labour relative to capital have a low equilibrium market wage, while countries with a limited endowment of labour relative to capital are characterised by a high market wage, as depicted graphically by the familiar interaction of labour supply and demand curves (Massey et al., 1993). The resulting differential in wages causes workers from the low-wage country to move to the high-wage country. As a result of this movement, the supply of labour decreases and wages rise in the capital-poor country, while the supply of labour increases and wages fall in the capital-rich country, leading, at equilibrium (Massey et al., 1993).

The flow of workers from labour-abundant to labour-scarce countries is a flow of investment capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. The relative scarcity of capital in poor countries yields a rate of return that is high by international standards, thereby attracting investment (Massey et al., 1993). The movement of capital also includes human capital, with highly skilled workers moving from capital-rich to capital-poor countries in order to reap high returns on their skills in a human capital-scarce environment, leading to a parallel movement of managers, technicians, and other skilled workers (Massey et al., 1993). The international flow of labour, therefore, must be kept conceptually distinct from the associated international flow of human capital. Even in the most aggregated macro-level models, the heterogeneity of migrants along skill lines must be clearly recognised. The simple and compelling explanation of international migration offered by neoclassical macroeconomics has strongly shaped public thinking and has provided the intellectual basis for much immigration policy (Massey, 1999).
Corresponding to the macroeconomic model is a microeconomic model of individual choice (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In this scheme, individual rational actors decide to migrate because a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive net return (usually monetary) from movement. International migration is perceived as a form of investment in human capital. People choose to move to where they can be most productive, given their skills; but before they can capture the higher wages associated with greater labour productivity they must undertake certain investments, which include the material costs of travelling, the costs of maintenance while moving and looking for work, the effort involved in learning a new language and culture, the difficulty experienced in adapting to a new labour market, and the psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones (Castle & Miller, 2003).

Neoclassical economists also tend to see migration in a positive light. However, it is important to note that neoclassical migration theory has no place for remittances (Taylor, 1999). Neoclassical advocates of the theoretical model of balanced growth perceive migration as a process that contributes to the optimal allocation of production factors for the benefit of all, in which the process of factor price equalisation will lead to migration ceasing once wage levels are equal at both the origin and destination (Taylor, 1999). From this perspective, the re-allocation of labour from rural, agricultural areas (within and across national boundaries) to urban, industrial sectors is considered as an essential prerequisite for economic growth and, hence, as an integral component of the whole development process (Todaro, 1969). The free movement of labour – in an unconstrained market environment – is eventually expected to lead to the increasing scarcity of labour, which will then lead to a higher marginal productivity of labour and increasing wage levels in migrant-
sending societies. Capital flows are expected to go in exactly the opposite direction as labour migration (Todaro, 1969).

**New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM)**

In the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called new economics of labour migration (NELM) emerged as a critical response to, and improvement of, neoclassical migration theory (Massey et al., 1993). A key insight of this new approach is that migration decisions are not made by isolated individual actors, but by larger units of related people (typically families or households) in which people act collectively not only to maximise expected income, but also to minimise risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, apart from those in the labour market (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1984; Katz and Stark, 1986; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999).

Unlike individuals, households are in a position to control risks to their economic well-being by diversifying the allocation of household resources, such as family labour (Stark and Levhari, 1982). While some family members can be assigned economic activities in the local economy, others may be sent to work in foreign labour markets where wages and employment conditions are negatively correlated or weakly correlated with those in the local area. In the event that local economic conditions deteriorate and activities there fail to bring in sufficient income, the household can rely on migrant remittances for support (Taylor, 1999).

In developed countries, risks to household income are generally minimised through private insurance markets or governmental programs, but in developing countries these
institutional mechanisms for managing risk are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible to poor families, giving them incentives to diversify risks through migration (Taylor, 1999). In developed countries, moreover, credit markets are relatively well-developed to enable families to finance new projects, such as the adoption of new production technology. In most developing areas, in contrast, credit is usually not available or is procurable only at high cost (de Haas, 2007). In the absence of accessible public or affordable private insurance and credit programs, market failures create strong pressures for international movement (Stark, 1991). Within NELM theory, migration can be a household strategy to overcome such market constraints, in particular through international remittances, and may potentially enable households to invest in productive activities and to improve their livelihoods (de Haas, 2007). While remittances do not play a role in neoclassical migration theory (in a strictly neo-classical world, the developmental role of migration is entirely realised through this process of factor price equalisation), within NELM, they are perceived as one of the most essential motives for migration (Taylor, 1999).

### 2.2.2 Structuralist and Marxist Theories

As of the late 1960s, optimistic views on migration and development in sending areas were increasingly challenged due to the combined influence of a paradigm shift in social sciences toward structuralist views and an increasing number of empirical studies that often did not support optimistic views on migration and development (Lewis, 1986).

The ‘migration pessimists’ have argued that migration provokes the withdrawal of human capital and the breakdown of traditional, stable village communities and their economies
This would then lead to the development of passive, non-productive and remittance-dependent communities. The ‘brain drain’ (OECD, 2006) is typically blamed for causing a critical shortage of agricultural and other labour, depriving areas of their most valuable work force. Because it is generally not the poorest who migrate the most, migration and remittances were also believed to increase inequality in communities of origin (Lipton, 1980).

Migration pessimists have argued that remittances were mainly spent on conspicuous consumption and consumptive investments (such as houses), and rarely invested in productive enterprises (Appleyard, 1989). Scepticism about the use of migrant remittances for productive investments became the common thread of the migration and development debate. Besides weakening local economies and increasing dependency, increased consumption and land purchases by migrants were also reported to provoke inflationary pressures (Russell, 1992) and soaring land prices (Rubenstein, 1992).

A second concern for proponents of the dependency approach notes that social inequality and conflicts tend to increase as remittances are returned to origin communities and sending households. Inequalities arise between migrant and non-migrant households as the latter lose economic status in comparison to the rising incomes of the migrant households around them (Massey et al., 1998). Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986) argue that these inequalities are founded upon the differences that separate early or pioneer migrants from non-migrants. Because early movers face higher costs and risks as they migrate, they are more likely to come from relatively wealthier households. When these migrants remit, the resources they return widen further the income inequalities that are found in origin communities.
Dependency theorists also argue that social tensions arise as migrants move away from agricultural livelihoods and as conspicuous consumption collides with socio-economic inequalities. Potts (2000) found such a pattern among Zimbabwe’s peasant farmers, who are increasingly dependent upon migrant remittances for their survival. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe's peasant migrants face racial as well as socio-economic inequalities as they balance their traditional identities as rural agriculturalists with new identities as marginal urban migrant workers. The real struggle arises as migrants are threatened with the loss of their agricultural lands and forced to choose between remaining rural (agricultural) or becoming urban workers.

Research in Mexico has given us some of the best examples of the role dependency plays in migration and remittance outcomes. Reichert (1991), Wiest (1994), Guidi (1993), and Binford (2003) argue that the costs of migration tend to outweigh any benefits, and these researchers find that remittances lead to increasing social and economic differentiation, inflation, and local labor shortages. The cultural costs of these remittances are manifest in the decline of traditional ritual practices and the replacement of community-based events with family and life-cycle rituals (for example, the celebration of a private wedding replacing the status-earning sponsorship of a community's Saint’s Day festivities).

Proponents of dependency theory argue that the seductive pull of wages and the rise of receiving-household incomes that remittances bring addicts rural Mexicans to migration and leads to what Reichert coined the “migrant syndrome” (1991). This syndrome traps rural migrants in a vicious cycle of repeat migrations, because there are few if any opportunities for work in communities of origin. The urge to live well, make luxury purchases, and educate children cannot be sustained locally; therefore, migration grows
even more prevalent as tastes for expensive consumer goods mounts. Furthermore, Wiest (1994) adds, the goods that migrants and their households purchase move hard-earned remittances away from communities of origin and to urban centers. Ultimately, the system collapses as remittances cease to be returned and migrants lose their attachment to sending communities and countries what Stark (1986) calls “remittance decay”.

Also, in a socio-cultural respect, the effects of migration and remittances were increasingly seen as detrimental. Exposure to the wealth of migrants was assumed to contribute to a change in rural tastes that would increase the demands for imported urban or foreign-produced goods and food (Lipton, 1980). This would further reinforce the cycle of increasing dependency. Migration has often been held responsible for the loss of community solidarity and undermining the socio-cultural integrity of migrant-sending communities (Appleyard, 1989). Moreover, the main positive effect of migration, the increase in family well-being for migrants and their families, was considered to be artificial and dangerous, because remittances were supposed to be an unstable and temporary source of revenue.

From this perspective, South-North migration was perceived as discouraging instead of encouraging the autonomous economic growth of migrant-sending countries (Durand et al., 1996). Such views conform to the historical-structuralist paradigm on development that perceives migration as one among many other expressions of the developing world’s increasing dependency on the global political-economic systems dominated by the powerful (Western) states. As a natural outgrowth of capitalist penetration, migration was seen as having ruined traditional peasant societies by undermining their economies and uprooting their populations (de Haas, 2007c).
In particular, the dependency school of development thinking viewed capitalist penetration and its concomitant phenomena such as migration not only as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countries, but also as the very causes of the ‘development of underdevelopment’. In a process known as cumulative causation, increasing prosperity in the economic core areas of the Western world was causally linked to the draining of capital and labour from peripheral areas (Skeldon, 1997).

In fact, these approaches turned the argument of neo-classical and developmentalist approaches upside down: migration does not decrease, but instead reinforces spatial and interpersonal disparities in development. In neo-Marxist terms, migration and remittances reproduce and reinforce the capitalist system based on inequality. Although these pessimistic views have been increasingly contested in recent years, they have remained prevalent in some recent studies (de Haas, 2005).

2.2.3 Other Theories

Migration as a Household Livelihood Strategy

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) has striking conceptual parallels with the ‘livelihood approaches’ that have evolved as of the late 1970s among geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists conducting micro-research in developing countries in the sense that it shares epistemology of micro-economic approach (de Haas, 2007c). They argued that the poor cannot only be seen as passive victims of global capitalist forces but try to actively improve their livelihoods within the constraining conditions they live in (Lieten & Nieuwenhuys, 1989).
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and activities required for a means of living (Carney, 1998). A livelihood encompasses not only the households’ income generating activities, but also the social institutions, intra-household relations, and mechanisms of access to resources through the life cycle (Ellis, 1998). For their livelihoods, people and households draw on five categories of assets (or capitals): natural, social, human, physical, and financial. A livelihood ‘strategy’ can then be defined as a strategic or deliberate choice of a combination of activities by households and their individual members to maintain, secure, and improve their livelihoods (Carney, 1998). This particular choice is based on (selective) access to assets, perceptions of opportunities, as well as aspirations of actors (Ellis, 1998). Since these differ from household to household and from individual to individual, this explains why livelihood strategies tend to be so heterogeneous.

The emergence of the livelihood concept has meant a departure from rigid and deductive structuralist views towards a more empirical approach (de Haas, 2007c). This went along with the insight that people – generally, but all the more in the prevailing circumstances of economic, political and environmental uncertainty and hardship – organise their livelihoods not individually but within wider social contexts, such as households, village communities, and ethnic groups (McDowell & de Haan, 1997). For many social settings, the household was recognised as the most relevant social group and hence the most appropriate unit of analysis, acknowledging that the forms of households vary across time, space, and socio-economic groups (McDowell & de Haan, 1997).
A Transnational Perspective on Migration

The rise of new economics of labour migration (NELM) and livelihood perspectives on migration and development have coincided with a third trend in migration studies, that is, the ‘transnational turn’ in the study of the settlement and integration of migrant communities in receiving countries (Bailey, 2001). There has been increasing recognition of the increased possibilities for migrants and their families to live transnationally and to adopt transnational identities (Guarnizo et al., 2003). This relates to the radically improved technical possibilities for migrants to foster links with their societies of origin through the telephone (mobile phone), fax, (satellite) television and the internet, and to remit money through globalised banking systems or informal channels (Faist, 2004). This increasingly enables migrants and their families to foster double loyalties, to travel back and forth, to relate to people, and to work and to do business simultaneously in distant places (Guarnizo et al., 2003). There is increasing scope for migrants and their families to pursue transnational livelihoods (de Haan, 2005).

Transnational migration refers to circular migration during which the migrant remains engaged with his or her community of origin (Cohen, 2005). Transnational networks are the linkages between individuals across time and space (mostly often across national borders), and possibly shape the ways in which development is done through them (Kothari and Bebbington, 2005). Transnational ties between migrants and their sending households can reinforce remittance practices – migrants carefully maintain relationships with sending households to ensure future well-being once they have completed their sojourns (Roberts and Morris, 2003). What is interesting is that migrants sometimes do not return to their communities of origin; nevertheless, the strength of ties and networks, the stories of future
return, and the remittances sent to non-migrant family members serve to support and foster the well-being of the migrant in his or her destination (Levitt, 2002).

Contemporary international migration is a systemic element in the process of globalisation and globalising processes are likely to increase migration pressures. The international migration system is now more integrated and has become more transnational in nature than ever before, and these transnational processes are rooted in the institution of the nation-state and derive some of their distinctiveness by transcending the nation (Bailey, 2001). The implication is that clear-cut dichotomies of ‘origin’ or ‘destination’ and categories such as ‘permanent’, ‘temporary’, and ‘return’ migration are increasingly difficult to sustain in a world in which the lives of migrants are increasingly characterised by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies (Castles and Miller, 2003). This has fundamental implication for the study of migration and development, because this implies that integration in receiving societies and commitment to origin societies are not necessarily substitutes, but can be complements (Cohen, 2005).

It has long been assumed that migrants’ integration would necessarily coincide with a gradual loosening of ties with societies of origin. This explains much of the prior pessimism on the sustainability of remittances as well as the fact that migrants’ contribution to development in origin countries was typically linked to return migration (de Haan, 2005). However, it has become increasingly clear that this is not necessarily the case, and that many migrant groups maintain strong transnational ties over sustained periods. Migrants’ engagement with origin country development is not conditional on their return, but can be sustained through telecommunication, holiday visits and circular migration patterns (de Haas, 2005).
In fact, the transnational turn in the study of migrant communities corroborates with NELM and livelihood approaches, stressing the need to see international migration as an integral part of transnational livelihood strategies pursued by households and other social groups. Return visits and return migration, remittances, transnational business activities as well as investments and civil society involvement in origin countries are all expressions of the transnational character of migrants’ life.

2.3 REMITTANCES

A large body of literature exploring the relationship between migration and development has grown and, in particular, researchers and policy makers have focused close attention on the inter-relationship between migrant remittances and socio-economic changes in migrants’ families and communities of origin (Taylor, 1999).

The importance of remittances can hardly be ignored in developing economies, where well-functioning market is often absent. Migrant remittances can be a valuable source of income for households of origin and a means of risk diversification (Stark, 1982; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Massey, 1997). Theoretically, remittances can increase household savings, facilitate purchase of consumer goods, and alter the local income distribution. If remittances are devoted to productive investment, they may stimulate the local economy and promote social development.

In the past few years, there has been a remarkable renaissance in the interest in the issue of migration and development in migrant-sending societies by scholars (Kapur, 2003; Ratha,
2003). This has coincided with a radical shift from pessimistic to optimistic views on the issue. Against the previous climate of widespread scepticism on the issue of migration and development (Massey et al., 1998), this is a remarkable phenomenon.

This interest has undoubtedly been triggered by a striking increase in remittance flows. Remittances sent back to developing countries rose from USD 31.1 billion in 1990 to USD 76.8 billion in 2000 to USD 167.0 billion in 2005 (UNFPA, 2006). There is a growing belief that remittances are a more effective instrument for income redistribution, poverty reduction and economic growth than large, bureaucratic development programmes or development aid (Kapur, 2003). After decades of pessimism and concerns on brain drain, governments of migrant sending countries have put renewed hopes on transnationally oriented migrants and diasporas as potential investors and actors of development (de Haas, 2005).

Although few scholars would deny the direct contribution of migration and remittances to the livelihoods and survival of families left behind (de Haas, 2007a), the issue – migration and remittances can bring about sustained human development and economic growth in migrant-sending areas and countries – has been the subject of frequent debate over the past four decades. While neoclassical theory dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, large-scale dependency theory prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s. This changed with the emergence of more nuanced views in the 1990s, namely NELM and livelihood perspectives, and the re-discovery of migrant remittances brought back optimistic view on migration and development in recent years (de Haas, 2007c).
2.3.1 Micro-impacts

In line with NELM and livelihood approaches, most recent empirical research supports the view that labour migration, rather than being a response to destitution or absolute poverty (Hampshire, 2002), is a livelihood strategy pursued by social groups (typically households) in reaction to relative deprivation (Stark and Taylor, 1989; see also Quinn, 2006) in order to spread livelihood risks, secure and increase income and acquire investment capital. Remittances are central elements of such household strategies to overcome local development constraints.

Although this seems to contradict structuralist and dependency views in pointing to human agency, the extent to which households succeed in achieving these goals critically depends on the specific circumstances under which such migration occurs. After all, these circumstances determine the destination, selectivity and the returns to migration. For instance, recent studies conducted in Burkina Faso (Hampshire, 2002; Wouterse, 2006) and Morocco (de Haas, 2006a) suggest that internal and international migration within the African continent should primarily be seen as a means to enhance livelihood security through income diversification because the welfare gains, if any, are relatively small. In both countries, it was mainly migration to Europe that allowed households to accumulate substantially more wealth. In these cases, intra-continental migration is difficult to explain from a neoclassical viewpoint, and instead seems to corroborate the risk-spreading argument put forward by NELM and livelihood approaches.

The rather extensive literature on motivations to remit provides additional insight into this issue. Generally, the literature distinguishes two main motives for remitting money:
altruism, on the one hand, and self-interest to secure inheritance and to invest in home assets in the expectation of a return, on the other. Findings from empirical studies are often conflicting, with some finding support for altruism and others for self-interest (Agunias, 2006:21). However, Lucas and Stark (1985:904) argued that the motives of altruism and self-interest are often inextricable, and that, in the end, one cannot probe whether the true motive is one of caring or more selfishly wishing to enhance prestige by being perceived as caring. Therefore, they argued that instead of opposing these two motivations, one could develop a far richer model of “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest in which remittances are one element in a self-enforcing arrangement between migrant and home” (Lucas and Stark, 1985:901). In such a model, remittances can simultaneously be seen as the return to household investments in migration, as part of a household risk diversification strategy (co-insurance through risk spreading, securing inheritance claims) and as a source of investment capital that can be used for entrepreneurial activities, education or to facilitate the migration of other household members. A study of remittances in Zimbabwe (Bailey, Cliffe & Magunha, 2009) supported that migrant remittances were not just used for conspicuous consumption activities but for medium and longer term investments, including in education and seed purchases.

This view is supported by micro-level empirical research indicating that a mixture of individualistic and familial motives explains the likelihood and size of remittances (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). At first sight, this evidence provides mixed support for neoclassical and NELM theory. Analysing survey data on Mexico–United States remittances, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) concluded that income increases in migrant receiving countries significantly raises both the propensity and the proportion of labour earnings sent home for family-provided insurance as well as for self-insurance.
A growing number of studies indicate that economic and currency crises in origin countries tend to increase remittance transfers (see, for instance, Blue, 2004). Such evidence further corroborates the risk-spreading and co-insurance hypotheses. An analysis of household data collected in the North-West Frontier Province in rural Pakistan indicated that the ability to cope with negative income shocks is lower for households that do not regularly receive remittances (Kurosaki, 2006). Similarly, a recent study of Turkish remittances concluded that consumption smoothing is an important short-run motive for sending remittances to Turkey (Alper and Neyapti, 2006). Lindley (2006) equally found that migrants in Hargeisa, Somalia, tend to send more remittances from abroad when the family experiences a decline in fortunes and, therefore, concluded that people receiving regular remittances are better protected from exchange-rate fluctuations and have an improved ability to assist relatives in rural areas in times of crisis.

Such evidence corroborates the NELM hypothesis that remittances function as income insurance and protect people from income shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries. Besides protecting against income shocks, a range of empirical studies has indicated the often positive contribution of international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, food, health and living conditions in places and regions of origin (de Haas, 2006; Stark and Taylor, 1989; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005).

For instance, half of the households surveyed by Lindley (2006) in Hargeisa were entirely reliant on remittances. In the Moroccan Todgha valley, 40 percent of all surveyed households received international remittances, which doubled their income in comparison to other households. Internal and international remittances accounted for 10 percent and 33 percent, respectively, of the cash income of all surveyed households, and 53–59 percent of
the income of households involved in international migration (de Haas, 2006a). Agunias (2006:17) cited evidence from Latin America indicating that remittances accounted for a significant proportion of the average recipient’s annual income. This share ranged from 18 percent in Ecuador to 43 percent in Brazil (Bendixen and Onge, 2005). Another study in Zimbabwe found that 50 percent of migrant households received remittances and these remittances account for considerable amount of total household income in some areas (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2008). A study in Southeast Nigeria concluded that the contribution of those who migrate outside of the African continent may be up to 50 percent of household expenditure (Nwajiuba, 2005).

2.3.2 Macro-impacts

On the national level, there is substantial evidence that remittances are an increasingly important and relatively stable source of external finance that often play a critical social insurance role in countries afflicted by economic and political crises (Kapur, 2003). Remittances have proved to be less volatile, less pro-cyclical and, therefore, a more reliable source of foreign currency than other capital flows to developing countries such as foreign direct investment and development aid (Global Commission on International Migration, 2005). It is claimed that remittances are nearly three times the value of the official development assistance provided to low-income countries, and that they comprise the second largest source of external funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2006).

Because many remittances are sent through informal channels, the actual importance of
remittances is even higher than official figures show. A recent review concluded that the economies of countries such as Somalia and Surinam are in a much better state than official figures would imply thanks to highly developed informal remittance systems (Pieke et al., 2005). In the case of Somalia, for instance, it has been argued that remittances have been far more important for livelihood and survival in the country than development and humanitarian aid put together (Gundel, 2002). Remittances often cover an important part of developing countries’ trade deficits. Besides their importance as a source of foreign currency, remittances can also improve a country’s creditworthiness for external borrowing, and they can expand access to capital and lower borrowing costs (UNCTAD, 2006).

Regarding Asian remittance patterns, Stahl and Arnold (1996) note that while most remittances go to daily costs of living in sending households, the productive use of the estimated $8 billion in annual remittances is an important resource to consider when examining balance of trade and global as well as local economic investment outcomes. Focusing specifically on India, Madhavan (1995) finds a similar pattern: private remittances held by Indian-owned banks significantly improved the country’s balance of payments to international lending agencies. Furthermore, the regularity of remittance flows over time (and particularly when local and national economies may decline) often helps stabilize the economies in countries of origin, as was the case for Asian nations in 2000 and Mexico in 1994 following the devaluation of the peso. Thus, remittances become one plank upon which a nation’s loans are secured (Ketkar and Ratha, 2001).

There is growing recognition that migration is not simply an alternative for surplus labour; rather, it is an effective avenue through which a nation secures foreign capital and its citizens are able to save for both investment and household maintenance. This is clear in
lesser-developed countries around the globe, where remittances rank as one of the top three sources of hard currency and are typically as important to national economies as tourism, the production and export of raw materials, and agricultural production. A study from International Labour Organisation (ILO) reported that Pakistanis remitted $1.4 billion in 1994, or 17% of their country’s total revenue for exported goods and services. Indian migrants returned $5 billion (14% of revenues), while in Bangladesh, migrants returned $1.1 billion, or 34% of their nation’s total revenue for exported goods and services (ILO, 2000). Furthermore, these monies can make up a substantial portion of a country’s GDP. The IMF notes that remittances totalled nearly a quarter of Yemen’s GDP for 1999, although the average for the top twenty remittance-receiving countries was 6.15% of GDP in 1999 (see IMF 2001, Balance of Payments Statistics).

The indirect effects of remittances, including the ways in which returned capital flows through a nation's markets and banks, fosters savings and eases foreign exchange, and further illustrates how remittances can change national economies. Adelman, Taylor, and Vogel (1988) developed the Social Accounting Matrix to capture more clearly the indirect effects of remittances. Focused on Mexico, the matrix organizes inputs by economic sector (e.g., agriculture, industry, and commerce) and by socio-economic group (including small farmers and urban capitalists), and estimates the effects for each sector and group given each additional dollar returned by a migrant. The authors found that every dollar returned to Mexico increased the nation’s GNP by at least $2.69, although the exact amount depended on which sector received the remittance and which socio-economic group spent it.
2.4 IMPACTS OF REMITTANCES ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

2.4.1 Remittances and Poverty

Because of the important contribution of remittances to welfare, it has been argued that remittances are a safety net for relatively poor areas (Jones, 1998a). This private foreign aid seems to flow directly to the people who really need it, does not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side and “far less of it is likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials” (Kapur, 2003:10). Jones (1998b), therefore, stated that there is probably no other more bottom-up way of redistributing and enhancing welfare among populations in developing countries. While there is certainly an element of truth to this logic, there is also a clear danger of unrestrained optimism concerning the potential of remittances to reduce poverty and inequality. In fact, another study in Zimbabwe showed that the situation of household well-being, vulnerability and marginalisation is different among and between the households (Bracking & Sachikonye, 2007).

First, there is a tendency to overestimate the magnitude of migration and remittances. In fact, international migrants comprise only about 3 percent of the world’s population and, in 2001, remittances represented only 1.3 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP) of all developing countries (Ratha, 2003:10). These figures are enough to put the argument that remittances alone can generate take-off development into a more realistic perspective.

Second, the observation that remittances significantly contribute to income stability and welfare in developing countries does not necessarily imply that they contribute to poverty alleviation. This issue is related to the selectivity of migration. Because of the costs and
risks associated with migration, it is generally not the poorest who migrate the most, and
certainly not internationally. As migration is a selective process, most direct benefits of
remittances are also selective and tend not to flow to the poorest members of communities
(Centre for Development Research, 2002:2; Schiff, 1994:15) nor to the poorest countries
(Kapur, 2003:7–8).

The main beneficiaries of remittances are lower or middle-income countries, which receive
nearly half of all remittances worldwide (Kapur and McHale, 2003). The shares of
remittances to GDP tend to be rather high in typical emigration countries such as Mexico,
Morocco or the Philippines, and even higher in some small countries, especially island
economies in the Caribbean, the Pacific or the Atlantic (for example, Cape Verde) (Kapur,
2003:10). Although middle-income countries receive most remittances, in relative terms
they tend to be more important to small and sometimes very poor countries (such as Haiti,
Lesotho, Moldova and Tonga), which often receive more than 10 percent of their GDP in
remittances (World Bank, 2006:89). In other poor countries, such as Somalia, official
remittance figures are not available, but are likely to be very high relative to GDP.

Although most international remittances do not flow directly to the poorest people,
remittances often make up an important share of the income of poor people and poor
communities. Moreover, non-migrant poor might be affected indirectly (positively or
negatively) through the economy-wide effects of remittance expenditure on wages, prices
and employment in migrant sending communities (Taylor et al., 1996). Furthermore, it is
important to realize that the specific patterns of migrant selectivity fundamentally affect
poverty impacts. High-skilled or international migration is often more selective than low-
skilled or internal migration, and migration occurring under liberal immigration regimes is
likely to be less selective than migration under restrictive immigration regimes. For instance, guest workers who were actively recruited in the 1950s and 1960s by Northern and Western European countries in the Mediterranean were often low skilled and relatively poor (de Haas, 2003). Equally, guest worker schemes with Gulf countries have enabled relatively poor Egyptian peasants to migrate.

Most studies conclude that international remittances have reduced poverty either directly or indirectly. On the basis of an analysis of a data set covering 71 developing countries, Adams and Page (2005) concluded that international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing world. Their results suggest that, on average, and after controlling for the possible endogeneity of international remittances, a 10 percent increase in per capita international remittances leads to a 3.5 percent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day. Teto (2001) estimated that 1.17 million (out of 30 million) Moroccans would fall back into absolute poverty without international remittances, and the proportion living below the poverty line would increase from 19.0 to 23.2 percent. Another analysis of Egyptian and Ghanaian survey data equally indicates that migration enables poor people to move out of poverty. However, it also found that the largest determinant of current poverty status for all groups was their past poverty situation, highlighting the existence of poverty traps (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2005).

Although internal migration is generally associated with lower overall income gains, relatively poor people often migrate internally. This also implies that the positive role of internal migration in income redistribution should not be overlooked (Deshingkar, 2006). In a separate study in Guatemala, Adams (2004) found that the poverty-reducing effect of
internal and international remittances was particularly large in relation to the severity of poverty (measured by the squared poverty gap, which considers number, distance and distribution of poor households beneath the poverty line), because households in the lowest group receive a large share (between 50 and 60 percent) of their total household income from (internal) remittances. An analysis of Chinese household data found that having an (internal) migrant increases a household’s income per capita by 8.5-13.1 percent, but that the overall impact on poverty is modest because most poor people do not migrate, not even internally (Du et al., 2005).

2.4.2 Remittances and Inequality

One of the truths put forward by structuralist and dependency perspectives has been that migration and remittances have a negative effect on income inequality within migrant-sending communities as well as between peripheral and central regions (Lipton, 1980; Papademetriou, 1985). In turn, this increased inequality would further stimulate out-migration, setting in motion a cycle of cumulative causation of migration – deepening inequalities – and more migration (Cohen, 2005). However, recent research has provided enough evidence to reject this as a general hypothesis. Although inequality-increasing effects have been found in various studies at the regional (Adams, 1989) and national (Mishra, 2007) levels, this mechanism is not inevitable. It is more correct to say that the impacts of migration on income inequality in migrant-sending communities vary for different types of migration and for different periods in a community’s migration history (see, for instance, Stark et al., 1988). There is an argument that non-migrants can benefit indirectly from consumption and investments by remittance-receiving migrant households.
through employment creation and income multipliers, however, there are other arguments to contradict blanket claims that migration leads to more inequality, which are related to the spatio-temporal dimensions of migration (de Haas, 2007).

As with impacts on poverty, the effect of remittances on income distribution and other aspects of wealth is primarily a function of migration selectivity. If migrants mainly originate from relatively wealthy households, migration is more likely to imply greater inequality in the community of origin, while the reverse seems likely if migrants come from relatively poor households. Pioneer migrants tend to be from relatively wealthy households, as early migration – analogous to the adoption and diffusion of a new technology through space and populations – often entails high costs and risks. Although (pioneer) migrants tend to be relatively wealthy and educated, this is not always the case. The initial pattern of migration selectivity differs according to destination and type of work (e.g., low skilled/high skilled, legal or illegal).

Second, migration selectivity tends to change over time. During the first stages of the evolution of a migration system – defined as spatially clustered flows and counter-flows of people, goods and remittances between a particular community of origin and a particular destination – selectivity tends to decrease rapidly. Through the development of social networks between migrants and people staying behind, which diminish the risks and costs of migration (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998:5), and the flow back of information (Korner, 1987), less wealthy households tend to gain increasingly easy access to international migration. As a consequence of this diffusion process, the initially negative effect of remittances on income equality might, therefore, be dampened or even reversed in the long term. However, Jones (1998b) demonstrated that inequality may again increase at the ‘late
adopters’ stage of migration, when selectivity of migration, other things being equal, tends to increase again.

Thus, the impacts of migration on village income distribution clearly vary for different types of migration and for different periods in a community’s migration history. Kanbur and Rapoport (2005) demonstrated that increased migration from poorer to richer areas may in fact coexist with increasing or decreasing spatial inequalities, and that the question of whether divergence or convergence occurs critically depends on specific patterns of migration selectivity and agglomeration effects arising from migrant networks.

Third, differences in spatial scales of analysis may account for contradictory conclusions concerning the effect of migration on income distribution (Jones, 1998b; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996). For instance, one might conclude that migration has contributed to increasing inter-household income inequality within a certain community or region. However, when comparing this migrant-sending region as a whole with other more wealthy and centrally located regions in the same country (or between countries), one may find that inequality between the regions has actually decreased as a consequence of the developmental effects of migration and remittances (Taylor et al., 1996). The choice for either of the two scales is not obvious, and might partly reflect value judgments.

Such evidence indicates that migration and remittances do not automatically lead to increased inequalities as predicted by dependency and structuralist views. However, the neo-classical assumption that migration leads to factor price equalisation certainly should not also be taken as axiomatic.
2.5 MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND GENDER

The selectivity and impacts of migration and remittances are unlikely to be gender neutral. It is often taken for granted that female migration from patriarchal societies forms part of household strategies such as family reunification and family formation (Chant and Radcliffe, 1992; Salih, 2001). When women migrate alone, they are typically portrayed as passive victims of smugglers or traffickers, working under exploitative conditions in service sector jobs or prostitution, thereby denying them the power of agency that men are stereotypically ascribed. However, a high and increasing number of independent migrants are in fact women, especially for circular migration (de Haan et al., 2000). Even in patriarchal societies, such as Mexico and Morocco, female migration is no longer exclusively a corollary to labour migration by men, if this was ever the case at all.

The literature on the impacts of migration and remittances on sending societies also tends to ignore the gender dimension. This gender blindness has also been the major critique on the household approaches advocated by NELM, which may represent households as monolithic, internally altruistic units making unanimous decisions to the advantage of the whole group. Feminist researchers, in particular, have argued that this generalization masks intra-household power inequalities and rules out both individual decision making and the influence of non-household members (Rodenburg, 1997).

Gender inequality is likely to affect migration and remittance access and use as well as have a significant impact on the intra-family allocation of social and financial remittances, making questionable whether migration and remittances automatically enable people to challenge established gender roles. It is sometimes assumed that the migration of men
encourages the emancipation of women who stay behind since in their husbands’ absence, women’s responsibilities, autonomy and power would increase (see, for instance, Fadloullah et al., 2000), while remittances enable these women to assert this newly acquired independence. However, the limited empirical evidence suggests that migration and remittances do not necessarily have a structural impact on changing traditional gender roles, and may actually serve to reproduce them. It often means extra work for women left-behind, without any automatic share of the necessity.

A study by Van Rooij (2000) of wives of non-migrants and migrants in Morocco challenged the hypothesis that migration contributes to changing gender roles. The lives of migrants’ wives remained largely confined to housekeeping, child rearing and agricultural work. Although they tended to have more control over the use of their husbands’ earnings and in child rearing, this gain in authority was mainly temporary, since migrants resume their position as patriarchs as soon as they return. Empirical research in Albania (King et al., 2006), Burkina Faso (Hampshire, 2006), Egypt (Taylor, 1984), Turkey (Day and Işduygu, 1997) and Yemen (Myntti, 1984) yielded similar conclusions that migration and remittances do not lead to a permanent shift in the patriarchal family structure.

In addition, changes in gender roles are not necessarily positive. In case studies of Egyptian and Yemeni migrant-sending communities, Taylor (1984) and Myntti (1984) even suggested that the position of women might have worsened due to the growing influence of conservative interpretations of Islam that some return migrants bring back. Nyberg-Sorensen (2004:10) cited evidence from Morocco indicating that if women take over traditional “male” tasks such as harvesting as a result of migration, some of the younger men may refuse to work in what has now come to be dubbed women's work.
Furthermore, the emotional burden of the increased responsibilities can be high. For Morocco, both Hajjarabi (1995) and Van Rooij (2000) showed that women do not necessarily appreciate the sudden increase in responsibilities and tasks, which were not theirs within the normative context of traditional society and to which they do not always aspire. As this new role is generally not assumed out of free choice, it should not be equated with emancipation in the sense of making independent and conscious choices against prevailing norms of gender roles (De Haas, 2007). However, Gammage (2004) found that, through migration and remittances, Haitian women have been able to change the political landscape of Haiti and have challenged traditional gender roles. What might play a role here is that Haiti is a predominantly matrifocal society as opposed to most European, Middle Eastern and North African societies.

Also, in the case of women who migrate, it should not be assumed that they automatically adopt the receiving country’s societal norms of gender relations. A study conducted in North Carolina of four Mexican migrant-sending communities challenged the expectation that migrant women easily incorporate the behaviour patterns and cultural values of United States’ society. Rather, the authors observed a process of selective assimilation in which gender relations were reconstructed within the family at the place of destination. Some elements brought from communities of origin are discarded, others are modified and others are reinforced in this process (Parrado and Flippen, 2005).

It is important to disentangle the effects of migration and remittances from more general processes of social and cultural change affecting migrant-sending communities. The latter are often more important, although migration may play an accelerating or reinforcing role in such processes. In particular, in the long term there may be (inter-generational) gains for
women. For instance, international migration and remittances can have a distinct positive influence on the educational participation of younger women. In Albania and Morocco, it has been suggested that transformations of patriarchal power structures are more likely to be generational (King et al., 2006; De Haas, 2007).

Based on their research in four Guatemalan sending communities, Taylor et al. (2006) concluded that migration and social remittances may permit a gradual erosion of traditional gender and ethnic roles, but that such changes are gradual because migrants, despite their increased earnings and awareness, run into a social structure that resists rapid change. In the Moroccan Rif, Crivello (2003) demonstrated that, by working abroad, women might enhance their roles as economic providers to the families left behind, which tends to diminish the potential stigma attached to female migration.

Both Courbage (1996) and Fargues (2006) hypothesized that – besides factors such as older age of marriage, increased female labour force participation and improved education – migration from North African to European countries has contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage patterns and small family norms, and so has played an accelerating role in the demographic transition. In the case of Egyptian migration to conservative Gulf countries, the effect would be the reverse.

It has also been argued that female migrants show a deeper commitment than male migrants to providing more economic support to households that are left behind. Blue (2004) found that females were positively associated with remittance behaviour among Cuban emigrants. However, some empirical studies have reached opposite conclusions. For instance, Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005) argued that Filipino men remit more money
than female migrants do, even when controlling for income differentials between men and women.

2.6 IMPACTS OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES ON DEVELOPMENT

The beneficial and detrimental effects of migration and overseas remittances can be classified using three perspectives: at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The succeeding sections highlight these three perspectives.

2.6.1 Micro-Level

The effects of remittances on the recipient families are clear-cut. A huge portion of migrant workers’ income is mainly being remitted to their families in their home countries thereby increasing the family incomes. These remittances directly become part of the household budget which the families can spend on basic needs and serve as extra funds either for increasing consumption of both durable and non-durable goods or for savings (Maphosa, 2007). Remittances may also serve as capital for starting businesses. Thus, it can be seen that these overseas cash flows generally raise the immediate standard of living of their recipient families. However, it should be noted that this will only hold true for all households if families are able to spend on wise expenditures. Therefore, the benefits that will be derived from these remittances will depend on how and where the families spend them, and also related to social protection system.
Various studies empirically prove that remittances indeed lifted the level of children’s education of the recipient families. In Mexico, Lopez-Cordova (2004) finds that as the fraction of remittance-receiving households increases, child illiteracy and child school attendance among children aged 6-14 years old improves. However, Mckenzie (1997) finds that migration lowered educational attainment of children which he attributes to the parental absence arising from current migration.

Aside from affecting educational outcomes, migration and remittances are also found to positively affect health status of recipient families. Education and health are two factors that augment human capital development. In Mexico, Hildebrant and McKenzie (2005) find that Mexico-US migration improves child health outcomes-lower infant mortality rates and higher birth weights. The study identifies two channels of the effect: one is the health improvements brought about by increases in income and another is the finding that having a migrant family member is associated with increase in the level of health knowledge among the mothers.

Although labour migration and remittances indeed provide households with considerable benefits, there are also substantial economic and social costs associated with it. On the economic side, unfortunately, migration may generate dependency behaviour at the household level (Meins, 2007). Overseas remittances as pointed out by Bridi (2005) do promote idleness on the part of the recipients. Chami and others (2005) argues that migration may create a moral hazard problem. It induces disincentives to work among migrant household members.
On the social side, Rodriguez (2003) writes that migration has unfavourable effects on the sender’s family in the form of broken families, fatherless children and other problems as a result of parental absence. Furthermore, remittances can also cause family tensions within households with migrants (UNICEF, 2005).

2.6.2 Meso-Level

Most migration impact studies have focused on the direct social and economic effects of migration, that is, the impact on migrants and their households. However, remittances may also have significant impacts on non-migrant households, and hence may reshape sending communities as a whole (Taylor, 1999). Such indirect effects are usually not captured by remittance-use studies. For instance, research has tended to negatively evaluate consumptive expenses as non-developmental. However, consumptive expenses, provided that they occur locally, can have positive impacts by providing non-migrants with labour and income. This is confirmed by empirical evidence that consumption by migrant households can lead, via multiplier effects, to higher incomes for non-migrant households (de Haas, 2007c).

The same holds true for so-called “non-productive” investments. For example, academics and policy makers have almost universally bemoaned the high amounts of money that migrants tend to spend on housing. This is partly because such “diatribes by academics and policy makers against migrants for their profligate and unproductive ways” (Taylor et al., 1996:411) reflect common elitist views on the irrational spending behaviour of lower classes, which in any case have a weak or absent empirical basis.
An empirical study has reported that construction activities can generate considerable employment and income for non-migrants (Durand et al., 1996). This also applies to many other expenses such as feasts and funerals (Mazzucato et al., 2006). In this way, the benefits of remittances might accrue to households other than the ones that directly receive them (Taylor 1999). These expenses increase consumption levels that may—by easing capital and risk constraints on local production—in turn facilitate local investments by migrants and non-migrants alike (Stark 1980; Stark and Bloom 1985). In this way, expenditure on housing and consumption may have significant multiplier effects in the wider economy.

Remittances are also found to prop up formation of small-scale enterprises, thereby, promoting local development. Workers’ remittances ease credit constraints and as mentioned earlier provide working capital for the recipients to engage in entrepreneurial activities. This results to job creation and enhance the development of the remittance receiving locality. Woodruff and Zenteno (2001), utilizing survey data for 12,005 microenterprises owned by 11,823 individuals in 44 urban areas in Mexico, find a large positive impact of remittances on microenterprise development in Mexico.

Lastly, aside from enterprise investments, remittances may also contribute to the creation of new social assets and services and community physical infrastructures such as schools, health centres, roads and other community projects. This is where the role of migrant associations comes in. These associations usually pool their resources and send them to their home communities (Ghosh, 2006). According to Sorensen and Pedersen (2002), they may serve as platforms that bring significant development in the communities which benefit both migrant and non-migrant families.
2.6.3 Macro-Level

One of the most significant benefits of the influx of remittances to a country is the fact that these increase the foreign exchange earnings of the labour exporting country. The foreign exchange enhancing effect of these inflows has been very significant in many countries, especially developing countries, which are experiencing fiscal deficits, external debts, continuing trade imbalances and limited foreign direct investment (Pernia, 2006). According to Ratha (2003), remittance inflows have become the least volatile and growing source of foreign exchange for developing economies. In addition, workers’ remittances exert a positive impact on the balance of payments (BOP) of a certain country. In the 1990’s, the Philippines experienced a sharp rise in the current account deficit and this threatened the country with a balance of payment crisis. Opiniano (2004) claims that the BOP crisis is halted through the joint effect of the overseas workers’ remittances along with the investment inflows and medium to long-term loans.

Aside from their contribution to the foreign earnings and valuable support to the BOP, remittances also promote economic growth, through their effects on certain macroeconomic variables (Ratha, 2003). A variety of literature has identified two main channels by which remittances affect the recipient country’s growth: direct effects through savings and investment and indirect effects through consumption (Adams and Page, 2005; World Bank, 2006; OECD, 2006). Cattaneo (2005) notes that remittances are typically spent on investments in physical assets as well as investments in human capital such as education and health, which stimulate growth. The second main channel through which remittances may affect growth is consumption. In fact, remittances may stimulate the economy through
the consumption multiplier and create indirect effects which may not only benefit the
sender’s family but also do extend to non-migrants as well (Cattaneo, 2005).

Although labour migration and migrant remittances truly benefit the labour-sending
country, there are issues such as ‘brain drain’ (the focus of interest of this terminology is on
the highly-skilled). If the highly-skilled leave the country when they migrate to another, it
is lost for the country of origin, and gained by the destination country. Hence, the
destination country receives the human capital as a gift – it has made a brain gain, whereas
the country of origin has suffered a brain drain.

Recent empirical study (Mayr, 2008), however, have emphasised the fact that the prospect
of international migration increases the expected returns to skills in poor countries, linking
the possibility of migrating (brain drain) with incentives to higher education (brain gain).
For example, if a young scientist leaves his/her country of origin for higher income, it is
certainly justified to speak of a loss of human capital. But if this scientist returns after a
number of years, the original loss is being compensated and, what is more, additional
human capital acquired during the research-training phase is being won. As long as these
flows cannot be correctly established, it will remain a matter of conjecture who has made
the brain gain. Therefore, it has been argued by some that, as long as migration cannot be
said to be permanent, it would be more appropriate to talk in more neutral terms of ‘brain
circulation’.

Even in those cases where migrants remain in their host country, and there is thus no return
migration, it has not remained uncontested that the flow of benefits is in a one-way
direction only. By keeping ties with their country of origin, migrants act as ‘bridges’ which
contribute to a transfer of technology and knowledge back to their country of origin. On these grounds, it has for example been argued that Indian expatriate engineers working in Silicon Valley have played a central role in starting India’s emerging software industry. Further, the migration of the highly skilled does not in each and every case necessarily lead to brain gain on the part of the destination country. This is the case if a migrant nuclear physicist finds employment as a nuclear physicist in the destination country, but it is not if he or she finds work only below his education level (i.e. if he becomes a taxi driver or a bar tender). In this case of a mismatch between the skills offered by the individual and those demanded by the labour market, experts speak of a ‘brain waste’: there are only losers and no winners. So, a specific socio-economic context should be considered in the “brain drain and brain gain” debates caused by migration. For this research, most of Thai migrants are categorised as the low-skilled and they have a relatively lower educational background and engaged in not well-paid jobs. So, the loss of human capital in this context is not regarded as ‘brain drain’ but ‘labour losses’.

There are also discussions about how labour migration and remittances cause severe changes in exchange rates, increased demand for local currency and how they affect exports and external competitiveness of the labour-sending country. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch disease (Meins, 2007). In a case study in Cape Verde, Bourdet and Falck (2003), finds that, in general, capital inflows in the form of remittances give rise to a phenomenon known as the Dutch Disease effect and thus result to a decline in the competitiveness of the in the world export market.
2.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter overviewed the existing migration theories and explored the role of migration has played in development studies in debates on the migration-development nexus, remittances, poverty and inequality. It argues that, despite a recent surge of interest in international migration and remittances, research on human mobility particularly for labour within poor countries does not have the place it deserves, and that it used to have in the classical development literature. Review of the empirical literature suggests that in fact much is known about the migration-development relationship, provided we are careful with definitions, and allow for context-specificity to be a key component of analyses. Against this richness of empirical details, the chapter reviewed theoretical models of migration, finding significant differences in understandings of migration but also complementarities. This highlights the importance of inter-disciplinary understanding of processes of socio-economic development through migration.

International migration can be seen as one of the main elements of the strategies to diversify, secure, and, potentially, durably improve, rural households, which is often combined with other strategies, such as agricultural intensification and local non-farm activities (Ellis, 2000; McDowell & de Haan, 1997). It is increasingly recognised that labour migration is often more than a short-term survival or crisis coping strategy or a stereotypical ‘flight from misery’ (Bebbington, 1999). Rather, it is often a deliberate decision to improve livelihoods, enable investments, and help to reduce fluctuations in the family income that has been entirely dependent on climatic vagaries (de Haan et al., 2000; McDowell & de Haan, 1997). Migration can then be seen as a means to acquire a wider range of assets which insure against future shocks and stresses (de Haan et al., 2000).
This comes surprisingly close to the premises of the new economics of labour migration (NELM), and this can be integrated with livelihood approach, if we see migration as part of a broader ‘household livelihood strategy’ to diversify income sources and overcome social, economic, and institutional development constraints in the place of origin. The development of NELM as of the late 1970s meant a departure from neoclassical and actor-oriented approaches towards a household-level based theoretical perspective recognising the relevance of both agency and structural constraints to development (de Haas, 2007).

The choice of the household as the primary unit of analysis can be seen as a kind of optimum strategy or a compromise between actor and structure approaches, acknowledging that the forms of households vary across time, space, and social groups (de Haan et al., 2000). In perceiving migration as a household livelihood strategy seems particularly applicable in developing countries where for many people it is not possible to secure the family income through private insurance markets or government programs (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1998), increasing the importance of implicit contracts within the family.

This chapter also presents ample evidence that migration and remittances are often part of risk-spreading and co-insurance livelihood strategies pursued by households and other family groups (this evidence generally corroborates NELM and livelihoods approaches that point to the development potential of migration and remittances). Remittances have the proven capacity to protect people from income shocks and lifecycle risks. They may also enable significant increases in income and improvements in living conditions, education, health and well-being in sending communities. In the absence of well-functioning credit markets, remittances can also provide migrants and their families with the financial resources to invest in enterprises. For national accounts, remittances have gained increasing
importance as a relatively stable source of foreign currency.

Although the direct poverty-alleviating impact of remittances is limited because migration is a selective process, remittances do have a substantial potential to reduce poverty indirectly through multiplier effects generated by remittance expenditure and investment. The impacts of migration and remittances on social, economic and gender inequality as well as on community cohesion are much more ambiguous. The specific nature of such impacts partly depends on migration selectivity and temporal and spatial scales as well as value judgments. This analysis also exemplifies that the developmental impacts of migration and remittances tend to change over the different stages of household- and community-level migration cycles.

In the country specific context, international labour migration in rural Thailand which is going to be investigated in following chapters as a case study is not a new phenomenon. However, literature and empirical research in this area is very limited. Past studies on international migration in Thailand is found in historical studies (Terwiel, 1983; Lysa, 1984; Mucat, 1994), and a few studies of internal and international migration in Thai context (Jones and Kittisuksathit, 2003; Osaki, 2001; 2003) were undertaken during 2000s, however, the quality of data used for alaysing the phenomena still remains a major problem, and several studies (Sussangkarn, 1995; Chalamwong, 1996) note the poor quality of data as a major limitation in research in this area.

Despite the ever increasing size of international remittances, there has been a one-sided focus on remittances and their direct economic consequences. Less systematic attention has been paid to the non-pecuniary consequences of remittances, such as their impact on
gender and education, and there has also been less attention paid to the non-remittance-related impacts of migration, such as the role of migration and migrants in cultural and social change in origin societies (see also Levitt, 1998).

At present, there is no single, coherent theory of international migration, only a fragmented set of theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another, sometimes but not always segmented by disciplinary boundaries. In addition, although migration research cuts across many academic disciplines, there is often very poor communication across disciplinary boundaries. For instance, the high level of synergy between the new economics of labour migration and livelihood approaches toward migration, remittances and development has largely gone unnoticed, whereas the combination of such perspectives could create significant empirical, disciplinary and theoretical cross-fertilisation.

More fundamentally, and perhaps even more striking, the foundational debate in migration studies on what the concept of development is absent. While the concept of development is almost never explicitly defined, most approaches toward migration and development tend to be based on notions of development that focus on gross income indicators. Consequently, research on migration and development has been focusing on the impact of remittances on income growth and investments in productive enterprises.

Different from the existing approaches, the concept of ‘development’ which is used in this thesis, is defined as micro level dynamics (such as household or local community level dynamics), and these dynamics are including many different dimensions – economic, cultural, religious and gender aspects. This research addresses the links between the well-being of households and economic and social change associated with the phenomenon of
labour migration. Societies and communities are always changing and the concept of
development should be understood as a process, not a product. The migration theories we
examined in this chapter also explain both processes, and development practice intends to
provide tools that can be applied to the societies or specific communities. Such
interventions are intended to move specific communities or societies from a situation in
which they are believed to be worse off to a situation in which they are assumed to be
better off, and this thesis tries to find the links between the migration phenomena and
socio-economic development in the specific rural Thai contexts.

Some recent studies have been carried out on the impact of international remittances on
poverty alleviation in Asian region. Most of these studies are focused on the countries like
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Philippines, but there has been little effort to analyse its
impacts in the context of Thailand. As I mentioned above, some past studies in Thailand
used large and nationally representative samples, the data used have limited information on
remittances and the impacts of remittances in rural Thailand is not known.

In addition, in resource scarce areas like Northeastern Thailand, remittances have a great
potential to generate positive economic and social impacts. This fact has been recognised
by policymakers and has received attention from researchers. However, as has been
mentioned, there are hardly any studies on the micro-level impact of remittances on
households and their livelihoods in rural Thai context. I am not aware of any other such
studies so far. Most research has tended to be focused on the macro-level impact,
controlling migration flows from neighboring countries, potential use of remittances as a
policy tool, and having acknowledged its importance with a single methodology. I believe
that current patterns and trends in international migration cannot be achieved by relying on
the tools of one discipline or methodology alone. Rather, their complex, multi-faceted nature requires a variety of perspectives. So, a mixed-methods approach with multi-disciplinary perspective that is going to be used as a tool for this research will contribute a full understanding of current issues on international migration in rural Thailand and solve the single-oriented analysis problem for migration research.
3  International Migration in the Context of Thailand

3.1  INTRODUCTION

Increasing technological and infrastructure interconnectivity and interdependence of goods and labour markets in an unbalanced global economy are spurring migration flows across the world. In the last few decades, international migration has expanded to an unprecedented range of countries and socio-economic groups, giving way to multiple migratory circuits of a diverse nature (IOM, 2005). While the much discussed migration movements to Europe and North America continue to catch media and scholarly attention, recent estimates suggest that a significant portion of international migration occurs in the southern hemisphere, with South-to-South migrants as numerous as South-to-North migrants (United Nations, 2005).

Asia is a primary source and locus of international migration from within the region and beyond, and Thailand – a leading open economy in Southeast Asia – is evolving into a global and regional migration hub for incoming, outgoing and transiting migrants (IOM, 2009). This chapter provides an overview of regional and national processes affecting migration and migration movements from Thailand as background information for a case study.

The term of ‘international migration’ is an extremely broad concept vaguely defined as the crossing of national boundaries for a determined period of time, and whose statistical
operationalisation implies the inclusion of any person living outside their nation of birth (IOM, 2005). As a result, disparate social groups such as students, retirees, workers, refugees and displaced persons are clustered together as “migrants”. While this chapter aims to provide an overview of international migration issues related to Thailand, it is important to recognize that a wide range of coverage is virtually impossible, and by necessity, selected facets of international migration had to be prioritised. Thus, the main focus of this chapter is on those that move abroad for voluntary and labour purposes only.

3.2 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THAILAND IN MIGRATION CONTEXT

3.2.1 Trade and Market

Thailand is a lower middle-income country in Southeast Asia that has in the last thirty years achieved remarkable growth from its open economy and export-oriented policies. Struck by economic crisis in the late 1990s, the country has recovered to pre-crisis levels, attaining greater fiscal accountability and macro-stability in the process (IOM, 2005). These strong economic fundamentals are expected to hold as Thailand struggles to accelerate its pace of expansion, which has recently slowed due to political instability following the ousting of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006, high-energy prices, and waning consumer and investor confidence. As a result, real GDP growth declined from 6.2 percent per year between 2002-2004 to 4.6 percent per year between 2005-2007 (IOM, 2009).
Despite the current uncertainties, Thailand remains the fourth richest nation in Southeast Asia in terms of per capita income after Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia, well ahead of many other countries in the region, especially Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar, three of the least developed countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (ESCAP, 2007). In 2006, Thailand’s per capita GDP (in 1990 United States Dollars) was about seven times that of these three countries (Table 3-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990 US dollars</th>
<th>2000 PPP* Dollars</th>
<th>Average Annual GDP per Capita Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>12,763</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4,417</td>
<td>10,091</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>4,731</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>23,164</td>
<td>28,305</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,797</td>
<td>8,045</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* PPP = Purchase Power Parity adjusting for differences in the price of goods and services across countries.
Source: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2007)

Economic differentials also translate into different degrees of social development. For example, levels of education, health, and access to safe drinking water and sanitation are higher in Thailand than in the neighbouring GMS countries. Not surprisingly, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar have much lower life expectancy at birth, and maternal and infant mortality is very high when compared to Thailand (Table 3-2, see next page).
Table 3-2 Selected Social Indicators of Thailand and Neighbouring GMS Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal/Target/Indicator</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Lao PDR</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth*</td>
<td>56.4 years</td>
<td>53.5 years</td>
<td>61.0 years</td>
<td>70.2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>66.0 (2005)</td>
<td>70.9 (2005)</td>
<td>49.7 (2003)</td>
<td>22.0 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td></td>
<td>405.0 (2005)</td>
<td>100.0 (2001, urban)</td>
<td>24.0 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of rural population with sustainable access to safe drinking water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65.8 (2000)</td>
<td>91.0 (2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thailand’s attainment of this relatively advantaged position as a developing country originates in the early 1970s, when it committed to an open market economy. Adopting an export promotion strategy, Thailand favoured foreign investment and exchanges to facilitate industrial and tourism development and to stimulate domestic growth (Nikomborirak, 2004). To this day, Thailand invites foreign investment in all economic sectors except those that are related to national security, fisheries, and mass media (Nikomborirak, 2004). This provides incentives for both labour-intensive as well as high-tech manufacturing and other key industries. Thailand’s foreign direct investment (FDI) totalled USD 14.5 billion in 2006, with Japan, the European Union (EU), Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, the United States, and Hong Kong, China topping the list of investors (The Bank of Thailand, 2007). The same countries are also major sources of international tourism revenues, totalling approximately THB 480 billion in 2006 (at the time about USD 11 billion) (The Bank of Thailand, 2007).

Exports, though currently affected by declining markets, will remain Thailand’s key driver of growth for the foreseeable future. In the 1980s, Thailand transitioned from a primarily agricultural country to a rapidly industrializing one. Since then, export-oriented manufacturing accompanied by growth in the service and tourism-centred industries has

---

1 The table is provided as indication only as data across countries are not consistent in years and methodologies.
been fuelling the country’s economy, accounting for about 70 percent of its 2007 GDP (OECD, 2008). In 2007, major export items included computers and computer components, automobiles and automotive parts, gems and jewelry, integrated circuits, and rubber, with major export destinations being the United States, Japan and China. Thailand in turn imports the most goods from these countries, but in the reverse order (Japan, China and the United States). Key import items are crude oil, industrial and electrical machines, chemicals and integrated circuits (OECD, 2008).

In the last decade, Thailand’s merchandise exports with other Southeast Asian countries have also been increasing under the cooperation frameworks of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, more significantly, that of the GMS and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS)2. These last two arrangements emphasize Thailand’s integration into a regional market economy composed of its immediate neighbours through the construction of large-scale telecommunication and transportation infrastructure projects, facilitating the joint use of natural resources and the transnational movement of goods, investments, and people (IOM, 2009). The extensive network of so-called “economic corridors”, which links transport systems, power grids, and production centres across and beyond the sub-region, together with visa harmonization and cross-border transport facilitation, has reduced distances and enhanced intra-regional trade and movement (Sciortino et al., 2007). Since the formation of the GMS in 1992 up to 2004, intra-regional trade driven by Thailand and China increased 11 fold (IOM, 2005), not including informal cross-border trade, estimated to be equivalent to 30 to 50 percent of the official trade volume. Thailand is further an important anchor

---

2 The regional cooperation framework of ACMECS was spearheaded in 2003 by Thailand and it includes all the GMS countries less China, thus comprised of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Viet Nam and Thailand.
market for the disadvantaged GMS countries of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar, primarily importing natural resources to feed its export-oriented industrial sector at an annual compound growth rate of almost 10 percent since 2000 (Menon, 2005).

In parallel to trade, travel within the sub-region has picked-up, with Thailand as a main destination of sub-regional travel and tourism flows. The number of visitors crossing GMS land borders has climbed steeply, rising 19 percent from 2004 to 2005 to a total of 24 million (ADB, 2005). In particular, border area travel to Thailand has boomed in response to the establishment of tourism facilities, and investment and export-processing zones close to frontiers. The creation of border passes\(^3\) has also contributed to the increase in border crossing. As travel becomes easier, and the previously confined economies in the GMS become more interconnected, labour markets also transcend national boundaries – regionalisation is having unprecedented migratory consequences for Thailand (IOM, 2005).

### 3.2.2 Disparities in Growth

Within Thailand, the development of the export sector has spurred a high-wage, high-income economy concentrated around the capital, Bangkok. This part of the economy is expanding much faster than the low-wage, low-income, agriculture-dependent economy of the rest of the country (Sciortino et al, 2007). Agriculture is, however, still important to the Thai economy, with Thailand ranking among the top five food producers in the world, and the agriculture sector employing roughly 40 percent of its total labour force in 2006.

\(^3\) Border passes enable citizens of GMS countries to cross the border of a neighbouring country in the sub-region at special border checkpoints for a limited number of hours, days or weeks in lieu of passports.
(Sciortino et al., 2007). Data from the Bank of Thailand (BOT) also indicate that, in the same year, agriculture contributed only 8.9 percent of GDP, implying a significant labour productivity and income gap with other economic sectors.

Poverty in Thailand has traditionally been a rural phenomenon (World Bank, 2006). Notwithstanding the impressive reduction in the number of people living below minimum standards, from about 13 million in 2000 to 6.1 million in 2006 (Figure 3-1), stark disparities persist across rural and urban areas. In 2004, more than 87 percent of the poor lived in rural areas, a similar number to before the 1997 economic crisis (UNDP, 2007). In 2006, poverty affected 12 percent of the rural population, over three times the rate of 3.6 percent in urban areas, with almost half of the poor households dependent on agriculture, fishing and forestry for their livelihoods (Figure 3-2) (World Bank, 2007).
The urban-rural divide is also reflected in intra-regional disparities. As the economy grew, the gap between predominantly urban regions and rural regions has become wider, with Bangkok and the Central Region accounting for a 72 percent share of national GDP in 2004, up from 70 percent in 2002 and 60 percent in 1996 (Richter, 2006).

In a correlated trend, poverty has been reduced the most in Bangkok and its vicinities and less so in the South, North and the Northeast respectively (see Table 3-1). Approximately 60 percent of the country’s poor or about 3.8 million people reside in the Northeast, the most populous Thai region, with about one third of the total population (UNDP, 2007). Data from relevant ministries also indicate that the Northeast is behind in social development, having lower education enrollment ratios at all levels, and less access to services than other parts of the country (World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2006). The disadvantaged position of the Northeast and the North is central to internal and international migration, as these regions have become the primary source of Thai migrants for the expanding industrial sector and for wealthier countries in Southeast Asia and beyond (Sciortino et al., 2007).

### Table 3-3 Thailand Poverty Head Count Ratio Classified by Region, 1996-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: National Economic and Social Development Board in World Bank (2007)*
3.2.3 Demographic and Labour Market Transitions

By shifting to an industrialized society, Thailand has undergone the so-called “demographic transition”. This process, where fewer births and fewer deaths result in slower population growth and eventually an aging society, with fertility rates reaching replacement level of 2.1, has since long occurred in the economically advanced Western countries. Later in the 1950s, this transition began in the highly industrialized East Asian countries (Atoh et al., 2004). In the 1970s, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia to complete the transition, followed by Thailand in the 1990s and Indonesia and Viet Nam in the 2000s. The demographic transition is still ongoing in the Philippines and Malaysia and has barely begun in other Southeast Asian countries (Ananta and Arifin, 2007).

These distinct transition times have resulted in different levels of aging with Thailand having a somewhat younger population than most East Asian countries. However, the Thai population is still older than most Southeast Asian countries, especially its immediate neighbours, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar (ADB, 2004). These countries have a higher fertility rate and much larger youth populations – 60 percent of the people in Cambodia and 50 percent in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic are less than 20 years old, compared with Thailand’s 30 percent (ADB, 2004). As summarised in Table 3-4 (see next page), the demographic differentials shape migrant movements to and from Thailand in more than one way.

The ongoing aging process affects the labour force and supply. With the population pyramid in the intermediate stage of demographic transition, the work force still
temporarily grows, albeit at a slower pace, even if the number of people below 14 is decreasing (Figure 3-3). However, in the medium-term, the decline in fertility rates and the shrinking numbers of people of working age reduces the labour supply (Lee and Mason, 2006).

Table 3-4 Demographic Indicators for Selected East and Southeast Asian Countries, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>14,364</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,320,509</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>231,627</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>128,191</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>5,659</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>27,124</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>48,798</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>88,462</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>48,455</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4,543</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>86,909*</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>85,590</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For now, with the work force still growing from about 34 million in 2004 to roughly 37 million, Thailand’s economy has been able to accommodate most entrants, leaving only 0.56 million persons unemployed in 2007 (Ministry of Labour, 2008). In this tight labour market there are shortages at all skill levels, but especially at the extreme ends of the spectrum. The Thai work force has a large proportion of workers with limited education:
about 70 percent are at or below lower secondary level, whereas 35 percent are below the basic education level (Chalamwong, 2008). Thai industry’s increased use of more medium and high technology is resulting in a shortage of high-skilled personnel. To address this gap, the Thai Government besides allowing migration of high-skilled workers in selected occupations is trying to enhance the educational level of the population by extending basic education to 12 years and offering scholarships for students who have financial needs or perform well in school – these scholarships include assistance for MA and PhD study abroad. The new entrant work force is therefore gradually becoming more educated (Chalamwong, 2008).

The smaller, higher educated population, with work opportunities at its disposal, is finding lower-paying, lower-status and more physically demanding jobs unattractive. Even the less educated and skilled workers have begun to shun these so-called 3-Ds (Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult) jobs, finding them poorly compensated as employers suppress wages to maintain competitiveness in labour-intensive industries. Low-skilled jobs in the agricultural sector are particularly unappealing as the wages are the lowest and the conditions harsh (Chalamwong, 2008). In the more rural Northeast and North of Thailand, wages are one third to one half lower than those in Bangkok and the Central Region respectively, and unemployment and temporary employment rates are higher than in other regions (World Bank, 2007). These factors compound migration of disadvantaged inhabitants from these regions to other countries where at least, for the same kind of low-skilled jobs, they can earn more and gain a relatively higher status in return. At the same time, workers from poorer and younger GMS countries are willing to migrate to Thailand to fill jobs at the bottom of the occupational pyramid as the suppressed wages are still higher than what they could earn in their own countries (IOM, 2009).
3.2.4 Migration Trends and Patterns

Economic and demographic differentials in the increasingly interconnected global and regional economy, combined with the specifics of the labour market, provide the backdrop for labour migration dynamics centred on Thailand. These are primarily structured along a chain in which low-skilled workers from the weakest economies in Southeast Asia move to Thailand, and slightly more skilled Thai migrants move to the stronger economies in East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and other parts of the world (Kapur, 2004).

Labour expert Yongyuth Chalamwong (2004; 2005) identified four main migration trends coexisting in the country today, which have arisen during the transformation of the Thai economy from agricultural to manufacturing-led. The first trend refers to internal migration, which began in the 1980s, made of movements of young adults, both male and female, from the poorest regions, especially the Northeast, to the central part of the country to work in the industrial, service, and informal sectors. As Plambech (2007:39) puts it, “the cheap labour that sustained [Thailand’s] urban-based accumulation came largely from the agricultural periphery like Isaan [the Northeast]”.

Concurrently with the increase in rural-urban flows, the share of rural-rural flows declined, but it was only in more recent years that urban-rural flows, still increasing in the late 1980s, also began to abate (Saifi, 2006). In comparison with the past, fewer migrants are now willing to return home from the cities to work on family farms during the peak agricultural season. This reduction in temporary migrants, a traditional feature of Thai internal migration, is further tightening the rural labour market and opening up space for hiring foreign migrant workers from neighbouring countries (Chalamwong, 2005).
The second trend consists of outward migration from disadvantaged regions of Thailand to higher income countries. Since the late 1970s, rural residents with low education and, thus, poor prospects in the industrializing labour market, have had the option to work abroad as contract or independent labour (Chalamwong, 2005). Though male dominated in the last two decades, outgoing migration has been increasingly characterized by a growing number of women, especially among irregular migrants (IOM, 2005). Destinations have also changed over time. From the late 1970s up to the mid-1980s, Thai workers migrated primarily to the Arab states of the Gulf, which had turned into wealthy, migrant-dependent economies due to the rise in oil revenues. With the collapse of oil prices, the Gulf War crisis, increasing competition by other labour-exporting Southeast Asian countries, and the deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia in 1985, due to the still unresolved jewellery robbery in Saudi Arabia and murder of three Saudi diplomats in Bangkok, the Thai migrant work force began seeking new markets in the East (Chalamwong, 2005). In the late 1980s, Thai migration to the Middle East almost vanished, except for Israel, where it substituted Thai for Palestinian workers (Figure 3-4). This happened at a time when the newly industrialized countries of East and Southeast Asia began pulling workers from their poorer neighbours, including Thailand, thus giving way to the so-called “Asianisation” of Thai labour flows (Chantavanich et al., 2000). In a parallel trend, a growing number of Thai women started migrating to Europe, Australia and other Western countries to establish families and work in the manufacturing and service sectors. There are indications, however, that the Middle East may soon regain its status as a priority market for Thai labour also because of Thailand’s growing commercial interest in that region (Lucas, 2004).
In the late 1970s, Thailand started to formally employ significant numbers of international migrants. This third trend emerged in response to new demands from the expanding industrial and service sectors, which could not be met by the local workforce because of limited or non-existent expertise (Chalamwong, 2005). As part of the Government’s efforts to incentivize foreign investment and facilitate industrial development, highly skilled professionals were allowed to immigrate in order to fill executive, managerial and high-tech positions mainly in foreign and national corporations concentrated in Bangkok and nearby provinces. Some of these workers, posted in Thailand for significant periods of time, later decided to retire in the country (IOM, 2005). As discussed later, expatriate employment declined in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis, but started to grow again in 2002 when the Thai economy recovered, before decreasing again due to the recent ongoing uncertainties (see Table 3-5 in section 3.3). Consistently over time, principal sending countries have been those with a high degree of investment in Thailand, namely Japan; the EU countries, especially the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; the United States; and China, including Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong, China.
The gradual transition of Thailand from a labour-exporting into a net labour-importing country was eventually completed in the 1990s with the large influx of lower-skilled migrants from neighbouring GMS countries. This fourth, and last, migration trend implies a change in intra-regional migration from being spurred by conflict to being stimulated by economic conditions (Chalamwong, 2005). Thailand has a long history as a regional safe haven. In the second half of the last century, thousands fled from China, Viet Nam, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and especially Myanmar, into Thailand because of war or internal conflict. Gradually, these intra-regional flows have expanded to include migrant workers in a process intrinsically linked to Thailand’s more rapid economic growth in relation to its GMS neighbours. This process is further fueled by regional infrastructure development that has reduced transport costs and facilitated cross-border interaction, thereby lowering the costs of migrating abroad (Chalamwong, 2005).

As the economy prospered and the Thai education levels and relative job expectations increased, Thailand’s tight labour market started to face a manpower shortage in low-skilled jobs (Chalamwong, 2004). The shortfall was eventually filled by an influx of low-skilled labour from less industrialized neighbouring countries with scarce employment opportunities and growing working age populations (Chalamwong, 2006; Sciortino et al., 2007). In the words of Athukorala, Manning and Wichramasekara, (2000:3) “It is precisely the relative shortage of low-skilled workers in Thailand, in a regional context of surplus rural workers in other GMS countries, that has provided an incentive for substantial migration flows within the region”. The establishment of investment and export processing zones in border areas as part of the Thai Government efforts to regionalize supply chains and decentralize industrial development further enforces the pulling of workers from across the border (Arnold, 2004).
In the years to come, the Thai economy is expected to grow more dependent on low-skilled migrant labour because of the regionalisation of the economy, the growing demand for low-skilled workers in almost all economic sectors and the aging of the Thai population (Martin, 2007). The Thailand Development Research Institute projected in 2006 that from 2007 to 2012 there will be a need for 300,000 primary workers of whom only 33 percent can be satisfied by new Thai entrants to the labour market. The shortage will probably continue to be filled by workers from neighbouring GMS countries. Unless the uneven spread of opportunities in the GMS is addressed, which is unlikely in the short term as even with reduced growth rates Thailand’s economic advantage is projected to consolidate between 2007-2017, the low wages for low-skilled jobs in Thailand will remain higher than those in other GMS countries (Chalamwong, 2008). Thailand will, thus, continue to appeal to the poorer and, in the case of Myanmar, also politically disenfranchised populations across the border. For Thai employers, the lasting oversupply of cross-border labour continues to suppress wages and maximize profit (World Bank 2006; Sciortino et al., 2007). As Martin puts it, (2007:6) “demand pull factors in Thailand, supply push factors in migrant countries of origin, and networks that bridge borders are likely to sustain migration”. Still, Thailand has been hesitant to acknowledge its growing integration into the emerging sub-regional labour market and migration flows from Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar remain largely unregulated.

Outside of labour, specific migration patterns originate from the key economic role played by the tourism industry in Thailand since the 1960s. During the Cold War, the presence of American bases and other foreign agencies based in Thailand stimulated the establishment of a diverse tourism and entertainment industry, which prospered in successive years thanks to the expansion of global tourism and the open market policy of the Thai
Government (Caouette et al., 2006). Of the large numbers of tourists who have been drawn to Thailand in the course of the years, some have subsequently decided to stay and engage in business or other activities in the country. Relationships have also been established between foreigners and the local population leading to mixed marriages, formation of inter-cultural families in Thailand and abroad, and migration, especially of Thai women, to a multitude of countries across the globe (IOM, 2005). The growth of the sex industry as an integral part of the tourism industry has fostered migration of entertainers and sex workers, as well as trafficking of women and children for sexual purposes, from Thailand to East Asian and OECD⁴ countries, and from Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar, to Thailand (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005).

The migration patterns described here and other less prominent international movements to and from Thailand have resulted in a diverse migrant population consisting of both immigrants and emigrants of various types, who have crossed borders at different times and for different reasons.

3.3 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM THAILAND

A common feature of international migration in Southeast Asia is the involvement of States in promoting and administering export labour. Together with Philippines, Thailand led the way in introducing overseas contract employment in the region, a practice later followed by Indonesia and more recently by Myanmar, Viet Nam, the Lao PDR and Cambodia (IOM, 2005).

⁴ The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes Australia, Canada, selected countries in Europe and the United States.
As early as the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1987), the Thai Government formulated the policy goal of promoting labour exports to address rising unemployment, and the conditions for the recruitment and placement of “overseas Thai workers” through government agencies and licensed private recruitment companies (Ministry of Labour, 2008). Under this government-dominated migration system, almost 1.5 million overseas Thai workers have migrated during the last decade from Thailand, mainly to East and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The largest proportion of the 161,917 Thais officially deployed abroad in 2007 was in East Asia (Table 3-5, see next page).

The volume of Thai contract labour has fluctuated over the last decade. As Table 3-5 indicates, after reaching a peak during the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the export of Thai labour gradually declined, before significantly rising again in the last two years due to increased demand from Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and new market openings with the Republic of Korea. This resurgence in contract labour is also related to the recent deterioration of the Thai economy, as well as a more active role of the Thai Government in establishing or renewing bilateral agreements with key destination countries (Ministry of Labour, 2008). Interestingly, in 2007, because of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar’s growing demand, the Middle East surpassed Southeast Asia for the first time in this decade to become the second largest destination region for Thai labour after East Asia.

Notwithstanding volume fluctuations, throughout the decade, the top destination for overseas Thai workers has been Taiwan Province of China. Despite a downward shift in

---

5 Thai official figures are only available with regard to Thai nationals who migrate through government channels. As will be discussed later, these overseas Thai workers are predominantly male, have low educational levels, and are employed in low-skilled occupations.
demand since 2000, this is due to rising competition among labour-exporting Southeast Asian countries (Ministry of Labour, 2008).

In 2007 Taiwan Province of China still absorbed roughly 30 percent of the total Thai worker population deployed abroad, while the other top five Thai labour-importing countries, i.e. Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Israel and United Arab Emirates, employed less than 10 percent each.

### Table 3-5 Officially Deployed Overseas Thai Workers, 1997-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183,689</td>
<td>191,735</td>
<td>159,566</td>
<td>177,709</td>
<td>165,047</td>
<td>160,807</td>
<td>147,769</td>
<td>148,596</td>
<td>139,667</td>
<td>160,846</td>
<td>161,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East and Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Qatar</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>1,939</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>7,516</td>
<td>5,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bahrain</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kuwait</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>3,906</td>
<td>3,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UAE</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>3,624</td>
<td>8,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Libya</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1,269</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>2,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Israel</td>
<td>10,780</td>
<td>10,644</td>
<td>12,765</td>
<td>8,764</td>
<td>12,163</td>
<td>12,952</td>
<td>6,327</td>
<td>10,611</td>
<td>8,746</td>
<td>9,312</td>
<td>10,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>2,734</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>3,722</td>
<td>4,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia</strong></td>
<td>114,976</td>
<td>122,327</td>
<td>111,103</td>
<td>123,540</td>
<td>106,396</td>
<td>92,148</td>
<td>94,091</td>
<td>91,109</td>
<td>82,796</td>
<td>90,250</td>
<td>78,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Japan</td>
<td>10,106</td>
<td>10,790</td>
<td>5,033</td>
<td>5,207</td>
<td>5,246</td>
<td>4,701</td>
<td>5,037</td>
<td>5,857</td>
<td>6,585</td>
<td>7,218</td>
<td>8,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Taiwan Province of China</td>
<td>100,910</td>
<td>106,828</td>
<td>101,814</td>
<td>110,753</td>
<td>94,126</td>
<td>79,589</td>
<td>75,849</td>
<td>69,982</td>
<td>57,663</td>
<td>62,067</td>
<td>52,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hong Kong, China</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td>2,702</td>
<td>5,121</td>
<td>5,488</td>
<td>4,962</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>3,790</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>3,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>8,631</td>
<td>10,650</td>
<td>14,232</td>
<td>16,456</td>
<td>13,287</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Asia</strong></td>
<td>49,011</td>
<td>45,671</td>
<td>27,011</td>
<td>32,565</td>
<td>32,375</td>
<td>38,321</td>
<td>27,278</td>
<td>26,318</td>
<td>24,681</td>
<td>25,959</td>
<td>27,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Singapore</td>
<td>17,770</td>
<td>17,069</td>
<td>18,181</td>
<td>21,273</td>
<td>20,411</td>
<td>15,354</td>
<td>12,480</td>
<td>11,338</td>
<td>11,780</td>
<td>15,115</td>
<td>16,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Malaysia</td>
<td>8,860</td>
<td>9,031</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>14,619</td>
<td>7,479</td>
<td>5,853</td>
<td>4,915</td>
<td>3,418</td>
<td>3,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brunei</td>
<td>17,671</td>
<td>15,246</td>
<td>6,086</td>
<td>8,607</td>
<td>8,607</td>
<td>7,155</td>
<td>6,118</td>
<td>5,680</td>
<td>5,216</td>
<td>5,141</td>
<td>4,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td>4,710</td>
<td>4,325</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>3,447</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>2,285</td>
<td>3,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Asia</strong></td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>2,342</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- India</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western</strong></td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>5,609</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>4,363</td>
<td>5,276</td>
<td>5,541</td>
<td>6,522</td>
<td>7,846</td>
<td>8,958</td>
<td>10,975</td>
<td>13,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- US and Europe</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>3,865</td>
<td>4,511</td>
<td>4,893</td>
<td>5,917</td>
<td>7,298</td>
<td>8,359</td>
<td>9,191</td>
<td>12,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>2,985</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour (2008)
Migrant contract labour, like in the “guest worker” rotation system found decades ago in Europe, is expected to be temporary and circulatory. Countries in Asia and the Middle East do not approve permanent settlement and expect migrants to travel alone, remain single and childless during their stay, and return home at the end of the contract (Ministry of Labour, 2008). Evidence, however, shows that formal rules do not stop migrants from engaging with local population, marrying and having children in the destination country. Nor do they preclude migrants from deciding to overstay or re-enter the destination country irregularly (IOM, 2005). How many overseas Thai workers have returned to their country of origin is, in this context, difficult to assess, due to a lack of data on returnees. In 2007, the Ministry of Labour reported looking after 500,000 overseas Thai workers currently abroad, which would imply that about a million workers sent during the last decade have returned home or are no longer under TOEA oversight. Generally, it is assumed that most overseas Thai workers return to Thailand at least for some time before engaging in successive contracts to the same or another destination country (Chantavanich and Germershausen, 2000), but the literature (Rojvithee, 2007) suggests that many actually continue to stay abroad outside of the contract scheme.
In 2007, as in the past, the great majority of overseas Thai workers were males (Table 3-6). Male migrants have usually been employed in construction, manufacturing, and agriculture, while female migrants have been concentrated in the household and commercial service sectors, working as live-in maids, caregivers, entertainers, and service employees (Yamanaka & Piper, 2005). After reaching 18.43 percent in 2004, the proportion of Thai female workers underwent a decline, which could indicate a growing reliance on Thai labour in the male-dominated markets of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the Republic of Korea, as well as gender shifts in labour demand from the more established destinations of Taiwan Province of China and Singapore (see Chapter 5). The trend could also reflect a growing preference for female workers to go through irregular channels because of increasingly established migration networks and the higher costs of regular channels.

![Figure 3-6 Number of Overseas Thai Workers by Age Group, 2007](image)

*Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration, Ministry of Labour (2008)*
The overseas Thai worker population is relatively old, with the majority over 25 years of age and the highest concentration in the 30-39 age group (Figure 3-6). Most of the migrants are from the Northeast and the North, the poorest and most disadvantaged regions in Thailand. A significant proportion also comes from the Central Region, indicating that Bangkok and its surroundings may not offer adequate employment opportunities, and that residence close to the capital facilitates administrative recruitment processes, reduces transport costs, and thus the cost of migration (Ministry of Labour, 2008).

Similar to the past and in line with Thailand’s educational structure, education levels of overseas Thai workers were generally low in 2007 (Table 3-7), with half of them having only partial primary school education (below Grade 4), more than 70 percent having less than lower high school (Grade 9 and below), and only roughly 11 percent having a diploma or a bachelor degree. No Thais with a Master’s or PhD degree were recorded as being deployed abroad through government-led overseas employment schemes in the last decade.

Table 3-7  Education Levels of Overseas Thai Workers, 1999-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>128,475</td>
<td>137,810</td>
<td>118,029</td>
<td>107,226</td>
<td>89,263</td>
<td>83,645</td>
<td>75,377</td>
<td>84,305</td>
<td>78,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>19,351</td>
<td>24,165</td>
<td>28,484</td>
<td>34,087</td>
<td>35,413</td>
<td>32,183</td>
<td>29,936</td>
<td>34,563</td>
<td>36,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>4,296</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>8,099</td>
<td>8,789</td>
<td>11,144</td>
<td>15,641</td>
<td>15,894</td>
<td>19,484</td>
<td>21,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert.Voc.</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>2,259</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>2,302</td>
<td>2,877</td>
<td>4,182</td>
<td>4,186</td>
<td>5,172</td>
<td>5,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIP.Voc.</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,953</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>3,341</td>
<td>5,555</td>
<td>5,830</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>7,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIP.Tech.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor Degree</td>
<td>3,098</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>4,561</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>5,941</td>
<td>6,912</td>
<td>7,652</td>
<td>9,078</td>
<td>10,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Degree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ins. Of Skill</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>159,566</td>
<td>177,709</td>
<td>165,047</td>
<td>160,807</td>
<td>147,769</td>
<td>148,596</td>
<td>139,667</td>
<td>160,846</td>
<td>161,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consistent with the low level of education, overseas Thai workers are generally employed in relatively low-skilled occupations. Table 3-8 shows that in 2007, less than four percent of overseas Thai workers were employed in executive and professional positions and only
eight percent filled high-skilled occupations, the majority still being employed in less skilled occupations, with one in three women employed as service (mostly domestic) workers.

Table 3-8 Occupations of Overseas Thai Workers by Sex, 2002-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislator, Senior Official and Manager</td>
<td>2,965</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>3,568</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>3,028</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technician and Associate</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>2,420</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>2,647</td>
<td>2,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Clerical and Related Work</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Worker and Dealer</td>
<td>4,570</td>
<td>8,694</td>
<td>4,701</td>
<td>8,923</td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>9,435</td>
<td>5,232</td>
<td>7,058</td>
<td>5,666</td>
<td>7,290</td>
<td>5,979</td>
<td>7,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural and Fisheries Worker</td>
<td>12,555</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>11,426</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3,944</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Labour, Craft and Related Trade Worker</td>
<td>11,505</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>10,297</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>9,502</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>40,831</td>
<td>3,804</td>
<td>51,284</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>51,345</td>
<td>3,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer and Technical Worker</td>
<td>56,852</td>
<td>9,702</td>
<td>60,165</td>
<td>9,815</td>
<td>56,162</td>
<td>10,272</td>
<td>29,533</td>
<td>6,072</td>
<td>32,354</td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>31,402</td>
<td>5,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>36,233</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>36,622</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>33,507</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>33,591</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>38,513</td>
<td>4,466</td>
<td>36,696</td>
<td>3,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136,198</td>
<td>24,609</td>
<td>122,698</td>
<td>25,071</td>
<td>121,200</td>
<td>27,396</td>
<td>115,267</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>135,752</td>
<td>25,094</td>
<td>137,922</td>
<td>23,995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Interestingly, however, “skilled labour” is increased since 2005 (Table 3-7), and this is probably in compliance with requirements for more skilled labour by the destination countries as articulated in bilateral agreements. It also should be noted that this form of classification could be misleading, since the label refers to jobs not entailing elaborate skills that in other contexts would be classified at most as “semi-skilled” (Ministry of Labour, 2008).

The low-educated and low-skilled overseas Thai workers are supposed to be in good health and to have the necessary skills to perform in a foreign setting, having undergone physical examinations, pre-departure tests and orientation sessions. They can also be expected to receive adequate compensation given that wages and other work conditions have been established in official contracts, and to enjoy a certain degree of protection overseas under the 1985 Employment Act, which stipulates that employment agencies have to reimburse
then if the job and wages are not as specified in their contracts. Because of these and other support mechanisms, contract migration is considered a relatively safe option for Thais wishing to work overseas (Ministry of Labour, 2008).

The impact of migration is also felt at home, as the migrant’s absence puts a strain on remaining household members. As overseas Thai workers are predominantly men, their migration may impact their wives and children, with women often having to take over traditionally male responsibilities in running households (Chalamwong, 2008). Marital problems may occur during migration and upon return of the migrant worker, especially if the separation has been long and the family has grown apart. For single migrants, it is their parents and siblings who have to adjust to the change. In rural areas, households are confronted with the loss of manpower necessary for farming, and may have to look for substitute workers (IOM, 2009).

The overseas Thai workers are willing to endure an often-strenuous situation is testament to their resilience and desire for better lives for themselves and their families. Migration studies show in general, the incomes earned from foreign countries are used to purchase consumer goods and pay for the needs of family in households, and the households temporarily enjoy higher standards of living (Angsuthanasombat, 2001). Migrants’ remittances are also important at the macro economic level as a source of foreign exchange and day-to-day consumption.
The already significant figure of about USD 1.8 billion\(^6\) recorded for 2007 by the Bank of Thailand (Figure 3-7), could be even greater if the remittances sent home through informal channels by the much larger number of independent migrants were to be established and taken into account.

3.4 CONCLUSION

The overview of international migration in the context of Thailand provided in this chapter indicates the background and outward flows of labour migration from Thailand. There are migration issues the country faces that need to be understood and addressed, if international migration is to contribute to development and economic growth, as well as to migrant well-being. Today, international migration garners heightened press and public attention. Media reports on migration issues appear more frequently, however, as noted in Chapter 1, there is a lack of reliable and comparable data and the issues related to international migration in Thailand remain inadequate to properly address the magnitude and diversity of this phenomenon. As the previous chapters reveal, there are still many knowledge gaps that

\(^6\) Calculated at current THB value (1 USD = 31.26 THB).
ought to be filled if international migration is to contribute to human and economic development, and the following chapters will help us understand the complex phenomenon of international migration and its implications on well-being for the households in rural Thailand, especially in the Northeast, the poorest and marginalised region of the country.
4 Data and the Village Context of the Case Study Area

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Thailand has experienced a substantial growth in international labour migration and it is important to consider the impact on development and the extent to which such mobility affects the social and economic well-being of migrants and their families. However, little is currently known about which groups are affected most by the movements and how people adjust to changes caused by migration at the micro-level. The macro picture of impacts examined through secondary data can give only partial answers. Thus, the small scale data in conjunction with the available larger scale data-set can provide more detailed insights on people’s movements and their implications. This approach is endorsed by authors such as Hugo (1997) who states that, “the micro approach to study population mobility allows the complex two-way interactions between movement and economic and social change to be more readily tackled than is possible in large scale census data. This is largely because the approach allows individuals, households, and communities to be studied in context”. This chapter will explore the methodological basis of the fieldwork and explain how the field research is designed in order to meet the theoretical challenge of combining the macro and micro level in a multi-scale approach.

Primary data collection is essential in the study of international labour migration in developing countries like Thailand where secondary data concerning migration is insufficient. While being of poor quality, the secondary data also do not tell us much about
many important aspects of the migration process. The extent of datasets in Thailand which preceded this study is explored below. In order to ameliorate the gap in research on migration in Thailand this study then chooses a case study approach to triangulate with the aggregate data. As described below, the present study follows the example of using a ‘mixed method approach’ to primary data collection involving a detailed quantitative migration survey and qualitative interviews with key informants within the case study. Through these procedures, it is possible to examine a range of population mobility and the extent to which they were having social and economic effects on individuals, families and households in Northeast Thailand.

4.2 DATA SOURCES

4.2.1 Household Survey Questionnaires

The major source of data used in this study is the household survey, conducted by the author in 2008. While the standard sources of migration data in developing countries are population censuses, specialised survey is considered to be the best source of data investigating the migration dynamics (Bilsborrow, 1998). The migration household survey has several significant advantages over large scale censuses or other administrative sources of information. For example, the survey can include questions that allow the researcher to focus more sharply on the particular interests and motivational forces which underpin migration decisions. Thus, the mobility of people can be analysed by various criteria such as frequency of movement, duration and reason for migration. In addition, the survey can gather a wide range of information on the characteristics of individuals, households, or
communities, in order to better analyse the impacts and consequences of migration across a range of indicators.

The household survey in this study has two unique features that this analysis uses to good advantage. First, it overcomes the most prominent disadvantage of household surveying, as discussed above, which can be to hide gender relations by only interviewing the household head, who can tend to give a male-oriented account of the workings of the household. By contrast, this survey also collects data at the individual level. The survey gathered detailed social, economic, and demographic data, at the individual as well as the household level, in order to build a much more detailed picture of the income and asset base of the household as well as the interrelationships therein. Therefore, using the data, a multi-level analysis of migration is possible. Second, the survey was designed to identify out-migrants who were usual residents of the sample households, but were living elsewhere at the time of survey. Specific questions were asked regarding the money and goods that the household received from those migrants during the previous years. Although these questions were answered by those left behind in the origin household, the information can be used to examine the direct contribution of migrant remittances to the household livelihoods. The migration survey questionnaires are attached in Appendix and the household questionnaires consisted of six parts.

Section A and B of the questionnaire elicited basic demographic, social and economic data for household members. Using data collected in these sections, it is possible to investigate household size, demographic composition and socio-economic status of a household. The questionnaire covered a broad range of household characteristics, including the total
income of the household, type of housing, possession of various consumer goods, access to water and toilet, ownership of house and the size of land owned.

Section C (migration experience) was used to seek information on persons who had been usual residents of the household but who had moved out and been residing elsewhere for more than a month. Information pertaining to basic socio-demographic characteristics of the out-migrants, their relationship to the head of household of origin, destination countries and occupations, and duration of migration was obtained.

Section D of the questionnaire explored information on the migrants’ remittances and transfers. This data allows an estimation of the amount of cash and the value of goods transferred to the household of origin by members abroad. The use of money received and the channels for money transfer were also inquired about. Moreover, by combining the data of section C and D, one can explore the features of remittances behaviours by out-migrants who sent money home.

Section E seeks information about the migration process such as migration decision-making, reasons for leaving, the source of money to finance the journey, and interaction with migration assistants. Lastly, the questionnaires captured some detailed qualitative views around the migration decision, journey and experience which have the potential to inform the policy process. The benefits and vulnerabilities caused by labour mobility were explored, as were attitudes towards migration, the local labour market and social well-being of the family left-behind in section F.
Different from the conventional migration surveys, *the detailed qualitative views* in the questionnaires for this research are based on the responses of the sending family members perceptions rather than the migrants themselves, and this feature made this research unique compared to the other migration research and these perceptions sometimes reflected the respondent’s own interpretations rather the reality of the actual situations.

Before the actual survey began, a pilot survey was carried out for two purposes. Firstly, it was to evaluate the level of response and co-operation that could be expected from local people. Secondly, it was used to pre-test questions to see if they were understood by respondents and effective in obtaining the required information. This was also a good opportunity to spend a short period of time with the research assistants before the survey began. It was also a chance to discuss the actual migratory situation with inhabitants in the village.

### 4.2.2. Qualitative Interviews

In this study, migration data were also obtained from the qualitative interview technique. This was to gather more detailed information on particular issues from key informants such as researchers at academic institutions, professionals/experts in international organisations and government, and village heads/local folks who had significant experience of migration such as being labour migrants themselves in the past, to support the quantitative information gathered in the survey. The interviews were recorded and key information were written at the same time by the research assistants, and analysed by the author with the assistance of interpreter.
4.2.3 Secondary Data

One of the major reasons for the dearth of research on international migration in Asia is the lack of adequate data collection systems in the bulk of nations in the region. This is also true for Thailand, and unfortunately, very few countries in the Asian region have large survey or census data relating to international migration. Hugo (1996) suggests that in many developing countries contexts, the lack of comprehensive secondary data relating to migration necessarily needs both the collection of primary and secondary data – “It is necessary to gather fragments of information from a number of sources, and through triangulation and intelligent and careful exploration arrive at an estimate of the scale and nature of movement… which involves: collection of all available relevant secondary data; intensive field-based survey; qualitative techniques such as use of focus groups, key informant interviews, etc.” (Hugo, 1996:103).

There are several international and public organisations and academic institutions in Bangkok where information concerning international migration are collected. However, in most cases, these data are a part of an administrative process and are not compiled into a form accessible in public research. In order to establish broad patterns of international labour migration flows, this study used supplementary information from the Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA) under the Ministry of Labour (MOL), The Bank of Thailand (BOT), and regional offices of International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and United Nations Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). Internet sources (migration data base and publications) from World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and IOM also accessed and used to capture the broad migration context for the case study.
4.3 CASE STUDY AREA

In order to select areas to undertake primary data collection for the present study, a multi-stage selection approach was adopted, and sample households were drawn in five stages; region → province → district → sub-district → village, respectively.

From the secondary data and the consultations with migration experts in Bangkok, it is found that the Northeast region has the largest number of international labour migrants. After the Northeast region was selected, a province-level was then selected. To do this, all provinces within the Northeast region were ranked based on the number of international labour migrants who left their hometowns, and it was obvious that Udon Thani province held the top position – the highest incidence in the region and the country, among them.

Figure 4-1 in next page shows the location of case study area.

---

This fact was confirmed when I did an interview with the local official at TOEA in Udon Thani province and this results partly from the region’s economic and environmental marginality – consequently the lowest regional living standards in Thailand, and partly from the American Air-Bases during the Vietnam War and associated road systems.
Udon Thani province is 474 km far away in Northeast direction from the capital city, Bangkok and raked 8th in population size in Thailand.
The province is divided into 15 districts (Figure 4-2) and these districts are further sub-divided into 155 sub-districts and 1,682 villages (Udon Thani Province Council).

Figure 4-2  Map of Udon Thani Province and the Volume of International Labour Migrants by Districts

![Map of Udon Thani Province and the Volume of International Labour Migrants by Districts](image)

* The size of black circles indicates the volume of labour migrants. Source: Modified and adjusted by the author.

It is apparent from Figure 4-2 above that Muang, Nong han, and Phen districts were selected for survey areas because of the largest number of migrants among the districts in Udon Thani province. They are accounting for 14.4, 13.3 and 12.0 percent of total migration population among 15 districts in Udon Thani province respectively in 2007. However, other districts also had a significant number of out-migrants during the year 2007 (see Table 4-1).

Due to budget and time constraints, similar procedures were not able to be used to identify sub-districts and villages for the study. Bilsborrow et al. (1997) pointed out that selecting study areas by judgement is often appropriate when comprehensive sampling frames are not available for areas where international migrants and their households are thought to be
concentrated. In applying this approach in this study, the district officials of Muang, Nong han, and Phen districts were contacted and asked for recommendation of the sub-districts where a large number of people were leaving for seeking a job in abroad.

Table 4-1  Top Ten Districts Experiencing Highest Number of International Labour Migrants by Sex (Udon Thani province in Thailand, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Muang</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>2,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nong han</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>2,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Phen</td>
<td>2,242</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>2,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ban phue</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Kum pavapee</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ban dung</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nong vueysaw</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Kud jap</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Chai van</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Tung phon</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14,673</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>16,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration Office in Udon Thani province.

From these procedures, two sub-districts of each three districts were selected, and two villages were randomly drawn from each sub-district. The process yielded for a target sample of 300 households, and eventually, 312 questionnaires were completed. Figure 4-3 shows the locations of survey villages and Table 4-2 presents the distribution of sample households in those three selected districts.
Figure 4-3 The Location of Survey Villages in Udon Thani Province, Thailand

* The black dots indicate the survey villages (A=Muang, B=Nong han, C=Phen).
  Source: Modified and adjusted by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts/Villages</th>
<th>Stage of sampling frame</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muang (A)</strong></td>
<td>1 district x 4 villages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nong nakham</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koi</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang nyu</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eluik</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nong han (B)</strong></td>
<td>1 district x 4 villages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nong han</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mek yai</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na dee</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pung nku</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phen (C)</strong></td>
<td>1 district x 4 villages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na senual</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pon sawan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching hwan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey by the author.
4.4 THE VILLAGE CONTEXT

The examination of the social, economic and cultural context of the case study village provides meaningful insights into the impacts of international labour migration on family and households. Udon Thani province has experienced international migration for more than three decades. The occurrence of this mobility has been attributed to the presence of US Military Base during the Viet Nam War when the companies associated with the development of massive base-employed local workers. After the withdrawal of this military base in 1975, the huge construction projects led by oil boom in the Middle East countries provided further demand for workers and the migration flows from the region were continued accordingly. The phenomenon of international labour migration from the 1970s has resulted in socio-economic changes in the villages and communities where migrants were drawn. This section provides some background information about the livelihoods of people in Udon Thani, the case study area, with a particular focus on the 12 villages surveyed.

4.4.1 Village Setting

In the case study area, it was found that each village was located alongside main dirt road (Picture 4-1), and a village may be extended in linear fashion from a few hundred meters to a few kilometres. In villages such as Nong nakham and Pung nku, there can also often be found an isolated group of households separated from the main part of village. Such a group of households are identified as sub-village (moo in local language) and are generally located not far from the main village. These sub-villages are linked to the main village by a
dirt road. The number of moo in a village varies, and the households in moo are numbered for administration purpose.

Villages are often separated from each other by large expanses of open rice fields, but if they adjoin each other along the same road, the boundary of a village is identified by a traffic sign. The size of the village in the case study area varied from less than 2,000 rai (1 rai = 0.4 acre) to 7,000 rai, and the village is surrounded by the rice fields (Figure 4-4).
4.4.2 Transportation

A construction of roads in Udon Thani had had a considerable impact on the villages. Not only do roads provide communication between villages but they also provide farmers with direct access to external markets, which significantly increases their agricultural incomes by cutting out the middleman. New roads are constructed every year by province council and some are upgraded from dirt to concrete ones. The local villagers have the responsibility of maintaining them, except for some important roads which are muddy during the rainy season such that the province council allocates a budget to maintain them.

People usually use bicycles and motor cycles to communicate with other villages and communities. These vehicles have become part of the livelihoods of the rural population. Some people have a pick-up truck-type commercial vehicle (Picture 4-2) for business, and it can be used to transport agricultural products within the farming area as well.
In addition, a motorbike-type vehicle, called *skylab* (Picture 4-2) is a popular service in rural areas and the villagers prefer to use this service for travelling to the district or province centre. Interestingly, the fare is negotiable, but the standard fare is ten baht for a one way trip to or from the district centre.

In villages located close to the highway, such as Nong nakham and Koi, people can travel by inter-district/inter-province bus service. The bus service is normally available in every 30 minutes or until the seats are fully occupied, but the passengers can ask the driver to depart earlier and pay a little extra money. Using the bus services in the study area, however, is less popular than *skylab* which is available on request at any time.

### 4.4.3 Housing

Houses in the villages of Northeastern Thailand are normally built on the ground or posts, using hardwood, cement and tiles, given the fact that the appearance of houses in rural Thailand reflects the social and economic status of the owners. Houses of the better off (in
the middle of Picture 4-3) have two floors – the first floor is built with concrete and decorated with colourful ceramics and the second floor is built with hardwood. On the other hand, the houses of the poorer (left in Picture 4-3) are built on wood posts, leaving a lower open area, while the upper floor is a living area for family members.

Picture 4-3 The Various Types of Houses in Udon Thani, Northeast Thailand

Source: By the author.

The compounds of houses in rural Northeast are generally the same, occupying areas of around 20 meters by 15 meters. The house is normally located in the middle of the area and the fence is made of trees or cement to specify the boundary of the house. Most houses are built very close to each other, so people can walk through from one house to another easily. In most villages, houses are built within a square block so the rear of one house is facing another within a block, and each block is separated by a dirt road. Many blocks are grouped together as a unit called a kum. Each kum has a head to manage general matters and to raise issues with the village head in a meeting.
4.4.4 Family Kinship and Living Arrangement

The primary social unit in the society is the ‘household’. Conventionally, the term ‘family’ refers to a group of people who are related to each other through kinship ties, and the members composed by blood ties and in-law (for this research, the terms ‘household’ and ‘family’ are exchangeable).

As the same in other Southeast Asian societies, the family traditionally takes primary responsibility for older persons in Thailand. Widespread norms supporting filial obligations to parents underlie the existing system of intergenerational relations (Knodel, Saengtienchai, and Sittitrai 1995). Parents also typically feel a continuing obligation to ensure their children’s well-being, and intergenerational exchanges of support and services remain pervasive (Knodel et al. 2000). Living arrangements of older aged parents and adult children have been closely intertwined with this system of support exchanges. A vast majority of older Thais either live with or very near at least one of their adult children. Nevertheless, co-residence has declined moderately during the last two decades (Knodel et al. 2005).

An overall tendency exists to live with a married daughter rather than a married son – the common practice of co-residence requires that male (husbands) leave their parents to live with their wives’ family for a certain period of time. This pattern differs by region and is especially pronounced in the areas coterminous with the Northeast and Northern regional dialects but much weaker in the central region and even modestly reversed in Bangkok. More importantly, Thais are relatively flexible in this matter, living with a son if no daughter is available even where the norm is strongly skewed towards married daughters.
Traditionally children inherit equally, except that the one (the youngest daughter in general) who stays with the parents permanently gains the house and perhaps an extra share of the land. This pattern produces a simple family cycle, reverting again to a nuclear family when the parents passed away, thus, the household members consist of two to three generations.

Family life is guided by a strict hierarchy, in which the senior is the ultimate source of authority. In a family, the father is regarded as the head of the household and other family members are expected to obey him. The children are brought up to show their respect to the head and mothers teach children the proper family roles. Within family, children address relatives according to their position. Thai kinship distinguishes age differences in terms of younger and older brother/sister. In speaking to older siblings, the younger use the more general term *pee* (elder sibling) and in speaking to younger ones, the older use the term *nong* (younger sibling). These terms are applied to the relationship between husband and wife as well – the husband calls his wife *nong*, while the wife calls her husband *pee* (Knodel and Saengtienchai 2005).

**4.4.5 Social Protection System**

In Thailand, social protection system can be classified into social security (social insurance), social assistance and social services, and labour protection system. Within the system, social assistance and services are designed to provide assistance to specific groups such as the poor, the elderly, and students with specific purposes.
An Education Loan Fund for the student loan scheme was established in 1996. The eligible beneficiaries include students studying at upper secondary and tertiary private and public educational institutions with an income below 12,500 baht per month (Pongsapich, 2002).

With respect to health care service, the services have been provided to people in both urban and rural areas. Very poor people can receive health care services from government hospitals and health care centres. But services may be slow and not fully adequate. Programmes for health care services including 1) Monthly Cash Assistance to the Elderly: the programme pays 300 baht per month to each elderly poor, 2) In-kind Transfer Programmes: the programmes include the School Feeding Programme, which is administered by the Ministry of Education, and the Medical Services operated by the Ministry of Public Health. However, the government subsidy is considerably less than the minimum subsistence requirements implied by the poverty line for the elderly and the identification of poor students was not properly carried out for the original purpose – in fact, the poor households in the rural areas like the fieldwork site were easy to be neglected and not benefited from the government programmes due to the poor administration problems (Pongsapich, 2002).

### 4.4.6 Local Economic Activities

The rhythm of life of people in the case study area is determined by a relatively fixed cycle of agricultural activity. People are generally engaged in farming and spend six months for rice cultivation. Farming tasks begin in early June when the first rains soften the soils.
It is quite normal that children are productively engaged in agricultural works. The household in rural area is the place both for a work and a residence where all family members including children share the family works. Children are regarded as a potential labour source and often participate in farming jobs during the peak season (July to October).

The nature of agricultural work has a sequence, so the rice field needs less labour after the transplanting period and the villagers start to seek another jobs – the extra labour usually sell their manpower as manual labourers on a daily basis in the district or province centre. In the dry season, followed by harvest in December every year, the land is unable to be cultivated, and the most of young inhabitants migrate to urban areas, notably Bangkok, to find a job and return home either in April for Song Krang festival (Thai new year on 13th) or in late May for preparing for the rice farming. As is explored further in Chapter 3, in comparison with the past, fewer migrants are now willing to return home from the cities to work on family farms during the peak agricultural season.

The elderly and children left behind spend most of their time doing local handicrafts such as weaving textiles at home, some villagers earn income from feeding livestock – animals such as pigs and buffaloes - and sell them to dealers who come to the village every month, and some others remain in the village and wait until the new cultivation season is started.

4.5 LIMITATIONS OF DATA

By using a fieldwork-based survey we are able to learn more about the livelihoods of the rural people and can establish definitively how migration is a part of their lives. It became
apparent once the survey began that the accuracy of the sampling frame (25 households per village) was not as great as had been expected. It was found that many households randomly selected were empty or occupied by the elderly who were not able to give the answers to the survey questionnaires. In this situation, the accessible households were selected regardless of the average targeted numbers in each village instead. This means the approach adopted in this study may not be statistically representative of all villages in Udon Thani province. It also means that the surveyed households are overly representative of the households most likely to have migrants, who have three generations present and active working age parents. Furthermore, due to the language barrier, there might be possibilities that some of the answers and responses from the interviewees could be mistranslated, although this error is of a low magnitude. In sum, the sample is deemed to be of an adequate size to support the analysis which is presented in following chapters.

4.6 SUMMARY

The household survey is a very important methodology in the study of migration at the micro-level. Because the data from the survey can provide more detailed insights into migration impacts compare to secondary data analysis. However, it is crucial to back up the survey data with material obtained using qualitative methods and from the available secondary data sources.

This chapter has presented the research design adopted for examining impacts of international labour migration and provided the background information of the village context in the case study area in Udon Thani, Thailand. A multi-stage selection procedure
was used to select the 12 villages of the districts in Udon Thani as the study areas. Both quantitative and qualitative information were collected and analysed together with existing studies, and the main focus of the study shifts toward the process and consequences of international labour migration from the Northeast Thailand. The information gathered and analysed will be presented in the following chapters.
5 Characteristics of International Migrants and Their Households from Northeast Thailand

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In Thailand, growth in the rural population during the last century resulted in the use of increasingly marginalised land, particularly in the North and Northeast regions (Chalamwong, 2005). Clearing of forest and the increased planting of cassava as a cash crop depleted the soil, reducing rice yields. The Thai government also artificially deflated the market price of rice in order to reduce inflationary pressure on urban wages (Sussangkarn, 1995). Falling rice income and rice output per capita, increasing indebtedness and landlessness, and the increasing use of expensive inputs for agricultural products created the need for a ready source of alternative cash income for rural households (Chalamwong, 2005). Thus migration became a major coping strategy of rural households, as they sought to take advantage of greater income opportunities. These migrants would then support their rural family through remittances.

The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate, using data from the fieldwork, the major characteristics of international migration from rural villages in Northeast Thailand. The first part of this descriptive chapter identifies the selected features of Thai migrants. It begins with an investigation of the individual characteristics of migrants, and looks at the migration flows in which migrants were involved, the reasons why they moved, and the relationship of migrants to their households of origin. The latter part of the chapter
describes the characteristics of households having out-migrants, in comparison with those of households not having international migrants. Growing numbers of analysts take the view that the mobility of people can be explained better by taking into account the perspective of a family or household rather than seeing it merely as an individual choice (De Haas 2005). Especially, in developing countries, migration of family members is often a risk-diversification strategy of poor households. Without investigating the circumstances that might have induced international migration of family members, the subsequent behaviour of migrants, such as sending remittances, will never be fully understood. Thus in this chapter we will explore the motivational aspects of the migration cycle in terms of the initial decision to move, the nature of the experience away and the behaviour adopted while absent, all the way through to the subsequent return, consequences and possible cycle of further journeys.

This chapter serves as the basis for understanding of remittances behaviour which will receive direct focus in the following chapter. Within this framework, several questions guide the analysis in this chapter. These include: What is the main pattern of population mobility from Northeast Thailand? Do Thai women migrate as much as Thai men do? Who is moving out of a household? Are there any differences in socio-demographic and economic features between households having and not having migrants? For example, are migrants more likely to originate in poor or rich households? In order to fulfil the requirements of the underlying research questions in chapter 1, it is important to provide this multivariate contextual detail.
5.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THAI MIGRANTS

The present study focuses on migrants who had out-migrated during the two years preceding the survey and their households of origin. According to Bilsborrow et al. (1997), data on aggregate flows of international migrants should be classified by their major socio-economic and demographic characteristics for analysing the determinants of migration. The age composition, for instance, is usually an important determinant of migration. A sample of 312 households\(^8\) is used for the following analyses. Like the situation in many developing countries, previous work in Thai migration studies showed that migrants were predominantly drawn from the labour force, aged between 25 and 40 years old. Migrants tended to be married, employed as low-skilled labour in destination countries and had little formal education. The descriptive data obtained from the survey (Table 5-1) are shared similar features with the national statistics as it is presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), and this means that the sampling framework for data collection was appropriate in terms of being commensurate with the underlying trends established from the official literature reviewed prior to fieldwork. The data from the survey questionnaires represents well the expected characteristics of international migration from Northeast Thailand, such that in the analysis that follows in this and later chapters, we can afford to extrapolate in terms of central findings to a broader geography.

---

\(^8\) A total of 312 household questionnaires were drawn randomly from the 12 villages of Udon Thani province in Northeast Thailand. A remarkable 236 of the sample households contained a member currently working abroad.
Table 5-1  Characteristics of International Migration from Northeast Thailand by Sex of Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Male Migrants (%)</th>
<th>Female Migrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 29 years</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39 years</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 49 years</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50 years</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (grade 1-4)</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (grade 5-9/9-12)</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher (college/university)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (vocational training)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single (including divorced &amp; widowed)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations in Abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural related occupation</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural occupation</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-house occupation (maid/driver)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since Migrating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 2 years</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 5 years</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 10 years</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destinations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia (Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong)</td>
<td>49.16</td>
<td>58.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei)</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Israel, UAE, Qatar)</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD Countries</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>31.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N=236)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.2.1 Migration Streams

In Thailand, the bulk of the population lives in rural areas and the dominant migration stream had been rural-rural and rural-urban flows. Over the last few decades, however, the relative balance of migration streams has been changed because of the growing importance
of international migration (Guest, 1998). The data from household surveys presented in Table 5-2 below shows that destinations to East Asian countries represented dominant flows among Thais\(^9\), making up 49 percent for male and 59 percent for female migrants respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Male migrants (%)</th>
<th>Female migrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia (Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong)</td>
<td>49.16</td>
<td>58.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei)</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Israel, UAE, Qatar)</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD Countries (US, Australia, Europe)</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>31.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N=236)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Household survey data (2008).*

The primary receiving countries in East Asia for Thais were the Taiwan Province of China with the Republic of Korea coming in a distant second. Japan, Hong Kong, and China also remained important destinations for international migration. Thailand has traditionally been the top exporter of low-skilled labour to the Taiwan Province of China (35.6% from the survey data). According to Lee (2005), almost 80 percent were male employed as factory workers and construction workers in government infrastructure projects. The remaining were women who employed as domestic workers and caregivers. The manufacturing sector in Taiwan Province of China continues to employ the greatest proportion of foreign workers, including Thais, but a shift is occurring toward the health sector because of the growing need to provide hospital and home care to the aging population (Lee, 2005). In view of the limited mobility of Thai nursing personnel, this realignment could further

\(^9\) Unfortunately, the clarification of the relationship between migration destinations and well-being effects were impossible to capture due to insufficient data from the fieldwork. It is assumed that the destinations to East Asian countries – Taiwan, Korea, Japan and Hong Kong – were favoured (since the economic incentives were the most important considerations for migration decision) among the migrants because the long-term returns through remittances were (probably) greater compared to other destinations. If the cost-benefit analysis were possible, more detailed pictures could be shown but the data could only give the overall trends for guessing the links.
reduce Taiwan Province of China’s demand for overseas Thai workers, who are already negatively affected by the rapid expansion of Indonesian and Vietnamese labour in the home care and service sectors (Lee, 2005). These figures suggest that the migration journeys contribute to a regional labour market and that migration is significant to the productivity of this regional market, rather than to a more dispersed set of destinations that could be associated with a globalised pattern of migration.

According to the TOEA official in Udon Thani, most Thais migrate to the Republic of Korea (9.9%) for work. In 2004, the Government enforced the Employment Permit System (EPS) to regulate the employment of lower skilled overseas workers in unattractive jobs in construction, manufacturing, livestock production and agriculture. Among the first six countries selected to send overseas workers was Thailand, and a MOU was signed in the same year to regulate labour exports from Thailand to the Republic of Korea on a government-to-government basis (Ministry of Labour in Thailand, 2008).

For Thais to become EPS overseas workers they must be between 18 and 40 years old, pass medical and Korean language proficiency tests, and have no record of criminal activities or of illegal stay in the Republic of Korea. No accompanying family members are allowed and they have to return after a three-year period. Thereafter, they are required to stay out of the country for at least one year before re-applying for a second, and last, term. Accepted overseas workers have to comply with Korean immigration laws and are expected to enjoy the same labour protection as Korean workers, except that they are not free to change employers and can request only one employment transfer and only in extreme cases (Ha, 2006; Park, 2006). In addition, the flourishing of inter-cultural marriages is also one of the
reasons for making Republic of Korea as a popular destination, where people in rural areas increasingly seek brides from other Asian countries.

Hong Kong China’s(2.2%), rapid industrialisation and subsequent development into a service and financial centre has made this city one of the region’s major migration poles, especially for Southeast Asian women, and Thai female migrants find their employment as domestic workers in this city (AMC, 2007:131). A study of 50 Thai migrants in Hong Kong, China (Hewison, 2003) confirms the general profile of the Thai migrant population, that is that the large majority are poorly educated and come from the Northeast, especially Nakhon Ratchasima Province, and the North. By and large, Hong Kong, China was their first destination country, but most had friends and relatives who had worked in the Middle East or East Asia, and who provided information and facilitated contact with placement agents and employers in Hong Kong, China.

Thailand is the third largest Southeast Asian labour-exporting country to Japan (3.5%) after the Philippines and Indonesia, and Thai migrants, especially female migrants, are mostly allowed for commercial activities such as teaching or providing a special skill including entertainment (TOEA, 2008). Hundreds of thousands more Thais are thought to be living and working irregularly in Japan (Debito, 2007), such that female Thai migrant workers continue to be employed in the wide-ranging entertainment sector, including the sex industry, while male workers find work in 3D (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs in manufacturing, construction, agriculture and the service industry (TOEA, 2008).

In Southeast Asia, intra-regional migration flows over the last decades have primarily originated from the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand to fill low-skilled labour shortages
in the wealthier economies of Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei (IOM, 2005). Singapore (5.8%) was the first country in Southeast Asia to attract Thai labour. To sustain rapid industrialisation and export-led growth in the early 1970s, Singapore opened its labour market to low-skilled overseas workers from Thailand. Hundreds of thousands of Thais found work in the construction, service and manufacturing sectors, as well as the shipbuilding and shipyard industry. According to Thai official statistics (Table 3-5 in Chapter 3), an average of 15,000 overseas workers has left Thailand for Singapore. A less discussed, but actually quite significant destination country for Thais is neighbouring Malaysia (0.6%). In general, the reputation of Thai workers was good, and Thai migrants from the Southern provinces could assimilate particularly well because of the shared language, culture and religion. Most Thai migrants wished to return to their home, but a shortage of jobs and security concerns in the restive Southern provinces had motivated many to settle in Malaysia with their families (ASEAN Affairs, 2008). Thai migration to Brunei Darussalam (2.2%) has a long history, having started in the mid-1970s, following the discovery of oil and gas fields. From the survey samples, most Thai overseas workers in Brunei are men and perform manual labour in manufacturing and construction, with a few women in the services sector.

In the Middle East, Thai migrants are dispersed across the region because of past migration flows and continuing small scale migration of overseas Thai workers to, among others, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Libya. Notwithstanding the sudden increase in Thai labour exports to the United Arab Emirates (2.9%) and Qatar (2.2%) in the last two years, the main destination in the Middle East throughout this last decade remains Israel (16.3%). Thai migration to Israel is definitely male, and most of them are employed in agriculture with a few in construction or services.
Thai migration to OECD countries is usually not taken into account in Thai migration studies as main destination regions. However, among the survey samples, significant Thai migrant are found in the United States, Australia and Europe. As mentioned before, Thai migration to the United States (1.6%) started to gain volume at the time of the Viet Nam War, with a higher rate of international marriage with American men, and the number of Thai migrants continued to grow thereafter. Compared to the United States, the growth of Thai migration to other OECD countries has been more recent. Thai migration to Australia is predominantly female from the survey data, and Thai women also play a major role in migration to Europe – concentrated in Germany as the top destination for Thai in Europe, and in the Northern European countries such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden. The female Thai migrant are, or have been, often married to European men. In Europe, while caring for their new family, Thai migrant women work in manufacturing, services and as domestic helpers to achieve economic security for themselves and their family back home, including children from previous unions with Thai men.

Recent growth in international migration has been explained by concentration of new employment opportunities and high incomes in receiving countries. A lack of cultivatable land and increased mechanisation in agriculture are other factors often mentioned as facilitating outflows of rural dwellers to foreign destinations. Results from the survey here reaffirmed the active level of female migration from rural Thailand. 23 percent out of data samples were women. In general, Thai men are more likely than women to be involved in short-term forms of movement, and Thai women, especially to OECD countries, are more likely to take migration opportunity by means of marriage.
5.2.2 Reasons for Migration

Many migration studies place economic reasons at the root of factors influencing the decision to migrate. However, some scholars (Massey, 1990; Hugo, 2005) argue that analysis of root causes of migration should not only consider economic factors but also the interaction between social and economic contexts that influence the migration decision making of individuals and groups.

The Table 5-3 sets out the answers given to the question of ‘reasons for migration’ by destinations. While a variety of situations may lead to migration, in response to this question, the economic and family reasons were the two most frequently mentioned which made individuals decide to move out their households of origin. More specifically, more than 57 percent of male migrants and 40 percent of female migrants left their home to look for job elsewhere for economic reasons and more than 35 percent of all migrants left their home to support their family (interestingly, 16.6 percent of females migrated to OECD countries for marriage). Thus, in Thailand, besides economic factors, life-stage factors or familial networks also operate to stimulate international movements of people. Furthermore, as the country has achieved rapid socio-economic development, opportunities for higher education have also expanded.

10 Migrants were in abroad at the time of survey, so their family members (normally spouse or parents) answered this question on their behalf.
11 ‘Insufficient income’, ‘Cannot find a job’, ‘Want to be rich like other migrants’, ‘Dislike job here’, and ‘Unfairly paid’ were categorised as economic reasons and ‘To support family otherwise did not migrate’ was categorised as a family reason. There is a possibility of dual interpretation since economic reason and family reason are shared common features. However, the family reason here (to support family otherwise did not migrate) strictly means that even though the migrants did not need to move to another country (i.e. they have jobs, sufficient incomes for life, and satisfied with their current situations), they were willing to choose to migrate to support their family with more incomes from overseas.
12 Education was mentioned as a reason for migration about 2 percent among the female migrants while none of male migrants reported their reasons of migration for education.
Table 5-3 Reasons for Migration by Destinations and Sex of Thai Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for migration</th>
<th>Destinations</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>OECD countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reasons</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage/Education</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow other migrants</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N=236)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>0.241**</td>
<td>0.260**</td>
<td>0.129**</td>
<td>0.281**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data (2008). *p<0.05

The data show that there was a moderate association between the sex of migrants and reasons for migration (Cramer’s V=0.22). In general, men were more likely than women to move out their households because of economic incentives, however, the importance of family consideration in the migration decision was more evident among female migrants. While much of their migration was associated with marriage, about 51 percent of female migrants to OECD countries reported that the primary reason they left their origin households was to support family members.

The reason for migration may differ depending upon the destination they chose. As presented in Table 5-3 above, the disaggregation of the data by migration streams and sex of out-migrants provides some useful insights. The values of Cramer’s V suggest that among different migration streams, the association of gender with reasons for moving was weakest in Middle East destination. It bears stressing that, as this weak association reveals, regardless of sex, employment factors were particularly important for migrants who moved to Middle East countries for both male and female out-migrants. For female migrants, as compared to male migrants, economic factors are less significant and family considerations
played an important role for the migration decision except destination to the Middle East, and it seems to be still men who take a lead in finding a better economic opportunity as migrants.

For economic reasons for migration, when age, status, education and occupation of migrants are cross-tabulated (Table 5-4) the response of ‘want to be rich like other migrants’ was the dominant reason mentioned by all sub-groups, except for the unemployed. Table 5-4 shows that there is a significant relationship between the occupation of migrants (prior to migration) and economic reasons for migration. The main difference is between the unemployed and employed, although not as great as between those employed in agricultural and non-agricultural occupations.

Table 5-4 Economic Reasons for Migration by Characteristics of Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Insufficient income</th>
<th>Cannot find a job</th>
<th>Want to be rich</th>
<th>Dislike job here</th>
<th>Unfairly paid</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 29</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=10.12, df=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=3.34, df=4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than grade 4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than grade 4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=7.28, df=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agriculture</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=28.45**, df=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Household survey data (2008).*  
**p<0.05

The significance of the answer ‘want to be rich like other migrants’ is two-fold. Firstly, it reflects the relevance of neoclassical economic theory which sees migration as being a
response to wage differentials – it is a fact that migrants decided to go abroad because they can earn higher wages at the destination countries. Secondly, the importance of the effect of earlier successful migrants is encouraging further migration from the survey area. With respect to the second issue, it was frequently observed during the fieldwork that villagers who come to the grocery store\textsuperscript{13} often indicated that they wish to work abroad like others whom they know. Indeed, international migration was considered as a normal pattern of life especially among young people, and those who neglect to do so or even do not talk about working overseas seemed to be regarded as old-fashioned or very conservative/out-of-date. In addition, returning migrants and the families who received remittances from abroad are quite ostensive in displaying jewellery and good clothes, and so forth as a symbol of their success and wealth. The purpose of this behaviour is to show off how they are wealthier than others in the villages, and this behaviour undoubtedly creates envy among villagers and plays as a trigger encouraging people to migrate for economic reasons. This competition fuels a pattern of consumerism and outward signs of consumption.

5.2.3 Migration Decision Making

Hugo (2205) has reviewed that the involvement of family members in the migration decision making of individuals is the main feature of New Economics of Labour Migration theory and concluded that migration behaviour is often not just the result of individual decision making but is shaped by others within the family and community.

\textsuperscript{13}The grocery store is normally regarded as a place for social interaction among rural villagers in Northeast Thailand.
There are two possible elements relating to migration decision making. The first is the one who has a definite right to control his/her migration decision and the second is the other persons who give the potential migrants advice on their move. If migration decision making is viewed according to the first perspective, all migrants must be decision makers. The migrants, however, usually consult at least one person to confirm his/her personal opinion about migration. This behaviour is regarded as a consequence of explicit intentions when he/she needs social approval for his/her migration decision (Fishbein, 1997).

Evidence from the survey villages reveals that more than 85 percent of migrants consulted at least one person regarding their migration before leaving (Table 5-5). Nearly 15 percent of responders stated that the migration decision was made with singular reference to their own deliberations. Among the consultants, parents and spouses were dominant, accounting for 29 percent and 20 percent respectively.

| Table 5-5 Consultants Concerning Migration Decision |
|-------------------------------|--------|
| Consultants                        | Percentage |
| On his/her own                   | 14.2   |
| Spouse                           | 19.9   |
| Parents                          | 28.5   |
| Senior members in village         | 14.9   |
| Siblings (brothers/sisters)      | 8.9    |
| Others                           | 13.5   |


The data tabulated by age, marital status, education and occupation of migrants (Table 5-6) show that there is a significant relationship between the marital status of migrants and the persons consulted with. Clearly, more married migrants consulted their spouses, parents and persons outside the family than single migrants did. Results were also consistent when controlled for age and sex of respondents.
Table 5-6 Persons Consulted Regarding on the Migration Decision by Characteristics of Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 to 29</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=13.32, df=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=13.97**, df=4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than grade 4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than grade 4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=5.82, df=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agriculture</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=8.65, df=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data (2008). **p<0.05

Although other statistical relationships tested were not significant, some interesting findings can be noted. For instance, there is a pattern evident with the age of migrants in relation to persons consulted. The older the migrants, the more they are likely to consult senior people in the village. These seniors could be the any elderly who are highly respected in the Thai context.

Results from interviews revealed that villagers usually talked about migration with those who had migration experience before making the final decision. Many villagers indicated that international migration was a common topic in their daily conversations within families and neighbours and the contents of such discussions were the relative advantages and disadvantages of moving-out from their villages. My impression from the intensive observations while I was there, which I collected in a field diary, is that international migration has already become a significant part of their culture, and is considered to be
normal, relatively easy and an available option for most of the people. As we saw above, it is also the chief vehicle for funding competitive displays of consumption and wealth, and thus as representing and giving form to inequalities and social hierarchy within the village. This observation on the ubiquity of migration, even among the poor, is also interesting, because it seems to refute the ‘poorest don’t move’ hypothesis (see Kothari, 2003). We will explore this further below in terms of how an institutionalised culture of migration seems to have broken down barriers to movement for the poorest villagers in this case study. This is a different view from traditional migration literature which saw the migration option is not possible for the poorest among the poor due to lack of resources (Table 5-7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local income of households with migrants</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>6,523.30</td>
<td>5,398.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local income of households without migrants</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7,802.63</td>
<td>6,511.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.2.4 Channels of Migration

Under the Thai Recruitment and Job Seekers Protection Act (1985), there are three ways which Thai nationals can seek overseas employment. The options are through private recruitment agency, Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA) of the Ministry of Labour and self-arrangement. Labour export from Thailand began to be mainly handled by private recruiters and virtually all overseas migrants in 1980s were taken their journeys abroad through such agencies (TOEA, 2008). In 1980s, 223 licensed private agencies were registered at TOEA working under the control of government, and the numbers of these private recruiters in operation dramatically increased to more than 600 in
year 2008. Over 70 percent of private agencies are working in the Northeast region and 82 percent among them are located in Udon Thani province (TOEA, 2008).

**Table 5-8 Channels of Migration by Migration Helpers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants Sent-by (Percentage)</th>
<th>Management Period (Month)</th>
<th>Average Fees (Thai Baht)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Agencies/Brokers</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Scheme by TOEA</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families/Friends/Relatives</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5-8 above shows that more than 65 percent of migrants left their hometown through private recruitment agencies, followed by families and friends (21 percent) and the TOEA (13 percent). For the average time for placement in abroad varies by migration helpers, but government scheme takes a longest period and it is caused by more necessary documentation works required by the governments in destination countries.

Table 5-9 below shows when channels of migration were tabulated by age, marital status, education and occupation, the relationship between occupation and channels was significant. Obviously, migrants in different kinds of jobs took different channels for migration. Most of migrants who were engaged in non-agricultural jobs took their journeys to overseas through the assistance of their families or friends whereas those unemployed or engaged in activities for agriculture were tended to go abroad through the private agencies. Although not statistically significant, married migrants were more likely to find overseas jobs through the assistance of government than single migrants. This suggests that marital status of migrants does not influence the selection of channels for international migration.
Table 5-9 Channels of Migration by Characteristics of Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOEA</th>
<th>Private Recruiters</th>
<th>Family/Friends</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 29</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=3.23, df=4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=0.36, df=2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than grade 4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than grade 4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=2.42, df=4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agriculture</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chi-square=25.33**, df=4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data (2008). **p<0.05

Choosing channels of migration is not solely dependent on the variables considered above, but it is also probably dependent on the convenience offered by recruiters – most of the private agencies processed pre-departure preparation on behalf of the potential migrants if they provided required documents, but pre-departure preparation with TOEA is more complicated than private recruiters do. For examples, female migrants are required to undergo urine testing when pursuing overseas employment and if found to be pregnant are excluded from the program (Wiwanitkit and Ekawong, 2007). Some destination countries, such as Taiwan Province of China, screen migrant labourers for HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases.

In the current competitive atmosphere, there will be high chances for recruiters to take advantage of unwary job applicants, and this means that Thai migrants continue to encounter many challenges in their migration efforts. At recruitment, they remain at risk of being overcharged and exploited, despite improved TOEA commitment to ensuring legal
compliance by both public and private agencies. According to TOEA (2008), recruitment and travel costs are high, while wages earned are often moderate. This results in disproportionate levels of debt for migrant households and migrants being trapped in debt bondage. Once abroad, Thai workers who do not make their journeys through official channels frequently found that their contracts are not honoured by overseas employers or the employment conditions are not as expected. Although these misfortunes are happened repeatedly, a large number of potential migrants still take their chance with (unofficial) private recruitment agencies over the government.

5.2.5 Source of Money and Information for Migration

In order to obtain the money to fund overseas migration, potential migrants draw upon many sources to meet their migration fees. The early Thai migration study (Singhanetra-Renard, 1992) found that migrants from Thailand normally funded money to cover their expenses from savings and loans. More than half of her respondents had to make use of more than one source. In response to a question asking from where they obtained the required money for migration (Table 5-10), 81.4 percent of respondents in this study reported that they used loans from money lenders, banks and relatives, while only 2.3 percent of respondents sold their property such as land and buffaloes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>81.41</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell property</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Migrants with loans had to pay high interest rates which varied from 10 to 120 percent per year. Of the 194 migrants who borrowed money, 8.1 percent reported that they were obliged to pay interest rate at 120 percent per annum. Some migrants (20.9 percent), however, obtained loans from their relatives with free of interest.

The role of family members (including relatives) and friends of migrants as a source in providing information about migration and possible destinations is crucial. In many developing countries, friends and family members are regarded as a reliable source of information for migration, hence the information that comes from these sources is undoubtedly significant (Hugo, 1992). This was certainly found to be the cases in the survey villages in Udon Thani, where 57 percent of migrants reported that they obtained migration information from family members and friends. In many cases, this information was obtained from return migrants who give guidance to potential migrants as to where to go, live and seek assistance when abroad. These return migrants are often founded in the same households when the questionnaires were completed. This also reflects patron-client relations which are connected to family relationships in some contexts.

5.2.6 Relationship of Migrants to the Head of Origin of Households

Another aspect of particular interest is to explore the relationship of out-migrants to their origin household. As mentioned in migration literature, migrants’ ties with the origin society have important implications for the size and frequency of remittances that migrants make (Osaki 2002). The information presented in table 5-11 shows that approximately 35 percent of out-migrants were the child of the head of origin household and another large proportion of out-migrants (21 percent) were son-in-law or daughter-in-law of the head. In
rural Thailand, a couple often live together with their parents until their children reach school age (Yoddumnern-Attig 1992:15). The results indicate such traditional living arrangements may still be practiced. The data in the table also indicate that under the present definition of out-migration, female heads of households are not likely to migrate (less than half proportion as compared to male heads), leaving their household members behind. Heads of household and their spouses taken together represented only 14 percent of the female out-migrants.

Although not as strong as the relationship between the gender and the reason for moving, there was an association between the sex of out-migrants and the relationship of out-migrants to their origin household. The data indicate that female out-migrants were slightly more likely to be the daughter-in-law (30 percent) rather than being the own child (29 percent) of the head of the origin household. It is interesting to observe that, while male migrants were more likely to be the own child of the head (39 percent), and 27 percent of them were also the son-in-law of the head. Again, in Thai culture, especially in Northeast Thailand, it is traditionally a man who moves into the wife’s home after the marriage and lives together with her parents until a couple establish their independent household (Yoddumnern-Attig 1992:15). The figure may partly be a reflection of such tradition.

Table 5-11 Percentage Distribution of International Migrants by Relationship to Household Head

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Male migrants (%)</th>
<th>Female migrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head or spouse of head</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child of head</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son or daughter in-law</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandchild</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (N=236)</strong></td>
<td><strong>182</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Household survey data (2008).*
5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS

In this section, households having and not having out-migrants are compared in order to identify the characteristics likely to affect member’s international mobility. Table 5-12 (see next page) presents the comparison of the socio-demographic characteristics of households having and not having out-migrants. Demographic characteristics of households are analyzed in terms of the three components of household members: numbers of children (less than 15 years old), adults (15 to 59 years old) and elderly (60 years or older) in the household. Household size in Thailand has gradually decreased during the last three decades because fertility has declined, and the majority of households are nuclear in structure (National Statistical Office, 1998). It is, therefore, not surprising that the NMS data revealed the small household in Thailand consists of, on average, 1.3 children, 2.2 adults and 0.5 elderly.

The bivariate comparison of the two types of households indicated that households having out-migrants had smaller numbers of children than those having no out-migrants. The difference in the two means was found statistically significant by t-test (p<0.01). This can be interpreted as suggesting that responsibility for the care of small children might have acted as a hindrance to the mobility of its members.

In theory, elderly members can provide care for small children and can also make important labour contributions to their households when a member is away. At the same time, it is also possible that elder members in poor health need daily assistance and, therefore, their presence prohibits the out-migration of other household members.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Households with Migrants</th>
<th>Households w/o Migrants</th>
<th>Cramer's V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.081***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>1.1 (1.2)</td>
<td>1.3 (1.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Adults</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or more</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>2.5 (1.4)</td>
<td>2.6 (1.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Elderly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.050***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>0.4 (0.6)</td>
<td>0.4 (0.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education of HH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.052***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>4.5 (3.5)</td>
<td>5.1 (3.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monthly Income (local)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.188***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2,000 Baht</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-4,999 Baht</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-7,999 Baht</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000-9,999 Baht</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-14,999 Baht</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 Baht and over</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>6,235.8</td>
<td>7,262.5</td>
<td>(7,439.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7,401.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Source of Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.106***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local labour</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales/Business</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee (public)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee (private)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership of House</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Land Owned</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9 rais</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-30 rais</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;30 rais</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N (Total)</strong></td>
<td>236</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A Including fishing and animal husbandry, B Including labour for agriculture, ***p<0.01.

According to the data, there was only a weak relationship between the presence of out-migrants and the number of elderly in a household (Cramer’s V=0.05). Moreover, virtually
no difference existed in the mean numbers of elderly between two groups. Thus, it is unlikely that the presence of elderly in a household had a substantial impact on the migration of its members. There was a tendency for households having out-migrants to have a slightly smaller number of adults than those not having out-migrants, with the mean number of adults being 2.5 for the former and 2.6 persons for the latter. However, given the fact that out-migrants identified in this survey are relatively young adults, the number of adults in households might have been larger for the former than the latter at the time when migrants actually left the households. Hence, excess persons who were in large households and not needed at home might have moved out.

Social dimensions of households used in this analysis are the highest level of education completed by the head of the household, and the place where the household is located. The former variable was included as a proxy to measure the head’s earning power and his or her ability to allocate resources of the household effectively. The t-test shows that there was a significant difference in the mean years of schooling of the head between households having and not having out-migrants (p<0.01).

A household head where there were out-migrants had completed an average of 4.5 years of schooling, whereas those not having out-migrants had 5.1 years. A household head with a relatively poor education may mobilize the resources of household less successfully, so that some of its members needed to seek earnings or opportunities elsewhere.

The household survey included a number of variables that allow me to investigate the economic status of households. These include monthly household income, main source of income, ownership of residence, and amount of land owned. Table 5-12 shows that there
were weak associations between the presence of out-migrants and all these economic characteristics.

According to the survey, approximately 26 percent of the households having out-migrants belonged to the low end of the income distribution, with less than 2,000 Baht of income per month, whereas 11 percent of households having no out-migrants fell into this category. At the higher end, about 16 percent of the households having out-migrants had the income of over 15,000 Baht, as compared to 20 percent of the households having no migrants belonging to the group. Thus, households having out-migrants were more concentrated in low-income strata, suggesting that low cash income might have been one of the factors promoting international migration of household members. On average, the monthly income of households having migrants was lower than that of non-migrant households by approximately 1,000 Baht. The difference in the mean household income between households having and not having out-migrants was also found to be statistically significant by t-test.

A high concentration of households having out-migrants in the low-income groups is probably related to the fact that the large proportion of them generated income from agriculture. Approximately 51 percent of households having out-migrants reported that their main source of income was agriculture, whereas 43 percent of households having no out-migrants generated their main income from agriculture. From another perspective, the data also suggest that out migration of household members was more likely to occur among households that drew income from agriculture. The households relying on income from their members’ employment in the private and public sector, as well as sales, were less likely to have out-migrants.
With respect to other economic factors, and in contrast to the foregoing variables, households having out-migrants were generally better off than those having no out-migrants. Households having out-migrants were found to have a higher proportion of home ownership and more land owned.

5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided insight into the migration pattern in Thailand and the characteristics of households in which migrants originate. It was found that in the country, women were active participants of international migration streams. While family-tied migration generally better characterized women and economic considerations appeared to be stronger in encouraging men to leave the household of origin. Interestingly, however, for destination in the Middle East, the importance of economic incentives in the decision to migrate was dominant for both men and women. This suggests that important economic roles are increasingly played by female migrants in recent migration, which has been growing noticeably in the migration literature (Curan and Saguy 2001). The data also revealed that the majority of out-migrants were the children or child-in-law of the head of origin household. Therefore, their ties with origin households are likely to be retained closely after the move.

Although past Thai migration studies that analysed determinants of migration tended to emphasise the individual characteristics as potentially the important explanatory variables, characteristics of households can also explain the movement of individuals from their household of origin. The findings reported in this chapter revealed differences between
households having and not having migrants in terms of selected socio-demographic and economic characteristics. In Thailand, the presence of children in a household might have hindered the out-migration of female members, since raising small children requires close attention and responsibility. Moreover, out-migration of household members was a phenomenon widely experienced by households in rural areas of Thailand.

The analysis also showed that households having out-migrants were more concentrated in the lowest-income group than those not having out-migrants, suggesting that poor economic conditions of households might have been a catalyst for the migration of its members. The other economic characteristics of households examined in this chapter indicate that although the households having out-migrants tend to be lower income than households not having out-migrants, the former were generally better off than the latter in terms of ownership of the house and in terms of land holding.

In this chapter, the study found two important features in the survey villages on migration. Firstly, the data are substantial enough to suggest that these particular communities may well have developed an institutionalised and self-sustaining migration culture. On the contrary to migrants’ households, among the households that have not engaged in international migration but has a relatively stable local income source, a substantial proportion of respondents (80 percent) indicated that they have never thought about working abroad. What have deterred them are not worries about family separation or fears of the unknown world, but high agency fees and debts.

Secondly, international migration has been so widely spread in these particular communities that it has had a ‘demonstration and emulation’ effect throughout the
communities in consumption aspirations. The wider community accepts that the material benefits of working abroad outweigh any social costs, so that great respect is widely accorded to families that engage in working abroad. In terms of research question shown, desires for economic well-being (meeting consumption aspirations) have pulled a trigger of international movement, but it is not sure whether it leads to alleviate poverty in this community. We will see more details regarding on the matter of poverty in chapter 7.
6 Gendered-Remittance Behaviour and Its Linkage to Migrants’ Future Well-being

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Remittances between overseas migrants and their families left-behind combine into enormous transfers of money and goods between countries (Adams, 1998; Taylor, 1999). The remittances especially from other countries to the rural areas of developing countries loosen family budgets and create the potential for investment and rapid economic development (Durand, Parrado, and Massey, 1996; Taylor, 1999). To understand the micro-level processes that make up these macro-level flows, we need to understand the pattern of remittance flows between migrants and their origin households.

Two theoretical approaches dominate the literature on remittances behaviour. Migrants can be seen as acting altruistically, sending money and other forms of support to increase the well-being of family members (Lillard and Willis, 1997). Alternatively, migrants may be seen as entering into a contractual arrangement with non-migrant members of their families. This contract may involve remittances as repayment for family support for the education of the migrant (Lucas and Stark, 1985) or may involve the future bequest of land or other inheritable assets to the migrant in repayment for the remittances (Hoddinott, 1994).

This chapter examines patterns of remittances between rural Thai households and migrants abroad and considers how these patterns are related to expected altruistic and contractual
patterns in terms of migrants’ own well-being when they return. This work builds on the previous literature by taking a gendered approach to testing the altruistic and contractual approaches to remittances. Most past research either has focused only on one gender of migrant (Hoddinott, 1994) or has grouped male and female migrants together (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Regmi and Tisdell, 2002), despite knowledge that women remit at higher rates in most societies (Osaki, 1999, 2002; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003). I took advantage of gendered/social norms regarding education, inheritance, and familiar support in the study area to develop expectations of gender-differentiated remittance patterns and to test them using data from the fieldwork to answer the research questions in relation to gendered-remittance behaviour.

Previous work on remittances in Thailand has examined gender differences in the propensity to remit (Curran, 1995, 1996; Osaki, 1999, 2002; Phongpaichit, 1993; Richter and Havanon, 1995) and has shown the insurance function of remittances for migrants and origin households (Paulson and Miller, 1998). Richter and Havanon (1995) and Phongpaichit (1993) described the remittance behaviors of male and female migrants, finding that women remit more (both overall and as a percentage of their income) than do men. Curran (1995, 1996) examined gender differences in remittances and found that daughters are more likely to remit to their origin households, but that these effects vary by birth order. Middle daughters are the most likely to remit, while middle sons are the least likely to remit, because of the interactions of norms and opportunities that are based on gender and birth order. Using the National Migration Survey of Thailand, Osaki (1999, 2002) found that women are more likely than men to remit. She attributed this gender difference to Buddhist traditions in Thailand that assign religious merit to women who financially or materially support their families (Osaki, 1999). The religious norms to which
Osaki referred, as well as traditional norms of female inheritance of land and the lack of support for the education of girls, form the basis for the gendered remittance behaviour detailed here.

6.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

6.2.1 Altruism

Altruistic theories of migration/remittances (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002) of household or family behaviour more generally (Lee et al., 1994) argue that members of households act to improve the well-being of every member of their families. This does not imply that individual family members are not self-interested, but that their behaviour responds to the needs of other household members.

At the most basic level, altruism is acting to increase the income, consumption, and economic well-being of someone else, even to the detriment of one’s own well-being (Vanwey, 2004). Remittances increase the well-being of the recipient and, if earnings are taken as fixed (because migrants and rural households are unlikely to have the capacity to increase earnings substantially to remit), also decrease the well-being of the sender. For economists, this approach to altruism is formalized by including the utility of the relevant others in one’s own utility function. For the study of remittances, an altruistic approach requires a spatially diverse conceptualization of family and household. The analyses presented here treat migrants and members of their origin households as a single household or family unit (Vanwey, 2004).
Altruistic behaviour would be manifest empirically in two key relationships. First, altruistic behaviour implies a negative relationship between remittances from a sender and the pre-remittance standard of living of the recipient. Second, altruistic behaviour implies a positive relationship between remittances from a sender and the pre-remittance well-being of the sender. Together, these relationships imply that a migrant who behaves altruistically will return income or goods to his or her family of origin in proportion to his or her income.

Table 6-1 Predictions for the Effects of Variables on the Probability of Remitting from Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Remittances from Migrants to Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant's Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant has a non-agricultural occupation</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land owned</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrants</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income proxies (family members employed)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Ties between Migrant and Household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse of migrant in household in origin</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse of migrant in destination</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents (children/elderly parents) in household</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-1 summarises the predictions of this model, as well as those of the contractual model discussed later. The altruistic model predicts that remittances from the migrant to the origin household will be positively related to the ability of the migrant to provide support, indicated in this study by the education and occupation of the migrant (proxies for income). Migrants who have more education and are employed in non-agricultural occupations will have higher incomes and a greater ability to provide for their origin households. The migrant-to-household remittances will be negatively affected by the earnings potential of the origin household, measured in this study by the amount of land owned, any household members working in non-agricultural occupations, and the number of migrants from the
households. As each of these variables increases, the household has access to greater income from other sources rather than remittances, and the migrant will correspondingly reduce her or his contribution.

The model also predicts that the migrant will respond to the needs of the origin household by sending remittances more often to households with a larger number of dependents (either elderly persons or children). Finally, the model predicts that migrant-to-household remittances will be positively related to the ties between the migrant and the household and negatively related to the ties between the migrant and others in the destination. Remittances will be positively related to the migrant having a spouse in the origin household and negatively related to the migrant having a spouse at the migration destination. Remittances will be positively related to the migrant having dependents in the origin household.

6.2.2 Contractual Relations

Lucas and Stark (1985) argued for a theory of ‘tempered altruism’ or ‘enlightened self-interest’ in which remittances represent the outcome of an implicit contract between the migrant and the household. There are two main components of this contract. First, a potential migrant and other member of her or his household may engage in an inter-temporal contract. In this inter-temporal contract, some remittances from the migrant to the origin household are repayments of an earlier loan from the other members of the household. The household supports the future migrant while she or he is investing in education that will command higher returns in a migration destination (Hoddinott, 1994).
When the migrant realises the returns to this investment, she or he remits a portion of her or his earnings to repay the household (Lillard and Willis, 1997).

This inter-temporal contract may also include the future transfer of land (or other property) through inheritance. Whereas Hoddinott (1994) considered land to be a tool that self-interested parents use to ensure remittances from self-interested sons, Lucas and Stark (1985) considered it to be simply one more aspect of the inter-temporal contract between migrants and origin households. The migrant supports the other members of the household in anticipation of his/her future well-being through the bequest of land when the parents are no longer able to farm the land or when they die (de la Brière et al., 2002; Regmi and Tisdell, 2002).

As a second main component of the contract between them, the origin household and the migrant insure each other against potential shortfalls in income (de la Brière et al., 2002; Stark, 1991). In the absence of formal unemployment insurance and crop insurance, household members provide insurance for each other. The migrant and the origin household are inclined to enter into a co-insurance arrangement with each other, rather than with any other individuals or groups, for several reasons. First, the migrant and other members of the household are generally in different geographic areas and are employed in different sectors of the economy. Thus, their fortunes are unlikely to covary, making each an ideal support for the other in times of hardship (Stark, 1991). Second, the enforcement costs that are associated with this arrangement are lower than those associated with an arrangement between unrelated individuals (Lucas and Stark, 1985). Third, because of altruistic motivations of both the household and the migrant and because the migrant
wishes to have the continued option of return migration, each party is encouraged to adhere to the implicit contract.

Table 6-1 summarises the predictions of the contractual model for this study. The key points at which the altruistic and contractual theories predict different outcomes are shown in ‘household characteristics’ in the table. Altruistic behavior includes a negative relationship between migrant-to-household remittances and the income of the origin household, while contractual behavior includes a positive relationship between these variables (Stark, 1999). The contractual model predicts that migrant-to-household remittances will be positively related to the education of the migrant, to the migrant having a non-agricultural occupation, and to the income of the origin household. The migrant and the origin household insure each other better to the extent that they are in different sectors (households in the agricultural sector, migrants in the non-agricultural sector; Stark, 1991) and to the extent that each has a higher income. The income proxies for the origin household and the migrant having a non-agricultural occupation therefore a positive affect on migrant-to-household remittances, while the migrant having a non-agricultural occupation positively affects household-to-migrant remittances.

The inter-temporal contract indicates that migrants with higher education will remit to their origin households at higher rates. The potential inheritance of land motivates migrants to remit to origin households with more land, implying a positive effect of household land on migrant-to-household remittances. Because this strategy for securing an inheritance is open to all migrants, any given migrant will be more likely to remit in the presence of other migrants (de la Brière et al., 2002). The other migrants are potential competitors for this particular strategy for ensuring an inheritance for their future well-being.
6.2.3 Gender Differences

Previous studies in Thailand have shown that women remit at higher rates and/or levels than men do (Curran, 1996; Osaki, 1999, 2003). This higher propensity to remit is seen in data from the study area in Udon Thani as well (see Table 6-2 in next page). This overall difference could be due to natural differences between men and women in the baseline propensity to remit or to differences in how male and female migrants follow altruistic or contractual patterns of behaviour. In rural Thai culture, women traditionally accrue religious merit for their families by supporting their families materially, while men accrue religious merit by becoming ordained as monks (Keyes 1984; Mills 1997). Thus, because women have a motivation to remit to their families that men do not, women will follow a more altruistic pattern of behaviour. Women will react more strongly to key variables, rather than have a higher baseline propensity to remit.

Traditional gender norms suggest two gendered perspectives on contractual remittance behaviour. In the Northeast region of Thailand, inheritance is traditionally bilateral, with children of different genders receiving different types of inheritance (Limanonda, 1999). Sons do not inherit the family land, but do inherit more transportable assets, such as cattle and agricultural equipment. Older daughters inherit similar assets, while the youngest daughter takes care of the parents in old age and inherits the rice land. This system is more flexible today (Chamratrithirong, Morgan, and Rindfuss, 1988), but women remain the preferred care-takers and inheritors. Following a contractual approach, women would expect to inherit without providing much support to their parents, while men would need to provide support to be considered potential inheritors. Curran et al. (2003) provided ethnographic evidence that families come to depend on male migrants who remit steadily to
their families and to see them as the logical inheritors of family land. Thus, because female inheritance is the default position, men should display more contractual behaviour with regard to land ownership by the origin household. The positive effect of land owned on remittances should be stronger for male migrants. Tradition in the study area dictates that education should be supported for sons over daughters (Curran et al., 2003). This tradition suggests that daughters who receive a given level education will owe a greater debt to their families than will sons who receive the same level of education. Thus, the contractual prediction that education will positively affect remittances behaviour is stronger for daughters.

Table 6-2 Descriptive Statistics of Male and Female Migrants and Their Origin Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Male migrants</th>
<th>Female migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances Behaviours</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remitting to household (%)</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics of Migrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educations (in years)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural occupation</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural occupation</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-house occupation (maid/driver)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household head (%)</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since migrating</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for migration (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reasons</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destinations (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asian countries</td>
<td>49.16</td>
<td>58.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian countries</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East countries</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD countries</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>31.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single (including divorced &amp; widowed)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (spouse in the origin household)</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents in the origin household</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics of Households</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land with legal right</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of employed household members</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents aged below 15</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents aged above 60</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Total)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Household survey data (2008).*
6.3 ANALYSING REMITTANCE BEHAVIOUR

Table 6-2 presents descriptive statistics for samples of male and female migrants and their associated households. My sample consisted of 182 male and 54 female migrants from the households in 12 villages, and 80 percent of the male migrants and 85 percent of the female migrants remitted to their households. Table 6-2 also presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models discussed later. Levels of education and occupation serve as proxies for the income of the migrant. The amount of land with legal right, plus a dummy variable distinguishing landless household, and a remaining household member in employment serve as proxies for the income of the origin household. The number of dependents (aged below 15 and aged above 60) in the household measures the needs of the origin household. Dummy variables whether the migrant had a spouse in the origin household or parents in the origin household measure the ties between the migrants and the household. The models also include interactions between the variable measuring legal right of land and the number of migrants from the household. In addition to these variables that are based on the theoretical background, models control for the age of migrants, headship status, time since migration, and the destination of the migrant in abroad.

The analysis consists of two logistic regression models predicting the log-odds of remittances: (1) from male migrants to households, and (2) from female migrants to households. Likelihood ratio tests indicated a significant difference across gender only for migrant-to-household remittances.
6.3.1 Migrant Remittances to Households

Table 6-3 (see next page) shows the results of the regression model for migrant-to-household remittances. In Table 6-3, there is considerable support for both the altruistic and the contractual approaches. However, in the situations in which the two models have competing predictions, there is more support for the contractual model.

The effects in Table 6-3 of income proxies and migrant-to-household ties are consistent with the predictions of the altruistic approach. The proxies for the income of the migrant have the expected effects; with education and non-agricultural occupations having a positive effect and being an unemployment status having a negative effect (for male) on the probability of remitting. The proxies for the income and needs of the origin household have some of the expected effects. As expected, the presence of employed members in the origin household deters remittances from male migrants, while the number of elderly dependents encourages remittances from female migrants.

Male and female migrants are more likely to remit as a function of a family in the household (when their spouse is in the origin household) and of the presence of parents in the household. Male migrants are more likely to remit if they have a spouse in the origin household than if they are single. Male and female migrants are less likely to remit if they have a spouse at the migration destination than if they are single.

The effects of the migrant’s education and occupation in Table 6-3 support the contractual model, while the effects of the proxies for home household income do not. Education and occupation, both proxies for income, have a positive effect on the probability of migrant-to-
household remittances. The effects of proxies for household income are generally non-significant. These results together provide support for the contractual approach.

Table 6-3 Logistic Regression Models of whether Migrants Remitted to Their Origin Household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Male migrants</th>
<th>Female migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of Migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educations (in years)</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural occupation (reference)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural occupation</td>
<td>0.565*</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation</td>
<td>-1.909*</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household head</td>
<td>1.122*</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since migrating</td>
<td>-0.0036</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destinations (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian countries (reference)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asian countries</td>
<td>0.605*</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East countries</td>
<td>0.506*</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD countries</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties Between Migrant and Household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single (reference)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (spouse in the origin household)</td>
<td>0.411*</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (spouse at the destination country)</td>
<td>-0.365*</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents in the origin household</td>
<td>1.028*</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of Households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land with legal right</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>0.826*</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of employed household members</td>
<td>-0.272*</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents aged below 15</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dependents aged above 60</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.953*</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Total )</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data (2008). * p<0.05.

6.3.2 Gender Differences in Remittances Behaviour

Table 6-2 shows the bivariate relationship between the migrant’s gender and the likelihood of migrant-to-household remittances. While 85% of female migrants remit, 80% of male migrants remit. Table 6-2 also shows that female migrants are less likely to be in
agricultural occupations and have been gone from their origin households a shorter time, on average. From this evidence, we may guess that the differences between male and female migrants’ remittance behaviour (female migrants are more likely to remit) are due to the difference of average characteristics of households or migrant themselves.

Table 6-3 shows the effects that drive the gender differences. The significant differences in effects between male and female migrants are indicated in the far-right column in Table 6-2. There is no significant difference between the intercepts in the male and female models, confirming the finding that the differences are in men’s and women’s responses to individual and household characteristics.

Female migrants react more strongly to the motivators put forward by the altruistic approach to understanding remittances, consistent with the argument that they are responding to ingrained norms stemming from Buddhist practices that accord merit to women for supporting their families. When women have not yet married and started their own families at the migration destination, and when there are more elderly members in the origin household, women are more likely to support their origin household than are men. In contrast, the gendered predictions of the contractual approach are not evident in the results. Men do not respond more strongly to the land available for inheritance, and women do not respond more strongly to past educational support. To the extent that migrants and origin households are engaging in an inter-temporal contract that involves the past education of the migrants or the future inheritance of land, male and female migrants are equal participants.
6.4 CONCLUSION

The results of these analyses have shown that we need to take a more complex view of remittance behavior, considering the role of gender and social class in altruistic or contractual theories of remittances. Past research has found evidence for altruistic (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002) and contractual patterns (de la Brière et al., 2002; Hoddinott, 1994; Lillard and Willis, 1997; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Regmi and Tisdell, 2002) among migrants from communities in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This paper has similarly found support for both approaches but more support for contractual approaches among migrants from rural Northeast Thailand. However, the theoretical and empirical discussions have indicated that behaviours and expected behaviours under the altruistic and contractual approaches are gendered. In addition, the empirical results have shown that there are important differences between poorer families and wealthier families. Migrants from Northeast Thailand are heterogeneous in their behaviours, with some following altruistic and some following contractual patterns of behaviour. These heterogeneities indicate the need for more complex theories and analyses.

Women behave in more altruistic ways than do men. This pattern is consistent with theoretical expectations that are based on Theravada Buddhist norms indicating that women acquire religious merit for their families through material support. However, the results are also consistent with an alternative explanation. Curran et al. (2003) provided ethnographic evidence from the same study area that families are hesitant to allow daughters to migrate, both because they want to avoid the loss of day-to-day household assistance and because they want to protect the daughters from more modern and dangerous lifestyles. She noted that female migrants effectively pay their families to allow them to migrate until they are
married and are no longer under the control of their parents. The results presented here show that women are much less likely than men to remit when they marry and that they respond more strongly than do men to the dependents in their home households. This altruistic pattern could be the result of hidden exchange behavior within the households. In this case, female migrants exchange money for the lack of social sanctions during or after migration but no longer need to do so after marriage. Further research on the negotiations between migrants and their families is necessary to confirm or eliminate this alternative explanation.

Regarding the migrants’ future well-being in terms of inheritance of land, men do not respond more strongly to the land available for inheritance, so remittance behaviour is not relevant to the inheritance culture, and all migrants are equal participants for sending money.
7 Migrants’ Remittances and Economic Well-being of the Rural Households in Northeast Thailand

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Labour migration has long been viewed as a rational economic strategy utilised by household units in order to increase the flows of income and to improve economic well-being of household members in poor countries (Semyonov, 2004; Massey et al., 1998). According to the ‘household theory of labour migration’, decisions to migrate are rarely reached by isolated individual actors without consideration of the household’s needs (Massey et al. 1998). Rather, migration decisions are reached collectively and rationally within the family unit to maximize potential economic gains and to minimize the scope of economic risks (see chapter 2).

That is, many households in places with depressed economies are likely to ‘send’ members of the household to distant labour markets in search of better employment opportunities and of higher incomes. They do so with the expectation that the labour migrants would remit substantial portions of their earnings back home (Massey, 1994). The empirical literature on this issue demonstrates, rather clearly, that labour migrants attain higher earnings returns on their human capital resources in the host country. They usually take jobs of lower status and lower prestige than the jobs they had in place of origin but they earn higher income than the income they could possibly attained in their place of origin.
Substantial portions of their earnings are remitted to family members left behind (Semyonov, 2004).

Remittances, the portion of migrant workers’ earnings sent back from the country of destination to their families in the country of origin, have come to play a major role in the economies of labour-sending societies (Lu and Treiman, 2006). At the micro-economic level, remittances from migrants are an important source of income for the households of origin and often used to overcome economic hardships and help family members to raise well-being and to improve quality of life (Koc and Onan, 2004). From this point of view, labour migration is viewed as a rational economic strategy of some poor but mostly lower middle income households in less developed countries (Suro, 2005; Orozco, 2005).

While an increase in household income is one direct and immediate outcome of remittances, the precise effect of remittances also depends on how the money is spent. Conclusions drawn from available remittance-use studies have been surprisingly consistent: remittances were seen to be mostly used to satisfy recipient households’ consumption needs and investment did not usually have high priority (Massey and Parrado, 1994; Osaki, 1999).

Another frequently raised question in the migration literature is whether remittances contribute to an eventual equalization of income among households in the community of origin. Some researchers argue that migrant remittances tend to reduce income inequality (Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Guest, 1998), others that remittances increase inequality (Barham and Boucher, 1998). Evidence remains contradictory, and the answer is likely to depend on the economic circumstances of households from which migrants come, the types of migration and different phases in a community’s migration history (Taylor, 1999).
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the role of remittances that plays in improving household economic well-being as an income source and to measure to which extent migrant remittances can affect poverty and inequality in the context of rural Thailand. By comparing households with and without migrant workers in abroad, I am in a position to estimate the extent to which remittances explain disparities in household income and economic well-being as well as to contribute empirical findings to debate on relationship between international remittances, poverty and inequality. I am going to disaggregate these separate but related effects so that a more nuanced and multivariate picture can emerge of the contribution of remittances. So in this chapter, I will build on this literature and seek to answer the outstanding questions of how the income effects, inequality affects and well-being indicators interrelate.

7.2 ESTIMATION OF HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

Data for estimating the impact of remittances and labour migration on household income and well-being were obtained from the survey questionnaires. For the purpose of analysis, I focused on 236 households that sent and currently have an overseas worker abroad and on 76 households that do not have a current labour migrant to an overseas labour market.

I chose a number of interrelated variables in order to capture the pecuniary, non-pecuniary, demographic and income effects. The variables used to predict household income and household well-being include: age of household head (in years), education of household head (years of formal schooling), local occupation for household income (three major categories), and size of household (number of persons). Household income is used in the
analysis, once as a dependent variable and once as a predictor of well-being. Household income has two measured components: domestic earnings (in Thai Baht) and remittances received from overseas earnings (in Thai Baht). The dependent variable – ‘well-being’ – is defined by two measured indicators. The first measure is an index based on the number of household goods in the possession of the family. Ten items were selected for the construction of the index. This number was chosen after the pilot exercise as one that would be manageable, as attrition rates of respondents grew dramatically with larger sizes of items. Each item was given a value of 1 when it was in possession of the household (and 0 otherwise). The index was constructed by adding the social values for each item weighted by its scarcity (hereafter OBJWB)\textsuperscript{14}. The second measure is based on subjective evaluation of household economic position. It is derived from respondents’ assessments of the relative position of the household (as compared to other households in neighbourhood) with regard to: well-being and capability to meet daily needs (hereafter SUBWB) and is expressed in terms of a cumulative scale (scale from 1 to 10). The detailed operational definitions of the variables and their mean values or percentages are presented in Table 7-1 on the next page.

7.3 RESULTS

7.3.1 Descriptive Overview

In Table 7-1 below, I compare the mean characteristics of households with and without overseas labour-migrants for a descriptive overview. The data reveals rather clearly that the

\textsuperscript{14} Objective well-being (OBJWB) is a weighted measure of the number of household goods that are in the possession of the household. The items included in the index are TV, VCR, stereo, mobile phone, computer, rice cooker, microwave, fridge, motorcycle, and car. That is, in scarcity index of well-being, each item was given a weight calculated as 1 - p, where p is proportion of households in the total population who possess the item.
income of households with overseas labour migrants is higher by 30 percent than the income of households without labour migrants and that the income per capita of the former type of households is almost twice the income per capita of the latter type of households. Remittances sent by overseas workers make over 70 percent of the household income. Apparently, remittances have become not only the major source of income for households with overseas workers but they also contribute greatly to income differentials between households with and without overseas workers.

Table 7-1  Mean (S.D.) Characteristics of Households with and without Overseas Labour Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>With migrant (N = 236)</th>
<th>Without migrant (N = 76)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>In Baht</td>
<td>15,657 (14,150)</td>
<td>10,659* (14,494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income per capita</td>
<td>In Baht</td>
<td>3,459 (3,039)</td>
<td>1,833* (2,467)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>In Baht</td>
<td>10,491 (9,160)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances as share of household income</td>
<td>In percent of household income</td>
<td>73.2 (28.4)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective Well-being Index (OBJWB)</td>
<td>Weighted measure</td>
<td>3.44 (1.79)</td>
<td>2.58* (1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Well-being Index (SUBWB)</td>
<td>Scaled responses from 1 to 10</td>
<td>6.48 (0.98)</td>
<td>5.96* (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of household</td>
<td>Number of persons</td>
<td>5.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>6.3* (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>In years</td>
<td>43.5 (6.8)</td>
<td>44.9* (7.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of household head</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.9 (2.3)</td>
<td>9.4* (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local occupation for household income</td>
<td>Agricultural work</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-agricultural work</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual work or others</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* P < 0.05 (for difference between household with and without overseas worker).
* 1 USD = 30 THB (Thai Baht).

Disparities between the two types of households are also evident with regard to well-being whether measured on the ‘objective’ index of possession of goods (OBJWB) or on the ‘subjective’ assessment scale (SUBWB). Well-being is considerably higher among households with overseas workers. Households with overseas workers are more able than households without overseas workers to purchase goods for household consumption, hence,

15 Since weights were assigned to household to reflect the proportion of households with and without overseas workers in the sampling areas and since the data in the descriptive table are displayed separately for households with and without overseas labour migrants I present the unweighted descriptive statistics.
16 For household with overseas workers, household income is divided by total number of persons in household minus 1 (overseas worker).
to raise their economic well-being and quality of life. Likewise, respondents in households with overseas workers tend to assess their well-being and the ability to meet daily needs (as compared to other families in their neighbourhood) significantly higher than respondents in households without overseas workers.

The two types of households not only differ by their income and well-being but also by their demographic and social composition. More specifically, households with overseas worker are characterized by higher educational levels than households with no overseas worker, and they have smaller size of family numbers. Types of work for local income are also different – households with overseas worker present higher rate of manual work and lower rate of non-agricultural work compare to households without overseas worker.

Before estimating the impact of remittances on the economic well-being of households in rural Thailand, it seems in order to present first, how and then for what purposes remittances are being used by members of the household. Thus, in Appendix A (at the end), I list a series of responses by members of the households on the ways and for what purpose they spend the remittances they receive from overseas worker. The data reveal that most of the families (82 percent) spent almost all remittances, and only 18 percent of the households indicated that they were able to save some of the remittances. Remittances were used ‘always’ to buy food (89 percent) and to purchase basic items (82 percent). Remittances, however, were also used for investment such as to buy land and livestock (25 percent and 13 percent respectively). It is important to note that remittances were not only
used for personal consumption but also for investment in education. Most households indicated that remittances were used to support children’s education (69 percent).  

7.3.2 Multivariate Analysis

Since the data displayed in Table 7-1 reveal that households with and without overseas workers not only differ by access to remittances but also by income level and by well-being as well as by their social and demographic composition, it seems important to estimate the net effect of remittances on the two indicators of economic well-being (i.e. household income and the two measures of household well-being). Thus, in the analysis that follows I estimate a series of regressions predicting household income (Table 7-2) and a series of regressions predicting household well-being (Tables 7-3 and 7-4).

The data presented in Table 7-2 pertain to the net impact that remittances exert on household income. Column (1) pertains to households with overseas workers while columns (2)–(4) pertain to both types of households. In columns (1) and (2), I let household income be a function of remittances plus socio-demographic characteristics of household head. In column (3) remittances is replaced by a variable distinguishing between household with and without overseas workers. In column (4) both remittances and type of household are introduced as predictors of household income.

---

17 Regrettably, as the answers to this question are not the proportion of household expenditure and broadly categorized, the precise nature of expenditure patterns cannot be further explored.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Household with overseas labour migrant only</th>
<th>Total population of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>0.338* (0.018)</td>
<td>0.051* (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>0.015* (0.005)</td>
<td>0.013* (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of households head</td>
<td>0.043* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.034* (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of household</td>
<td>0.082* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.065* (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural work</td>
<td>0.653* (0.091)</td>
<td>0.807* (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural work</td>
<td>0.233* (0.053)</td>
<td>0.384* (0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual work</td>
<td>0.420 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.572* (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with migrants</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.379* (0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>6.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis reveals, rather clearly, that net of the household socio-demographic characteristics, every Baht that the household receives in the form of overseas remittances increases household income substantially.

The effect of remittances on family income is positive and highly significant in both column (1) 0.338 and column (2) 0.051. Notwithstanding the impact of remittances on household income, the findings indicate that household income is also affected by the socio-demographic characteristics of the families. Household income is likely to rise with age and education of household head, and size of the households (the effects of all these variables are positive and significant in all four equations).

The findings revealed by column (3) suggest that income of households with overseas workers is significantly higher than the income of households without overseas workers,
net of the socio-demographic attributes of households. The effect of overseas employment on income is positive (0.379) and highly significant.

The results of column (4) indicate that the differences in household income between households with and without overseas workers can be fully attributed to remittances. When both remittances and overseas employment are introduced into column (4), the impact of remittances on household income remain positive and significant (0.314) but the effect of overseas employment becomes negative (-2.40). This finding may attest to the productivity loss of households that sent labour migrants overseas. Without overseas remittances the income of households with labour migrants could have been considerably lower.

The data displayed in Table 7-3 examine the impact of remittances on household well-being (measured on the index of possession of goods). Columns (1) through (3) pertain to the sub-sample of households with an overseas labour migrant and columns (1a) through (4a) pertain to the total sample (both households with and without labour migrants). In column (1), I let the index of well-being be a function of remittances and socio-demographic attributes. In column (2), I replace overseas remittances with household domestic earnings, and in column (3), I introduce both remittances and earnings in survey area as predictors of well-being. Columns (1a), (2a), (3a) and (4a) of Table 3 pertain to total sample (both households with and without labour migrants). In column (1a), well-being (OBJWB) is predicted as a function of socio-demographic characteristics of the household plus a variable that distinguishes between two types of households (i.e. households with and without labour migrants). In column (2a) remittances is added to the set of predictors, and in column (3a) remittances is replaced by domestic earnings. Column
(4a) includes all sources of earnings along with type of household as predictors of well-being.

Columns (1)–(3) of Table 7-3 demonstrate that among households with labour migrants, overseas remittances are the foremost determinant of household well-being. By contrast, domestic earnings have no impact on household well-being. That is, while remittances exert significant and positive effect on the number of goods in the possession of the household (columns 1 and 3) earnings in survey area do not exert a significant influence on well-being (columns 2 and 3). Apparently, number of goods in the possession of the household as an indicator of well-being is likely to rise due to remittances. The higher are the remittances the higher is the well-being.

The results displayed by column (1a) suggest that, other things being equal, households with labour migrants enjoy higher well-being (measured by the index of household goods – OBJWB) than households without labour migrants. The effect of migrant status in column (1a) is positive and highly significant (0.531) implying that households with overseas workers are able to purchase more goods than households without overseas workers.

The difference between the two types of households in OBJWB, however, can be attributed to differences in the income of the two types of households, especially to differences due to remittances. That is, when ‘remittances’ is also included in the set of predictors in columns (2a) and (4a), the effect of ‘migrant status’ on well-being becomes statistically insignificant. Although both domestic earnings and remittances affect the number of goods in the possession of the household (as evident by the significant and positive effects of both variables in columns 2a, 3a and 4a), remittances are responsible for the difference in well-being between households with and without labour migrants.
Table 7-3 Regression Equations Coefficients (S.D.) predicting Household Objective Well-being Index (OBJWB)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Only household with overseas labour migrant</th>
<th>Total population of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>0.152* (0.046)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic earnings</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of households head</td>
<td>0.024 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of households head</td>
<td>0.199* (0.032)</td>
<td>0.121* (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of household</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural work</td>
<td>0.738* (0.202)</td>
<td>0.721* (0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural work</td>
<td>0.548* (0.247)</td>
<td>0.525 (0.280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual work</td>
<td>0.083 (0.144)</td>
<td>-0.023 (0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with migrants</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.72</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* P < 0.05
It is interesting to note that number of goods in the possession of the household (as an indicator of well-being) is likely to increase not only with the flow of earnings and with remittances but also with age and the level of education of household head. Number of goods is also likely to rise in households where the family members are employed, regardless of their occupational category.

The data presented in Table 7-4 examine the impact of remittances on subjective assessments of well-being (measured on SUBWB scale). The regression models predicting SUBWB are identical to the models presented in Table 7-3. Similar to the findings observed for OBJWB, the data suggest that the foremost significant predictor of subjective assessment of well-being among households with overseas workers (columns 1-3) is overseas remittances. The higher the remittances sent from overseas the higher is the value of the SUBWB scale (0.082). However, and similar to the findings observed for the previous measure of well-being (OBJWB), domestic earnings exerts no impact on respondent’s subjective evaluation of the household relative economic position. (The net effect of domestic earnings on SUBWB in both columns 2 and 3 is negligible and statistically insignificant).

The data displayed in columns (1a) through (4a) in Table 7-4 pertain to the total sample including both households with and without overseas workers. The data clearly reveal that the subjective assessment of well-being is significantly higher among households with overseas workers. The effect of type of household on SUBWB in columns (1a) and (3a) is positive and significant (0.463 and 0.506, respectively). However, similar to the findings observed in Table 7-3 for the index of possession of household goods, the difference between the two types of households is fully attributable to the flow of remittances.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Only household with overseas labour migrant</th>
<th>Total population of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td><strong>0.082</strong> <em>(0.027)</em></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic earnings</td>
<td>--</td>
<td><strong>-0.016</strong> <em>(0.013)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of households head</td>
<td><strong>0.010</strong> <em>(0.008)</em></td>
<td><strong>0.009</strong> <em>(0.008)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of households head</td>
<td><strong>0.067</strong> <em>(0.019)</em></td>
<td><strong>0.071</strong> <em>(0.020)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of household</td>
<td><strong>-0.045</strong> <em>(0.020)</em></td>
<td><strong>-0.040</strong> <em>(0.022)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural work</td>
<td><strong>0.169</strong> <em>(0.148)</em></td>
<td><strong>0.294</strong> <em>(0.170)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural work</td>
<td><strong>-0.096</strong> <em>(0.087)</em></td>
<td><strong>0.146</strong> <em>(0.097)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual work</td>
<td><strong>0.110</strong> <em>(0.121)</em></td>
<td><strong>0.210</strong> <em>(0.144)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with migrants</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>4.32</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>4.76</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td><strong>0.072</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.065</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* P < 0.05
When remittances are included in columns (2a) and (4a), the effect of type of household on SUBWB becomes statistically insignificant. The data suggest, once again, that remittance is an important determinant of subjective evaluation of well-being. The data also suggest that domestic earnings (columns 3a and 4a) have no influence on the subjective assessment of the household well-being.

7.4 DECOMPOSITION OF MEAN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS

The data presented above reveal that household income and well-being whether measured on the objective index of possession of household goods (OBJWB) or on the scale of subjective assessment of living standard (SUBWB) are likely to rise with remittances and that remittances are responsible, to a large extent, for the disparities in income and well-being between households with and without overseas labour migrants. This is an important, because it is the first time attempt in Thailand with recent data, and this can be a conclusive proof to the remittances/development debate (see chapter 2). In order to systematically and accurately evaluate the extent to which remittances explain the observed disparities between households with and without overseas workers I decomposed the mean differences between the two types of households using regression models.

There are several methods for decomposing mean differences between groups via the use of regression equations. In the present analysis I employed standardization procedure to decompose mean differences in income and two measures of well-being between households with overseas workers and households without overseas workers. The logic embodied in the procedure employed here is to ask what would be the income or well-
being of households without overseas workers if their income and their well-being, respectively, would be determined exactly in the same way as households without overseas workers. It serves as a hypothetical case where one group (i.e. households with overseas workers) is exposed to the same conditions and processes that determine outcomes of the other group (i.e. households with overseas workers). The procedure can be expressed by the following notation:

$$\bar{Y}_O - \bar{Y}_W = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_i (\bar{X}_{iO} - \bar{X}_{iw}) + K$$

where $O$ and $W$ stand, respectively, for households with overseas workers and for households without overseas workers, and $Y$’s are the mean value of the dependent variables. The $X$’s are the mean values of the independent variables weighted by the regression coefficients obtained from the regression equation for the standard population (here households with overseas workers). The $K$ term is the component due to ‘remittances’.

The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 7-5 below. Column 1 pertains to household income, column 2 pertains to objective well-being and column 3 pertains to subjective well-being.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Household Income</th>
<th>(2) OBJWB</th>
<th>(3) SUBWB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean for household with</td>
<td>9.396</td>
<td>3.486</td>
<td>6.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overseas labour migrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for household without</td>
<td>8.913</td>
<td>2.655</td>
<td>5.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overseas labour migrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial gap</td>
<td>0.482 (100%)</td>
<td>0.813 (100%)</td>
<td>0.520 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap Remaining after</td>
<td>-0.008 (-1.8%)</td>
<td>0.192 (26%)</td>
<td>0.162 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standardization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap due to ‘Remittances’ ($K$)</td>
<td>0.491 (98.2%)</td>
<td>0.621 (74%)</td>
<td>0.358 (69%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The findings provide firm support for the thesis that most of the disparities between households with labour migrants and households without labour migrants in either income or well-being are accounted by the availability of remittances. In fact, the entire income gap (98 percent) between households with and without overseas workers is found to be attributed to the flow (or lack) of remittances. Without remittances, the predicted income of households with overseas workers would be virtually equal to the income of those households that have not sent migrants to overseas labour markets. Availability of remittances accounts for almost three-quarters (74 percent) of the disparity in well-being measured on the index of possession of household goods (OBJWB). Had families without overseas workers received remittances their well-being could have improved considerably. The improvement in well-being due to remittances is also reflected in subjective assessments of respondents. Two thirds of the gap in the subjective evaluation of economic well-being (SUBWB) is accounted by availability of remittance. Indeed, the data presented here do not leave any doubt that the flow of remittances is responsible for economic disparities between households in rural Thailand.

In the following section, we take our result from the previous one, that remittances are the overwhelming factor in explaining differences in income and well-being between household and relate this to prior known indices of poverty between households. This is in order to assess how far this result informs the creation of reduction of inequality. This is because prior research (see chapter 2) shows that levels of inequality can be exacerbated by remittances receipt so we will now control for this effect in our, so far, overwhelmingly positive picture.
7.5 ESTIMATION OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

In this study, a household is classified as poor if their per capita income is below the poverty line which is set up by UNDP and NESDB (National Economic and Social Development Board). In Thailand, the poverty line based on income has been established since the early 1970s. The approach used to establish this minimum income level is called ‘Nutritional Adequacy Approach’. The minimum nutritional requirements are measured against the actual food consumption of the Thai people in different regions to see if they meet these minimum requirements. The prices of these foods are then used to convert the costs of these foods into monetary terms. What results is the minimum income that is needed to get these nutritionally adequate food items. This income is sometimes called ‘food poverty line’. When the minimum income required to get non-food items is added to this food poverty line, the final result is the ‘total poverty line’. The average poverty line can be computed for the whole population or sub-populations in different regions or locations.

| Table 7-6 Poverty Lines and Poverty Incidence in Thailand, 1988 to 2002 |
|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 634 | 693 | 790 | 839 | 953 | 1,130 | 1,135 | 1,163 |
| Poverty incidence (%) | 43.1 | 34.7 | 28.9 | 20.1 | 15.6 | 18.3 | 21.9 | 14.4 |
| No. of the Poor (million) | 17.9 | 15.3 | 13.5 | 9.7 | 6.8 | 7.9 | 8.9 | 6.2 |

Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), Thailand (* unfortunately, this is the most recent data).

The latest poverty line which can be obtained at this moment is published in 2002. Poverty lines in the following years are estimated by deflating the 2002 poverty line using the consumer price index of Thailand 2002-2008. Table 7-6 above presents poverty line and

It shows that the poverty incidence dropped dramatically from 43.1 percent in 1988 to 15.6 percent in 1996 – poverty incidence increased again during the period of financial crisis in Asia (1998-2000), and decreased under 15 percent in year 2002. However, the poverty incidence remains rather high in rural areas, especially Northeastern region, at 24.4 percent in 2002.

Higher poverty in rural areas and growing inequality require the government to have to strengthen policies on poverty reduction and income redistribution. As many agreed that migrant remittances can be an important source for welfare improvement and poverty reduction for the poor, there might be a question on whether the migrant remittances can reduce poverty and inequality or not. If most of the households are non-poor before receiving remittances, remittances can have no effect on poverty, but positive effect on inequality. This section reviews the results in relation to the overall research question which centres on the concept of ‘poverty’, which as we saw in chapter 2, and further details will be discussed below.

**Measurement of Remittances’ Impacts on Poverty and Inequality**

Poverty is often measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indices – the poverty incidence, the depth of poverty and the severity of poverty. The measures used for the dependent variables are the headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio and the squared poverty gap ratio respectively. The poverty incidence is a measure of poverty which refers to the proportion of families with per capita income less than the per capita poverty threshold to
the total number of families. For the poverty incidence, the headcount ratio is used as the measure.

The headcount measure is considerably the most commonly calculated poverty measure. Meier and Rauch (2005) points out that solely considering this measure in analyzing poverty in a particular setting would suffer from one major pitfall. The headcount measure fails to consider the fact that the poor people’s income levels may exhibit wide differences. Some people are located just below the poverty line and others are located far greater below the poverty line (Meier and Rauch 2005). Therefore, to overcome this drawback, the study also uses other poverty measures that consider the distance of the poor people from the poverty line and the degree of income inequality among the poor people which are captured by the other FGT poverty indices, the depth and severity of poverty.

The depth of poverty indicates how far below the poverty line the average poor household’s income falls. The depth of poverty is measured by the poverty gap ratio which is defined as the total income shortfall, expressed in proportion to the poverty line, of families with income below the poverty threshold, divided by the total number of families.

The severity of poverty is the poverty measurement that is more sensitive to the income distribution among the poor. The measure used for the severity of poverty is the squared poverty gap ratio which is the total of the squared income shortfall, expressed in proportion to the poverty line, of families with income below the poverty threshold, divided by the total number of families. The severity of poverty defines how many families are located far below the poverty line.
To measure the income inequality, the Gini coefficient will be used. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal (the line of perfect equality) to the area below the diagonal. As a measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. The larger the coefficient is, the greater the degree of inequality. Thus, the Gini coefficient limits 0 for perfect equality and 1 for perfect inequality (Meier and Rauch 2005). Table 7-7 presents estimation results of the impacts of migrant remittances. The result shows that migrant remittances have strong and positive impacts on income of the receiving households. According to results, migrant remittances increased per capita income of the recipients by 2,142 Baht, so the impact of remittances on income is high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>With remittances</th>
<th>Without remittances</th>
<th>Effect of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Well-being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income (Thai Baht)</td>
<td>4,311***</td>
<td>2,169***</td>
<td>2,142***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(471)</td>
<td>(712)</td>
<td>(684)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGT(0): headcount ratio</td>
<td>0.0749***</td>
<td>0.1125***</td>
<td>-0.0376*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0217)</td>
<td>(0.0254)</td>
<td>(0.0145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGT(1): poverty gap</td>
<td>0.0160***</td>
<td>0.0249***</td>
<td>-0.0089*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0060)</td>
<td>(0.0072)</td>
<td>(0.0047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGT(2): squared poverty gap</td>
<td>0.0058***</td>
<td>0.0094***</td>
<td>-0.0037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0026)</td>
<td>(0.0030)</td>
<td>(0.0019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.3931***</td>
<td>0.3482***</td>
<td>0.0449***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0061)</td>
<td>(0.0052)</td>
<td>(0.0019)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

The table also presents the estimates of the impact on poverty of the remittance recipients and inequality of the population. It shows that migrant remittances decreased poverty. The estimates are rather small but statistically significant. Due to migrant remittances, the headcount of poverty for the recipients was reduced by around 3.7 percentage points. Similarly, the poverty-gap and poverty-severity indices are decreased for the remittance receiving households. However, the remittances from migrants increase inequality, albeit at the small magnitude. With the remittances, Gini coefficient is significantly higher than
without the remittances. This is not a very surprising result, since the non-poor households tend to receive larger international remittances than the poor.

A certain degree of increase in inequality is/is not a social issue? In my view, this would not detract from or offset the increased income affects for some households, as it is of such a small magnitude. From our goods index, we can see this inequality exemplified in small differences in goods bought and their quality. Also everyone can now join in due to institutional culture of migration which keeps social envy in check.

7.6 CONCLUSION

The major objective of this chapter was to examine the impact of remittances on economic well-being of households in rural Thailand. The data presented by the analysis lend firm support to the thesis that labour migration is a rational economic strategy of poor and lower-middle income households to combat poverty and to improve well-being. The findings demonstrate that the money that labour migrants send back home is mostly used by members of the households for consumption (e.g. to buy food and basic items) and to support education. Due to remittances households with overseas workers have higher incomes and enjoy higher living standard than households without overseas workers. The analysis reveals clearly that the entire income gap and most of the gap in well-being (whether measured by the number of goods in the possession of the household or by subjective assessment of the household relative well-being) between households with and without overseas workers can be accounted by availability of remittances.
The findings of this chapter show that the Thai labour migrants are able to send home large sums of foreign currency in the form of remittances; remittances, in turn, are heavily used by members of the household to improve well-being. As a result, although migrant remittances increased remarkably income of the remittance receiving households, their impact on poverty was rather small. The computation results indicate that migrant remittances decreased the head count of poverty for the recipients, and remittances also helped to decrease the poverty gap index and the poverty-severity index for the recipients, albeit at the very small magnitude.

However, the findings also reveal at the same time that overseas remittances increase well-being they also increase economic inequality (i.e. disparities in well-being) between households with and without overseas workers, albeit at a small and still manageable rate. Notwithstanding, the significant impact on labour migration on both well-being and economic inequality among households in rural Thailand, their intended and unintended implications for the society are yet to be systematically studied – for instance, it is not clear yet whether and to what extent the prevalence and scope of labour migration in rural Thailand have prompted investment in the domestic economy. Unfortunately, the data do not have information on the extent to which remittances are invested back in the local economy or on the extent to which remittances stem and prompt domestic economic development. It is my hope that the complex and multiple effects of labour migration on the sending societies would be further studied and understood. In following chapter, non-economic aspects of household well-being will be presented.
8 International Migration and Its Implications on Social Well-being of the Family Left-behind

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The ‘plight’ of family left-behind by migrants in developing countries has attracted growing attention in recent years. Uneven development and poverty are encouraging more people – particularly labour migrants from rural regions in developing countries – to cross borders in search of better job opportunities (Osaki, 2002). Many of these labour migrants have left their family behind with extended family members in the home countries in their quest to improve livelihoods for themselves and their families through migration (IOM, 2006).

During the last decades, Thailand experienced rapid economic growth and those economic expansion were accompanied by a decline in the importance of agriculture and increasing geographical mobility, especially in the form of labour migration from rural to urban areas and overseas (Curran et al., 2003). In Northeast region of Thailand, in particular, international migration has become so much a part of the operation of the village as we saw in previous chapters, in both economic and social terms, that it was viewed as having become institutionalised within the village setting.

Arguably, there are both benefits and disadvantages for rural households as a result of the migration of family members to overseas. While their departure reduces local labour force
and availability to provide routine personal care or household help, rural households may benefit from remittances or derive pride from their family members’ occupational or social success in the new settings (Asis, 2006). Moreover, migration including possible return are likely responsive to the changing situation of the households. The basic theme is that out-migration affects support exchanges between migrants and their households which impact the households’ social and economic well-being. Some of the changes will lead to gains and others to losses for each party (Asis, 2006).

When a family member migrates, the most visible and immediate impact is the material benefit, in particular improvements in the financial situation of the family. As we saw in Chapter 7, the income level and economic well-being of households are improved after migration departure. While improved economic circumstances after migration have been noted in a range of studies, the social costs of their departure, especially on those left-behind, have been often omitted from the migration literature. Relating these together is a particular challenge to researchers, as it is not always clear what value the households themselves place on economic as compared to social effects. The qualitative data allowed me to ask detailed questions on their evaluation regarding social well-being.

While numerous migration studies have already recognised that migration is not merely the business of the individual but also involves and affects the migrants’ families, fewer studies have progressed to examining in detail the circumstances of those left-behind and how their lives have been reshaped in a complex manner by the departure of key household members (Toyota, Yeoh and Nguyen, 2008).
This research was focused understanding international labour migration and the well-being of households rather than mobility itself, and this section seeks to focus on the impact of international migration on two distinctly immobile; the elderly and the children who are being left-behind by migrating adults who are their children (for the elderly) and parents (for the children). The analyses of this section are based on the fieldwork data from household questionnaires and interviews. Due to the limitations of data collected, the analyses here are focused on several household cases during the fieldwork.

8.2 WELL-BEING OF THE ELDERLY

8.2.1 Migration and Social Support

Given the focus of this analysis, I am particularly interested in the well-being of elderly parents who were left-behind in rural households. Although the impact on the migrants themselves is beyond the scope of the present study (since they were not present during fieldwork), it is important to recognise that for parents, the migrants’ well-being appears to have been a far more important consideration than their own well-being, especially when children left to find work in abroad.

Interviewer: “When she was about to leave, did you think with whom you would live? Did you think of yourself in this respect?”
Father: “I was hardly concerned about myself. Since I have some land, farming work and another son, I only worried about the daughter who left home. She was young at that time; she might not have thought much about it.” (Case 103)

From the above statement, we can guess that long-term implications of migration for rural parent’s well-being in old age were rarely considered by either migrant children or their parents at the time of initial departure from home. This likely derives from several key influences. Firstly, given the young age at which migrant children left, the initial departure typically occurred when the parents themselves were still economically active and physically well. Thus, parents often did not see a need for the child to remain in the locality to assist them. Secondly, given that today’s elderly typically have many children, when one departed abroad, there would often still be others at home or nearby. In addition, when children migrated, there was often genuine uncertainty about the permanency of the move, and some parents held expectations or at least hope that one or more of their children would later return (6 out of 9 respondents expected their children’s return).

To the extent that the implications for the rural parents’ well-being were considered by either party, it was usually from a more immediate rather than a long-term perspective. The inability of some parents to support their migrant children adequately contributed to this. Some with little or no land saw the departure of their children as relieving economic strain within their household.

Interviewer: “Having your children leave home for here and there, sometimes coming back then leaving again, makes you concerned, doesn’t it?”
Father: “No, not at all. Only that they have a job and money without depending financially on us. Their living away, it is fine for us. They come home once every year or on occasion of family events.” (Case 72)

Far more common, particularly in the Northeast region, was the anticipation of the support that migrant children would be able to provide to their parents soon after the move to relieve current economic hardship. The idea that migration could help to support parents could be initiated by either the child or the parent.

“She said she didn’t like living in the countryside, but preferred living in the city. She consulted with me and told me that, if she could earn money, she would send me some. So I let her go as she wished, she was going for work, not for fun. Leaving to work, she could afford to feed herself and the family. Staying here, she had nothing to do.” (Widowed mother, Case 238)

Not all parents, however, expected meaningful material support. Several explicitly denied this, making clear that their primary consideration was that the move would benefit their child.

Interaction with migrant children, including face-to-face contact, is a valued and important source of social and emotional support for elderly parents. Since the migration of children clearly reduces opportunities for face-to-face interactions, it potentially undermines such support. However, geographical separation does not preclude maintaining contact, and periodic face-to-face contact is possible through visits. In the following section, I examine how contact between parents and migrant children is maintained, as well as the nature and frequency of visits in either direction.
Maintaining Contact While Away

Not long ago, maintaining contact, especially on a regular or frequent basis, was difficult for both rural parents and their children living in distant places in overseas. If parents urgently needed to reach migrant children, the main option was through telegrams. This required both access to a post office and knowing an address where the child could be reached. The latter could pose a serious problem if the child moved frequently or lived in temporary housing typical for those in construction work, a common occupation of migrant children abroad. Letters could be used for less urgent matters, but took several days to arrive, required literacy, and took an effort to compose. Messages could be passed by intermediaries who travelled back and forth, but this depended on chances (Knodel et al., 2000).

In the last few years, the widespread availability of mobile phones has literally revolutionized the ability of rural parents and their children living in another country to contact each other. When I conducted fieldwork, private land-line telephones were rare. Public pay telephone booths, although now common in villages, are often out of order and are only convenient for calling out but not for receiving calls (Interview data, Case 219). In contrast, mobile phones are both convenient and increasingly common. The vast majority of parents reported that they have had at least occasional and, in numerous cases, fairly frequent phone contact with migrant children through mobile phones. Quite a few had a mobile phone of their own, typically provided by a migrant child. Sometimes a co-resident child or grandchild would have a mobile phone. Even elders with no mobile phone in the household usually had access through a neighbour or nearby relative. Only in a few cases, was telephone contact reportedly reserved for urgent matters, and hence infrequent. In
addition to greatly facilitating contact for social and emotional reasons, mobile phones also serve practical purposes for both parents and children.

_Husband:_ “Only a ring. We don’t have one, but all our children do. It has become much more convenient since mobile phones are used everywhere. They were expensive before, but I’ve heard now the rate is getting smaller. In the past, we had to write them letters, which took long to reach their hands. It’s better now via phone.” (Case 219)

_Interviewer:_ “What do you do, when you want to get in touch with the migrant children abroad?”

_Husband:_ “I call them using a mobile phone. We often call each other. They call me to ask about us if I failed to contact them for too long.” (Case 219)

One circumstance that clearly served to increase the likelihood of frequent calls was the presence of the migrant child’s own children in the household. Migrant sons or daughters would call to check up on and speak to their children if the children were old enough, but at the same time they would also talk to their own parents. In some cases, the grandchildren had even been given their own telephones. Mobile phones also make it easier for migrant children to consult with each other about their parents’ well-being and health, and to coordinate visits, joint outings or provision of material support. In several interviews, the parents specifically mentioned how their children would phone each other when they were ill.
"If I get sick, I’ll call her. Then, she will phone to tell her siblings. Or when I run short of money, I also tell her. She’ll call to tell her brothers again. When I get sick, all our children know that we don’t have money, so they help us. In normal condition, we sometimes have financial trouble, so we call to tell her." (Case 45)

Visits

Visiting constitutes an important means of contact between rural parents and their migrant children, especially given the opportunity for face-to-face interaction. It is extremely rare for a parent not to see children who had moved away on at least an occasional basis, and even rarer for them to lose contact completely with children once they migrate. Although visits can go in either direction, in most cases, migrant children make return visits to their home village. In Thailand, there is a strong tradition of migrant children who are away returning to pay respects to their parents on ‘Song krang’ festival, the three-day Thai New Year celebrations in April, and many do so. Special events such as weddings and funerals can also prompt visits back to the village (Knodel et al., 2005).

Numerous factors influence how frequently migrant children visit rural households. Distance is one. Frequent visits were more common for the migrants working in Southeast Asia (e.g. Singapore), reflecting the shorter distances involved and the relative ease of transportation from where they live and work (Khun, 2004). Another is the presence of grandchildren who were sons or daughters of the migrant child, especially migrant daughters, in the household. Regular and frequent visits were often associated with visiting a child in the care of the rural grandparents. In contrast, migrant children who were raising their family in the new location were less likely to visit parents. A number of parents accept
this as being understandable – compared with unmarried migrants, those who were married were more firmly rooted in their own new community.

The type of work could also influence the children’s ability to visit. Self-employed migrants are better able to take time off than regular employees. Parents often cited the inability of a child to leave their work as a reason why a child did not visit often. In some cases this may have been more a rationalisation to excuse a negligent child, but in others it was likely to be a genuine consideration.

“*It is not easy for him to come. His work doesn’t allow him for long leave. He can’t be absent more than the permitted amount. At the time his father died, he came to him as he was hospitalised, but had to return while his father was still suffering.*”

*(Widowed mother, Case 62)*

Financial considerations could influence the ability to take time off work and to afford a trip back home, especially since many migrant children feel a sense of obligation to provide at least some extra money or gifts to their parents on the occasion. In a few cases, strained relationships between parents or co-resident siblings and a migrant child kept visits infrequent. More commonly, however, the opposite was true, with siblings coming together to visit parents or getting together among themselves as well. For some parents and migrant children, being able to talk frequently on the telephone can substitute for visits or compensate for infrequent visits, especially when the child lives far away from home. This is exemplified in the following exchanges.

*Interviewer: “What about your son? Does he come here often?”*
“Not so often. He calls us regularly instead to say, ‘hello, how are you, and how about dad?’” (Case 228)

A variety of reasons prompt international migrants to visit parents in their home community. Often the emotional need to see parents and a sense of obligation to provide social support underlie visits. But these are often mixed with other motivations and circumstances, such as returning to vote or carrying out business at the district office. Perhaps most importantly, visits by children are intricately linked to the provision of material support to parents. Although money can be and often is sent to parents through the banking system or other means, a preferred pattern is to bring the money personally when it is possible, especially in regard to parents who were caring for the migrant’s own child. Visits for this purpose cannot be frequent or regular. It is just occasional.

8.2.2 Implications on Social Well-being for the Elderly

Assessing the social implications of the international migration of children on parents who have remained in the rural village, based primarily on qualitative data, necessarily requires subjective judgments. Measuring social well-being is less straightforward than economic well-being. In spite of this, the interviews provide a basis for some relevant general observations on this.

Indicators of parents’ social well-being are less observable than those for material well-being. I focused on maintaining contact and visiting as key aspects of social support. Some parents had conflicted feelings about their children living away. While they would like to
have them nearby for company, they also understood that their children gained greater opportunities for earning by migrating. Also, the social impact created by the absence of those who had left was moderated by the fact that most parents still had at least one child co-residing or living nearby.

Clearly, recent technological changes in communications and improvements in transportation have attenuated the negative impacts of migration on social support; the advent of relatively inexpensive mobile phones in particular has made contact between migrant children and their rural parents far easier than just a few years ago. Telephone contact is now pervasive. The ability to contact each other at short notice helps allay the concerns of both parents and migrant children about marshalling each other’s help in a time of crisis, particularly when a parent falls ill. More generally, telephone contact can provide an important source of emotional support, as a parent whose children had all moved away clearly recognised:

“Although our children are far away from us now, we don’t feel such distances. Thanks for constant contact by telephone. This really makes us feel as though they were near us. Telephone technology nowadays is quite advanced.” (Case 34)

Better means of transportation and a constantly improving airport system also facilitate visits between parents and their migrant children. Although systematic evidence to document change is impossible, I suspect that visiting increased in research sites, given the level of improvement of airport and long-haul flights travel recently. Now the analysis shifts to the well-being of the children, another family members usually being left.
8.3 WELL-BEING OF THE CHILDREN

8.3.1 Care and Family Relationship

“When my kids are seeking support or advice, I am the one available for them. It appears now I am both the mother and father.” (42-year-old father, Case 91)

The absence of parents has a significant effect on family life, especially for children. The absence of parental care may represent a major deprivation, due to lack of supervision, support, encouragement and role models. Children whose parents are absent due to migration may have limited roles in their communities, and this can affect their development, socialisation, and family relationships.

The new configuration of the family entails changes in duties and tasks for the family members left-behind (UNICEF, 2008). In the majority of Thai families, like other Asian societies, mothers take care of the family and perform tasks such as cooking, cleaning, taking children to health facilities, helping them with their homework and supervising them during their leisure time. The traditional role for the father is earning money, although many roles are shared by fathers and mothers (Bryant, 2005).

The data for this study found that the departure of one or both parents leads inevitably to the rearrangement of gender roles and entails redistribution of responsibilities in household works. The nature and extent of these changes depends on the parent who has migrated: when the father is the migrant parent, 64 percent of mothers continue playing their
traditional role of direct care-giver. When mothers migrate, only 46 percent of fathers take on the role of direct care-giver and perform all the duties previously carried out by mothers.

We can guess from this data that fathers may receive support from other female family members - in fact, in mother-migrant families, care-giving has tended to fall more on other family members (grandparents) than on the fathers. The role of other female family members was also evident in families where both parents worked abroad – children were most often left in the care of grandmother or mature female siblings, and in any case, the only areas where fathers were more prominent than other female relatives are the discipline of children, helping the children with school work, and teaching the children about good manners.

Children often have difficulty adapting to the new family configuration and the new division of responsibilities. According to the fieldwork data, children left-behind by one or both parents take on more responsibilities in their households, and this sometimes ends up in an overwhelming load of duties. In rural Thailand in particular, the children of migrants are often involved in their family’s agricultural activities. Children interviewed in the survey asserted that their new responsibilities did not allow them time for play, and in some cases, this affected their peer relationships.

“My sister and I now do everything that our mother was doing when she was at home, and our father works in the farm.” (16-year-old female, Case 107)

“I take care of the buffaloes, and my brother do the dishes and wash the clothes, which mother used to do when she was at home” (11-year-old boy, Case 269)
The majority of local leaders (village heads) interviewed for the qualitative data collection mentioned repeatedly that it is much better for children to live with their parents.\textsuperscript{18}

Long absence also creates tensions with care-givers and can result in family (or marital) breakdown. In very few cases, a relationship between husband and wife is clearly compromised or undermined by one partner working abroad.

\textit{“I have heard that my husband has another woman in abroad. But I don’t mind as long as he sends the money home.”} (47-year-old wife of male migrant, Case 8)

The family relationship as a domain of well-being in some households is very much a secondary one. Some respondents to the qualitative interview reported that divorce is a direct and frequent consequence of going to work abroad, however in deed, marital breakdown often preceded working abroad due to financial hardship – doubtless reflecting the vulnerability of peasant farming under the uncertainties of market conditions and climate.

Despite the extended family system, some children left-behind receive little physical or emotional nurturing from their care-givers. In some cases, children experience a sense of abandonment. Some children interviewed felt that grandparents or other relatives are not the best care-givers, particularly if they are in their teens. A few children are stressed-out too much and exposed to drug abuse, but this is a very rare case.

\textsuperscript{18} Many of households without migrants disagreed with the statement that it is more important to provide financial support than to live with their children while this opinion is only minor of the families with migrant households.
Since the child-care roles of parents vary according to their gender and the child’s age, it was important to explore the links between the sex of the migrant parent and the impact of their absence on children. The household surveys found that the sense of abandonment is exacerbated when the mother is the migrant: in 14 percent of families with a migrant mother, the children's perception is that nobody is taking care of them, while only 3 percent feel this way in families with the father abroad. The following table shows about the parents’ absence and its effect on boys and girls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8-1 Parents’ Absence and Its Effect</th>
<th>Mother Left</th>
<th>Father Left</th>
<th>Both Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra work at home</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>HA</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with remaining parent</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The migration departure of parent(s) not only affects the daily life of children but also their relationship with the remaining parent. A few cases of abandonment were reported, but the magnitude of this issue was not adequately determined. This phenomenon seems to happen sometimes when mothers migrate – the father finds a new partner and leaves his children.

When they need help, children left behind appeal to different people depending on their age and the issue. Children over middle school of age (56 percent) prefer their friends, colleagues or elder sisters and brothers rather than adults. Younger children (94 percent) appeal more to the people who are caring for them.

Children with both parents absent rely heavily on their friends (74 percent). Girls left behind living with their fathers encounter more difficulties than boys as they cannot talk
with their fathers about problems related to their physical maturation. They have to seek support from other females living with them, or usually friends and close relatives.

8.3.2 Perceptions of the Respondents and Children on the Parents’ Migration

After the departure of one or both parents, children have to adjust to new roles, adapt and reorganise their lives and their relationship with the parent left-behind and with their peers. The nature and magnitude of these changes depend on the age of the children and the length of the separation, but also on the new configuration of the family as described earlier.

Information gathered from household surveys provides a mixed picture. Overall, children tend to have an optimistic view about the migration of their parents according to the perceptions of the adult respondents. In general, they perceive their own well-being as improving: better housing; financial support for education; good clothes and food, etc. Respondents surveyed considered that the relationships with the parents working abroad and their children were good. Only 6 percent felt these relationships had deteriorated to a
certain extent while 58 percent thought that the relationships were the same as before and 6 percent thought that the relationships had improved slightly or significantly (Figure 8-1).

Despite these positive perceptions from the adult respondents, some children – especially those whose parents have been working abroad for more than 5 years – stated that their parents left them too early and should have waited until they had grown up a little, and they are worried about their future and mentioned that they might face problems such as difficult relationships with their parents and difficulties in ensuring both personal and family well-being. As I mentioned earlier (see p.96 in chapter 4), these responses showed that the well-being of the children as perceived and articulated by the adult family members is differently interpreted from the children’s own views, and the realities of actual situations are sometimes even more distorted by the guardians with their own perceptions. It is suggested that the qualitative data should be interpreted carefully and dealt with more cautions to make arguments about the well-being of the families left-behind in migration literature.

8.3.3 Children’s Education and School Performance

In Thailand, education has always been considered as a “value sphere” and as a result, it has continuously been given high priority by the state and households (NSO, 2004). Despite this strong interest, very little research has been done to empirically evaluate the effects of migration on educational outcomes in rural Thailand.
In exploring the question as to whether migration and remittances are increasing children’s educational attainment, the household survey found that the impact of remittances on education (school registration) is very positive, but the qualitative interviews reveal that impact of remittances on educational performances is rather modest or not known. However, it should be noted that this opinion is not supported by any quantitative test of children’s educational performance. The worst cases are when the migrant is the mother of children because mothers usually help their children with their homework.

“I have a hard time at school. I used to study well but since mother left, there was no one to help me check my assignments. My grades started to drop and I didn’t have much interest in studies now.” (14-year-old boy, Case 224)

In the case of children with both parents abroad, most of care-givers mentioned having problems explaining school materials to children left-behind. Many grandparents cannot read the textbooks and are not able to help their grandchildren with their homework as well, even in the primary grades. However, no cases were reported that the grandparents are neglecting their grandchildren, and the statement above cannot be an indicator for any accurate estimation of the magnitude of this issue.

The effect of remittances on educational performance is difficult to assess, but according to the survey data (see Appendix A: the usages of remittances), more than 68 percent of the households spent their remittances for children’s education. The opinions of families with and without migrants also showed that the children of migrants would have more chances for higher education.
“Children left-behind who receive money from their parent(s) working abroad have better chances to continue their education than other children.” (38-year-old mother without migrants in household)

Interestingly, an analysis by Francesco Manaresi of the Faculty of Economics, University of Florence in 2005-2006 using a specific theoretical framework to process data from the household Budget Survey found that only one group of children is positively affected by parental migration, i.e., female children living in urban settings whose father is a migrant. According to this analysis, children left-behind by migrant fathers in rural areas experienced an increase in school absence irrespectively of their gender. On the other hand, the effect of maternal migration on children left-behind is an increase in school absenteeism in urban areas, while children left-behind by their mothers in rural areas do not report any effect at all.

Nevertheless, these results should be treated with caution, since they may be caused by several different factors. For example, the fact that children left-behind by migrant mothers are relatively older than those left-behind by their fathers and hence they are absent from school more often.

8.3.4 Children’s Health

Evidence from the international migration literature shows that migration can affect the health of those left-behind children both positively and negatively (IOM, 2007; UNICEF, 2008): with additional money coming from remittances, the migrants’ households have
easier access to health services, can buy expensive medicines (83 percent) and eat more food (89 percent, see Appendix A). However, the survey data also shows that the absence of migrating parents may negatively affect children’s health: children do not receive needed care and in some cases (less than 2 percent), they were exposed to drug abuse and got emotional disruptions such as stress, loneliness and abandonment, etc. Hence the survey tried to determine if changing individuals’ and communities’ resources by migration and remittances had also affected the health of children left-behind in rural Thailand.

However, due to the multi-dimensional relationship between migration and health and lack of information, the study is not able to determine to what extent migration and remittances affect children’s health status. In addition, while it is not possible to assess this impact, a few cases from household survey reported that high levels of out-migration of highly skilled labour such as a doctor deprive the essential personnel from communities and have reduced access to essential services such as health care.

It is the common belief that the absence of parents somewhat affects children’s physical and psychological health. According to the UNFPA (2002), 87 percent of children who live with both parents are physically healthier compared to 69 percent of children in households with migrant parent(s). However, it is also possible that the better economic status of migrant families has contributed to the better health outcomes.
8.4 CONCLUSION

For the elderly in Northeast Thailand, contrary to claims embodied in much of the discourse about the rural elderly in the developing world, extensive rural to international migration of family members has not led to the widespread desertion of ‘left-behind’ elderly parents. Rather the relationships between rural parents and their geographically dispersed children have changed in ways consistent with the ‘modified extended family’ perspective common in discussions regarding elderly parents in developed countries. This is undoubtedly the most significant implication of the study, and provides a very different theoretical perspective with which to view the impact of migration, and indeed social change more generally, than the more common modernisation framework that underlies most of the assertions of declining elderly well-being in the third world (Aboderin, 2004).

Although the rural Thai context differs in numerous respects from that of other Western societies, many similar forces shape family life in an increasingly globalised world. The research suggests intriguing parallels in how families adapt to these changes. In particular, extended family ties, especially relationships between migrant children and their parents, do not simply dissolve because of geographical dispersal. Greater spatial separation precludes neither financial assistance to members elsewhere, nor the maintenance of emotional ties and social exchange. In particular, contact is facilitated by the telephone and better transportation facilities. This characterises the situation of many of the parents I interviewed. Recent research on elderly men in Mexico comes to a similar conclusion (De Vos et al., 2004). While there are deserted elderly parents in Northeast Thailand who have been ‘left-behind’ by children abroad, they are exceptional. Most rural-based parents and
their migrant children are adapting to the increasing need to live apart in ways that maintain family relationships and provide each other with support.

In general, the findings are also consistent with much of the academic literature on rural to international migration in developing countries that sees benefits to both migrants and household members who remain behind in rural areas. However, two important cautions to this conclusion seem appropriate. Firstly, the full impact of migration on rural parents can only be known by the end of the parents’ lifetime. Particular interests are the adaptations during the final stages of life when health conditions may require daily personal assistance. The research design does not permit this kind of assessment. A second caution is that the rapid transition to low fertility several decades ago would pose new challenges to maintaining a ‘modified extended family’ for the next generation of elderly parents and their migrant children. While past high fertility and improved mortality ensured that current Thai elders have relatively large numbers of living children, future cohorts entering the elderly age group will have substantially fewer. According to the Survey of Elderly in Thailand, 44 percent of persons aged 50–54 in 2002 have only two or fewer children. Moreover, when younger cohorts reach older ages, the large majority will have only two surviving children. Thus the current situation, in which some siblings remain with their rural elderly parents and others migrate, will become increasingly difficult to maintain. This could substantially change the implications of international migration for the well-being of the parents left-behind.

For the children, based on survey and interviews, the research found that parental absence creates disruptions and changes in care-giving arrangements. The departure of one or both parents somewhat leaves an emotional mark on the children left-behind. The children are
affected more when mothers are away, but the study also suggests that the children are attended by the extended family – fathers, grandparents, and other relatives – while mothers are away. Despite the emotional displacement in some cases, it is safe to argue that the most of children in migrant families are not disadvantaged in terms of well-being from this study. Thus, when the extended family relations are stable, it can withstand the separation imposed by international migration of their parent(s).

In terms of economic well-being, as seen in previous chapter, the children of migrants are remarkably better off compared to the children of non-migrants. This economic advantage appears to provide the children of migrants with another advantage. It is not obvious from the data analysed here to evaluate academic performance, but it is widely agreed that the children of migrants tend to have more opportunities for better and higher education.

Due to the migration of parent(s), the migrant children experience a reconfiguration of gender roles and more household chores as well as different ways of maintaining family relationship. The departure of mothers and both parents has clearly rearranged care-giving and provider roles. Thus, in migrant families, the distribution of gender roles is different from the traditional ‘stay-at-home mothers’ and ‘working fathers’ or the emerging dual-earner families – the changing roles in migrant families is evident. According to the respondents, family relationships remain close in spite of physical distance in migrant families, but there have been also problems of marital breakdown in some cases of migrant family. In terms of health measures, it is not possible to draw meaningful conclusion at this stage, but data from other survey indicates that in general terms, the children with both parents in households are seems to manage well.
This chapter has established that there are some well-being effects recorded by respondents but that an overall adverse pattern is hard to establish. This suggests that the economic gains reported in the preceding chapters, alongside the income and well-being effects, are not particularly offset by emotional or psychological adverse affects. But more research is needed in this area.
9 Conclusion

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study has been to extend our knowledge concerning international labour migration with particular focus on its consequences for the rural households and families left-behind by migrants in Northeast Thailand. The consequences that we have focussed on were designed to give a multivariate, micro level analysis of the poverty changes within households, along the income and well-being dimensions. Analyses of both primary data obtained from fieldwork and some secondary data have been undertaken to meet the objective. In this conclusion chapter, I will briefly summarise the findings of the four previous chapters in section below. Then, on the following sections, the limitations of this study and the direction for future research based on the experience of the present study will be suggested. Finally, concluding remarks of the research will be added at the end of the chapter.

9.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The main objective of this study was to deepen our understanding of the impacts of international labour migration and remittances on the households of origin in the rural Thai contexts in terms of their poverty and well-being. In doing this, a number of specific research questions guiding the whole research process were as follows;
Chapter 5:

- What are the main characteristics of international labour migration from Northeast Thailand?

Chapter 6:

- What patterns are examined in money transfer between migrants and households, and how are these patterns related to theoretical approaches on remittances behaviour?
- Is there any difference in remittances behaviour between male and female migrants, and if so, what drives them to behave differently in relation to different well-being effects?

Chapter 7:

- How much do the remittances sent by migrants boost household economic well-being?
- Is there a significant effect on poverty and inequality between households with and without migrants due to remittances?

Chapter 8:

- Are there any other (both in positive and negative) impacts on family members left-behind besides material well-being caused by out-migration?
- What are the socio-cultural changes in households that take place as a result of international labour migration?
9.2.1 Labour Migration from Northeast Thailand

In chapter 5, the findings showed that family-tied migration was generally better characterised by women and their ties with origin households are likely to be retained closely after the move. On the contrary, the economic considerations appeared to be stronger in encouraging men to leave the household of origin, with the exception for the destinations to the Middle East, where the importance of economic incentives in the decision to migrate was dominant for both men and women. This suggests that important economic roles have been becoming more dominant in the decision making model used by females when planning to migrate than was previously the case, an observation which has also be noted in other literature.

The analysis also showed that households having out-migrants were more concentrated in the lowest-income group than those not having out-migrants, suggesting that poor economic conditions of households might have been a catalyst for the migration of its members. The other economic characteristics of households examined in chapter 5 indicated that although the households having out-migrants tend to have a lower income than households not having out-migrants, the former were generally better off than the latter in terms of ownership of house and land holding.

In chapter 5, the study found two important features in the survey villages on migration. The data were substantial enough to suggest that these particular communities may well have developed an institutionalised and self-sustaining migration culture, and because of this development process, it has had a demonstration and emulation effect throughout the
communities in consumption aspirations. The wider community accepts that the material benefits of working abroad outweigh any associated social costs easily.

9.2.2 Remittances Behaviour by Gender

In chapter 6, the findings were more supportive for the contractual approach among migrants from rural Northeast Thailand when the two theories – the altruistic model and the contractual model – were compared using proxy measures. In considering of altruistic or contractual theories of remittances. However, migrants from this region were heterogeneous in their money transferring to their households, with some following altruistic and some following contractual patterns of behaviours. Interestingly, but expectedly, women behaved in more altruistic ways than men did. This pattern was consistent with theoretical expectations based on Buddhist norms in (rural) Thai society indicating that women acquire religious merit for their families through material support. However, the results presented in chapter 6 showed that women are much less likely than men to remit when they marry and that they respond more strongly than do men to the dependents in their home households. This altruistic pattern could be the result of hidden exchange behavior within the households. In this case, female migrants exchange money for the lack of social sanctions during or after migration but no longer need to do so after marriage. Regarding on the inheritance of land for migrant’s future well-being, men do not respond more strongly to the land available for inheritance, so remittance behaviour was not significant to the inheritance culture, and all migrants were relatively equal participants for sending money home.
9.2.3 Remittances and Economic Well-being

In chapter 7, I examined the impact of remittances on economic well-being of rural households in Thailand. The data presented in this chapter showed that remittances were rational economic strategies of poor and lower-middle income households, and had poverty reduction effects – the computation results indicate that migrant remittances decreased the head count of poverty for the recipients, and remittances also helped to decrease the poverty gap index and the poverty-severity index for the recipients, albeit at the very small magnitude – and improvement of well-being. The analysis revealed clearly that the entire income gap and most of the gap in well-being between households with and without overseas workers could be accounted for by the availability of remittances. This is conclusive proof of the importance of remittances to poverty reduction and wellbeing in these areas, and overall suggests that the theoretical consensus in the development and migration literature around the positive effects of migration is substantiated in this case study. Adverse affects reported in the migration and development literature – around inequality, pricing, inflation, social affects – seem to be in evidence to a small degree, but the households and community have demonstrable coping and mitigation strategies for these.

For example The findings of this chapter, however, revealed that remittances from overseas also increased economic inequality slightly, by Gini coefficient measurement, between households with and without overseas workers at the same time. Notwithstanding, the significant impact on labour migration on both well-being and economic inequality among households in rural Thailand, their intended and unintended implications for the society are yet to be systematically studied due to the lack of appropriate data. Such affects could also
grow in the future, but at present a pattern of inclusive, pro-poor migration-led growth seems to be the overriding result of cross border movement in the study area.

9.2.4 Labour Migration and Non-economic Well-being

In chapter 8, the modified extended family perspective had been found from the research, and it suggested that extended family ties, especially relationships between migrant children and their parents, did not simply dissolve because of geographical dispersal, so social well-being did not decrease much. Greater spatial separation precluded neither financial assistance to members elsewhere, nor the maintenance of emotional ties and social exchange. In particular, contact was facilitated by the telephone and better transportation facilities. This characterised the situation of many of the elderly in rural Northeast Thailand.

For the children’s side, the research found that parental absence created disruptions and changes in care-giving arrangements. The departure of one or both parents somewhat left an emotional mark on the children left-behind to a certain extent. The children were affected more when mothers were away, but the study also suggested that the children were generally successfully attended by the extended family – fathers, grandparents, and other relatives – while mothers were away. Despite the emotional displacement in some cases, it is safe to argue that most of the children in migrant families were not disadvantaged in terms of well-being from this study. Thus, when the family relations were stable, it could withstand the separation imposed by the international migration of their parents, and the economic advantage from remittances somewhat cushioned negative impacts and allowed
for increased school enrollment. However, children had to experience a reconfiguration of
gender roles and more household chores as well as different ways of maintaining family
relationship while their parents were away from home.

9.2.5 The Process of Labour Migration

From the results presented in the preceding section, I can draw some general ideas about
the process of migration. Labour migration is a process through which households diversify
income sources, and remittances are the evidence of the positive outcome of the spatial
diversification of rural households. As described by the new economics of labour migration,
households react to deficiencies in their wealth, including both productive and non-
productive assets, and to constraints in their environment. To finance the purchase of assets
or goods ranging from land to televisions, individual members of households move to
destinations in which they can earn more money. Neoclassical economic models appear
more appropriate for understanding the destination choice. For female migrants, household
ties to destinations are important in perpetuating migration as described in transnational
migration theory.

International labour migration plays a significant role in the household well-being and
poverty reduction of this particular region, but it probably influences the whole social and
economic fabric of the rural communities in Thailand which migrants leave. With
increasing improvement in transportation and communication and further globalisation
tendencies, international labour migration will continue to increase in scale and rural
population both men and women, will continue to cross borders despite the significant
structural changes occurring in rural societies. This is not only because of the economic difficulties and marginalisation being experienced by the region, but also the fact that Thailand’s workforce still has low average levels of education which makes difficult the transition from agricultural to industrial society. It is also because of the built-in momentum of strong social networks, active recruitment systems and normative structures which have created a “culture of migration” in the study area. Individual labour migration is not always resulting in benefits to the participants and their families left-behind, and it is imperative that we learn more of why and in what circumstances this occurs, so that the undoubted benefits of it can be maximised, any further negative effects be suitably ameliorated.

9.3 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Above all, the number of family members interviewed was not large enough. Moreover, the number of respondents in the household survey was also not sufficient. More participation from them is thought to have added more reliability and representativeness on the implications of this thesis. Secondly, as it was family members themselves that answered the question of migration impacts in the survey and interviews, it may, to some extent, be either more exaggerated or depreciated than the reality. Triangulation with the migrants themselves would have enhanced the results through verification and cross referencing of reported accounts. Also the research design was not able to factor in any adverse effects suffered by the migrants themselves.
9.4 THE DIRECTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The present study has been able to only provide a limited glimpse of the impacts of international labour migration and remittances in rural Northeast Thailand. To understand migration in rural Thailand, especially Udon Thani where international migration has been occurring for decades, it is crucial to establish how the economic, social and cultural contexts influence the way in which migration impacts on the households, family members, and communities. In order to truly appreciate the nature and significance of the impact of international labour migration, it is clear that more empirical work and longitudinal data are required. A first step towards an informed social dialogue would be the collection and dissemination of more statistics and information. Little is known about the number of Thai nationals departing for long-term or permanent residence in other countries, or their demographic, social and economic characteristics. This information would need to be compiled from sources in each of the destination countries such as censuses, surveys, immigration statistics and social research. No systematic attempt has been made to compile or analyse such information. This is an urgent priority for the country where policy relating to international labour migration is largely developed in an empirical vacuum.

Notwithstanding a growth in the body of knowledge on international migration in Thailand, evidence for action remains scarce. As noted above, there is a lack of reliable and comparable data for the various migrant groups, and research is often piecemeal because of time and budget constraints. Thais abroad have to rely heavily on official statistics that are at times poorly collected and tend to exclude the majority of migrants who are irregular. In this context, to improve the availability, comparability, and quality of information, a multi-
layered approach is required that combines complementary capacity-building strategies and attention to a wide range of topics in the field of international labour migration. Among the many possible interventions directed at strengthening institutional capacity in collection and analysis of data on international migration in Thailand the following are proposed.

1. **Build independent think-tanks to systematically study and analyse migration trends from Thailand**: Possible models are the Scalabrini Migration Center in the Philippines or the Migration Policy Group in Europe. Existing research institutes with an interest in migration could be strengthened to develop in this direction, or new ones created for this purpose (Coauette et al., 2006). To ensure their relevance, structures should be devised for the think-tanks to disseminate the findings to the public and feed them into the policy-making process.

2. **Devise strategies to integrate monitoring of migration trends into other existing information systems, in order to capture both regular and irregular migrants**: Efforts supported by the World Bank to redefine the sampling frame and add a new set of questions in the Population and Housing Census could be intensified, and expanded to other national surveys, such as the Household Socio-Economic Survey, the Agriculture Survey, and the Labour Force Survey (World Bank, 2006). To improve the data sets, methodologies and tools will have to be developed to more clearly define different migrant groups so as to distinguish internal variations and differentiate them. Disaggregation of data by ethnicity, in addition to gender, is strongly recommended to allow greater understanding of specific vulnerabilities.
Increased capacity in data collection and analysis can, in turn, allow for a diversification of research modalities and a broadening of research questions that would be beneficial to fill some of the knowledge gaps. To achieve this goal, the following research approaches and topics are identified as potential fields of inquiry.

3. **Promote cross-country collaborative efforts to study international migration so as to better capture its transnational character and learn more about its regional and global determinants:** Translation of existing studies, sharing of information and best practices across countries, and joint research projects would greatly enhance existing understanding of migration systems. For instance, in this report, literature produced in destination countries of Thai migrants has proven indispensable in portraying outgoing flows, completing, and at times showing the flaws in information produced in Thailand. Emerging research networks such as the Mekong Migration Network (MMN) and the Development Analysis Network (DAN) deserve support in their efforts to overcome language and conceptual barriers in conducting joint research of a regional scope. The last comprehensive reviews are outdated having been published at the turn of this decade (Chantavanich et al., 2000; Chantavanich et al., 2001).

4. **Strengthen policy research to assess existing policies and regulatory mechanisms and propose improvements and/or alternative approaches:** In particular, contract labour agreements in Thailand and in Southeast Asia need careful examination, considering that the Thai Government and other Governments in the region see it as the main, if not only, policy approach to migration. Assumptions that lied at the core of the current policy direction for contract
migration, such as that a more flexible treatment may foster larger immigration flows (see World Bank, 2006:67). When assessing these assumptions it will be important to learn from the experiences of Thai migrants in countries that have implemented similar policies for longer periods of time, like Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Israel. Another area of policy study centres on decentralisation and the role of provincial governments in managing migration and servicing migrants, including the controversial issuing of provincial decrees. More studies also need to be made on future scenarios to help the Thai Government better prepare for changes in inward and outward flows. In all these cases, mechanisms also need to be devised to ensure the effective transfer of knowledge to policy-makers.

5. Devote attention to the forming of transnational communities and families:

This study area, which is receiving increasing attention globally, is relatively underdeveloped in Thailand. More research needs to be conducted on the processes by which identities and family and community structures, in both countries of origin and destination, are changed as a consequence of migration and transnational linkages. Issues of family formation and reunion, migrant children, and financial and social remittances are among those deserving attention. Of pressing importance is the impact of migration on citizenship entitlement as migrant children may end up stateless with serious implications for their future. Mixed marriages and their multiple economic and socio-cultural implications also deserve attention in view of their growing number.

6. Examine the roles of employers and private recruitment agencies: These very important actors in international migration seem missing from the research agenda.
In view of the increasing reliance on private recruitment agencies and their associates, more ought to be known about their practices, the economics of their involvement, and their role in stimulating and managing migration. Issues of fraud and exploitation in the recruitment process deserve attention, as too often the focus is on individual brokers rather than on institutional patterns. Likewise, more research is needed on employers’ involvement in the migration process.

7. **Promote theoretical studies that, although rooted in the context of Thailand, are of a global relevance:** Information from the Thailand case could contribute to the global discussion in at least three key areas under debate. The first relates to migration-by-means-of-marriage and the discussions on women as agents or victims, and on the blurring of sentimental, sexual and economic needs in the context of a growing global tourism industry and aging in richer societies. The second area relates to the degree to which labour exploitation overlaps with trafficking and the many ways such a lack of conceptual distinction affects the policy discourse and the position of migrants. And the third area centres on the mixing of economic and political push factors for inhabitants of countries that are politically and economically devastated, such as Myanmar, raising important questions on whether a migrant who ostensibly escapes famine or forced displacement is less in need of international protection than an asylum seeker and/or refugee who flees conflict.
9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The contents of international labour migration provided in this thesis indicate the complexity of outward flows centred on Thailand and the societal challenges they pose. In a regional context of rapid socio-economic change, Thailand is still struggling to find the right balance on social and economic concerns. There are migration issues Thailand faces that need to be understood and addressed, if international labour migration is to contribute to development as well as to migrant’s household well-being.

The importance of labour migration is clear, and the role that remittances play for rural sending communities will likely continue to grow. What we know now is that migrant households in rural Northeast Thailand depend on remittances to secure their livelihoods. Typically, remittances serve to cover the costs of daily life that cannot be met through local activities, and can therefore lead to dependency and foster the growth of an institutionalised migration culture and syndrome. On the other hand, the remittances also had a critical impact on poverty reduction and this significance is particularly evident in the research area.

I have tried to show that remittance practices cannot be viewed through a single lens that emphasises only dependency or only development. Rather, by understanding the history of migration of a certain community, the stages of migrant households, and the socio-cultural aspects that characterise migrant households, we might begin to qualify what is dependent in a given situation and how that situation may lead to development and growth over time. What is clear is that, we should not mistake the success of migrants as a sign that everything is fine. Rather, we need to remember the dismal context that many rural migrant’s households find themselves in today.
By exploring labour migration and remittance practices as a part of household strategy – not by using one-dimensional models, but by using mixed-methods approach – we begin to move beyond the limits of dependency and developmental frameworks. This small piece of work could be the sign of methodological change in development studies, and the growth of new multi-dimensional approaches that take into account economics, social anthropology, geography and history, is an indication that migration and social science researches are gradually meeting the challenge head-on.
Bibliography


Chantavich, S., 2001. *Female Labour Migration in South East Asia: Change and Continuity* (Bangkok, Asian Research Centre for Migration).


Faist T. 2004. The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces:


Lu, Y., & Treiman, D. J. 2006. The effect of labor migration and remittances on children’s education in South Africa. Paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Los Angeles.


Mora, Jorge and J. Edward Taylor. 2006. “Determinants of migration, destination, and sector choice: Disentangling individual, household, and community effects.” In Çaglar Özden and Maurice Schiff (eds.)


Osaki, K. 2002. “Migration, Remittances and Gender in the Context of Development: The Case of Thailand.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, May 9–11, Atlanta, GA.


Özden, Çaglar. 2006. “Educated migrants: Is there brain waste?” In Çaglar Özden and Maurice Schiff (eds.)


242


Wouterse, Fleur. 2006. *Survival or Accumulation: Migration and Rural Households in*
Burkina Faso. Wageningen University and Research Centre, Wageningen.


### The Usages of Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usages</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consumptive Investment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics/Gadgets</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic items (clothes, shoes)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorbike</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay off debt</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical expenses</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built/Improve a house</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Productive Investment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Income generating</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm management</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B:

MIGRATION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

Sampling Information

Village / District: 
Address: 
Serial Number: 
Name of Interviewer: 
Date:                              Time:                         Duration: 

➔ Say: Hello I am __________, and we are conducting a survey for a research project at the University of Manchester, UK. The purpose of this study is to find out how much migration and remittances affect the living standard of households in rural Thailand. It would be greatly appreciated, if you provide us some information about your household and migrant members. The answers you give will be kept confidential and you will not be identified in any of the report we plan to write. (To be eligible as a survey respondent, a person must be aged 20-65).

Section A. Demography

1. Name of household head: ____________________________
   (your name will not be identified to others and also in any of the report I write)

2. Age of household head is: ___________ years old

3. Gender of household head is: (circle one)
   1 Male
   2 Female

4. Civic status of household head is:
   1 Single
   2 Married
   3 Divorced
   4 Widowed

5. Number of persons in the household: __________

6. Number of household members aged below 15 years: ________

7. Number of household members aged above 60 years: ________

8. Number of household members with wage employment: ________

9. Number of household member in school/study/training: ________
Section B. Household Socio-Economic Status

1. In the past 2 years, where did the largest portion of household income come from? (circle one)
   1. Rice farming
   2. Cash crop
   3. Orchards
   4. Fishing
   5. Husbandry (including shrimp and fish farm)
   6. Other agriculture
   7. Salary from agricultural work
   8. Salary from other employment
   9. Own commercial business
   10. Other (please specify): ____________

2. Besides the major income source specified above, what were the other sources of income? (circle as many as apply)
   1. Rice farming
   2. Cash crop
   3. Orchards
   4. Fishing
   5. Husbandry (including shrimp and fish farm)
   6. Other agriculture
   7. Salary from agricultural work
   8. Salary from other employment
   9. Own commercial business
   10. Other (please specify): ______________

3. Currently, how much is the total monthly income of this household? (please specify)
   1. Less than 5,000 baht per month
   2. Above 5,000 baht and below 10,000 baht per month
   3. Above 10,000 baht and below 20,000 baht per month
   4. Above 20,000 baht and below 30,000 baht per month
   5. Above 30,000 baht and below 40,000 baht per month
   6. Above 40,000 baht and below 50,000 baht per month
   7. More than 50,000 baht per month → (please specify): ____________

4. In the past 2 years, have you made any improvements or additions to your house?
   1. Yes
   2. No → go to question 6

5. What improvements did you make?
   1. Built a new house
   2. Rebuilt walls
   3. Rebuilt roof
   4. Rebuilt floor
   5. Expanded the house
   95. Others like new bathroom, etc
6. What type of house do you live now?
   1 Single house (one floor)
   2 Townhouse (two floors)
   3 Row house (built by concrete)
   4 Row house (built by wood)
   95 Other (please specify): ______________

7. How many bedrooms are there in this house? (please specify): ______________

8. What is the ownership of the house?
   1 Owned
   2 Rented → how much of the rent? ______________ baht/month
   3 Free as part of working benefit
   4 Free of use

9. Do you possess any land with legal right? (including agricultural and non-agricultural land)
   1 Yes
   2 No → go to question 11

10. If yes, how much land belongs to this household altogether? ______________ rais

11. What kind of toilet do people in this household usually use?
    1 Flush toilet, exclusively for this household
    2 Flush toilet, share with other household
    3 Latrine, exclusively for this household
    4 Latrine, share with other household
    5 Open pit toilet
    6 No toilet

12. What is the major source of water in this household used for drinking or cooking?
    1 Rain water
    2 Piped water
    3 Well water
    4 Digging water
    5 From dam, pond, lake
    6 From canal, river
    7 Bought water

13. Does this household possess any of the following items? (circle each of Y or N)
    1 Rice cooker Y N
    2 Television Y N
    3 Refrigerator Y N
    4 Stereo Y N
    5 Electric water pump Y N
    6 Motorbike Y N
    7 Video recorder Y N
    8 DVD player Y N
    9 Mobile phone Y N
Section C. Migration Experience

1. What is your attitude towards labour migration for your spouse, either elsewhere in Thailand or abroad?
   1. It is alright for my spouse to work elsewhere in Thailand or abroad
   2. It is alright for my spouse to work in abroad only, but not elsewhere in Thailand
   3. It is alright for my spouse to work elsewhere in Thailand only, but not in abroad
   4. Never allow him/her to work outside of this village
   91. Don’t know
   95. Other (please specify):

2. Do you have any family member, either who is currently working in another place or who has returned from another city/country, in this household?
   1. Yes
   2. No → End

3. How many family members of this household are working or have worked, either in another city in Thailand or abroad, such that they sleep there most of the time?
   1. One
   2. Two
   3. More than two, (please specify): __________

4. What is respondent’s relationship to the migrant? (if this household has more than one migrant in another city/country, please select one person who is the most important to this household)
   1. Spouse
   2. Son
   3. Daughter
   4. Father
   5. Mother
   6. Nephew or Niece
   7. Cousin
   8. Uncle or Aunt
   95. Other (please specify): __________

5. The gender of migrant is:
   1. Male
   2. Female

6. The migrant’s age is: __________ years old

7. What is the highest educational background of the migrant?
   1. Completed primary school
   2. Completed secondary school
3. Completed college/university
95. Other (please specify): ________________________________

8. The migrant’s economic activity (job) in another city/country is (was): __________ ________

9. For how long has the migrant been working in another city/country?
   ____ years ____ months

10. Where does (did) the migrant live (have lived) in?
    1. Bangkok
    2. Taiwan
    3. Singapore
    4. Brunei Darussalam
    5. Hong Kong, China
    6. Malaysia
    7. Japan
    8. Korea, Republic of
    9. Other Asian country (please specify): __________
    10. Israel
    11. Middle East/Africa (please specify): __________
    12. USA/Canada
    13. Europe (please specify): __________
    95. Other (please specify): __________
    91. Don’t know

11. Does he/she have a work permit?
    1. Yes
    2. No
    91. Don’t know

12. Does the migrant come home regularly?
    1. At least once in every year
    2. During the holidays
    3. For family events
    4. Less than once a year (hardly come home)
    5. Never

13. Does the migrant plan to return home to settle?
    1. Yes, because ______________________________________
    2. No, because ______________________________________

Section D. Remittances and Transfers

1. Has the migrant sent money home over the past 2 years?
    1. Yes
    2. No  go to question 13

2. If yes, how often did the migrant send money home?
1. Every month
2. Bi-monthly
3. Quarterly
4. Twice a year
5. Every year
6. Less than once per year
7. Whenever he/she can afford to
8. Irregularly

3. For what purpose did the migrant send money home? (circle all that apply)
1. For the benefit of the household
2. For the benefit of the migrant him/herself
3. For loan repayment to the household
4. For loan repayment to a third party
95. Other (please specify): ____________

4. How did the migrant send money home?
1. Brought it in person
2. Sent it with a relative or family friend we know well
3. Sent it through another person
4. Sent it by post
5. Sent it by bank transfer
6. Sent it by Western Union
91. Don’t know
95. Other (please specify): ____________

5. Why do you think he/she used this way of getting the money to your household?
1. Because it is the cheapest
2. Because it is the safest/most secured
3. Because it is the most convenient
4. Because it is the fastest
91. Don’t know
95. Other (please specify): ____________

6. How long did it take time to arrive? (please specify): ____________ days

7. In which currency was the money received?
1. Foreign currency (eg. US Dollar)
2. Thai Baht → go to question 9

8. If you received the money in foreign exchange, did the household have to pay a fee?
1. Yes: how much per transfer? ____________
2. No

9. Any problems in receiving money?
1. Yes: please describe __________________________________________________________________
2. No
10. What was the amount of money sent home to the household last year? 
*(please specify): _____________________ Baht*

11. Has the amount sent home increased or decreased over time? 

1. Increased 
2. Decreased 
3. Same 
91. Don’t know exactly

12. Thinking about the money that you have received in the past 2 years from the migrant, what did the family members in your household use the money for? *(circle each of Y or N)*

1. Used it to buy food Y N
2. Used it to buy electronics (eg. TV, DVD player) or gadgets (eg. iPod) Y N
3. Used it to buy furniture Y N
4. Used it to buy appliances (eg. fan, rice cooker) Y N
5. Used it to buy other household items (clothes, shoes, etc) Y N
6. Used it to buy a motorcycle Y N
7. Used it to pay off debts (to the bank, local shops, money lenders) Y N
8. Lent it to my friend/relative Y N
9. Used it to pay school fees Y N
10. Used it to see a doctor/buy medicine Y N
11. Used it to pay for a family events (eg. funeral, wedding) Y N
12. Bought seeds/fertilizer Y N
13. Used it to buy/raise livestock Y N
14. Used it to buy farm machinery/tools Y N
15. Used it to buy land Y N
16. Used it to build a new house/improve the house Y N
17. Used it for gambling/lottery Y N
18. Used it to buy alcohol/cigarettes Y N
19. Used it to pay for travel Y N
95. Other *(please specify): ____________________________________________

→ go to question 14

13. If no, what was the reason that the migrant never sent money back home? *(please specify): ____________________________________________

14. Have you or your household received goods from the migrant over the past 2 years? 

1. Yes 
2. No → go to Section E

15. What was the item(s), and when did you receive it (them)? *(please specify the details of item(s) and dates, over last 2 years)* 

______________________________________________
______________________________________________
16. How did you get the last item you received?
   1  Brought by the migrant on home visit
   2  Brought by a relative or family friend
   3  Brought by another person
   4  By post
   91  Don’t know
   95  Other (please specify): ____________

17. Why do you think he/she used this way of getting the goods to your household?
   1  Because it is the cheapest
   2  Because it is the safest/most secured
   3  Because it is the most convenient
   4  Because it is the fastest
   91  Don’t know
   95  Other (please specify): ____________

18. Were the goods requested for by the household?
   1  Yes
   2  No

19. Were the goods necessities that you would not otherwise have had/bought?
   1  Yes
   2  No
   91  Don’t know/Ambiguous

20. Were the goods additional things that you could have lived without?
   1  Yes
   2  No
   91  Don’t know/Ambiguous

21. If you could order an item which would make your life better, what would it be?
(please specify the item and the price ranges):

22. What was the total value of goods sent home to the household last year?
(please specify): _________________ baht

Section E. Migration Decision-making and Financing

1. What were the major reasons that he/she decided to move to another city/country to work?
2. Did any of the followings play a part in his/her decision to move? (circle all that apply)
   1. Have been there before
   2. Have a family/relative there
   3. Have a friend there
   4. Found a job through a recruitment agency/broker
   5. Found a job through the media/internet
   6. Found a job through government organizations
   95. Other (please specify): ____________

3. Who was responsible for the decision-making of his/her move?
   1. On his/her own
   2. Spouse
   3. Parents
   4. Siblings
   5. In-laws
   6. Relatives/friends/acquaintances
   7. Broker
   8. Employer
   95. Other (please specify): ____________

4. Did he/she really want to move?
   1. Yes, because ____________________________________________________________
   2. No, but he/she did, because ______________________________________________

5. Did the household contribute to the travel costs and other expenses?
   1. Yes  \(\rightarrow\) go to Section F
   2. No

6. If no, where did he/she get the money from?
   1. From his/her personal savings
   2. Given by relative or close friend
   3. Given by another person
   4. Borrowed from relative or close friend
   5. Borrowed from another person
   6. Borrowed from a money lender
   7. Borrowed from a bank/Cooperative
   8. Sold land
   95. Other (please specify): ____________

Section F. Impacts and Policy Issues

1. Do you think the absence of parents has a significant effect on children? (please provide the sex of children and effect details in 3 scales – affected, highly affected and not affected)

   ____________________________________________________________

2. Are there any changes in the livelihood of the children because of the money sent h
ome? (please provide the details)

* Apart from “yes” or “no”, please write down how the respondent describes the impact of the remittances on children. For example: 1) the children live in a better house and can attend primary school, 2) we have money to feed our children when needed, etc.

3. Did any of children in your household have ever experienced following impacts as a result of migration? (circle all that applies)
   1. Extra house chores
   2. Problems with remaining parent (e.g., mother)
   3. Problems with friends/peers
   4. Lack of cares
   5. Never experienced
   91. Don’t know
   95. Other (please specify):

4. Did any of children in your household have ever experienced following consequences due to the absence of parents or either of them? (circle all that applies)
   1. Worse performance at school or lower school attendance
   2. HIV/AIDS infection
   3. Drug use and addiction
   4. Emotional disruption such as stress, loneliness, and abandonment, etc
   5. Never experienced
   91. Don’t know
   95. Other (please specify):

5. Who is the most vulnerable among the ‘left-behind’ in this household from the migration and who is the major care-giver for children?

* This may be the elderly (for instance, the elderly are often saddled with looking after their grandchildren), the household as a whole (for instance, migrant never returned and didn’t send money home to live), the children of the household (for instance, emotional and education problem). Please indicate the gender of the principal vulnerable.

6. Do you think that you will move from this village to another city of Thailand or other country to work or for another reason in near future?
   1. Yes
   2. No ➔ go to question 10
   3. Never thought about it ➔ go to question 11

7. If yes, why do you plan to move away from this village? (please specify the reason):

8. Do you know anyone who lives in the place that you plan to move?
   1. Yes
   2. No
9. If your family really wants you to stay here, would you?
   1. Yes
   2. No

10. If your family really wants you to move to another place, would you?
    1. Yes
    2. No

11. Have you ever heard about illegal migrant workers from other countries to Thailand?
    1. Yes
    2. No → End

12. Do you think these migrants take jobs from the Thai worker?
    1. Yes
    2. No

13. Do you think these migrants take jobs from you?
    1. Yes
    2. No

Thank you very much for your time.
Appendix C:

แบบสอบถามเพื่อสำรวจการย้ายที่ทำงาน
(MIGRATION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES – THAI VERSION)

ข้อมูลของกลุ่มตัวอย่าง

ชื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์:

วันที่:

เวลา:

ระยะเวลาในการสัมภาษณ์:

เกริ่นน้ํา: สวัสดี ดิฉันชื่อ ...............................

ชื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์:

ชื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์จะไม่ถูกเปิดเผยให้กับคนอื่นและไม่ถูกระบุในรายงานใดๆที่ข้าพเจ้าจะเขียนทั้งสิ้น

1. อายุของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ _______ ปี

2. เพศของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ (กรุณาลงหนึ่งตัวเลือก)
   1. ชาย
   2. หญิง

3. สถานภาพในการสมรส
   1. โสด
   2. แต่งงานแล้ว
   3. หย่า
   4. หม้าย

4. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือน
   1. ไลด
   2. ต่างงานแล้ว
   3. หาย
   4. ไม่รู้

5. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือน _______ คน

6. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่มีอายุต่ำกว่า 15 ปี _______ คน

7. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่มีอายุมากกว่า 60 ปี __________ คน

8. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่มีรายได้จากการจ้างงาน _______ คน

ส่วนที่ A ประชากร

1. ชื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ ________________ (ชื่อของท่านจะไม่ถูกเปิดเผยให้กับคนอื่นและไม่ถูกระบุในรายงานใดๆที่ข้าพเจ้าจะเขียนทั้งสิ้น)

2. อายุของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ _______ ปี

3. เพศของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ (กรุณาลงหนึ่งตัวเลือก)
   1. ชาย
   2. หญิง

4. สถานภาพในการสมรส
   1. โสด
   2. แต่งงานแล้ว
   3. หย่า
   4. หม้าย

5. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือน _______ คน

6. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่มีอายุต่ำกว่า 15 ปี _______ คน

7. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่มีอายุมากกว่า 60 ปี __________ คน

8. จำนวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่มีรายได้จากการจ้างงาน _______ คน

261
9. จ้านวนสมาชิกในครัวเรือนที่กำลังเรียนอยู่ ______ คน

ส่วนที่ B สถานภาพทางสังคมและเศรษฐกิจของครัวเรือน

1. ในช่วง 2 ปีที่ผ่านมา รายได้หลักของครอบครัวมาจากอะไร (วงกลมเพียงหนึ่งข้อ)
   การปลูกข้าว
   การปลูกพืชเศรษฐกิจ
   การทำสวนผลไม้
   การทำประมง
   การทำผลิตภัณฑ์
   การทำเกษตรอื่นๆ
   รายได้จากการทำงานภาคเกษตร
   รายได้จากการจ้างงานอื่น
   การทำธุรกิจส่วนตัว
   อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ): __________

2. นอกจากรายได้หลักในข้อ 1 แล้ว รายได้จากแหล่งอื่นๆมีอะไรบ้าง (วงกลมได้มากกว่า 1 ข้อ)
   การปลูกข้าว
   การปลูกพืชเศรษฐกิจ
   การทำสวนผลไม้
   การทำประมง
   การทำผลิตภัณฑ์
   การทำเกษตรอื่นๆ
   รายได้จากการทำงานภาคเกษตร
   รายได้จากการจ้างงานอื่น
   การทำธุรกิจส่วนตัว
   อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ): __________

3. รายได้แต่ละเดือนของครัวเรือนในปัจจุบันคือเท่าไร
   น้อยกว่า 5,000 บาทต่อเดือน
   มากกว่า 5,000 บาทและน้อยกว่า 10,000 บาทต่อเดือน
   มากกว่า 10,000 บาทและน้อยกว่า 20,000 บาทต่อเดือน
   มากกว่า 20,000 บาทและน้อยกว่า 30,000 บาทต่อเดือน
   มากกว่า 30,000 บาทและน้อยกว่า 40,000 บาทต่อเดือน
   มากกว่า 40,000 บาทและน้อยกว่า 50,000 บาทต่อเดือน
   มากกว่า 50,000 บาทต่อเดือน (โปรดระบุ): __________

4. ในช่วง 2 ปีที่ผ่านมา มีการปรับปรุง ซ่อมแซมหรือต่อเติมส่วนหนึ่งส่วนใดของบ้านหรือไม่มี
   ไม่มี ข้ามไปข้อ 6

5. ให้มีการปรับปรุง ซ่อมแซมหรือต่อเติมอะไรในส่วนใดส่วนหนึ่งของบ้าน
   สร้างบ้านใหม่
   ทำกำแพงใหม่
   ทำหลังคาใหม่
   ทำพื้นใหม่
   ต่อเติมบ้าน
   อื่นๆ เช่น สร้างห้องน้ำใหม่ เป็นต้น
6. ลักษณะของที่อยู่อาศัยในปัจจุบันเป็นแบบใด
   1. บ้านเดี่ยว (ชั้นเดียว)
   2. อาคารพัก (สองชั้น)
   3. บ้านแถว (สร้างด้วยปูนซีเมนต์)
   4. บ้านแถว (สร้างด้วยไม้)
   ถ้ามีอื่น ๆ โปรดระบุ: ____________

7. อาศัยประกอบด้วยห้องนอนกี่ห้อง (โปรดระบุ) : ________

8. ลักษณะความเป็นเจ้าของในที่อยู่อาศัยเป็นเจ้าของ
   เขา ค่ะชาย __________ บาท/เดือน
   ไม่เสียค่าใช้จ่ายเนื่องจากเป็นสวัสดิการสวนหนึ่งของงาน
   ไม่เสียค่าใช้จ่ายใด ๆ

9. ท่านมีที่ดินในครอบครองตามสิทธิทางกฎหมายหรือไม่
   (รวมทั้งที่ดินเพื่อการเกษตรและไม่ได้เพื่อการเกษตร)
   มี ไม่มี ข้ามไปข้อ 11

10. ถ้ามี ในการเรียนมีที่ดินในครอบครองรวมพื้นที่เท่าไร ________ ไร่

11. ลักษณะของสุขาที่ครัวเรือนใช้ประจำเป็นแบบใด
     1. ชักโครก ใช้เฉพาะครัวเรือน
     2. ชักโครก ใช้ร่วมกับครัวเรือนอื่น
     3. ส้วมหลุม ใช้เฉพาะครัวเรือน (ปิดมิดชิด)
     4. ส้วมหลุม ใช้ร่วมกับครัวเรือนอื่น (ปิดมิดชิด)
     5. ส้วมหลุมกลางแจ้ง (ไม่มีประตูปิด)
     ไม่มีสุขา

12. น้ำที่ใช้ดื่มกินและประกอบอาหารของครัวเรือนมาจากแหล่งใดเป็นหลัก
   1. น้ำฝน
   2. น้ำประปา
   3. น้ำบ่อ
   4. น้ำบาดาล
   5. น้ำจากแหล่งอื่น
   6. น้ำทะเลสาบ
   7. น้ำจากการค้ำซึ่งกันและกัน

13. ครัวเรือนมีสิ่งของต่อไปนี้ในครอบครองหรือไม่ (โปรดระบุ หรือ ไม่ อย่างใดอย่างหนึ่ง)
   1. หม้อหุงข้าว มี ไม่
   2. โทรทัศน์ มี ไม่
   3. ตู้เย็น มี ไม่
   4. วิทยุ มี ไม่
   5. เครื่องปั๊มน้ำมันไฟฟ้า มี ไม่
   6. รถจักรยานยนต์ (มอเตอร์ไซค์) มี ไม่
   7. เครื่องบันทึกวีดีโอ มี ไม่
   8. เครื่องเล่นวีดีโอ มี ไม่
   9. มือถือ มี ไม่
ส่วนที่ C ประสบการณ์การย้ายถิ่น

1. ท่านมีความคิดเห็นอย่างไรหากคู่สมรสของท่านจะย้ายที่ทํางานไม่ว่าจะภายในประเทศหรือไปต่างประเทศ
   1. ยอมให้คู่สมรสไปทํางานได้ไม่ว่าจะเป็นภายในประเทศหรือต่างประเทศ
   2. ยอมให้คู่สมรสไปทํางานได้เฉพาะภายในประเทศ ไม่ไปต่างประเทศ
   3. ยอมให้คู่สมรสอยู่ที่ทํางานได้เฉพาะในประเทศ ไม่ใช่ต่างประเทศ
   4. ไม่ยอมให้คู่สมรสย้ายไปทํางานที่ไหนเลย ไม่ว่าจะในหรือต่างประเทศ
   91 ไมทราบ
   95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ____________________________

2. มีสมาชิกในครอบครัวของท่านที่ปัจจุบันทํางานอยู่ที่อื่น หรือ เพิ่งกลับจากทํางานในเมือง (ในประเทศ)/ประเทศอื่นหรือไม่ มี/ไม่มี จบการสัมภาษณ์

3. มีสมาชิกที่ในครอบครัวที่กำลังทํางานหรือเคยทํางานในเมือง (ในประเทศ)/ประเทศอื่นหรือไม่ (หรือยึดเอาสถานที่ที่นอนมากที่สุด)
   1. หนึ่งคน
   2. สองคน
   3. มากกว่าสองคน (โปรดระบุ) ____________________________

4. ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์มีความสัมพันธ์อะไรกับแรงงานย้ายถิ่น (ถ้าครอบครัวมีแรงงานย้ายถิ่นมากกว่าหนึ่ง
   ให้เลือกเพียงคนเดียวที่มีความสัมพันธ์ต่อครอบครัวมากที่สุด)
   1. คู่สมรส
   2. ลูกชาย
   3. ลูกสาว
   4. บิดา
   5. แม่
   6. หลานชาย หลานสาว
   7. ลูกพี่ลูกน้อง
   8. ลุงหรือป้า
   95 อื่นๆ (การระบุ) ____________________________

5. เพศของแรงงานย้ายถิ่น
   1. ชาย
   2. หญิง

6. อายุของแรงงานย้ายถิ่น: _______ ปี

7. การศึกษาระดับสูงสุดของแรงงานย้ายถิ่น
   1. ระดับปริญญา
   2. ระดับมัธยม
   3. ระดับวิทยาลัย / มหาวิทยาลัย
   95 อื่นๆ (การระบุ) ____________________________
8. งานของแรงงานย้ายถิ่นที่ทำในเมือง/ประเทศอื่นคืองานอะไร______________

9. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นที่ทำในเมือง/ประเทศอื่นมาเป็นเวลา______ปี______เดือน

10. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นเคยไปหรือปัจจุบันทำงานอยู่ที่ใด
    1. กรุงเทพ
    2. ไต้หวัน
    3. สิงคโปร์
    4. บรูไน
    5. ฮ่องกง
    6. มาเลเซีย
    7. ญี่ปุ่น
    8. เกาหลีใต้
    9. ประเทศอื่นๆในเอเชีย (กรุณาระบุ)__________________________
    10. อิสราเอล
    11. ตะวันออกกลาง / แอฟริกา (กรุณาระบุ)______________________
    12. อเมริกา
    13. อื่นๆ (กรุณาระบุ)________________________________________
    95 ไม่ทราบ

11. เขา/เธอได้รับใบอนุญาตทำงานหรือไม่
    1. มี
    2. ไม่มี
    91 ไม่ทราบ

12. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นเคยกลับบ้านอย่างไร
    1. อย่างน้อยปีละครั้ง
    2. ช่วงวันหยุดยาว
    3. วันสำคัญของครอบครัว
    4. น้อยกว่าปีละครั้ง (แทบจะไม่กลับ)
    5. ไม่เคย

13. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นวางแผนจะกลับมาตั้งรกรากที่ภูมิลำเนาหรือไม่
    1. ใช่, เพราะ__________________________________________
    2. ไม่, เพราะ____________________________________________

ส่วนที่ D การส่งหรือโอนเงินกลับบ้าน

1. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นได้ส่งเงินกลับบ้านในช่วง 2 ปีที่ผ่านมาหรือไม่
   1. ไม่ส่ง
   2. ส่ง ข้ามไปข้อ 13

2. ถ้าส่ง ส่งเงินกลับบ้านอย่างไร
   1. ให้คนอื่น
2. สองเดือนครั้ง
3. สัปดาห์ครั้ง
4. ปีละครั้ง
5. หยุด
6. เนื่องกับปีละครั้ง
7. ส่งทุกครั้งที่เขา/เธอสามารถส่งกลับมาได้
8. ไม่แน่แน่

3. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นส่งเงินกลับบ้านเพื่อวัตถุประสงค์ใด
   1. เพื่อครอบครัว
   2. เพื่อตัวเอง
   3. เพื่อจ่ายเงินกู้คืนกู้
   4. เพื่อจ่ายเงินกู้กับบุคคลที่สาม
95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ________________

4. แรงงานย้ายถิ่นส่งเงินกลับบ้านด้วยวิธีใด
   1. นำติดตัวเอง
   2. ผ่านญาติหรือเพื่อนที่รู้จักกัน
   3. ผ่านคนอื่น
   4. ผ่านไปยังภูมิ
   5. ผ่านทางธนาคาร
   6. ผ่านเว็บที่มีคุณสมบัติ
91 ในทราบ
95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ________________

5. ทำงานคิดว่าไม่เข้าใจ จึงได้เลือกวิธีส่งเงินกลับบ้านดังกล่าว
   1. ภูมิที่มี
   2. ภูมิภูมิที่มี
   3. ภูมิที่มี
   4. ภูมิที่มี
91 ในทราบ
95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ________________

6. การส่งเงินกลับบ้านใช้เวลาเท่าไร (โปรดระบุ) : ________ วัน

7. เงินจะถูกส่งกลับมาในเงินตราใด
   1. เงินตราต่างประเทศ (เช่น ดอลลาร์สหรัฐ)
   2. เงินบาท ข้ามไปข้อ 9

8. ถ้าทำงานได้รับเงินในเงินตราต่างประเทศแล้ว ต้องเสียค่าธรรมเนียมหรือไม่
   1. เข้า ทำให้ต้องอยู่เงินแล้วจะส่ง
   2. ไม่เข้า

9. มีปัญหาอะไรจากการรับเงินที่ส่งกลับมาหรือไม่
   1. มี กรุณาอธิบาย ______________________________
   2. ไม่มี
10. ในปีที่แล้วมีการส่งเงินกลับให้ครอบครัวจำนวนเท่าไร (โปรดระบุ): ____________ บาท

11. จำนวนเงินที่ส่งกลับแต่ละครั้งเพิ่มหรือลดลง
   1. เพิ่ม
   2. ลด
   3. เท่าเดิม
   4. ไม่ทราบแน่นอน

12. เรื่องที่ได้รับจากแรงงานย้ายถิ่นในสองปีหลังนี้ ทำได้แก่ไปใช้เพื่อวัตถุประสงค์ใด (วงกลม ใช้ หรือ ไม่ในแต่ละข้อ)
   1. ใช้ซื้ออาหาร ใช้ ไม่
   2. ใช้ซื้อเครื่องใช้ไฟฟ้า (เช่น โทรศัพท์ เครื่องเล่นวีดีโอ) ใช้ ไม่
   3. ใช้ซื้อของมัน籍อ ใช้ ไม่
   4. ใช้ซื้อกลั่นแอลกอฮอล์ (เช่น แอลกอฮอล์ น้ำตาล) ใช้ ไม่
   5. ใช้ซื้อสินค้าอื่นๆที่ใช้ในครัวเรือน (เช่น เสื้อผ้า รองเท้า) ใช้ ไม่
   6. ใช้ซื้อจ่ายบริการหมอ ใช้ ไม่
   7. ใช้ซื้อสินค้า (สินค้าขายร้านขายยาท้องถิ่น แหล่งให้เงิน) ใช้ ไม่
   8. ให้เพื่อน / ญาติยืม ใช้ ไม่
   9. ใช้สำหรับตนเอง / ซื้อของ ใช้ ไม่
   10. ใช้สำหรับหลักฐานการครอบครัว (เช่น งานแพทย์ งานแต่งงาน) ใช้ ไม่
   11. ใช้สำหรับท่านสมาชิกหรือครอบครัว (เช่น งานแพทย์ งานแต่งงาน) ใช้ ไม่
   12. ใช้เล่นการพนัน / ซื้อตัวเลข ใช้ ไม่
   13. ใช้เล่นการพนัน / ซื้อตัวเลขเสียงขัน ใช้ ไม่
   14. ใช้เล่นการพนันในการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   15. ใช้เพื่อการพนันที่ไม่ผิด ใช้ ไม่
   16. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   17. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   18. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   19. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   20. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   21. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   22. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   23. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   24. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   25. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   26. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   27. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   28. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   29. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   30. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   31. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   32. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   33. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   34. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   35. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   36. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   37. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   38. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   39. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   40. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   41. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   42. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   43. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   44. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   45. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   46. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   47. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   48. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   49. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   50. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   51. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   52. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   53. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   54. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   55. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   56. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   57. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   58. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   59. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   60. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   61. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   62. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   63. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   64. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   65. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   66. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   67. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   68. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   69. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   70. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   71. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   72. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   73. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   74. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   75. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   76. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   77. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   78. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   79. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   80. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   81. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   82. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   83. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   84. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   85. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   86. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   87. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   88. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   89. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   90. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   91. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   92. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   93. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   94. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่
   95. ใช้เพื่อการทํานาย ใช้ ไม่

13. ถ้าไม่ได้ใช้จ่าย อะไรเป็นสาเหตุที่แรงงานย้ายถิ่นไม่เคยส่งเงินกลับบ้าน
   (โปรดระบุ) __________________________________________

14. ในช่วงสองปีที่ผ่านมา ครัวเรือนเคยได้รับสิ่งของจากแรงงานย้ายถิ่นหรือไม่
   เลข
   เลข
   ข้ามไปส่วนที่ E

15. เลขได้รับสิ่งของอะไรบ้าง และได้รับเมื่อไร
   (โปรดระบุรายละเอียดของสิ่งของที่ได้รับ และวันที่ที่ได้รับในช่วงสองปีที่ผ่านมา)
   ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________
16. สิ่งของชิ้นสุดท้ายได้รับนั้นได้โดยวิธีใด
   1. แรงงานยายกินนำกลับมาเองเมื่อกลับมาเยี่ยมบ้าน
   2. ญาติหรือเพื่อนนำไปกลับมาให้
   3. บุคคลอื่นนำไปกลับมาให้
   4. ไปรษณีย์
   91 ไม่ทราบ
   95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ___________________________

17. ท่านคิดว่าทำไมแรงงานยายกินจะเลือกให้ใช้วิธีดังกล่าในการส่งสิ่งของกลับมา
   1. ถูกที่สุด
   2. ปลอดภัยที่สุด
   3. สะดวกที่สุด
   4. เร็วที่สุด
   91 ไม่ทราบ
   95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ___________________________

18. สิ่งของต่างๆนั้นส่งกลับมาเพราะครอบครัวเรียกร้องหรือไม่
   1. ใช่
   2. ไม่ใช่

19. สิ่งของที่ส่งกลับมาในปีล่าสุดจ่ายเป็นมูลค่าเท่านั้นไม่เคยติดต่อกับยายหรือไม่
   1. ใช่
   2. ไม่ใช่
   91 ไม่ทราบ / คลุมเครือ

20. สิ่งของที่ส่งกลับมาในปีล่าสุดจ่ายเป็นมูลค่าไม่เท่ากับยายหรือไม่
   1. ใช่
   2. ไม่ใช่
   91 ไม่ทราบ / คลุมเครือ

21. ถ้าท่านสามารถขอสิ่งของจากแรงงานยายกินได้เพื่อทำให้ชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ของท่านดีขึ้น
    ท่านจะขออะไร (โปรดระบุสิ่งของและช่วงราคา):
    ___________________________

22. มูลค่าของสิ่งของที่ส่งกลับมาให้กว่าเรือนปีที่แล้วคิดเป็นเท่าหมดเท่าไร
    (โปรดระบุ): ___________________________
ส่วนที่ E การตัดสินใจย้ายถิ่นและการเงินของการย้ายถิ่น

1. อะไรคือเหตุผลหลักของการย้ายไปทำงานในเมือง / ประเทศอื่น
   ______________________________
   ______________________________
   ______________________________________________
   ______________________________

2. ปัจจัยต่อไปนี้ได้มีส่วนในการตัดสินใจย้ายที่ทำงานของเขา/เธอหรือไม่ (วางใต้ทศทศที่เกี่ยวข้อง)
   1. เคยอาศัยในสถานที่นั้นมาก่อน
   2. มีครอบครัว/ญาติอาศัยอยู่
   3. มีเพื่อนทางธุรกิจ
   4. ได้ทำงานผ่านบริษัทจัดหางาน/นายหน้า
   5. ได้ทำงานผ่านสื่อ/อินเตอร์เน็ต
   6. ได้ทำงานผ่านนายจ้างรายอื่นหรืออื่นๆ
   95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ): ______________________________

3. ใครเป็นผู้รับผิดชอบการตัดสินใจย้ายที่ทำงานของเขา/เธอ
   1. ตัวแรงงานเอง
   2. คู่สมรส
   3. ผู้ปกครอง
   4. พี่น้อง
   5. พระมหากษัตริย์
   6. ญาติ/เพื่อนสนิท
   7. นายหน้า
   8. นายจ้าง
   95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ): ______________________________

4. เขา/เธอต้องการจะย้ายที่ทำงานอย่างแท้จริงหรือไม่
   ใช่, เพราะ ____________________________________________
   ไม่, แต่ที่ย้ายเพราะ ______________________________

5. ครอบครัวได้ช่วยเหลือแรงงานย้ายถิ่นในแง่ของค่าเดินทางหรือค่าใช้จ่ายอื่นๆหรือไม่
   ใช่ ช่วยไปส่วนที่ F
   ไม่

6. ถ้าไม่ได้ช่วยเหลือ แล้วเขา/เธอได้เงินมาจากไหนเพื่อดำเนินการย้ายที่ทำงาน
   1. เงินเก็บส่วนตัว
   2. ได้จากญาติหรือเพื่อนสนิท
   3. ได้จากบุคคลอื่น
   4. ยืมจากญาติหรือเพื่อนสนิท
   5. ยืมจากบุคคลอื่น
   6. จากการกู้
   7. ยืมจากธนาคาร/สหกรณ์
   8. ได้จากการขายที่ดิน
   95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ): ______________________________
ส่วนที่ F ผลกระทบและประเด็นด้านนโยบาย

1. ท่านคิดว่าใครในครอบครัวที่ได้รับประโยชน์จากการส่งเงินกลับบ้านของแรงงานย้ายถิ่นมากที่สุด เพราะเหตุใด (โปรดระบุรายละเอียด)

* ที่นี่อาจจะเป็นประโยชน์ต่อบางแรงงาน
(เช่น เงินดังกล่าวส่งลิมูซีนเพื่อใช้สร้างบ้านให้กับแรงงานแรงในตอนที่ย้ายถิ่นอยู่กับภูมิคุ้มกัน, ครอบครัวชวยinka (เช่น เพื่อซื้ออาสนะเพื่อใช้ในเรื่องการศึกษา), เด็กๆในครอบครัว (เช่น เพื่อการศึกษา), หรือเพื่อสมาชิกที่เคยเคยของครอบครัวโดยเฉพาะ (เช่น เพื่อรับเงินเพื่อใช้ในเรื่องการศึกษา)
โปรดระบุเพศของผู้ที่ได้รับประโยชน์ดังกล่าวด้วย

2. มีการเปลี่ยนแปลงความเป็นอยู่ในครอบครัวบางที่เนื่องจากแรงงานย้ายถิ่นอย่างไรบ้าง เช่น

* นอกจากตอบว่ามีหรือไม่มีแล้ว กรุณาบันทึกคำอธิบายของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ว่าเงินดังกล่าวมีผลต่อครอบครัวอย่างไรบ้าง เช่น
1) เรามีบ้านที่ดีมากขึ้นและเด็กๆสามารถเข้าโรงเรียนได้
2) เราได้เงินเพื่อซื้อของใช้ในเรื่องการศึกษา
3) เรามีเงินเพื่อใช้ในเรื่องอื่นๆที่จำเป็น

3. มีสมาชิกคนใดในครอบครัวที่เคยได้รับผลกระทบต่อไปนี้จากการย้ายถิ่นของแรงงานหรือไม่
1. การติดเชื้อเอชไอวี/เอดส์เนื่องจากการขาดผู้ปกครองหรือฝ่ายแม่หรือฝ่ายพ่ออย่างใดอย่างหนึ่ง
2. มีปัญหาการติดยาเสพติดเนื่องจากการขาดผู้ดูแลพัฒนาอย่างต่อเนื่อง (เช่น แม่)
3. มีการเปลี่ยนแปลงที่มีผลต่อเรื่องการศึกษาของเด็กในครอบครัว (เช่น แม่)
4. มีการเปลี่ยนแปลงที่มีผลต่อเรื่องการดูแลเด็ก (เช่น แม่)
5. ไม่เคยประสบปัญหา
91 ไม่ทราบ
95 อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ): ________________________________

4. มีเด็กๆในครอบครัวใดที่เคยประสบกับผลต่อไปนี้เนื่องจากการขาดผู้ปกครองหรือฝ่ายแม่หรือฝ่ายพ่ออย่างใดอย่างหนึ่งหรือไม่ (โปรดระบุรายละเอียด)
1. มีผลการเรียนไม่ดีหรือไม่ค่อยเข้าเรียน
2. การติดยาเสพติดหรือวัยรุ่น
3. มีการใช้ยาเสพติดหรือวัยรุ่น
4. มีปัญหาการเรียนรู้ เช่น ความเครียด, รู้สึกโดดเดี่ยวและรู้สึกถูกทอดทิ้ง เป็นต้น
5. ไม่เคยประสบปัญหา
91 ไม่ทราบ
5. ใครเป็นผู้ที่ประสบปัญหาที่สุดในครอบครัวจากการย้ายถิ่นของแรงงาน

*อาจจะเป็นคนชรา (เช่น คนชราร่ำรวยใหญ่ที่มีการรับผิดชอบดูแลทุกคน),
ครอบครัวโดยรวม (เช่น แรงงานยายเกิ่น นโยบายที่จะบ้านเลยและไม่เคยสงเสริมเด็ก),
เด็กๆในครอบครัว (เช่น ปัญหาทางอารมณ์และการศึกษา)
โปรดระบุเพศของผู้ที่ประสบปัญหาที่สุดดังกล่าวด้วย

6. ท่านคิดว่าท่านจะย้ายออกจากหมู่บ้านเพื่อไปยังเมืองหรือประเทศอื่นๆในอนาคตอันใกล้หรือไม่

1. คิด
2. ไม่ ข้ามไปข้อ 10
3. ไม่เคยคิดเลย ข้ามไปข้อ 11

7. ถ้าคิด เพราะอะไรท่านคิดจะย้ายออกจากหมู่บ้าน (โปรดระบุเหตุผล):

8. ท่านรู้จักใครในสถานที่ที่ท่านคิดจะย้ายไปหรือไม่

รู้จัก
ไม่รู้จัก

9. ถ้าครอบครัวของท่านต้องการให้ท่านอยู่ที่หมู่บ้านอย่างมาก ท่านจะอยู่ต่อหรือไม่

อย่
ไม่

10. ถ้าครอบครัวของท่านต้องการให้ท่านอยู่ที่ที่ถ้าอย่างมาก ท่านจะย้ายหรือไม่

ย้าย
ไม่

11. ท่านเคยได้ยินเกี่ยวกับแรงงานต่างด้าวผิดกฎหมายจากประเทศอื่นมาทำงานในประเทศไทย หรือไม่

เคย
ไม่เคย

12. ท่านคิดว่าแรงงานต่างด้าวเหล่านี้ยังงานจากคนไทยหรือไม่

ใช่
ไม่

13. ท่านคิดว่าแรงงานต่างด้าวเหล่านี้ยังงานจากท่านหรือไม่

ใช่
ไม่