MANCHESTER: WORK IN PROGRESS
GOVERNANCE NETWORKS FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE
GREATER MANCHESTER CITY REGION

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Abbreviations and Glossary

Association of Greater Manchester Authorities [AGMA]
Centre for Local Economic Strategies [CLES]
Collaborative Award: Science and Engineering [CASE award]
Comprehensive Area Assessment [CAA]
Commission for Employment Economic Development and Skills [CEES]
Commission for the New Economy. [CNE] (formerly CEES, and ME)
Communities and Local Government [CLG] (formerly DLTR, DETR, ODPM)
Community Strategy [CS] (later SCS)
Corporate Performance Assessment [CPA]
City Regional Development Plan [CRDP]
Centre for Urban Policy Studies [CUPS]
Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions [DETR]
Department for London, Transport and the Regions [DLTR]
Economic Development and Regeneration [ED/R]
Economic Prosperity Board [EPB]
Economic and Social Research Council [ESRC]
Government Office [GO]
Government Office North West [GO-NW]
Greater Manchester Council [GMC]
Greater Manchester City Region [GMCR]
Greater Manchester Forecasting Model [GMFM]
Greater Manchester Strategy [GMS]
Homes and Communities Agency [HCA]
Indices of Multiple Deprivation [IMD]
Institute for Political and Economic Governance [IPEG]
Joint Economic Council [JEC]
Joint Investment Board [JIB]
Joined up Government [JUG]
‘knowledge exchange’ [KE]
Knowledge Transfer Partnership [KTP]
Local Area Agreement (LAA)
Local Authorities [LAs]
Local Authority Districts [LADs]
Local Development Framework [LDF]
Local Enterprise Partnership [LEP]
Local Government Modernisation Agenda [LGMA]
Local Governance Performance Architecture [LGPA]
Local Government White Paper 2006 [LGWP]
Local Government etc. Act 2009 LEDCDC
Local Public Service Agreement [LPSA]
Local Public Service Agreement : Second Phase [LPSA2G]
Local Strategic Partnership [LSP]
Manchester Enterprises [ME]
Marketing Manchester
Manchester: Knowledge Capital [MK:C]
MIDAS: [Manchester inward investment Agency]
Manchester Independent Economic Review [MIER]
Manchester International Festival [MIF]
Multi Area Agreement [MAA]
Multi-Level Government [MLG]
National Indicator Set [NIS]
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal [NSNR]
National Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts [NESTA]
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit [NRU]
New Deal for Communities [NDC]
New Public Management [NPM]
New Local Government Network [NLGN]
No Overall Control [NOC]
North-West Development agency [NWDA]
North-West JEC
National Indicator Set [NIS]
Office for National Statistics [ONS]
Office for the Deputy Prime Minister [ODPM]
Policy Action Team [PAT1-18]
Public Service Agreement [PSA]
Public Service Board [PSB]
Regional Growth Fund [RGF]
Regional Development Agency [RDA]
Regional Economic Council [REC]
Regional Economic Strategy [RES]
Regional Integrated Strategy [RIS]
Regional Spatial Strategy [RSS]
Sustainable Community Strategy [SCS]
South-East Lancashire North-East Cheshire [SELNEC]
Social Exclusion Unit [SEU]
Sub-National Review of Local Government and Regeneration [SNR]
Single Regeneration Budget [SRB]
Social Network Analysis [SNA]
Stockport Borough Council [SBC]
Stockport Partnership Board [SPB]
Story of Place [SOP]
Statutory City-Regional Pilot [SCR]
Sustainable Community Strategy [SCS]
Voluntary Community Sector [VCS]
Wigan Borough Council [WBC]
Abstract

The thesis seeks to draw upon and develop theories of governance with attempts to explain the functioning of policy and delivery mechanisms within the area of economic development and regeneration within the Greater Manchester City Region. [GMCR]

It seeks to identify and to understand the fine-grained processes underlying the evolution of metropolitan governance using multiple methods. The thesis provides a ‘socio-spatial biography’ of the city-region through the use of Social Network Analysis [SNA] linked to a programme of semi-structured interviews with elite policy actors. It seeks to contribute to work on metropolitan governance by considering the role of actors within meta-governance processes which define their ‘scope at scale’, or their ability to act and to exercise discretion within the structures available to them. This discretion rests upon a highly centralised form of ‘contrived randomness’ under which UK central-local relations are skewed in favour of the frames of reference of national policy makers, with local actors responsible for delivery and implementation.

Empirical data are drawn from case study fieldwork within the context of the wider array of bodies, vehicles and initiatives at the scale of the Greater Manchester City Region. The thesis seeks to explore the roles of the ‘Manchester Family’ these ‘quasi-local actors and entities’ [qualgae] their forms and functions and their relationship to economic development and spatial planning in the city region. It seeks to conceptualise the qualgae as a network and to consider the relationships between formalised, mandated local government and the more recent assemblages of single-purpose strategic vehicles.

The thesis highlights the tensions between actors involved in these parallel (and sometimes competing) forms of city-regional governance and the power and authority associated with strategic co-ordination and ‘joining-up’. It argues that these tensions are particularly acute where sub-national governance innovations combined with the legacy of multiple initiatives within the field of regeneration and local economic development have left complex institutional and cross-organisational structures. It argues that Greater Manchester constitutes a rich milieu from which future initiatives may spring.
Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this of any other university of other institute of learning.

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Dedication

for

J P H

‘The still point in the turning world...’

also for

Theodore

Riccardo &

Clementine

‘One has to have chaos within to give birth to a dancing star’

The rest of you know who you are when and whether you helped
Even if you don’t – I do and I will never forget
It takes a village to raise a child
and a city region to support the production of a doctoral thesis.

---

1 TS Eliot
2 Freidrich Nietzsche
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Thanks to …

…all the people who gave up time in their working day to talk to me about the worlds they inhabit professionally and how they make sense and make the best of it all. The whole system functions only due to the ingenuity and commitment of public sector workers.

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…to Dr. Mark Baker for internal examiner duties and Professor John Diamond for taking the time to act as external examiner.

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For all the support and advice I have received errors in interpretation and ‘sins of omission’ remain my own.
Grossly unequal societies chase their problems around the policy map.
Robson and Turok, 2007

Deprivation is to me as daffodils are to Wordsworth
Philip Larkin

You have to have been part of the system to understand quite how absolute central control of local government is
Michael Heseltine

I fought central government right through the 80’s and I can tell you – it doesn’t work
Richard Leese
Figure 1 Manchester: Work in Progress
Chapter I Manchester: Work in Progress Introduction

F Scott Fitzgerald says that American lives don’t have second acts, well this is Manchester, we do things differently here
Tony Wilson (Cotterell Boyce, 1998)

This thesis explores the recent history of ‘second act’ collaborative municipal/metropolitan governance for the Greater Manchester city region. As subsequent parts of the thesis go on to explain, this second act comprised a continuing inherited axis of policy-making linked to formal institutions established in the wake of the demise of the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) in 1986, alongside a newer set of initiatives whose inception drew upon ideas linked to the importance of city-regional agglomeration, and embodied in particular by the Commission for the New Economy (CNE).

There incomplete and emergent nature of city-regional governance in Greater Manchester means it can be seen as a continual ‘Work in Progress’. Despite relative formal political stability and leadership, and a governance trajectory which has emphasised co-ordination and joining-up over time, the city-region remains a highly fragmented institutional space populated by actors whose power and influence waxes and wanes and whose connections with formalised mandated local government shift over time. The thesis seeks to tell this story by combining insights from the theoretical literature on governance with the policy area of economic development and regeneration. It focuses in particular upon the functioning of ‘second generation policy mechanisms’ active within the Greater Manchester City Region (GMCR). It presents an innovative approach to the ‘fine-grained processes’ (Healey 1998; Healey 2006) of metropolitan governance through a combination of methods, attempting to construct a ‘socio-spatial biography’ (Pike 2009) of the city region which combines Social Network Analysis [SNA] and elite interviewing. The thesis seeks to discuss the effects of innovation in governance on those populating the structures by considering the role of actors within meta-governance processes which define their ‘scope at scale’, or their ability to act and to exercise discretion within the structures available to them.
1.2 ‘The Mechanism Mix’ in sub-national governance

Fundamental questions of constitutional structures, centre-region relations, institutional co-ordination, and public expenditure… are addressed as the perhaps unglamorous dimensions of sub-national government and governance. Pike and Tomaney, 2004 pg 249 (emphasis added)

Since ‘fundamental questions’ are more important than ‘glamour’, the thesis explores the theoretical governance literature in order to shed light on the modes of governance deployed within sub-national government and governance, specifically within the policy area of regeneration and local economic development. It explores the ways in which policy has been ‘sliced and diced’, with differentiation both spatially and thematically, by central policy makers who devise specialised mechanisms for strategy and delivery.

The thesis traces the evolution of urban policy through a number of stages, arguing that attempts to circumvent the perceived obstacle of local government, through the preferred object of the ‘partnership panacea’ has left a ‘para-static’ legacy (literally beyond or outside of the state itself), characterised by a proliferation of initiatives, followed by attempts to co-ordinate, rationalise and mainstream, and finishing with retrenchment to the formalised processes of government. In a close study of a selection of ‘second generation governance mechanisms’ of the Local Area Agreement (LAA), the Multi Area Agreement (MAA) and the Public Service Agreement (PSA) it is argued that common integrative logics underpin these attempts at public sector modernisation through joining up the supply side of public service provision. The thesis discusses the changing logics of such policy mechanisms, arguing that an attitude of ‘it can do that too’ led to each being overloaded with unrealistic aspirations for both local government modernisation and the policy area of economic development and regeneration. It also contends that policy mechanisms are particularly prone to instability when they move from conceptualisation to implementation – in the case of the LAA leading to an innovative approach to policy coordination becoming buried under a series of unwieldy indicators and an inspection regime driven by performance management concerns that proved difficult to reconcile with practical concerns around implementation.
1.3 The Approach

Overall the thesis seeks to argue that it is helpful to focus on the fine-grained effects of networks and partnerships within sub-national governance as part of a ‘relational’ state where connectivity within and between actors and agencies is key (Mulgan, 2010). It argues that ‘whether the jungles are green and leafy or concrete, they are brimming with intricate webs of relationships, which when viewed from afar reveal elementary structures’ (Stephenson, 2004) and holds out hope that the possibility of socially and spatially just outcomes could emerge from the mechanism mix as it is calibrated locally and in the specific junctures at which actors are able to exercise their preferred policy choices, the scope that they are able to exercise within their scale of operation. (Haughton and Allmendinger 2008). It explores what (Kooiman 2003) calls the overall governability of the city-region and argues that sub-national governance innovations in the fields of regeneration and economic development have left a legacy of structures rather than outcomes with regard to the uneven spatial development which characterises the conurbation.

**Aim:** To explore the spatial construction of the Greater Manchester City Region (GMCR) up until the formation of the combined authority in 2011, focusing on the role of strategic mechanisms within the differentiated networks of the urban elite in order to explore the overall systemic ‘governability’ of the GMCR.

**Objectives:**

1. To consider the impacts of mechanisms designed to implement regeneration and economic development policy and practice and their inter-relationships across spatial scales.
2. To assess LAAs and MAAs as ‘second generation governance mechanisms’ and to situate them as emergent and hybrid governance forms.
3. To assess the partnership governance architecture operating at sub-national scale in the UK and the resultant implications for established central-regional-local government relationships.
4. To explain the composition of the GMCR urban elite tracking their changing purposes through development of a typology unpacking the roles and functions of brokers within partnership governance structures.
5. To develop and apply a mixed method evaluation framework incorporating Social Network Analysis [SNA] in order to treat governance networks as complex networks.
1.4 The Manchester Case

Greater Manchester is held by some to represent an experimental and innovative ‘space of governance’ (Forester 2010) populated by a number of discrete, yet overlapping cliques of actors. In interrogating the urban elite differentiation is drawn between:

1) Politicians and their urban bureaucrats, officials of mandated (Type I) government entities.

2) The qualgae, ‘quasi local governance actors and entities populated by ‘policy entrepreneurs’(Mintrom and Norman 2009) and ‘pragmatic localists’ (Coaffee and Headlam 2008) called qualgaeocrats.

3) ‘Imagineers’ ‘leaders of the Manchester imagination’ (interview data, 2008) whose institutional basis and visibility shifts.

The thesis differentiates between the accounts of these three cliques within the urban elite and the ways in which they discursively construct and maintain the brand of the city-region. Elite interview data assembled at these local and city-regional scales are augmented by information derived from discussion with national decision makers to inform a wider account of the evolution of governance and policy-making in the Greater Manchester city region, culminating its designation as a Statutory City-Regional Pilot [SCR] from 2010/11.

The thesis tells the story of the reification of the city region describing the actors in the realisation of governance at the city-regional scale as highly networked and relational types and arguing that the city-region is socially constructed by their combination and interaction through the ‘institutional matrix’, and ‘mechanism’ mix available to actors.

The thesis seeks to explore the roles of the actors within the ‘Manchester family’ these ‘quasi-local actors and entities’ (qualgae) their forms and functions and their relationship to economic development and spatial planning in the city region. It seeks to conceptualise the qualgae as a network and to consider the relationships between formalised, mandated local government and the more recent assemblage of single-purpose ad-hoc vehicles. It seeks to consider the relationships between these bodies and Type II, formal, mandated and accountable local government. (Hooghe and Marks 2003) It narrates how the reticulated brokers of AGMA have adapted to the two decades since the abolition of the GMC and the rise of the ‘Manchester family’ of organisations which offers a rich feeding eco-system for policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Norman 2009) (both big and little fish) who feed in the Greater Manchester pool.
In the decade or so since Hebbert and Deas (2000) wrote their article decried the inelegance of some of the marketeering and city-promotional initiatives of Manchester encapsulated by the slogan ‘Greater Manchester -Up and Going’, there has been a further proliferation of ‘Type II’ governance forms, that is to say ad-hoc single purpose vehicles and initiatives operating at the city-regional scale. This thesis seeks to explore and differentiate between these actors and entities, their forms and functions, scope at scale, and their relationship to economic development and spatial planning in the city region.

1.5 On-going policy relevance

1.5.1 …for national government

Whilst the contribution of the thesis is to narrate a very particular policy ‘moment’ through setting out a typology for the trajectory of governance instruments and mechanisms under the Brown premiership there are key strands which are of relevance to any (reforming) government. These include; difficulties associated with mechanisms for delivery in the sub-national policy space, the necessity of instruments for implementation, and the need to work with the grain of the extant policy actor-networks. It is unclear how far the ‘pure’ localism of the Coalition government takes this mid-range problem of delivery seriously. Their approach foregrounds decentralisation, through localism but does not frame inequality as problematic. Emphasising decentralisation emphasising uneven spatial development separates these delivery mechanisms from their original purposes and may render them obsolete in the short term.

1.5.2 …for sub-regional and city-regional governance

At the ‘extended locality’ scale of the city or sub-region the political construction, articulation and circulation of a brand ‘stretched’ to encompass administrative territory is by no means a simple matter and local policy elites must be offered alternate discursive spaces into which they may articulate alternate imaginaries. The role of universities is fundamental to this and should be viewed as part of their obligations as critical friends and partners and extend beyond their narrow roles as signatories and supporters to the LEP process as it emerges. The LEP has undergone all the ‘loops and stages’ of any other mid-range delivery mechanism but with timescales contracted and resources tightened. The role of planning powers at the LEP scale has been confusing as has been their capacity and capability at intervening in labour and housing markets.
1.5.3…for city leaders

Visualising the city governance network as a network is a first step toward configuring the formal and informal entities of the city (and wider region) in order to make them work towards socially just and equitable outcomes. Functional differentiation between the cliques of the urban elite and their connections and tensions may lead to the design of a qualgae which is able to frame active state intervention to these ends.

1.6 Introduction Summary

The thesis seeks to make a contribution to the literature on Metropolitan Governance, and on the roles of partnerships in galvanising activity. It proposes some methodological innovation through the construction of a Socio-Spatial Biography (SSB) using Social Network Analysis (SNA) as well as elite interviewing. This research design supports critical reflections on the underlying logics of the current iteration of the city-regional governance project.

It seeks to treat metropolitan governance networks as networks and to offer and integrative whole combining SNA with qualitative work with the salient elites. That access these has been possible reflects both the nature of the collaborative studentship with CLES and is a function of the propinquity that Peter John alludes to as one of the reasons for being interested in urban politics as an object of study (John, 2009). It suggests a comparative research agenda for urban scholarship in the future focussing on fine-grained mechanisms and brokerage as a strategy for escaping the structure/agency ‘trap’ of over-reliance on one partial causal explanation at the other’s expense. Close attention to the inter-relationships and functioning of Type I and II entities illuminates their reticulated nature which makes such methods ideally suited to the study of the contemporary complex conurbation, a phenomenon characterised as immanent, changeable, vibrant and dynamic which should be viewed as far as possible as un-finalisable, emergent, and as a true ‘work in progress’. 
Chapter II: Regeneration: Rules, Roles and Re-brands

2.1 Introduction

Regeneration seems to offer an almost infinitely inclusive canopy under which all may be persuaded to shelter and find agreement, yet vital issues remain beyond the pale (Furbey 1999) pg 440

…so urban regeneration is in principle a floating signifier but in practice it does not float very far. It is ubiquitously used to a fairly standard set of policy goals and outcomes ”(Lovering 2007) pg 344

The prism of urban policy is used in order to explore the effects on structure and agency of the construction of policy mechanisms and delivery vehicles which circumvent local government. The reasoning for this narrow focus is threefold; First in order to view urban policy as inherently connected with the practices of the urban laboratory, that is to say as experimental, innovative and subject to rapid changes. It is often forgotten that despite intense waves of modernisation and reform there were areas of local government which were less exposed to policy changes and that the labour government of 1997-2010 chose models of investment and reform which focussed on non-statutory functions of local government and preferred to build new delivery infra-structures and mechanisms rather than work within extant professional or institutional/service based structures. Secondly it is in regeneration and economic development policy that over the studied period an entire industry emerged in the UK; merging the uneasy bedfellows of conventional local authority economic development and inward investment activity with values-based community development and the practices of property development. Tensions between physical regeneration and social, and community renewal bubbled under the surface throughout the period, not least through the ways in which knowledges were constructed and circulated.

This industry itself wielding its preferred mechanism of partnership negotiated the power and resources of markets hierarchies and (nascent) network formations in some oblique and surprising ways. This chapter seeks to tease out the features of the urban policy laboratory in terms of the rules of partnerships and the roles, those behaviours, repertoires and strategies available to actors deployed within these mechanisms and governance structures.

Through presenting periodisations and typologies for the Regeneration and Local Economic Development policies of the new labour period it is possible to tease out the underlying and reforming logics, their perverse effects and legacies. We look in detail at
specific mechanisms in chapter V, arguing that they are floating and slippery signifiers and tracing the micro-politics on the life of a small number of initiatives as they veer from wide conceptualisation to narrow calculability.

This chapter seeks to introduce urban policy as operationalised over the period of 1997-2010, to explore the role of partnerships and the effects of participation and possibility for action through those operating within the new governance spaces which emerged. This chapter seeks to explore the governance effects of successive waves of urban policy. To extract lessons from the wide literature on the role of partnership in regeneration, and to describe the ‘policy networks’ which constellate around urban policy problems and how ‘evidence based policy’ connects to political localism in the UK context where the relationships between Whitehall and the Town Hall are perennially problematic. Finally the chapter explores the possibility that for all the rhetoric of holistic and area-based regeneration over this period the legacy has been more clearly seen in the rise in city-promotional and marketing activities. Places arguably were re-branded rather than structurally transformed and the role of the cultural asset of the brand of an area has assumed increasing importance.

2.1.1 The Urban Policy Laboratory and Central-Local Policy

There is a capacious critical literature on economic development and regeneration policy. Parkinson et al (2006) identify three broad trends in relation to cities.

Firstly there has been a redrawing of the balance between national, regional and local actions with many countries reducing the role of the national government and providing greater responsibilities – if not resources – to cities. Secondly, there has been growing recognition by many European countries and governments of the potential contribution that cities can make to national economies and a more coherent attempt to boost their economic performance. Thirdly there has been growing recognition of the need for more explicit national urban policies which specifically address the challenges and opportunities facing cities, their communities and residents.” Parkinson, 2006 (p.237)

Despite this recognition of the need for more ‘explicit’ national urban policies many commentators view regeneration policy as characterised by ambiguity and describe it as ‘janus faced’(Swyngedouw 2005) and suffering from ‘spatial schizophrenia’ (Harding, 2009). And here is the rub; by decentralising responsibilities but not resources national policy makers raise expectations but leave delivery vehicles at the local scale without the levers they require in order to secure the changes that they seek to make by deploying discretion over policy choices.
Core to this problem have been issues regarding the continuum between centralisation and ‘localism’ rhetoric but also the vexed relationships between public and private and the dynamic unleashed between ‘instability’ and ‘innovation’ (Wilson 2004). Lowndes and Wilson (2003) have badged the restlessness of change to the organisations of local governance as typified by seeking a balance between ‘revisability and ‘robustness’ (Lowndes and Wilson 2003).

The following table (Table 1) helpfully describes urban policy under new labour using machinery of government change, key documents and strategies, delivery agencies, funding regimes and regeneration initiatives.

Table 1 Urban regeneration under New Labour 1997-2009
(modified from Shaw and Robinson, 2010 pp128)

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<td>Social Exclusion Unit (1997)</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (2001)</td>
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<td>Urban Policy Unit (2001)</td>
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<td>Academy for Sustainable Communities (2005)</td>
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<th>Key Documents and Strategies</th>
<th>Bringing Britain Together (1998)</th>
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<td>Local Government Act 1999</td>
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<td>National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (2001)</td>
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<td>Local Government Act 2000</td>
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<td>Sustainable Communities Plan (2003)</td>
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<td>Egan Review (Skills for Sustainable Communities) (2004)</td>
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<td>Sustainable Communities: Homes for All &amp; People Places and Prosperity (2005)</td>
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<td>Sustainable Communities Act (2007)</td>
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<td>Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007</td>
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<td>Prosperous Places: Taking forward the Sub-national review of economic development and regeneration (2008)</td>
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<td>Communities in Control White Paper (2008)</td>
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<td>Urban Development Corporations</td>
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<td>Urban Regeneration Companies</td>
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<td>City Regional Development Partnerships</td>
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<td>Homes and Communities Agency</td>
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<th>Funding regimes</th>
<th>Single Regeneration Budget (rounds 6 &amp;7)</th>
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<td>Neighbourhood Renewal Fund</td>
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<td>Safer and Stronger Communities Fund</td>
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<td>Area Based Regeneration Grant</td>
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<td>Working Neighbourhoods Fund</td>
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<th>Regeneration Initiatives</th>
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<td>New Deal for Communities</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood Wardens Schemes</td>
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<td>The liveability fund</td>
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<td>Local Enterprise Growth Initiative</td>
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<td>Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders</td>
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As we can see specifically under the heading of the machinery of government the policy area had four discrete departmental names over the period. A symptom of what has been described as a constitutional state of permanent revolution within Whitehall, particularly under Tony Blair’s premiership. His biographer recounts that he ‘never found a machinery of government settlement which suited him’ (Seddon, 2003, pp 317) This unease reflects a far broader set of circumstances under which;

The relationships between central, local and regional government in Western Europe have been greatly affected by (these) major shifts and metamorphoses. The overarching change can be summed up as a shift from the primacy of a very hierarchical, top-down, principal agent model of government to one that is characterised by significantly increased “choice” and flexibility for local and regional tiers of government. Nevertheless this does not mean that the new model has replaced the old. Rather there is now a preponderance of hybrid types of state, in which old and new models co-exist in widely varying combinations… (Loughlin, 2009 pg 68)

It is widely argued that British urban regeneration policy from the early 1990s underwent a significant trans-formation in its organisational characteristics, funding regimes, and policy emphasis. (Cochrane 2007) (Robson 1988) During the 1980s, urban regeneration had followed a market approach (Healey et al 1992; Hill, 2000; Robson et al, 1994). In contrast, in the 1990s, multiagency partner-ships, holistic programmes, and competitive bidding for regeneration funds became essential elements, (Hall and Nevin, 1999; Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001a).

The regeneration landscape in the UK has undergone substantial change during the time New Labour has been in office. From a situation of largely area-based interventions [ABIs] focused on combining activity across a range of issues, a complex and changing landscape has emerged with different policy streams and a plethora of agencies operating at a variety of spatial levels… Others see behind this ‘new regeneration narrative’ a different picture of tensions between competing objectives such as competitiveness and cohesion and between participatory democracy and central control within a context of the restructuring of policy to meet neo-liberal agendas. REF

In tracing these ‘wildly varying combinations’ or the types of ‘hybrid; state in which old and new models co-exist in widely varying combinations’ we can see these tensions surfacing within the ‘new regeneration narrative’ we seek to outline ambivalence about the respective roles of the market vis a vis the state and confusion about whether processes of multi-level dialogue have been confused with more fundamental shifts in decision making, power and authority. Many attempts have been made to characterise New Labour or Third Way spatial and regeneration policy (Imrie & Raco, 2003; Lupton, 2003; Hall, 2003: Allmendinger, 2003). (Imrie and Thomas 1993; Imrie 1999; Imrie and Raco 2001; Allmendinger, Morphet et al. 2005) (Brownill 2007) Rather than seeing these as a coherent set of objectives many writers have stressed the ‘hybridity’ of current regeneration policy

2.1.2 Governance effects of Urban Policy experimentation

Table 2 Governance effects of Urban Policy 1997-2010, author synthesis

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Initiative-it-is SRB etc. continuing Con policies Other ABIs, Sure Start, HAZ etc.</td>
<td>Public Funding ££££ + Euros</td>
<td>European National Regional</td>
<td>Ad hoc para-static project proliferation (neighbourhood and region)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2000-2004 (after CSR 2000)</td>
<td>National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal emphasising role of LSPs for “the 88”</td>
<td>£££ Less Euros</td>
<td>European National Supra-regional Regional Local Authority + Neighbourhood</td>
<td>para-static paradox independence of earlier phase leads to impossibility of co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2004-2008 (After CSR 2004)</td>
<td>Co-ordination “Mainstreaming” Structures LSPs, LDFs, LAAs</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>European National Supra-regional (?) Regional City Regional Local Authority +</td>
<td>Seeking to resolve para-static paradox through development of local partnership governance architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2008 – (recession)</td>
<td>Contraction of Funding /projects “Refresh” of LAAs MAA – SCR pilots</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>European National Regional City Regional Local Authority +</td>
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This chapter now turns to scholarly reflections on the ‘new regeneration narrative’ by examining first two phases delineated above, of para-static proliferation leading to para-static paradox whilst the role of efforts seeking to resolve this fragmentation is covered through narrating the emerging mechanisms in Chapter V. What is often missed by political scientists struggling to put the LPSA-LSP-LAA developments into context is that these policy streams emanated out of economic development and regeneration policy and, as they were embedded within local authority corporate departments and ‘tamed’ Arguably then, looking at LAA policy from 2004 makes no sense without a feel for the contradictions of urban policy in the earlier period.

2.1.2.1 para-static proliferation

Both the NSNR, in 2001, and the establishment of the RDAs in 1999 showed a first term confidence both in what labour wanted to do (tackle deprivation) and how it wanted to do it (through governance partnerships and structural innovations in the regions and at the neighbourhood scale). This period, arguably a high-water-mark for both neighbourhood
renewal/local economic development and regeneration and for strategic and co-ordinating functions collected at a regional scale. Whilst successive phases of regeneration policy have been somewhat contradictory we reject the premise that the ‘initiativitis’ of the early phases was accidental but that a strategy of ‘contrived randomness was being pursued by national policy-makers. Bearing this in mind, it is important to identify the imperatives and dynamics of this policy landscape which give some structure to the ‘bowl of spaghetti’. (Audit Commission, 2000) I use the phrase para-static to flag up that the preferred agencies and actors for this reforming agenda where not to be found from within the cadre of local government officers. They were beyond (para) the state itself and located within the thicket of neighbourhood, regional and latterly city-regional governance actors. The phases were accompanied by spatially ‘contrived randomness’, ‘spatial schizophrenia’ and a continual ‘shuffling’ as the objects of policy skipped about from neighbourhood and region to locality to city region.

This political project is anything but a "top-down" brute and desensitized imposition on cities. I believe it is best conceptualized as a series of differentiated, keenly negotiating, processural, and space-mobilizing constructions in new political and economic times. These governances… are constituted and reconstituted through the vagaries of the situated social hierarchies, political cultures, economic bases, and cultural understandings that create a patchwork of wildly varying governances. (Wilson 2004)

Some analysts have seen within these wildly varying governances quite deliberate gaming strategies on behalf of central government.

2.1.2.2 Para-static paradox fragmentation

Periodising just how short-lived was the confidence of the first phase is hard but suffice to say that somewhere before the rejection of an ERA in 2004 in the North East and wholesale abandon of anything but the NDC element of the NSNR was fairly abruptly terminated by *Strong and Prosperous Communities* The local government white paper of 2006. In this (second phase) period confidence in both the neighbourhood and regional projects had foundered under the weight of criticism both of delivery at the improvised scales of the neighbourhood and the region for their weak connection with institutions with democratic oversight. The mechanisms brought forward by this white paper and the act which followed were privileging the locality and partners in the LAA and the city-region in the MAA, meanwhile New Labour’s hostility to local government itself (and its preference for the para-static) spawned an absolute cascade of targets designed to frame the operation of LAAs.
In this chapter are these first two phases; that of initiativity and the subsequent recognition that fragmentation had gone too far and that a gap had been left where the LA was unable to effectively co-ordinate. It concentrates on accounts of how partnership governance formations operate in practice, who they include and who they exclude. In seeking to explore these issues the following two sections concern. The rules which govern the partnership panaceas of urban policy and the rules adopted by actors peopling the new governance spaces.

2.2 Partnership Panaceas - Rules

A sociological literature, going back at least to Benson (1975), points out that partnerships are seldom of equals, and can easily become instruments of oppression wherein a strong partner gains at the expense of weaker members.

The point is made very strongly by community development professionals with particular reference to regeneration partnerships which involve representatives or residents of local communities alongside professionals from a wide range of public or private agencies. Thus Balloch and Taylor (2001, p. 2), looking at partnerships from the point-of-view of the voluntary sector, start from the view that:

Partnership can offer participants the opportunity to influence other agencies to operate in ways that help them achieve their objectives more effectively and it has the potential to transform radically the culture of public service delivery, through compelling people to think in new ways.

They go on, however to describe how difficult this can be to achieve in practice. There is also a tension here since ‘compulsion’ does not appear on the surface of it to be to be a very effective strategy for novelty, still less for innovation.

2.2.1 Power to the Partnership

Despite enthusiasm about the partnership panacea there are many disappointed commentators who view partnership as largely leaving existing power relationships intact. Arguing that partnership working has too often been dominated by the more powerful partners and has not ‘delivered’, especially for the communities and service users who are now a required to ‘window-dress’ most partnership arrangements. Byrne, writing in this vein concludes concludes:

Is empowerment possible? The answer would seem to be: not through partnership, because that at best attempts to reconcile irreconcilables and at worst, which means usually in practice, offers the objects of policy, at the very most, some role in influencing the implementation of strategies that have already been decided upon. This is incorporation, not partnership (Byrne, 2001, p. 256).
Charges of incorporation and the quest, to ‘reconcile irreconcilables’ has led Rowe (2004, 2006) to reverse the emancipatory language of Kanter (1989,1994), who writes positively about giants learning to dance, or partnership development as a succession of successful stages from courtship to marriage. In his analysis partnerships have the properties of an unequal relationship that a strong partner uses to dominate a weak partner (Rowe, 2004). His more recent work (2006) narrates that LSPs in developing their Community Strategies, contrary to feeling like enabling and pragmatic spaces, are prescribed and directed from above, where partnerships act to ‘airbrush out’ legitimate political difference resulting in bland pronouncements where only the least contentious elements make it to the anal document. Others have also shown how political and institutional inertia may thwart strategic development and restrict the extent to which local government and its partners could operate Davies (2004) also bags up this issue, describing the contemporary as a ‘punctuated phase’ of partnership working:

Partnerships are unstable ensembles where values clash, interests differ, state-centred hierarchies persist and a stable path-dependent trajectory seems elusive. Arguably, then we are in a punctuated phase and the growth of informal network styles of governance is but one possible outcome (Davies 2004, p. 570).

These critiques have gained ground with communities wary of processes of ‘Non-sultation’ where narrow policy options are delivered to communities for a ‘community-proofing’ tick-boxing or ‘Astro-turfing’ The latter describing a context where an initiative is designed to look participatory and ‘grass-roots’ but essentially just re-articulates the ‘shadow of hierarchy’(Whitehead 2003) There have been innumerable studies of partnership working. The surveys associated with the first evaluation of LSPs (ODPM 2003) showed that ‘stakeholder engagement’ was a crucial factor; both achieving the ‘appropriate membership and balancing inclusivity’ and keeping ‘numbers manageable’ whilst ‘securing the buy-in and commitment of partners.’ ‘Maintaining momentum’ and members ‘interest’ avoiding ‘partnership fatigue’ and partners prioritising their ‘day job’ over partnership, developing a ‘sense of trust and shared ownership’ and ‘demonstrating the value of the time input required’ were all defined as ‘challenges.’ But that brokerage within new spaces of partnership may stretch the competences of those charged with this new way of working is not emphasised. Despite this lack of guidance in the ‘nuts and bolts’ partnerships to lead on urban regeneration initiatives in the UK claim to facilitate inter-agency working and local involvement. They are presented both as ways of ensuring the effective management of services within neighbourhoods and as potential ‘change agents’ in the way they bring together different (and sometimes competing) interest groups. Regeneration partnerships are, therefore, often the sites of unresolved conflict
The problem with maintaining the received explanations for partnership working is that they usually ignore the issues of conflict and power. The ideal type of partnership working requires a shift in power held by professionals to a sharing of decision making between groups who have different interests but shared (time limited) goals. As a necessary first step we need to acknowledge the fact that conflict is inherent in the process. (Diamond, 2002 pp 300)

Also ‘ideal types’ are all very well but such shifts are profoundly challenging to the identity of those working in spaces of partnership governance. ‘For officers used to the formality of the council committee structure partnership arrangements can be quite a long way from their comfort zones’ (source, interview data, LA officer, 2008) Quite on the contrary to acknowledging or resolving conflict ‘agreements’, ‘partnerships’ and ‘concordats’ are couched in a language of ‘consensus’ Which is quite at odds with being able to acknowledge the roles of wider structural, social or spatial inequalities in generating the conditions which regeneration partnerships are designed to challenge. This normative position is articulated by the Audit Commission’s report On Governing Partnerships (Audit Commission 2005). They report that on the one hand, partnerships can be a flexible and innovative response to the complex issues that cannot be resolved by any single organisation. The evidence suggests that the benefits brought by partnership working are mainly qualitative and local, but there is little hard information about impact. On the other, they are not without risks. They take up a lot of time and other resources, but also they argue that ‘Working across organisational boundaries brings complexity and ambiguity that can generate confusion and weaken accountability.’ (p324) Clear internal accountability is needed between partners as well as external accountability to the public.

2.2.2 Leadership within partnership spaces of governance

Although much has been written about leadership (and management) in general, there has been relatively little research on the exercise of leadership in inter-organisational settings or city-wide, multi-sector partnerships (Sweeting et al, p. 350). Leadership may be individual and personal or corporate. Strong elected mayors are cited as examples of the former.

The persistence of policy around elected mayors and their role as highly visible individuals within localities has led Orr (2003) to ask ‘If elected mayors are the answer what was the question?’ so varied have the rationales underpinning calls for their introduction been.

If I were the elected mayor of Manchester what difference would it make to my ability to get things done? Buggler all (source: interview data, Richard Leese, June 2010)

Leadership, quite conversely may be formal or informal. It may be political or managerial. It can be identified in terms of position or behaviour. For the former, it is the formal
position held – such as Chair or Chief Executive – that is relevant, even though there remains much scope for different styles of leadership behaviour. This contrasts with leadership based upon reputation, that is, those who are perceived by others to be key leaders or opinion formers. The first LSP evaluation indicated that leadership is a complex issue:

[A] partnership offers no automatic connection between ‘leadership’ and ‘follower-ship – in other words when an LSP commands ‘jump’ it is not clear anyone necessarily jumps (ODPM and DfT 2006).

This can be due to credibility or personal authority in some cases but takes on a broader significance where linked to question of the drivers and levers at the disposal of the partnership. In the example of many partnerships they may become visible and publicly accountable for issues that they do not have the ability to resolve. Much work on cities focuses more on structures and ‘institutional thickness’ than on importance of governance and leadership and a consideration of the circumstances affecting them however, it is uncertain how influential this is in promoting good economic performance. Marshall (2005) points out that the North East is the most ‘institutionally thick’ part of the country but also the worst performing. (Marshall p.7) as Buck et al indicate

It is in the very nature of governance that there should be relatively unpredictable and variable outcomes. … Whereas conceptual literatures tend to assume that structural, institutional changes determine the way institutions are used, … it is central to the study of governance that the behaviour of a range of actors (within and between institutions) affects outcomes in ways that, cumulatively, can be important. (Buck p.277)

An OECD study of urban and metropolitan governance throughout the developed world published in 2001 underlined the importance of governance arrangements for achieving economic outcomes but argued that governance structures in most OECD countries were outdated and not well adapted to the tasks they face. It pointed out three major obstacles to better governance:

(1) the fragmentation of administrative jurisdiction which results in a lack of correspondence between administrative and functional territories;
(2) strain on the financial and fiscal ability of local authorities in metropolitan areas;
(3) a lack of transparent, accountable decision making processes.

It also stated that there is no one ideal model repeating the truism that governance structures must be tailored to specific circumstances. The regeneration partnership activity can be seen as defined by their response to these ‘obstacles’ and how far responsibility was devolved without these levers being addressed. It is also worth noting that ‘partnership failure’ rooted in any one of these fundamental dimensions is somewhat underplayed in an area which prefers to discuss ‘good practice’ than ‘systemic failure’.
2.3 Agency and Action within partnerships

Making sense of and negotiating the fluid and contradictory spaces of partnership, and the ‘variable and unpredictable outcomes’ described above is a key aspect of the identity work of public sector officers and managers, indeed it is critical to their personal and professional survival (Benviste, 1977) Strategies include; the designation of output measures, rules such as bureaucratic risk avoidance, excessive co-ordination, documented histories and ‘doing nothing.’ Managers are very often characterised as pragmatists who have to navigate a fluid policy environment fraught with politics and infused with micro-power struggles. As Shields (1996, p. 391) has highlighted in relation to the North American public sector:

Public administrators practice in a world of paradox and contradiction, disorder and pattern. They may be required to narrow their focus and concentrate on rules and regulations. On the other hand, public administrators may need bargaining skills to ensure that organizational conflict is resolved.

Work on the social–psychological effects of working within these complexities for the ‘frontline bureaucrat’ (Considine and Lewis, 1999), or the street-level bureaucrat (Lipsky xxx) demonstrates at the micro-scale how peopled organisations actually operate (Durose 2009) A key point here is the effect on the identity of those charged with negotiating and navigating an environment characterised by continual change and reform. Clearly a factor is how far reforms are felt to constrain, or reduce the ability of managers to act pragmatically or professionally, and how far (and how quickly) modified actions and strategies are developed. The caricature of the capable, but cynical local authority manager ‘weathering’ whatever emerges, and concentrating on ‘business as usual’ is only one of the actor strategies delineated by Van der Pennan (2005) whose description of policy networks for urban governance in the Netherlands focuses on the varieties of ways that individuals within municipalities adapt new strategies in order to attempt to balance procedural, process or material steering. ‘Business as usual’ is another way of framing Beneviste’s ‘doing nothing’ For these authors the best strategy for the mitigation of failure is through peer-regulation. making the development of trust relationships as key to professional survival and advancement. ‘Correction’ is not assured to come from higher authority (as in a hierarchical structure) but be internalised through a self-reflexive process of norm adoption;

Trust is built gradually over the length of bureaucratic careers, and it is central to bureaucratic survival. But trust is easily lost. When personal careers are at stake – when the issues are highly controversial — it is difficult for anyone to be sure that others will behave elegantly. (Beneviste, 1977 pp 152)
Further empirical work with both frontline personnel and service managers (perhaps in search of such ‘elegance’) has also sought to connect attitudes to waves of reform, arguing that ‘a hybrid form of bureaucracy is emerging which combines some of the traditional procedural bureaucracy with flexibility, user focus and professional pride’ (Berg, 2006, p. 556) These appeals to elegant behaviour, to the emotional intelligence and notions of pride bring to mind George Bernard Shaw’s observation on the relationships between ‘manners’ and ‘laws’ ‘Manners are more important than laws and upon them, to a great deal, the law depends.’ (ref)

Further Sweeting et al were able to identify three approaches to leadership in urban governance:

(1) Designed and focused leadership is explicitly built into institutional structures and clearly focuses on the contribution of individuals in exercising leadership. This type is highly dependent on external policy and is not constrained by partnership arrangements, but individual style and success in generating support are also significant.

(2) Implied and fragmented leadership or distributed governance exists in a system of loose governance where multi-organisational partnerships coexist in a fragmented system and where no single organisation or person offers clear direction, but rather “a number of potential leaders hold multiple membership of several partnerships which may imply the presence of integrated leadership but in practice may fail to offer it”. (p.361) It provides a consensual – but sometimes confused – view of direction and can lack visibility.

(3) Emergent and formative leadership emerges as a consequence of the behaviour of partners within the structures and processes of partnership working. In this case, leadership means ‘making things happen’ and derives authority from getting things done. It rests on a pragmatic approach based upon organisational and inter-organisational learning. This type is less dependent on the policy environment, but partnership arrangements are highly influential and personal style in the capacity to build networks and trust and relationships with followers are also important.

There are also theories which emphasise the distributed leadership shared across partnership governance spaces. There are also different roles leaders can play which include giving political direction; identifying and acting upon opportunities; coalition building; lobbying; building institutional capacity; driving decision making and activity. Sweeting et al (2003) identify these roles or leadership styles more specifically:
champion – taking forward the partnership’s goals;

salesperson – selling the partnership and its achievements to others to generate more resources and support;

broker – moving between networks as a negotiator, bringing resources or putting project packages together;

c-co-ordinator – mediating, bringing partners together, ensuring information is shared;

manager – ensuring effective operation of the partnership, the delivery of outputs and fulfilment of contractual obligations;

visionary – inspiring the partnership to think long-term;

representative – reflecting particular interests and ensuring their voice is heard;

agent provocateur – seeking to provoke action, generating controversy or conflict.

scratch beneath the surface of any successful partnership you will invariably find one or more individuals who have taken on the role of the partnership’s “broker”. Brokers rarely receive recognition and acknowledgement... But the role is essential and without it a partnership based development initiative is highly unlikely to achieve its goal... Partnerships are complicated and difficult and the broker’s role is crucial. (Ansett, 2006).

Brokerage, rapidly emerging as critical to negotiating partnership spaces connects with the appeal to ‘bargaining skills’ above and is linked to the is the notion of the importance of the ‘generic skills for place-making’ emphasised in the Egan Review (2003) of which ‘brokerage’ and ‘problem solving across partners’ were identified as of critical professional importance.
2.4 Regeneration as re-branding

Given the problems inherent to genuinely redistributive regeneration and the ambivalence with which Labour approached the needs of deprived areas, and combined with the difficulties associated with successful leadership in order to construct alternate imaginaries for places it in some quarters Third Way ‘regeneration’ has looked increasingly like a re-branding exercise as opposed to anything more fundamental as regards social and spatial inequalities. The regeneration ‘industry’ has adopted some of the tactics of corporate entities in adapting city promotion and marketing strategies in order to boost their competitiveness and attractiveness to investment. The incorporation of the tools of marketers into the repertoire of the urban manager has been a feature of regeneration since the millennium. (Hospers 2008)

2.4.1 Branding and Place marketing

The upsurge of branding in urban planning is not only related to the penetration of practices from the private domain into the public domain, but also to the increased competition between regions and cities to attract people and resources. (Eshuis and Edelenbos, 2008 pg 273)

There have been some studies of the promotion of individual and groups of places, since Burgess’ (1982) pioneering account of promotional media used in UK local authorities. (At this stage largely very unsophisticated photocopied pages advertising vacant office space!)

Ever since Milton Glaser’s iconic I love NY campaign in 1979, Cities have been keen to create visual identities and brands. The practices of place branding have taken on increasing sophistication, and resource intensiveness. This has led to some scholars to approach the city itself as a commodity, in order to study the images and stories bound up with this external presentation of the city. Trueman et al. (2001:8-13) argue that given the importance afforded to this reputational capital within cities that there is an urgent need for a robust analysis of the city as a brand suggesting that it may be useful to look at the literature on corporate identity since;

it offers the dimension of culture to underpin corporate values. It is possible to examine the city as a brand using conventional typologies for brand analysis providing sufficient weight is given to different stakeholders.

There is, of course a methodological issue inherent in this suggestion defining urban actors and the ‘weight’ to accord to the ‘different stakeholders’ runs the risk of further airbrushing marginalised voices out of the picture you end up constructing.
Arguably such symbolic assets are of huge reputational worth in maintaining the discourse of that place (Holt 2006) Almost 20 years after Burgess’ pioneering study Hankinson (2001) studied the practice of branding in 12 English cities, discovering that it was both widely used and little understood

very few marketing specialists have given much thought to its application to places, treated as products, and, if they do, they too easily assume that places are just spatially extended products that require little special attention as a consequence of their spatiality. Equally public sector planners have long been prone to the adoption, overuse and then consignment to oblivion, of fashionable slogans as a result perhaps of their necessity to convince political decision-makers who place a premium on novelty, succinctness and simplicity. (Hankinson 2001, pp 414)

A critical notion of place as a ‘spatially extended product’ is particularly apposite in the context of governance structures which are elastic concepts in themselves. In the context of the Manchester City Region Tom Bloxham (in the following quote) emphasises that the spatially extended product has to at some point connect to a material reality;

Marketing has developed so much over the last ten years, that all sorts of products, good and bad, are using good covers and good logos. Therefore it’s very important nowadays not to judge a book by its cover or by its packaging. Peter (Saville’s) point very, very strongly was never mind the brand, the first thing we’ve got to do is think about the product it’s offering. I think that’s very astute. Of course there’s still a lot of work to do. (Source: GM imagineer, interview data, 2008)

2.5 Summary

This chapter has looked at the role of the partnership panacea in governance instance by its use within urban policy. It acknowledged some of the conflicts and currents under the surface of partnership entities, and that their use in the early phase of the Labour government led to para-static proliferation and paradox. It views this policy area is both dynamic and unstable and that the rules of engagement within partnerships may lead to uncomfortable positions regarding authority, ability and professional autonomy. As if the challenges of adaptation to these structural changes were not enough of a challenge for the contemporary urban bureaucrat we have seen in this chapter some of the challenges to professional identities are configured through governance and how far leadership and scope for action and agency are subject to instability and variable outcomes not least in the range of actor strategies deployed by those peopling partnership governance spaces. It suggests that brokerage is assuming central importance in the skill set of public officials who may adopt any number of behaviours in pulling the levers available to them. In addition to the repertoires and strategies of leading across the contested spaces of partnership governance the possibility of being mobilised as guardian of the cultural commodity of a brand has been mooted as a potential area for regeneration denuded of its connotations of social or spatial justice and operating in the superficial and commodified world of the construction, maintenance and circulation of the brand of a place.
Chapter III Modes of Governance

3.1 Introduction

Having introduced the ways in which urban policy and partnership create collaborative spaces and some of the emerging skills required to successfully lead within partnership settings. In this chapter we seek to synthesise the underpinning literatures on the manner in which institutional forms connect and hybridise and the ways in which balances are sought between markets and hierarchies and their bureaucracies. It brings together the extensive literatures on networks drawn from across public administration, political and organisational sciences and other social science disciplines and sketches some of the challenges of meta-governance and ‘steering’ in advanced post-industrial nations.

The Third chapter is structured thus: Firstly the chapter introduces the wide literatures on markets, networks and hierarchies, discusses some of the definitional problems of what is described as the ‘muddled middle’. It argues that differentiating between market, hierarchy and network as modes of control and regulation of social life is useful in differentiating between modes and orders of control and regulation but that there is a lot of confusion about whether networks are brought into being through combining market and hierarchy approaches to create hybrids or networks are independent modes of governance in their own right.

Secondly, the chapter unpacks the less established of the three modes, that of governance by network to tease out some of the key issues presented, particularly the difference between ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ network explanations outlining the properties and dysfunctions of these modes of governance and how these modes interact to create governance hybrids. There is a good deal of variety in views about the degree to which local governance systems in the UK are ‘reticulated’ (or networked) either rhetorically or in reality. How far networks exist and what relationships that they have to formal power structures, to markets, and to citizens is explored. In terms of definitional precision it is important to differentiate between; network-ing, policy networks, networked governance, governance by network and the operation of second generation governance mechanisms.

Third, the chapter situates this discussion on modes of governance from within ‘the turn to governance’ Fourthly we contrast views about the ontological and philosophical basis of contrasting conceptions of the ‘governance of governance’ considering the utility of ‘governmentality’ with ‘governability’. Lastly we differentiate between modes of
governance at scale and explain that (re-scaling literature notwithstanding) it is the scope for action at various scales which it is most important to understand in order to make judgements about institutional design or governance as practiced. Here we look at the scope of various types of governance networks and the usefulness of differentiating between localities as; sites of governance within a centralised polity, decentralised governance spaces, or truly distributed governance spheres

In Summary this review of the literature seeks provide a grounded basis to understand the array of to the following dimensions which are of interest to the study of governance networks such as those brought into being by the policy mechanisms of Multi and Local Area Agreements.
3.2 Market / Hierarchy Definitions in ‘the Muddled Middle’

It is now widely recognized that political decision-making is not confined to the formal structures of government. Public policy is formulated and implemented through a plethora of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms and processes that are commonly referred to as governance (Pierre & Peters, 2000).

This ‘plethora’ of modes of modes of governance discussed here represent a ‘cacophony of heterogeneous concepts, theories and research results’ (Powell, 2006 ppt). Martin Powell’s 2003/4 systematic review of the literature covering 1990-2003 uncovered 268 peer reviewed publications defining some version of a market-hierarchy-network approach and a wide range of disagreements on number of modes, their definitions, their characteristics and the relationships between them. This results in ‘a terminological jungle where any newcomer may plant a tree’ (Nohria, 1992) Definitions abound, with their differing emphases, the following introducing the notion of exploring the ‘capacity of the institutional matrix’

Governance can be defined as ‘the capacity of a country’s institutional matrix (in which individual actors, firms, social groups, civic organizations and policy makers interact with each other) to implement and enforce public policies and to improve private-sector coordination (Ahrens, 2002, pp. 128–9).

Seen from this position, govern-ance is presented as inherently about questions of structure and agency, focusing on the interactions within and between actors. This describes a discretely different “moment” than the one in which the study of govern-ment sought to explain. Arguably studying formal institutions and structures is a necessary but insufficient way to explain the way in which the “institutional matrix” operates, and with what effects.

Governance refers to the processes through which organisations and institutions articulate interest, mediate differences, formulate and implement policy, exercise rights and obligations, manage resources and perform functions. Ultimately, governance is about people: structures, institutions, policies and, above all, relationships. (Governance.net)

It is worth noting that the turn to governance has been felt most acutely as European countries respond to the way in which their national interest is nested within the supranational structures of the European Union. (Eu) Exploring these trends in a European Context as Gualini writes;

The relevance of theorising scale for governance studies related to an understanding of governance as a set of emergent practices and as a process – that is based on a set of assumptions
“governance” implies a redefinition of patterns of legitimacy and effectiveness of public action
“governance” implies a redefinition of scales of public action
“governance” implies a co-evolution of the institutional context for public action
This view; of redefinition of patterns of legitimacy, scales of activity and this final point of the “co-evolution” of the institutional context suggest that simple explanations of why what happens happens are likely to be inadequate. The notion of the ‘mechanism mix’ and the ‘institutional matrix’ are very important as they suggest how far governing is reliant on the precise calibration of institutions which are designed and which evolve.

Table 3 Trilogies of orders of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Heterarchy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Laws</td>
<td>Combinations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within scholarly work on modes of co-ordination about a trilogy of orders of governance in operation there are three clear modes defined. Modes of co-ordination and regulation by market or hierarchy connect with clear political philosophies and shape the 20th century’s political ideologies. ‘Market forces’ have been presented as opposing ‘Statist’ or ‘welfarist’ solutions. Arguably this terrain has become even more overgrown with very many scholars exploring ‘new modes of control’ (Hoggett 1996) within public administration and charting the rise of ‘new organisational forms’ or hybrid forms of accountability and delivery. It is the hope of this chapter to navigate the ‘terminological jungle’ and to concentrate on explaining the features and effects of different modes of governance. Scott’s work on “spontaneous accountability” does give very useful definitions of market-hierarchies and networks and his research explores the ways in which the modalities work together;

hybrid accountability regimes evolve in a way that might be expected to counter-balance weaknesses that are found in pure forms of accountability rooted in hierarchy, competition and community” (Scott and Storper 2003)

A key question is whether partnership governance networks are the product of combining markets and hierarchies or a discrete mode of governance in their own right. This is a question posited by Grahame Thompson et al. in their influential 1991 book on Markets Hierarchies and Networks. The diagrams over the page (Figs 2 & 3) demonstrate the two possibilities; the first showing the three forms combining and the second with the network as encompassing both market and hierarchical explanations;
Figure 3 Combination of market, hierarchy and network
(Thompson et al, 1991 pg 17)

According to this figure the three forms connect and combine and governance hybrids would exist where the three modes overlap. This figure proposes that networks are modes in their own right and are part of the mechanisms mix with hierarchies and networks.

Figure 4 Network encompassing market and hierarchy
(Thompson et al, 1991 pg 18)

This model is completely different, according far more power to the Network explanation under which a Network would totally encompass hierarchies and markets. This represents the absolute extent of network enthusiasm. Here networks are seen not only as discrete forms in their own right but superceding the ‘old’ problems of market and hierarchy with a new mode of governance.
The emphasis on networks in the governance literature is designed to capture decision-making processes that are decentralised and characterised by fluidity, which is necessary to cope with what sociologists have identified as rapid processes of social change, intense societal complexity and instability (Castells 1996) (Jessop 2002). These characteristics of networks draw attention to their distinctiveness from hierarchies and markets as modes of governance. The following table is useful in presenting practical and useable definitions of the modes of governance.

**Table 4 Modes of governance**
(Powell 1991 pg 269).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative basis</th>
<th>MARKET</th>
<th>HIERARCHY</th>
<th>NETWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract – property rights</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Complementary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relationship</td>
<td>strengths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of communication</td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Routines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of conflict resolution</td>
<td>Haggling – resort to</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>courts</td>
<td>Flat – supervision</td>
<td>reputational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of flexibility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of commitment</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone or climate</td>
<td>Precision</td>
<td>Formal bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and/or suspicion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mutual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor preferences or choices</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This explains the network as discrete from the markets and hierarchies which preceded it emphasising the interdependence, relational and reciprocal character of the network, and the high level of commitment required from those involved to making it work. In contrast a market is defined as flexible and independent but regulated by recourse to legal means. As Hayek (1945) suggests “market co-ordination is the result of human actions but not of human design”. Powell explains the key role of price mechanisms thus;

"prices are a simplifying mechanism, consequently they are unsuccessful at capturing the intricacies of idiosyncratic, complex and dynamic exchange. As a result markets are a poor device for learning and the transfer of technological know-how.” (Thompson et. al ed. 1993 pg 271) (Thompson 1991)

The defining simplicity of markets, then, is counter posed against their capacity for learning and “knowledge transfer” In contrast the defining characteristic of hierarchies is their stability. In his work on the ideal form of bureaucracy Weber defines this as

"a structure of the everyday... defining stability as one of its most important characteristics” (Weber, 197 pg 226)
Formal bureaucracies, however, particularly to their detractors, are not known for their flexibility, due to their control being exerted through routines and employment relationships. Hierarchies are characterised by clear roles and lines of control and authority and directive processes within organisations. They orient towards bureaucratic positivist modes of decision-making based on problem solving through expertise rather than local experience.

Hierarchy, generally, is losing its legitimacy while partnership is in the ascendant as different interest groups flex their muscles and individuals start to take back control of their lives from organizations and governments. (Handy, 2004: 98)

The third mode, of the network is presented as relational and defined by reciprocity and reputation. According to this tradition networks represent a new social and sociological category. The following tables (5 & 6) draw on a classic thought problem from sociology positing collaborative governance, or the post-bureaucracy, as a discrete societal category.

Table 5 Three forms of community
(Adler and Heckscher, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Gemeinschaft</th>
<th>Gesellschaft</th>
<th>Collaborative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
<td>“Mechanical” Division of labour co-ordinated by common norms</td>
<td>“Organic” division of labour co-ordinated by price and/or authority</td>
<td>Growth in organic division of labour co-ordinated by conscious co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of interdependencies</td>
<td>Vertical dependence</td>
<td>Horizontal Independence</td>
<td>Collaborative interdependence, both horizontal and vertical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tie network structure</td>
<td>Local, closed</td>
<td>Global, open</td>
<td>More global, open ties as well as stronger local ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values Basis of trust</td>
<td>Loyalty Honour Duty Status deference</td>
<td>Integrity Competence Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Contribution Concern Honesty Collegiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of legitimate authority</td>
<td>Tradition or charisma</td>
<td>Rational-legal justification</td>
<td>Value-rationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td>Consistent rational individualism</td>
<td>Simultaneously high collectivism and individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation to others</td>
<td>Particularism</td>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Simultaneously high particularism and universalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation to self</td>
<td>Dependent self-construction and self - concept</td>
<td>Independent self-construction and self - concept</td>
<td>Interdependent Self-construction and self - concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Post-bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. There is a clear hierarchy of offices</td>
<td>1. Hierarchies are flattened. Horizontal connections are emphasized.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The functions of each office are clearly specified;</td>
<td>2. Significant parts of the organization’s activity are no longer conducted by specific ‘offices’ with a fixed place in the hierarchy, but rather by temporary teams or networks which may include outsiders of various sorts. Additionally a major change in many public sectors has been the widespread shift to outsourcing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Officials are appointed on the basis of a contract;</td>
<td>3. Officials are still appointed on contracts, but the nature of these contracts becomes more variable. More and more are temporary or short term, and are tied to the achievement of specified goals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. They are selected on the basis of a transparent set of requirements for certain levels of education/training;</td>
<td>4. Appointments may still be made on the basis of transparent criteria but the variety of criteria for the variety of roles becomes greater. All sorts of specialists may be hired on all sorts of specialist or local terms. This may well weaken the general sense of uniformity and hierarchy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. They are paid a salary, linked to hierarchical position, and accrue pension rights;</td>
<td>5. Salaries also become less uniform and less predictable. Top executives may be paid salaries to ‘reflect the market’. At all levels of the hierarchy performance-related pay (PRP) means that competitive elements are injected.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Their posts are their sole or major occupations;</td>
<td>6. At all levels, there is more part-time and temporary working. For many in the post-bureaucratic organization their ‘post’ may be only one of the things they do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. There is a career structure, and promotion is by seniority or merit (or some mixture), decided by the superior ranks;</td>
<td>7. There is a career structure, but it may involve jumping from organization to organization, from public sector to private sector and back, in order to ‘get on’. This alters patterns of loyalty, and the depth of experience high-flyers get of organizations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Management of the office relies upon written files – decisions are inscribed in an official record;</td>
<td>8. The principle that decisions should be recorded is maintained, but the ways in which such recording takes place have become faster and more varied most notably through electronic systems.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The official may not appropriate the post or the resources which go with it;</td>
<td>9. The individual still may not appropriate the post or its resources. On the other hand, the increasing rate of movement between organizations, the increasing rate of part-time working for more than one organization, and the growing participation of for-profit companies in the delivery of public services, combine to create larger possibilities for conflicts of interest.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The official is subject to unified control, and a disciplinary system;</td>
<td>10. The official is subject to control and discipline, but 6, 7 and 9 above all tend to weaken the effect of these controls on a significant proportion of staff.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The whole organization is rule-governed, and those rules are law or law-like.</td>
<td>11. The whole organization remains rule-governed, but (a) (at least rhetorically), flexibility and initiative are said to be prized more than ‘rule-following’; (b) more of the rules are likely to be ‘soft’ – codes of practice; guidelines, for example; and (c) the rules are likely to change more quickly which also makes them harder to learn and internalize.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Herein the collaborative mode is defined by simultaneity – a logic more of “both-and” than of “either-or.” Following mainstream scholarship, a ‘pure’ bureaucracy would possess features digested by Christopher Pollit into the Table 6 (on the previous page) delineating the features of the classical bureaucracy. This work is very important in teasing out the precise differences between bureaucracies and contemporary governance forms, and in connecting the possibilities for the post-bureaucratic state in mitigating the implicit criticism of the functioning of the governmental apparatus. As we can see from the changes delineated between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic forms are significant, not least by virtue of the effects of the experience of those peopling them.

Perhaps there was a time when the term bureaucracy had a settled meaning and the institutions it defined had a standard purpose. If so this time has passed. In its place has emerged a variety of bureaucracies, temporary and fixed, public and private... this profusion of bureaucracies raises important questions concerning the work that bureaucrats do (Considine and Lewis, 1999, p. 467).

Application of some of this thinking to the features of systems of centralisation in contract to those of functional differentiation can be summarised in this useful diagram contrasting the properties of centralisation to more devolved arrangements.

Figure 5 Centralisation to devolution, functional differentiation, Pickstone

So then in addition to the notion of multiple bureaucracies there are also different scales at which to operate under which administrative, fiscal or functional devolution could be achieved either through a marketised response or an appeal through the ‘open societies and differentiated markets’ or this new category of the community, or gemeinschaft.
The arrangements outlined by Pickstone in Figure 4 (previous page) link with those badged as Bureaucracies within Table 6, Column 1 on page 44. Consequently we can see that a centralised state could operate as a hierarchical, functionally specific, contractual, rule-bound structure with merit governing selection and advancement, a clear career trajectory, clear boundaries between work done, resource use and clear and well defined templates.

The more differentiated, heterogeneous and devolved arrangements become the further we move towards the conditions of the post-bureaucratic which is characterised quite conversely by fluidity and complexity in terms of institutional arrangements and the strategies deployed within them. Difference, then destroys the stability of the classical bureaucracy, either in terms of scales, tiers and levels it is required to deploy or in terms of a fragmenting population.

3.3 Networks from “light to heavy” explanatory use

Networks from “light” to “heavy” explanatory use

- networking, as an activity entered into by myriad actors in order to facilitate connections and innovation
- policy networks, a sophisticated way of describing and analysing how the policy process accommodates the perspectives of various stakeholders in preparing legislation.
- networked governance, which posits that there are many loci of control within a polity and that networks enter the “co-ordination mix” alongside markets and hierarchies
- Governance by network, arrangements resulting in political polycentricity operating to the exclusion of markets and hierarchies

It is possible to develop further this distinction between networking and network structures with reference to the political science conception of governance, which underpins much of the discussion in the Anglo-Governance school. In contrast to networking, network structures result in new values, new attitudes, changed perceptions and ‘actively doing something’.

A critical feature of network structures is that they order action such that the behaviour of participants is altered from that which they would engage in as individual actors (Mandell, 1994, p. 109). As we have already seen there is a lot of enthusiasm for the network as a description for contemporary reality. There are also those who argue that after a decade of ‘taking networks seriously’ (O’Toole, Walker et al. 2007) that the concept does little to illuminate anything very much due to vagueness and overuse in the literature. Rod Rhodes
warned in 1990 that ‘the concept of policy networks is becoming ubiquitous’ (Rhodes 2000) and for Mark Considine ‘if there was a repetitive strain index for social science concepts this one might be in a full body cast by now’ (Considine 2002) (We will go on to discuss the ways in which we can move from metaphor to method in the following chapter on methodology.)

Information and communications technology has some responsibility for propelling the use of the network metaphor as a central organising principle for society, following Manuel Castells epic trilogy connecting technological innovation to social organisation which concludes;

Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic modifies the operation and outcome in process of production, experience power and culture (Castells 1996)

If the study of networks enables integration of differentiated and diffuse social processes and the possibility of moving through levels, with individuals situated as nodes within a wider network structure then they are surely worth paying attention to. Enthusiasm for networks has infected the policy community as well as the academy. Demos, the influential UK Think tank begin their 2004 collection ‘Network logic; who governs in an interconnected world’ extolling the virtues and risks of network based approaches to governance problems

They are all around us, We rely on them. We are part of them Networks shape our world, but they can be confusing; no obvious leader or centre, no familiar structure and no easy diagram to describe to them. Networks self organise, morphing and changes as they react to interference or breakdown. Networks are the language of our times but our institutions are not programmed to understand them (DEMOS, 2004 pg 3)

Despite the focus in this chapter on modes of governance emphasising structures, institutions and organisations it must not be forgotten that spaces of governance are peopled, and the roles, rules, activities and behaviours of those actors interplays with the structural and institutional dimensions. (This is the rationale for the sections concerning leadership and brokerage as contained within Chapter 2 of the thesis).

It is notable that despite a well-developed literature on networks further analytical clarity is required in relation to the governance role of these new network arrangements, as understood by political scientists; as it stands there has been a tendency to conflate networks with networked governance. In order to differentiate between some of the ways in which networks are deployed within social science the taxonomy outlined at (3.3 pg 45) has been developed; differentiating between behaviour/action and style defined as ‘light’
use of the network concept through to ‘heavy’ (or over-) use of networks to explain the contemporary polity.

The existing literature on policy networks and network governance also includes a wealth of material on how governments seek to govern in an era when the certainties and solidities of modernity are perceived as melting into air. This literature considers the following (1) strategies for co-ordination in terms of political economy; (2) the changing role government relations in an environment if complex systems; (3) the re-aligning of formal and informal relations between and within trans-national, national and sub-national levels and (4) the emasculation of traditional mechanisms of command and control as government shifts form hierarchy to heterarchy. “The literature points to the emergence of new patterns of governance, and especially a mix of hierarchy, networks and markets” (Bevir and Richards, 2009 pp 139)

This quotation contains within it the key areas of ‘strategies for co-ordination’ under conditions of ‘complexity’ at multiple scales and the shift from ‘hierarchy to heterarchy’. It may be then that Networks are ‘lighter on their feet than hierarchies’ but in no sense should they be viewed as ‘simple’ modes

In networks modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex they involve neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the hierarchy. A basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be made in the pooling of resources. In essence, the parties to a network agree to forgo to pursue their own interest at the expense of others” (Thompson et al eds. pg 272)

In positing a discrete political economy of network exchange defined by reciprocity and collaboration it is clear that the benign network could offer a remedy to the challenges of the pure forms themselves. There are, however, sceptics suggesting that in network enthusiasm does not match with reality. Jonathan Davies (2000) explains that in parts of the governance literature ‘evidence of local networking is evidence of local governance’ (Davies 2002) Erik-Hans Klijn (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Klijn and Koppenjan 2006; Klijn and Skelcher 2007) has also highlighted the gap between the ‘dream’ and ‘reality’ of partnership arrangements involving cooperative governance, arguing that ‘while there is an intensified interaction between public and private partners, there is little joint decision making and continuity in cooperation’ (p. 198).

David Wilson (Wilson 1998) has indicated that while the central state is increasingly consulting local government in Britain, this can be understood as a process of multi-level dialogue rather than multi-level governance involving real power. Despite the wide variety of actors participating in an extensive array of meetings, few of these groups demonstrate decision-making influence (p. 335). As Mike Marinetto explains, even if local networks are autonomous from the central space, there needs to be further analysis as to whether they are serving a governance function or whether they are just a loose arrangement of social actors
involved in talk. (Marinetto 2003) (This point links with the problems of power within partnerships in Chapter 2)

Networks involve negotiated agreement that can be contrasted with majoritarian decision-making and hierarchical directives. Networks can also be contrasted with markets, which involve atomistic arms-length contractual interactions between utility-maximising actors. In contrast to hierarchies and markets, within networks there is decentralisation of power and decision-making and a blurring of roles and responsibilities (Stoker, 1998). Jessop has described network processes as being based on ‘reflexive rationality’ involving attempts at negotiation and steering for the purpose of shaping common world views among actors in the pursuit of coordinated solutions (Jessop, 2002, pp. 229–30).

This reflexivity is also emphasised by Bang and Esmark in Table 7 (below) who argue that it is the dynamic between globalisation and ‘self-programmable’ labour which defines networked economies. This linked to a social life defined by heterogeneity and a politics of complexity.

Table 7 Types and aspects of society
Bang and Esmark 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of society</th>
<th>The Economy</th>
<th>The Social</th>
<th>The Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialized</td>
<td>Antagonism and opposition between national capital and labour</td>
<td>Pattern maintenance and normative integration</td>
<td>Goal attainment as legitimate or illegitimate domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Collaboration between globalized capital and ‘self-programmable’ labour</td>
<td>Pattern innovation and ethical resonance among different belief systems</td>
<td>Creative leadership and management in face of increasing complexity and reflexivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, by emphasising the specific political challenges instanced by network formations this work is ambivalent about the governance innovation effect on the bureaucrats charged with managing the system. Rod Rhodes, whose long interest in the field posits networking as a superior mode of governance, arguing that it is both possible and desirable to govern by network in the contemporary UK.

Hierarchy (Rhodes, 2000 pp 358)
(1) A high degree of *state control*, the result of policies such as nationalization.

(2) A large *bureaucratic machine*.

(3) *Legitimacy* to undertake large-scale intervention in society.

(4) The *incorporation* of key economic groups into the policy process.

(5) A high degree of *consensus* between officials and politicians over their role in governing and decision making.

Echoing the delineation of the bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy Rhodes’ legitimate state bureaucracy is defined by consensus, clarity and homogeneity. In short it has the levers available to govern a certain kind of society only.

Networks (Rhodes 2000 pp 359)

(1) A shift from bureaucratic management to *decentralized* and *delayed* management.

(2) A tendency to set overall *direction* of policy rather than detail of policy

(3) Control over a *smaller* public sector.

(4) The *exclusion* of economic groups from the policy process.

(5) *Loss of consensus* between officials and politicians.

In his extensive writing on the relative roles of market hierarchy and network he views forms of networked governance not as hybrids of market or state centred approaches to governing but as a discretely different, alternative. In his more recent work returning to the topic he makes his position very clear (Rhodes 2007) The view that we are governed by autonomous networks does not sit easily with the view that the UK core executive is among the world’s most centralised political systems. And Rhodes has been broadly criticised from those arguing that the phenomenon of the policy network must be viewed as *part of the governance mix* rather than a *complete theory*. It may follow that, if as argued legislating is a property of a hierarchy and hierarchy is only one part of a ‘mechanism mix’, an ‘institutional matrix’ or a range of strategies for co-ordination that there must be alternative ways of governing emerging.

The term ‘network governance’ has two faces. First, it describes public sector change whether it is the increased fragmentation caused by the reforms of the 1980s or the joined-up governance of the 1990s, which sought to improve coordination between government departments and the multifarious other organizations. Second, it interprets British government; it says the hierarchic Westminster model of responsible government is no longer acceptable. We have to tell a different story of the shift from government with its narrative of the strong executive to governance through networks. The term always refers to the changing role of the state after the varied public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. In the UK context, where there is no state tradition comparable to the continental tradition of *rechtsstaat*, the literature on governance explores how the informal authority of networks supplements and
supplants the formal authority of government. It explores the limits to the state and seeks to develop a more
diverse view of state authority and its exercise.

Others, notably Parker (Parker 2007) have sought to unpack the conditions under which
governance networks may ‘go into their governing mode’, This list of conditions can be
usefully applied to test whether partnerships are truly functioning as governance entities
as distinct from partnerships functioning as which are ‘loose associations engaged in talk’,
her tests include;

**Networks requiring:**

1. Actors connected by *ties* and social relations
2. Decentralised decision-making involving *shared power* (absence of single-actor
   control and domination)
3. *Information transfer and reflectivity* (reflection on practice and world views)
4. Actors participate out of recognition that *they affect and are affected by* the behaviour of
   other actors

This notion, that it is societal heterogeneity which instances the need for alternate modes
of control typified by social ties, reflexivity, mutuality, sharing of power and collaboration
necessitates a shift to the mechanisms of governance away from prices (in markets) or
stability and rules (in hierarchies with stable predictable bureaucracies) And instead into a
system where

**Governance (decision-making, steering, negotiation and coordination of activities) requiring:**

1. Density (direct or indirect linkages between all nodes)
2. Breadth (incorporation of full range of innovation institutions)
3. Trust, mutuality, common identity

These tests connect with the perspective of system-wide governability as explained by
Kooiman (see pg 70) In delineating these properties he lists the requisite properties (in
Parkers terms how far it is able to ‘go into governing mode’) as diversity, complexity,
resilience and dynamics which connect to the elements of density, breadth and trust
explained above. The two positions are summarised within Table 8
### Table 8 Governability and Governance Conditions (author synthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kooiman’s properties of governance system (2003 pg)</th>
<th>Parker’s governance conditions (2007, pg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>Breadth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using these sets of characteristics and properties and viewing networks as using both network ties and social relations, concentrating on shared power, the role of knowledge, information and reflexivity within networks as well as the reciprocity of actors in the network and assessing the density, breadth and trust is an endeavour that suggests treating governing networks as networks for the purposes of interrogating these features. (see methodology Chapter 4) Reflecting on the potential scope of networks to perform discrete functions differently (or better) is a question which divides scholars.

#### 3.3.1 The Anglo-governance “school”: Networked Governance enthusiasm

In the UK context the ‘turn to governance’ has been widely described by various commentators and is very closely associated with ‘Third way’ policy prescriptions and the New Labour ‘long decade’ from 1997-2010. In this section the positions, influential within public administration in the UK, of Rod Rhodes,(Rhodes 1998; Rhodes 1999; Rhodes 2000; Rhodes 2000; Rhodes, Tyler et al. 2003; Rhodes, Tyler et al. 2005; Rhodes 2007) Gerry Stoker, (Stoker 2002; Stoker 2006)Janet Newman, (Newman and Thornley 1997; Newman 2001; Newman, Raine et al. 2001; Newman and Nutley 2003; Newman, Barnes et al. 2004; Newman 2005; Newman and McKee 2005; Newman and Vidler 2006; Newman 2007; Newman, Glendinning et al. 2008)and Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1998)are presented and discussed. These writers may be reasonably described as the Anglo-Governance school (Marinetto 2003) as they have provided general accounts of the shifts from government to governance. In this approach specific state initiatives are implicated in a transition to governance including; privatisation, contracting and marketisation which have created a plethora of quangos, public–private partnerships, sub-contractors and not-for profit organisations which the state now relies on for the delivery
of public services (Giddens 1998), pp. 28–33; Hay and Richards, 2000; (Richards and Smith 2004) Rhodes, 199 (Rhodes 1998; Rhodes 1999; Rhodes 2000; Rhodes 2000; Goss 2001; Goss 2007) It is argued that it is this practical fragmentation which necessitates a new way of understanding the business of governing.

Rod Rhodes’ highly influential governance thesis was that the state was losing its ability to act as a result of these processes and consequently the core executive. This has been taken up as describing the capacity of the ‘enabling’ state as “steering and not rowing” Osborne and Gaebler. Another key proponent of this approach is Gerry Stoker, (Stoke 1998; Stoker 2002; Stoker 2006) whose academic work as well as his heavy influence over the New Local Government Network argues that;

a governance perspective opens out an opportunity to think anew about the challenges facing local government and public administration more generally” (1996, i)

It is this balance, the wholly political business of identifying the proper remit and role of ‘the state’ and it's relationship to ‘the market’ which has led the anglo-governance school to describe fragmentation which sees a decline in the capacity of the central state to steer society (Pierre and Peters, 2000, pp. 83–91). (Pierre 1995). In Table 9 (below and over) Gerry Stoker cites a Cabinet Office publication in which a discrete ‘era of local governance’ is presented (in column iii)

Table 9 Eras of local governing (Stoker)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key objectives</th>
<th>Dominant ideologies</th>
<th>Definition of public interest</th>
<th>Accountability model</th>
<th>Service Delivery System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Elected local government in post-war setting</td>
<td>Professionalism and Party partisanship</td>
<td>By politicians / experts Little in the way of public input</td>
<td>Overhead democracy, voting in elections mandates party politicians, tasks achieved through control over bureaucracy</td>
<td>Hierarchical department or self-management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Local government under New Public Management</td>
<td>Managerialism and consumerism</td>
<td>Aggregation of individual preferences demonstrated by consumer choice</td>
<td>Separation of politics and management, politicians to give direction managers to manage additional loop of customer assessment</td>
<td>Private sector or tightly defined arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Networked Community Governance</td>
<td>Managerialism and localism</td>
<td>Individual and public preference co-produced through complex interaction</td>
<td>Elected leaders, managers and stakeholders involved in search for solutions to community problems and effective delivery mechanisms</td>
<td>Menu of alternatives selected pragmatically</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This vision, of a ‘public-facing’, ‘localist’, ‘co-produced’ polity where ‘stakeholders interact’ using ‘mechanisms’ selected from their ‘pragmatic menu’ and ‘ethos’ is both ‘complex and multiple in its flexible relationship with the EU’ and based on ‘shared values’ has been criticised (not least for its abuse of the English language) as paying insufficient attention to power, resources and the role of agency within the system; it suffers the enthusiasm of the ideal type, for example the scope of the ‘menu of alternatives’ for ‘service system delivery’ to be ‘selected pragmatically’ suggests no constraint form any other scale.

Foundational political questions of ‘who gets what when and how’ (Lasswell 1950) are sidestepped or obscured, making questions of political economic and social justice hard to ask, let alone answer. Another analysis of these dimensions is attempted by Anne Mette Kjaer who traces the assumptions embedded within the ‘eras of local governing’

Table 10 Governance and the urban bureaucracy
Anne Mette Kjaer (eds. Davies and Imbroscio 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key concepts in governance theory</th>
<th>(i) Assumptions in the old public administration</th>
<th>(ii) Assumptions in the new public management</th>
<th>(iii) Assumptions in governance theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Secured through bureaucratic hierarchy</td>
<td>Secured through competition</td>
<td>Secured through co-operation and partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Secured through elected parliaments, separation of politics and administration</td>
<td>Aggregation of individual preferences defined by politicians. Separation of politics and management</td>
<td>Secured through participation. No analytical separation of politics and implementation processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Is visible and located in the centre of government</td>
<td>Is dispersed in the marketplace and therefore un problematic</td>
<td>Is fragmented and/or shared in consensus building networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the local state</td>
<td>The state as steering and controlling mechanism</td>
<td>The state provides an enabling environment for the market</td>
<td>The state facilitates network governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the urban bureaucrat</td>
<td>Technocrat, driven by prospects of predictable career</td>
<td>Competitive employee driven by the incentive of performance pay</td>
<td>Mediator and networker, driven partly by prospects of self-development in a dynamic working environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here again the roles of the urban bureaucrat are characterised as dynamic and their position as one as a mediator, facilitator and networker rather than motivated by performance related incentives or career advancement along predictable lines. What is most important about his work is that both Stoker and Kjaer see a new governance type emerging out of earlier phases – the first a post war consensus and the second a New Public Management (NPM) market-facing reality since the 1970s. They genuinely view this ‘third way’ of the possibility of the network as resolving the contradictions of the earlier two phases. Kjaer’s contribution, in addition to other European thinkers have been very instrumental in shaping the governance debate, and offering this way through privatisation and marketisation of public services with an alternative, networked governance approach.

This influence is also visible in the influential Janet Newman book Understanding Governance. Newman describes the following propositions about governance shifts

**Governance Shifts**

(Newman 2001)

(1) *a move away from hierarchy and competition as alternative models for delivering services towards networks and partnerships traversing the public private and voluntary sectors*

(2) *a recognition of the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues*

(3) *the recognition and incorporation of policy networks into the processes of governing*

(4) *The replacement of traditional command and control mechanisms by “governing at a distance”*

(5) *The development of more reflective and responsive policy tools*

(6) *The role of government shifting to a focus on providing leadership, building partnerships, steering and co-ordinating and providing system-wide integration and regulation*

(7) *the emergence of negotiated self governance in communities, cities and regions, based on new practices of co-ordinating activities through networks and partnerships*

(8) *The opening up of decision making to greater participation by the public*

(9) *Innovations in democratic practice as a response to the problem of the complexity and fragmentation of authority, and the challenges this represents to traditional democratic models*

(10) *A broadening of focus by government beyond institutional concerns to encompass the involvement of civil society in the process of governance.*

This position is very much in line with another, more influential, set of propositions about governance. Anthony Giddens’ analysis was instrumental in providing an intellectual basis for the ‘Third Way’ which came to mean a new approach to the state accommodating the market. In the list (over the page) he outlines his framework of how a nation state must respond to these “Third Way” governance propositions.
Giddens (1998)

1. The state must respond structurally to devolution.
2. The state must expand the role of the public sphere.
3. To retain legitimacy states without enemies must increase their administrative efficiency.
4. The downward pressure of globalisation introduces not only the possibility but the necessity of forms of democracy other than the orthodox voting process.
5. States without enemies depend for their legitimacy on their capacity for risk management
6. The democratizing of democracy can only be local or national.

Though they appear slightly curious now Giddens’ premises were widely accepted by the Blair administrations and it is from within these simple premises that some of the key tensions within the third way approach to central-local modernisation are established: Clearly the ‘administrative efficiency’ of point 3 collides with the expanded public sphere of point 2 and the democratizing of (representative) democracy at either local or national scale of point 6 collides with the ‘other forms of democracy’ (participative) of point 4. These tensions have been visible throughout the New Labour Period. The last point in the list, however sticks out. Whilst it is true that ‘the democratizing of democracy can only be national or local.’ This neglects the high degree of experimentation at non-traditional, improvised or ‘soft’ scales of governance.

In exploring these accounts of “the turn to governance”, and from the work of those from within this persuasion in the Anglo-governance school it is clear that there is significant enthusiasm for a shift to looking at governance, rooted in an approach which views the processes as broadly benign and preferable New Public Management (NPM) approaches, viewed as a straightforward marketisation of the public sector.

3.3.2 Distributed and Multi-level governance

There are other political theorists who have characterised the contemporary as ‘Distributed governance’ (Flinders 2002; Flinders 2004; Flinders 2005) and whose account of the proliferation of quangos, agencies and NPBs etc as expanding within the New Labour period is less favourable, these writers, Matthew Flinders, (Flinders 2002; Flinders 2004; Flinders 2005) Ian Bache (Bache and Catney 2008) and Chris Skelcher (Skelcher 2003; Skelcher 2005) have their roots in a critique of the ways in which the EU influences and affects national and sub-national scales. Matthew Flinders introduces the concept thus; the term distributed public governance is more than simply a new term for well-trodden issues…DPG also widens the focus of analysis to encompass the growing number of independent bodies that operate at the supra-national and global level. In this context sub-
national and national quasi-autonomous actors frequently operate within the jurisdiction of an independent body operating beyond the national state (Flinders, 2004 pg 884)

He goes on to emphasise the intense degree of ‘institutional hybridity’ which offers a sophisticated way of understanding modes of governance in practice. It was through work with Ian Bache on the ways in which Sheffield dealt with the European Union Funding (Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders) That Multi-Level Governance [MLG] offers a way of viewing the nested and stacked scales of governance. From an MLG perspective the activities of the reconstituted state look something like Fig 4 (over)
Figure 6 The reconstituted state under Labour
(Richards and Smith 2002, pg 264)
MLG is very much alive and well in the sub-national, regional, city-regional, local and neighbourhood scales and visible through the ways in which the global and supra-national entities make their effects felt at lower spatial scales. Following this kind of ‘stacked’ model, they themselves acknowledge that it is an over-simplification and that lines connecting the various levels of decision making simplify the complex relationships between actors in a multi-level polity. Not all relationships are channelled hierarchically and a more sophisticated diagram would represent a complex network or web of relationships linking sub national to supranational sub-local to regional etc. … however this research agenda is relatively new and part of our purpose here is to highlight the need for further research exploring these relationships.” (Bache, 1998; Pg 98)

It is the intention of this thesis to seek to demonstrate that the ‘sophisticated diagrams’ called for here can indeed shed light on the webs of relationships in the sub-national and their connections to other scales and tiers. Arguably by helping to show networks it is possible to help with the problems diagnosed by the Demos quote on page 48 which worried that networks were without ‘familiar structures’ or easy diagrams’. Whilst not ‘easy’ the increasing currency of SNA in explanations of governance (see Methods chapter) does seek to make network increasingly familiar.

Connected to this approach is the work on Multi-level governance by Lisbeth Marks and Gary Hooghe (Hooghe and Marks 2003) who differentiate between formal and informal governance mechanisms as driving discretely different types of multi-level governance. This distinction is drawn and developed within Table 11 (below)

Table 11 Types of Multi-Level Governance
(Marke and Hooghe)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE I</th>
<th>TYPE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>general-purpose</td>
<td>jurisdictions task-specific jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-intersecting</td>
<td>memberships intersecting memberships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jurisdictions organized on a limited number of levels</td>
<td>no limit to the number of jurisdictional levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system-wide architecture</td>
<td>flexible design</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.2.1. Type I
Type I Governance represents the ‘stacked’ or ‘nested’ explanation of how institutions and organisations function together. This conceptualisation, for example of the ways in which general-purpose democratic entities connect in a ‘simple’ fashion; as we saw from Anthony Giddens, the ‘democratisation of democracy can only be central or local’ and in terms of democratic accountability cover for example, European Union or Parliamentary reform or Local Government ‘reorganisation’. The good thing about Type I initiatives or interventions is that they can involve a genuine codifying of a change of direction of a spatial-territorial entity, sometimes dramatically such as in France where constitutions are sporadically redrawn giving rise to a new republic. At the European Scale the vexed attempts at ratifying the European Treaty are Type I governance reforms, designed to improve some collectively agreed dimension of the codified politics of the institution. The EU constitution offers the clearest example of the downside to Type I reform. As has been seen attempting Type I reform across the countries of the EU is a devilishly difficult business. Again in the sub-national context the ERA referendum of 2004 was a Type I governance reform to extant Type II agencies.

3.3.2.2. Type II
Type II governance reforms, quite on the contrary may not result in such protracted and public problems, as Type II entities are not subject to democratic scrutiny in the same way (referenda and etc would not be deployed over a Type II entity) such institutions; characterised by flexibility, connections and intersections within and between other jurisdictional levels, and their focus on specific issues means that they are arguably more “fleet of foot” and flexible, also more difficult to classify and to define in a lasting or permanent way. They may also not connect at all with any form of democratic accountability or scrutiny such as from within the formal Type I institutions. The proliferation of ‘government by task force’, of concordats, agreements and of institutional and organisational hybrids of varying shapes, sizes and complexity has led to theorists describing the rise of ‘second generation governance mechanisms’ (see Chapter 5 section 3)

The use of Type II entities in their varying forms has been clearly seen at the sub-national scale in the UK also. Using this frame of reference the regional policy agendas of the New Labour administrations have ‘stuck’ in Type II form only, the building of a partnership governance architecture at the regional scale whereby agencies are free to operate within limited scrutiny whilst Type 1 reform attempts were thwarted by democratic processes.
Type II entities, as we have already seen are not vulnerable to the vicissitudes of democratic opportunities. It is the ‘Black Box’ nature of many of the second generation networked governance mechanisms which has attracted the critical attention of many scholars. Chris Skelcher, for example has done a lot of work to delineate between varieties within the general order for Type II governance entities. It is only through a careful attention to the properties of these different entities, Skelcher (2005) argues in Table 12 (below) that we can avoid an uncritical enthusiasm for network-type entities.

Table 12 Democratic Alignment of Type I and Type II entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Type I entity</th>
<th>Type II entities</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Polity-Forming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Club</td>
<td>Self-generated to deliver benefits to members</td>
<td>Created by government to deliver policies through flexible management under arm’s-length political supervision</td>
<td>Established to engage well-defined constituency of users/residents in formulation and delivery of specific public policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>On basis of benefits accruing to members</td>
<td>On basis of central government mandate</td>
<td>On basis of popular participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Elected representatives</td>
<td>Appointment or nomination by government</td>
<td>Deliberative processes between board and constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability (TO)</td>
<td>Legislative body of elected representatives and to citizens</td>
<td>Organisational stakeholders in terms of cost-benefit ratio</td>
<td>Constituency on basis of democratic process and policy achievement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly the three different types of Type II entity could be completely different in character. In focussing on Distributed Public Governance [DPG] and the specific differences between and between Type I and II governance mechanisms these scholars offer an approach which is more critical than the cheer-leaders for governance approaches. This framework is very helpful in exploring the subtle differences between governance forms, in particular. Type II Governance entities which as we have seen are defined by their flexibility, their ability to hold intersecting memberships and to be instances around specific tasks are further split into three subsets, according to their characteristics, legitimacy, accountability and consent. The three, Clubs, Agencies and Polity-Forming offer categorisations as the proliferation and fragmentation of these less formal elements of the governance system may manifest these properties in different times and in different places.
3.3.3 Re-scaling the state

‘the market is a dream mechanism for proponents of diversity. Left to its own devices it spreads income and wealth differentially. Advocates of the new localism should beware of becoming a fifth column for economic [neo] liberalism’ (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008) pg 58

There are many other scholars, however who have a far more critical stance regarding the operation of the institutional matrix of the nation state. For these critical geographers there is an alternative explanation for the fragmentation and distribution of authority of the nation-state. They view ‘Governance’ and ‘localism’ as inherently neo-liberalising processes, which they describe as a process of state re-scaling in the interests of global capital.

Economic geographers have been influential in offering an alternative critique of the impetus behind emerging models of governance. Bob Jessop (2002) has provided an account of the rescaling and reframing of the state in the particular field of economic governance. For Jessop, change is driven by the crisis of the Fordist developmental regime that prioritised the Treasury and Keynesian economic management; this regime was based on a strategy of ‘national developmentalism’ that linked state space to the nation and involved centralised control of local institutions and economic development trajectories. The response to crisis involves the development of local forms of state power and a strategy of networked urban entrepreneurialism in which local spaces become important sites for economic development initiatives and competitive local inter-state rivalries (Brenner 2004)

With Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner as a starting point there is a raft of scholars for whom exploring the ‘re-scaling’ of the state is of interest, Kevin Cox,(Cox and Mair 1989; Cox 2001) Jamie Peck,(Peck 1995; Peck and Theodore 2000; Peck 2004), Rodruiguez-Pose (Rodríguez, Langley et al. 2007) Ward (Ward 1996; Ward 2003; Ward 2003; Ward 2004; Ward 2004; Ward 2005; Ward 2006; Ward 2006; Ward 2007)and many others present the argument that the proliferation of agencies at differing regulatory scales is part of the rescaling and restructuring of the state. It is the position of these critical geographers working within the neo-Marxist tradition that state restructuring is best understood in terms of the extended reproduction (roll-out) of neoliberalism.

Shifts in governance forms are for these theorists intimately related to what has been termed the ‘rescaling of the State’ – that is, the emergence of new and reconstituted scales of governance within an increasingly globalised economy. The re-scalers are active in
generating a robust critique of the “Governance enthusiasts” from the Anglo-governance school. The notion of the rescaled state takes as its starting point that economic competitiveness within a global economy is constituted not only by increased internationalisation and globalisation of activity, but also by key regions, or city regions, that act as the motors that drive the global economy. Such changes, it is argued, have profound impacts on national and sub-national territorial structures, identities and governments (Brenner, 1999), not least through the ‘hollowing-out’ of the nation state, whereby national state powers have in part shifted upwards to the supra-national level and elsewhere have been devolved downwards to the regional and local levels (Jessop 1997; Jessop 1998; Jessop 2002).

Interestingly they have less to say about more nuanced accounts of multi-level governance preferring a pastiche of Stoker and Rhodes as their jumping off point for a denunciation of the ‘hollowing out’ and ‘retreat- ing state’. Re-scalers argue that in actual fact state power re-trenches itself in new ways, and hyperbole about new forms of governance may in effect be displacing democratic local governance in favour of market forces as the co-ordinating form for society. Asking “How new is the new local governance” Imrie and Raco present the following (Table 13).

Table 13 Characterising local government and local governance (Imrie and Raco, 1999 pg 46) (Imrie 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(i) Local Government</th>
<th>(ii) Local Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Flexible and responsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Post-democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivised</td>
<td>Privatised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit of Social/Welfare Goals</td>
<td>Pursuit of Market Goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A key difference between this perspective and the earlier one espoused by Stoker (for example) is that whilst the Networked Governance enthusiasts do differentiate between “classical” accounts of local government an in between phase of “New Public Management” and then a third phase of “Network Community Governance” in general the re-scaling position requires only a two-stage analysis. This table represents the new local governance as having ‘swallowed whole’ the characteristics of private enterprise. In short
there is no later (evolutionary?) phase to follow but that the ‘new state spaces’ represent a continuation of NPM-type approaches to managing the public realm.

The re-scaling theorists are highly critical of the substantial body of work broadly within the governance and institutional approach has sought to theorise this state restructuring in terms of pragmatic policy adjustment (Rhodes 1998; Rhodes 1999; Rhodes 2000; Rhodes 2000; Rhodes, Tyler et al. 2005; Rhodes 2007) and seek instead to connect their positioning to what they argue are broader social, economic and political processes that affect the local state (Jones 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999) (Geddes 2005; Geddes 2006) The most important question that “new localism” avoids is the extent to which the restructuring of urban governance arrangements by New Labour follows a neoliberal agenda (Hall and Nevin 1999; Hall 2000; Hall and Hickman 2002; Hall 2003) (Giddens 1998; Powell 2000; Arestis 2001; Tiesdell and Allmendinger 2001; Brewer, Clark et al. 2002; Hall 2003; Dean 2004; Reddel 2004) Proponents of ‘new localism’, a profoundly disparate set of propositions which have been enthusiastically propagated through New Labour think tanks (NLGN) as well as those emergent and ascendant on the right of the political spectrum (Localis and Policy Exchange) There is an ease of fit between ‘new localism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ if it leads to policy prescriptions which emphasise mixed provision at the locality scale. Another broad issue revolves around the tensions and contradictions that are evident in New Labour’s restructuring and rescaling of the urban state and governance arrangements. To date this has tended to be examined within the context of governance theory, with its focus on networked governance systems, but often with little theoretical appreciation of the complex and contingent processes characterising inter-organisational arrangements (Newman 2001; Newman, Barnes et al. 2004; Newman 2005; Newman and McKee 2005; Newman 2007; Newman, Glendinning et al. 2008) This represents a failure to fully comprehend the tensions and contradictions arising from the insertion of New Labour’s emergent institutional agendas and agents into the inherited institutional landscape of the local state (Brenner and Theodore 2002). (Brenner 1997; Brenner 2000; Brenner 2003; Brenner 2004; Brenner 2004).

Pike et al (2003) discuss the influence of government and governance: There have been problems of fragmentation and lack of co-ordination of policy and delivery. Initiatives have been developed at different levels but with no consideration of the inter-relationship between them. This has created new bureaucracies and uneven decentralisation and devolution have put pressure on the capacity of local institutions. There can be evident tensions between regional priorities and local needs; for example, a concentration of
regional resources where it is deemed they can make things happen can neglect issues in specific localities. The relationships between institutions within a multi-level governance system are making decision-making more complicated. The centralisation of power and influence at central government department level and within regional institutions gives insufficient local flexibility. There is an issue about political accountability and legitimacy at regional and sub-regional levels. Key decisions are being made by institutional partnerships linked into regional institutions whose accountability is through national central government departments. Peripheral places feel marginalised and unable to influence decisions within dominant regional centres. The emergent city-region focus was seen by some as reinforcing this tendency. The state spatial strategies of New Labour include a strong focus placed on social inclusion and social cohesion (Lister 2001; Lister 2003; Lister 2007), and a reconfigured rights and responsibilities agenda through “active citizenship” (Raco 2003) These strategies have been accompanied by an authoritarian and managerialist approach to governing (Richards and Smith 2003; Smith 2003). (Richards and Smith 2004) (Smith 2007).

3.3.4 Neoliberalism, the State and New Labour

neoliberalism represents an “actually existing framework of disciplinary political authority that enforces market rule over an ever wider range of social relations throughout the world economy” (Brenner and Theodore 2002:14). In an important recent contribution Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism should not be understood as a bundle of characteristics, but as a political project, a process of neoliberalisation (Fuller and Geddes 2008) pg255

Proponents of the approach argue that the period since the 1970s has witnessed the start of a pragmatic and uneven transformation, leading to a greater strategic focus on market forms of organisation, imaginaries and subjectivities (Peck and Tickell 2002) State restructuring has been geared towards a greater emphasis on releasing productive potential, economic growth and competitiveness, and shifting the balance of power between capital and labour, albeit through a complex and uneven interaction with inherited arrangements, and involving strong authoritarian and managerialist action by the state (Jessop 1997; Jessop 1998; Jessop 2002) This has created a paradox, of ensuring the freedom of the market by the use of all the mechanisms and paraphernalia of the welfare state. There has simultaneously been a focus on individual freedom through governmentalties of devolved responsibility and competitive subjectivities (Rose 1993). Ultimately, this period of “roll-back neoliberalism” has not involved the “hollowing out” of the state, but its restructuring as Keynesian priorities and practices declined in importance, partly replaced through
arrangements that support the market and subjectivities of devolved responsibility (Peck and Tickell 2006 pg 5)

There are, even within this ‘school’ differing theorisations of the diversity of outcomes ‘on the ground’ as neoliberalism encounters widely differing inherited economic, social and political landscapes. On the one hand there are those accounts, such as that of Harvey, which argue that neoliberalisation is the globally dominant process, albeit a project embodying major internal tensions and contradictions, which can work themselves out in markedly different ways in different contexts. Harvey’s approach here seems consistent with that of Peck and Tickell (2002), who, in differentiating between the neoliberalism of the 1980s and that of the 1990s and early twenty-first century, do so by contrasting the ‘roll-out’ latter period with the ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ of the 1980s.

Roll-out strategies extend and maintain the legitimacy of neoliberalism by managing the socio-spatial contradictions and tensions that have arisen from and been exacerbated by neoliberal accumulation processes and the state strategies of the preceding period. Another view is that neo-liberalisation has become so differentiated in it’s effects that it is a form of variegated process

A research agenda is advancing which endeavours to marry the valuable theoretical insight provided by the existing state rescaling corpus… with a programme of research designed to understand the latest mutation in the geography of state power- the emergence of new bodies rescaled to speak in modish narratives of city-regionalism. The purpose of this is to bridge the gap between the conceptual insights provided by much of the existing literature and the new empirical reality that, as real world, peopled organisations, in many cases ‘new’ agencies represent a scalar amplification or contraction of previous entities, themselves frequently cobbled together from the flotsam and jetsam of past policy experimentation (Lord 2009 pp 78)

In probing these ‘scalar amplification or contraction’ emerging from the ‘flotsam and jetsam’ of past policy experimentation the notion of governance failure must be viewed as central. Not least since the mechanisms deployed change with such regularity.
3.3.5 Governance and complexity

Is the process one of re-scaling arenas from city and nation-state to “urban region” and “neighbourhood” with the consequent challenge to create a new territorial actor around a new arena and scale? Or is it the fragmentation there all the time, for any analyst to see who looks carefully enough at the fine grain of urban governance processes… should urban governance be understood as in *continual transformation*” (Healey 2006)

(Healey 2006)

It is clear that there has been a wide-ranging debate between the network governance enthusiasts of the anglo-governance school and those convinced that re-scaling constitutes a more pervasive shift but in other quarters a turn to Governance is presented as a sensible response to complexity’ Healey (2006) attempts to reconcile these arguments by concentrating on the fragmentation which is apparent from studying the fine-grain of institutional arrangements and dynamics. However, there can be a tendency, for example through ethnographic work on small-world research on the roles of street-level bureaucrats to over emphasise the role of individuals at the expense of systems and structures. The fine grain then is viewed a necessary but not sufficient as these accounts must be tempered by advancing the understanding of the interpersonal chemistry of actor relationships within wider socio-political structures, as work on the relationship between partnership governance formations and the skillets required to lead them successfully (as described in 2.5) the effects of governance formations on the individual agency of agents in networks, as brokers, as mavens and finding a place between being ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and ‘pragmatic localists.”
Keith Grint has further developed this differentiation in his work on the social construction of leadership, arguing that leaders constitute and construct the social circumstances into which they are required to perform. This milieu, and context specificity is key in framing the ability of leaders to lead. For Grint the difference between management and leadership is key, managers who deal with the non-wicked and leaders who are required for situations of genuine complexity. It follows, if you accept Grint’s typology that it is a leadership tactic to constitute reality in a dynamic process which conforms to your preference as a leader. Rittel and Webber’s article of 1973 ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’ delimit the following list which is a far better way of exposing a truly wicked problem, unfortunately applying would make the cosy networked community governance model unworkable and consequently whilst wicked issues sand complexity were rhetorically referred to local actor lacked the requisite power and autonomy to ‘exercise their preferences’
Wicked Issues

There is no definitive formula of a wicked problem
Wicked problems have no stopping rule
Solutions for wicked problems are not rule-false or good-bad
There is no immediate test of a solution to a wicked problem
Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot” operation because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly
Wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into plan every wicked problem is essentially unique every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem the existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways
The planner has no right to be wrong

Their basic premise is that rational planning is unfit for the fluidity and discontinuity of the messiness of reality, and, such a rational/ideal model in neither possible nor desirable in actuality.

A great many barriers keep us from perfecting a planning/governing system that is adequate for decent forecasting, our intelligence is insufficient to our tasks, plurality of objectives held by pluralities of politics make it impossible to pursue unitary aims... the difficulties attached to rationality are tenacious and we have so far been unable to get untangled from their web” (Rittel and Webber 1973 p 160)

This view, that ‘plurality of objectives held by plurality of politics make it impossible to pursue unitary aims’ chimes with Grint’s belief in the increasing complexity of scenarios that require both ‘collaborative resolution’ and in contexts of ‘increasing uncertainty’

Such ‘tangles’ require robust institutions and empowered professionals able to exercise judgement and make decisions not ambivalence and a polity characterised by diffusion from above and below within a multi-actor and multi-level polity. The essential contingency and complexity of governance construction, however sees actors pulled not only from the centre but also regionally and supra-regionally (vertically from above) There are those more convinced by an approach emphasising meta-governance or controlling governmentality from ‘higher’ spatial scales or from ideologies such as ‘roll out neoliberalism’ Whilst many commentators take their own line in defining governance, most particularly over the question of whether to include civil society within the definition one thing that is clear ; is that it requires one to consider a plurality of actors and to consider the roles of formal institutions of government alongside other agents. The question, however of where the genuine balance of power resides is far from clear

It is to this thorny question that we now turn, contrasting the ontological positions of Michel Foucault and Jan Kooiman who are arguably in opposition to one another on the
question of power. Sorensen and Torfing, (200 ) show Governmentality theory at odds with governability theory using the following table (Table 14) where they contrast 4 approaches ; Governability they argue sees networks defined by co-ordination and calculation whilst Governmentality views networks as defined by cultures (of control) and conflict.

Table 14 Four theories of networked governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Calculation</th>
<th>Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Interdependence theory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Governmentality theory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Rhodes, 1997a; Kickert, 1993; Jessop, 1995; 1998]</td>
<td>[Foucault, 1991; Dean, 1999; Rose &amp; Miller, 1992]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td><strong>Governability theory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Integration theory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Mayntz, 1993; Scharpf, 1994; Kooiman, 1993]</td>
<td>[March &amp; Olsen, 1995; Powell &amp; DiMaggio, 1983; Scott, 1995]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.6 Kooiman’s Governability

Two contrasting philosophical and theoretical frameworks establish a contradiction which stalks all governance studies. Both have their roots within divergent philosophies and whilst the former is connected with the work of Jurgen Habermas and be loosely be described as “communicative” connecting more with the networked enthusiasm, the latter is more connected with Michel Foucault’s conception of governmentality and sees metagovernance mechanisms as deployed as technologies of control. The differences between the two are outlined in Table 15 (below)

Table 15 Contrasting Governability and Governmentality

Grimshaw and Smith 2007, pg 189 (Grimshaw, Vincent et al. 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views on relationships between different ways of seeing the world</th>
<th>Communicative Theory</th>
<th>Governmentality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Powerful stakeholders are under moral duty to empower all stakeholders (although not necessarily equally) and come to a consensus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Powerful stakeholders attempt to frame the ways in which neighbourhood renewal is understood and to dominate other ways of seeing the world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who is learning / changing their point of view?</th>
<th>All parties</th>
<th>Those who hold ways of seeing the world that are different from the dominant view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical abstract system views from dominant stakeholders</th>
<th>Constructionist/ realist</th>
<th>Positivist/realist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are typical knowledge-generation strategies for underpinning dialogue?</th>
<th>Deliberative and participative evaluation methods</th>
<th>Performance management and audit centrally controlled evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
According to Habermas Communicative rationality is:

The processes by which different validity claims are brought to a satisfactory resolution. The relations to the world that people take to forward validity claims for the expressions they deem important. (Habermas 1981, pg 75)

In these terms the process for bringing forward ‘validity claims’ connect to the more practical language of the Grimshaw and Smith table where they ask in the second row: who is learning and changing their point of view? Under communicative theory the answer is all parties whilst governmentality would suggest that the powerful would redefine the frame of reference of the powerless.

There is a very live debate about whether much of what passes for partnership or networked governance is, in effect a quasi-Habermasian space. Since contained within the theory of communicative action is the possibility that through this process of that there is the scope for change. Habermas’ influence is clear within the work of Jan Kooiman whose conceptualisation of governability concentrates on movement and dynamism between the system to be governed [SG] and the governance system/structure [GS] as characterised by governance interactions [GI] of varying kinds. This approach seeks to view the systematic properties of governance and the mechanisms which connect the varying sectors together through policies and participation. In his influential book ‘Governing as Governance’ Kooiman outlines the key principles of governability, rooted in his earlier work on the management of public organisations. Governability shares similarities with the quest for ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin and Thrift, 1984, Raco, 1998) but extends the question not only to how dense/thick the governance networks are but also, critically what they do.

Figure 8 Governability as a system Kooiman

![Figure 8 Governability as a system Kooiman](image)
When one considers the increased plurality of agents of government and civil society participating in the policy process, and the growing complexity of issues to be decided upon, it is perhaps not surprising that some contributors to this debate question whether modern societies are in fact governable. (Kooiman, 2008 pg 3)

Stated this way, features of governance and governability become major contextual factors for policies and for policy connected concepts such as policy problems, policy processes, policy arenas, and may become even a part of a general conceptual framework for the policy sciences establishing the relation between governability and its ‘mother’ concept governance. In the UK urban policy has acted as a laboratory for governance experiments which substantively alter the relationships between democratically elected representatives, their officers, business and civil society.

Governability is always changing, depending on external and internal factors. What may be high governability at a given time may be low governability at another.

Clearly this conceptual approach connects with fundamental political debates regarding the role and proper remit of the state and its proper relationship with/through/to the market. There is also a balancing role afforded to participatory democracy which serves to ‘feed back’ to the GS.

3.3.7 Foucault’s Governmentality

Governmentality, quite conversely, is used by those following Foucault to suggest that those with power exercise it in sometimes mysterious but always dominating and defining ways.

For Foucault government takes up the question of the government of the self (the problem of the subject) and articulates at the same time the problem of the government of the others (the problem of politics and the state). He “discovers” a new dimension of power; government does not operate as “right” or as “war” it works foremost as a “conduct of conducts” (Lemke, 1990 pg 14)

Following Foucault the frame of governmentality follows the ‘programme of government’ framework as defined by Rose and Miller (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992). According to these authors, ‘programmes of government’ comprise: (1) a guiding rationality specifying the ideals of the programme and defining the true nature of the objects to which government is applied (a rationale) (2) a set of analytical tools (a toolbox); and (3) prescriptions for action in relation to judgements obtained using these tools (tactics).
The premises established within these two fields can be seen to set up a difference of view which stretches from the theoretical and conceptual and into the empirical. When one explores local governance formations or urban regeneration and partnership policy is left either bemoaning the ways in which central government gathers power around it and re-articulates itself or celebrating a mix in which governed and government interact in often new and surprising ways. This difference can be profitable traced back to the two differing conceptualisations of the possibility and desirability of the state to act from within these two very different theorists. Ultimately those who view the contemporary governance space / institutional matrix as defined by autonomous network formation sit at one end of the continuum towards Habermas, whilst those emphasising the ways in which metagovernance is deployed as a technology of control are more comfortable with conceptualisation of power offered by Foucault. The two views have looked irreconcilable.

These competing explanations of networked governance, both the relationship between network, markets and hierarchies (and their bureaucracies) and the roles played within the institutional matrix. to explore another more practical divergence of opinion. whether it is possible to invoke networks to solve governance dysfunction of whether, as hybrid forms of governance they will inherently multiply such dysfunctions rather than solving them. Tom Entwistle et al. (2007) address this question directly in their work on the dysfunctions of markets hierarchies and networks in the meta-governance of partnership. (Entwistle, Bristow et al. 2007) The authors explore the ways in which the modes interact within the practice of partnership delivery. Delineating two different positions; the first that ‘ungovernability, instability and unaccountability’ characterise the fragmented institutions of governance and the second that partnership activity and approaches to co-ordination have allowed the reassertion of hierarchical controls. This second position, that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ can be seen within ostensibly reticulated forms is one that we will return to repeatedly within this thesis. This work on governance dysfunction within the partnership governance environment is helpful
It is their conclusion that by combining the modes it is possible to mitigate them;

![Diagram](https://example.com/diagram)

The distinctive problems of hierarchy, markets and networks provide an account of three forms of partnership failure...our model therefore implies that it is only by mixing hierarchical, market and network forms of co-ordination that it is possible to avoid the crippling dysfunctions associated with the pure forms (Entwistle, Bristow et al. 2007) pp 68

These hopes that hybrids may avoid the crippling dysfunctions of the pure forms links to Andy Pike’s thoughts about an the possibility of an emergent counterweight and heterodox agenda within economic development. Pike is arguing that it is possible and desirable to mitigate the effects of hybrids through increasing democracy... and that it is possible to encourages heterodoxies to challenge (neoliberal) orthodoxies (see Table 16, over)

Table 16 Preliminary analytical framework for the heterodox agenda in economic development (developed from Amin, 1999; Pike, 2002; Storper, 1997).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heterodoxy</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiagency issues</td>
<td>the level and degree of multi-institutional organisation, participation, and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>of the local, regional, sub national, and national state and quasi-state, private, and voluntary sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The form</td>
<td>the balance between 'soft' processes and 'hard' infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of intervention</td>
<td>individuals, firms, sectors, production systems, and territories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The anticipated timescale of operation</td>
<td>whether it is open-ended, task-oriented, or fixed-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and service provision</td>
<td>whether it is an existing mainstream or new policy or service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>in-kind or matched funding or whether it is based on grants or incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The type of assistance</td>
<td>discretionary and targeted or automatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Heterodox approaches therefore may be a specific (and possibly ideal-type of) form of Type II entity. It offers some hope that governance by hybrid may avoid some of the dysfunctions of the pure form of (principally) market co-ordination.

Whilst agreeing that governance has a tendency towards failure Bob Jessop is not so hopeful that through combinations or hybrids this can be mitigated. His position when examining the modes of ‘exchange, hierarchy and heterarchy’ is to argue that quite conversely the inherent instability of even the pure forms themselves can make them more prone to failure when hybridised.

*Governance is the cycle of modes of co-ordination.* All modes are prone to dilemmas, contradictions, paradoxes, and failures but the problems differ with the mode in question. Markets, states, and governance fail in different ways. *One practical response to this situation is to combine modes of policy-making and vary their weight over time – thereby shifting the forms in which tendencies to ‘failure’ are manifested, and creating room for manoeuvre. The rediscovery of governance could mark a fresh revolution in this process – a simple cyclical response to past state failures.*

This view, of the strategic ‘shuffling’ between of modes of governance can be connected to the views of the re-scaling theorists who argue, similarly, that the ‘spaces for manoeuvre needed can be found through this process of ‘shifting the forms in which tendencies to failure are manifested’ Jessop concludes;

> Given the growing structural complexity and opacity of the social world, indeed, failure becomes the most likely outcome of most attempts to govern it with reference to multiple objectives over extended spatial and temporal horizons – whether through markets, states, partnerships, or some other mechanism. This is often recognized. However, whilst failure in the other two modes of co-ordination is regarded as inevitable, in the preferred mode of co-ordination it is typically seen as exceptional and corrigible.

This position returns to the problem of the overall system-wide governability of the spaces of partnership governance. Despite a quite overwhelming literature on the problems associated with partnership governance there is a continual air of surprise by policy makers in the face of an overwhelming evidence regarding the problems associated with partnerships, regimes or coalitions. Jonathan Davies, has strongly challenged this position arguing that there is a chasm between those who view network as genuinely possible and desirable in the UK context contrasted with a ‘second strand’ who view the augmentation of the power of the over-weaning central institutions of Westminster and Whitehall as a more accurate picture of the contemporary polity. He bemoans the lack of attempt at theorising ‘the relationships between the primary modes of organisation in urban politics ; hierarchy, market and networking’ (Davies 2005)2005, pp 313 Key to this is the role of conflict within networks. It is his view that;
the reality of conflict requires the UK government to intervene in networks it originally intended to be decentralised, autonomous and inclusive. Put another way antagonisms structured into markets may undermine the capacity of actors to aggregate resources in pursuit of a common agenda, in turn generative of a widely assented common good (pp 325)

There is an acknowledged paradox in the business of legislating for co-operation at lower spatial scales.

The very act of legislating for cooperation perhaps indicates the complexity of the issues, and the strength of the forces that counter cooperation.

(Quirk, 2007) Routes of Cooperation, in DEMOS, The Collaborative State

Could not autonomous network form where needed without influence from national actors? The variables that Davies posits are how ‘open’ or ‘closed’ the networks are in their agenda setting and the intensity of conflict as the dimensions which are of importance. (link to section 2.5) This issue, of partnerships mandated externally and lacking in the accountability structures which link them strongly back to the institutions of local government is a key one.

Thus the rhetoric of policy has stressed coordination, collaboration and partnership. On the other hand much institutional innovation and experimentation throughout the 1980s took the form of the establishment of ad hoc often single purpose and largely centrally controlled agencies. The practice of much policy intervention has thus been centralised, fragmented and competitive has in fact diluted the impact of locality based structures of power and influence, most notably the power of elected local government (Stewart 1994 pg 135)

There is a clear connection between this conceptualisation of networks and the work of Paul Alder who, following Joseph Schumpeter also sees hybrid forms of governance as developed according to the interplay between the dimensions of the market and the hierarchy. Here his high and low-trust hybrids refer to partnership or network forms of organisation. Alder traces Joseph Schumpeter’s thesis about the inevitable displacement of the market as the principle form of social organisation and concludes ‘the institutional framework likely to emerge from capitalism’s development is not any form of socialism but a form characterised by high levels of trust’

trust is not merely a lubricant facilitating the functioning of markets and hierarchies: it can also function as a co-ordination mechanism in its own right …under this view all forms of social organisation – teams markets, firms social networks etc. typically embody a mix of the three ideal-typical organisation forms and rely on a corresponding mix of price, hierarchy and trust…it follows that as our economy becomes increasingly knowledge-intensive trust is likely to become increasingly important in the mechanism mix.

This looks to the personal and professional roles adopted as described in Chapter 1 pg 32 and is core to considering knowledge and power within hybridised modes of governance. If it is true that as the economy becomes increasingly knowledge-intensive trust is likely to
become increasingly important within the mechanism mix then this will have significant implications of the activities of urban bureaucrats and the work that they do will rely more heavily on their credibility and skills as brokers and away from acts of ‘individual heroics’

Figure 10 A typology of institutional forms
(Adler)

![Figure 10 A typology of institutional forms](image)

Similar to the Pickstone Model in Fig 8 Adler’s model in the quadrant suggesting both high levels of market and high levels of hierarchy combining into either low or high-trust hybrids. This suggests that good governance or even any governance is far more reliant on the properties of those within the system rather than the conditions of the structure itself. This emphasis on the reflexive actions of bureaucrats therefore assume a higher importance. The key question here is whether, as a result governance mechanisms tend towards failure or whether through hybrids and partnership forms the likelihood of governance failure can be mitigated. It is the argument of this review that without an appreciation of the role of conflict hybrid governance forms such as partnerships will combine both the properties and the dysfunctions in unpredictable and unstable ways. Further, following this work from Adler it is critical to pay attention to the precise calibrations of the “mechanism mix” in contemporary governance in order to explore these critical questions of conflict, trust, and the ‘democratic anchorage’ posited by Chris Skelcher.
3.4 Scope at Scale, The role of Site, Space and Sphere

Mainstream literatures on governance very often take their object of interest as the accommodations at the national scale but another question is through focussing on scope at scale and whether what is operating is a site, space or a sphere of governance, these conceptualisations have the effect of spatialising the concerns of governance studies and of linking them with important question of agency and action, rather than presenting wholly structural explanations.

Much recent work on local governance systems (Taylor, Taylor and Kelly 2006; Lowndes 2001; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Lowndes 1999; Lowndes 2001; Lowndes 2002; Lowndes and Leach 2004; Lowndes and Sullivan 2004; Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 2006; Sullivan 2001; Barnes, Newman et al. 2003; Barnes, Newman et al. 2004; Barnes, Sullivan et al. 2004; Sullivan, Barnes et al. 2006; Sullivan, Downe et al. 2006; Barnes 2007; Sullivan 2007)) have sought to interrogate whether policy networks in the sub-national more closely represents sites, spaces or spheres. (Table 17, below) Arguably these three forms map effectively onto differing types of networks. (See Fig 10)

Table 17 Definitions of Site, Space and Sphere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A site of governance</th>
<th>spatial territory within which policies are enacted and services delivered.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A governance space</td>
<td>multiple, unclear - actions contingent on other frameworks combination of state and VCS activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A governance sphere</td>
<td>decision making power, clarity re: relations with other spheres.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11 Centralised, Decentralised and Distributed Network Ideal Forms

![Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed Networks](image)
The first, [A] is a centralised network as governance site, where the individual nodes are subject to centralised leadership and independent activity curtailed. The second [B] a more decentralised model, under which the cliques exhibit a slightly more reticulated form,
Whilst the third [C] represents a wholly distributed network under which nodes are connected as a more independent governance sphere. It is possible to differentiate between the three ideal types, and to view sites, spaces and spheres as different kinds of networks with structurally different configurations which will affect their ability to operate. It is further possible to try to rise to this analytic challenge by differentiating between certain ‘strategic arenas’ ‘institutional matrices or elements in the ‘mechanism mix’ according to whether they are sites, spaces or spheres of governance.

The premise is that the three are distinctly different, defining them carefully and then exploring which form is applicable in specific context in order to ‘bring conceptual order to messy realities… enabling the investigation of variation within and between institutional alternatives’ (Smith 2007) In their work on changes to the spatial planning system (Haughton and Allmendinger 2008) emphasise the importance of scope at scale, their reading of Castells and Harvey lead them to emphasise the distinction between the scope of a territorial structure (the range of different sectors and interests involved) and the scale (that is the geographical coverage of a territorial structure)

Thinking of a 'politics of scope' is useful in highlighting the contested and dynamic scales of policy networks and their role in the production of space...This brings closer to the analytical foreground the ways in which government directives to pursue more holistic approaches to strategy making, typically calling for the joining up of different strategies and the need for more cross-sectoral working on strategic documents are not neutral policy devices. Rather, integrative approaches require some often-heated debates about the differing values and priorities of differing sectoral coalitions and indeed the different professional and lobby groupings which are involved as they struggle for legitimacy, influence, and resources (Haughton and Allmendinger 2008)

This approach can be applied to the ways in which capacity is constructed at varying scales. The governing capacity – or scope at scale, then becomes a key question in delineating the political economy of the distributive effects and properties of networked governance.
We will return to these forms when, at the end of the methodology chapter, we have looked in further detail at the role of networks to ask what network configurations may indicate.
3.5 Summary

the recent academic work on state rescaling and sub national economic governance might usefully engage more with issues of `scope' and the significance of social and cultural processes flowing through the *new spatial geometries* (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2008 pp)

In this chapter we have seen various perspectives on the modes of governance deployed and to what ends. We have emphasised that a governance perspective suggests that trust is key to the construction of the mechanisms mix, particularly as work and the economy become increasingly knowledge-intensive. We have interrogated conceptualisations of structure and agency, from those enthused by the possibilities of Networked Community Governance as an alternative to NPM-type approaches and contrasted these with a regulationist perspective which views the functioning of networks as a continuation of marketisation and privatisation – one very specific form of market-state interaction.

It is the intention of this thesis to integrate conceptualisations of governability with scope at scale in order to use the concepts empirically to take more seriously the processes flowing through the ‘new spatial geographies’ of the complexities of governance and in exploring the sub-national in the area of economic development and regeneration. It seeks to explain the spaces in which actors can operate, framing policy problems and exercising discretion which is key to delineating whether they operate within a site, space or sphere of governance. It suggests that a heterodox approach to economic development may offer increased policy choice to actors exercising discretion and may affect the likelihood of governance failure. This requires a dynamic, complex and multi-scalar attempt to explore power and knowledge as they flow through partnerships and networks and it is to the construction of the methodologies to do this that the following chapter now turns.
Chapter IV : Methodology and Conceptual Framework

4.1 Introduction : Networks from metaphor to method

Governance is not a homogenous agent but a morass of complex networks and arenas within which power dynamics are expressed and deployed. Researchers therefore find themselves deployed within the black boxes of government” Healey, 2000 pp 919

Following on from the literature on modes of governance co-ordination the conceptual framework and methodology chapter emphasises the importance of moving from metaphor to method and of treating governance networks as networks. It seeks to make a number of connections; firstly between some of the more theoretical work on modes and scales of governance (some of which has been outlined within chapter two) and to connect them up with methods for empirical investigation and secondly between those looking at city regional institutional and organisational forms with the use of formal SNA methods (from quantitative sociology)

The thesis is attempting a ‘socio-spatial biography’ (SSB) of the Greater Manchester City region (GMCR) and an account of the complex ways in which the current City arrangements are affected by governance networks both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ In this sense we are keen to explore the ‘democratic anchorage’ of governance networks as well as their relational and reticulated natures. The analysis is necessarily multi-scalar since effects are nested and stacked in complex ways. In order to study ;

(1) the governance networks in play ‘as if’ they were networks
(2) the overall ‘governability’ of the Manchester city region system
(3) the issues of ‘scope at scale’ for the actors involved
(4) how localities are ‘sliced and diced’ from above – and how far they reflect ‘spatially contrived randomness’
(5) How far it is possible to knit/weave networks together in different ways

The policy area of regeneration and economic development was used as a lens through which to explore the issues partly because it is continually “shuffled” as the UK seeks to address persistent spatial disparities and inequalities. and secondly since it has been the site of considerable experimentation in governance terms, through the proliferation of the partnership panacea.
The methodology for exploring the sub-national in the UK is necessarily mixed method in approach partly due to the extreme heterogeneity of arrangements in the UK sub-national polity. Areas from within the Manchester City Region were selected for study and a framework established for testing the effect of local government structure and recent experience of regeneration policy in order to explore the issues raised by LAAs and in order to respond to the further shuffling of salient scale for co-ordination purposes away from the region and towards the city-region. It is considered to be a significant limitation of other work in this area that it does not ‘treat governance networks as networks’ which is the approach of this thesis.

The thesis seeks to contrast the effects of regeneration policy and the mechanisms of the LAA and MAA within different administrative and structural contexts by looking at the Boroughs of the Manchester City Region and by exploring the ways in which sub-regional assemblages have emerged via the MAA process. It seeks to illuminate the system-wide governability of the context, in combination with the ‘scope at scale’ available to individual actors within the networks at specific times, identifying the junctures at which scales were ‘shuffled’ (re-scaled or re-organised). It is argued that studies of Urban governance have often been inductive and more interested in theory-building Secondly in delineating the scope for this research it is argued that it is through attention to specific junctures within the story of a place. We have already seen conceptual work on the ways in which the contemporary sub-national is re-working debates about structure and agency couched in terms of systems-properties or governability and the individual scope at scale exercised by actors in local governance environments. Thirdly the chapter seeks to explain an integrated mixed method approach, comprising a socio-spatial biography of the Greater Manchester city region and comprising a multi-stranded, multi-scalar effort. Qualitative elements include: documentary and policy analysis, participant observation of local elites and ‘drive by’ ‘scattergun’ interviewing resulting in numerous conversations combined with the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) SNA is barely utilised within governance studies or in urban contexts specifically. Exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the approach it is presented as a useful component of a mixed methods approach but that its use in isolation would be methodologically problematic. SNA can be used as a formal snowball technique in order to assure reach of qualitative work or as an influence mapping tool for exposing the manner in which formal governance structures connect with one another. The rationale for the use of Manchester as an atypical case is explained. The section concludes with a statement of the methodological contribution of the thesis.
4.2 Thesis Aims, Objective and Research Strategy

*Aim:* To explore the spatial construction of the Greater Manchester City Region (GMCR) up until the formation of the combined authority in 2011, focussing on the role of strategic mechanisms and assessing how brokerage is achieved within the differentiated networks of the urban elite in order to explore the overall systemic ‘governability’ of the GMCR.

*Objectives:*

1. To consider the impacts of mechanisms designed to implement regeneration and economic development policy and practice and their inter-relationships across spatial scales.
2. To assess LAAs and MAAs as ‘second generation governance mechanisms’ and to situate them as emergent and hybrid governance forms.
3. To assess the partnership governance architecture operating at sub-national scale in the UK and the resultant implications for established central-regional-local government relationships.
4. To explain the composition of the GMCR urban elite tracking their changing purposes through development of a typology unpacking the roles and functions of brokers within partnership governance structures.
5. To develop and apply a mixed method evaluation framework incorporating Social Network Analysis [SNA] in order to treat governance networks as complex networks.
Figured 12 Overall Research Strategy

### Objectives & Methods

#### 1. To consider the impacts of mechanisms designed to implement regeneration policy and practice and their inter-relationships across spatial scales.

#### 2. To assess the partnership governance architecture operating at sub-national scale in the UK and the resultant implications for established central-regional-local government relationships.

#### 3. To assess LAAs and MAAs as ‘second generation governance mechanisms’ and to situate them as emergent and hybrid governance forms.

#### 4. To explain the composition of urban elites tracking their changing purposes through development of a typology unpacking the roles and functions of the brokers within partnership governance structures.

#### 5. To develop and apply a mixed method evaluation framework incorporating Social Network Analysis [SNA] in order to treat governance networks as complex networks.

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**Methods.**

Qualitative : Elite Interviewing
Quantitative : Formal SNA

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**Methods.**

Socio-spatial biography
Integrative Mixed methods
data, documentary, participant
observation, qualitative
generation of SNA maps.
It is the specific contention of the thesis that viewing administrative and organisational realities as ‘boxed off’ in spatial terms is insufficient. The thesis attempts to link the scales above and to disrupt / contest this neat nesting through the use of SNA diagrams which seek to explore some of the connections within and between scales. At the end of the chapter is a further figure (Fig 25) which seeks to display the above information in a more networked fashion. The figure follows the exposition of the network terminology.

4.2.1 Use of Networks in Urban Governance Studies

Almost all empirical research into governance is designed with the goal of culling information about three factors:

- the individuals who wield the greatest influence over political decisions;
- the nature of the organisational resources these persons use to wield influence;
- and the particular activities or policies that were carried out over a specific period of time. (Gissendanner 2003)

It is the position of this research that an empirical attempt at having something to say about the above three questions necessitates the use of mixed methods, deploying an integrative logic to ask questions about connecting parts, segments or layers of a social whole. So far, it sits safely within the framework of ‘almost all research into governance’ as described above. However, as we will see it is a key contention of the thesis that this
cannot be achieved without close attention to the governance networks active within the studied areas and their profoundly nested, stacked, imbricated, interstitial, relational, connected, reticulated properties and further the possibilities for recombinant activities as the mode of the network ‘goes into governing mode’. In short is of less importance what the network looks like in its ideal type but what it does. For this purpose it is necessary to integrate formal, quantitative SNA with the qualitative and quantitative techniques more usually deployed within urban governance studies. The thesis makes specific methodological contribution to the study of state rescaling and restructuring in the arena of economic development and regeneration in the following ways; A ‘Socio-spatial biography’ of the Greater Manchester City Region (modified from Andy Pike’s work on brands, branding and commodities.) (Pike 2009) offers the opportunity for integrating social/historical accounts, contemporary policy documents, and data with other techniques with the specific objective of uncovering the current ‘spatial self-concept’ of the place. It is fair to use a set of techniques looking at the rootedness (or de-racination) of a brand and its spatial connotations since the fashion for contemporary place-marketing has gone so far that the city itself can be examined as a commodified brand in its own right. In a sense the trade-marking and construction, circulation and commodification of the MCR as embodying brand values which mobilises the city elites.

The thesis explore the possibilities of using SNA sociograms in order to delineate some of the cliques, elites, regimes, partnerships and assemblages emergent and active in the UK sub-national context and to integrate this approach with other qualitative techniques. It is not wholly surprising that scholars of a re-scaling persuasion have not used social network analysis to probe the functioning of local elites. Since implicit in their critique of the ways in which localities and cities are subject to the vicissitudes and vagaries of global capital is a defining role for the nation-state as a bulwark. Scott Gissendanner narrates the problem in some detail in his 2003 article (Gissendanner 2003) where he describes the methodological problems arising from the different between inductive and deductive works in urban governance studies.

Although the very first were inductive in nature, deriving general rules based on individual cases, in subsequent governance studies these new rules were applied to new cases and were thus essentially deductive.

The deductive approach takes as its starting point the theoretical assumption that cities face structural problems that limit their formal governance capacity, and that they must compensate for this by creating informal governance structures. Empirical researchers then set out to find particular examples of urban governance
and show how they are formed and how they work in practice. Although studies based on this method cannot lead to a falsification of the basic concepts used, they can yield propositions that make the general concepts more precise and differentiated.

There is a wide literature on methods for comparative urban analysis particularly from the US. (Mossberger and Stoker 2001) (DiGaetano and Strom 2003) However this does not translate into overt methodological guidelines (or even clues) explicit within the literature.

The only set of guidelines available for interviewee selection comes directly out of the US experience. There, the ‘usual suspects’ thought to be involved in governance include elected officials, bureaucrats, business association representatives, individual business executives, the press, utility company executives, and university officials … Further, as few guidelines are offered concerning the choice of policy area, many researchers simply look at economic development policy; this is where cross-sector cooperation is most likely.

This is also a consequence of state/private sector relations within urban regimes.

is an excellent diagnosis of some of the problems of methodological reliance on qualitative accounts generated by the very elites, the ‘usual suspects’ that you are going out in order to study. It also, potentially more seriously, pays scant attention to the far more pernicious ways in which a governance clique may construct, maintain and defend share a particular set of myths, which they themselves author, circulate, furnish and perpetuate. This form of ‘groupthink’ is common where cities ‘collaborate in order to compete’ on European and global stages for investment and profile.

Whilst this approach to phenomena could be labelled as ‘critical-realist’ they are more appropriately viewed as ‘social constructionist’ what is more important is the concern to give adequate accounts of the roles of structure and agency, and their interplay. Social constructionism is the specific form of borrowing from the sociology of knowledge which emphasises interplay, dynamism and contingency

A major focus of social constructionism is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived social reality. It involves looking at the ways social phenomena are created, institutionalized, and made into tradition by humans.

Socially constructed reality is seen as an ongoing, dynamic process; reality is reproduced by people acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it.

A potential remedy for those who view interviewing elites as insufficient has been a ‘narrative turn’ within public administration particularly. Bevir and Richards bemoan that their preferred decentred approaches lack empirical coherence but in order to remedy this advocate;
the potential of the centred approach to use qualitative methods to develop innovative agendas... practitioners should turn towards story-telling as a way of managing the public sector, where stories point towards analogical lessons and so possible ways of acting... this storytelling often involves a shift of topic from institutions to individuals, leading to a focus on the social construction of policy networks through the abilities of individuals to create meaning” Bevir and Richards, 2009 pg 138

Unfortunately, reliance on a ‘narrative turn’ ie. ‘telling stories’ about institutions and a methodological preference for the accounts of individuals makes it almost impossible to explain that, with the best will in the world, telling yourself a different story about power leads to a wholly unsatisfactory explanatory relationship to structure.

Constructing of an alternate discursive reality will be of little help in being able to critically engage with power structures as they are made and re-made around you. Following structuration theory (Giddens, 1995) (Giddens 1998) and the development of the concept of the Habitus in the work of Pierre Bourdieu it is the ontological position of this research both that structure matters and that it cannot be disavowed, however inconvenient or disempowering its effects. Viewing the habitus as a ‘structured and structuring structure’

Thus LAAs and MAAs are simultaneously policy instruments and operational realities and that the research participants, drawn from national, regional and local scales are engaged in simultaneously making and responding to their realities. It is hoped that by emphasising the scope that individuals are bale to deploy within their scale of operation that attention can be paid to the structural and agency effects of local governance activities, practices and cultures. The approach is influenced by developments in Sociology, such as propounded by MacQuarrie and Marwell below who argue that the perspective of structuration theory offers an opportunity for taking organisations in a more serious and nuanced fashion.

Drawing on key elements of structuration theory, we attempt to lay the groundwork for improving the treatment of organizations in urban sociology by flagging some of the key insights in the sociology of organizations. We do not view this intellectual borrowing as a one-way street, and we emphasize that urbanists have a contribution to make to sociological thinking about organizations. Correcting these problems is essential if we are to understand the link between contemporary institutional transformations and urban neighbourhoods.

These insights from sociology, as well as taking seriously the role of the social psychology of inter-group processes underpin the relational approach taken in this research process. It is the overt position of the research that this process of ‘intellectual borrowing’ is necessary in order for nuanced approached to questions of structure and agency to develop and further that these approaches seek to explain the ways in which the ‘real world peoples organisations’ operate which is a major concern of the thesis How individuals behave... both
the in creating the context for the LAAs and MAAs within the studied localities and by deploying ‘brokerage roles and roles is highly salient in defining the differences between LAAs/MAAs in policy and the reality of practice.

It is consistent with this epistemology to integrate quantitative and qualitative methods. In the course of the thesis the technique of qualitative influence mapping, as a formalised way ‘snowballing’ has been developed. This methodological innovation has huge potential in the systematic study of place. And has been used to great effect as an heuristic device in eliciting highly detailed comments about network and structural properties which arguably would not have been possible otherwise.

4.3 Scope of Research

The multiple scales and various conceptual tools within the research design make it a challenging and ambitious piece of research but the reality of reticulated local governance is that multi-scalar contexts interlock and that all are necessary to illuminate the phenomena of local and multi area agreements (LAAs and MAAs) and the critical and under-researched role of such ‘second generation’ policy mechanisms in framing what happens within localities ‘on the ground’ The ways in which the conceptualisations of governability and ‘scope at scale’ are situated within the academic literature are outlined within Chapter 2. However their empirical usage is explained here.

The Governability approach emphasises connection and intersection between structures and agency at particular junctures. The work seeks to answer question about the overall ‘governability’ of the Greater Manchester city region by following the work of Jan Kooiman (Kooiman 1987; Kooiman 2003) in developing a conceptual model for the governability of a particular societal system based upon the (inter)active perspective on governance. Following Kooiman Governability is seen as consisting of three main components;

- a system-to-be-governed (SG),
- a governance system (GS),
- and the interactions between these two (GI).

With policies connecting the two from GS to SG and participation connecting the two from SG to GS. We will explore the Greater Manchester Case as a ‘system to be governed’
SG, then delineate the diversity, dynamics and complexity in play within it to frame the emergent statutory city-regional structures, building on a new constitution for Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and its new delegated structures of seven commissions to take forward the strategic direction as a governance system [GS] Thirdly describing how this GS can be operationalized according to aspects of governance activities: elements, modes and orders of governance, and in the three major societal governance institutions: state, market, civil society and increasingly hybrid forms among them. In their work on the soft spaces of local economic development Haughton and Allmendinger describe the importance of a politics of scope in the production of space. (Haughton and Allmendinger 2008) The work is important since it seeks to interrogate a rather different question to the prevailing trends in governance studies

recent work on governance, which tended to focus on the ways in which private, public, and community sectors have seen their roles reworked at both strategic and delivery levels, for instance the growth of quasigovernment organisations since the 1980s to deliver and coordinate state policies at sub national scales. Most of this work has been undertaken on fairly narrow ‘sectoral’ areas, in the process downplaying some important dimensions of how policy sectors come to be mutually constituted.

It is their suggestion that attention to these connections and intersection, as well as the process of ‘mutual constitution’ They suggest that methodological implications of taking these connections seriously would result in new empirical approaches. It is this question, how far actors can exercise ‘scope’ for action at a given moment, albeit within the network structures available to them that is interesting in the context of the use of mechanisms such as the LAA/MAA. It is the hope of this research to advance this approach, through the use of formal SNA to delineate just these things and to interrogate the roles of defined actors in advancing such thinking. Arguably the approach, of interrogating the ‘scope at scale’ contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of ‘joined-up-ness’ and coherence. Specifically taking up the challenge of paying close analytical attention to the issues outlined above may offer a way of refining policy in order that it may not refract chaotically off the nested salient scales. In order to attempt this, however it is necessary to have a position on how/why things change at different specific junctures and moments.

Together these components form a conceptual basis to analyze and eventually assess the governability of Greater Manchester in the present moment. The framework has been developed in order to probe whether, given the incursion of market forces into the ambit of the state
4.4 Policy research and change

Social research struggles to reflect change through static models and constructions. In advocating a sociology of flux and flow Scott Lash warns that the contemporary economy of signs and space presents practical methodological challenges.

by the time the anthropologist has got his tent up the reality he went out to explore has changed” (Lash 1995)

This problem can be particularly acute in policy studies, the ‘things’ themselves are short-lived and flash into being and then fade again just as quickly. The mechanisms which are the object of study within this thesis did not exist before 2004 (2006 in the case of the MAA) The mechanisms are viewed as continually changing. (see Chapter 5 for an account of the ‘loops and stages of LAA development and a discussion of MAA trajectory.)

The specific ways in which mechanisms have been localised in the Greater Manchester context is delineated in Chapter 7. Indeed one of the reasons that the Urban policy laboratory is challenging to study is that its essential condition is of change. It is in order to manage this that the evaluations of LAAs were couched in terms of theory of change. The evaluators explain;

Selection of policy drivers and levers is informed by the interaction of actors exercising political judgement about priorities. As governance systems rely on human interactions attempts at steering are likely to be met with unexpected and unintended though not necessarily unwelcome reactions and outcomes. (CLG, Sullivan 2008)

This is of critical importance when seeking to differentiate between the realities of policy as a discursive construction or of operational realities and effects flowing from it. In translating between the ‘blueprints’ and ‘templates’ of policy documents and into the realities of delivery mechanisms the role of resistance, of perverse effects and of ‘political judgements about priorities’ The political judgements link to the various strategies for survival from the partnership space delineated in Chapter 2.

Here the notions of public officials ‘weathering’ changes ‘doing nothing’ or promulgating ‘business as usual’ explain why imposed waves of modernisation may founder. Accounts of such strategising (and its’ effects) must be very sensitively handled. The Theory of Change (or no change) approach necessitates definitional precision around terminology.
Change *mechanisms* = interactions between relevant policy drivers and levers. Policy *drivers* = the general aims of government in specific policy areas. Policy *levers* = are the instruments available to government to effect change in public policy and services.

This perspective contains within it an expectation of change and dynamism as a pre-condition of studying public policy. (See Chapter 5 for a more precise set of definitions for the constituent parts of Theory of Change governance within ‘soft spaces’; drivers, levers, infra-structures, mechanisms.)

### 4.5 Specific Methods and Techniques

#### 4.5.1 Qualitative Methods

In order to hope to deal with the effects of human interactions upon governance contexts it is important to carry out qualitative data collection, which is as extensive as possible Lowndes and Pratchett explain. 

> researching the ongoing process of institutional emergence is *dirty work*…to unearth the real rules that shape local political behaviour (informal as well as formal, invisible as well as visible) We need to talk to the local government actors themselves. We need to ask them ‘How are things done around here?’ ‘why do you do x but not y?’ obtaining information about rules-in-use requires spending time at the site and learning how to answer non-threatening context-specific questions about rule configurations” (Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 2006)

The thesis deploys techniques from across the spectrum of the ‘dirty work’ of qualitative research, beginning with the least structured, loosest ways of engaging participants through to more structured ways of engaging with participants.

(1)Participant observation of dynamics and behaviour was carried out in a number of different contexts; with national policy-makers and decision-takers, within parliament and CLG, with the bodies of the extended policy network such as think tanks, within regional and sub-regional partnerships, regional networking meetings, within studied localities and neighbourhood forums. Over the researched period in excess of 150 such meetings and events were attended. The researcher became a familiar fixture at events were local and city-regional decision makers gather.

(2) ‘Drive by’ or ‘scattergun’ conversation were carried out within the above contexts. 302 such conversations were of sufficient interest to be written up in fieldwork journals, often leading to more formal interviews, access to documents or data not in the public realm or more formal interviews.
(3) Semi-structured scoping elite interviews with stakeholders and LAA brokers helped me to follow the policy development, to refine the research hypotheses and to generate appropriate conceptual models and typologies. 72 of such focussed, elite interviews were carried out with a range of salient respondents.

4.5.2 Elite interviewing

Social and political scientists have traditionally conceived elites as those individuals;

so placed within the structure that by their decisions they modify the milieu of many other men (Mill 1953, 112).

There are those who dispute the usefulness of the term ‘elite’ arguing that

if the shift from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism is anything to go by then elites can also include local celebrities and business barons from the private sector (Peck 1995 and Harvey 1989)’ Rice, 2010 pp 71

In accordance I have used this widest sense of the local elite in framing my investigations and have been quite precise in differentiating between the various categories of elite players. In fact the continual re-balancing between the more and less accountable cliques operating within the urban context is key to understanding the oscillation of the power dynamics. However accessing elites under the contemporary conditions of fragmentation is described by Raco here as inherently problematic

Researching institutions of governance and interviewing elite personnel has long been a difficult issue for social researchers. Even before the emergence of relatively fragmented and non-locally accountable institutional structures, research that sought to uncover elites and identify influences over decision making processes came up against a series of barriers in terms of access and accessibility. (Raco 1999 pp 274)

Feminist accounts of the research encounter with their interest in problematising epistemological and ontological claims are interesting when considering issues of positioning. The following comes form an account of attempting to ‘research up’ into the world of bio-technology;

the issue of power was always and ever a consideration. Given the situatedness of the hybrid elite actors within the blurred academic, industrial and political fields, an interrogation of the relations of power connecting the researcher, researched and the research findings became a significant point of consideration. Invariably, any attempt to map the researched–researcher relationship inevitably centres on the question of power and in particular its exploitative potential. This is because with elite interviewees the relationship is inevitably asymmetrical regardless of the research strategies deployed. The researcher is dependant on the cooperation of a relatively small number of people with specialized knowledge, [Desmond, 2008pp 265]
Despite being alive to the issue described and alive to the problem of asymmetries in power and the reliance on a ‘small number of people with specialised knowledge’ policy experience within the fields of local economic development and local government was of critical importance in maintaining credibility with the elite group in question. It is the strength of a mixed-method approach that there is a compelling story to tell without becoming overly reliant on the uncritical accounts of the city-regional and local brokers. In recent work on co-production of the research encounter (O’Hare et al, 2008) have the following to say…

Collaborative or co-produced research is an increasingly prominent feature of the contemporary university. In engaging with such types of research, researchers occupy a privileged location at the interface between theory and practice. Not only can such relations bring funding and employment such knowledge production, but the synergies generates, it is proposed, offers potentially illuminating insights into critical and challenging themes and issues. Moreover, in a more practical sense, the support of actors who operate in spheres of policy or practice can open doors into otherwise impenetrable worlds or can facilitate access to unreachable elites.

It was a key consideration of the research to move in the circles of the city-regionalists but not to absorb their accounts of themselves uncritically. Here the bridging role of the CASE industrial partner was key, as CLES operate within that space as ‘critical friends’ to many Manchester institutions. The field work was approached from a perspective of acute awareness of what Orr and Bennet have described as ‘the politics of co-produced research’ this position suggests not that theoretical and practical concerns about power and access merge and obliterate one another, rather that the differences of perspective and positioning be attended to reflexively.

Co-producing research entails tussling with the dialectic between unity and difference, sovereignty and independence, the self and the other. Co-producing research holds the potential for creative coalitions but also the possibility of the clash of civilisations. Co-production is therefore in inherently political process which requires continual negotiation” (Orr and Bennett, 2010 pp 202)

This ‘inherently political process’ is particularly sensitive where the elite interviewed are engaged in a very overt form of ‘reification’ under which their construction and circulation of the brand of the city is key to their continued right to exist. Manifestly in an economic development context where new economies and knowledge industries are fore grounded and institutions designed in order to promulgate these notions challenge to this orthodoxy is not encouraged.
4.5.3 Quantitative methods

Qualitative work is viewed as necessary but not sufficient for shedding light on the relational aspects of the ‘new (soft or para-static) governance spaces’ Quantitative work is important in order to balance the subjective perspectives of those involved. Work by Entwistle et al. which has led to the development of ‘the co-ordination triangle’ quoted in Chapter II on and concerning the Triangle of co-ordination approach to probing partnership effectiveness warn in the strongest possible terms about an over-reliance on qualitative sources in work of this nature;

All of the empirical evidence reported in this paper is drawn from the partners’ subjective criticisms of their partnership’s performance. In simple terms, they may have got it wrong. *Partners are perhaps unlikely to be alive to the network failings of their own partnership*. They may not be well placed to diagnose group think or free riding and they may be disinclined to admit that their organisation should not perhaps be part of the partnership at all.

This connects with the concerns at the beginning of this chapter regarding an over-reliance on the elites themselves in diagnosing the issues associated with governance by cliques. This research hopes to partially take up this challenge and to explore the development of more robust and objective measurement of the functioning of partnerships in general. It is an assumption of the research that part of the reason that much of the academic analysis of partnerships for regeneration in particular is so scathing about partnerships and governance networks is because it falls into this methodological trap.

*There is, in short, a danger that, when asked about the problems of partnership working, partners will inevitably pin the blame on someone else. Without an analysis of the objective measures of the outcomes of collaboration or at least some alternative perspectives perhaps from external observers of the partnerships in question, we cannot know what weight should be attached to the partner’s critique of their partnership. . . . It may be the case that, although partners complain about market and hierarchical dysfunctions, this combination of instruments is the least worst governance option. Without objective measures of performance and research into a greater variety of partnership forms, we cannot be sure that partners know what policy or programme arrangements make for effective partnership working.*”

Entwistle et al

That Entwistle et al. view elites as more likely to ‘pin blame’ on their partners rather than manifest the cosy ‘groupthink’ I have described is interesting and may speak to the specificities of the Manchester context. Their concern, however with methodological enquiry into ‘objective measures’ of partnership functioning is critical if we are to understand the functioning of urban policy elites in practice or to be able to make claims about models for partnership working. This interest in objectivity leads to combining the qualitative with the quantitative described below in section
Quantitative Stages

(1) Analysis of relevant data-sets pertinent to both regional and sub-regional contexts and case study areas

(2) The use of Social Network Analysis in order to attempt to explore/explain how different LAA/MAAs function.

The use of Social Network Analysis is key in the ambition of this research specifically to look at more objective measures of governance performance and dysfunction.

4.6 Use of SNA

In their excellent article Knox et al. (2006) bemoan the fact that in spite of the network being the defining contemporary metaphor much if not all exploration of networks is done in almost complete ignorance of the contribution of SNA [Social Network Analysis] from formal, quantitative social science. It is the intention of this research to connect the metaphorical/rhetorical use of the network to the method itself and in this way to expose whether we truly have functional networks, fit to ‘go into governance mode’ by analysing the relational data gathered from LAA/MAA and city regional actors.

Network methods are seen as a means of mapping roles comprehensively, so allowing “real” qualities of social structures to be delineated …the basic presumption of SNA is that sociograms of points and lines can be used to represent agents and their social relations. The pattern of connections among these lines in a sociogram represents the relational structure of a society or social group” (Knox, 2006)

This work can be situated within a sociological tradition exemplified by Granovetter whose influential article ‘the strength of weak ties’ (1975) narrating the importance of roles within networks such as brokers, bridges, early adopters, boundary spanners, centrality and periphery and the effect of cliques, on change, innovation and diffusion.

significance within networks is given to individuals that act as connectors within a network, boundary spanners who connect networks, information brokers and people who are peripheral to the network” (Granovetter, 1975)

Networks have a whole language of their own which makes their use somewhat difficult to explain simply or to teach, also methodological concerns and considerations can make the use of SNA appear daunting and complex. It is the contention of this thesis that networks are useful as heuristic tools which expose some of the underlying and structural elements underpinning the views and actions of the governance cliques.
We define a network as a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the nodes. We refer to the nodes as actors (individuals, work units, or organizations). The particular content of the relationships represented by the ties is limited only by a researcher's imagination. (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai, 2004 pg 795)

Appeals to the imagination of the researcher connect with the potential usefulness of the theoretical position that such importance is placed on getting into the dynamics of brokering LAAs/MAAs through the use of situated case studies. SNA suffers from widespread misunderstandings, from those who view it is not desirable and from those who view it as not possible to achieve.

A problem with applying a high methodology standard, which would allow for a sociometric analysis of the interaction of coalition members, is that it requires that all potentially influential persons in each particular case be identified. This is a costly enterprise, and thus constitutes a serious detriment to multicase studies. If a method exists that generates relatively reliable data at a lower cost, researchers can investigate more cities, more policy areas, in more countries, and over more points in time.

It is this core misunderstanding about the difficulties associated with formal sociometry which leads researchers to exclude it from their methodological toolboxes. It is possible, as we will see in section 5.4 to achieve the ‘high methodological standard’ described as desirable using the new computer programmes such as Pajek⁴ and YeD⁵ without it necessarily being a costly enterprise.

The other practical misunderstanding is that in order for sociometric approaches to yield information of analytic use you need to know the absolute extent of the network before it yields dividends. This is categorically not the case. It is quite possible to generate interesting results from mapping a very few connections and in no way is extensiveness required.

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⁴ Pajek website
⁵ YeD website
Fig 13, (above) is an example of a small ego-net designed to elicit information about the coordination of volunteer and community activity in the second Manchester International Festival. It was generated as part of a project where only 6 interviews were carried out and sought to demonstrate the connections in play as those respondents were asked about their key contacts and these were mapped. A process like this can usefully underpin any qualitative enterprise.

It is somewhat surprising that despite enthusiasm for the network as a metaphor neither those from within the anglo-governance traditions nor critical geographers have used the technique of formal SNA in looking at cities. Apart from the notable exception of Peter John’s 1998 work using sociometry (John 1998) \(^6\) in which he explores the roles of elites in comparative English and French contexts there are no other examples of the use of networks analysis methods in looking at the role of urban governance networks and no published studies applying SNA to the crowded partnership arena of UK sub-national economic development and regeneration. It is the core methodological objective of the thesis to argue that the topic is ideally suited to a sociometric approach, in combination

\(^6\) Which is all the more impressive since it pre-dates computational techniques
with approaching and observing the elite actors themselves. Use of SNA allows the researcher to look beyond the attributes of the individual actors in order to explore;

1. The nature of the relations between actors  
2. The positions of actors within a network  
3. The structure of the network as a whole  

(Scott, 2000)

The most palpable hit on the usage of SNA as a social-scientific method is that in looking at network structures the analyst is blinded to the wiser socio-economic forces in play and may be tempted by micro-level explanations of phenomena. This is a serious critique which requires sensitive handling, as Foley and Edwards argued 1999

Although SNA does not take into account the larger socio-structural context (e.g. historical patterns and institutions) the approach does focus attention more precisely on how trust and reciprocity flow through social relations.

As we have already seen in sections on ‘trust’ Chapter II section from the work of Alder and Schumpeter and precision that can be brought to bear on this issue is useful. The key terminology of SNA is listed at Table 17 (over the page.) Despite the impenetrable nature of SNA language many of the concepts deployed can be seen to be quite intuitive when looking at the actual sociograms themselves. As John writes in his article on the use of SNA for the interrogation of urban elites (John 1998) pp 14

You do not need to be an expert in network theory to understand that the central position within a star-shaped network is likely to have some significance to how that network performs.

Figure 15 Sample SNA graphs
In order to calculate centrality the Kamada-Kwai Algorithm is used (Kamada and Kawai 1989). This method calculates the shortest distances between nodes. And therefore their degree (of) centrality.

Table 18 Network terminology
(modified from Krebs, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Node</td>
<td>Actor within a network. The researcher must decide if nodes are always people. Some studies in Science and Technology Studies (STS) posit buildings as nodes in order to demonstrate interaction between material worlds. In my networks nodes are always people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tie</td>
<td>The link between nodes, the lines on a sociogram. Ties demonstrate the connections between nodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Centrality</td>
<td>Social network researchers measure network activity for a node by using the concept of degrees the number of direct connections a node has</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct connections</td>
<td>Having high degree centrality suggests who is an active node in the network. Who may be a 'connector' or 'hub' in this network. Common wisdom in personal networks is &quot;the more connections, the better.&quot; This is not always so. What really matters is where those connections lead to -- and how they connect the otherwise unconnected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clique</td>
<td>Nodes that connect only connections within their immediate cluster - or connects only those who are already connected to each other. Cliques are useful in the transmission of shared knowledge but not so good for diffusion or innovation (there is no way on for new connections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network centralisation</td>
<td>Individual network centralities provide insight into the individual’s location in the network. The relationship between the centralities of all nodes can reveal much about the overall network structure A very centralized network is dominated by one or a few very central nodes. If these nodes are removed or damaged, the network quickly fragments into unconnected sub-networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubs</td>
<td>Hubs are nodes with high degree and between-ness centrality. A highly central node can become a single point of failure. A network centralized around a well connected hub can fail abruptly if that hub is disabled or removed. A less centralized network has no single points of failure. It is resilient in the face of many intentional attacks or random failures -- many nodes or links can fail while allowing the remaining nodes to still reach each other over other network paths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness Centrality</td>
<td>Having fewer connections but possibly a degree of bridging capital or brokerage. High betweeness centrality is both a powerful position and a point of vulnerability. A node with high betweenness has great influence over what flows -- and does not -- in the network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Reach</td>
<td>networks have horizons over which we cannot see, nor influence. They propose that the key paths in networks are 1 and 2 steps and on rare occasions, three steps. The &quot;small world&quot; in which we live is not one of &quot;six degrees of separation&quot; but of direct and indirect connections &lt; 3 steps away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary Spanner</td>
<td>Nodes that connect their group to others usually end up with high network metrics. Boundary spanners are more central in the overall network than their immediate neighbours whose connections are only local, within their immediate cluster. You can be a boundary spanner via your bridging connections to other clusters or via your concurrent membership in overlapping groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral Players</td>
<td>Peripherality may mark the end of one network and the beginning of another</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the hiatus within urban policy studies of network methods the first credited usage of sociometry is credited to Dr J.L. Moreno an early social psychologist who envisioned mapping out the entire population of New York City which in 1934 amounted to 5.5 million people. His monograph ‘Who Shall Survive’ represents an alternate path for the study of cities rooted in their relational and networked properties.

Moreno rooted his work on sociometry within a highly ambitious therapeutic-humanist framework, In the preface to the book it is argued that

> Complex patterns of social structure are built from simpler ones by increasing the number of individuals, increasing the qualities of interest which each has for the other, and so increasing in the final analysis the capacity for bringing about results of a social nature.

(Moreno, 1934 pp cxi)

This focus, on ‘results of a social nature’ links to my concern regarding the governance capacity and capability (and scope) of a particular scale and, further to the key question of the outcomes and performance of partnerships and networks. It matter less the configurations of network structure but what they are able to achieve collaboratively. This represents a road less travelled for studies of cities.

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8 [http://www.asgpp.org/docs/WSS/Preludes/index.html](http://www.asgpp.org/docs/WSS/Preludes/index.html)
Another notable interest in cities and networks can be found in even earlier work by Georg Simmel, whose metropolis and mental life offers another alternate starting point for the urban analyst. In his work on the necessity of strangeness to underpin the exchange economy of the modern city he argues that nature of network size on interaction and to the likelihood of interaction in ramified, loosely-knit networks rather than groups (Simmel, 1908/1971).

Sociometry became of great interest to more mathematically inclined analysts, including the graph-theorists of the sixties and seventies. Much SNA is carried out in this very quantitative tradition, including mathematically inclined sociologists and anthropologists. There is a good deal of activity on the usage of SNA methods clustering around the Manchester group on Social networks. This work very rarely connects with work on governance at still less often on governance within urban policy. This is a significant research agenda for the future specifically in terms of comparing governance structures.

4.5.1 Knowing and Knitting Networks for Economic Development

From the very roots of the discipline we now turn to contemporary uses of SNA within the field of economic development, where Valdis Krebs and June Holley have laid out a series of stages/phases for networks development. This work, under the aegis of the Appalachian centre for Economic Networks (ACE.net) offers a series of ideal type networks which may be applied to network governance structures to explore their structures and brokerage.

The typology;

1. Scattered fragments
2. Hub and spokes
3. Small worlds
4. Centre/ periphery

offers a framework for sorting types of governance networks and looking at the brokerage activities of the key nodes within them. Krebs and Holley argue that at each discrete phase there are specific brokerage functions to undertake and that a focus on the bridging capital of the brokers can result in markedly different structural effect. This work offers a useful tool for the analysis of the network governance effects of partnership formations.
argue that Network maps provide a revealing snapshot of ecosystem at a particular point in time. These maps can help answer many key questions in the community building process.

4.5.1.1 Scattered Fragments

Here the individual nodes are quite isolated from one another – there are some small cliques but they do not show connections with one another.
Fig 15 shows scattered fragments of interviewees. The gaps demonstrate that relationships do not cross from one clique or set to another.

4.5.1.2 Hub and Spoke

Figure 19 Hub and Spoke: Ideal Type
(Krebs and Holley)
The hub and spoke model here has a central broker connecting the nodes together. The introduction of this central node has the effect of transforming the way in which the nodes are connected together.

Figure 20 Hub and spoke 2
Example author’s data

It is amazing that this hub and spoke network is based on the same data as Fig 15 on the previous page with a single extra node added and deliberately designed to broker between the clique and scattered fragments, through 4 more connections a cohesive structure is created.
Fig 20 shows nodes connected with different places, and a hub and spoke model associated with a few core central nodes.
In the small world configuration brokerage has achieved further integration of nodes into cliques. This network demonstrates multiple hubs forming. In his work on Manchester Music Scenes Crossley, (2009) demonstrates the efficacy of a small world-type system held together by a number of brokers in the post-punk phase in Manchester.
4.5.2.4 Core/Periphery

Krebs and Holley view the core/periphery model (see over) as optimal as there are multiple brokers, convening multiple strands.
Work as diverse as the role of innovation systems in Manchester (D’andrea, 2009) in Fig 24 (over) and community action in New Cross carried out by the RSA (fig 25 over) show a core/periphery model emerges through intense and focused collaboration.
Figure 25 Core Periphery 2: Manchester Innovation System

Figure 26 Core Periphery 3: Community Action in New Cross Gate (RSA, 2010)
Though they look different figs 23-25 all show core and periphery networks, a formation through which arguably innovation and information can flow freely. The core nodes function effectively as brokers and there are multiple hubs.

4.5.2 Combining Networks with conceptual descriptions

Having described these networked models, it is possible to connect the forms of ideal type of network with the conceptual differentiations outlined earlier, (Chapter 2)

The synthesis in Table 8 (below) seeks to combine the insights on the properties of Type II governance entities from Chris Skelcher with network models.

Table 19 Type II and Network Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Sphere</th>
<th>Taylor, Sullivan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Club</td>
<td>Polity-Forming</td>
<td>Skelcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Distributed</td>
<td>Network Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hub and Spoke</td>
<td>Small World</td>
<td>Core/Periphery</td>
<td>Krebs,Holley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the above table the first column is a ‘Site’ of Governance, under which agencies are reliant on a centralised system of authority. They may operate as ‘hub and spoke’ types with brokers as central. Column Tow shows the ‘between mode of the ‘space’ of governance – arguably an ‘in-between’ type – which may exhibit some decentralisation, where clubs or cliques form into ‘small world’ configurations. The Third Column is the more fully extended distributed network-type. Herein a governance sphere has more autonomy and may exhibit the forms of core-periphery ideal type shown in figs 23-25 (previous pages)
4.5.3 Leading Networks through brokerage

It is clear that, having mapped out the networks in play and concentrated on structural explanations that the roles and actions of agents, their brokerage functions and capacity for governability and scope at scale for influence can be explored

The key point is this: just because you have an organisational chart at your fingertips does not mean you have a charter for your world. And having the networks mapped does not tell you about the cultural terrain you have to cross in order to lead effectively; the map is most certainly not the territory. Rather it is the lack of a coordinated leadership network within a network of hierarchies that produces the lurches, lunging and sputtering we frequently experience in government. What I have tried to do here is explain the science underlying the practical vagaries, which is essential for planning and predicting effective change.™ Karen Stephenson, 2004, pp

As was demonstrated by Sweeting et al. in Chapter II brokerage is of increasing importance within the skill-set of public managers as and support for them to articulate their context in sociometric terms. As Karen Stephenson describes it SNA is the ‘...essential for planning and predicting effective change’ It is the contention of this thesis that there is a research agenda opening up which situates public servants within these contexts of operation and then uses SNA methods in order to plan, predict and strategise. And it may be in viewing leadership in this, relational fashion that we can explore brokerage as a function of effective leadership in networked spaces. Currently it remains to be seen whether brokerage as a set of behaviours and competences can be reconciled with the hierarchical nature of working within a Local Authority.

4.5.4 Using networks as key element of research strategy

Having argued that the use of networks is both a conceptual and an empirical foundation of the thesis it would be odd if the inter-scala methodology diagram (at Fig 10, pg ?? this chapter) with it’s linearity and ‘boxed off’ nature were the only heuristic device deployed. Fig 26 (below) shows the semi-structured interview participants, the interview respondents for the research process, as a network. I have sorted the respondents according to their positions (European, national, regional, city-regional, local) and generated ties in order to demonstrate respondents cross referring, mentioning one another or suggesting one another as key contacts to follow up. The central node, connecting all respondents is, of course the author. It is in this sense that SNA may be used to describe the more traditional snowball-type methodologies deployed within qualitative research endeavours.

http://www.drkaren.us/pdfs/networklogic03stephenson[1].pdf
The nodes in this network are coded as European (triangles) national (squares) Manchester city-region (circle) locality (octagon). Ties show where they explicitly refer to one another. It seeks to demonstrate that in constructing a perspective on a place the (linked) and multi-scalar perspectives of many respondents should be used.

4.7 The Greater Manchester Case

The justification for the Greater Manchester Case is rehearsed in depth as Chapter VI where the peculiarities of the City, its development and governance arrangements are described. In order to explore the heterogeneity of sub-national governance arrangements some comparative work was also carried out in the neighbouring shire county of Lancashire (which is a two-tier authority comprising 12 districts) and within the GM boroughs of Stockport and Wigan, these reflections are gather together in Chapter VIII

Table 20 Greater Manchester

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater Manchester</th>
<th>LAAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAs</td>
<td>MAA as AGMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochdale MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salford CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockport MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tameside MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafford MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigan MBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An early area of research interest in interrogating the subsequent shape, structure and effectiveness of the local governance performance architecture was to explore the role of successive phases of regeneration funding in arguably catalysing partnership governance approaches and the changes to partnership policy wrought over the period 2004-2009. It was considered important to look in depth at areas with a history of regeneration monies in contrast with areas without and to contrast the roles of regeneration funding in areas with different structural arrangements.

In Table 10 the characteristics of the constituent boroughs of Greater Manchester are explored. As a result the areas corresponding with this framework were selected as:

(a)  Greater Manchester Unitary Authority in receipt of NRF : Wigan
(b)  Greater Manchester Unitary authority with no NRF : Stockport

Table 21 Potential Case Study Location Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>political</th>
<th>CPA</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>IMD</th>
<th>NRF?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolton MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>261,037</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>180,608</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester CC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>392,819</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>217,273</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochdale MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>205,357</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salford CC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>216,103</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockport MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LIBDEM</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>284,528</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tameside MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>213,043</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafford MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LIBDEM</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>210,145</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigan MBC</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>301,415</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above demonstrates that of the 10 GMCR boroughs only 3 were not in receipt of NRF monies. shaded rows are GMCR metropolitan boroughs in receipt of NRF monies, and therefore among the 88 most deprived LAs in the UK. The importance of governance effects of regeneration money will be explored within Chapter 5.
4.8 Summary and Methodological Statement of Thesis

The methodology for exploring the sub-national in the UK is necessarily mixed method in approach. It is considered to be a significant limitation of other work in this area that it does not ‘treat governance networks as networks’ which is the approach of this thesis. The enterprise requires a thoughtful approach towards the elite active in the studies areas and that ethical considerations about positioning and access be considered. The thesis seeks to contrast the effects of regeneration policy and the mechanisms of the LAA and MAA within different administrative and structural contexts by looking at the Boroughs of the Manchester City Region in contrast with the heterogeneity of two-tier local government and at the ways in which sub-regional assemblages have emerged via the MAA process.

It seeks to illuminate the system-wide governability of the studies contexts, in combination with the ‘scope at scale’ available to individual actors within the networks at specific times, identifying the junctures at which scales were ‘shuffled’ (re-scaled or re-organised) Having presented the core elements of social network analysis it argues that ‘knowing the networks’ is a first step towards ‘knitting the networks’ differently and that governance networks must be judged by whether and when they ‘go into governing mode’ and what they do rather than simply by their structures.
Chapter V: Slippery Signifiers

5.1 Introduction

In large part the spatial, temporal disjuncture inherent in ‘policy smart, delivery fraught’ programmes rubs up against the inherent tensions long identified between top-down and bottom-up approaches to community renewal (Pinnegar, 2010 pp 2921)

First speaker: ‘Of course the A of the LAA is not the A of the ABI’ Second speaker: ‘or the MAA- that is different too…’First speaker: ‘Local? Not really…no place for our area-based work and agreements in only the traditional sense…’ Second speaker: as in the suspension of loathing in pursuit of cash? First speaker: Exactly.

(Interview data, NW LAA brokers, 2008)

This chapter comprises a policy review of the widely varying combinations of second generation network governance mechanisms for sub-regional economic development and regeneration. These are described as slippery signifiers by virtue of the changes they undergo and the ways that they morph according to circumstances. Chapter 2 has discussed governance and functional/structural effects of urban policy programmes on the functioning of local government itself and the roles and rules applied to those brokering these ‘soft spaces’ Chapter 3 The modes of governance and co-ordination in play within the sub-national, and the ways to study them in Chapter IV. In this chapter we aim to connect these literatures, to explore the specific underlying reforming logics of the mechanisms of PSAs, MAAs and LAAs (and their antecedent policies) and the peculiar forms that ‘joining up’ government brought into being within the New Labour Long Decade 1997-2010.

In doing this, the chapter focuses on how far the initiatives, projects and programmes of UK regeneration and economic development policy have impacted profoundly on the available policy and co-ordination ‘mix’ at the more local scale. We explore where and whether mobilisation of the ‘partnership panacea’, as a preferred strategic and delivery model has served to create unstable hybrid entities combining the logics of market, hierarchy and network. Firstly, it outlines an explanation for the governance elements deployed within Type II governance spaces, differentiating between mechanisms drivers and levers and presenting the role of second generation networked governance mechanisms from the European literature Second It outlines international central-local comparisons internationally, looking at the ways in which formal sub-national government interacts with non-legislative Type II mechanisms in the area of urban policy before thirdly
focussing on the UK case in detail, explaining the roles of the various innovative mechanisms deployed to fulfil national policy objectives from the PSA regime, through to the locality scale where mechanisms brought into being in order to deliver the *national strategy for neighbourhood renewal* such as the LSP and SCS brought into being structures which ultimately (briefly) functioned as local governance performance architecture where delivery was governed by the complex targetry of the LAA and designed to connect with the spatial expression of the SCS; the LDF. *Fourth* it shifts up a scale and describes the policy trajectory of the mechanisms of the MAA, a city-regional spatial fix which emerged after the ‘the little regional difficulties’ of New Labour after the failed regional referendum of 2004. In the (albeit brief) period where both LAA and MAA were functioning there was a great deal of confusion that MAAs were simply larger-scale LAAs. We will explore that this was emphatically not the case and explore their differing logics and trajectory. We suggest how and why mechanisms are subject to change, revision and are ultimately very vulnerable due to their lack of legislative and statutory fixedness and the ways in which the statutory and legislative authority interacts with governance mechanisms

\[\text{...Up until then we had been laboriously designing specific mechanisms for specific policy agendas and then it hit us... it can do that too}\]

*(source: Interview data, CLG civil servant, 2007)*

In order to explore this balance it is important to make a number of distinctions. This table seeks to provide clarity over the ways in which the elements of governance combine in order to make things happen. Firstly however as described in the section on theories of change differentiation between the elements of governance are necessary (see over)
| **Table 12 Governance Elements**  
| (defined by author) |
|---|---|---|
| **Infra-structures** | The selection of areas, according to ‘objective’ criteria for special spatially targeted support | ‘the 88’ LAs in the UK under the NSNR ‘Assisted Areas’ under the EU | Can be applied at any scale for which there is reliable data available  
Eg SOA/LA |
| **Architectures** | Deliberately constructed strategic/delivery vehicles | The LSP-LAA-LDF performance regime for local governance (after the 2007 Act) Regional arrangements from 1999 | Generally Type II governance formations. Can be applied at any scale: key issue is connection between such architectures and accountability at other (horizontal) scales |
| **Mechanisms** | Component elements of an architecture (above) mechanisms combine drivers and levers (see below)Could be localised versions of national policy, strategic documents, assemblages of actors or ‘soft spaces’ | PSA LAA MAA | Can be applied at any spatial scale – especially in ‘soft’ or ‘para-static’ spaces. You may not need mechanisms if your activity matches/maps neatly to established spaces of governance |
| **Levers (Carrots and/or sticks for change)** | Instruments available to government to effect change in public policy and services. | Reward grant attached to LAA SBR Inspection regimes | Powers. Ability to exercise policy choices. The lack of genuine levers in the UK sub-national to exercise policy choices means that levers are predominantly ‘pulled’ nationally |
| **Drivers** | General aims of government in specific policy areas | Could be policy documents of strategies NSNR (UK-wide) SCS (LA-wide) | The processes through which things come onto (and off) the agenda are notoriously complex (see policy streams in John Kingdon) manifesto commitments, sectional interests, ‘crises’ ‘framing’ |
| **Funding Streams** | The way to make things happen. Channels through which government money is spent, can encompass competitive bidding and/or be connected with infrastructures or architectures (see above) | NDC WNF | Competing for, and spending of, various funding streams has been a core regeneration activity. Can lead to fragmentation |
Manifestly there are connections and tensions between all these elements and it is through their combination that ‘things happen’. From the perspective of these definitions, then, we can explain that regeneration policy after the national strategy for neighbourhood renewal was concentrated around a specifically constructed infra-structure ‘the 88’, which was supported by a deliberately designed and built evidence base, the IMD, based around a different functional economic geography of SOAs which was designed to objectively allocate the funding streams of NDC etc. via a new joined up local architecture, the LSP which subsequently morphed its functions into a more generalised local governance performance architecture after the 2006 White Paper. The mechanisms through which this was achieved, NDC Boards, Partnerships etc. had scant read across to the established scales of democracy and accountability as in these phases regeneration was ostensibly para-static and focussed on softer spaces than LA boundaries. Hence the governance effects of this phase of regeneration policy are necessarily connected with the policy drivers which defined the issues of spatially concentrated poverty and deprivation as worthy of action in the first place.

This oversimplified heuristic device is useful in showing the myriad bodies and how far the disaggregation of the decision-making model serves to make joined-up government far harder to attain. Despite joined-up-ness being an ostensible policy goal of the early New Labour period it connects with the MLG heuristic described in the previous chapter whereby the relationships between the boxes are acknowledged as insufficiently described.

Holistic Governance is a major commitment for the reform of policy-making, civil service and local government structures, budgets, work processes and professional networks, systems of staff development, management practices, information systems including the design and use of digital information technology, and for the accountability of public officials at every level” [6 et al, 2002, pp 212]
5.2 Second generation governance mechanisms

Second generation network governance mechanisms are defined by Klijn and Koppenjan as ‘non legislative’ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006). Following the assumptions that within new or soft spaces of governance non-legislative instruments are commonplace Heritier proposes this framework.

These new modes of governance are guided by the principles of voluntarism (non-binding targets and the use of soft law), subsidiarity (measures are decided by member states), and inclusion (the actors concerned participate in governance). The mechanisms of governance are diffusion and learning, persuasion, standardization of knowledge about policies, repetition (iterative processes of monitoring and target readjustment are employed) and time management (setting of time-tables) (Jacobsson 2001, 11ff.) Heritier, 2002 pp5

This view, that the mechanisms of governance are; diffusion, learning, persuasion, standardisation of knowledge about policies, repetition and time management means that paying close attention to the construction of these elements will be key to who is wielding power and authority, in short who is able to impose joined-up ness, or coherence on whom. Second generation governance mechanisms are believed to have specific advantages: They evade the lengthy, unwieldy, and cumbersome process of legislative decision-making. At the same time, the threat of legislation is used to increase the willingness of actors to act voluntarily. This place, where the mandating of non-legislative mechanisms connect with statutory instruments at various scales is of particular interest in assessing ‘governability’ and capacity to act and accountability, or ‘democratic anchorage’

Since these new forms of governance avoid regulatory requirements, it is expected that they will meet with less political resistance from the decision-makers and the implementing actors alike. After all, the latter would have to carry the costs of regulation. At the substantive level the advantages are seen in the greater flexibility of the policy measures and the greater adaptability of those measures to a rapidly changing social, economic, and technological environment. Within many countries within the EU and beyond, vertical co-operation is growing in popularity over solely inter-municipal arrangements.

In the following sections we review the balances sought within the area of contemporary urban policy between the role of Type I formalised, hierarchical government arrangements and Type II ‘soft’ ‘voluntaristic’ arrangements looking at incentives for partnership working, which can include statutory obligations and financial incentives, such as covering
the costs of joint working or grants or making co-operation a prerequisite of gaining certain financial resources. Although financial incentives have been effective for compensating for the costs of establishing a partnership, they have been less effective in promoting joint planning and programming of policies on socio-economic development.

It is not uncommon to find that co-operation in these cases can be more symbolic than real. (CLG 2007 p.12)

In short, a return to ‘loose associations engaged in talk’, or networks not yet ‘in governing mode’ (see Chapter II) Early work on the roles of mechanisms was couched in ‘rational action’ and thus methodologically individualistic terms (see Elster, 2007; Hedstro¨m and Swedberg, 1998). However, recent by work by Tilly (2002, 2006; McAdam et al., 2001), amongst others, has both freed the notion of its ‘rational action’ connotations and sought out ‘relational mechanisms. Crossley, (2009) defines this

Relational mechanisms are those which generate sequences of interactions and events conditional upon given interaction dynamics and/or figurations. My focus here is upon mechanisms which generate relationships and networks. (Crossley, 2009 pp??)

The following seeks to explain the rise of such relational mechanisms within contemporary, second generation, networked, Type II multi-level polities and their vexed relationship with democratic accountability and scrutiny of government. Describing in turn the PSA regime, and its function as a mechanism for [JUG] Joined up Government within the core executive, then the changing roles of the LAA, which it is argued has moved from a conceptualisation and become a mechanism for calculability and performance management over their short life. (Ahmad, Sullivan) We also explore the specific relationship between the [NIS] National Indicator Set and the mechanisms of the LAA and then move ‘up’ a scale to explore how far City-regional thinking has been inscribed within the MAAs.
5.3 UK Mechanisms.

The targeting regime for central and local government is excessively centralised, deploys more targets and outcome measures than can sensibly be managed by delivery organisations, promotes conflict between organisations by failing to align incentives, and over-emphasises accountability to inspectorates. (LGA)

In the light international comparison the UK system is almost uniquely centralised. However over the period studied a myriad of novel governance (Type II) mechanisms were experimented with. This period of experimentation was most intense in the period between the Local Government White Paper *Stronger and prosperous communities* (CLG, 2006) and the general election of 2010. The mechanisms which were at the fore during this period, however were the results of several rounds of prior experimentation and iteration in similar guises. This period after the CSR of 2004 and lasting up until the election of 2010 covers Phases 3 and 4 in the table below. It was in this period that CLG sought to resolve the para-static paradoxes of the earlier phases and set about the construction of a functioning local partnership performance architecture.

Table 23 Governance Elements Phases 3 and 4 (author synthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What?</td>
<td>Initiative-it-is SRBetc. Continuing Con policies Other ABIs, Sure Start, HAZ etc.</td>
<td>National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal emphasising role of LSPs for “the 88”</td>
<td>Co-ordination “Mainstreaming” Structures LSPs, LDFs, LAAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How? Public Funding</td>
<td>££££ + Euros</td>
<td>£££ Less Euros</td>
<td>££</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where? Salient Scales</td>
<td>European National Regional Neighbourhood</td>
<td>European National Supra-regional Regional Local Authority + Neighbourhood</td>
<td>European National Supra-regional (?) Regional City Regional Local Authority +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Ad hoc para-static project proliferation (neighbourhood and region) para-static paradox independence of earlier phase leads to impossibility of co-ordination</td>
<td>Seeking to resolve para-static paradox through development of local partnership governance architecture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In seeking to resolve the para-static paradox set up by the proliferation of partnership entities in the earlier two phases by the time of the LGPIIH Act an entire local governance partnership architecture had been defined and inscribed within legislation.
These shuffles represent a significant challenge to local government practice and a deliberate attempt by successive governments to behave in a para-static fashion - empowering actors other than local government itself or, emphasising Type II governance arrangements as innovative and simultaneously down-playing the role of the local authority itself Type I, general-purpose local government. Describing the governance effects of the various urban regeneration partnership policies and arguing that these represent a test-bed for approaches subsequently mainstreamed, and at proto-typical attempts to create governance structures through which to coordinate service delivery.

Arguably these two policy areas are two sides of a very complicated equation. It is contended that whilst regeneration functions were re-scaled to small area-based initiatives characterized by partnership working, there was a lack of thought about the effect that this would have on local government form itself and it describes some of the underlying and connective reform rationales, technocratic innovations specifically designed to bring coherence to domestic policy. Notably attempts to replicate at the local level the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) process in connecting resource allocation to Public Service Agreement PSA targets. These changes to the “wiring” of Whitehall are described and their implications suggested for localities where LSPs and LPSA(2G) policy streams connected to create the LAA, it also explores the characterization of public sector partnership brokers, the key importance of this set of skills and behaviours and how critical it is to take seriously their assumptions, experiences and the organizational “rules-in-use” that they employ in navigating a continually changing policy context, how far they are able to employ their own judgement and discretion.

5.4 (L) PSA regime and LSP

5.4.1 PSAs

At the national scale the Public Service Agreements (PSA) regime which supports the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) process instated by The Brown Treasury in the early years of the Labour government. The PSA regime, characterised variously as a tool of meta-governance or as a significant constitutional innovation bringing horizontal co-ordination to the notorious messiness of the UK core executive. Following some success at aligning departmental objectives within overarching themes (see SNA map 24 below and Table 22 over the page) As can be seen the PSA regime enabled ministers to connect across functional area and to ‘own’ targets possibly beyond the purview of their
departmental brief. Looking at the PSA priorities does seem to expose the ‘true nature’ of power within the core executive as, rather than focussing on the historic status of government departments it emphasises who has control of the levers of policy as such at this time it can be argued that Ed Balls (responsible for 5 PSAs), Jacqui Smith (responsible for 4) and John Hutton and Hazel Blears (responsible for 3 each) were in a central position.

Figure 28 SNA map of the PSA regime by government minister 2007

Table 24 PSAs for which each Cabinet Minister is operationally responsible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number of PSAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ed Balls</td>
<td>DCFS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacqui Smith</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hutton</td>
<td>DBERR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazel Blears</td>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Hain</td>
<td>DWP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Johnson</td>
<td>DH</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Denham</td>
<td>DIUS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilary Benn</td>
<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alistair Darling</td>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Straw</td>
<td>MoJ</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Kelly</td>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Purnell</td>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Miliband</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Alexander</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Miliband</td>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the PSA process was deemed successful at joining-up across Whitehall There was an interest in attempts to localise PSA logics into Local Public Service Agreement (LPSA) pilots in 2000-2002. The following sections seeks to explain how LPSA pilots at this time became derailed by further difficulties of vertical co-ordination, through tiers and scales of governance and further confused by the merging of the LPSA second round with LSPs whose purpose was rooted in ‘the 88’ of the NSNR.

LAAs (from 2006) were the ‘bastard children’ of LSPs and LPSAs, the two containing quite contradictory rationales. It is to these underlying rationales that the following sections now turn;

5.4.2 LPSA

(LPSAs) had been piloted themselves with 20 authorities in late 2000, rolling out to all upper tier authorities from September 2001. Areas were generally required to negotiate 12 targets with Government. Some targets were chosen from a national suite of performance targets, and some had equivalent Best Value Performance Indicator (BVPI) measures within the (then) new CPA. The Government asked that these targets focus on education, personal social services, transport and cost effectiveness. Other targets were considered ‘local’ targets, important to the local authority but not necessarily part of the Government’s wider expectations for local authority improvement. These were expected to focus on cross-cutting issues such as social inclusion, economic development and regeneration etc.

There were successes from the LPSA process

Local PSAs have won widespread endorsement in local government as a valuable means of working with central government to improve public services and discuss barriers to performance.

(Chris Leslie Minister for constitutional affairs, Greenwich July 2002)

Though the LPSA did drive performance improvements, it was seen as a confused and ungainly initiative. It was hoped that LAA1 would be the start of a ‘new deal’ for local government. In reality, it too remained a ‘clunky, top down driven process’ (source: Local Authority Chief Executive Interview data, 2007). This was the source of some frustration from the outset of LAA2: ‘LAA1 was oversold which undermined its credibility somewhat.’ (source: interview data LAA broker, 2008). Clearly LAAs still had a lot to prove if they were to deliver on local expectations and ensure sustained enthusiasm for their implementation.
5.4.3 LSPs

LSPs, meanwhile were being developed in order principally to act as umbrella local delivery vehicles (LDVs) at local government level promoting the importance of multi-stakeholder partnership. The umbrella LDV for a plethora of area-focused initiatives was termed a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) which aimed to: ‘bring together at a local level the different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors so that different initiatives and services support each other and work together’ (DTLR, 2001, p. 7). One of the primary functions of the LSP was the development of a dedicated Community Strategy. Community Strategies were first introduced in the Local Government Act 2000, and placed a duty on local governments to prepare strategies for promoting or improving the well being of their areas. Broadly related to the underlying objectives of pragmatic third way policy – that is, enhancing enterprise and economic development with the promotion of sustainable social services. Community Strategies were required for local authorities initially in the 88 most disadvantaged areas of England in order to galvanise the promotion of partnership working and enable them to think strategically and in a long-range fashion.

The underpinning principles of Community Strategies were that they engage and involve local communities and when prepared were implemented by a LSP. The Community Strategy could therefore be seen as a ‘plan of plans’ or ‘overarching policy statements for each council’ (TewdwrJones et al., 2006, p. 537). Community Strategies (which in 2004 were rebranded Sustainable Community Strategies) defined their aims as fourfold:

1. allow local communities (based on geography and/or interest) to articulate their aspirations, needs and priorities;
2. co-ordinate the actions of the council, and of the public, private and voluntary and community organisations that operate locally;
3. focus and shape existing and future activity of these organisations so that they effectively meet community needs and aspirations, and
4. contribute to the achievement of sustainable development both locally and more widely, with local goals and priorities, relating, where appropriate, to regional, national and even global aims (DETR, 2000, p. 2).

The idea that an LSP represents a form of networked local governance or new localism is challenged as now apparently locally pragmatic structures are steered where:

Central government defines the rules of the game by setting targets, requiring the preparation of strategies and delivery plans, and by ensuring that LSPs only become eligible for additional resources if their membership and other criteria are met through a process of accreditation. In other words they are a top-down intervention aimed to achieve local network formation’ (Bailey, 2003, p. 445).
5.4.4 LPSA2G and LSP

Contemporaneous with the LSP ‘experiment’ to create a ‘plan of plans’ strategic vision another centrally generated policy – this time focused upon ‘measurement’ not vision – was developed as Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) and were designed and piloted within 20 local authorities between 2000–2002. LPSAs trade in detailed, specific and measurable improvements in performance, and tightly defined and controlled performance management. Key to the LPSA was the arrival of so-called ‘stretch targets’ – these are targets which have proved difficult to achieve and where a partnership can request additional or pooled /aligned funding and/or seek to negotiate ‘freedoms or flexibilities’ in how they undertake existing processes. In short, LPSAs

supposedly focus on the outcomes of service delivery rather than processes, inputs or outputs. However, evaluation evidence suggests that defining robust performance indicators that accurately reflected desired outcomes became problematic...many national indicators were not themselves outcome measures but throughputs and outputs’ (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005, p. 561).

LPSAs did not trade in the visions of the LSP but the very prosaic, detailed business of performance improvement. The LPSA experiment demonstrates the same frustrations articulated by many of the LSP evaluations and the difficulties local government were having around identifying and working with a range of ‘partners’. Young (2005, p. 16) for example, argues that;

working in partnership has long been a source of frustration for both central and local government. Although authorities are now encouraged to extend partnership working throughout the LSPA there is a basic lack of symmetry involved; the heart of the LPSA is a bilateral agreement between the two principal parties which can only be achieved through multilateral action on the part of several local partners

Here, is another suggestion that the visions of the (Sustainable) Community Strategy and LSP were colliding with the detail of the LPSA, both lacking in the necessary ‘symmetry’ between central–local action and co-ordinating with partners. Somehow LAAs were becoming stuck in between behaving like networked partnership formations and fitting with the extant hierarchy of the local authority.

It important to see LAAs as rooted in these experience of earlier waves of partnership delivery and policy, notably Local Public Sector Agreements [LPSAs] and also the experimental governance formations trialled under area-based regeneration initiatives and urban policy developments such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs)
5.5 From concept to calculability: The evolution of the LAA

They really shot themselves in the foot at the centre by not changing the name. The “new” LAA is not remotely related to the values and principles upon which partnerships came together and did the vision thing collectively or to the regeneration objectives of the first phases.

*(GO Director, interview data, 2008)*

5.5.1 Loops and Stages of Development: The LAA trajectory

*I mean just how many loops are they going to send us around??*  
*(LAA co-ordinator (NW LA with NRF), interview data, 2007)*

We are very much building the aircraft in flight  
*(LAA co-ordinator, NLGN Seminar respondent, 2007)*

The LAA went through a rapid evolution in its short life as a policy mechanism. It was announced in November 2004 by John Prescott and underwent huge changes. This can be explained by the logic of ‘it can do that too…’ *(source: interview data civil servant, 2008)* which moves from organisational design towards more multi-purposes and towards polity-forming and formal mechanisms. This process is described here as one of loops and stages which local authorities and their partners have negotiated.

Figure 29 The loops and stages of the LAA.

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1. Launch/Pilot Phase [LA Pioneers]
2. Review, Roll-Out, Refresh } blocks, f&f
**LGWP 2006 – LGPIH Act 2007**
3. Road Test, [trial] } **National Indicator Set/Story of place**

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10 And abandoned by the coalition in 2010
Fig 29 seeks to demonstrate the trajectory of LAA policy and guidance over the period October 2004 to July 2008. These phases are here described as

(1) Launch Pilot
21 LAA pilots were agreed in October 2004 and were in place by 2005. These were 3-block LAAs lacking a specific role for ED/R activities

(2) Review and Roll Out
2006 saw the ‘second round’ of 67 local authorities signing up.
63 further ‘round three’ LAAs were introduced in 2007 with all top-tier authorities councils by then signed up to the LAA process. In this phase the ‘fourth block’ a place for Ed/R activities was included.
As befits such a slippery signifier it was only once LAAs had been fully rolled out that the LGWP proposed the notion of the NIS as attached to the operations of LAAs.

(3) Road Test
Subsequent phases therefore included a further pilot phase (this time called the road test) where 6 authorities sought to use their existing block-based LAAs to connect with an emerging NIS.

(4) ‘New’ LAA
Statutory LAAs, with partners bound by duties to ‘consult and consider’ the LAA and LAs tied to (up to) 35 indicators from the NIS were signed off by Summer 2008.

5.5.2 new LAAs and the LGPA

Following the LGPIH Act of 2007 there were significant changes to the LAA:
A local area agreement (LAA) was now a three-year agreement between a local area and central government covering the period 2008-2011 consisting of up to 35 targets negotiated from the national indicator set to be applicable locally. The LAA was negotiated between the local strategic partnership (LSP) and the regional Government Office (GO). And had a new performance framework which had evolved in parallel with PSAs and is expected to flow directly from it. There was still a hope at this stage that by connecting local activities to the PSA process a new central-local framework could represent the primary means by which the Government is held to account.

The formation of Community Strategies (now Sustainable Community Strategies SCS) has improved local engagement, bringing groups and individuals together from across a community to offer ideas, viewpoints and input. SCSs should have a coherent, bottom-up mandate that supports their vision for an area. They should contain transparent goals and a clear sense of direction that local agencies are signed up to for the longer-term.
(CLG, Communities in control: real people, real power (2008) pg

The agenda for the LAA is set out in the sustainable community strategy (SCS). The SCS is a long-term vision for an area and is written and owned by the LSP. It aims to create a sustainable community by addressing economic, social and environmental needs.
The LAA will be a time-limited delivery plan for the SCS. Whilst an SCS could cover the medium to long term vision for an area LAAs are in 3-year “chunks” of time, and will now be refreshed for 2011. An SCS should represent a more holistic view for the future of a
place, and how the agencies can shape progress towards making the changes to their services which make this happen (place-shaping). It should also link to the local development framework (LDF). The consultation requirements of the SCS and the LDF have been integrated and the ‘place-shaping’ role of councils means the integration of an area’s key strategies is important. Within the plan rationalisation research carried out for DCLG on the fit between SCS and LAA priorities which was published in August 2008

With ministers arguing that

If LAAs continue to evolve in the way we want, they can be the basis for a new era of more effective and more devolved public services.
(Source: Interview data, 2008)

I believe [LAAs] set a new balance. A new balance that is better for central government, better for local government and local agencies, and, most important, better for local communities.
(John Healey, Minister for Local Government, LAA Conference 2007)

5.5.3 Views on LAAs

It just changed so fast… It was like ‘lets have a barbecue and have everyone round’ so I turned up in my shorts. By the time the party was underway it was more like a formal dinner with everyone in black tie except me… the agencies all knew the new rules, and adapted to them and the discussion had completely moved on to who was delivering what against which target… I was like…, ‘did I miss a meeting…’?

(Community representative on LSP, interview data 2008)

This quote from an interviewee explains succinctly how far civil society and voluntary sector representatives were bewildered by the changes to the LAA’s role and felt edged out by the increased focus on statutory partners, targets and indicators. Despite this widespread view local government’s representative organisations reported that they were pleased at the new iterations of the LAAs

The new framework for Local Area Agreements brings some major changes which are very welcome – much greater clarity about the relationship of national and local priorities, a reduction and rationalisation of national performance monitoring, and greater financial flexibility

(source: LGA conference)

Perspectives on Local Area Agreements (LAAs) varies from area to area, agency to agency, and through the loops and stages of time. For some they offer the hope of a truly devolved constitution. For others they are an empty bureaucratic gesture, or ‘the best thing we have in the absence of real local government powers’ (source: interview data Local Authority Leader, 2006).

For most local authorities, they represent an opportunity to refocus and re-align activities around local priorities, and to strengthen relationships across local partnerships. They
certainly seemed to offer LAAs promised a more devolved, joined-up policy framework within which local authorities and their partners and a coherence with regards to the future of local service delivery. Along with a raft of other policies around devolution, public service reform and community engagement, LAAs were a central plank in the new labour devolved framework for governance. There were, in the differing phases hopes that the mechanisms themselves improved by their policy evolution and based on the findings of the government commissioned evaluation process (see (DCLG 2007) (DCLG 2007) (Gillanders and Ahmad 2007) Early and hopeful messages emphasised that LAAs were evolving from their early, top down, fragmented and burdensome incarnations, to a situation where they could be more flexible and locally-facing

Local Area Agreements (LAAs) have promised much. As part of a package of devolutionary policy, LAAs have helped localities to improve relations with Government, inspired joined-up service delivery, supported the emergence of a family of local services, and made explicit the core challenges that face local areas. Relationships between local partners have improved as a result, services are more integrated and the ambitions of local agencies are increasing in response. There is little doubt that LAAs have been a positive experience for almost all of those involved in them.

(NLGN, 2007)

The New Local Government Network (NLGN) and certain ministers, (not exclusively from within CLG) remained convinced by reforming central-local relations through the use of these mechanisms

LAAs provide real opportunities to develop more mature, better coordinated dialogue. They provide opportunities to reinforce core partnerships between central and local government and the local partners.

(Des Browne, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 2005)

Unfortunately in doing better at vertical co-ordination between the centre and localities the voices of the voluntary and community sector were getting lost in the process. Where representatives persisted in attending the strategic meetings they report a retrenchment towards the statutory service providers. Here again the mechanism seems effective either horizontally (in hierarchy) or vertically (across to organisations of civil society and wider governance) but not managing both at once.
5.5.4 LAA and Sustainable Community Strategy Convergence

The LAA genuinely is a short-term delivery mechanism for a long-term Sustainable Community Strategy.
(source: Local Authority Officer, NW interview data)

Promised ‘Freedoms and flexibilities’ were instrumental in driving early enthusiasm for LAAs (and LPSAs before them) This was presented as an opportunity for local government to prove what could be achieved by unshackling the chains that many felt had restricted and undermined local interventions for so long. Unfortunately, we weren’t very clever about it and ended up going to Government with a long shopping list of things, many of which could already be achieved with existing powers
(source: interview data Local Authority Officer).

Other more ambitious demands met with Whitehall scepticism. Position papers put out by health and DWP appeared to seriously restrict the holistic hopes of the LAA enthusiasts, with the effect that the scope for flexibilities felt somewhat reduced and the appeals for freedoms remained to a large extent uncoordinated and ad-hoc, with predictable results.

CLG, National Evaluation of Local Public Service Agreements (2008)

There was also a sense that with an average of 32 targets per ‘new LAA’ (down from dozens of outcomes and often scores of indicators in LAA1s) the focus of the new LAAs has certainly been increased and attempts to align the LAA to the SCS as a 3-year delivery plan met with some approval from brokers and leaders. Given some of the disappointments and problems with earlier LPSA and LAA rounds, it is not surprising that respondents thought that the new LAA was an improvement, but critically that it looked to be evolving in the right direction. Reporting that it had evolved into a regime which was:

Far more interesting, productive and locally sensitive process.
Promoted a more of a culture of support than earlier rounds
Focused more on cross-cutting targets that would drive collaboration.
(source : interview data NW LAA brokers)

The next section explains how far this evolution connected into a whole-system performance architecture for localities.
5.6 Local Governance Performance Architecture

Following the Local Government Act of 2007 the SCS was supposed to provide a coherent long term vision for a (local government) area and be supported by a ‘new style’ LAA with formal targets agreed with GOs and to be bound by a ‘story of place’ (SOP) to the LDF, which constituted the ‘spatial expression’ of the SCS.

Figure 30 Local Governance Performance Architecture (LGPA) after 2007 Act

Figure 31 Simplified LSP-SCS-LAA-LDF structure
As Figure 26 demonstrates the LDF, the ‘spatial expression’ was designed as a coming together of numerous statutory and non-statutory documents into a coherent document. This process was designed to ‘wrap around’ the SCS and LAA.

Figure 32 The Local Development Framework after 2007

However there was a major disconnect between the formal and statutory requirements of the spatial plans and the remainder of the local government performance framework.

Throughout this period there was confusion as to whether the LAA was a mechanisms specifically for economic development or whether it retained the ‘whole vision’ elements it had inherited from the earlier rounds of the LSP. A further problem was that the whole partnership architecture was guilty of emphasising a narrow sense of economic development, stripped of the holistic rhetoric of wider policy on regeneration.
5.6.1 LAA brokers: All about the people skills

Really having to go in there and say, well we know that we work shopped this and that we had away days but there is new guidance now and all that doesn’t count for anything… it is all about the people skills, handling the fallout, because other agencies don’t understand what a political context does for our ability to deliver
(source: LAA broker interview data, 2008)

Talking to LAA brokers in the period 2007-2008 revealed that many were relatively new in their posts. They accounted for this turnover in staff since the arrangements for the partnerships had changed so much that people who had been in the position of personally ‘selling’ the benefits to partners and members and the brokers had found it challenging to have to explain all the policy changes. This demonstrates the downside of brokerage in networks, it is both a position of power and authority but can be quite exposed and exposing too. If support is lacking in specifically how partnerships should be brokered officers may struggle within them, This in spite of the fact that partnership arrangements are likely to be strained by staff turnover and the difficulty in retaining knowledge across a partnership. Brokers have a reservoir of important tacit knowledge which helps partnerships to function. The LGA suggest that existing local authority personnel structures do little to encourage cross-fertilisation of public sector experiences and skills. Nor do they engender stability, knowledge retention or the willingness to embrace new and complex working practices.

Whilst it is clear that the driving force behind the LAA as a whole continues to be the corporate centre of the council, in conjunction with the Chief Executives and strategic core of local partners. Councils have been very much responsible for the gathering of the local partners and engendering a climate of open-ness in the LSP or PSB

The Public Service Board (PSB) has a responsibility for creating an atmosphere of open challenge without leading to partners running away from the table. (LA CEO, 2007).

This core role of the council and reliance on brokerage by LA officers with partners shows up in the network structures of the partnerships, where at best they have succeeded in pulling together partners into a hub and spoke configuration with corporate/policy officers at the core.
5.6.2 Problems in partnerships

“.any fall off in commitment from partners, for whatever reason, won’t be explicitly mentioned – you’d just start to see a fall off in resources committed and people would stop turning up for meetings,”
(Local Authority Officer, 2008).

What we have discovered is that there are multiple government boxes and yet they want one agreement from us
(interview respondent, LAA broker, 2007)

The rapid evolution of partnership structures and the assumption that they can be easily overlaid onto existing public sector structures for purposes of accountability is a difficult area. Partners may ‘drift away’ and there is a risk is that rather than being left with collective responsibility, areas end up with collective irresponsibility where nobody is truly held to account for LAA success, or failure. Despite the language of LAA governance evoking positive images; ‘consensus decision-making’, ‘mutual trust and integrity’, ‘a partnership of equals’ ‘resolving differences through discussion’. For some, this form of language was important in attracting people to the table, but at the same time, it is evidence of the underlying weaknesses in partnership governance. This is an era when the ability to govern through networks is vital to the success of local services, and particularly the local authority

LSPs remain a relatively new development and are at different stages of development. Some LSPs remain distant and somewhat disconnected from local authorities, and unpopular with other local partners. Partners, some of whom sit on multiple LSPs, repeatedly made the point that LSP capacity and clarity of structures vary from area to area. Nonetheless, LSPs have put considerable time and effort into building and supporting effective LAA governance arrangements. Several have undergone recent review in order to make them fit-for-purpose in delivering the SCS and LAA.

LSP theme leads play a key coordination role in bringing LAA partners together, and holding those responsible for target delivery to account. Furthermore, LAA partnerships are still fragile in some places, and as with all partnerships, rely to some extent on the people involved at any given time. Fora such as PSBs and LSP groups successfully bring together senior staff and leaders from across a locality, while emerging Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) are creating links across local authority boundaries. However the impact of these fora on LAAs remains varied.
5.7 The slippery signifier of the LAA

As we have seen the various forums of the LGPA have created hub and spoke governance models, where brokers use their people skills to manage strategic partnerships. Arguably in practice brokerage is a harder skill to get right, particularly in the context of the hierarchical LA itself. In a sense the LGPA is an attempt to overlay a hub and spoke form of networked governance against the extant hierarchical structures of Local Government and public sector partners. As the above table shows the shift over the life of the LAA from a more Type II, that is to say flexible and personal framework and its statutory nature since the LGPIH has led to different strategies being deployed by LAA brokers (some of whom will not have been through the earlier phases of LAA development due to the challenges of brokerage in a rapidly changing policy context.) Arguably then these brokers are required to pull on skills of reticulated brokerage in the ‘new’ LAA where they are supported by scrutiny arrangements and more clarity regarding lines of accountability for agreed targets.

Table 25 Type I and Type II governance within LAAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Entity Type</th>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Model /moment</td>
<td>New LAA</td>
<td>LAA prior to statutory status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills required to work model</td>
<td>reticulated brokerage</td>
<td>policy entrepreneurialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what end</td>
<td>Process Management Audit – Targets etc.</td>
<td>Reification – Selling benefits to partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political oversight</td>
<td>Built in including scrutiny</td>
<td>Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of private/voluntary sector</td>
<td>Built in</td>
<td>Stockport : Strong On LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wigan : on LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Barnley : VCS dominant on LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government connections</td>
<td>Stable and through GO and Audit Commission</td>
<td>Mediated via GO Ambitious “asks” Negotiation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms framing activity</td>
<td>SCS – LAA</td>
<td>SCS development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined by</td>
<td>Comprehensive, inclusive, organisational relationships</td>
<td>Small, tight, personal networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.7 MAA UK city-regional policy.

Interviewee: Of course the A of the ABI is not the A of the LAA.
Q: what about the MAA?
That is quite different too ‘Area’ means whatever the government say it means at any one time
(source: interview data, L-A officer, 2008)

Cities represent the spatial manifestation of economic activity – large, urban agglomerations in which businesses choose to locate in order to benefit from proximity to other business, positive spill overs and external economies of scale. (HM Treasury 2006)

MAA national policy iteration is nothing like as frantic a pace of change, where the mechanism of the MAA has been taken forward as a governance entity within a locality covering a number of LAs it has been embedded in a different form (as we will see in Manchester.)

The fundamental acceptance of the heterogeneity of arrangements stretching across local authority boundaries is a very different starting point. It was The Local Government White Paper of 2006 that first signalled the Government’s intention to work with local authorities to develop Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) just as it was tightening arrangements around LAAs is seemed to offer a far looser framework to cities. Stating that MAAs

should facilitate greater cross-boundary collaboration, particularly on key economic development issues”. (CLG 2006 p.69).

The Sub-national review of economic development and regeneration fleshed out these principles

to establish how the Government can best devolve powers and resources to regions and local authorities in cities and elsewhere to ensure there is clear accountability for decisions; stronger leadership and incentives to enable and support growth; reduced inequalities; and effective governance arrangements. (Treasury, 2007 p.69)

The SNR talks of a group of local authorities

coming together on a voluntary basis to agree collective targets and performance indicators, rather than each having individual targets in separate Local Area Agreements. Local authorities and their partners would also be able to agree to pool funding streams to be used to achieve these collective outcomes.
Bodies such as RDAs, LSCs, the Highways Agency, Jobcentre Plus and the new Homes Agency should be involved as partners in developing MAAs and supporting the achievement of targets. The SNR indicates that the Government will consider whether to apply the duty to co-operate to MAA targets following a review of LAA experience of the duty. It also underlines the importance of flexibility to allow different sub-regions to use the mechanism in the most appropriate way for them to build on their areas of comparative advantage.

The principles of the MAA approach are that:

1. MAAs should be voluntary at the point of creation;
2. MAAs should focus on activities where sub-regional working can add most value – the rationale for cross-boundary delivery of objectives should be evidence-based;
3. MAAs should have an economic core and relate primarily to economic development (though MAAs for other activities not ruled out);
4. Local authority partners and public sector bodies will share collective responsibility for outcomes;
5. Sub-regional partnerships will have transparent arrangements for ensuring financial and democratic accountability;
6. Sub-regional partnerships should include representation from businesses and other key stakeholders such as RDAs;
7. As far as possible, MAAs should reflect economic areas that reflect the policy scope for the MAA (and therefore may include partners from more than one region and may also include parts of counties);
8. In two-tier authorities, county councils and participating districts will be co-signatories in MAAs;
9. MAAs will be consistent with the regional strategy and local Sustainable Community Strategies, and complement the LAAIs of participating authorities;
10. MAAs will build upon existing sub-regional partnerships and arrangements.

Once in place, MAAs will last for 3 years. The SNR states that ‘the Government will expect to give funding certainty for sub-regions over the period of MAAs, including funding from the RDAs and from the proposed new homes agency’ It is also recognised that some sub-regions may wish to establish permanent structures in order to bind in the relevant local authorities to long-term decision making. According to Geoff Mulgan (2004), cities can be understood as concentrations of flows and connections that create value. He takes London as a classic example, but also indicates factors that are more widely applicable. Mulgan indicates that visions for cities are relatively easy. Fine grained strategies are harder, but vital, and rigorous implementation is harder still. Delivery requires institutional structures, skills, funding, accountability, aligned with the key tasks.
This works best when institutional coordination is matched by bottom-up civic coordination, grounded in high social capital.

However MAAs, the preferred mechanisms for developing city-regional governance must not operate in a way which closes off the possibilities of other, arrangements

City-regions need to be understood as part of wider economic systems, networks and resource flows, rather than as self-contained units. This means that the strength of external business connections and the efficiency of external communications and transport links are important as well as national and international policies and the changing structure of external markets.” (Turok, 2003)

There has been a very lively debate since 1997 (and devolution of powers to Wales and Scotland) about the most suitable strategic scale for sub-national economic development policy. A key element has been the degree of importance attached to different places in terms of the potential economic benefits they might generate and nature of spatial policy framework that would foster these most effectively. MAAs are the current policy mechanism charged with this responsibility

Cook et al argue that all English core cities are ‘under-bounded’ to different degrees in the sense of having administrative boundaries that are smaller than their functional economic areas. There are, therefore, benefits to be gained from co-ordination but there are several reasons why incentives are still required to encourage local authority co-operation on economic development

1. local authorities bear more of the costs than the benefits of economic development; they only gain a limited share in the growth of local tax bases;
2. the benefits of co-operation are uncertain and long-term whereas the costs are immediate;
3. political and local rivalries can impede co-operation;
4. the strong local bias of the electoral system encourages local authorities to ‘free-ride’ on the co-operation of others or push for local interests within any partnership.

These risks to cross-authority working they argue make it difficult to accrue the hoped for benefits in strategic co-ordination. They worry that moves to co-ordinate through MAAs will indulge in jam-spreading rather than strategic decision-making in the interests of the wider functional economic area (Cook et al pp??)
As with LAAs central government relationships will be a critical factor. In their first rounds MAAs came up with a list of ‘asks’ of government and were testing not only the credibility of the MAA initiative and what it conveys about government’s willingness to ‘let go’.

In comparison with the LAA the MAA is both a more recent development, been through far fewer ‘loops and stages of development’ and is arguably more flexible, being voluntary at the point of creation. Whilst many commentators viewed the MAA as an LAA at a different spatial scale this is erroneous since they have completely different statutory basis. The MAA of 2008 is somewhat like the LAA of 2004 in that it was a looser and more open structure, but the subsequent loops of the LAA have led to a very different, and more constrained delivery context. There is nothing comparable with the NIS to connect with MAAs and they should be seen as containing more scope for innovation between partners.

Partnerships need to understand and have a clear shared view about the interaction between LAAs and MAAs and which indicators are suitable at which level. Inter-relations across geographic levels and on new territorial entities like city-regions and pan-regional areas generate enormous challenges for policy making and delivery and creating multi-level and more flexible forms of governance to co-ordinate and integrate policymaking across geographic scales, raises questions about appropriate institutional forms and accountability and transparency.

The MAA ‘tightened up’ and became more of a formalised entity it became more and more specialised according to local context and the demands of the partners. Indeed the development trajectory of the GMCR MAA and how it developed into a more formalised entity is a key plank of the story of the city-regional arrangements told in Chapter VII, since in the Manchester example it morphed from MAA to EPB to SCRP and to the ‘Combined Authority’ in the years 2006-2010.
5.8 Policy Mechanism Summary: Slippery Signifiers

This chapter has sought to present the context for ‘second generation governance mechanisms’, before exploring the contemporary UK context under which the PSA, the LAA and the MAA have assumed increasing importance. It argues that the PSA regime was a significant constitutional/institutional innovation of the Labour government and its subsequent introduction to the locality scale as the LPSA was an attempt to render coherence and joined-up-ness over localities. The LPSA pilot process collided with the LSPs despite the two having quite opposing rationales; LPSAs concerning targets and performance management and LSPs far more in the business of the ‘vision thing’ initially in ‘The 88’ deprived LAs of the NSNR. LAAs were developed in order to connect the two sets of reforming logics but swiftly veered towards the performance management and calculability of LPSAs. Despite attempts to integrate the strategic tier at the locality scale development of the LDF was still somewhat removed from the SCS process.

5.8.1: LAAs hubs and spoke networks within hierarchies

The chapter demonstrates that there is considerable heterogeneity within localities as they implement the local government performance architecture that consistent emergent themes are the role of local brokers in partnerships and the pace of change. LAAs as deployed in localities have assumed ‘hub and spoke’ configurations with LA officers centrally situated as brokers but that this position has not been empowered by the scope at scale to resolve structural and organisational problems. In no way does the LAA assume the community networked governance properties of empowered governance spaces or spheres, at best functioning as sites of governance. These structural configurations may suggest that the structures prove ‘brittle’ with emergent hub and spoke sites in tension with the persistent hierarchy of the local authorities. There is some evidence to suggest that LAA brokers do not stay in post for very long and may change as the policy framework changes around them.

5.8.2 MAAs: City Region mechanisms

The voluntaristic nature of MAAs at the point of creation should mean that they are more flexible as governance mechanisms than LAAs (in their final form). However as we shall see their structures have also been subject to a certain slipperiness, MAAs have gathered in statutory force as they have morphed into EPBs and the SCR Pilot. We look now at the specificities of these processes as played out in the context of Greater Manchester.
Chapter VI Contexts: The Mancunian Way

6.1 Introduction to the Mancunian Way

The case of Manchester, as what Barlow (Barlow 1995) describes as a ‘complex conurbation’, has long been of interest to researchers as an example of the complex ways in which an elaborate political and institutional geography can emerge in the context of a functionally polycentric economic space (see for example (Deas, Robson et al. 2000) (Hebbert and Deas 2000) (Boddy 1981; Ward 1997; Quilley 1999; Quilley 2000; Cochrane 2007).

More recently, there has been considerable interest in what is viewed by some as innovation in city-regional governance and economic development policy, variously described as the ‘The Manchester model’, the ‘Mancunian Way’ or, with even more hyperbole, the ‘Manchester Miracle’ (Harding and Rees 2010). Alongside academic exploration of the dynamics of city-regional governance, a succession of reports from think-tanks and policy research institutes have also lauded what is often viewed as the pioneering development of a framework for city-regional governance which might serve as a model for cities elsewhere. The Work Foundation, NESTA, Localis (dates) have highlighted the lessons to be learnt from Manchester from the specific perspective of their policy prescriptions applied.

The chapter focuses on the form and function of the mechanisms of contemporary urban governance in Manchester. It explores the ways that The Greater Manchester ‘brand’ of governance and policy has been constructed and mobilised for political and economic purposes and defended by the ‘qualgae’ of the ‘Manchester family’ of organisations.

6.2 Manchester Contexts

we need to understand how social relations and struggles have shaped the terrain lest we forget that as spaces of governance, city regions are political, as well as administrative and managerial constructs” [Liddle, 2009, pg 193]

The thesis has referred to ‘second act’ municipal governance for Greater Manchester. It is therefore necessary to explore what went before, to explain the periodisation developed in this thesis, and to explain how the context and history, as well as the wielding of power, informs and affects the notion of the city-region today. Liddle’s reminder not to neglect the political nature of these social constructions is helpful, as tinkering with governance
mechanisms is sometimes viewed merely as a technocratic undertaking. Whilst it is true that 2010's moves towards the formation of a statutory city region with elements of devolved authority to the 10-borough scale represent the most complete attempt to institutionalise and formalise governance structure since the municipal experiments of the 1970s, these contexts are still salient in the decisions regarding the political construction of the city region.

For the purposes of this chapter, the phases of governance in Manchester are delineated as follows. The First and Second ‘Acts’ represent moments when Type II governance reached the full extent of their ability to act and respond to calls for accountability and co-ordination, resulting in their possible evolution into Type I, more formalised government-style arrangements.

The ‘First Act’ covers the more formally institutionalised phase of the GMC (until 1986). The intervening period covers the informal working arrangements which increased in frequency and intensity, culminating in the MAA process instated by the Local Government White Paper of 2006. The ‘Second Act’ was instanced by the Budget of 2009 under which the SCR was to have substantive powers (admittedly somewhat ill-defined) inscribed in legislation. The further differentiation between the various categories of Type II agency should also be borne in mind - whether the governance entities are clubs, agencies or polity-forming in character (see extended discussion within Chapter II). It is this balance combined with the scope of actors to operate which will explain the overall ‘governability’ of the GMCR.

In exploring city-regional co-ordination it should not be forgotten that these issues are perennial. The Manchester Plan for 1935, for instance, provides an instructive illustration:

> Regional Planning: The most effective planning scheme is one which is comprehensive in character and not limited by the artificial boundary of a local authority’s area. Its success depends upon (1) securing an area capable of economic development (2) effective joint action with neighbouring authorities (Manchester Corporation, 1935 pp xii)

‘Comprehensiveness’, securing an area for ‘economic development’ and the issue of ‘concerted action with neighbours’ are all issues with which policy actors in Manchester still grapple today.
6.2.1 ‘First Act municipal governance in MCR

This section seeks to explore the contexts for a study of the contemporary Mancunian mechanisms in play by considering the longer trajectory of the city.

The evolution of metropolitan/city-regional governance, from the late 1980s to the early part of this century saw institutional capacity at the metropolitan scale remain fragmented, relatively weak and low profile and the potential for a new round of collaboration was built up slowly, largely as a by-product of the City’s radically different and increasingly successful approach to economic development and regeneration.” (Rees and Harding, 2010)

Williams (1995) offers the most compete descriptive account of the trajectory of the city region. However the stories of the relationships between the locality and the regeneration and economic development policy take many forms.

The ‘first act’ of the development of metropolitan/city-regional governance for Manchester from the early 1970s to the late 1980s was, in one sense, the most formally institutionalised. However, whilst the local government boundary reforms of the period left the UK with some of the largest local authority units, by population size, in Europe, the effect on Manchester itself was that it was reduced in size at the expense of the neighbouring boroughs. Large though urban local authority areas in England are, it is still typically the case in the most densely populated areas that the boundaries of a single local authority rarely cover the continuous built-up area centred upon the relevant ‘core’ city (the ‘metropolitan area’), far less the more extensive urban fringe and rural areas with which the core urban area has significant interaction (the ‘city region’).

This has prompted longstanding concern about underbounding in the UK. Like other major cities, Manchester’s borough boundaries cover only a fraction of the de facto contiguous built-up metropolitan area:

The 1972 reforms reduced the status of the core city, Manchester by superimposing a metropolitan council over it an enlarging the size of the metropolitan boroughs which hemmed it in on all sides – two authorities within one mile of the city centre and a further two within three miles. While the core dominates as the central place of the region in business, retail, leisure, culture, health and education, its local government is handicapped by the restrictive boundaries of 1972 reform. Manchester has 11,621 hectares, less than half the size of Birmingham, a third of that of Sheffield and well under a quarter the size of Leeds” (Hebbert and Deas 2000 ; 82)

After the abolition of the metropolitan-scale GMC, the fragmented nature of Manchester’s administrative geography necessitated some form of collaboration across lower tier district authorities, in relation to research, archaeological services and pension fund management, for example. The Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) was established
to oversee these joint arrangements and provide a forum for local authority leaders and chief officers to consider issues that affected Greater Manchester as a whole (Hebbert and Deas, 2000). Most significant of all to the economic development of the area (and wider region) is the unusual situation whereby the 10 boroughs own Manchester Airport. Interview data with Economic Development professionals within MCC suggests that this connection is very important, not least as an international airport is regarded as key to connectivity but also as regards discretionary ED/R monies as

There is a slush fund for things like this which I manage [the funding of the event memorialising Anthony Wilson] and for the Festivals and things. The leader has a million pounds a year from the airport in order to do pretty much anything which promotes economic development or enhances the standing of the city (source: MCC senior officer, interview data, 2008)

6.2.2. ‘Intervening Period’ I : Municipal Socialism and Alternate Local Economic Strategies

The Conservative government’s approach to economic development in the wake of the disestablishment of the GMC was driven partly by a perceived need to respond to the impact of national recession in the early 1980s on formerly manufacturing-dominated urban areas, and partly by a distrust of local government as an instrument for economic modernisation. As a result, its urban economic development initiatives increasingly bypassed local government and were delivered through various Government-appointed agencies, including two Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), one established in fringe areas of Manchester City Centre and the other in the strategically important Trafford Park industrial area, one of the remaining major areas of private sector employment in the conurbation (Harding et al., 2004).

In response to economic restructuring and the erosion of the city’s manufacturing base, and operating in a context of the perceived emasculation of local government by the centre, Manchester City Council was among the local authorities that formed part of a prominent ‘local socialism’ movement during the 1980s. This movement saw the protection and growth of public employment, linked to a highly interventionist approach to the promotion of indigenous industrial growth, as a more desirable alternative to the laissez faire economic restructuring envisaged by central government (Gyford, 1985). The established of the Centre for Local Economic Strategies (CLES), funded through subscription by some northern cities, exemplified this perspective. CLES operated in this period as an ‘external brain function for municipal socialism’ (CLES Chair, Interview data) and had been established deliberately outside of the council in order to offer strategies for resistance to the prevailing Thatcherite orthodoxies.
Confidence in a municipal socialist strategy wavered following the third successive Conservative national election victory in 1987. Quilley (2000) describes the ‘seeming futility of collapse of collective municipal resistance to national government strategy’. Nevertheless, its legacy is still felt in the ways that local politicians view their roles today. It can be argued that this ‘punctuated phase’ made Manchester ripe for ‘third way’ type regeneration and economic development strategies. As Manchester City Council’s long-time leader Richard Leese has commented, Labour politicians were looking for strategies other than simply overt resistance, which was proving electorally unpopular and (to some) economically unviable.

6.2.3 Intervening Period II: ‘pragmatic localism’ of bidding coalitions

Graham Stringer’s period as leader of the council from 1986 to 1996 saw a Manchester Labour Group demonstrating a more pragmatic desire to work more closely with potential investors and partners – public and private – on the development of the city’s asset base (Peck and Tickell, 1995). This was a process which arguably gathered pace under Richard Leese’s leadership, from 1996

In the case of Manchester the state was instrumental in shaping the city’s development trajectory (Ward 2000, pg 181)

Interview data covering this period from actors still active (or recently retired) tells a story of high-level ministerial access to Michael Heseltine, the sometime Secretary of State for the Environment):

We met in the Town Hall with Heseltine and plotted a future for the city covering reviving the asset-base, and culminating in bidding for the Olympics in 2000… everything except the Olympics came to pass as we were aiming high. Out of that came a lot of things: the transformation of Hulme, the ‘Northern Quarter’ for example

(source: Interview data retired MCC senior officer)

The partnerships instanced, and the role of the council in orchestrating planning and development, has been described by Robson (2002) as having a transformative and proselytising effect of the council in crystallising coalitions for future funding coalitions. At this stage the Economic Development function of MCC was very strong, at its height employing more than thirty officers in the development of partnerships with the private sector and of the attraction of competitively-allocated Government funding. A further role for the City Council was through brokerage, providing land, planning permissions and support through mainstream services in order to attract private sector investment, especially from overseas firms (Harding, 2000; Cochrane et al., 1996). Manchester’s
perceived success in these areas of activity was important in building its reputation, and in helping to attract and retain skilled staff in key areas of MCC itself:

Success attract success, officers were attracted (to Manchester) as there was a real possibility of building a career here

(source: interview data, ex-MCC officer)

This view, that talented local government officers are attracted by strong political leadership, was expressed by numerous respondents in the field work phase. It was argued that stable local political control represents the best context in which to develop a career trajectory for ambitious officers. There is evidence, therefore, that the alchemy of political leadership provides opportunity for officers to behave entrepreneurially.

The tenure of Sir Howard Bernstein as the CEO of MCC has also been important. Writing in the Guardian about his career, Bernstein picks out this period and the way that the city leaders ‘put place before party politics’:

The Manchester story is both long and complex – but hugely exciting. Events such as the terrorist bomb in 1996 and the Commonwealth Games in 2002 were major influences in the development of the city. I think my highlight was in the early 1990s when a so-called hard left council successfully negotiated with a Conservative government a funding package for the first phase of our light rail system – the first privatised railway this country had seen for a century. I think this showed more than anything our capacity to put place before party politics – a characteristic which applies to this day – and why we have one of the most formidable partnerships with business to be found anywhere. (Guardian 9.11.10; emphasis added)

This cross-district activity came together in the City Pride Prospectuses of the mid-1990s. Manchester was not only one of three cities invited by central government to prepare a prospectus for the future economic development of the conurbation, it was also able to broker a joint response with southern Greater Manchester neighbours (Williams, 1995). This coincided with, and built upon, a stream of cross-district collaborative achievements, which included: improvements to transport infra-structure; the expansion and upgrading of the airport, completion of the motorway ring around the conurbation, and the development of the UK’s first modern tram system. These successes were reliant not only on public-private partnerships, but on co-operation and joint work with neighbouring authorities (Peck and Ward, 2000). Similarly, the relationships established with developers and financiers through a series of commercial development schemes from the late 1980s onward were critical to the City’s response to the extensive bombing of the city centre in 1996 and the subsequent redesign of the retail core of the city (Peck, 1995; King, 2006). What began as a bidding coalition has developed over time into more mature relationships
between the adjacent boroughs and a record of inter-municipal collaboration, where the loose networks coalescing around the activities of AGMA have become more formally underpinned by the strategic functions of the ‘Manchester family’ of institutions.

6.2.4 Mapping Politico-Administrative Histories: Defining Greater Manchester

Although consensus grew in the wake of the abolition of the GMC about the need for some form of city-regional governance and policy for economic development, there has always been a degree of uncertainty about the precise geography of the metropolitan area. Figure 29, taken from the website of Marketing Manchester, shows a city-region floating beguilingly (and erroneously) as an island in a void. However, this representation ignores the complexity in the relations between the ten authorities that formed the old GMC, and the wider array of suburban districts and free-standing towns that encircle it.

Figure 33 Greater Manchester ‘floating in space’

Figure 30 shows those same areas, shaded in dark green, which fall within the administrative boundaries of AGMA, the area once covered by the ‘strategic’, upper tier, metropolitan authority. The red line on the map, however, demonstrates Manchester’s wider ‘sphere of influence’, calculated on the basis of travel-to-work patterns amongst at the time of the 2001 Census. This wider area has a functional economic integrity in that it
approximates to a coherent labour market area for Manchester. It contains not just the ten districts of GMC, but authorities to the north, east and (particularly) south of Greater Manchester. These districts, along with the ten Greater Manchester authorities, are sometimes seen to comprise a broader ‘Manchester City Region’ in functional terms. In political terms, however, because of the history of administrative relationships between the authorities, it is the ten Greater Manchester districts that are taken to comprise the city region.

Figure 34 GMCR boundaries

Commuter flows were modelled (using the same data-set) and shown in Figure 35 as a heuristic network map as part of the MIER evidence process. This shows commuting data both within and beyond the city region, demonstrating clearly the economic linkages within and between GMCR and other entities. The SCR project is based on the narrower 10 borough geography for political reasons, ignoring the functional reality of the broader definition.
In terms of the delimitation of Manchester’s city-region, then, it is clear that economic concerns have been subordinate to political ones; the desire to develop an administrative geography that relates to economic space has been thwarted repeatedly by political tension between the 10 AGMA districts and some of the surrounding authorities. This is not a new phenomenon. Efforts to define a more expansive Manchester city-region can be traced back at least as far as the Redcliffe Maud Commission, and its proposal that a South East Lancashire, North East Cheshire [SELNEC] metropolitan area be created (Figure 32). The SELNEC model proved contentious at the time, and the less expansive geography of the contemporary SCR is a reflection of the continued potency of these inter-authority tensions.
Even amongst a more narrowly delimited 10 district Greater Manchester, agreement can be difficult to broker. This is a longstanding problem that has been accentuated by changing patterns of local political control, as more-or-less uniform Labour control has weakened (Table 24). By 2010, amongst AGMA boroughs Labour was in a minority position, magnifying the difficulty in negotiating the formal shape of the city-region - particularly in terms of relationships with the southern boroughs of Stockport and Trafford.
Table 26 Political control of the 10 Greater Manchester local authorities, 1998-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolton</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>NOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>NOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>NOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochdale</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>LD</td>
<td>NOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salford</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockport</td>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>LD</td>
<td>LD</td>
<td>LD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tameside</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafford</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>Con</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigan</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Lab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lab = Labour  Con = Conservative  LD = Liberal Democrat  NOC = No overall control

Source: BBC (2010)

It should be pointed out that the period of the table represents the whole period of the Labour government and that the relationship between central and local government voting does operate as a double helix whereby national electoral success serves to undermine local government share of the vote. Since voting behaviour in local elections is often defined by ‘voting against’ rather than ‘voting for’, it may reasonably be expected that Labour ascendency will return to coincide with the party’s period in national opposition. The southern boroughs in particular have proven to be extremely hard bargainers and there have been numerous crisis votes as AGMA has developed.

6.3 Summary : Contexts

This chapter has introduced in summary form the historical context for the city region, highlighting in particular the persistence of demands for cross-boundary working (in various configurations).

City-regional governance has been a concern of long-standing, and it is to the current 10-borough solution for a second phase of institution-building activity that the thesis now turns.
VII: Second Act Municipal Governance in MCR

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 sought to summarise the long-term evolution of city-regional governance in Greater Manchester. This chapter explores in more depth the institutions of the ‘Manchester family’ and assesses the mechanisms deployed by the ‘qualgaecrats’ in their attempts to advance city-regional governance and economic development policy.

Using the definition laid out in Table 21 of Chapter 5 – essentially, that mechanisms are the ‘non-legislative tools of governance’ – the chapter looks in detail at the three specific contemporary Mancunian mechanisms which underpin second generation governance within the City-Region: the Manchester City Region Multi-Area Agreement (MCR MAA), the Manchester City-Region Forecasting Model (MCRFM) and the Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER). The chapter also looks at the two policy areas which have been key to the development of the GMCR, the role of agglomeration accounts of the economy (core to the promulgations of the MIER), and of the role and concept of the post-industrial knowledge economy through the usage of a discourse emphasising global competitiveness. This chapter concludes by setting the context for the governance of the conurbation, with a view to exploring in more detail the dynamics of city regional arrangements in the subsequent chapter.

Lastly the chapter considers Manchester as a brand and explores the reflexive construction of the ‘imagineers’ in developing a city-regional perspective.

7.2 Mancunian Mechanisms

Figure 37 Manchester qualgae from formal to informal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most formalised</th>
<th>least formalised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 10 boroughs</td>
<td>mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGMA</td>
<td>spectacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board members</td>
<td>‘other’ orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Members</td>
<td>e.g. MIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘imagineers’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Budget of April 2009, Manchester and Leeds were awarded pilot ‘statutory city-regional status.’ This was a recognition of the processes of city-region building that had been active in both cities for a number of years, but more particularly an attempt to formalise the outcomes of their MAA activities in the period since 2006. Thus began the second act of the municipal governance story for Greater Manchester, a story about the ways in which the governance arrangements for the economic development and regeneration of the Greater Manchester City Region have evolved and the ways in which governance structures are actively made and re-made by certain key people working within, around and between the formal structures of representative local government. This announcement marked the end of the period in which the development of city-regional governance had been based exclusively on voluntaristic cooperation on a sometimes improvised ad hoc basis, and the beginning of a process of firming-up and formalising the extant and emergent inter-municipal arrangements. The Chancellor’s Budget Book contained the following;

The pilots will be overseen at ministerial level and will draw on recent work from the Manchester Independent Economic Review and on innovation in the Leeds city-region. Government will work with the pilots to develop proposals for new strategy-setting powers over adult skills funding, expected to be in place within three to six months; new joint investment boards with RDAs, the Homes and Communities Agency and other partners to co-ordinate and align investment; and piloting new employment programmes.”

(2010 Budget Book para 4.48; emphasis added)

The project of reinstating statutory city-region government could be viewed as the culmination of significant collaboration across the city region ever since the abolition of the GMC in 1986 and the evolving role and purpose of the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities [AGMA]. But even with statutory status secured, qualgaecrats were already arguing the next phase ought to be instigated:

progressive local authorities like Manchester are actively promoting a radical public sector reform agenda. We need to see more local services to ensure integration and less national models run by quangos. That was one of the failures of the last decade. We want to see this balance corrected and soon.
(CEO MCC, interview data, 2009)

The above quote, suggesting that the progressive public service reform agenda is bound up with the ability for localities to ensure integration at the expense of the national models imposed by quangos, accounts for the development and maintenance of the qualgae within the Manchester city-region. Their development has been a conscious strategy deployed by the core cities as a way to localise functions largely devolved to other innovative scales, such as the regional. The role of the North-West Regional entities has been a vexed one over time.
During the first Labour government, non-elected Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were created in each of the standard administrative English regions, ostensibly as one element of a more far-reaching devolution that might culminate in the establishment of directly elected regional assemblies. Paradoxically, RDAs gave further impetus to the institutionalisation of city- and sub-regional governance arrangements insofar as most of them quickly realised that the regional economic strategies they were established to formulate and deliver, in what for the most part are very diverse territories, could only have traction if they were seen as collections of sub-regional and city-regional strategies (Deas and Ward, 2000). At the same time, actors within the sub-regions themselves were sometimes keen to develop strategy for their areas as a defensive response to the creation of the RDAs, reflecting their concern that sub-regional specificity might be sacrificed in favour of the wider regional good.

This was a position evident in Greater Manchester at the establishment of the North West RDA (NWDA). On the one hand, leading policy actors in Manchester City Council and amongst some of the participants in the city-regional institutions in existence at the time were keen to agree a strengthened economic development strategy for their area, fearful that region-wide priorities might not reflect localised interests. This drew upon a long history of tension between Manchester and its wider region, not least in relation to the always contentious issue of the location of foreign-direct investment (Deas and Ward, 2000). Equally, the NWDA itself from the outset adopted a pragmatic standpoint which recognised the reality of these competing sub-regional agendas which – together with the fragmented nature of the region as a whole – prompted it to establish a series of sub-regional offices. The result was that institutional innovation over much of the next decade involved the creation of parallel institutions at the scale of the region and city-region. The latter involved not just the sub-regional offices of the NWDA, but a wider array of initiatives of the kind explored in the previous chapter. In other cases, some of the institutions established had rather ambiguous roles. Manchester Enterprises, for example, was established in part as an agent for the delivery of the regional strategy, and partly as the strategic economic development body for Greater Manchester.

When the next intended phase of the Government’s regional devolution plan failed in 2004, though, as the first of several planned referendums on the creation of directly elected regional assemblies produced an emphatic ‘no’ vote in the North East region, a
fundamental rethink was needed. In the three years it took Government to produce a revised approach to sub-national economic development and regeneration, a loose campaign linking academics, think tanks and the Core Cities group of local authorities (of which Manchester is a leading member) formed around the idea of a more selective approach to national policy in which the larger city-regions, in light of their important role in recent patterns of economic change, should play a more prominent role (Burch et al., 2008)

In the North of England, part of this process of formulating city region policy took place under the auspices of the Northern Way, a pan-regional grouping of the three northern RDAs. The Northern Way itself emerged in 2003 with the publication of the Sustainable Communities Plan (SCP) by central Government. The ongoing articulation of the Plan, which was dominated by Growth Areas designed to relieve pressure on the overheated Greater South East, acted partly as framework for national spatial development policy, setting out mechanisms for accommodating demand for housing in the regions around London, and instituting a process of managed restructuring of housing supply (and, to a lesser extent, demand) in the provincial cities of the English north and midlands. This was the backdrop to a crucial period in which Greater Manchester, partly independently and partly with the Core Cities group of local authorities which represents the largest cities outside London, began to ‘raise its game’ through a more assertive insertion into the policy debate about the economic and social future of the principal cities of the English provinces. City Region Development Plan (CRDPs) were developed by 2005, covering Greater Manchester, Tyne and Wear, Tees Valley, Central (Pennine Lancashire) Hull and Humber Ports, Leeds and Sheffield (Figure 34). The intention was that the CRDPs were to provide an indication of the means by which the broader revitalisation of the trans-Pennine Northern Way would be effected; the reality, however, was that the CRDPs to a large extent developed autonomously, in the main as inward-looking development prospectuses for the respective city-regions. (Source: Deas, unpublished personal communication)
The CRDPs of the Northern Way represent a far simplified view of the territory in comparison with the formal administrative structures, which can be contrasted with the following figure (39).
Figure 39 Administrative boundaries of northern LAs
7.2.2 The Manchester Family

This section seeks to explore the notion of the qualgae, which has been developed as an alternative to both national regional and in some cases local bodies. The strategic bodies of the qualgae serve to suck powers ‘down’ from the regional tier (through their role as sub-regional groupings), but also to absorb funding and functions ‘upwards’ from the boroughs themselves, as can be seen from the denuding of the economic development capacity of the boroughs. This is reflected, for example, in the recent history of MCC’s Economic Development function, which as outlined, experienced some success in the 1990s on the basis of a staff of 30 officers. As one policy actor commented in the programme of semi-structured interviews, that this number has shrunk to only 5 is a reflection of the capture of powers, functions, responsibilities, staff and resources at the city-region scale (source: interview data MCC officer).

Figure 40 Logos of the Manchester Family institutions

The Manchester Family, 2009

The former Manchester Enterprises was one of a number of bodies which grew in importance through the 2000s, and which forms part of what can be conceived of as the Manchester Family of institutions around which a qualgae of city-regional policy actors has cohered (see Table 26 next page).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Geographical Scope</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Annual budget (08-09) and Funding Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGMA</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>GM 10</td>
<td>Local authority association for Greater Manchester</td>
<td>£18.4m 10 local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing Manchester</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>GM 10</td>
<td>A 'tourist board' for Greater Manchester</td>
<td>£7.9m 10 local authorities, airport, private sector contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDAS</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>GM 10</td>
<td>Inward investment</td>
<td>£3.2m NWDA, 10 local authorities, private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester: Knowledge Capital (Manchester and Salford only)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Manchester and Salford</td>
<td>Innovation, knowledge transfer</td>
<td>£0.5m + project funding. Manchester and Salford Universities and City Councils</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Table includes bodies that have emerged over three different waves of institution building, showing an increasing specificity of the roles of the qualgae over time. AGMA is the longest running, its functions deriving initially from its status as residuary body following the abolition of the GMC. As Hebert and Deas (2000) note, it began life largely
as a body intended to coordinate cross-district service provision, with only a small central policy unit. A decade later, in response to the rise in place marketing and the increasing importance of inward investment policies pursued at the wider scale of the city region, AGMA was augmented by new bodies: Marketing Manchester and MIDAS. Subsequently, Manchester: Knowledge Capital (M:KC) was established in 2002 as a new vehicle for promoting knowledge-intensive economic development; the various incarnations of Manchester Enterprises from 2003 have focused upon securing economic growth in a broader sense. M:KC has a modest budget of only £500,000 (2008-9), and its remit is limited to the university boroughs of Manchester and Salford.

Recent research carried out under the banner of ESPON has calculated the costs for the year 2008-09 of ‘the Manchester family’ (Table 25). Total expenditure was £30 million. The budgets of these economic development-focused metropolitan institutions, along with others created after the abolition of the metropolitan county council, are meagre by comparison with local authorities. Revenue spending by Manchester City Council alone, for example, is well in excess of £700m per year. Nonetheless, the financial and executive strength of Greater Manchester’s metropolitan institutions is considerably greater than that for any other metropolitan area or city-region outside London (whose formal arrangements include the autonomous London assembly and mayoral structures). In response to the charge that a well-funded strategic tier for the city-regional comes rather expensive the response of one interviewee was that:

what I do know is we are on the side of better use of public money. That should mean we are able to add value, so we really should become more important.
(Source: MEN interview CEO CNE)

7.3 CNE and agglomeration

This ‘second act’ in the evolution of Manchester’s city-regional governance has been characterised by a much higher level of institutionalisation and a more thoroughgoing attempt to develop an overarching strategy for the ten local authority areas in which a developing understanding of the importance of agglomeration has played a key role. Core to this phase of institution-building (the machinations of polity-forming type of governance entities) has been the operation of The Commission for the New Economy (CNE), formerly the Commission for Economic Development Employment and Skills and originally Manchester Enterprises(ME). A critical point as regards the functioning of the institutions of AGMA since the establishment of ME in 2003 has been that the model has dealt with policy both spatially and thematically: ‘sliced and diced’. This has applied in very
specific ways. The slice is the selection of the city-region as the geographical region upon which it has focused (itself an innovative, soft Type II space of governance). The slice is the demarcation of economic development policy, which has been captured by the Commission, and has had been viewed from a perspective that reflects the worldview of actors leading that body.

That the Commission has been so integral and has driven the policy agenda to such a significant extent is due to the fact that, as interviewees noted, the other seven thematic commissions of AGMA have never acquired the same kind of momentum or political support. The Commission is responsible for all three of the mechanisms on which this chapter focuses in detail, partly because they were unencumbered by the balancing responsibilities of, say, other commissions on planning and housing or the environment.

The initial activities of Manchester Enterprises contribution to the CRDP and in this early phase of operations is was tasked with ‘carving out a sub-regional strategic entity for the city regional scale’ (source: interview data GM-wide qualgaecrat)

Under the aegis of the commission the city-region moved steadily away from responding reactively to national policy initiatives, instead anticipating developments through the creation of new governance arrangements which signalled an increased confidence and capacity within the city region:

We use anything that is helpful to us from the national policy agenda and throw out the bits that aren’t (with reference to the sub-national review of economic development and regeneration)
(Source: Senior Officer GM-wide quango)

The Mancunian mechanisms we will go on to look at in detail are: the MAA, as localised from the national policy context outlined in Chapter V section 7; the GMFM as devised as a comprehensive suite of indicators to underpin city-regional economic development; and the MIER as commissioned to provide and ‘evidence bas’.

Each of these is explored in turn as a means of unpacking the dynamics of the network of actors around which city-regional governance and economic development policy has evolved in Greater Manchester. As befits a slippery signifier like the MAA the incarnations of the past decade are delineated in the following table (27 see over)
Table 28 MCR City-Regional Strategic Context

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRDP</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAA</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPB</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRP</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Authority</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3.1 The Manchester MAA Governance Arrangements : Take I

In 2007, leading policy actors in Greater Manchester sought to create seven Greater Manchester-wide functional commissions, together with an allied Business Leadership Council. The rationale was to anticipate discussion with Government around the proposed establishment in 2008 of a Multi-Area Agreement (MAA) – the principal mechanism through which Government anticipated dealing with city-regional and sub-regional groupings of local authorities. The ability and willingness amongst policy actors to create these entities was itself a reflection of Manchester’s ‘institutional thickness’ and capacity to act. In entering negotiations with Government on an MAA, interviewees report that Manchester was unusually insistent in its dealings with Government, demanding access to high ranking civil servants and eschewing the timorous language of other localities in entering policy negotiations.

In an indication that Government was prepared to go further with selected city-regions, though, part of the upshot of these negotiations was the designation of Greater Manchester as one of two ‘pilot city-regions’, announced in 2009 and preceding their eventual establishment on a statutory footing. That government was prepared to position Manchester at the vanguard of this formalisation of city-regional government in England reflected the earlier decision to launch an independent economic review. The Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER, 2009) The MIER looked specifically at the issue of agglomeration economies in the Manchester city-region in comparison with other UK cities and developed a series of policy implications from the work. The result was a further round of institutional reform designed to enhance city-regional delivery capacity, through the inception of seven joint-authority ‘commissions’.

The development of the City Region Pilot (CRP) was a reflection of Manchester’s impatience to create a city regional entity with ‘real powers’, rather than a mere talking
shop. But an equally important dynamic was the unwillingness of Government Ministers to see the devolution of powers to sub-national entities that lacked delivery capacity, or which were insufficiently accountability to local people. Partly this was a recognition of the political reality that in a still highly centralised polity, perceptions of local incompetence or error can become a media-driven problem for Ministers. In addition, it reflected Government’s ambiguity over the extent to which policy, which to date had had a weakly enabling, and at least formally spatially even-handed character, had fully worked through the consequences of more profound devolution of powers to city regions. The most obvious consequence, for example, might be growing spatial disparities, which conflicted with formal policy commitments. Hence, a key theme of the most recent developments in the city region has been the reform of existing governance mechanisms to establish institutions that are acceptable to both Government and local politicians.

At the heart of Manchester’s most recent moves towards more robust and autonomous city regional governance has been a process of internal capacity development, reform of governance arrangements, and ongoing negotiation with central Government. The Multi-Area Agreement has been widely seen as the first serious and effective vehicle for the development of city regional governance. First outlined in the 2006 Local Government White Paper, the concept was further developed through the Sub-National Review (SNR) process in 2007. Manchester submitted an initial expression of interest in developing an MAA to Government in late 2007. MAA guidance from national Government was both short and deliberately non-prescriptive, yet Manchester’s bid, covering the 10 AGMA authorities, was seen as broad and ambitious in comparison to other English sub-regions. Central to the process of ‘agreement’ which was officially signed in summer 2008 was a series of negotiated priorities around specific actions, to be carried out by Manchester, that depended on agreement by central Government to various forms of devolution. In policy terms the MAA focussed on a number of actions to reduce long-term worklessness, improve adult skills provision, provide skills and training to 14-19 year olds at the city region level, improve business support and innovation, and promote the development of new infrastructure. Each of these policy themes required particular actions on the part of Whitehall departments to ‘let go’ and devolve functions to the city region, but also a willingness to break down ‘silo’ distinctions and think about the connections between each of the areas of activity. Hence, the MAA, rather than being a static or definitive policy document, was instead a tool or concordat to lock in agreement to ongoing devolution.
The establishment of the Commission for the New Economy based on the old Manchester Enterprises happened in parallel to the development of the MAA, creating the most important and well-staffed of the seven commissions. Most of the actions contained in the MAA, being focused on the realm of economic development and labour market policy, came under the remit of the Commission for the New Economy. In addition a Business Leadership Council had been promised as a precondition of positive private sector involvement in further public sector governance change that did not result, in theory, in more ‘bureaucracy’ or a ‘talking shop’. Taken together these significant changes to city-regional machinery added momentum to the need for changes to AGMA’s constitution and working practice. In particular the existing constitution was considered ‘not fit for purpose’ because it did not provide for delegation to the Commissions. Furthermore, there were constraints on what could be realised under existing legislation. The governance structures for the MAA were hailed by their architects as ‘radical’ ‘ground-breaking’ and ‘innovation in practice’:

This may be best symbolised by our radical new governance structure – innovation in practice. Nowhere else in Europe are different local authorities working as closely together as we are in Manchester, where Local Authorities are delegating strategic authority to seven sturdy Commissions. Even more radically, the Commission has a private-sector majority Board: how many Skills and Employment Strategies have you read that start ‘Many of us in the private sector are rather sceptical about grand public sector strategies ...’

This adds up to a groundbreaking attempt to put together a single, cohesive city region that can collectively determine the best way forward and can effectively implement it through a variety of sub-regional organisations that closely coordinate with each other, with their ten constituent Districts, and with the other regional and national authorities without which we cannot pull the levers we need to implement our single ‘Economic Strategy’, in areas including innovation, investment, enterprise, branding, employment and skills. Getting regional and national agreement to our new modus operandi and bringing new competencies to the party is a primary function of the MAA (Emmerich and Frankal, 2009, pgs 93-94; emphasis added)

This new system is represented diagrammatically in Figure 41 (next page) showing the ideal type for this arrangement. This same diagram expressed can be expressed as a network, (figure 42) showing an ideal-type for city-regional governance as imagined within MAA policy. The actors within Figure 41 represent the statutory consultees within each constituent LSP (since the MAA has overt links back to the individual borough-level LSPs)

The MAA of this round of the formal AGMA arrangements was constructed upon the foundations of the statutory consultees to the constituent LSPs of the 10 Boroughs, whose partners are legally bound to ‘have a duty to have regard to’ the targets and deliberations of the LSP. As we saw in the extended discussion on LSPs in Chapter V Section 5.4.3 these are instruments of vertical co-ordination at the locality level.
Figure 41 GMCR MAA-LSP linkages

Figure 42 SNA map GMCR MAA-LSP linkages (Ideal type)
Figure 40 (previous page) shows the ten constituent districts connected to the operations of AGMA by two connecting brokers, the Leader and the CEO of the local authority. However, the democratic ideal is somewhat affected by the operation of the commission, particularly the role of the private sector in the MAA governance arrangements. Figure 37 shows that the QMV model being described in the quotation has the effect of altering the accountability arrangements for the MAA significantly. The more ambitious and wide-ranging governance powers – and particularly in enabling the work of the Commissions – faced the considerable legislative limitations in the existing provisions of the Local Government Act 1972. Manchester therefore considered it important to shape new legislative developments that might emerge from the SNR.

The introduction of nodes 141-147, (ABOVE) representing business leaders, has the effect of warping the symmetry of the arrangements. Despite the pride with which the model was launched this iteration of the governance model was subsequently revised in favour of a structure emphasising scrutiny and oversight (see Fig 44) Here again it must be emphasised that the whole model (on paper) looks thematically spread and sensible, but the functioning in practice of the Commission for the New Economy) in isolation had the effect of skewing the focus of the city-region towards a specific conceptualisation of the economy and of the role of the city-region.
7.3.2 The Manchester MAA Governance Arrangements: Take II

City-Region Pilot status, through AGMA, set out the city region’s case for real devolution of powers. The quid pro quo was enhanced and more robust governance arrangements. At this point Manchester was still considering the adoption of the Economic Prosperity Board model, but its developing confidence, bolstered by the publication of the MIER in early 2009, meant that Manchester’s selection as a City Region Pilot was a staging post rather than destination – particularly in the search for the type of arrangement which suited the city region. As this process developed, and governance mechanisms were refined, the AGMA Leaders agreed a number of principles for future city region governance. One was not to create a separate local authority, but to retain the ten local authorities’ status as ‘sovereign bodies’ on which city-region governance would build. Another principle was that functions undertaken at the city region level would have to be agreed jointly by the constituent boroughs. These principles were enshrined in a new constitution, which established the Executive Board as the primary accountable body for the city region. The new constitution also included new voting, scrutiny and call in arrangements.

Figure 44 The Manchester city region governance arrangements in 2010.

Source: www.agma.gov.uk
These arrangements show how the seven commissions play an important role in the architecture of the architecture of the city-regions governance.

Figure 44 also provides a diagrammatic indication of the role played by the private sector, and the degree to which it has changed over time. Here, critically the Manchester Business Leadership Council is isolated away from the Commission itself and its weight is counterbalanced by other forms of scrutiny. This model continued to develop through the process of modifying the MAA arrangements in response to national policy shifts towards statutory Economic Prosperity Boards (EPBs).

The establishment of the SCRP agreement with central Government in December 2009, and the enactment of the 2009 LDEDC Act led to a final round of consultation over governance structures that would be robust enough to satisfy Government that devolved powers – especially those connected to transport – would be forthcoming. During this intense period it emerged that the combined authority model was the favoured option. It also reflected the considerable progress made on transport governance, which had already seen significant changes with the earlier move to an Integrated Transport Authority (GMITA) and the work done to try to achieve a consensus on congestion charging as part of the Transport Innovation Fund process.

The SCRP-pilot-process led to the formal establishment of the seven commissions, each of which is responsible for a particular policy area related to economic development. It also resulted in the amendment of the constitution of AGMA to enable majority voting amongst its members on key strategic issues. And, toward the end of the pilot city region discussions, there was also agreement about the establishment of a combined authority to bring together transport, economic development and regeneration powers across the ten authorities, linked to the pooling of resources to provide capacity for further devolution of powers.

7.3.4 The Greater Manchester Forecasting Model (GMFM)

The MAA-EPB-SCR-Combined Authority trajectory described above makes clear the ever-increasing formalisation of governance structures for the Manchester city-region. It must not be forgotten though that the construction of an evidence base is as much a governance mechanism as a partnership development process, and it is on two separate but connected acts of evidence base construction that the following sections now concentrate. Primarily
the GMFM, designed in 2005 and implemented in 2006, underpinned the strategic development of Manchester Enterprises.

Consistent, sophisticated and robust information on the current and likely performance of Greater Manchester and the county’s hinterland, in terms of the economy, population and households, is a vital tool in the development of strategies and plans to accelerate economic performance. In April 2006, the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) agreed to adopt a single economic, population and household forecasting model within Greater Manchester. This model consists of forecasts for all ten districts in Greater Manchester, but recognising economic realities, the model also contains data for areas within Cheshire (Warrington and the former districts of Congleton, Macclesfield and Vale Royal) and one in Derbyshire (High Peak).

From a data perspective, then this exercise is carried out over the true functional economic area of the Manchester city-region, over more or less the SELNEC area proposed by Redcliffe-Maud (see Figure 36). Here again a specific perspective is inscribed within the construction of the model, one presented as ‘common-sense’ by the Commission but based on particular assumptions. The long quotation below describes the functioning of the Commission (at the time, Manchester Enterprises) from the perspective of OECD inspectors who came to investigate the uses and functioning of evidence based policy making across Europe. Their conclusions formed a minority report to the OECD describing a local policy elite pursuing a local economic development strategy described by an OECD officer in a semi-structured interview as ‘peculiar, ideological and frankly quite bizarre’: (source: OECD officer, interview data 2009)

Our hosts for the visit to Manchester were a group of sub-regional bodies led by Greater Manchester Enterprises Ltd. …While [Greater Manchester] has no formal political status under the English system of governance, the City Region spans an extended urban agglomeration with a population of around 2.6 millions…. A sector-driven Greater Manchester Forecasting Model (GMFM) has also been in place since 2005. From the perspective of indicators for local development, Greater Manchester brought to the project a very particular approach set within the sphere of New Public Management. In this case, the context for creating indicators is not just to map trends, needs and policy outcomes (though these do come as a part of the package), but to set performance indicators against which semi-contractual agreements can be struck between the Local Authorities (singly and in combination) and their superordinates in the Regional and Central authorities. The indicators are used to monitor compliance as well as to judge the success of local policies. The formal underpinning for the current Greater Manchester indicator system is the Multi Area Agreement (MAA). These agreements (LAAs for single authorities and MAAs for combinations) form the basis on which English central government devolves some powers and a degree of control over funding to multi-area entities like Greater Manchester.

These Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are listed below as Table 26. This ‘particular approach set within the sphere of New Public Management’ was particularly notable since the impetus for the model had been largely locally derived and it was a construction of the Commission itself. The OECD inspectors were particularly surprised at the scant consideration given to other salient dimensions, particularly the spatial, social and
environmental. Given that the development of such a model was driven by the locality, it represented an(other) orthodox agglomeration-style construction by the Commission (or Manchester Enterprises as it was).

Table 29 Greater Manchester: Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total annual real Gross Value Added (GVA) output</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVA per hour worked (£)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employment (numbers of employees)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall employment rate (% working age population)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working age people on out of work benefits in worst performing neighbourhoods (% working age population);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of adults qualified to Level 2 or higher (% of adult population);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of adults qualified to Level 4 or higher (% of adult population);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock of VAT registered companies (numbers of firms);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of non-car morning peak journeys to the regional centre (% of total);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net additional home provided (units)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ME sets out its own key principles for indicator design as follows. First, the methodologies underpinning the data must be widely recognised as sound. The indicators must be sufficiently precise and robust to be useful and illustrative over a three-year period. Second, the data series must optimally show developments over time across the sub-region as a single entity. The indicators are not designed for comparison with other spatial areas, or to highlight differences between component parts of the sub-region. Third, the indicators are focused on elements that a successful MAA will specifically bring added value to, over and above what other levels of governance will anyway be likely to achieve. And fourth, whilst it is not entirely possible, in particular with the KPIs, the intention is to ‘screen out’ outputs where the determinant levers lie predominantly at the local, regional or national level.

Whilst laudable, The aspiration of the 3rd and 4th points; isolating the ‘value-added’ by the MAA and managing to ‘screen out’ outputs where determinant levers lie at other spatial scales area particularly heroic (impossible) task, again seeking to isolate the GM economy and construct an evidence base which over- emphasises connectivity within rather than connectivity across or between.

What we have in the Manchester case is a system that, while it has strong home-built ingredients is also required to form part of an externally supplied national system of indicators designed for the purposes of aligning public actions at local authority levels with the overall objectives of central government.

*(GM-wide quango officer, interview data 2008)*
Trying to create an amalgam of both approaches - top-down and bottom up simultaneously - is a dilemma that Greater Manchester has had to be particularly ingenious to try to resolve. There has been an attempt to construct the whole information and indicator system on the basis of a clear conceptualisation of how the local economy works and how individual policy actions (national and local) fit into it. Figure 2 shows how, in the Manchester case, there is a genuine attempt to connect together all the elements of what makes the sub-regional economy work – from projects and programmes right through to the drivers that underpin the growth of GVA. (see Fig 45 over)

Once again, this produces a picture of extreme complexity but it represents a heroic attempt to keep in view the connections between particular policy interventions, broad strategic policy themes and economic drivers. Trying to load such a conceptual framework with all the data it needs is, however, not just a mammoth task but one that, given what we know about the discontinuities in data landscapes, is probably unachievable…Perhaps this serves to remind us both that the concept of indicators is a highly elastic one and that maybe pure pragmatism against whatever complexity defines the context is probably the best that can be hoped for OECD, 2009.

The issue with the GMFM is that in the absence of other and contrasting evidence bases it serves as a system-diagram for all activity within the city-region, whereas it should arguably at most make up an element of a wider conceptualisation of place, with connectivity and spatial dimensions viewed as having some import in the mix of the evidence base available. As in the first phase MAA governance model preferred by the Commission (ME and later CNE) the exclusion of wider (contradictory?) views of the world are ‘screened out’. The ‘evidence base’ is then presented to decision makers as a simple fact rather than the complex social construction it really represents.
Figure 45 Greater Manchester GVA Growth Framework

GVA Growth Framework
7.4 The Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER)

As the experience of the GMFM testifies, ME/CNE – the Commission – can be associated with a specific political and economic worldview in respect of its stance towards city-region governance and local economic development policy. This worldview is, as the case of GMFM demonstrates, is one which emphasises neo-classical growth models, proposes ‘heroic attempts at co-ordination’ of GVA-type indicators and is most interested in models emphasising the private sector. These preoccupations they brought to bear in their instigation of the MIER, ‘biggest urban study in the world’ in June 2008.

The idea had emerged from the management team at Manchester Enterprises (now the Commission for the New Economy), who had been conducting a review of the existing strategy and evidence base and noted that whilst the previous and current work was thorough and provided policy makers with sound evidence for their decision making process, there was a need for a greater understanding of the Manchester City Region economy to understand properly its inherent and structural strengths and weaknesses.

‘The Review’ was managed by a secretariat at Manchester’s Commission for the New Economy. In order to retain its independence, the MIER had a complicated structure and consisted of:

- a Commission of prominent economists and business leaders, supported by a Policy Advisory Group and Secretariat, with responsibility for commissioning high quality evidence-based research to inform decision-makers in Manchester.” (source: MIER secretariat, interview data, 2008)

An independent panel of reviewers was established to act as a steering group for the project, comprising: Sir Tom McKillop (former chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group), Jim O’Neill (Head of Global Economic Research, Goldman Sachs), Professor Edward Glaeser of Harvard University, Diane Coyle (Managing Director, Enlightenment Economics) and Jonathan Kestenbaum (Chief Executive, National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts) (see Figure 42). Glaeser is associated with scholarly work on agglomeration economies. Kestenbaum is most closely connected with NESTA’s work on innovation and the role of the knowledge economy.
There were seven reports commissioned by the reviewers addressing distinct yet inter-related thematic areas (Table 29 over). The key hypothesis underlying the MIER was that Manchester is the UK city, outside of London, most likely to increase its long term growth rate, to access international markets and enjoy strong connections to the rest of the world. However, it was argued, the city has for many years ‘punched below its weight’, given its size and scale. This was viewed as an opportunity for the city to continue to reinvent itself, cultivate new areas of economic growth and realise its potential for growth as it seeks to transform itself from an industrial past.
Table 30 The MIER findings (Feb-April 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIER thematic area</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Case for Agglomeration Economies</td>
<td>An overview of agglomeration economies which aimed to establish the overarching framework and assessment of the performance, landscape, threats and opportunities currently displayed in the Manchester City Region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Innovation, Trade and Connectivity</td>
<td>Exploring the scope of the links between firms in the city region to understand how well, or otherwise, innovations are spreading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sustainable Communities</td>
<td>Aimed to identify the drivers of social and economic polarisation. It detailed the unevenness of economic development within Manchester City Region over the last decade of strong growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Growing Inward and Indigenous Investment</td>
<td>Provided a better understanding of the importance of inward investment for the city region economy, as well as a better understanding of the links between sectors, in terms of the direct and indirect benefits of domestic and foreign investment in the city region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Understanding Labour Markets, Skills and Talent</td>
<td>Assessed the extent to which the city region encourages and attracts a sufficient density of highly skilled workers, and the challenges the city region faces if it is to generate high value output, improving the real incomes of people in the region, and to reach critical mass needed to start to close the skills and prosperity gap with London and the Southeast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Review of Daresbury Science and Innovation Campus</td>
<td>The MIER was asked by the Government to undertake, alongside the Review’s existing programme of work, an assessment of the current and potential contribution of the Daresbury campus to science and innovation in the UK economy as a whole, the North West science base and the Manchester City Region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of the Review were launched at a conference at the Lowry Hotel in Salford on 6th April 2009. It was immediately viewed by some policy actors as a landmark document, symbolising the boldness of the economic development strategy that had emerged over the previous decade, and around which future policy would have to be based:

Several of the recommendations have forced policy makers to question and perhaps change existing, long standing practices, providing them with tough choices, some of which could indeed be applied to other city regions (GMCR-wide quango manager, interview data)

The development of more coherent city-regional governance structures and policy mechanisms was highlighted in the MIER as a critical way of effecting this transformation (MIER 2009a pgs 23-34). In many of their recommendations, the reviewers concern themselves directly with governance structures:

We therefore recommend that Manchester and central government explore fully the evidence about costs and benefits of, and the potential for delegation and devolution of some decision-making powers, including funding. (MIER 2009a pg 34)
Many of the MIER’s other recommendations have implications for governance, touching on school allocations, the planning system and the role of market forces, both in determining land use and skills policy. More detached observers may view this call as an opportunity to go through a process such as the one described in *The Architecture of Governance: Rethinking Political Decentralisation* (Triesman, 2007), which advocates mathematical modelling as the basis for decision-making and concludes:

> we do not – and usually cannot – know whether in a given setting political decentralisation will on balance increase or decrease efficiency, accountability, and other values (Triesman, 2007, pg 294)

Gathering ‘evidence’ about the ‘costs, benefits and potential for delegation and devolution’ as proposed by the reviews is in no way a neutral process; echoing the Pickston model (see Chapter II), there are too many unknowns in the study of the tendency of devolution towards heterogeneity and the instability to be found within the mechanism mix at the local scale.
For city-regional enthusiasts, such as Dermot Finch, formerly of the Centre for Cities, those within the Work Foundation (who had carried out work on the ways in which the city could become an Ideopolis), and those staffing the Commission for the New Economy, the belief that the city needs further powers at its disposal is an article of faith;

It is important to recognise that this city has tried to pull all the levers available to it and we now need to change the balance of investment between people and place. This is a priori true regardless of the facts that the review has uncovered.

(Source: CEO, Commission for the New Economy, MIER launch)

Not everyone was so quite so convinced, however, that ‘the evidence’ was so clear in supporting a structural and statutory role for the city region. Even some of those closely associated with the process were doubtful. Commissioned as part of the MIER to make The Case for Agglomeration Economics (MIER 2009b), Henry Overman from the London School of Economics remained unconvinced that the MIER had in fact made the case for decentralisation of powers:

Do they, as the report suggests, need increased powers at city region level?... I’m not sure that the MIER makes the case for this one way or the other. Collaborative agreements, the new regional plans, and less binding national guidelines might be enough on many of the policy areas. Others would strongly disagree. I am increasingly convinced that the available evidence does not answer this question either way so expect to hear lots of people claiming the opposite.

(Source: Academic, Interview data, 2009)

It was a core assumption of the MIER was that the devolution of power to the city-regional level, and its consolidation across local authorities, was desirable, and part of the rationale for the establishment of the MIER was to assemble evidence to support this widely held contention.

The MIER findings, in the main, have been interpreted as supporting this view (Overman’s reservations notwithstanding). The long quote below from the review it is worth replicating in full as it encapsulates the standpoint of the review and uncovers the assumptions that drive the city-regional project from the perspective of the qualgaecrats of the commission:

Table 31 MIER recommendations

(1) The need for sustained efforts to improve the very early years experience of all young people in the city region, including at school, socially isolated neighbourhoods, and a review of school admissions policy to test the extent to which existing policies reinforce inequalities;

(2) A review of housing strategy is required with the emphasis more on demand rather than supply and the easing of planning restrictions which restrict availability and increase housing costs for skilled workers

(3) There is a need to review transport planning within Manchester from the perspective of improving productivity and the connection of those areas of the city where employment is concentrated and others
(4) Planning policy should be reviewed to acknowledge the reality of economic demand and permit more expansion of suitable business premises in those parts of the city region where demand is strongest – this demand is broadly more apparent in the south of the conurbation.

(5) Manchester needs to quickly create a unified regime for planning, regeneration and neighbourhood renewal, with the balance of local and city regional roles being further reviewed.

(6) Sub-regional, regional and national bodies need to undertake further research into whether there are potential government investments in science and elsewhere in the non-traded sector, including universities and other publicly funded research, in the city region, which could enhance the UK economy as a whole.

(7) Governance is key in driving economic growth – although Manchester has strong leadership, the review identified that the city region still needs to assess how major decisions are undertaken to ensure that difficult decisions, such as those outlined here, are considered more effectively.

(8) Evaluation activity has been limited, and the review recommended the development of a more effective system of programme and project evaluation. This included regular city region wide evaluations of housing, economic development, planning, skills, regeneration and transport policy initiatives and interventions.

(9) Some of the policy levers for the recommendations are not available at city regional levels. The review recommended that Manchester and central government explore the evidence of the costs and benefits of, and the potential for, devolution of some powers, including funding. (MIER, 2009, pg **; emphasis added)

The MIER recommendations were counter to much mainstream thinking around cities and economic development, not least in the decision to concentrate on the agglomeration arguments propounded by the LSE team’s report. They also represented a challenge to some policy, most notably around the issue of sector based clustering policies. The most surprising thematic area was the role for spatial planning for the conurbation, with recommendations 2,3,4 and 5 all concentrating on what could be interpreted as a call to loosen (or even dismantle) the planning system, in line with a more permissive, developer-friendly attitude towards housing, transport or the location of employment land. The MIER recommendations are indicative of a market-first, pro-growth perspective that is relaxed about the prospect of further development in the already more buoyant economy of the southern parts of the city-region. Conversely, there is implicit and explicit opposition to a more interventionist approach that would promote a spatial redistribution of economic activity and narrowing of intra-conurbation inequality through the concentration of planning and regeneration efforts. This position was directly challenged from the floor via a question at the MIER launch event:

If we don’t do spatial planning, industrial subsidy, conventional economic development or skills then why do we need devolution of powers to the city regional level? (source: researcher MIER launch)

The question was intending to draw attention to what was seen as the overly market-focused perspective espoused by the MIER recommendations. It encapsulated the criticism that the market-led mindset of the MIER was at odds with the thrust of earlier
policy for city-regional economic development, which placed much greater emphasis on narrowing intra-conurbation disparity and tackling social malaise, as well as promoting economic growth.

The response of actors central to the MIER was robust. Their argument, in the words of one leading official from a city-regional agency interviewed at the MIER launch, was that “it is axiomatic that we need powers at the city-regional level in order for us to fulfil our economic potential”. This belief framed the activities of the commission in this period. The reification of a MIER-style city-region - the process of making something real through sheer force of effort - was evident across a range of actors interviewed. It was notable that critical perspectives were not welcomed in the glitzy events at which MIER was launched. The recommendations, specifically with regard to the role of the city-region in spatial planning, reflected only a very narrow interpretation of the role of the state in relation to the market at the sub-national scale.

By contrast, many of the obvious points of criticism were ignored by the MIER documentation, and rejected by interviewees involved in the MIER. Yet the MIER can be critiqued on many levels, the most serious being its reliance upon a neo-classical model of city-regional economic growth that appeared especially inopportune at the precise moment the UK economy ended 77 successive quarters of growth and entered a period of recession. There were some challenging ‘noises off’ about the narrowness of the policy prescriptions advocated by the MIER:

> it is disappointing that the Strategy takes a narrow view of the economy. For instance, there is little recognition of the value of the social economy in the City Region, or indeed how the social economy will be supported. There is also a lack of appreciation of spatial issues, such as planning, and little on the relationship between the Greater Manchester City Region and elsewhere in the UK. (CLES, 2008)

Research participants identified numerous other specific criticisms of the MIER which are grouped under a number of headings and explored sequentially below.

7.4.1 City regional focus

Although there was an acceptance of the desirability of creating governance and policy at the city-regional scale, the precise area covered by the MIER was delimited on political grounds, rather than functional reasons. Any attempt to delimit the functional economic area of the city region on an objective basis would result in the inclusion of the suburbs to the south, embracing the more affluent areas contained in the boroughs of Stockport and
Trafford. As a result of this politically-inspired ten-district definition, the scope of the MIER study was almost entirely city-regional, apart from the report on Sustainable Communities, which includes in-depth analysis of each of the ten Greater Manchester districts and Super Output Areas. A consequence of the limited local focus is that policy makers across the authorities have little evidence to help inform interventions they themselves can make in their localities. This problem was addressed to a degree by the Commission, who commissioned SQW, the regeneration consultancy, on a road show presenting the MIER to the constituent boroughs. This strategy was only partially successful in ‘selling’ the conclusions to the Boroughs themselves, as interview evidence testifies:

It is recognised that the MIER is of interest to all and that a structured conversation is absolutely necessary for the Economic Strategy to understand and indeed be based on the vision and economic plans of each District. Furthermore, the MIER must be able to speak to each district and have a story to tell about the future and role of different places in the broader sub-regional context. The Road shows are designed to be the beginning of that intense dialogue.

The road shows served to back up the ‘evidence base’ by gathering information at the borough council level, and – despite the city-region focus of much of the initial MIER analysis, as outlined – the resultant digests contain a wealth of baseline information about the districts. These were not universally well received:

what they failed to understand was not that we didn’t understand the bloody MIER, but that we did understand and didn’t agree (with it)”
(Elected member, interview data, 2009)

I couldn’t go to the road show when it came to town as I was preparing for my role on the borough’s planning committee… though if they get their way I might as well not waste my time. They think planning is pointless but it is one of the core duties of an elected member.
(source: elected member interview data, 2009)

In addition it is unclear how the Manchester of the MIER taps into cannot wider sources of economic strength. The focus on the city-region, wrapped up in a discourse of urban competitiveness, could conceivably result in an island of strong economic growth within the wider north of England. One interviewee argued that this could mean returning to the approach of the Northern Way and earlier attempts to develop the trans-Pennine corridor by linking Manchester to the two major city-regions to its immediate east and west, Liverpool and Leeds. Equally, given the experience of the Northern Way, the insularity of existing city-regional strategies, and the lack of commitment to top-down strategic regional planning and economic development from central government, some interviewees felt that the prospect for joining-up across city-regions was very limited.
7.4.2 Reconciling economic objectives with social and environmental goals

The city-region as articulated by the MIER is at best silent on the subject of social justice, and at worst works counter to it
*(source: Elected member, MBC Interview data, 2008)*

The commission are guilty of Over-mania [a reference to the academic Henry Overman]. They don’t recognise other contributions
*(source: interview data)*

The overwhelming focus of the MIER was on revitalising the city-regional economy. Other concerns – linked to social equity or environmental sustainability, for example – were accorded limited importance. This was a view with which many non-MIER interviewees – those outside the qualgae – concurred. This emphasis is unsurprising, in that it follows a recent history in which sub-national development in England has been viewed almost exclusively in terms of stimulating economic development, partly as an end in itself, but also to an extent as a means of narrowing inter-regional disparity in economic and social wellbeing. It is also unsurprising in the context of a city like Manchester, for which the principal challenge is seen – rightly – as one of building a new economic base that can substitute for the manufacturing one on which the city was founded. However, interviewees were critical of the degree to which wider development concerns were sacrificed in the face of stimulating growth. The MIER, they argued, fails to specify how best to manage the tensions between the drive towards both productivity and social equity – especially in a city-region in which social problems and socio-spatial disparities are as deeply embedded as Manchester. Whilst one of the commissioned reports (*Sustainable Communities*) and the work on social and educational segregation emphasise inequality and differential outcomes across the conurbation, neither their working assumptions nor their conclusions ultimately fed into the recommendations of the MIER.

The overall ambition of the MIER is about increasing productivity in the southern side of the city region so it (and the wider region) can act as a second growth pole to London and the South East. Where social concerns feature in the MIER, the implicit view – as some interviewees contended – is that they are seen as problematic only in the sense that they inhibit economic growth. Interview evidence confirms the potency of the consensus underlying the MIER, which holds that a minimum degree of social cohesion is a prerequisite for economic growth – but which does not view social inequality as problematic in itself.
A similar pattern holds in relation to environmental sustainability. The MIER identifies the growing challenge of climate change, and argues that a policy response is necessary. However, beyond this unsurprising standpoint, there is no consideration given to the ways in which policymakers could best ensure sustainable forms of economic growth, or about the wider tension between economic development and environmental sustainability. The overarching emphasis is not one which suggests a focus on anything other than the role of market forces, which, unchecked have often served to deal with such matters ineffectively. Arguably it is for this environmental dimension that strong state action is best placed to offer leadership and regulation. However, past experience of sub-national economic development policy suggests that environmental concerns are very often subordinate to economic goals. For example, this was a criticism levelled at the RDAs from their outset (Gibbs and Jonas 2001). The MIER, according to some interviewees, continued this tradition of underestimating the importance of environmental goals and failing to acknowledge the conflict with an economic development remit. The recommendations of the MIER serve to diminish the capacity for this.

7.4.3 Spatial planning goals

Critical perspectives in the interview programme held that social and environmental goals had been subordinated to economic ones, but also that the MIER paid insufficient regard to spatial planning. To some, this was seen not as a case of underestimating the potential role of spatial planning in underpinning economic growth, but a rather more radical view that planning as constituted in the city-region acted as an impediment to economic development. In the governance structure of the new AGMA constitution there is a ‘Planning and Housing Commission’, listed as having equal weight to the Commission for the New Economy. However, by the time of the MIER the Planning and Housing Commission had yet to appoint any staff, reflecting what some interviewees felt was either indifference, ambivalence or scepticism about the value of spatial planning in contributing to economic revitalisation.

The MIER recommendations around planning may assume that a less constrained market will enable supply of the right kinds of development, in the right places, for future economic growth. But, as interviewees noted, a period of sliding property prices is unlikely to encourage the right sort of development – or even development of any sort. Here, a predisposition against planners and planning is reflected in the notion that market forces should be the only way of deciding where to locate development. The alternative
interviewee perspective, directly contrary to the position of the MIER, was that only robust, long-term planning can help supply the kind of guarantees that developers need to help ensure their investments will pay off over the longer-term. There needs, in other words, to be a clear and credible spatial plan for a locality – and an acceptance that there are limits to a demand-led planning system.

7.5 MIER summary

Despite these criticisms, it is important to acknowledge that the MIER approach benefited from a degree of support amongst at least some of the economic development actors who populate the city-regional qualgae. That is not to say that the city region’s economic development community (members, officers, partnerships and wider stakeholders) are in concert and agreed on all the findings, but MIER provided a single, ‘model’ narrative that galvanised their thinking about future policy for the city region.

If the assumptions made on the basis of the association that is claimed to exist between city-regional governance arrangements and superior economic performance are right, it might be expected, in principle, that a clear link could be observed between the stability, autonomy and executive power of institutions operating at this scale and the resultant economic outcomes that flow from their activities. The following section explores this issue through closer scrutiny of another city-regional economic development initiative, Manchester Knowledge Capital.
7.5 M:KC, Ideopolis and Imagineers

Dull, inert cities contain the seeds of their own destruction and little else. But *lively, diverse, intense* cities contain the seeds of their own regeneration (Jacobs, 1961, pg **)

IMAGINEERING is the word... Imagineering is letting your imagination soar, and then engineering it down to earth *Time*, 1942-02-16

In discussing the trajectories of contemporary city-regional governance and the Mancunian mechanisms on display, this chapter has looked in particular at the operation of the Commission and at specific initiatives intended to help in the process of creating coherent governance at the scale of the city-region, including the MAA, the GMFM and the MIER. The chapter has also discussed the role of AGMA, both ‘old’, ‘interim’ and ‘new’ versions.

This final section of the chapter turns to a much less formalised (but highly influential) group of actors who operate around the margins of the Manchester City Region qualgae. These ‘imagineers’ are weakly institutionalised but highly visible, as self-styled arbiters of taste, aesthetic and culture. Peter Saville, for example, has played a key role in building consciousness of the city-region through his role as ‘Creative Director of the City’ (in interviews more than one respondent expressed their uncertainty about whether that was a job-title he had given himself). This may have had limited effect in implanting city-regional identity in a popular sense, but the consensus in interviews was that it has proved important in fostering shared identity and mission amongst policy elites, providing a narrative that can bind different forms of actor behaviour.

The behaviour of ‘Great Men’ has always been important in influencing the trajectory of Manchester’s political, economic, social and cultural development. This is evident in the literature on the activities of the ‘Manchester men’ and their role in propelling the rapid development of industrial capitalism and associated urbanisation in nineteenth century Manchester (Peck and Tickell, 1995). Robson’s (2002) discussion of ‘Mancunian Ways’ in the politics of regeneration alludes to the role of ‘conspicuous victories’ and image in contributing towards the ‘boosterism’ of Manchester City Council. He talks of ‘a welter of promotional materials – many badged with the photography of Len Grant – flowing from the Town Hall’s Economic Initiatives Department’ (Robson 2002 pg 45)

From the beginning of the period in which entrepreneurial approaches to urban development began to dominate policy (Harvey, 1989; Ward, 200*), Manchester embraced
the idea of ‘selling’ the contemporary attractiveness of city. This often involved capitalising assets such as the city’s footballing and pop cultural heritage. But it also involved harnessing external assets, particularly Cheshire’s desirable countryside and villages, as particularly Mancunian assets. Whereas previous efforts to develop metropolitan governance had been founded on a desire to enhance the city’s fiscal integrity by annexing its affluent peripheries, contemporary approaches sought to claim the ‘quality of life’ assets prevalent in the suburbs but in short supply in the core city.

Again, the leadership of Manchester City Council led the way, with Salford following later while the other authorities have had little impact in international profiling. Apart from the well-known sporting events, Manchester has attracted regular swimming, cycling and triathlon events, and supported cultural festivals (most recently Manchester International Festival). Salford’s Lowry Arts Centre is particularly important for the city and has helped to create the conditions for the BBC’s relocation of some of its functions to a new ‘Media City’ campus at Salford Quays. Marketing Manchester’s visitmanchester.com website markets assets from across the city region under the Manchester banner. Manchester’s leadership was prominent in entrepreneurial networks such as the Core Cities group, but – as interviewees noted – it has been a careful role, outwardly cooperative but predicated on an instrumental ‘do anything that makes us look bigger and better’, focused on real outcomes for Manchester. Manchester : Knowledge Capital (M;KC) was established soon after Manchester Enterprises in order to advance thinking in the university boroughs about the role of the knowledge economy in contributing to the development of the city. This built upon renewed interest in the role of universities in the knowledge economy.

A knowledge-based economy is defined by the systematic and permanent mobilisation of knowledge in order to analyse the result of actions and to design new actions to be undertaken ... Learning and innovation – meaning the design and implementation of new technical solutions and/or new products and services are not intermittent or occasional as is the case in traditional industry, but are on-going processes” (Crevoisier and Jeannerat, 2009, pg 1223; emphasis added)

Manchester has made much of its potential reinvention as an ideopolis, following on from its past role as cottonopolis in the 19th Century. Research carried out by the Work Foundation concluded that:

Outside world cities, the ideopolis is one of the most successful urban forms around. Strikingly, many cities that were formerly in decline have used the ideopolis framework to regenerate and thrive [through] knowledge creation (world class universities and technology transfer infra-structure), good skill levels throughout the workforce, cluster(s) of growing knowledge industries, transport links (especially with airport connectivity) to
and within the city, quality of life (good service/cultural industry presence), effective local leadership, [and an] appropriate degree of political autonomy\textsuperscript{11}

There are a number of organisations who promote this version of urban economic development:

\textit{At the heart of an ideopolis is a core dynamic, a mixture of self and external image, which acts as a centripetal force drawing in the creative, the innovative, the talented and binding together all those groups who make the ideopolis the place where those who can choose where to work and live, choose to work and live.}” (Work Foundation, 20***, pg **; emphasis added).

This ‘core dynamic’ is one we will return to in our discussion of the role and mobilisation of the imagineers of the city region. Current thinking about the role of universities in innovation draws heavily on the work of NESTA (and the Young Foundation to an extent). Jonathan Kestenbaum, as part of the MIER review, team demonstrated Manchester’s pre-existing endorsement of this approach. As expected, the MIER recommendations regarding the role of the local universities is in line with the role envisaged within Innovation Nation, a government White Paper itself heavily influenced by NESTA’s thinking:

\ldots there is an important role for Manchester’s universities to redouble their efforts in their historic role as important social institutions where ideas can be exchanged freely. Earlier conventional thinking about the pre-eminence of spin-offs from university research is now seen as short-sighted. Spin-offs by their nature guard their innovations very closely, in order to make a financial return. The drive should be for universities to act as a bridge connecting parts of MCR’s business community and enhancing the region’s capacity to innovate. (MIER 2009, pg 46)

So then, cities are conceived variously as ‘ideopolis’, where economic agglomeration dictates collaboration in order for a territory to enjoy enhanced international competitiveness or as investing in a ‘soft infrastructure’ with a ‘collaborative character and co-operative spirit’. It is this distinction, between collaborating in order to compete and collaborating for less well-defined economic ends which this thesis is exploring. As forces emphasising competition contend with forces emphasising collaboration at every scale within the university itself and between the university and its partners. Arguably in building Manchester into a knowledge capital the universities have multiple roles beyond that of as employers and producers of graduates and In public statements about the role of Manchester university as partner of choice for the city-region, Professor Rod Coombs, who coordinates the universities engagement with external stakeholders, presents this specific view of the role of the university;

\textsuperscript{11} Work Foundation 2003, Cannon, Nathan and Westfield Welcome to the Ideopolis http://www.ideopolis.info/downloads/ideopolis_r01.pdf
The University has essentially a dual role: as a supplier of raw economic muscle and opportunities for economic value creation and as a synthesiser for a dialogue between diverse views. It is our moral responsibility to insist on challenging our city regional colleagues and to ensure that they don’t confuse us with simply being an input into the economic system. We are the imagination of the City too. (Speech to City Lab Event @ Urbis 18/06/09)

The business of ‘being the city’s imagination’ has more stakeholders concerned there is a long tradition of local elites being involved in representations of the city.

This image making has intensified in the New Labour years and the elastic brand of Manchester has extended itself whereby the whole city region is offered a bit of ‘Manchester magic’ in marketing itself to the world. Efforts to promote the city-region have also involved participating in such trade-fairs as MIPIIM, the Marche International des Professionels d’Immobilier, in Cannes, where the city-region has had a presence since 2000. Reports in the local media of a Manchester city-region yacht docking on the Riviera may have been apocryphal, but the rationale behind such commercial exposure was expressed by a city CEO in bald terms:

We are competing for investment worldwide, so the message is if we come together under the Manchester brand we are stronger than if we were trying to do it alone (Source: interview data MBC CEO, 2008)

Despite sporadic contractual arrangements with the formal institutions of the city and city-region, the imagineers retain an independence and ‘outsider’ status – an anti-establishment establishment. In studying the development of governance and policy-making, it is, of course, easy to overemphasise the importance of key policy actors and formal policy initiatives. But there is an argument that, alongside policy influentialists (Howard Bernstein, Richard Leese) and policy initiatives (from City Pride to the MAA), the imagineers play a pivotal role in constructing the story that accompanies city-regionalism, and in publicising it. Anthony Wilson, Peter Saville, Tom Bloxham and Dave Haslam all bring a bit of ‘Madchester stardust’ to bear on the city about which they are all passionate, linking their causes predominantly to the cultural organisation of the city. For example at the Manchester International Festival of 2009, a sick Anthony Wilson led a debate against Richard Leese on the question of whether the measure of decentralisation brought into being by the attempts at more formal regionalism were of benefit to Manchester or not. With characteristic flamboyance, Wilson smoked, sulked, swore and eventually changed sides and left to go and meet Leonard Cohen. He died a month later.

Peter Saville is working very closely with the city and I think congratulations are due to the city fathers who are actually organising the people who have got a key role to play (source: interview data, imaginer 2009)

They are in your face, sometimes laughable, grandiloquent and vainglorious but do not underestimate them as ‘twats in hats’ they are a vital ingredient of the city’s success (source: interview data journalist, 2010)
I come here not to bury London but to exalt Manchester. Decentralisation, to region or to city-region is good all to the good. What I am here for is to see your leader, Sir Richard blow smoke rings up your arses

(Wilson, debate contribution xx:06.08)

Reification: Making the Abstract Concrete

The reification event (whose logo appears as Figure 45, below) memorialising Tony Wilson was in many ways was symbolic of the close connections between officialdom and the imagineers; combining the use of Urbis, the official actors of the city-region and the urban bureaucrats (who paid for it) with the key actors of the MIF, the other cultural and creative actors of the city.

Figure 52: Reification: Making the Abstract Concrete

This elite is surprisingly easy to access and study since they are so visible, media-savvy, happy to appear at public events, disinhibited and so self-congratulatory about their role in the city’s renaissance. (in short though they may be adopted Mancunians they manifest the braggadocio and vain gloriousness of the stereotype)
The biannual Manchester International Festival (MIF) performs a similar function. Combining creativity and commerce with publicly subsidised art. Despite criticisms that the first MIF demonstrated only a weak connection to the art produced within the city at the expense of promoting high culture at the expense of mass participation Jeremy Deller was commission in the second festival in order to create a popular spectacle in his work Procession. The picture above (Fig 47) plays with the iconography of a municipal socialist past and uses the platform in order to interrogate the notions of identity and participation circulating in the contemporary city-region. Through the use of visual media Procession (which was a standing exhibition at the Cornerhouse) has done more to provoke debate about the city-regional trajectory than any other single forum. Here again in Fig 48 (over) Deller is memorialising the individual notions of the identities of the constituent parts of the city-region by featuring a wreath for the ‘Wigan Pier; within a hearse.
As ever though, through the city (and AGMA’s) patronage of the arts there is a pragmatism in play ‘this isn’t art for arts sake it is the serious business of projecting the city as a global player’ (source: elected member, interview data, 2009) emphasising the playful, and creative notion of the city (and even serving a critique of their operations back up to them) is as much about marketing it as the mainstream conventional economic development and inward investment activities of activities of Marketing Manchester and MIDAS. The cultural opinion-formers of the ‘imagineer class’ have been very important in influencing the content of city-regional policy. They have helped bolster the role of culture, and promulgate awareness about its economic benefits. They have also provided a bridge to a form of identity politics which emphasises Manchester as lively, diverse and intense (connecting with the Jane Jacobs view of the city cited above). The imagineers are thus critical to the projection and self-concept of the city. Their focus on cultural industries and regeneration offers a kind of identity politics for the city which contributes to its self-image as well as how it presents itself to the outside world:

When I say that that all the cultural and creative community require is space and an opportunity, I don't just mean physical space, the buildings, but also, for the dreamers, the creators, a space in their lives and time to create. There's a case for individual grants, grass roots subsidies, mentoring, arts and culture training. Then we'll be moving towards cultural regeneration.

(source: Dave Haslam, website article)
As the following chapter will go on to explore, the usefulness of the imagineers in helping to construct an image of a city as ‘cool’ is of huge import to the ways in which the city leaders are able to operate. Equally, it is important to acknowledge the role played by a third sub-group within the wider range of actors who have driven the development of city-regional policy. The high-profile nature of the imagineers in Manchester may be a phenomenon which is not replicated in the same way in other cities. So key are they to the projection of the city that Urbis (2002-2010) was in part dedicated to memorialising the legacy. There is no space here for a discussion of Urbis as a symbol of the city’s Imagineering but its’ 8-year life was a controversial one.

As an attempt to give people access to an experience of the city that they will both enjoy and learn from, Urbis can only be deemed as a failure…What the museum does is articulate, albeit implicitly, the vision of the accessible capitalist city of entrepreneurial governance (Hertherington, 2007 pg 644)

Whilst it is tempting to focus to too great a degree on urban elites, whether they be policy actors within the qualgae or ‘imagineers’ it is also important to look at those excluded from these circuits. Acknowledging the role of non-elite actors is especially important given the criticism that, as the thesis has already highlighted, the city-regional project has evolved within the confines of the black box of decision-making, with very little connection with either participative or representative forms of democracy. Moreover, the interrelationships between the various cliques of the urban elite is – imagineers excepted – is done imperceptibly to citizens.

It is encouraging, then, to note that over the process of studying the city small hopeful signs have emerged that there may be a media platform for these matters in the form of social media. In addition to the ‘official versions’ within the records of public bodies, and the offerings of the think tanks, there has been a recent addition to the study of the city. Citizen-journalists using social media have begun reporting, providing live tweets and feeds on the activities of the individual councils and of AGMA, as well as offering commentary and more investigative activities probing the functioning of the elites. These volunteers coalesce under the banner of the Inside the M60 blog whose founders Nigel Barlow and Louise Bolotin define their purpose as:

> to report on the issues of concern to the general population of the city, scrutinise the policies of local government and other public and private bodies within the city and be unafraid to tackle even the smallest issues that affect the people of Greater Manchester. We believe that hyperlocal and niche journalism have an important role in the future of news.
Their activity goes some way to opening-up the functioning of these elite to (tech-savvy, interested) local residents. The activities of Inside the M60, however, have been criticised by more or less the only other journalistic voice to report on the functioning of the Greater Manchester elites, David Ottewell, chief political commentator of the Manchester Evening News. He has recently described their activities as ‘run by amateurs who don’t have the time, resources, or sometimes skills to dig out the news.’ (Ottewell, 2010)

Whilst ‘dead tree’ media and social media contest one another’s right to exist, the lack of debate about alternate possible futures for the city region continues and citizens will remain in the dark about processes which underpin the spending of millions. We turn now to synthesise the lessons from the Mancunian mechanisms by exploring in Chapter 8 the specific form of reification which has been achieved in the Greater Manchester City Region.
Chapter VIII Summarising the ‘reifications’ of the Greater Manchester City Region

8.1 Introduction: Actor Strategies in GMCR

“You have to think of the city as a body, those policy nerds (The Commission) are the brains and the ‘cool’ kids (Tom Bloxham and Peter Saville) are the heart.”

Q. “What about the politicians?”

“Hmmm…. I guess you’d have to say that Richard Leese, and Howard are the balls.”

(source: interview data GM-wide imagineer)

The eighth chapter summarises from Chapter VI and VII the story of the various reifications of the city region describing the interactions of the cliques described in the previous chapter. We have differentiated between the cliques of the urban elite as follows;

1. Politicians and their urban bureaucrats, officials of mandated (Type I) government entities.
2. The qualgae, ‘quasi local governance actors and entities populated by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom and Norman 2009) and ‘pragmatic localists’ (Coaffee and Headlam 2008) called qualgaeocrats.
3. ‘Imagineers’ leaders of the Manchester imagination (Interview data, 2008) whose institutional basis and visibility shifts.

They are, however described with somewhat more chutzpah by the respondent above (!)

Having introduced the groups and their preferred modi operandi this summary explores how far their operations combine in projecting the brand of the contemporary city and how far the trajectory of the Mancunian mechanisms described answer the conceptual issues at the heart of the thesis; the state of the overall governability of the city-region and the roles adopted by the key brokers within the circuits and networks available to them.

Synthesising these efforts, which are explored in terms of the reification of the contemporary city-region to explain the specific way in which discourses have been mobilised and how far the actors peopling the structures have exercised their scope for action at the city-regional scale and to suggest that the conscious political construction and imaginary is deployed to prescribed ends encompassing political, administrative and economic concerns as well as the logics under-pinned by the current vogue for place branding and marketing.

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12 For the purpose of disambiguation it should be noted that this interviewee was expressing admiration for the role played by Howard Bernstein and Richard Leese.
13 Reification: making the abstract concrete was a brand used in the memorialisation of Anthony Wilson. Such situationist-inspired rhetoric is often used by the ‘imagineers’ of the city including, famously ‘the hacienda must be built’
The chapter seeks to pull together a number of threads. It argues that roles adopted by of the Manchester family of policy entrepreneurs (and their tactical and political manoeuvres) can be traced through the shifts, balances and connections within and between ‘the state’ and ‘the market’ through the deployment of highly differentiated mechanisms of governance. That these relationships are, affectively under tensions and strains all the time and that the study of the fine grain of the system emphasis oscillates between different sections of the ‘whole’ urban elite according to both ‘local difficulties’ and wider issues. Another tension has been the construction of an identity which differentiated Manchester men form their other regional neighbours. This process, to be found from the literature of the industrial revolution contrasts the industrial and progressive mancunian man with the Liverpool gentlemen.

There was a saying that lingers in Liverpool today - the Liverpool gentleman and the Manchester man. Manchester was an industrial city that made things, its workforce stable, drawn from the Lancashire hinterland, dedicated to progressive causes such as the industrial revolution and the campaigns that grew out of it for trade unions and socialism. The Manchester mill-owner had dirt under his finger nails. The Liverpool gentleman engaged in commerce sat in an office in a white collar (Grant 2003).

Whilst anxious to refer to the fact that in the commodified city Manchester competes, not regionally but internationally there is a residue of these regional stereotype to be founding within the adopted actor strategies of the urban elite; the paradox in self-concept of the city which gave the world both the trades union movement in the form of the first meeting of the TUC and the free trade hall is still perceptible within the oscillation between the cliques that we are seeking to expose herein. Not that any of this is carried out in a way that is perceptible to the citizenry. The accommodations, contestations, power struggles, little victories, and the rise and fall of policy entrepreneurs, elected representatives and the representatives of private capital (all of whom may appear in different hats at different times) occur within carefully constructed ‘black boxes of governance’ presented here within chapter V of the thesis as ‘second generation policy mechanisms’ of a kind imported from the EU. The resultant assemblages result in ‘good governance hybrids’ which combine well-meaning EU-style ‘associationalism’ with the opacity of the most exclusive urban regime.

From the extensive elite interview data collected, and the ordering of the cliques as described it is possible to describe herein the interplay between the various actors in the realisation of governance at the city-regional scale, always seeing it as highly networked and relational and arguing that the city-region is socially constructed by their combination and interaction and that this oscillation is a profoundly political act.
Narrating the power shifts of the ‘Manchester family’, their forms and functions and their relationship to economic development and spatial planning in the city region we seek to conceptualise the qualgae as a network and to consider the relationships between formalised, mandated local government and the more recent assemblage of single-purpose ad-hoc vehicles.

By natural extension the role of the imagineers (as the heart) constructing how the city feels and mobilising an identity project is closely connected with the qualgocrats (the head) constructing a rationale for decentralisation emphasising independence and self-determination. As we have seen this technocratic project has sought to pull the levers available to it in a highly specific and ideological set of ways. As ever it is down to the Type I actors (the b*alls) to rein in both gualgocrats and imagineers should their reach exceed their grasp and this is precisely what the MCC and AGMA ‘city fathers’ have achieved.

8.2 Imagineers : Re-ification and Procession

Would I be a boring Establishment type? No but it's a bit worrying isn't it? I always used to complain that whenever you saw these boards and groups of people there, it was the same old usual suspects that used to crop up...and now I suppose I can be accused of being one!
(Source : Tom Bloxham MEN profile, 2006)

The imagineers as we have seen in Chapter 7 are more associated with spectacled and cultural events than with governance mechanisms per se. Their contribution is towards the identity project of the city (and by extension the city region) As their institutional and organisational position are less fixed, and they are not formally accountable to anyone they are the most mobile actors within the networks. They inject a certain amount of passion and enthusiasm into matters through a combination of international exposure, a belief in the power of the visual arts and built environment and a certain amount of situations sloganeering. More recently their roles have been more formally institutionalised as Tom Bloxham is not the chancellor of the university of Manchester and Peter Saville, as discussed has delivered a re-brand in his capacity as Creative Director of the City.
8.3 Manchester Type II Governance Spaces for the policy entrepreneurs of the qualgae

Researcher: erm… Just finally, and bearing in mind all you’ve said are the commission the jedi knights or are they the empire?
Respondent: the commission are on the side of the angels
(source: GM-wide qualgaecrat, interview data, 2009)

In exploring the actor strategies of the qualgaecrats it should be noted that whilst the above comment was (partly) humorous it was noted by almost all respondents to interviews that there was a certain amount of swagger and braggadocio demonstrated by the commission (NCE) in its ascendancy. A truncated history of Manchester Enterprises, told as a specific narrative from within the panoply of city-regional agencies operating within Greater Manchester the rise (and fall?) of the Commission is very interesting in terms of the shifting usefulness of Type II governance entities to the city-regional project. The CNE project is the technocratic project, specifically their job was to furnish an evidence base with the numbers needed by the decision-makers in advancing the city-region.

In many ways it was like with the International Festival [MIF] they weren’t trying to make friends or to make compromises (or deals) they were like aliens landing and saying ‘take me to your leader’
(source: Senior officer, Greater Manchester-wide quango, 2008)

From the start they didn’t take any prisoners”
(source: elected member, Manchester City Council, 2009)

The manner in which this was achieved, however as described above was in challenging the established order. As we have seen in Chapter VI the GMCR is a politically constructed territory and the agents of the ‘Manchester family’ have sought to support the current incarnation by operating at the utter extent of their capabilities as policy entrepreneurs. As has been shown Manchester Enterprises, and its subsequent morphing into the modish-sounding CNE around the time of the launch of the MIER. This attempt should be seen as admirable given the over-weening nature of national policy. Even the city regional brokers of the GMCR project, pulling on close Whitehall and Westminster personal network, marshalling international experts and constructing mechanism to support their view of the world were only ever offered the slimmest chink of light imaginable through an utterly miserly and meagre central-city-regional process.
The launch of the MIER in April 2009 represented the high water mark for the ambitions of the commission. Following this the centre ‘snapped back’ with almost comic timing for the sub-regional policy entrepreneurs who ended up launching a policy map (the MIER) for a context for growth and the ‘trickle down’ of that growth just as the recession hit the UK ending 27 consecutive quarters of economic growth. The recession served to re-assert the dominance of the Treasury, who need all imaginable resources in order to deal with the bail out of the banks and subsequent recession. Whilst it was not inevitable that the MIER would come to so little in the end it was the exant meta-governance mechanisms of the UK state, and its ability to act with a singularity of purpose in the face of threats to UK plc (the downturn and recession) and in the end the structural centralisation which is viewed as normal within the UK polity which ended up obliterating the spaces of hope that the policy entrepreneurs had devoted themselves to carving out. These ‘exogenous’ factors once combined with the ‘endogenous’ matter that the qualgaecrats had flushed out politically impossible policy recommendations for the politicians who were able to stretch credulity only so far in the face of commissioning an ‘evidence base’ and ending up with such overtly neo-liberal policy prescriptions. As ever for those reliant on classical economic agglomeration arguments it is the externalities/ exogenous factors which end up doing for your model.

Close study comparing the differences between the SNA maps from the qualgae in charge of their own governance arrangements (Figs 42 and 43) and the next iteration of a governance model at the time of the SCR launch show a reigning in of the policy entrepreneurs and a vindication of good old reliable bureaucracy, albeit in a somewhat reticulated form and connecting the boroughs more tightly together than had been achieved in a generation.

The following table (see over) suggests that Manchester Enterprises have lost some of their independent scope for action as the later AGMA governance models responded to the problems of the earlier MAA constructions. In supporting the (short-lived) Economic Prosperity Board (EPB) the intense, sporadic and improvised nature of the personal networks of the commission were obsolete as the structure needed to demonstrate more and better democratic anchorage and accountability.
Attempts to co-ordinate activity at the city-regional scale in the cases of the MCR suffers the hybrid dysfunctions of hierarchy-network in much the same way that the LAA did.

Brokers were required to mange the horizontal forms of accountability familiar to the boroughs and to operate in this now and concerted fashion. However these problems were exacerbated by the introduction of the Business Leadership Council (BLC) into the governance arrangements initially in too central fashion and by the ideological fashion in which the mancunian mechanisms were deployed.

The scope at scale enjoyed by these policy entrepreneurs reached its apex and limit as they commissioned the MIER. In the face of the recession, and with limited Political support for the Reviewer’s recommendations the Greater Manchester Strategy dropped many of the MIER’s more excessive and radical policy prescriptions (particularly as regards the
desirability of spatial planning in making housing markets, arguably then having had their moment, at the launch of the MIER the qualgocrats have been sidelined as AGMA and the boroughs themselves reasserted control. The notion that the qualgae is peopled at the indulgence of the accountable politicians and their officers and that its’ people are engaged in ‘flying some kites’ by advancing radical policy suggestions and that their influence is extended only insofar as these ideas remain politically acceptable and deliverable goes some way to explaining the febrile nature of this policy space. The qualgae have only mechanisms at their disposal, such as the MAA, the GMFM and the MIER whereas decision making power resides ultimately with other actors.

Following the high-water mark of the MIER some of the innovative aura of the commission and etc. lingered but the retrenchment of AGMA and the insertion of scrutiny, the countervailing tendencies of the other commissions beginning to be peopled, not to mention the fact that the CNE governance model of2007 was in contravention to LG Acts which specifically forbids the sub-contracting of public sector function to majoritarian private sector boards. The recommendations in the MIER regarding spatial planning, skills and housing in particular, positioned the reviewers as specifically opening the city-region to further market activity. In this sense the specific reification pursued by the CNE can be labelled as following a strategy of neo-liberalisation but of an extremely variegated and heterodox nature

The MIER was launched with a fanfare but things went rather quieter afterward. There were rumblings that the structures governing the Commission were illegal (due to this vexed question about the role of the private sector and frantic activity ensued regarding the Asks of government as part of the MAA process). By the time of the Greater Manchester Strategy in 2010 the majority of the more contentious suggestion from the MIER finding had been jettisoned in favour of the more usual and bland ‘top lines’ (below)

GMS top line headings :

(1) radically improve the early years experience for hard to reach groups, particularly in the most deprived areas;
(2) improve life chances in the most deprived areas by investing in lifelong skills development and providing other forms of support, including accessible employment opportunities;
(3) increase the proportion of highly skilled people in the city region;
(4) attract, retain and nurture the best talent;
(5) significantly improve transport connectivity into and within the city region;
(6) expand and diversify the city region’s economic base through digital infrastructure;
(7) increase the international connectivity of the Manchester city region’s firms, especially to newly-emerging economies;
(8) achieve a rapid transformation to a low carbon economy;
(9) create quality places to meet the needs of a competitive city region;
(10) review city region governance to ensure effective and efficient delivery mechanisms;
(11) build the city region’s Sense of Place.

In order to move from the MIER recommendations to the GMS different consultants were commissioned to create ‘something that won't frighten the horses’ (source: interview data, anonymous, 2010) This was a highly secretive process, about which it is extraordinarily difficult to elicit information, however my anonymous respondents were scathing about the usefulness of the MIER. ‘it was just a hugely expensive vanity project for the commission’ (source interview data, anonymous, 2010) ‘it was even worse than academic studies in how useable it was (no disrespect…) just flim-flam… unusable in concrete policy terms’ (source, interview data, anonymous 2010) It is notable that the GMS itself list excludes the more contentious and radical suggestions of the MIER. In defending the MIER its’ architects say that it was only ever a research study

…it should be noted that MIER was not intended to be a policy document, and perhaps there were some elements of miscommunication regarding this. It is purely a research study based on strong empirical evidence and analysis, designed to inform the policy decision making process, not dictate it, and it is the responsibility of all policy practitioners (both local and city regional) to use their skills and knowledge to apply (and to challenge) findings of large scale studies such as this in the most effective way. (source: interview data GM-wide qualgaecrat, 2010)

This post-hoc rationalisation, however belies the wider objectives of the study which was to test out theories of agglomeration at the Manchester city-regional scale. The subsequent non- adoption of the more contentious elements of the MIER in the GMS is because this went ‘too far in a direction members could not support’ (source: elected member, MCC interview data, 2010) Despite the elaborate nature of the construction of the mechanisms deployed they failed to achieve traction because power and authority remains vested in the ‘city fathers’
8.3 Government of governance

So then in summarising the differential re-ification projects in play in the contemporary city region we return to the beginning, to the last remaining group actors active in the city, neither *qualgae*, nor urban creative *imagineers* but those democratically accountable and mandated to lead the for the city-region. The politicians and their public servants are a different breed again and Cllrs Richard Leese, Peter Smith and John Merry (leaders of Manchester, Wigan and Salford respectively) have been the most stable and fundamental element of the governing of the city-regional project. (What has been described elsewhere in the thesis in data from an elected members as ‘ringmasters for this whole three-ring circus’. They represent, therefore the governing of the governance contexts within the city region. The ‘city fathers’ are content to deploy either the identity project or the technocratic one insofar as it suits their purposes. The politicians and their urban bureaucrats are required to secure some form of legitimacy for these activities moving reflexively between the two disparate rationales, drawing on the different sources of strength as it suits the audience and the politicians are the only ones able to secure any form of ‘democratic anchorage’ within the polity-forming Type II networks of the city region.

As we have seen from the previous sections the various imaginaries result in disparate political projects and reification of the city and city region. Whilst the *imagineers* motivate and inspire an identity project using spectacle, creative industries, the night-time economy, the built environment and a heady mix of local allegiances through sport and patronage of city institutions and such as through the re-branding efforts *qualgae*crats seek to construct an economic, evidence based, technocratic project by using of specific mechanisms.

It is impossible to tell whether the firewalls that seem to operate in between the more excessive activities of both *imagineers* and *qualgae*crats was deliberately done in this way but there is a neatness about the way in which their independent status enables a certain amount of ‘plausible deniability’ by the city leaders. It is also possible that the Commission in fact played a role not dissimilar to the one that CLES played in the far earlier era of municipal socialism, removed but not totally removed from the ambit of those responsible.

Be that as it may the most skilled reticulated brokers of the lot are the politicians themselves.
Figure 55: Policy refraction in the GMCR
Chapter IX: Thesis Conclusions

9.1 Manchester: Work in Progress

The Frontispiece (on page 14) of this thesis depicts an advertising hoarding emblazoned with a version of the city’s branding wrapped around a building undergoing capital investment (in this case the library in Longsight). The picture on the previous page (202) is a smashed pane of glass at the end of Canal Street which overlooks an undeveloped ‘brownfield’ site. Between these images of regeneration and degeneration is the story of the city-region as it is.

The smashed glass is supposed to illustrate that the concept of refraction (in this case of light splitting through a pane of glass). The notion is important in understanding the ways that the UK sub-national manages instructions from higher tiers of government which are more intensive and more diffuse than the role of formal legislative channels. This process was explained in the interview phase of this research by a senior civil servant in the treasury that ministers see their policies and initiatives like ‘clear beams of light’ from the centre and can’t understand why they ‘bounce off’ the subsequent lower tiers. (source: Treasury senior civil servant, interview data 2008) This process, how policy refracts from one scale to another is key to the design and development of mechanisms designed for specific purposes, particularly if these mechanisms are designed to change the way things are done in localities with an outcome of increased fairness.

As we have sought to explore the construction of the GMCR we have seen that focussing on the changing roles of such mechanisms is key to assessing how brokerage is achieved within the differentiated networks of the urban elite network in order to explore the overall systemic ‘governability’.

The early part of the thesis seeks to trace the evolution of the governance effects of urban policy through a number of stages, arguing that attempts to circumvent the perceived obstacle of local government, through the preferred object of the ‘partnership panacea’ has left a ‘para-static’ legacy, (literally beyond or outside of the state itself) characterised by a proliferation of initiatives, followed by successive attempts to co-ordinate, rationalise and mainstream, and finally in the face of declining investment a retrenchment back to the formalised processes of government. It goes without saying that this was a specific tactic on behalf of the national policy makers whose antipathy towards the institutions of formal,
legitimate local government has been much reported upon. Never before have so few
senior national labour people had the experience of local democracy as an apprenticeship
for a parliamentary career (of the architects of ‘new’ labour only Peter Mandelson has a
brief stint within the London Borough of Lambeth in 1979-1982) This speaks of an unique
context under which central-regional-local government relationships were being re-worked
by people largely unsympathetic to the ‘cause’ of sub-national governance, indeed in
articulating his post-ideological recipe for New Labour, David Hare imagines Tony Blair as
saying ‘we gather the best people and call them new labour’. The resultant devised
partnership governance architecture extemporised this contempt for local politicians acting
alone and tied them into slippery and ill-defined relationships with other public sector
partners and private interests in order to deliver regeneration at the locality scale.

This implementation model, and the deployment of second generation governance
mechanisms rather than empowering local government actors themselves, underpins a
specific set of government/governance forms operationalised within localities and to a
particular set of constitutional and institutional issues underpinning central-local relations
in the UK. The ways in which mechanisms for policy co-ordination and ‘joined-up-ness’
influence the key political questions of taxation, expenditure and redistribution. The
complexity of the UK sub-national can be connected to the subservient and
constitutionally unprotected status of local government, despite the incorporation into UK
law of the European Charter of Self-Governance via the Central- Local Concordat in 2006 (see
House of Commons Standard note by author) The incorporation of the concordat into UK
law has not acted as a sufficient counterbalance to the centralisation of the UK by
international standards. In themselves complexity, in combination with vulnerability in the
face of an over-weaning central government, suggests that there will be difficulties for local
policy elites in localising central government policies due to the inter-linked problems of
policy refraction from tier to tier and the fragmentation of the levers required. These issues are
compounded by the unstable nature of the emergent and hybrid governance forms
unleashed.

As a direct response to their structurally powerless and subservient position the Manchester
policy elite have consciously and deliberately created, maintained and circulated a vision of
the city (and city-region) and collaborated collectively in projecting this image into the
global marketplace through reflexive processes of ‘Imagineering’. This process of self-
referential reification is manifest in the maintenance of the image and discourse of the
contemporary competitive ideopolis and a range of qualgae have flourished in order to
flesh out the features of the city as a commodity. The thesis has sought to unpack the
roles and functions of the brokers within partnership governance structures of the cliques within the Manchester City Regional urban elite, and to track their changing purposes, inter-relationships and the state of flux between the city-regional networks and entities.

The combination of the officials and the Type II governance entities they mandate changes markedly over time. The Commission, for example was mandated by the formally accountable entities of the city council, but keeping it at an arm’s length from their democratic and scrutiny processes of oversight enables more potential scope for experimentation by policy entrepreneurs all too keen to exploit their pet theories on the agglomerative potential of the city region. In spite of the innovative patina of these actors and agencies in the Manchester case the stubborn realities and restrictions of the real powers act as a constraint over their genuine scope to exercise discretion in policy choices.

These various and myriad forms, their capacity and capability contribute to their ‘governability’ and the related ‘scope at scale’ exercised by the brokers and actors within these governance arrangements. Brokerage is the key skill within the reticulated local polity and notions of bridging capital, used to proselytise bidding coalitions is a form of distributed leadership required to manage mechanisms and architectures in order to pull levers and effect changes. It is further a contention of the thesis that any sub-national ‘spatial fix’ attempted in isolation will prove unhelpful; whether on the neighbourhood, locality, city-regional, or regional is of no use in explaining social relations if it has the effect of obscuring the networks within and between scales (vertically) and government and the market (horizontally). It is for this reason that the governability model is preferred and that its use, in combination with a close study of a selection of ‘second generation governance mechanisms’ and the interrogation of actor’s scope at scale, necessitates foci across multiple scales.

The policy area of regeneration and economic development was used as a lens through which to explore the issues partly because it is continually ‘shuffled’ as the UK seeks to address persistent spatial disparities and inequalities and secondly since it has been the site of considerable experimentation in governance terms, through the proliferation of partnership approaches.
9.2 central-local relations, the governance of regeneration under New Labour

The urban policy laboratory speaks of a highly specific form of central-local relations. In tracing the governance effects of urban policy over the period from 1997-2010 the following typology was developed in order to explain the waves of institution building instanced by non-statutory economic development and regeneration monies. Table 33 (replicated below) shows this process.

Table 33 Governance effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Initiative-it-is SRB etc. continuing Con policies Other ABIs, Sure Start, HAZ etc.</td>
<td>Public Funding £££ + Euros</td>
<td>European National Regional Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Ad hoc para-static project proliferation (neighbourhood and region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2000-2004 (after CSR 2000)</td>
<td>National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal emphasising role of LSPs for “the 88”</td>
<td>££££ Less Euros</td>
<td>European National Supra-regional Regional</td>
<td>para-static paradox independence of earlier phase leads to impossibility of co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2004-2008 (After CSR 2004)</td>
<td>Co-ordination “Mainstreaming” Structures LSPs, LDFs, LAAs</td>
<td>££ £</td>
<td>European National Supra-regional (?) Regional City Regional Local Authority +</td>
<td>Seeking to resolve para-static paradox through development of local partnership governance architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2008 – (recession)</td>
<td>Contraction of Funding /projects “Refresh” of LAAs MAA – SCR pilots</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>European National Regional City Regional Local Authority +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table presents the notion that investment in the first phase above created fragmentation and a frittering of strategic capacity. Seeking to resolve this ‘hinge’ juncture was the LGWP if 2006 which sought to resolve this problem through the development of a comprehensive, coherent and thorough-going local governance performance architecture. Phase 3 (column 3, above) presents the common integrative logics underpinning the Local Area Agreement (LAA), the Multi Area Agreement (MAA) and the Public Service Agreement (PSA). It is argued that these mechanisms are all attempts at public sector modernisation through joining up the supply side of public service provision.

The thesis presents the changing logics of such policy mechanisms, arguing that they function in practice as slippery signifiers and that an attitude of ‘it can do that too’ from those designing policies led to a morphing of single-purpose mechanisms into far more generalised contexts, ultimately resulting in the case of the LAA being overloaded with
unrealistic aspirations for both local government modernisation and the policy area of economic development and regeneration. It also contends that policy mechanisms are particularly prone to instability and eternal mobility when they move from conceptualisation to implementation – in the case of the LAA leading to an innovative approach to policy coordination becoming buried under a series of unwieldy indicators and an inspection regime driven by performance management concerns that proved difficult to reconcile with practical concerns around implementation.

It then turns to contrasting philosophical approaches to draw out some of the underpinning reform logics in play, contrasting strategies emphasising governability (Kooiman) with approaches viewing governmentality (Foucault) as more central. Having introduced them there are attempts to draw out the more practical and tactical steps for government in the light of these contrasting conceptualisations and exploring the ways in which government/governance forms hybridise.

Part of the methodological position of the thesis is that it is imperative to look at governance networks as networks. It does so by applying a mixed method evaluation framework incorporating Social Network Analysis [SNA] in order to treat governance networks as complex networks. The Manchester “brand” is mobilised for political and economic purposes and defended by the qualgae of the Manchester family of organisations; AGMA, CNE, Marketing Manchester and Midas, and through the maintenance of a discourse emphasising global competitiveness, the creative class and the ‘Ideopolis’ The approach seeks to make a number of connections; firstly between some of the more theoretical work on modes and scales of governance and empirical investigation and secondly between those looking at city regional institutional and organisational forms with the use of formal SNA methods (from quantitative sociology) The analysis is necessarily multi-scalar since effects are nested and stacked in complex ways. Further that these methods look rather differently at the performance of governance in the UK sub-national than either the governance corpus or the critical geographical literature. In a close examination of what governance networks do it is important to differentiate between ideal types of governance entity. The thesis argues that differentiation between Type I and Type II governance entities emerges to bring some conceptual coherence and that a framework modified from the ‘theory of change literature’ is useful in differentiating between ‘second generation governance mechanisms’. Table 34 (over) delineates the roles of the various elements of complex non-legislative governance systems.
### Table 34 Second generation governance and theory of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructures</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The selection of areas, according to 'objective' criteria for special spatially targeted support</td>
<td>‘the 88’ LAs in the UK under the NSNR ‘Assisted Areas’ under the EU</td>
<td>Can be applied at any scale for which there is reliable data available. Eg SOA/LA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Architectures | Deliberately constructed strategic/delivery vehicles | The LSP-LAA-LDF performance regime for local governance (after the 2007 Act) Regional arrangements from 1999 | Generally Type II governance formations. Can be applied at any scale: key issue is connection between such architectures and accountability other (horizontal) scales |

| Mechanisms | Component elements of an architecture (above) mechanisms combine drivers and levers (see below). Could be localised versions of national policy, strategic documents, assemblages of actors or ‘soft spaces’ | PSA LAA MAA | Can be applied at any spatial scale – especially in ‘soft’ or ‘para-static’ spaces. You may not need mechanisms if your activity matches/maps neatly to established spaces of governance |

| Levers (Carrots and/or sticks for change) | Instruments available to government to effect change in public policy and services. | Reward grant attached to LAA SBR Inspection regimes | Powers. Ability to exercise policy choices. The lack of genuine levers in the UK sub-national to exercise policy choices means that levers are predominantly ‘pulled’ nationally |

| Drivers | General aims of government in specific policy areas | Could be policy documents of strategies NSNR (UK-wide) SCS (LA-wide) | The processes through which things come onto (and off) the agenda are notoriously complex (see policy streams in John Kingdon) manifesto commitments, sectional interests, ‘crises’ and framing |

| Funding Streams | The way to make things happen. Channels through which government money is spent, can encompass competitive bidding and/or be connected with infrastructures or architectures (see above) | NDC WNF | Competing for, and spending of, various funding streams has been a core regeneration activity. Can lead to fragmentation |

Work carried out at European Union level gives a framework for exploring these differences and the work of Chris Skelcher notably generates useful sub-categories for the analysis of Type II governance effects. Combining his trilogy of club, agency and polity forming entities with literature which visualises these discrete categories as networks as in Fig 23 (Chapter II Section 3.2.2 Page 59) and within Table 35 (over.)
Table 35 Site Space and Sphere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Sphere</th>
<th>Taylor, Sullivan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Club</td>
<td>Polity-Forming</td>
<td>Skelcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Distributed</td>
<td>Network Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hub and Spoke</td>
<td>Small World</td>
<td>Core/Periphery</td>
<td>Krebs, Holley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These conceptual threads we bring to bear on time-honoured questions of structure and agency re-cast as questions about the overall governability of the system itself. In order to explore the ways in which agency is exercised at different scales is useful how the scope for agency and action at particular scales is reliant on the manner in which modes of governance (and specific policy problems) are refracted through space/place, how far actors are free to exercise scope at scale and how far viewing networks as sites, spaces and spheres of governance offers one way of thinking through ways in which policy and delivery remain estranged.

This connects very well to the UK sub-national delivery and implementation context to interrogate the effects of a continually changeable context where specific governance mechanisms behave as ‘slippery signifiers’ modified and morphing through time. In a sense the 2006 LGWP was seeking to resolve a problem which had only emerged as a result of the perverse effects of earlier policy.

The LAA, originally a ‘bastard child’ of the LPSA and the LSP went through numerous ‘loops and stages’ in Fig 56 (over) this process is outlined. It is tortuous by virtue of the need for the LAA framework to be extensive in its coverage, applying to all top tier English local authorities.
The LAAs explored were only truly Type II governance entities prior to the new LAA and the application of the NIS, a difference outlined in table 36 (below)

### Table 36 LAAs and governance forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Entity Type</th>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Model /moment</td>
<td>New LAA</td>
<td>LAA prior to statutory status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills required to work model</td>
<td>reticulated brokerage</td>
<td>policy entrepreneurialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what end</td>
<td>Process Management Audit – Targets etc.</td>
<td>Reification – Selling benefits to partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political oversight</td>
<td>Built in including scrutiny</td>
<td>Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of private/voluntary sector</td>
<td>Built in</td>
<td>Stockport : Strong On LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wigan : on LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Barnley : VCS dominant on LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government connections</td>
<td>Stable and through GO and Audit Commission</td>
<td>Mediated via GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambitious “asks”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms framing activity</td>
<td>SCS – LAA</td>
<td>SCS development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined by</td>
<td>Comprehensive, inclusive, organisational relationships</td>
<td>Small, tight, personal networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In exploring LAAs as emergent, hybrid governance mechanisms and as slippery signifiers it was argued that insofar as they manifested networked governance properties (in earlier incarnations prior to the ‘new LAA’) these were limited to hub and spoke brokerage
positions. The LAA sits between hierarchy and network and lacked the sufficient discretion to significantly disrupt activities at the locality scale, in a sense then its’ effects appear to be isomorphic, contributing towards an already stable and path-dependent approach. The hybrid dysfunctions in the awkward space between hierarchy and network make it an awkward one to inhabit, the discomfort reported by LAA brokers, and their frequent career moves are a symptom of hierarchy/network being particularly challenging.

As is becoming increasingly common within the post-bureaucratic state brokers were forced to manage conditions with hybrid notions of accountability *across* to partners and *vertically* within their LAs and to alternate scales. LAAs were unstable hybrid entities but not so much because of the incursion of market forces per se. The hoped-for network effects of LAAs were obliterated by their subservient situation to higher tiers, particularly as the NIS and articulated itself over the actions of local partners. As discussed within chapter II, a governance perspective offers the opportunity to scrutinise the specific calibration of the institutional matrix and mechanism mix. The ‘scope at scale’ of the LAA broker was never sufficient that the mechanisms itself could assume sufficient strength to challenge the other tiers in the ‘mechanism mix’. The LA scale is not sufficiently autonomous for the notion of the governability of the locality to apply. LAAs in thrall to higher spatial scales function as *sites* of governance under the new LAA.

In contrast MAA policy went through no comparable *national* iteration. MAA policy at the city-regional scale was always more bespoke and responsive to the circumstances of the sub-regional entities themselves as it would have been a nonsense to seek to implement a uniform system over such disparate governance terrains (arguably the heterogeneity of structures at LA scale makes a nonsense of a meta-governing NIS also). Whilst many commentators viewed the MAA as an LAA at a different spatial scale this is erroneous since they have completely different statutory basis. The MAA of 2008 is somewhat like the LAA of 2004 in that it was a looser and more open structure, but the subsequent loops of the LAA have led to a very different, and more constrained delivery context. There is nothing comparable with the NIS to connect with MAAs and they should be seen as containing more scope for innovation between partners. Also in the wake of the move away from PSA targets (particularly the loss of the regional disparity PSA in 2008) there was less national proscribing of MAA activities.
9.3 Governability and The ‘Manchester Men’ of the current urban elite

In the previous chapter (VIII) the socio-spatial biography of the greater Manchester City Region was shown to represent an experimental and innovative ‘space of governance’ (Forester 2010). In interrogating the urban elite we look at the fine-grain of the dynamics in play as the operations of numerous cliques from within the urban elite who collaborate in the reflexive project whereby they contribute to the reification of the city region both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. These efforts to manage the mechanisms of the ‘un-glamorous’ sub-national result in ‘heroic attempts’ to co-ordinate and to foster trust across the complex spaces of metropolitan governance. Consequently MAA policy cannot be explored or explained without specific reference to a place, since the trajectories in different places have proven so disparate and differentiated from one another. The following table (37, replicated below) shows the iterations of city-regional planification in the GMCR from 2003-2010

Fig 37 Governance Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRDP</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAA</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPB</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRP</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Authority</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thesis argues that the key actors within this process are those listed below (in Fig 57).

Fig 57 Qualgae reprised :The cliques of the Manchester urban elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most formalised</th>
<th>least formalised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>‘imagineers’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 10 boroughs</td>
<td>‘other’ orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mandated mechanisms spectacles
Despite relative formal political stability and leadership, and a governance trajectory which has emphasised co-ordination and joining-up over time, the city-region remains a highly fragmented institutional space populated by actors whose power and influence waxes and wanes and whose connections with formalised mandated local government shift over time. The shifts between the officials, their qualgae crats and the independent imagineers all of whom are invested in projecting specific ‘successful’ images of the city-region

(1) Politicians and their urban bureaucrats, officials of mandated (Type I) government entities who use their mandate

(2) The qualgae, ‘quasi local governance actors and entities’ populated by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom and Norman 2009) and ‘pragmatic localists’ (Coaffee and Headlam 2008) the qualgae crats wo use mechanisms for a technocratic project

(3) ‘Imagineers’ leaders of the Manchester imagination’ (interview data, 2008) whose institutional basis and legitimacy shifts who use spectacle for an identity project.

9.3.1 ‘Officials’

Formal, Type I government entities: The formal elected members and public servants recruited on permanent contracts to service the authorities exist everywhere in the country within the structures of local government. In the Manchester case the leadership of the boroughs and, to an extent their collaboration as AGMA, represent the stable and accountable core of the operations of the city-region. The extension of the plastic and elastic notion of the city has been a long-term project of Richard Leese and Howard Bernstein ‘the foremost city-maker of his generation’ (source: academic, interview data, 2008) behave as ‘ringmasters to the whole three ring-circus (source: journalist, interview data, 2009) and both ‘mandate, support, legitimise and bankroll’ (source: academic, interview data, 2009) the activities of (particularly) the ‘qualgae crats’.

9.3.2 Qualgae: the commission’s Mancunian mechanisms.

Qualgae at the locality scale in an English context as dense and fecund as Manchester’s, however is rarer. To have such a diverse set of organisations operating ‘adjacent to but independent from’ (source: interview data GM-wide qualgae crat, 2008) the formal structures of local government. Largely ‘below the radar’ (source: interview data MCC elected member) necessitates exploration into their scope for action, trajectory and the effects of their activities. The three key ‘Mancunian mechanisms’ of the Multi Area Agreement(MAA), the Greater Manchester Forecasting Model (GMFR), and the Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER) are herein explored demonstrating how they are deployed and to what effect the qualgae have managed to ‘rescale regeneration’, taking effective and successful coalition-building for grant-funding and partnership regeneration (of the CBD)
and morphing these activities to the ‘10-borough’ scale somewhat repackaged but with similar activities and operations designed to project and market the competitiveness of the conurbation according to European and global capitalistic norms. The qualgae is peopled by ‘qualgecrats’ who are engaged in the reflexive relationships in the construction of the city’s brand constituting a ‘reticulated bureaucracy’ in which roles and rules of more formal, mandated structures of local government are only one element of the mechanism mix in evidence (Prior 1996).

9.3.3 Imagineers: boosterism, aesthetes and taste-makers

The actors of ‘officialdom’ and ‘the qualgae’ are aided by an active and self-styled local urban elite; such as Anthony Wilson, Tom Bloxham, Peter Saville and Dave Haslam who, imbricated within the Manchester International Festival, (MIF) Marketing Manchester and the Universities, as well as through involvement in other cultural enthusiasms and through their day-jobs, appear to function as a Floridian ‘creative class’ of civic-minded philanthro-capitalists. This elite is surprisingly the easiest to access and study since they are so visible, media-savvy, happy to appear at public events, and (arguably) so self-congratulatory about their role in the city’s renaissance. As Tom Bloxham tweeted on May 20th 2010

“Madchester: The 1980s generation (Incl me!) was not so mad after all – it is running the place now http://bit.ly/9NiDRc so says the Financial Times 6:22 PM May 25th

Their activities are far less formally institutionalised, though they certainly rub up against the formal structures of the city-region. And their energy and visibility in framing the city lends an innovative patina to the operations of the other cliques, which arguably is mobilised for specific marketing and inward investment purposes.

9.3.4 Residents and Citizens

The role of citizens within the soft (and para-static) spaces of governance is a vexed one. Neither representative nor participatory forms of citizen engagement are actively sought at the city-regional scale. Despite the democratic mandate of the locality scale it remains subservient to the needs of higher tiers of government. Whilst councils are made up of elected members this accountability is to electors within wards and activity at other scales is by virtue of stretching accountability to actors behaving as proxies. This leads to controversies regarding the ‘democratic anchorage’ of the arrangements. These spaces of governance can function as black boxes to the citizenry, although there are (a very few) citizen journalists emerging to render accounts of the functioning of the elites to a wider public. A problem we will return to later within the thesis. Even backbench / frontline
councillors struggle to articulate the usefulness of the mechanisms underpinning closer joined up working ‘LAA and MAA language doesn’t lend itself to things that members want to be remembered for’ (source: elected member, interview data, 2007).

9.3.5 Governability

An assessment of the overall governability of the Manchester city region, then must take into account these tensions as they are played out

An assessment of the overall governability of the MCR

Fig 58 Governability

The ‘governing interactions’ brought into being through the activities of the qualgae are unbalanced in their ‘impacts’ by the lack of the counterbalancing participation of the citizenry. Indeed it is far from clear that the GMCR has any legitimacy at citizen level. This lack of popular mandate and the functioning of the city-regionalists from within the black boxes of governance may be sensible. Sub-national policies when put to referenda have suffered crippling defeats. Also securing ‘voice’ is far from a simple thing to do. However that within the city-regional project the policy interaction on Kooiman’s arrow have no counterbalance from participation is a problem.

Governing, in this framework is viewed as a set of actions with a set of results. In this way, then power is viewed through what it does, the forces exerted and not through mindsets,
programmes or rhetorical categories. Concentrating on these governing actions/abilities leads to a different line of enquiry as to expose and illuminate the fine grain of the processes necessitates exploring how far mechanisms and entities have the necessary levers at their disposal in order to exercise the policy choices that they marshal. In short, to judge mechanisms on how they perform their functions and roles and with what effects.

A specific conclusion of the research is that the Manchester family – the qualgae in the studied time period exceeded their remit and used the MIER in order to test specific (neo-liberal) economic orthodoxies for Manchester and that their adherence to the agglomeration economics of the reviewers, combined with their appeal to European and global discourses led to a palate of policy preferences which were both politically unfeasible and unacceptable to the local political leaders. The protracted wrangling required to move from the MIER towards a Greater Manchester Strategy required that the hubris of the former was swiftly replaced by the far more prosaic latter, as precious little of the MIER was operationalisable.

A stand out ‘reconcilable irreconcilable’ within this oscillation is the ‘true nature’ of the city itself, simultaneously traded on variously as ‘bait’ for regeneration investment by emphasising its’ doughnut nature, with the ring of deprivation within 3 miles of the CBD to the role and the institutions of New East Manchester and the UDCs to the fore or as a vibrant ‘ideopolis’ where knowledge intensiveness and these agglomeration effects combine to create a competitive business destination to rival any in the world.

This vacillation, between foregrounding deprivation and foregrounding the ideopolis is due to the intrinsic pragmatism of the political and official ‘ringmasters’ of the city (and city-region) They have operated tactically and strategically given the constraint they operate under. Overall the thesis seeks to argue that it is helpful to focus on the fine-grained effects of networks and partnerships which function in the sub-national as part of a ‘relational' state where connectivity within and between actors and agencies is key. (Mulgan, 2010). It argues that ‘whether the jungles are green and leafy or concrete, they are brimming with intricate webs of relationships, which when viewed from afar reveal elementary structures’ (Stephenson, 2004) and holds out hope that the possibility of socially and spatially just outcomes emerging from the mechanism mix as calibrated locally.

The thesis seeks to make a contribution to the literature on Metropolitan Governance, and on the roles of partnerships in galvanising activity. It proposes some methodological
innovation as the construction of an Socio-Spatial Biography (SSB) using Social Network Analysis (SNA) as well as elite interviewing offers some critical reflections on the underlying logics and the current iteration of the city-regional governance project. It seeks to treat metropolitan governance networks as networks and to offer and integrative whole combining SNA with qualitative work with the salient elites. It suggests a comparative research agenda for the future focussing on fine-grained mechanisms and on the inter-relationships and functioning of Type I and II entities in a governance context. It views complex conurbations as immanent, changeable, vibrant and dynamic and subject to a great diversity in structural and governance forms operating within the ‘new modes of control’. It seeks to interrogate the roles of partnership hybrids and to suggest that far from ‘combining strengths’ they serve to multiply weaknesses. Further, it leads to questions of whether partnerships are more or less liable to dysfunctions than the’ pure modes’ or if enthusiasms for forms of networked governance are accounts of economic good times under which partnership formations proliferate under conditions of investment and plenty. It may be that in a contracting economy there are different rules in play.

The thesis seeks to make a contribution through its’ detailed synthesis of urban policy and the successive governance mechanisms seek to provide a backdrop to the Manchester case and the constellation of actors operating in the complex spaces fo Multi-level governance. It seeks to contribute to the literature on Manchester and to offer some critical reflections on the underlying logics of the city-regional governance project, viewing it as inherently unfinished/unfinishable always interesting and as unfinalisable and a true ‘work in progress.

Future research agendas include application of this mixed methodology to other contexts, applying the syntheses developed to comparative cities in England and beyond in international context, in order to advance thinking around the relationship between underlying governance structures, ‘institutional thickness’ or ‘governability’ and comparative performance. Another possible research agenda would be to carry out longitudinal work in Manchester in order to examine how persistent the forms under discussion here prove to be over time and in their absence how the intertwined policy problems of complexity, centralisation and inequality can be effectively challenged.

9.4 Urban Policy Mechanisms in Prospect and Retrospect
9.4.1 Back to the beginning

Returning to the quotations at the front of the thesis this final sections seeks to explain their salience in the context of the thesis and to offer a few connected concluding thoughts. From the cuts ravaged landscape of January 2011 sustained investment in the policy problems of the UK sub-national (indeed sufficient energy and enthusiasm for reform that it created perverse effects in the form of fragmentation) seems like a story from long ago and far away. It is an understatement to report that the specific mechanisms brought into play by Labour have found no favour with the current coalition government. However beyond these immediate policy concerns it is back to the more ‘fundamental questions’ that this short note seeks to turn. Returning firstly to the quotes on page 13 that set the context for the thesis.

Bryan Robson’s commitment to this policy agenda has been lifelong and he has watched (and advised of alternatives whilst) ‘grossly unequal societies have moved their problems around the policy map.’ It is absolutely a lack of will to challenge socio-spatial and structural inequality which sets the tenor for the conversation around the shuffling of intervention from one scale to another. (this process is described variously herein as a ‘slice and dice’, a ‘shuffling’, a ‘spatial schizophrenia’, or a form of ‘spatially contrived randomness’) Fortunately (or Unfortunately) there are many of us who follow Philip Larkin in seeing deprivation as a motivator and life-work ‘as daffodils are to Wordsworth’.

Despite this for many critical urban scholars there is frustration where hopes for alternate urban imaginaries collide with real power. As the quote from Michael Heseltine, somewhat of a lone localist within the Conservative government of the 1980s (and personally very important to Manchester’s development and regeneration trajectory) warns of ‘absolute central government’s control of local government’ is. This insight connects to the admission of Manchester’s long-time leader since Cllr Sir Richard Leese. ‘I fought the government through the eighties and I can tell you it doesn’t work’. It was the need to operate pragmatically and to make accommodations with and for political opponents that lays the scene for the qualgaecrats of the contemporary city-regional context.

Overall the policy driver of reducing inequality under Labour led to the governance effects of a *hierarchy with some elements of a governance network and weaker leverage over the market*. This may be contrasted with a government approach which foregrounds decentralisation, but does not frame inequality as problematic. Emphasising decentralisation without a
commitment to equality offers a governance context whereby market mechanisms, both in ‘pure’ forms and hybridised are privileged. The coalition’s particular brand of localism does not emphasise uneven spatial development or contain an ostensible commitment to urban or regional policy. Regions are so despised that within CLG the acronym TAFKAR (the areas formerly known as regions) is used in their stead to avoid enraging ministers and inner-cities are without specific policy for the first time since the 1976 White Paper whose architect Peter Shore said that solving the problems of the inner cities remains ‘this countries greatest challenge but its greatest prize’ (quoted in Parkinson, 1999) Extending the metaphor somewhat would suggest that this government is not interested in either the challenge or the prize of persistent and inter-generational deprivation.

Further, quite conversely to the obsessive tinkering to create the optimal range of mechanisms (described herein) this government eschews co-ordination of any kind unleashing ‘creative chaos’ within the policy area of spatial planning coupled with aggressive public sector cuts to associated professions such as neighbourhood renewal and community development. The coalition approach sees LSPs, LAAs and the whole LGPA as voluntary (and not necessary) seeking to dismantle the statutory duties to co-operate across the public sector. Whilst the Localism Act currently before Parliament does not deploy other mechanisms for strategic co-ordination. There is, of course, the possibility that such an extensive governance system is arguably only justifiable in a context of growth, (both in public sector expenditure and the wider economy) but it is more intuitive to suggest that mechanisms for strategic co-ordination actually assume even more importance in the age of austerity.

9.4.2 Political control of AGMA

The political balance of the leadership of the city-region is critical to the success of the governing project, not least through the mandating of the range of bodies in the qualsgae. As we saw in Chapter VI, there had been a voting trend which saw ‘other parties’ encroaching into what had been seen as a ‘Labour stronghold across the 10 boroughs. However, with the coalition in power councils have been beginning to turn back to Labour in May 2011.
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9.4.3 Cuts to the Manchester Family decimating the qualgae

The scale and nature of the budget cuts that the 10 boroughs have been required to make have led to a re-examination of the organisations of the qualgae. Despite responding with their usual alacrity and creativity to the call for RGF monies Greater Manchester’s ‘shadow LEP’ board is a collection of city-regional policy actors themselves facing huge turbulence and change; Manchester City Council itself in Jan 2011 announced losing 2000 jobs a move being actively opposed by the Trades Unions. It would require a whole other doctoral thesis to narrate the relationship between the Labour Party and the Unions over the period of the 1997-2010 government. However there are many similar issues to the study of the role of local government as famously Mrs Thatcher viewed both as bastions of socialism. The funding and arrangements of ‘The Manchester Family’ are under ‘strategic review’ with a view to significantly reducing the resources they use. The ‘family’ have been doubly hit by the withdrawal of the resources of the NWDA and the cuts to local government. Rumours suggest that this could reduce the £30 million they spent in 2008-09 by up to 66%.

9.4.4 Job done? Divesting the city of the imagineers

Having made the point about the institutional basis of the imagineers as being highly vexed in the period following the 2010 general election and the subsequent cuts to local government, it is perhaps not surprising that the most high-profile of the scalps of this period have included the much-vaulted ‘creative director of the city’ Peter Saville, who, it must be said has been instrumental to the ‘visual language and identity of the city region’ adopted since the 2009 Labour Party conference launch.
It may be that a city requires a creative director only in as they construct their brand identity but his international advocacy of the city-region is viewed as a luxury in times of austerity.

9.4.5 Roads less travelled for cities

My own view is that the story of the reification of the city-region over this studied period is a frustrating one as it could have afforded an historic opportunity to espouse an alternative approach to mere trickle-down economics within the city-region. Had a discursive space been constructed for that conversation it could have been a ‘game-changer’ for Manchester and beyond. That the ‘scope at scale’ of the qualgae within the city region was used only to parrot neo-liberal orthodoxies is our loss as citizens. But let us not be down-hearted. Next time there is a government committed to solving social problems through intervention in sub-national and sub-regional scales, they will need to co-ordinate themselves using non-legislative mechanisms again and hopefully some of the theoretical and conceptual content of this thesis can be part of that conversation next time around.

More broadly, by pointing towards the ‘road less travelled’ within the study of cities and focussing on Georg Simmel’s relational sociology and the efforts of Moreno to map whole urban populations it may be that we can seek to influence those wielding authority at the locality scale to frame their activities as through leading across coalitions using specific forms of brokerage and that by encouraging them to know their networks we can offer support in the knitting of networks into different configurations.


DCLG (2007). Development of the new LAA framework. DCLG, HMSO.


