How is Islamophobia Institutionalised? Racialised Governmentality and the Case of Muslim Students in British Universities

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

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Social Sciences/Sociology
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Abstract

This thesis explores *how* Islamophobia is institutionalised in British universities. Focussing on Muslim students, this question is largely explored through empirical research using two case study universities. Each university was examined through key university functions; namely, ‘ethnic’ monitoring data under the Race Amendment (2000), union politics and welfare/observance provisions.

The research involved semi-structured interviews with Muslim students who were in some way ‘active’ on campus, as well as university/union staff between 2004 and 2006. It also included some document analysis.

It is argued that Islamophobia is institutionalised through its govermentalising function and is reflected in three key modes of ‘managing’ Muslim students; ‘absence’ (invisibility), ‘presence’ (hyper-visibility) and ‘inclusion’ (liberal multiculturalism).

‘Absence’ refers to the absence of Muslim students as a recognised collectivity within the formal structures of the university. Thus, it is argued, *Muslim* student concerns about racism fail to be formally registered and remain trivialised at anecdotal levels.

‘Presence’ refers to the hyper-visibility of Muslim students as a troublesome ‘fundamentalist’/’extremist’ cohort. This is exemplified through numerous historical and contemporary sector and state interventions, but also in student union politics.

‘Inclusion’ refers to liberal multicultural practices that regulate Muslim students. This is observed in equality practices (e.g. university provisions) in the university and the way they function to minoritise rather than equalise the status of Muslim students.

What these modes of governance emphasise is the way Muslim students are the subject of and subjected to processes of racialised management, that is, regulation, discipline and normalisation. Each of these modes are explored through interviewee accounts/documents, and (in)formed by a recursive engagement with theories of racialised governmentality.

It is argued that together, these modes of racialised governmentality signify the transgressive status of Muslims. They are also seen to reflect the broader political (in)visibility of Muslims in Britain and their awkward place within British multiculturalism.

Influenced by ‘de-colonial’ thinking and activist-based research, the thesis has sought to develop a critique of dominant and racialised discourses about Muslim students in universities. This has involved the selective use of discursive techniques and a reflexive awareness of my own positioning with research. It has also involved cognizance of the way Muslim students and Muslim communities generally, have been perceived as ‘suspect’ and subject to increased securitisation. In the main however, the thesis has troubled the equality practices of universities and highlighted the way they are part of, not separate from, the problem of Islamophobia.
Declaration/Copyright Statement

No Portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree of qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BME</td>
<td>‘Black and Minority Ethnic’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMI</td>
<td>Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>Commission for Racial Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVCP</td>
<td>Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBIS</td>
<td>Department for Business Innovation and Skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>Equality Challenge Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOSIS</td>
<td>Federation of Student Islamic Societies in the UK and Eire</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEFCE</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding Council for England</td>
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<td>HEI</td>
<td>Higher Education Institutions</td>
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<td>HESA</td>
<td>Higher Education Statistics Agency</td>
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<td>HT</td>
<td>Hizb ul-Tahrir</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISOC</td>
<td>Islamic Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOC</td>
<td>Jewish Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATFHE</td>
<td>National Association of Teachers Further and Higher Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUS</td>
<td>National Union of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALSOC</td>
<td>Palestinian Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIA</td>
<td>Office for Independent Adjudicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>Race Relations Act (1956/1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRAA</td>
<td>Race Relations Amendment Act (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOP</td>
<td>Standing Conference of Principals</td>
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<td>UUK</td>
<td>Universities UK</td>
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## Other Terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaah</td>
<td>Congregation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jumma</td>
<td>Friday Prayers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wudhu</td>
<td>Ablution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hijab</td>
<td>Headscarf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niqab</td>
<td>Face-Veil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadhan</td>
<td>The Month of Fasting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarawiyya</td>
<td>Ramadhan Prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umma</td>
<td>Global Muslim community</td>
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Acknowledgements

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Chapter One

Managing Muslims

1.1. Managing Muslims Students: Racialised Governmentality in Universities

This thesis examines how Islamophobia is institutionalised in British universities. It approaches this question through an extended analysis of ‘white governmentality’ (Hesse 1997, p.99-100), a concept provisionally offered by Hesse in the late nineties. ‘White governmentality’ is developed in the context of Muslim students in two British universities, to advance a concept of ‘racialised governmentality’ (Hesse 2000, p.2/29 n.22; 2004b; Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.21). Racialised governmentality broadly refers to the management and (self)regulation of racialised populations. However, in this thesis, the concept of racialised governmentality is articulated specifically through non-Europeanised populations within White ‘(post)colonial’ states. Hence, institutionalised Islamophobia is articulated as an expression of racialised governmentality. This conception combines a ‘post-colonial’ understanding of racism developed from contemporary literature on Islamophobia with (post)modern (Foucauldian) forms of racialised power. This fusion can be seen as an advancement that challenges, to some degree, both Islamophobia literature, but also theories of governmentality.

Thus departing from conventional understandings of Islamophobia,¹ ‘institutional racism’² and in some ways theories of governmentality,³ this thesis seeks to elucidate how Islamophobia is institutionalised in universities through processes of racialised governance. It approaches this question specifically through Muslim student engagements with their universities, including unions. This involved an examination of key university functions; namely, ‘ethnic’ monitoring data under the Race Amendment (2000), union politics and welfare/observance provisions. Thus, did not include student

¹ This refers to the Runnymede conception of Islamophobia; “the dread or hatred of Islam, and therefore, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (CBMI 1997, p.1) and its eight-fold typology. This is often used as a template for discussion (see for example Cook et al 2009).
² Macpherson defined institutional racism as “The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people” (Macpherson 1999, para 6.34).
³ Generally, governmentality refers to a specific ensemble of power that emerged between the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries which focussed on the (self)regulation of populations. Specifically, it can be defined as the ‘conduct of conduct’. It “entails any attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behaviour according to a particular set of norms and for a variety of ends”. In this sense, governmentality involves “an attempt to deliberate on and direct human conduct” including that of the self (Dean 1999, p.10-14; Foucault 1991). Governmentality thus always involves regulation and (self)governance.
learning/classroom experiences per se, staff perspectives, or a focus on curricular or research activities pertaining to Islam or Muslims.

Through empirical research, three key modalities have been identified (‘hyper-visibility’, ‘absence’ and ‘inclusion’) and brought together under the rubric of racialised governmentality. These modalities have been raised in some literature on Islamophobia, to varying degrees and through a range of conceptual apparatus, (CBMI 1997; Meer 2008; Sayyid 2010; Tyrer Forthcoming-e). Here they are recast and elaborated as expressions of racialised governmentality.

The thesis argues that institutionalised Islamophobia operates diffusely across numerous sites and is exercised quite comfortably (and sometimes quietly), within the (secular) liberal space of the university. This can be gleaned in, but not reduced to mundane bureaucratic procedures including ethnic monitoring, political/institutional processes, and ‘multi-cultural’ provision-making. To some degree, each of these spheres reflect the modalities of governmentality identified in the university. Hence, ‘absence’ refers to the invisibility of Muslim students as a recognised collectivity within the formal structures of the university (e.g. ethnic monitoring). Thus, it is argued, racism against Muslim students fails to be formally registered and remains trivialised at anecdotal levels. ‘Presence’ refers to the hyper-visibility of Muslim students as a troublesome ‘fundamentalist’/’extremist’ cohort (e.g. political/institutionalised processes). This is exemplified through numerous historical and contemporary sector and state interventions. ‘Inclusion’ refers to liberal multicultural practices that regulate Muslim student conduct. This is illustrated through university provisions and the way they function to minoritise rather than equalise the status of Muslim students.

What is highlighted throughout are the way these (bureaucratic) procedures both produce and are the product of broader normalising discourses that render Muslim students a problem community; a troublesome cohort and incursion in the traditional ‘white’ spaces of the university. However, each of these are not characterised as discrete or static ‘institutional’ modalities, but in their co-articulation (Venn 2006) as part of a broader and complex repertoire of institutionalised racism. The broader discourses of which these bureaucratic functions are a part, are key in understanding the mobility of institutionalised Islamophobia. This explains the distinction between institutional and institutionalised racism. Whilst the former is included in the latter, the latter is not reduced to the former (i.e. practices, procedures, processes). Institutionalised racism is better understood as the outcome of a White supremacist
order, that is not confined to institutions but symbiotic and part of a continuum of repeat victimisation (Williams 1985, p.330; Frost 2008, p.567).

In what follows, the thesis is located in its immediate field of research and it is made clear how it departs from this literature and why. The thesis is then placed in broader political context and situated within prevailing discourses about the liberal university. The chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis plan.

Following Macpherson’s report (Macpherson 1999) on ‘institutional racism’ there has been scant empirical or conceptual research on the way racisms function in British universities (two exceptions include Law et al 2004; Chan 2005). Further, with one exception (Tyrer 2003), there are to my knowledge, no studies to date on the way Islamophobia manifests in ‘white’ higher education institutions, nor on the way equality practices in universities, via the Race Amendment (2000) are panning out in view of Muslims. In terms of this lacuna, the thesis makes a significant contribution.

Academic research on Muslim students in Higher Education have provided some insight into the histories of universities and their adjustment to ‘religious trends’ (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.11); the ‘ethnic’ penalties associated with some Muslim entrants in universities (Modood 2004; 2006); and the lack of provisions for Muslim students in universities (Siddiqui 2007). Recent reports on Muslim women in Higher Education (Ahmad and Tyrer 2006) and Muslim student experiences in universities generally (Cook et al 2009), have assumed a more holistic approach, seeking to encompass broader social and institutional experiences beyond questions of basic provision. These reports have partially included student accounts of Islamophobia.

This thesis builds on this literature by focussing on the racialised experiences of Muslim students, and in particular the way these experiences are registered (or failed to be) within the institution. These experiences are framed by the concept of racialised governmentality. However, the thesis departs from most existing research in one key way. Rather than assume an ‘interfaith’ or ‘religion in Higher Education’ approach, it focuses on Muslim students as a racialised collective, not a ‘faith community’ per se.

The former approach generally typifies the approach to ‘Muslim students’ in universities and is reflected in Gilliat-Ray’s unique study on religion in Higher Education (Gilliat-Ray 2000; see also Siddiqui 2007, p.52). She identifies university types (e.g. ancient/collegiate, civic, ‘new’) as reflecting a spectrum of inclusiveness

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4 Whilst the binary between old/new universities is certainly relevant, the sector is no longer divided in these terms, but also by Russell group (research intensive) universities, the 1994 Group (a coalition of research led universities),
towards their ‘faith students’, with the former being most unaccommodating, the latter “most willing to accommodate diversity”, and the civic to be located somewhere in-between depending on its version of secularity (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.150). In this approach, the ad hoc status of provisions for Muslim students are articulated as part of a historical adjustment to Britain’s religious diversity, with which these institutions are playing post-colonial catch-up. This is considered part of a process of de-secularisation in universities that began in the nineties (ibid. p.143).

Gilliat-Ray’s insights into the histories of universities are particularly insightful because they aid us in contextualising the way different universities attend to their respective Muslim student populations. This typology certainly resonates in campus cases. However, in addition to the historical religious/secular idiosyncrasies of particular universities, over the course of the last decade, other equally decisive factors in the approach to Muslim students require equal attention. In particular, the racialised and problematised status of Muslims in Europe (Marranci 2004; Carr 2006; Parekh 2006). In this regard, the debate around Muslims far exceeds straightforward polemics about the status of religion within British Higher Education. This is largely because in confining the debate to the status and reconfiguration of religion in institutions, this sidesteps the racialisation of some religions, as opposed to ‘others’.

Thus, whether it be ancient universities founded within a largely monastic tradition or civic (redbrick) universities founded in opposition to the church, these differing foundations and their relevance today also requires an understanding of the contemporary status of Muslim students; something noted below and in further chapters. This is particularly so where processes of de-secularisation in universities have, in part, been disrupted by the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘death of multiculturalism’ (Allen 2007a). In view of this, Muslim marginalisation is placed within an anti-racist, rather than interfaith framework. This keeps in focus the racialisation of Muslims and locates questions of, for example, provision-making, within this frame alongside other political processes that have minoritised Muslim students.

This approach is deemed important for two key reasons. First, questions of religion and ‘religious discrimination’ in universities have not merited the same attention or commitment as ‘race’ equality agendas in the university. Religious
affiliations are largely conceived as a private, pastoral issue which have been relegated to university chaplaincies or student societies. Within this schema, racism against Muslims for example, has often been fudged with ‘interfaith dialogue’ considered an appropriate resolution. This contrasts significantly from the way racism, as conventionally understood against prescribed ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ groups, has been treated (in theory at least), with more seriousness (see for example Brown 2000, p.74).

Second, more broadly, this anti-racist framework is important in a context which has seen the rise of Islamophobia (CBMI 1997; 2004; IHRC 2000; Allen and Nielsen 2002; Fekete 2009; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010). It is perhaps even more important in a context which has seen numerous popular and academic attempts to refute or undermine the presence of Islamophobia. As Modood and Meer have recently noted, there appear to be numerous surveys that reveal a “discerning trend alerting us …to the widespread prevalence of anti-Muslim feeling” (Modood and Meer 2009b, p.337). However;

Such findings are frequently met with derision by otherwise self-avowedly anti-racist intellectuals or politicians who either remain sceptical of the scale of the problem or, indeed of its racial content (ibid. p.338).

Such refutations are often based on the illegitimacy accrued to Muslim identities (Meer 2008; Modood and Meer 2009b; Tyrer Forthcoming-b), particularly when compared with other ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ identifications. For example, in 2005, Kenan Malik argued that compared with the “vicious and visceral” racism against Asians in the 70’s and 80’s, there is “little sense of… [that] intensity of racism” towards Muslims today (Malik 2005).

Clearly, this comparison fails to acknowledge the contemporary brutality of Islamophobia (see for example cases in Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Ansari 2006, p.42-96). It also reveals an epistemic problem, since it eclipses the discursive and more subtle aspects of Islamophobia operating across Britain’s institutions (see also Meer 2008, p.79). Finally, it also hints at the way certain ‘Asian’ identities are considered more ‘authentic’ as identities that suffer racism.

This denial of Islamophobia can be seen to form a distinct meta-politics of Islamophobia; one that is caught up in a politics of recognition of Muslim identities and the racism directed at them. This contested status can be summed up in the observation
that whilst racism in Western European states is no longer publicly acceptable, in view of Muslims, Islamophobia is plagued by degrees of permissibility (Modood and Meer 2009b; 2010).

With this in mind, the discourse of Islamophobia in Higher Education is in a fundamental sense the same as it might be in other institutions or other contexts. It relies on the notion that Muslims comprise a ‘transgressive’ identity disrupting the ‘natural’ (hegemonic) racial order of White ‘post-colonial’ states/spaces. This logic can be traced in the British university. For after nearly two decades of public and political discourse about ‘Muslim’ identity in Britain, symbolised in the inclusion of a religious question in the 2001 national census, there has been little or no adjustment to university practices. Although intended as a device to assess equality practices, ethnic monitoring data has rarely reflected the inclusion of Muslim categories in spite of an awareness of a distinct Muslim student body. Instead, this ‘invisibility’ has been accompanied by a discourse of Muslim hyper-visibility marked by discourses of popular fundamentalism.

This paradox of (in)visibility can be traced in the dialectic which on the one hand refuses to name and attribute legitimacy to students who choose to identify as ‘Muslim’, and on the other, implicitly and explicitly codifies the way ‘Muslim students’ are registered, included and managed. This has affected the way Muslim students and their concerns are recognised. How this is played out in university contexts provides the (sub)text for the various chapters in this thesis. These are each concerned with the ‘hyper-visibility’, ‘invisibility’ and ostensible ‘inclusion’ of Muslim students in universities. Before outlining each chapter, the broader political context of research and its relationship to the thesis is explored.

1.2. Managing Muslims: A Context

Given that this thesis focusses on the racialised governance of Muslim students in universities, it is with some irony that in the ‘war on terror’, universities have been identified as “ungoverned spaces” (Nawaz and Husain 2010, p.32). This represents one of many narratives that the ‘war on terror’ has (re)-animated. It appears to relate to the assumed liberalty, freedom and autonomy of universities. Following the 7/7 bombings,

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5 This was asserted in a leaked report by the Quilliam Foundation, the government’s only Muslim counter-terrorist think-tank.

6 Others might include the “apparition of a benevolent Empire” (Gopal, Guardian 28th June 2006).

7 The London Bombings involved four separate attacks on London’s transport systems killing a total of 56 people, including the four bombers involved. Three of the bombers were reportedly British-born Muslims (BBC 2005). For academic critical analysis (see Pugliese 2006; Sivanandan 2006).
this narrative became increasingly pronounced. It was most prominently expressed in the argument that some Muslim students enjoyed the freedoms to pursue their own clandestine agendas (Glees and Pope 2005). As a result universities were charged with harbouring “extremist Islamic elements” (ibid. p.25), insufficiently managing student activities, and instead leaving campuses open to the ‘extremist problem’. Claims that Muslim student extremism on British campuses posed a threat were made with certainty. Although contested, these claims have been reported as fact; iterated in post 7/7 media reportage, (non)governmental reports, state guidance to universities, (Glees and Pope 2005; DFES 2006; see also Fekete 2009, p.107-108) and conferences (Rammell 2006). This perspective can be seen to “chime” (Glees 2005) with that of the states.

At the same time however, from within Higher Education, the state has been charged with advocating “unacceptably wide” regulations (Curtis and Taylor, Guardian 8th November 2005; see also Macleod, Guardian 11th October 2005; NATFHE et al 2005). These responses have emerged in view of proposed anti-terror bills which have been said to threaten academic freedoms, namely teaching content, the dissemination of materials and training that could be used to glorify or aid terrorist activities (AUT 2005).

This resistance has emerged amidst an overwhelming raft of counter-terrorist legislation (e.g. Terrorism Act 2000: Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Terrorism Act 2006) which has involved the institutionalisation of racial profiling (Kundnani 2009; Derfoufi 2010), and a state regime of surveillance (e.g. ID Cards, DNA databases, biometric technologies, electronic ‘tagging’), (Kundnani 2009, p.30; see also Fekete 2009, p.48).

In this context, the university sector has generally positioned itself as guardian of a liberal agenda, keen to preserve academic freedoms and maintain racial/religious equality against state encroachment (ECU/UUK/SCOP 2005; Macleod, Guardian 11th October 2005; NATFHE et al 2005; Muslim News, 24th November 2006). The very public ‘handbag’ war\(^8\) on the issue of ‘extremism’ on British campuses exemplifies this tension.

Yet, although presenting somewhat opposing perspectives, both the state and university can be seen to converge upon and reify a singular ‘liberal’ narrative about British universities. This warrants greater attention. The premise of this narrative is

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\(^8\) This refers to heated exchanges between Professor Glees and Vice-Chancellor of Sussex University, Alasdair Smith at the Royal United Security Institute (RUSI) in early 2006. This followed the Glees report in which numerous universities were (mistakenly) listed as harbouring Muslim students allegedly involved in terrorism. The report provoked anger amongst Vice-Chancellors (Fazackerley, Times Higher 27th January 2006).
widely circulated and based on a certain romanticisation of British universities as sites of liberal acceptance, toleration and social justice. These ideas are now deeply entrenched and can be gleaned more broadly in the fallacies of neutrality (Back 2004, p.1; Moghissi 1994), “myths of academic liberalism” (Law et al 2004, p.viii), constructions of the “genteel, educated and liberal don” (Back 2004, p.4), and “leftist tendencies” (Neal 1998, p.x) thought to characterise the sector. Enunciated by many, it explains why academics intimate an inevitable relationship between education and ‘anti-racism’ (Sheridan 2004, p.176) and why universities have been identified as the most ‘neutral’ spaces in which to have ‘community’ debates about extremism (Fearn, Times Higher 31st January 2008). It is also thought to explain the lack of scrutiny of racism in universities compared to other sectors (Law et al 2004, p.viii; Pilkington 2004, p.17).

This shared discourse needs to be revisited for several reasons. First, it is increasingly difficult to sustain the narrative that universities are indulging in a blind liberalism or comprise a politically neutral sector (see also CAAT 2010). In view of Muslim students, this has become apparent through the scope of ‘de-radicalisation’ initiatives in Higher Education. These have emerged in the context of the government’s revised counter-terrorist strategy; Contest 1 (now Contest 2\(^9\)), specifically ‘PVE’, (Preventing Violent Extremism) (HMG 2008). This is a counter-terrorist programme to depoliticise and reverse potential ‘extremist’ ideologies. Under this strategy Muslim communities in Britain have become a prime focus of government policy and surveillance. This can be observed in the tiered approach to counter-terrorism which acts upon the Muslim population through a ‘universal’ strategy, moving upwards to include ‘extremist sympathisers’ and ultimately ‘violent extremists’ (ACPO 2008; Kundnani 2009). This universal approach explains why Prevent funding has been apportioned to areas based on the size (not risk of individuals/groups) of the Muslim population (HMG 2009, fn 148 p.172). It also explains the recent installation of over 150 ANPR (automatic number-plate recognition) cameras in Birmingham’s Muslim populated areas to track Muslims entering and exiting neighbourhoods (Lewis, Guardian 4th June 2010). Some have argued, that in a similar fashion to earlier Irish communities (Hickman et al 2010), this has rendered Britain’s Muslims a ‘suspect population’ (Kundnani 2009, p.6; see also Mythen et al 2009).

\(^9\) This was initially developed in 2003 and elaborated in 2006 to ‘pursue’, ‘prevent’, ‘protect’ and ‘prepare’ against terrorism (see for example HMG 2009).
It is in this context that HE authorities have been identified as working partners in preventing extremism (HMG 2008, p.9, 68) and have become key sites of state/surveillance intervention. For example, of substantial PVE funds, a portion has been channelled through the DBIS (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, formerly DIUS; Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills), to ‘guide’ and support counter-terrorism ‘initiatives’ in educational institutions (Kundnani 2009, p.12). The DBIS has subsequently initiated work with Vice-Chancellors in various ‘problem’ universities (Nawaz and Husain 2010, p.31), including an increased police presence on some campuses. It has also assigned a dedicated Prevent officer (titled ‘interfaith advisor’) in the NUS (DBIS 2008; NUS 2010). “Information–sharing” between universities and various agencies, as well as “tension monitoring” in universities is a key part of PVE (Thomas 2009, p.3).

As noted earlier, counter-terrorist legislation has had direct implications for university staff, teaching and research (ECU 2007; Sabir 2008). However, there have also been many other related research projects taking place in the sector. These include Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) sponsored research into Muslim communities through social science funding bodies (Baty, Times Higher 20th October 2006; Keenan, Times Higher 9th February 2007),10 the direct sponsorship of various projects within universities,11 and reviews to ensure degree courses and Islamic societies are not disseminating narrow interpretations of Islam (Rammell 2006; Siddiqui 2007). In fact, Islamic Studies has been identified as a “strategically” important subject of national interest to which HEFCE has contributed £1 million (House of Commons, 2009). This has not gone unnoticed by Muslim academics in the field (Gilliat-Ray 2010, p.177). Nor has the appointment and training of ‘Muslim chaplains’ under the auspices of Prevent (Gilliat-Ray 2010, p.174-177; see also DIUS 2007; Khan 2009). This latter initiative appears consistent with governments ‘softer’

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10 JTAC was established in 2003 to research and assess terrorist threat levels. It is a collaborative agency working closely with MI5-6. This same agency came under fire in 2006 for its attempts to fund a research initiative through the ESRC and AHRB. This was intended, amongst other things, to “scope the growth in influence and membership of extremist Islamist groups in the past 20 years” (Baty, Guardian 20th October 2006). The multi-million pound project was postponed due to academic objection. Subsequent revisions were not considered sufficient given its focus to meet “specific Government needs” including those of its ‘US allies’ (Keenan, Times Higher 9th February 2007). Professor Jeremy Keenan is research associate in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

11 There are many universities in direct receipt of PVE funding for research and campus-wide projects. Some of these include Middlesex, Brunel, Reading, Wolverhampton and Cambridge (ENGAGE 2009; Suleiman 2009; TPA 2009).
approach to cultivating a ‘moderate Islam’. Broadly, this has meant sponsoring Muslim groups on the basis of theological criteria (Birt 2006a; b; Kundnani 2009, p.22).12

In addition, there have also been consultation meetings with Muslim students and Vice-Chancellors (Ebdon, Times Higher Letters 15th September 2006; Rammell 2006), the withdrawing/re-organisation of provisions for Muslim students and in some cases the regulation of Muslim dress (Mitcheson 2005). Amidst these interventions, there has also been a flurry of policy oriented activity focussing on ‘Muslim students’, hate-crime and ‘extremism’ (ECU/UUK/SCOP 2005; Glees and Pope 2005; Rammell 2006; 2008b; DFES 2006; Thorne and Stuart 2008).

Consequently, we can observe a tension between university commitments to racial/religious equality and Prevents (racial) profiling strategies. The vetting and surveillance of Muslim students through administrative procedures and teaching settings (DFES 2006; Sanders, Times Higher 20th October 2006) is one example. The complicity of universities in the false arrest of Muslim students, as discussed further in the thesis, has raised similar concerns.

The ambiguous ‘political’ role of universities alluded to above thus deflates the conception that universities are far too liberal (read tolerant, anti-racist) for their own good; and as implied, remain untainted by the ‘war on terror’. As Professor Geaves has stated, the ‘war on terror’ has “transformed [universities] from a “quiet backwater” to one where “we’re now in constant demand by policy makers, intelligence services and governments” (Gill, Times Higher 20th March 2008).

Yet this same ‘liberal’ narrative also belies racist practices in the sector. It is worth elaborating on this in view of research on the culture of racism in universities. A growing range of qualitative and quantitative research have pointed to racist/exclusionary practices in the sector (Carter et al 2000; Puwar 2000; 2004a; Tyrer 2003; 2004; Back 2004a; Connor et al 2004; Gulam 2004; Pilkington 2004; Sharma 2004; IES 2005, p.61-62; Siddiqui 2007). One phenomenon often cited for example is ‘snow-capping’; a reference to the ‘white’, male and middle class monopoly in the higher ranks of the university (Gulam 2004, p.9; Chan 2005, p.11-12). Others include racism openly espoused by academics (Macleod, Guardian 16th March 2006; Bennett, Guardian 19th November 2007); legal cases of racism against universities (Neal 1998, 12

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12 For example, the Quilliam foundation received approximately 1 million pounds in public monies for its ‘de-radicalising’ programmes in schools under the rubric of citizenship education (Kundnani 2009, p.26; IHRC 2009; HMG 2010).
p.xii; Baty, *Times Higher 22nd April 2005*; *Times Higher 8th September 2006*; Chan
2005, p.39-42); ‘Russell Group Racism’,\(^\text{13}\) significant pay disparities amongst
academics (*Curtis, Guardian 22nd November 2005*) and the consistently lower grades
awarded to ‘Black’ students compared to their ‘white’ counterparts (*Broecke and
Nicholls 2007*). These are just some cases that have attracted public attention, and most
of these pertain to academic staff and management.

However, whilst universities have been subject to increased attention on ‘race’
issues, the role of university unions, namely the University and College Union (UCU;
formerly the AUT, Association for University Teachers and Natfhe, National
Association for Teachers in Further and Higher Education) and National Union of
Students (NUS) are rarely subject to public or academic scrutiny. Unions seem to have
escaped our critical gaze with rare exception (*Sayyid, Times Higher 4th March 2005*).

Recent media articles however have brought the issue of racism in the NUS to
public attention. An independent inquiry into anti-Semitism followed the highly
publicised resignations of three Jewish students (*Berger, Guardian 15th April 2005*).
This was the first time an independent inquiry into racism in the NUS had been
conducted; although the inquiry rejected all eight counts of anti-Semitism put forward
(*Henry 2005, 9.1*). The Black Students Movement has also brought attention to a range
of racist incidents in the NUS including racist stereotyping and a refusal to adequately
accommodate Muslim students (*Gilbert 2008, Guardian 22nd August 2008; See in
particular the letter from NUS Black Students President in ENS 2008*). These cases
however barely reflect the complex history of racism in the NUS, particularly in view of
Muslim students. In the NUS, as with the sector generally, Islamophobia has been
clouded by a discourse on the ‘threat of Muslim fundamentalism’, elaborated in further
chapters.

This ‘cloud’ was highlighted at a conference held at RUSI (Royal United
Services Institute) in early 2006 about extremism and security on campus (*RUSI 2006;
see also Fazackerley, Times Higher 27th January 2006*). Its occlusion of Islamophobia
as a serious problem in favour of a focus on British National Party (BNP) racism,
Islamism and anti-Semitism, and animal rights extremists, led several Muslim speakers

\(^{13}\) For example, it is frequently noted that “There are more Afro-Caribbean students at London Metropolitan
University than at the whole Russell Group combined”. See (*Sims 2007; Tahir, Times Higher 31st August 2007*).
This has not prevented this university from allegedly breaching its equality commitments (*Ford, Guardian 9th
February 2006*).

\(^{14}\) The Natfhe Muslim Members Network emerged as an informal group in November 2005 amidst growing
Islamophobia in the sector (see NATFHE 2005; *Wajid, Times Higher 17th March 2006*).
to withdraw from the conference (FOSIS 2006b). This absence of meaningful debate on the discourse of Islamophobia in Higher Education represents a major blind-spot in any account of institutional racism in the sector.

As noted earlier, the refusal to name Islamophobia is itself part of the problem of Islamophobia. This is also reflected in recent cases of anti-Muslim hate-crime on British campuses. For example, when three Muslim students from City University were stabbed by a local gang following attacks at the university prayer-room, the university failed to name the incident as hate-crime, Islamophobia, or anti-Muslim racism. A number of other reports also covered the attacks in more muted terms, as “racially aggravated” and involving ‘Asian’ students (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010, p. 26-32). Students involved were clearly dismayed; “‘Asian students??’…’Come on! Let’s tell it how it is!’” (ibid. p.32).

Indeed, in spite of these indicators of racism on British campuses, research, including my own, suggests that its denial remains deeply entrenched (Back 2004, p.4; Gulam 2004, p.9-10). Instead, racism has been associated with the “inadequately educated” (Gilborn 2002, p.18). This displacement on to a working class ‘chav’ milieu has served to cloud university racisms and the popular discourses of racism espoused there (Housee 2007). Writer and academic, Martin Amis’s recent “thought experiment” signifies just one example;

The Muslim community will have to suffer until it gets its house in order. What sort of suffering? Not let them travel. Deportation - further down the road. Curtailing of freedoms. Strip-searching people who look like they're from the Middle East or from Pakistan ... Discriminatory stuff, until it hurts the whole community and they start getting tough with their children (Bennett, Guardian 19th November 2007).

Curiously, Amis’s defence was that he was talking about Islamism, not Islam and that his ‘thought experiment’ was an ideological (not ‘ethnic’) critique (Amis, Guardian 1st December 2007). He also maintained a distinction between a “definite urge” to punish Muslims, and its advocation (Lea, Guardian 12th October 2007); although neither of these explanations appeared consistent with his solutions for the collective punishment

15 The main reasons for this were that the conference was seen to promote a partisan agenda, which affirmed rather than debated the question of Islamist extremism on campus and conference organisers questioned the relevance of Islamophobia.
16 This account is based on student interviews conducted by the authors.
17 Martin Amis is Professor of Creative Writing at the University of Manchester.
of the ‘Muslim community’. Thus in keeping with a general trend that has refused to acknowledge Islamophobia (Meer 2008), questions of Islamophobia were translated into more acceptable terms.

With the exception of Terry Eagleton, (Professor of English Literature at the University of Manchester up until 2008), the silence in the academic community was notable (see however Meer and Modood 2010). Defenders of Amis failed to challenge his racist outburst (Bennett, Guardian 19th November 2007; see also Eagleton, Guardian, 10th October 2007; Hitchens, Guardian 21st November 2007; McEwan, Guardian Letters 21st November 2007). Following this, a debate was hosted at the University of Manchester, where Amis was reported to have rebuked the ‘Muslim community’ without challenge (Butt, Guardian 4th September 2010; Freely, Guardian 4th September 2007).

Besides exemplifying the very illiberal thought-experiment of a university staff member, this public debacle also attracted another observation; of a racism reconfigured which “does not want to exterminate ignoble savages, only to domesticate unruly Muslims” (Sayyid 2007). This is germane as it points to the way the ‘war on terror’ has (further) unleashed a cultural desire to authorise versions of ‘Muslimness’. As we see in the case of Amis, under the PVE agenda, and symbolised by the mushrooming of an ‘Islam industry’, regulating Muslims and their civic sensibilities has become ubiquitous. This reflects European/British anxieties about a Muslim presence (Parekh 2006, p.180) and as some have argued can be seen as bound up in the fear of Muslim political agency (Birt 2008).

However, racialised forms of regulation are neither unique to the ‘war on terror’, nor the sole purview of an increasingly ‘exceptional state’ (Hillyard 2009). As noted earlier, racialised forms of governance can also be traced through the various functions of the university. Indeed, the re-animation of the ‘liberal’ university in the ‘war on terror’ can be seen to obscure the routine ways in which Muslim students are managed and subject to institutionalised Islamophobia. How this is argued through each chapter is outlined below.
1.3. Thesis Overview

The key focus of this thesis, then, is to elucidate the complex ways in which Islamophobia is institutionalised in British universities. Based primarily on two in-depth case studies, it is argued that in view of Muslim students, institutionalised Islamophobia is reflected through three key modes of racialised governmentality; absence (Chapter Five), ‘hyper-visibility’ (Chapter Six) and (multicultural) inclusion (Chapter Seven). Divided in two key parts, the thesis first offers a conceptual mapping and literature overview (Chapter Two); a focus on the methods and methodological approach to research and the campus cases (Chapter Three) and a historical/political context to research (Chapter Four). The latter half of the thesis, Chapters Five to Seven, proceed to empirically account for the differing modes of institutionalised Islamophobia identified.

Chapter Two, Islamophobia, Racialised Governmentality and Institutionalised Racism provides the conceptual framework for the thesis. This is established through an assessment of literature on Islamophobia, white governmentality and institutional racism; in particular highlighting the way empirical research addresses key lacunae. Part One focuses on a more complex understanding of the way Islamophobia functions. Part Two extends the concept of ‘white governmentality’, initially proffered by Hesse (Hesse 1997), revising its scope under the rubric of ‘racialised governmentality’. Part Three engages with the concept of institutional racism. The final part of this chapter reviews literature on Islamophobia in Higher Education, highlighting some persistent concerns that tally with my research.

Chapter Three, Method(ologies) and the Campus Cases focuses on key aspects of the research process and rationale. Part One narrates the research journey, offers a comparison of the campus cases and outlines the key methods and sampling process. Following this, a sustained engagement with the category ‘Muslim students’ is offered before concluding with an overview of the ‘de-colonial’ analytic methodologies that frame the thesis. Part Two turns to a reflexive analysis of (my positioning within) the research and concludes with a comparative analysis of equality infrastructures in each university.
Chapter Four, *Hyper-visibility and the Racialised Presence of Muslim Students* serves as a prelude to further chapters. It charts the hyper-visibility of Muslim students in Higher Education through historical and contemporary context. Part One focuses on the accumulation of the ‘fundamentalist’ narrative in historical context and seeks to track the development and racialised logics of this discourse through several reports/texts in Higher Education. Part Two elaborates on the PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) agenda focussing specifically on ‘Muslim student’ experiences and university complicity in the ‘war on terror’.

Chapter Five, *The Absence of ‘Muslim Students’* is set in contrast to Chapter Four. Chapter Five seeks to illustrate the invisibility of Muslim students within the official registers of the university. This absence, it is argued, functions in various complex ways as another mode of racialised governmentality. Part One offers a broader mapping of the ways in which ‘Muslim’ students fall outside of traditional equality remits in the sector. Part Two problematises ethnic monitoring in the university and Part Three offers a detailed examination of the absence of Muslim students in the context of university complaints schema.

Chapter Six, *Space Invaders* returns to questions of hyper-visibility within the context of campus cases. Part One draws on various examples to highlight the ways students identified as ‘Muslim’ are racialised when they intervene or appear to operate collectively in union politics. Part Two narrates the disenfranchisement of Muslim students through close examination of one campus case. The chapter concludes by re-assessing the way racialised bodies are located within ‘white’ institutions.

Chapter Seven, *Multicultural Equality and Racialised Governmentality* considers the way Muslim students are ‘included’ in the university. Part One, addresses assumptions that universities are ‘too accommodating’ of their Muslim students. Part Two focuses on the types of discourses that emerge when students engage with their respective institutions on prayer-room provisions; how they are managed, and resisted, and what, when they are granted facilities, this means.

Chapter Eight, *Co-articulating Islamophobia* reflects on the thesis. It explores the way the modes of racialised governance discussed in each chapter co-articulate and
affect each other. For example how can we understand the simultaneous absence and presence of Muslim students in universities? And how does the formal absence of Muslim students tally with their inclusion? What these modes of governance have in common and what forms of Muslim identity they guarantee is discussed.

**Chapter Nine, Key Themes and Contributions** offers a broad overview of key themes and scope for further research. It concludes with a brief consideration of how advantageous data monitoring might be for the equality of Muslim students in universities.
Chapter Two

Islamophobia, Racialised Governmentality and Institutionalised Racism

Introduction

How is Islamophobia institutionalised in Higher Education and how does present literature aid or hinder our understanding of this inquiry? This chapter provides the theoretical basis for answering these questions by focussing on three key subsets of literature; ‘Islamophobia’, ‘white governmentality’, and ‘institutional racism’. In the debates that emerge, how Islamophobia is institutionalised in Higher Education is highlighted through the ‘absence’, ‘hyper-presence’ and regulated ‘inclusion’ of ‘Muslim students’.¹

The first part of this chapter thus begins by attending to debates within the literature on Islamophobia. This focuses on Islamophobia’s contested status, key weaknesses of the Runnymede definition, and the adoption of a position which frames Islamophobia as a more complex discourse, rather than grounded in ‘good’ or ‘bad’ representations of Islam/Muslims. This is followed by a summary of literature positing Islamophobia as a ‘new’ racism in which Muslims are subject to changing forms of racialisation. Although considered insightful, Islamophobia is (re)located within a much broader ‘cultural’ framework, in particular, as a distinctly ‘post-colonial’ racism that is characterised by its govermentalising function. Drawing on current literature, the contextual/theoretical specificity of Islamophobia and its significance to a Eurocentric racial order is elaborated.

This focus on the governance of Muslims leads us to Part Two which elucidates what is meant by ‘(white) governmentality’. This concept is then developed and recast in view of empirical research and engagements with relevant literature. Following this, the way Islamophobia has been conceptualised within theories of (post)govermentality are explored. These theories are understood both within the context of British politics as shaped by the contemporary ‘war on terror’, but also, against a range of other Foucauldian literature. Weaved together, these accounts are shown to converge on the normalising capacity of racism, and in the case of Islamophobia, a desire to Europeanise Muslims. This part concludes with a focus on the various ways through which racialised govermentality is exercised. In particular, its expression through liberal

¹ Muslim (students) refers to a political category further discussed in Chapter Three.
models of multiculturalism and the regulated inclusion it signifies in universities.

Part Three turns to the way ‘race’ statutory conventions also function as a mode of racialised governmentality, by protecting some racialised groups but failing to recognise or protect Muslims as Muslims. Here, Macpherson’s legacy (e.g. the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000) is identified as a key example of this, although one which has rarely been accorded significance in literature addressing Islamophobia. The consequences of this institutional ‘absence’ for Muslims is outlined in the context of (anti)racist practice in universities.

Following this, the limits of ‘institutional racism’ are explored in favour of a broader and contextualised understanding of racism as institutionalised. It is argued that the former obscures the multiple ways in which racism is articulated and ‘lives’ in institutions. This part then surmises the state of (anti)racism in universities generally and concludes by situating my own research within existing literature that has addressed Islamophobia in British universities.

Part One: Defining Islamophobia

2.1.1. The Emergence of Islamophobia

The precise emergence of Islamophobia as a concept is contested, with references ranging from 1913 (Vakil 2008, p.53) to 1991 (Poole 2008, p.215). However, it is generally agreed that the British Runnymede Report of 1997 secured its common usage (ibid. p.50, 53). It is in the aftermath of this report that we encounter a myriad of dismissive (Halliday 1999; Toynbee 2004; Malik 2005) and sympathetic critiques (Tyrer 2003; 2008; Forthcoming-b; Marranci 2004; Allen 2005; Meer 2006; Allen 2007b; Dunn et al 2007; Meer 2008; Modood and Meer 2008). It is within the latter literature that my conceptualisation of Islamophobia is situated and developed. That many of these accounts are preoccupied with defining Islamophobia can be understood as symptomatic of its conceptually weak legacy and contested status. In spite of this troubled history, the concept is retained within a revised perspective for reasons discussed below. Thus, two key points of discussion engendered by the Runnymede report are worth elaborating in view of my conceptual positioning. These include the definition of Islamophobia as the ‘irrational fear of Muslims’, and its typology of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views. We can also add to this the report’s formulaic definition.
2.1.2. The Problem with Islamophobia?

As a short hand term to describe “the dread or hatred of Islam, and therefore, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (CBMI 1997, p.1) the concept of Islamophobia has been contested on grounds of its very naming. Critiques centre on two interrelated counts; Islamophobia as ‘phobia’ (Furedi 2007; Reisgl and Wodak 2001, p.6 cited in Modood and Meer 2008, p. 38) and as criticism of Islam (CBMI 2004, p. 21; Furedi 2007). This has lead to alternative descriptors, for example ‘Anti-Muslimism’ (Halliday 1999, p.898) on the premise that Muslims are the object of racism rather than Islam. These objections have also been countered (Meer 2008, p.72; Modood and Meer 2008, p.39; 2010) and can be surmised in the assertion that Islamophobia “does have the virtue of indicating a degree of fluidity” between hostility towards Islam and Muslims (Brown 2000, p.83).

What is of concern however, is that both of these common refutations focus on an etymological discussion of Islamophobia to ascertain its definition. This, Sayyid argues, is misguided, since it is the usage rather than fixed etymological rules that determine the meaning of a concept (Sayyid 2010, P.13). The use of anti-Semitism to denote exclusionary practices directed at Jews rather than all Semitic language speakers is a case in point (ibid. p.90), as is Furedi’s acknowledgement that until the 1960’s homophobia referred not to prejudice against homosexuals, but a generic aversion to men (Furedi 2007). The problem with Islamophobia then is not a semantic shortcoming but the “contested terrain” in which it operates (Sayyid 2008, p.90). It is this terrain that explains why ‘Islamophobia’ is often beset by a desire for prerequisite typologies (Allen 2007b, p.27).

That Islamophobia did not sufficiently describe the phenomena it sought to name formed the key criticism in the revised 2004 Islamophobia report. However, as the chair of the report noted, they could not find “another better one word description”. (Correspondence with Dr. Stone, July 2008). Indeed, in spite of recent descriptors of ‘anti-Muslimism’, these are frequently deployed interchangeably with Islamophobia. This suggests that the two are now perceived synonymously (Allen 2007b, p.27) or at least as complementary (Fekete 2004, p.4; 2009). Re-naming Islamophobia may also prove difficult in light of well over a decade of activist and official usage (Allen and Nielsen 2002; FAIR 2002). This is particularly so if it marks a political vocabulary grounded in Muslim redress. This is apparent in Higher Education where in spite of
universities failing to adopt the term in official policy. Muslim students have deployed the term nationally (FOSIS 2003; 2005) and on individual campuses (Tyrer 2004; IHRC 2008b). Thus, in line with political Muslim usage, the term is retained whilst investing in it a revised conceptual framework, further outlined below.

2.1.3. Open and Closed Views

Another point of contention concerns the Runnymede typology of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views (CBMI 1997), also maintained in the revised edition. Hence “phobic hostility towards Islam is the recurring characteristic of closed views” whereas “legitimate disagreement and criticism...and respect, are aspects of open views” (CBMI 2004, p.22-23). ‘Closed’ views posit an essential difference between Islam and the ‘West’ in which the ‘West’ is civilised, superior and enlightened and Islam is monolithic, inferior, or ‘Other’. ‘Open’ views are considered to be those in which Islam is represented as diverse, dynamic, sharing common values, and where anti-Muslim discourse is challenged (CBMI 1997, p.9; 2004, p.22-23). Binding this typology is a distinction between reasoned legitimate views and an illegitimate ‘hatred’ of Islam; distinctions said to correspond with a paradigm of inclusivism and exclusivism (CBMI 2004, p. 23).

This typology has been identified as most useful in media contexts (Allen 2007b, p.7-8/18), and perhaps, at least partly, explains the relatively greater number of media-based accounts of Islamophobia (see for example, Poole 2002, Meer 2006, Moore et al 2008, Richardson 2009) as opposed to, other institutions. It has however, also been identified as limited in scope. Tyrer for example argues that this typology oversimplifies Islamophobia into “set patterns...and easily identifiable outcomes” making its “usefulness in supporting more complex articulations of Islamophobia...limited” (Tyrer 2003, p.56). It is this binary conception of Islamophobia that has led Allen to ask what a more ‘grey Islamophobia’ might look like, particularly in view of other institutions (Allen 2007b, p.7).

More recent accounts provide an indication of this, thus exceeding notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ representation. For example, Tyrer’s work contends with the recent bifurcation of Muslim identities in the official discourse of ‘Muslim moderacy’. His contention is that the figure of the ‘moderate Muslim’ does not transcend the discourse of Islamophobia, but actually functions as one of its key registers. In view of the

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2 Universities received the initial Runnymede (Vertovec 2002, p.24) and subsequent reports on Islamophobia (Ahmad and Tyrer 2006).
Runnymede definition that the ‘moderate’ is;

...supposed evidence of an improvement is partly a function of the faulty logics of dominant definitions of Islamophobia, which reify the distinction between legitimate criticisms of Muslims and Islam (Tyrer 2008).

This account of contemporary Islamophobia is important for it alerts us to the way ostensibly inclusivist discourses can function within, not outside of, racialised governance. Significantly, it departs from the Runnymede focus which centres on exclusive boundaries and hierarchies (CBMI 2004, p.24) and assumes that inclusion is about whether Muslims “take part in numbers commensurate with their numbers in the population” (CBMI 1997, p.32). This is of fundamental import in universities where procedures of inclusion have revealed discourses of White hegemony; a feature of Chapter Seven. Considering how ‘Muslim students’ are situated within ‘white’ institutions and what it means when they are ostensibly ‘included’ therefore requires an understanding of the “complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion” (Hage 1998, p.135).

The importance of ‘bad’ representations in Islamophobia certainly remains relevant as highlighted in Chapter Six. However, focussing on this dimension alone bypasses the complexity of Islamophobia and the various modes in which it is enacted. Here-in lies a key weakness of the revised Runnymede report. It fails to account for the changing shape of racism against Muslims, instead only focussing on the changing context (Allen 2007b, p.11). However, acknowledging this should not lead us to postulate that Islamophobia is becoming exclusively implicit or covert (Allen 2007a, p.126). Rather, Islamophobia’s changing faces should be seen to parasitically co-exist.

2.1.4. Islamophobic Discourse

Addressing the changing shape of Islamophobia arguably requires a paradigmatic shift. A more useful framework would exceed the “Runnymede baseline” of open/closed views and “accommodate subtlety, complexity, difference or implication” (Allen 2007b, p.24). In view of this, a “less constraining... new typology” (ibid. p.26) is not adopted, but an understanding of Islamophobia as discourse (see for example Tyrer 2003, p.62). Borrowing from a Foucauldian conception of discourse, this is defined as “structured systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects” (Howarth and Stavrakis 2000, p.3-4 cited in Tyrer 2003, p.62). This usage differs from
narrow understandings of discourse as speech/text (CBMI 1997, p.44) emphasising the way discourses are bound up in knowledge/power (Foucault 1972, p.49 see also; Hall 1997). My analytic approach in view of this is further elaborated in Chapter Three.

Here however, it is important to clarify why understanding Islamophobia as a discourse is important in this thesis. First, universities rely on an approach of ‘procedure, practice and process’ to detect ‘racial’/‘ethnic’ discrepancies. Whilst this is useful in discerning certain types of racism (e.g. ‘Pakistani’ students failing medical school), it reduces racism to a problematic of statistical significance. Consequently, this ignores the multiple ways in which racisms are (re)produced and institutionalised; and institutionalised as a by-product of these very procedures, as highlighted in Chapter Five. In this sense, the formulaic approach that dominates anti-racist practice in universities can be seen as part of, not separate from the problem of racism.

Second, understanding Islamophobia as discourse is useful as it enables us to understand the way racism can appropriate other seemingly neutral discourses. One example of this can be seen in the way liberal conceptions of secularism are harnessed in the racialised governance of ‘Muslim students’ as related in Chapter Seven. This approach therefore allows us to consider the various nodes through which racialised governance is enacted, including their “co-articulation”3 (Venn 2006, p.178) as discussed in the concluding chapter.

2.1.5. **Islamophobia: The New Racism?**

There are a number of post-Runnymede accounts of Islamophobia (Weller and Purdam 2000; Werbner 2005; Goldberg 2006; Fekete 2009). In the main however, attempts to conceptualise Islamophobia are often positioned along a spectrum of ‘cultural’ new/‘biological’ old racisms. Although there is a general consensus that Muslims do not solely suffer traditional forms of racism associated with ‘phenotypical’ difference, there is little consensus on what ‘cultural’ forms of racism mean in the case of Muslims. ‘New’ Racisms are understood to denote the displacement of traditional pheno-typical markers of ‘racial’ difference with those of culture (Allen 2005, p.51). However, recent contributions have noted that traditional elements of racism can also be seen in contemporary Islamophobia (Alexander 2000 cited in Tyrer 2003, p.64-65), that the

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3 Co-articulation indicates “the dynamic interaction between two or more discourses or practices such that the outcome or state of affairs in any one of them at any particular time is the result of their reciprocal effects” (Venn 2006, p.178).
old/new distinction is misleading (Dunn et al 2007, p.567) and that it fails to account for
the way biological racisms presuppose cultural racism (Modood 2005, p. 28-29).
Cultural racism it is argued, should not be viewed as a repetition of biological
inherentism (Barker, 1981 cited in Modood 2005, p.11; Gilroy 1987; Miles 1989, p.84-
87; Modood and Meer 2008, p.42) as some have debated (Werbner 2005, p.6) and
Rather, in its hybridity, Islamophobia has come to be seen as an “interactive” form of
racialisation (Modood 2005, p.15). Muslim identities are argued to be “corralled by
racialisation” but without ‘race’ (Dunn et al 2007, p.582/583) and are the ‘objects’ of
“racialised discourse” (Tyrer 2003, p.78), a process also subject to specific national

My understanding of the racialisation of Muslims is discussed further through
empirical example in Chapter Six. However suffice it to say here that racialisation can
broadly be understood as a process by which “racial meanings and identities are
constructed in racial formation” and can occur with “previously unclassified …practices
or groups” (Winant 1994, p.59 cited in Murji and Solomos 2005, p.22). This
understanding does not therefore presuppose the existence of ‘races’ in racist discourse,
but views racism as concerned with the production of racial and cultural categories
(Sayyid 2007). Here ‘race’ is better understood not as property or corporeal signifier of
the Other (Hesse 2007, p.654, 645), but as a relationship that is “definitive of
Europeanness and non-Europeanness” (ibid. see also Lentin 2008, p.493). This coheres
with the observation that “the problem of Islamophobia is unlikely to diminish until the
problem of…European identity is itself resolved” (Sayyid 2003, p.92).

In view of Muslims, this contingent understanding of racialisation is crucial
since it enables rather than forecloses discussions of racism. Racialisation makes
emphatic the notion of ‘race’ as caught up in a process with other modalities (e.g.
gender, class, space) (Rattansi 2005, p.272, 283, 288). It also veers away from the
assumption of racisms uniformity within institutions (ibid. p.280); something
highlighted in Chapter Six. However, my usage does not go as far as to displace the
usage of ‘racism’ altogether (ibid. p.290). The complexity of racism can be seen as
informed by processes of racialisation, which are critically explored, but this ought not
to blur claims of racism.

Whilst the cultural thesis of Islamophobia is useful in so far as it has directed our
attention to the changing symbolism of anti-Muslim racism (e.g. cultural markers), the
broader geopolitical relations of power within which Islamophobia is situated has often receded from focus. Arguably, the culturalist thesis ought to be subsumed within this broader scope. Indeed, that Islamophobia should not be confused with the ‘New Right’ racism of the Thatcher era (Gilroy 1987) is germane, because this racism was not really ‘new’ but steeped in colonial differentiations of (pseudo)assimilable racialised groups (Smith 1994, p.95; Modood 2005, p.27-28). Equally, nor should Islamophobia’s specificity be lost in the new ‘xeno’ racism, where it is dissolved into a post 9/11 state racism against all non-Europeanised immigrants (Fekete 2009, p.44; see also Kundnani 2007a).

Rather, Islamophobia as a cultural or new form of racism can be closely associated with the “era of decolonisation and the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises” (Balibar 1991, p.21 cited in Modood 2005, p.28). This brings us closer to a different ‘cultural’ conception of Islamophobia. In contrast to Eurocentric conceptions of racism which have privileged racism as biological doctrine, cultural racism can instead be conceived as “characteristic of the coloniality of western culture”, where it has “folded in to unremarkable techniques of social governance” (Hesse 2004b, p.21). This provides a useful starting point for the governmentalising accent of Islamophobia, further elaborated below.

2.1.6. Islamophobia: Governmental Racism and the Racial Order of Things

It is arguably the case that a significant feature of Islamophobia is its governmentalising function; namely the desire to discipline, regulate and control Muslim subjectivities. Islamophobia is therefore understood as a “governmental racism” (Hesse 2004b, p.26 n.15) or put another way, Islamophobia is understood as an expression of “racialised governmentality” (Hesse 2000, p.2/29 n.22; 2004b; Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.21). Broadly speaking, racialised governmentality can be understood as the management and (self)regulation of racialised populations. However, in the present context, it is employed specifically with regards to non-Europeanised populations within ‘white’ ‘(post)colonial’ states (ibid). Before elaborating on the concept of racialised

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4 Xeno racism is defined as an institutionalised non colour coded racism that “bears all the hallmarks of...the old racism” (Fekete 2009, p.43).
5 ‘Self’ has been included to emphasise the fuller scope of governmentality as postulated by Foucault. See (Dean 1999, p.10-14; Foucault 1991).
6 Other historically ‘non’-white majority states subject to Western colonisation or not (for e.g. China, India or Turkey) are worth exploring as other sites where racialised governmentality is articulated (see for example articles in Sayyid and Vakil 2010)
governmentality, it is important to understand why this aspect of Islamophobia achieves prominence in my conceptualisation.

2.1.7. Islamophobia in Context

There is a plethora of literature on Islamophobia that cite its emergence within formal colonisation (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006; Mignolo 2006). There are others that locate Islamophobia trans-historically, identifying every moment of Muslim marginalisation as Islamophobia (Sayyid 2010, p.16). One example of this is the crusades which has been identified as proto-racist (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006, p.3), or as another moment in Islamophobia’s history (Modood 1997b; CBMI 2004, p.7). The most commonly cited periodisation for Islamophobia however is colonial orientalism (Said 1978). Fekete for example, identifies Europe’s “virulent Islamophobia” as symptomatic of the internalisation of orientalism within Europe’s borders (Fekete 2008, p.5; see also Fekete 2009, p.193).

It is understandable that many associate contemporary anti-Muslim racism with what Said defined as orientalism. Orientalism refers to the way in which the Orient was constructed in essentialist inferiority as a function of western colonial management. This thesis hinges on the relationship between 'knowledge' of the Orient, and the mastery that is made possible because of it. Orientalist knowledge was produced and disseminated through the social sciences (e.g. anthropology) but also through 'non-specialist' works such as political tracts and travel writing. This specialisation in the Orient was “the necessary furniture of Empire” (Curzon 1915, p.191-192 cited in Said 1978, p.214).

However, this is where attempts that maintain the continuity of orientalism in Islamophobia flounder, precisely because, as Sayyid argues, they overlook the specificity of each context in which antagonism towards Islam/Muslims emerge. For Sayyid Islamophobia has to be related to the presence of Muslims in the contemporary world (Sayyid 2010, p. 17; see also Howarth 1998, p.282). Other commentators share these concerns about the contextual specificity of Islamophobia (Tyrer 2003, p.68; 2008; Forthcoming-b; Poole 2008; Birt 2009, p.218). Poole for example, argues that Islamophobia is not simply “an extension of previous forms”. Rather, there are a number of contemporary political factors that suggest Islamophobia is unique to a post-colonial era. The collapse of communism, the emergence of Islamism symbolised by the
Iranian revolution and Islamism’s association with the demise of formal colonialism have each led to western anxieties about its claims to hegemony (Poole 2008, p.215).

Sayyid surmises these factors as the ‘decentring of the West’, which has in turn given rise to ‘eurocentrism’. ‘Eurocentrism’ is;

A project to re-centre the West, a project that is only possible when the West and the centre are no longer considered to be synonymous. It is an attempt to sustain the universality of the western project, in conditions in which its universality can no longer be taken for granted (Sayyid 1997, p.128).

Eurocentrism is thus symptomatic of the provincialisation of Europe following the juridical collapse of Empire. It is also an attempt to maintain a particular universalised construction of western identity (Mcgrew and Jeff 2005, p.136; see also Mandaville 2001, p.66). Thus, Islamophobia is defined by the “violent hierarchy” between ideas of the West and Islam. It is conceived as a “response to attempts to erode the West/non-West framework” (ibid. p.91) Following Sayyid, Tyrer argues that Islamophobia comprises a “subset of eurocentrism”, and although it may certainly invoke traces of orientalism, is firmly located within a ‘post-colonial/communist’ narrative (Tyrer 2003, p.69,79).

Bound up in the desire to maintain western racial hegemony, Islamophobia can therefore be understood as (in)formal racialised rule in a period in which racial rule has been profoundly called in to question, although not dislodged (Winant 2001, p.99). Islamophobia is thus bound up in the “unfinished business’ of empire” (Kundnani 2007a, p.20) because it is tied into maintaining a western racial order. Thus although contemporary, it continues to be marked by the racialised hierarchies of Europeanness and non-Europeanness (Sayyid 2010, p.15). Understanding Islamophobia’s ‘post-colonial’ specificity is therefore key in identifying Islamophobia’s governmentalising impulse. It elucidates “racial Europe in postcolonial context” (Law 2009, p.197).

‘Eurocentrism’ can therefore explain the recuperation of ‘race’ within ‘post ‘race” times, most notably in literature keen to discredit Islamophobia (Tyrer Forthcoming-b). Here, ‘race’ forms “a marker of the modernity of the western ideological project and its mastery over various racialised groups” (ibid.). Indeed, that re-invocations of ‘race’ occur most forcefully in the face of Muslim identities suggests
that Muslim identities comprise a “transruption”\(^7\) (Hesse 2000, p.17) in a Eurocentric racial order. In this order, Muslim identities are ‘resistant’ even as they are the object of intense governance. The (in)direct charge of spoiling Britain’s multicultural equilibrium (Allen 2007a; Kundnani 2007b, p.26) is one example that suggests Muslim identities unsettle racial convention. Islamophobia can therefore be understood as a ‘post-colonial’ governmental racism in which communities previously designated as ‘ethnic’ have emerged qua ‘Muslims’. Islamophobic discourse thus construes Muslim identities as necessarily transgressive and illegitimate, thereby necessitating racialised governance. In this conception, Islamophobia cannot be understood outside of its governmentalising function as explored in the following section.

Part Two: Racialised Governmentality and Islamophobia

2.2.1. ‘White Governmentality’

Hesse provisionally articulates “white governmentality” as;

A preoccupation with government which valorises ‘whiteness’ in the conduct of European activities as the source of legislative culture and the conduct of the 'non-white/non-European' as variously a threat, a resource, a fantasy or an epigone to be regulated by that culture (Hesse 1997, p.100).

In this conceptualisation, ‘governmentality’\(^8\) and the legislative culture of ‘whiteness’ comprise two interrelated axes in which the latter’s hegemony structures ‘governmentality’. Governmental rationality concerns itself not with imposition but “the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (Foucault, 1991, p.93). Governmentality is therefore characterised by calculated tactic and “knowledge of its intended object” (Hindess 1996, p.106; Brown 2006, p.80). Thus following Foucault, Hesse does not refer to government in the “reductive statist sense” but in the “specific ways in which the conduct of individuals and groups might be directed”, structuring “the possible field of the action of others” (Hesse 1997, p.99; see also Dean 1999, p.10-16). Governmentality relies on a dispersed conception of power which does

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\(^7\) This refers to marginalised phenomena that refuse to be repressed and are “unsettling because any acknowledgement of their incidence or significance within a discourse threatens the coherence or validity of that discourse, its concepts or social practices” (Hesse 2000, p.17).

\(^8\) Foucault locates the ‘art of government’ in sixteenth century Europe where he identifies a transition from the institution of sovereignty to a range of disciplinary tactics directed through administrative techniques. In this transition, law recedes as a central mode of governance in favour of a focus on the welfare of populations, a ‘pastoral power’ made possible in the eighteenth century through the statistical visibility of the population (Foucault 1991, p.100, 192).
not rely on “established authority” (Butler 2004, p.52), although can certainly include it. Rather, governmental rationality is conducted across a number of (non)state, institutional and discursive registers including the popular and religious (Brown 2006, p. 81).

Within his theorisation, Hesse notes two strategies of ‘white governmentality’. The first can be described as “nationalist political rationalities” which rely on techniques of surveillance and classification, and affirm through representational strategies, the “crushing object-hood” of the ‘racialised other’ (Fanon 1967 p.106 cited in Hesse 1997, p.100). In Foucauldian terms, disciplinary power relies on the meticulous organisation of institutions (e.g. factories, schools) and bodies producing ‘docile’ subjects through the inculcation of routinised norms. As Hesse infers, discipline is central to the management of populations and achieved through surveillance, regimentation and classification. Disciplinary power is thus instrumental to and subsumed within government rationality (Hindess 1996, p.114, 117) focusing on individuals in their multiplicity (Foucault 2003, p.242) but also dovetailing in to what Foucault names ‘biopolitics’.

Whilst discipline centres on the body “producing individualising effects”, biopolitics is directed at governing bodies en masse on the basis of statistical measures (e.g. fertility, disease) (ibid. p.246, 249). It is centred on governing the ‘life’ of the population (Nadesan 2008, p.2). However, whilst discipline is central to institutions, it is not confined to them but functions more ubiquitously throughout society. Thus discipline is not always ‘institutional’, but nor is bio-politics simply confined to the state (Foucault 2003; see also Tadros 1998, p. 94-96).

Bio-politics can be traced in Hesse’s second strategy of ‘white governmentality’; “racist programmes of government”. These seek to regulate non-white populations via popular racist ascriptions (e.g. Muslim fundamentalism), in turn, limiting the mobility, status and visibility of racialised bodies (Hesse 1997, p.100). In these discursive and pragmatic strategies of ‘white governmentality’, ‘whiteness’ is valorised through the convergence of both discipline and governmentality.
2.2.2.  **Racialised Governmentality and Coloniality**

Hesse’s (re)formulation of ‘race’ with governmentality is concerned with the management of Black populations within White post colonial polities, rather than former colonies (Venn 2006, p. 62-72; Scott 1995). This is also evidenced in later works emphasising the routinisation of racial modes of governmentality within “political conventions of western culture” (Hesse 2004b, p.23). Hesse and Sayyid’s (re)formulation of the concept of ‘coloniality’ is imbued with similar sentiments. Coloniality describes “a governmental cultural form or social regulatory process, assembled in formal and informal practices of ‘racial rule’” (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.17) corresponding specifically with the movement of ‘others’ into the ‘West’.⁹

These contributions suggest that racialised governmentality in ‘post-colonial’ states are symptomatic of “the incompleteness of anterior decolonisation” (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.16-17); a recognition falling under the rubric of a ‘decolonial’ perspective (Hesse 2004b, n.15, p.26). The ‘decolonial’ marks “the incomplete process of decolonising in the West” and the “colonial continuity underlying postcolonial forms of racism in liberal democratic formations” (ibid. n.12). This perspective marks a distinct shift from the classical (cultural) ‘post-colonial’ agenda of the 1970’s characterised by Said’s *Orientalism*, to a broader (political) agenda considered to be “properly postcolonial” (Venn 2006, p.1; Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.19).

2.2.3.  **Racialised Governmentality and Islamophobia**

There are several reasons why the concept of ‘white governmentality’, in extended form, provides a useful framework for understanding Islamophobia in ‘white’ institutions. First, Hesse relies on a Foucauldian conception of power. This is important in understanding institutionalised Islamophobia as a diffuse discourse that is exercised across multiple sites with violent effect. However, whilst Hesse relies on this latter framework, it has also been important to include a dimension of power introduced in Foucault’s later work to account for the way racism also involves the modification of action by action, suggesting a more strategic exercise of power (Foucault 1982, p.789). In this sense, power always involves “acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action” (ibid. p.789). These two conceptions reflect Foucault’s earlier almost

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⁹ This is similar to the concept of coloniality espoused by Quijano, (Quijano 2000; 2007) and Mignolo (Mignolo 2000; 2007a; b). The coloniality project comprise a distinct group of scholars that reject ‘post-colonial’ critique because of its perceived Eurocentric limitations (see also Grosfoguel 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007).
disindividualised and pervasive configuration of power articulated through the disciplinary institution and his later conception, concerned more with government (e.g. the conduct of conduct), the subject and the fundamental freedom to act. Both of these dimensions are important to understanding racism in institutions because together they involve an identification of key local actors and sites of racist reproduction but also a more systemic understanding that does not reduce racism to a few ‘bad apples’.

From a Foucauldian perspective, it is the relation between both, rather than the emphasis on structural or agentic conceptions which is key (see for example Baez 2000).

Second, although Hesse’s focus arises in the context of racial harassment in British cities, it does not preclude British institutions. Rather, the “aegis of white governmentality” is seen to pervade “social and political life” (Hesse 1997, p. 100). Institutions are of course paramount to disciplinary power (see for example Walby 2007, p.94-96) and the site of the university is no exception (Foucault 1982, p.787; Schmelzer 1993; Grant 1997). Universities can therefore be understood as honing an array of disciplinary and pastorate technologies (i.e. techniques) designed to inculcate norms with self-regulating effect.

These observations however, make little sense without also acknowledging that universities are also “racialised” (Gulam 2004, p.8) and no less marked by the incomplete processes of decolonisation (Sharma 2004, p.106). This observation seems to have been obscured by narratives of post-war educational expansion (Neal 1998, p.18-25). Here, universities have been characterised as institutions that have become racialised because of a ‘black’ student intake.

The implications of universities as disciplinary and racialised institutions however, are nowhere addressed in governmentality literature. Rather, this literature on education tends to focus on examples of pedagogy and the inculcation of (self)discipline through ‘panoptic’ technologies (Hartnett and Howley 1992; Schmelzer 1993; Grant 1997), offering, if any, brief mention of the way ‘ethnic minority’ students may find it “more difficult” to be “good students” (ibid. p.105). Equally, literature on racism in universities, noted further below, rarely consider that universities comprise “disciplinary

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10 Of course, some have argued that these earlier and later conceptions represent irreconcilable tensions between the subject as an effect of power and the subject as capable of resistance (see for example Lewandowski 1995; Armstrong 2008, p.26). However, these are perhaps better understood not as opposing conceptions of power, but as dimensions of power that co-relate by locating the (racist or racialised) subject within networks of power that are both “constrained and enabled by the discursive frameworks which structure these possibilities” (Armstrong 2008, p.25). In this sense, there is always a “gap” which allows us to recognise the subject as simultaneously “constituted and constituting, both embedded and detached” (ibid. p.27).
blocks” (Foucault 1982, p.787) involving “panoptican-like” (Grant 1997, p.106)\textsuperscript{11} technologies. In sum, although both strands of literature consider, to varying degrees, the normativities and exclusionary dimensions of the university, neither consider how the university is at once a site of disciplinary/racialised power. This lacuna is illuminated in Chapters Five and Seven.

Following this, just as racialised governmentality includes ‘white’ institutions, it is also not peculiar to specific locales or ‘class’ strata (Hage 1998, p.210-211). This becomes apparent in Chapter Six where the criminalisation of male Muslim students traverse traditional ‘class’ boundaries, also finding mediation through gender inflected discourses. Indeed, ‘middle’/‘working’ class distinctions in Higher Education assume a particular relevance as they are implicitly reified, and charges of racism are often (dis)placed on to the ‘working’ classes. This can be seen as one route through which racialised governance maintains its efficacy and conceals its violence in ‘white’ ‘liberal’ institutions. In this sense, racialisation can be seen as part of a “metalanguage” (Higginbotham 1992 cited in Gunaratnam 2003, p.25) that is (in)visible “in its intersections with other social differences” (ibid).

Third, Hesse’s articulation of racialised govermentality focuses on the spatiality of ‘white’ domination and the illegitimacy of ‘Black’ ‘intrusions’ (Hesse 1997, p.89). He incorporates a central aspect of governmentality (Huxley 2008) within a racialised logic. In the literature on Islamophobia however, the racialisation of space is rarely discussed with few exceptions (Archer 2009) even in collections that purport to incorporate it as a central theme (Gale and Hopkins 2009, p.3 see also; Birt 2009; Modood 2009). Rather, it is literature on ‘race’/space within ‘white’ institutions (Puwar 2004b) and the spatialised dimensions of governance (Laguerre 1999) that provide more useful grounding for understanding Islamophobia’s governmentalising function. This aspect of governmentality emerges most forcefully where Muslim students are negotiating space or are rendered illegitimate within certain spaces on campus as elaborated in Chapter Seven.

Fourth, Hesse refers to the way popular racist ascriptions function to demobilise racialised bodies. By locating ‘fundamentalism’ within ‘racist programmes of

\textsuperscript{11} The ‘panopticon’ originally referred to an \textit{architecture of surveillance} that made it possible to substitute force with gentle coercion by allowing individuals to believe they were under constant surveillance (i.e. in prison) (Foucault 1977). However, it has since been developed to refer to a “set of practices” not necessarily bound by space (Lyon 2006, p.5) and more dynamic in process than Foucault originally theorised (Haggerty 2006, p.34).
government’, this departs from linear understandings of Islamophobia which have focussed on ‘fundamentalist’ representations. Instead, Hesse directs our attention to the way discourses of fundamentalism are harnessed to limit Muslim interventions, forming part of a much broader repertoire of racism. This is particularly relevant in Higher Education as Chapters Four and Six elucidate where racist ascriptions of ‘fundamentalism’ have loomed large and functioned to de-legitimise and (self)regulate Muslim student interventions.

There are however certain aspects of Hesse’s definition that require some development. First, echoed by Hesse, conventional accounts of governmentality focus on the visibility of populations as the basis through which they are governed (Murdoch and Ward 1997; Bonnett and Carrington 2000). Classifying populations has of course been central to the racialised hierarchies of (post)colonial racism (ibid. p. 490), particularly in the way they have functioned to perpetuate a ‘natural’ order of social relations (Goldberg 2002a, p.98; Said 1978, p.119-120). However, the focus on classification presents a conceptual difficulty suggesting that where there is an absence of classification (e.g. Muslim identities), there is an absence of racialised governance. As detailed below, ‘Muslim students’ do not comprise a formally recognised collectivity in the administrative functions of the university. Rather, they are immersed within ‘ethnic’ statutory conventions. However, the consequence of this is not an absence of racialised governmentality but its entrenchment through other means, as explored in Chapter Five.

Second, although Hesse refers to a ‘legislative culture’ of ‘whiteness’, legislation as such, or the ‘law’ is not addressed as a key mode of endorsing and naturalising this legislative culture. This is perhaps because ‘law’ has mistakenly only been associated with sovereign power, and precluded from its disciplinary successor (Hunt and Wickham 1994, p.62-63; Walby 2007, p.554). However, that racialised governmentality often relies on ‘law’ (and its equivalent) cannot be understated. As Foucault clarifies, although government is more about “disposing things...of employing tactics rather than laws”, it is also about “using laws themselves as tactics” so “ends may be achieved” (Foucault 1991, p.95). Modern assessments of power thus do not preclude ‘law’ from governance, but merely re-situate its significance.12 Further, its

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12 In this sense, governmentality should not be seen as the periodic displacement of one form of power over another (i.e. disciplinary/governmental power over sovereign power) but a “triangulation” (Foucault 1991, p.102) of differing techniques at specific historical junctures (Chappell 2006, p.317). This has been explicated in both colonial (Scott 1995, p.193; Venn 2006, p.67) and ‘post-colonial’ contexts (Butler 2004, p.54-61; Brown 2006, p.78-106).
contested status in contemporary governmentality literature has also meant a more expansive and non-essentialist notion of law (Walby 2007, p.562), through ideas such as “social sanction” (Tadros 1998, p.78).

Thus one will find that ‘law’ in its conventional and contemporary sense comprises a disciplinary and legitimising technology within the university. This can be traced in every mode of racialised governmentality identified in this thesis. Whether through statutory ‘race’ law (Chapter Five), union constitutions (Chapter Six), secular university charters (Chapter Seven) or through guidelines issued by Higher Education authorities (Chapter Four), the ‘law’ together with institutional codes, form part of a (tactical) rationalisation in managing Muslim students and questions of Islamophobia.

Third, although Hesse centralises the governmentalising function of ‘whiteness’, he also places racism in exteriority to governmentality rather than as constitutive of its logic. Hence, ‘white governmentality’ legitimates if not the deployment of racism then at least its cognitive rationale” (Hesse 1997 n.13, p.103). Certainly, the centrality of ‘race’/colonialism to the modern state are submerged in Foucault’s account of the biopolitical state (Foucault 2003, p.87-89; Stoler 1995, p.56, 60) leading to charges of a Eurocentric “self contained version of history” (Spivak 1988 cited in Stoler 1995, p.14; see also Young 1995, p.57). Here, racism is construed as a tool of the modern state that allows it to exercise the right to kill and make death acceptable in the face of internal or external threats (Foucault 2003, p.254-257). As Stoler puts it; Foucault’s focus is on the modern state and the emergence of state racism as a part of it. Racism is seen to be inscribed in the modern state through biopower (Stoler 1995, p.56, 84).13

‘Race’, like sex, thus assumes an adjudicating function in the regulation of populations (Dillon 2008, p.179).14 However, the centrality of ‘race’ in the bio-political state (Mbembe 2003, p.17) has suggested a more explicit role than perhaps hitherto acknowledged. Here the state is a ‘racial state’ which has from its inception been “invariably moulded in the image of whiteness (Goldberg 2002b, p.162 also see; Frankenberg 1997, p.8; Mills 1997, p.29-30; Bonnett 2000; Lentin 2008, p.491-492).

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13 Other theorisations consider (“white”) governmentality to be driven by the imperatives of global capitalism (Mclaren et al. 2000); a suggestion contrary to Foucault’s genealogical mode of thinking (Foucault 1972, p.162 cited in Olssen 2004, p.458).
14 The logic of bio-power in the ‘war on terror’ for example exemplifies the desire of the state to intrude upon and defend its citizens and ‘civilisations’ (Mutimer 2007, p.171); and the racialised governance, expulsion and spatial control of Muslims and others (Pugliese 2006, para 15; Williams 2007, p.191; Vertigans 2010, p.37).
Notwithstanding the statism involved in these accounts, ‘white governmentality’ is less a rationale guiding racism, but its expression. This point is not misplaced in the broader corpus of Hesse’s scholarship, where he later refers to ‘governmental racism’ to describe the way racist colonial practices have been “reconfigured in the postcolonial liberal democratic present” (Hesse 2004b, p.26, n.15). Here ‘white governmentality’ and ‘governmental racism’ become virtually indistinguishable. This reassessment is pertinent to Islamophobia which cannot be understood outside of its governmentalising impulse.

Finally, ‘white governmentality’ cannot be understood as solely concerned with the governance of black people in White polities as Hesse and others suggest (Lentin 2008, p.501 n.504; Hage 1998). Rather, as hinted in later works, it can also include the management of non-Europeanised populations (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.17). Clearly, in this context, ‘whiteness’ figures as part of a much broader assemblage or “chain of equivalence” (Rattansi 2005, p.282) of ‘white’ ‘modern’ European Christian secular identities (Sayyid 2004, p.156; Goldberg 2006, p.352, 354). Here, ‘whiteness’ is conceived as a ‘meta-language’ expressed through other discourses (e.g. secularism/democracy/the universal), as is reflected in some empirical chapters. Following this, ‘white governmentality’ ought to be understood as no less “scripting the behaviour of whites”, (Mclaren et al 2000, p.111-112) particularly those charged with crossing “white boundaries” (Franks 2000) or ‘race’ traitor-hood (Mills 1997, p107-108) as ‘white’ Muslims may be.

Given that governmentality is an inherently racialised form of power,¹⁵ it is better named racialised govern mentality.¹⁶ This is not to suggest that it operates with uniform effect since this would discount the “hegemonic formation”¹⁷ of ‘Whiteness’. Of course, the focus on ‘whiteness’ may well be subject to charges of historical (Cooper 2006, p.404-405) and ‘racial’ essentialism. However, to identify the valorisation of ‘whiteness’ is not to evade its internal specificity or contextuality, as others have made apparent (Bonnett 2000; Goldberg 2002b, p.171-173; Twine and Gallagher 2008, p.7);

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¹⁵ Goldberg argues that ‘whiteness’ becomes a state project through calculated design in the mid to late nineteenth century (Goldberg 2002b, p.176) roughly around the same at which Foucault identifies the bio-political state and its involvement in colonising genocide (Foucault 2003, p.257).

¹⁶ Hesse and Sayyid refer to ‘racialised governmentality’ in later works with reference to the ‘ex-colonial immigrant’ (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.21). This is due to be elaborated in forthcoming work.

¹⁷ Hegemonic formations are the outcome of practices that “involve the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common project” (Howarth and Stavrakis 2000, p.14). The capitalisation of ‘Whiteness’ in some instances, is used to reflect a hegemonic political order, rather than ‘racial’ attributes.
even as these internal boundaries are limited to sociological convention.\textsuperscript{18} Rather, it is precisely these localised specificities and the oft accompanied desire to ‘en-whiten’ \cite{mills1997,p.80-81; twine2008,p.18-19} that reveal its hegemonic expression. Although clearly not absolute, they exude the relative ‘stability’ of ‘whiteness’ \cite{howarth2000,p.15}.

Thus ‘whiteness’ is clearly not understood as an ontic category, but an “ontocolonial” one in so far as it has been produced in relation with its ‘non-white/European’ Other \cite{hesse2007,p.658}. Following this, whilst ‘whiteness’ can be discerned through an interplay of corporeality, space and privilege \cite{puwar2004b; ahmed2007a}, it must be seen to exceed communitarian possession \cite{hesse2007,p.654 see also mcwhorter2005,p.544-545}. This is especially if we locate ‘whiteness’ as a strategic relation(\textit{s})hip of (in)\textit{visibility} intrinsic to the workings of a ‘post-colonial’ racialised governmentality \cite{goldberg1996,p.181}, as highlighted in Chapter Six.

\subsection{Islamophobia and Racialised Governmentality}

The desire to contain and manage Muslim subjectivities can be traced in literature focussing on Muslims in the ‘West’ \cite{ismail2008}, Europe \cite{marranci2004; carr2006}, and Britain \cite{khan2006a; sayyid2010; mcghee2009}. Although very few accounts have linked governmentality to Islamophobia conceptually, there are two recent exceptions. First, in a context where the political mobilisation of Muslims has been construed as retrogressive, potentially reversing “the European story of Progress” \cite{birt2008,p.32 also see; goldberg2006,p.346}, Birt identifies governmentality as relevant to the management of Muslims within modern Europe. Islamophobia is defined as “an assimilative discourse that attempts to domesticate Muslims within the nation-state through the contrast between good and bad Muslims” \cite{birt2008,p.3}. According to Birt, ‘Islamophobic governmentality’ can be seen in various forms through coercion, reform and self-discipline to manage Muslim agency. One example is the state engineered self-discipline of a ‘post-islamist’ generation geared towards patriotism and liberalism \cite{ibid.p.34-6}.

Similar to Birt, Tyrer also contends with the recent bifurcation of Muslim identities in the official discourse of ‘Muslim moderacy’. However, his conception of Islamophobia is sutured to more recent contributions to (post)governmentality theory, \textsuperscript{18}This refers to internal boundaries typically deemed relevant (ethnicity, class and gender) \cite{garner2006,p.269} but which fail to account for the way ‘whiteness’ is also bound up in Europe’s Christian and secular distinctions.
most specifically with control societies (Deleuze 1992 also see; Hardt and Negri 2000, p.22-31; Lazzarato 2006). Control societies constitute a “new assemblage of power” which;

...in contrast to discipline...control extends outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks (Hardt and Negri 2000, p.23).

This assemblage works in tandem with the disciplinary binaries of modern racisms, but function along a more subtle spectrum of difference. Thus in contrast, Tyrer argues for “softer modes of alterity” where identities are integrated into a racial order and undergo a series of modulations (e.g. home-grown/foreign, moderate/extremist).

In this conception, Islamophobia is grounded not in difference but in “degrees of sameness” from the universal ‘white’ male and in the supposition that “Muslim histories should follow in the footsteps of white western histories”. It is this latter assimilationist and Eurocentric trajectory that Tyrer identifies as the “central trope of Islamophobia” (Tyrer Forthcoming-e). Significantly, in both Birt and Tyrer’s re-assessment of contemporary Islamophobia, assimilation to European norms is key. This has also become a recent point of discussion in literature which has made emphatic a ‘new integrationism’ directed at Muslim populations. Sensationalised in examples of failing to integrate,\(^{19}\) (Kundnani 2007b; Pilkington 2008), Britain’s communities are;

...ranked according to their inherent distance from British norms of civility...a distance perceived greatest in the case of Muslims (Kundnani 2007b, p.40).

These degrees of difference can also be seen more broadly in the “greater degrees of qualification” to which ‘ethnic minorities’ are now subject (e.g. citizenship tests, oaths and ceremonies, language proficiency) (Modood and Meer 2009a, p.439).

Although the assimilating dimension of racism has been refuted (Frederickson 2002, p.7, 40, 146 cited in Modood 2005, p.14,15), it forms a central feature of “racial historicism”; a mode of racial rule in which non-whites are seen to be “developmentally immature... not yet capable of self-governance” (Goldberg 2002a, p.92). It is premised on a “civilising imperative...of structured sameness”, which in contrast to the naturalist

\(^{19}\) For example, the much publicised case of Jack Straw refusing to meet a constituent wearing the *nigab*. See (*Toynbee, Guardian 17th October 2006*).
logic, is “assimilating and in the end integrationist” (ibid.). In this sense, what Tyrer and Birt identify in contemporary forms of Islamophobia (of White Eurocentric hegemonies ordering Muslim subjectivities) can be seen to epitomise the ‘historicist’ racism which Goldberg details.

However, one can also extend these observations in view of other accounts that reformulate racism within contemporary bio-political states (Shein 2004, p.7-8; Mutimer 2007, p.172-173). Why this is relevant becomes clearer if we understand discipline and regulation in its normalising capacity (Foucault 2003, p.253). As Dean relates;

A norm creates an equivalence in that all are comparable in relation to it, but it also creates differences and inequalities in so far as it enables each to be individualised and hierarchically ordered in relation to it (Dean 1999, p.119).

If we understand the norm to be ‘white’ and the model by which racialised ‘others’ are “disciplined to resemble” (Shein 2004, p.8) then both discipline and regulation (Mutimer 2007, p.168, 173, 177, n.132; see also McWhorter 2005, p.543) are key to racialised govermentality. Discipline and regulation can both be seen in the “panoptican-like” (Grant 1997, p.106) technologies of the university as Chapters Five, Six and Seven highlight. These technologies have often functioned to inhibit and mould Muslim subjectivities. Although neither uniform, nor consistently (or successfully) applied, they are central to racialised governmentality in the university.

2.2.5. Bringing it Home: Modes of Racialised Governmentality

It should never be forgotten that while colonisation, with its techniques of political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization ... on itself (Foucault 2003, p.103).

In spite of Foucault’s colonial preclusions, the intimate relation between colony and metropole does not go entirely unacknowledged. Although he does not expand on this observation, Foucault’s reference to the transfer of colonial models has been repeatedly made in the context of ‘post-colonial’ Europe. For example, it is argued that we “may be witnessing the introduction of typically colonial features in the West proper”
Balibar identifies “the persistence of administrative methods and habits” (Balibar 2004, p.39) derived from the colonies and deployed within western Europe.

This transposition is described by Veracini as “colonial transfer;” a process that involves the blurring of classic cultural and legal distinctions between metropole and colony (Veracini 2005, para 11). For Veracini, this distinction has been “progressively disarticulated” signifying the reproduction of coloniality in metropolitan contexts (ibid. 13). He identifies this reproduction in methodologies of social control, forms of warfare and the concentration camp, amongst others.20

What is of interest in Veracini’s account emerges in his conclusion. He hints at the insidious types of coloniality that inhere in “the entitlements traditionally associated with ‘whiteness’/citizenship”, such as discourses of citizenship, integration and multiculturalism that “often remain un-investigated” (Veracini 2005, para 31). Veracini is thus aware that the (re)production of coloniality within metropolitan settings does not solely rely on technologies of power derived from formal colonies.

As Mbembe reminds us, we are witnessing “new forms of colonisation…more insidious and totalising than previous forms”, yet which “continue to operate, often in altered forms...through different apparatuses” (Mbembe 2001, p.14 cited in Venn 2006, p.3-4). In addition to migratory restrictions (Meghee 2009), ‘containment’ (Goldberg 2002b, p.166), ghettoisation (Balibar 2004, p.41-42) and control (Veracini 2005, p.20, 22-23, 28), we can also identify other modes of racialised governance. These include liberal (Hesse 2004a, p.144) anti-racist discourses such as multiculturalism (Hage 1998), secularism (Razack 2008, p.145-172), toleration (Brown 2006), ‘diversity’ agendas (Ahmed 2007b, p.604) and ‘race relations’ (Furedi 1998; Hesse 2004a, p.144-145). These must also be registered in any conceptualisation of ‘racial’ governance. Many of these latter features however, remain submerged in the chameleonic codes of British post-colonial racial regulation. Operating in the subtext of ‘liberal’ discourses, they “subsist fraudulently” (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.17-18).

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2.2.6. Liberal Multiculturalism and Racial Governance

(Liberal) ‘multiculturalism’\(^{21}\) has been identified as one of the key “reflexes of European coloniality” (ibid. p.17). Symptomatic of an “unresolved post-colonial condition”, it signifies a mode of contending with the “social interiority of non-whites” (Hesse 2000, p.11). Following assimilation and integration, multiculturalism is identified as a liberal response to ‘non-white’ immigration (ibid. p.6-7). This transition from colonial to ‘postcolonial’ is articulated as the “politics of ‘race’ as empire to the politics of ‘race’ as nation” (Hesse 1997, p.92).

Critiques of liberal multiculturalism in other former colonial centres point to this same ‘reflex’ and emphasise the way multiculturalism is “an idiosyncratic manifestation of [rather than departure from]...colonial history” (Gunew 2004, p.43). Viewed as a “covert form of assimilation” (ibid. p.6) multiculturalism is narrated as “managing the seepage” of ‘ethnic’ Others (Bannerji 1990, p.146-147). It is seen as an apparatus of political subversion precisely because multiculturalism remains severed from anti-racist practice (ibid. p.43). De-politicised, it “remains at the level of song and dance” (Bannerji 1990, p.146 cited in Chanady 1995, p. 425; see also Kundnani 2007a, p.44). This critique is no less familiar in Britain where multiculturalism has been “excoriated for having nothing to say about racism” (Hesse 2000, p.8, see also; Brah 1996 p. 230; Werbner 1997, p.262), instead indulging in an ethnic parade of ‘sarisses, steelbands and samosas’, and more recently in ethnic “connoisseurship” (Hesse 2000, p.10 see also; Bhattacharyya 1998). This transition from aesthetic to ‘productive’ modes of multiculturalism is signified by the “marrying of cultural” with “economic value” (Hage 1998, p.128); the ‘business model’ for including others. This can be seen as a more insidious version of multicultural practice because it relies not just on the ‘fact of diversity’, for example, more black faces in ‘white’ institutions (Ahmed 2007a, p.164; 2007b, p.604; Bourne 2001, p.12), but on the governmentalising function of increased provisions which serve to conceal racism.

Liberal multiculturalism can therefore be seen to fall under the rubric of racialised governance where it “conceals experiences of racism” and “supports the hegemony of whiteness” (Ahmed 2008). This view exceeds the ‘cultural’ focus of multiculturalism to consider its governmentalising function. Hage surmises this in his thesis on “white multiculturalism”; a “fantasy of a nation governed by white people” in

\(^{21}\) For a discussion on the differences between *multiculture* as opposed to *multiculturalism* see (Modood and Meer 2009a, p.449-452).
which racialised others are objects of governance (Hage 1998, p.10). In his view, multiculturalist discourses mirror overtly nationalist racisms because they function as “another way of reinforcing white power” (ibid. p.20). This however, is often disguised by modes of tolerance which although appear egalitarian, “presuppose white control over what is tolerated” (ibid. p.87, 89).

In the context of universities (and Muslims) however, we are not speaking of multiculturalism as official policy but as ‘common sense’ practice (Bhattacharyya 1998). This can be seen in three key strands of multiculturalist governance that are framed through the awkward status Muslims have assumed in traditional multicultural schema (e.g. as gate-crashing an otherwise harmonious set-up) (Modood 2002, p.126-127). The first is dominant forms of secular egalitarianism that ostensibly guarantee no one special treatment (Modood 2002, p.124), whilst at the same time disavowing ‘white’ privileges. The second is where ‘Muslim students’ have been characterised as exceptionally demanding and universities as exceptionally benevolent (Rammell 2006). This is related to a post 9/11 multiculturalism, coding ‘Muslim’ (Parekh 2006) as divisive. The third is the way multiculturalism has been “recast according to security considerations” (Fekete 2004, p.4), a trajectory most closely associated with the retreat of multiculturalism and exemplified in the context of university prayer-room re-organisation and closures (Choudhry, Education Net, April 2006).

In the campus cases, the primary, although not exclusive, concern was the second of these strands. It is my contention that provision-making in my university cases cannot be located outside of racialised governmentality. Rather, the efficacy of racialised governmentality rests in its capacity to subsume within it an ostensibly inclusive anti-racist paradigm; in turn altering our understanding of how racism is institutionalised. Ascertained through the chameleonic codes of a racialised governmentality, it is within articulations of ‘multiculturalism’ that notions of tolerance, ‘good practice’ and institutional beneficence emerge as strategies in the management and regulation of ‘Muslim student’ subjects. This is highlighted in Chapter Seven.
Part Three: ‘Institutional Racism’, *Institutionalised Islamophobia*

2.3. **Post-Macpherson**

In addition to the various liberal modes of racialised governmentality identified, we can also add the (post)Macpherson era as significant. This is because paradoxically, whilst the acknowledgement of ‘institutional racism’ was seen to usher in a new form of anti-racist practice, it simultaneously maintained the institutional invisibility of Muslims with Islamophobic effect. This is elaborated below in the context of Higher Education.

2.3.1. **Muslims and Statutory Conventions**

This refusal to acknowledge Muslim identity as being a proper form of political identification, is perhaps one of the hallmarks of Islamophobia (Sayyid 2008, p.92).

Academics have recently become cognizant of a fundamental ‘clause’ in Islamophobia whereby the refusal to recognise Islamophobia is premised on the refusal to recognise Muslim identities (Sayyid 2008, 2010; Tyrer Forthcoming-b). As the story goes “if there are no Muslims...then there can be no Islamophobia”. Within this logic debates often centre on the in-authenticity and incompleteness of Muslim identities (Tyrer Forthcoming-b). However, it is the ‘voluntary’ aspect of Muslim identities that has been most commonly invoked in the context of ‘race’ law (RRA 1976).

In spite of the evolution of ‘race’ law over the past 30 years, and the prediction that Muslims would eventually comprise a ‘racial group’ (Jefferson 1983 cited in Meer 2008, p.70) Muslims remain indirectly protected in a complex web of “secondary legislation” (CBMI 2004, p.3). The status quo is thus characterised by a “hierarchy of protection and provisions afforded to different ethnic minorities” (FAIR 2002, section 1 no.6) and the perception “that some have a higher status of citizenship than others” (FOSIS 2003, p.4).

As Meer notes “the statutory formulation of ‘race’ and racism has not developed sufficiently to assist groups subject to cultural as well as biological racism” (Meer 2008, p.62). This ‘impasse’, it is argued, is bound up in the “normative grammar of ‘race’” (Tyrer Forthcoming cited in Meer 2008, p.63); a grammar which relies on the arbitrary

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22 Employment directives designed to protect religious minorities from discrimination were limited, not including for example areas such as education. They were also considerably weaker than the RRAA since they lacked a positive duty and legal aid for complainants (Meer 2008, p.70, n.30).
distinction between voluntary (religion) and involuntary identities (‘race’) (ibid. p.62).\footnote{This ‘grammar’ can be seen in all the ‘race’ amendments and was also invoked by political commentators in the law to ban incitement to religious hatred in 2005/6 (Meer 2008, p.63, 76).}

These statutory conventions deny the;

...possibility that a racial group might emerge in a social and political context in which it is objectified and degraded through signifying and material practices that interact in the course of the racialization process (ibid. p.71).

Instead, ‘race’ is upheld as fixed and natural and the social contingencies of ‘race’ and racism are denied (ibid. p.63, 80). It is ironic that denying Islamophobia relies on the naturalisation (Goldberg 1993, p.81) of a prior racial order even as it is claimed to be contingent. In view of the mushrooming of a ‘post-race’ tradition (e.g. the banal sociological acknowledgment that ‘race’ is socially constructed, not biologically determined); calls for its abandonment (St Louis 2002; Gilroy 2004; Nayak 2006); and the plethora of historical accounts concerned with the way ‘race’ has been deployed to order the worlds non-white/European populations (Goldberg 1993; Wolf 1997 cited in Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.14; Quijano 2000, p.534; Maldonado-Torres 2007, p.244), this is particularly problematic.

Failing the racial register, Muslims have thus become sutured within anti-racist machinery that has produced some enduring anomalies. As Malik points out in view of other ‘ethnic’ groups (Sikhs and Jews) granted legal protections, this has been denied to Muslims even when they fulfil the geographical and ancestral criteria outlined in the 1976 Act (Malik 2004, p.54, n.20). This has meant that whilst black Ethiopian, ‘white’ Russian and Lebanese sephardic Jews would be categorised as a specific ethnic ‘race’ within English law, other religious faiths are not accorded the same privileges\footnote{When BNP campaigns mobilised on ‘the Muslim problem’ and disseminated racist material, the London Borough of Merton was refused the right to prosecute on grounds that Muslims were not a racial group. This loophole was exemplified when the same BNP member pleaded guilty in the same borough for inciting hatred against Jews (Meer 2008, p.72).} (ibid. p.53).

There are many anomalies to be cited (ibid. p.56, 57, 77; Vertovec 2002, p.27; Weller and Purdam 2000, 5.3), however the most obvious is that within the confines of ‘race’ law, Muslims have limited recourse to claims of indirect discrimination and can only do so as a legally recognisable ‘ethnic’ group. Obliging Muslims to take these circuitous legal routes to challenge Islamophobia has, according to Malik, largely proved ineffective (Malik 2004, p.57). Moreover as elaborated below, these ‘race’
conventions can be identified as a key mode in the racialised governance of Muslims.

2.3.2. Muslims and Macpherson

The absence of Muslims in British legal terms is starkly played out in the Macpherson Inquiry. It is upon the publication of Sir William Macpherson’s report in to the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1999, that the British establishment acknowledged racism in British institutions after denying its existence for well over 30 years (Macpherson 1999). Echoed by many, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), described the Inquiry as a “defining moment for race relations in Britain” (Gentleman, Guardian 25th February 1999). Why this was the case lay in the milestone shift from individual prejudice to recognition of a systemic form of racism. However, in spite of being lauded as a “watershed” in history (Bourne 2001, p.8), it has arguably constituted a pivotal moment in the further institutionalisation of Islamophobia. As one commentator argued “All they have done is disguise the Muslim experience of discrimination” (Khan, Q-News March 1999).

Clearly, the emergence of ‘institutional racism’, later legally enshrined in the RRAA (2000) was not pivotal for Muslims even though it was considered a watershed for ‘Black’ communities. Whilst the legal amendments following the Inquiry were not a direct result of the report (Correspondence with Dr. Stone, July 2008), there was considerable consistency in who was to be included as a potential victim of ‘institutional racism’. Racism was defined in the report as a dis(advantage) to “people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin” (Macpherson 1999, 6.4). In spite of Muslim lobbying before (CBMI 2004, p.vii) and after (FAIR 2002 Section C, no.72, Section D, no. 112; MCB 2002, p.10), the inclusion of Muslims was seen to complicate the straightforward ‘racial’ parameters of the amendment, possibly even causing its failure to pass (Correspondence with Dr. Stone, July 2008).

Following Macpherson’s Inquiry, the ‘Parekh Report’ sought to rectify the Muslim omission by including Islamophobia within its remit (Parekh 2000, p.60-62, 265). However, this addition was not welcomed (Pilkington 2008), did not affect ‘race’ legislation and by this point appeared considerably weak in the face of a retreat from the establishment (Kundnani 2007b, p.33-34; Neal and Mclaughlin 2009).

Few bemoan the lost potential of the RRAA vis-a-vis Muslims (CBMI 2004,
calling for a Muslim equivalent in light of their experiences over the last decade (OSI 2002). However, the significance of the RRAA for Muslims in British institutions has largely been overlooked in academic literature focussing on Islamophobia. At most, the ‘race’ amendment is seen to reproduce the defects of pre-existing ‘race’ legislation (OSI 2002, p.388; FAIR 2002 section 1, no.7), a point also reflected in literature contesting the lack of formal Muslim recognition (Malik 2004; Allen 2005, p.52-55; Mcghee 2005; Meer 2008; Modood and Meer 2008, p.92-117). Even in accounts of anti-Muslim racism that lament the states retreat from Macpherson’s agenda, oddly, there is no reference to the exclusion of Muslim identities (Kundnani 2007a, p.131).

The ramifications of the RRAA (2000) in view of Muslims within public institutions have rarely been accorded significance. Nor has it been explored empirically or with specific institutional focus. Rather, accounts of Islamophobia have been quick to note other flashpoints, namely the Rushdie Affair (Vertovec 2002, p.25; Werbner 2002, p.257-258; Poole 2008, p.216) and more recently, 9/11 (Fekete 2009). Whilst these comprise significant turning points in the emergence, exacerbation and institutionalisation of Islamophobia, the statutory legacy borne out of Macpherson’s Inquiry has been eclipsed from view.

Other sets of literature also shed little light. Besides HEFCE’s commissioned reports (OPM 2004a), literature on the implementation of equality directives in Further (Turner 2006) and Higher Education, is both generic and sparse (Ahmed 2007b; Pilkington 2004). Whilst other research on ‘race’ in Higher Education has certainly provided much needed insight on the way ‘Black’ bodies are received within ‘white’ institutions (Puwar 2004b; Ahmed 2007a), this has not focussed on the status of specific racialised groups. Further, although some literature has explored the tension between ethnic classifications and racial equality in universities, this has been analysed in isolation from the broader concern of racism (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.492-497). Interestingly, research on Muslim students and Islamophobia, further detailed below, pay little attention to the ‘race’ conventions of universities.

In this thesis, these critiques of ‘race’ equality in Higher Education are extended in view of Muslims. In particular, it is argued that in a critical account of Islamophobia,

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25 The Equality Act 2006 was proposed to tackle a wide range of discrimination including ‘religion/belief’ However, there was no sector duty for public bodies to address Islamophobia (An-Nisa 2009).
the Macpherson ‘watershed’ actually denotes its unique entrenchment. Paradoxically, it marks another mode through which racialised governmentality is exercised, legitimating the transgressive status of Muslims. Thus, rather than signify an ‘impasse’ as noted earlier, the absence of recognition of ‘Muslims’ qua Muslims actually produces many identifiable consequences. Broadly, this means Muslim students fall outside of traditional equality remits. Specifically however, it has also instituted several failures.

First, the absence of ‘Muslims’ qua ‘Muslims’ within equality directives means that Islamophobia in universities is eclipsed. This statutory absence affects the way equality is delivered, the way Muslims are ‘included’ and the way ‘Muslim students’ are guaranteed a transgressive status; something highlighted in Chapter Five. Second, because Muslim student engagements with their universities are often rendered informal, exceptional or outside the scope of statutory law, ‘race’ assessments stipulated by the RRAA (2000) fail to account for these procedures. These would, in any case, only recognise ‘ethnic’ groups.

Finally, the extensive reliance on data monitoring categories naturalises the hegemonic racial grammar instituted by the state such that ‘Muslim students’ are understood in exclusively ‘religious’ terms, rather than a racialised collectivity. As my case study examples elaborate, this categorisation deflects questions of racism to ‘religious provisions’ or ‘interfaith dialogue’, consequently fudging racist practices. This is indicative of “secondary victimisation” (Hesse 1997, p.88) where the very spectre of racism is repressed and blanketed as a non-issue.

In sum, ‘race’ conventions and the hegemonic racial grammar they normalise are complicit in the (re)production of institutionalised Islamophobia, comprising a key mode through which racialised governmentality is exercised.

2.3.3. ‘Institutional Islamophobia’

The CBMI (The Runnymede Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia) include ‘institutional’ Islamophobia in their 2004 revised Islamophobia report. The uncritical adoption of Macpherson’s definition of ‘institutional racism’ however, conveys no engagement with a decade of post-Macpherson thinking. Instead of forming a “stimulus for further reflection” as the panel hoped, it employed the same definition (Parekh 2000, p.70). Hence, ‘institutional’ Islamophobia was thought to be;

…detected in processes attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination

This transposition is indeed curious given the report’s acknowledgement of the way Islamophobia has “specific features” (ibid. p.12), is steeped in “common sense” (ibid. p.7) and “left-liberal media” discourses, as well as in the “non-recognition of Muslims” (ibid. p.8). Like the Macpherson report, this inconsistency perhaps reflects its range of contributions, rather than academic interrogation of the concept (Solomos 1999).

This failure to depart from conventional definition can be seen in the few references to institutional Islamophobia that have emerged in the context of post 9/11 judicial changes e.g. ‘anti terror’ laws. Disproportionate police stop and searches for example have been identified as key indicators of institutional Islamophobia (Mcghee 2005, p.99), as have other claimed miscarriages of justice in the aftermath of the 2001 Northern Riots (Pilkington 2008 also see; Mcghee 2005, p.59).

It is clear from the scant literature on Islamophobia in institutions that there is a presumption that it can be detected and remedied in pre-set ways (e.g. fewer stop and searches, lenient sentencing). This formulaic approach however, assumes racism in institutions applies to racialised groups in the same way. This is peculiar because whilst racism is now recognised in its plurality, racism in institutions tends to be viewed in singularity. This re-affirms earlier discussions about understanding Islamophobia as a discourse that can merge and adapt to other discourses. It also suggests however, that we require a much broader conception than ‘institutional racism’ permits.

2.3.4. ‘Institutional Racism’/Institutionalised Racism

The idea of ‘institutional racism’ in Macpherson’s Report, in academic literature and as translated in university practices, each pose distinct problems that require us to rethink how we understand racism in institutions and beyond. This rethink arguably requires a distinction between ‘institutional’ and institutionalised racism. Thus, whilst ‘institutional racism’ is conventionally identified within the formalised functions of an institution (i.e. policies, practices and procedures, or as the Islamophobia report identifies, in “laws, customs or practices” (CBMI 2004, p.14), institutionalised racism far exceeds, although certainly includes, this bureaucratic terrain. It can instead be characterised by hegemonic norms, and the diffusion of racist discourses that span society generally, rather than institutions per se. It is also concerned with locating
racism within a much broader historical trajectory, rather than within the confines of a-historic institutional procedure.

The Macpherson report does minimally reflect this embedded aspect of racism through its acknowledgement of the “informal”, “implicit” routinisation of racism (Hall 1999, p.195). However, what Macpherson and his interlocutors fail to attend to is how racism has become institutionalised at all. As Hesse observed “the concept of Institutional racism had entered a public domain that had no specification of a history or cultural formation” (Hesse 2004a, p.131). It emerges in a historical vacuum remaining unlinked to any particular discourse in spite of the fact that historically, racism was institutionalised through Britain’s Empire. That Macpherson did not articulate “where it came from, how it got here” (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.26), resulted in a rather sloppy, more comfortable way of accounting for its presence. This, Hesse argues, has “undermined the debate about institutional racism” (Hesse 2004a, p.131).

The lack of a colonial specification in Macpherson’s account (Macpherson 1999 see 6.1 - 6.63) is indeed peculiar, especially given the reports reference to Carmichael and Hamilton’s text (ibid. 6.33), which stated that “institutional racism has another name: colonialism” (Carmichael and Hamilton 1968, p.5). Instead, the report contains more muted references to policing in a society no longer ‘white’ (Macpherson 1999, 6.20) and of a “19th century institution being dragged into the 21st century” (ibid. 6.61).

This omission can perhaps be understood as part of the ‘white amnesia’ (Hesse 1997, p.87) that mire discussions of racism generally. However, other literature are also beset by tensions reflective of the report (e.g. structure/agency, witting/unwitting, individual/collective) (for example Anthias 1999; Wight 2003, p.712) and sidestep the issue of coloniality altogether. In view of the misplaced focus of the report, Bourne for example considers the “symbiosis between institutional racism and state racism” (Bourne 2001, p.19-20) as key. Cole critiques Macpherson’s “a-historical” definition of institutional racism but then proceeds to consider it a “reality” from “the origins of the Welfare state” (Cole 2004, p.38, 35). Neither of these accounts explain how the state has acquired its racialised configuration.

However, if we identify institutionalised racism as a condition of coloniality located “in the obscured inadequacies of western decolonisation and the disavowed continuities of its liberal/colonial practices” (Hesse 2004a, p.144), it is difficult to maintain a narrow understanding of racism in ‘white’ institutions. Thus whilst institutionalised racism can be said to include narrow forms of ‘institutional’ racism,
that is, of the procedural variety, it also far exceeds these boundaries. Closely aligned with Essed’s conception of “everyday racism” it “transcends the traditional distinctions between institutional and individual racism” (Essed 1991, p.37). In the context of fieldwork these distinctions appear perverse because they sever “procedures from the people who make and enact them” (ibid. p.36).

These distinctions are however, maintained in the Macpherson report (Macpherson 1999, 6.15). They also imply, as Macpherson’s definition was keen to make emphatic, that institutional racism is the outcome of “un-witting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping” (ibid. 6.34). Unwitting racism is equated with the idea of unconscious and unintentional practices, where racism is ‘covert’ (ibid. 6.17). Although this understanding elides the multiplicity of racism in institutions, it has nonetheless predominated in accounts that maintain a distinction between individual (overt) and institutional (covert) racism (Carmichael and Hamilton 1968, p.4; Mills 1997, p.75). This is also echoed in the Parekh report (Parekh 2000, p.57-59), and in the 2004 Islamophobia report which suggests that occupational culture produces a subtle ‘hidden’ form of racism that is practiced routinely but is neither conscious nor intentional (CBMI 2004, p.14).

One outcome of these accounts is they produce a blind-spot where ‘overt’ racism in institutions is rendered exceptional in spite of its conventionality and conversely, ‘covert’ racism is assumed to be without intent. Clearly, this is misleading and obscures the way racism in institutions can be articulated in multiple ways. Hesse has argued that this understanding of covert is weak and better understood as concealed, disguised and “consistent in its…strategic affect” rather than unwitting and idiosyncratic (Hesse 2004a, p.144) as suggested by Macpherson. This better describes one aspect of institutionalised racism with which this thesis is concerned. Namely, the way in which racism is concealed through ostensibly democratic discourse and bound up in political strategy as narrated in Chapter Six.

Further, if institutionalised racism is the outcome of a White hegemonic order, this order is not confined to institutions but circulates through various sites, comprises of accumulative knowledge, and allows statesmen, intellectuals and citizens alike the

26 The ‘unwitting’ aspect of Macpherson’s thesis has since been identified as “political necessity;” an outcome of political “bartering” in the metropolitan police force (Murji 2007, p.851 see also; Parekh 2000, p.69-70). It is indeed paradoxical that the very definition of ‘institutional racism’ was itself determined by an appeasement of the ‘white’ establishment.
cultural authority to manage ‘Others’ (Hage 1998). To some degree then, all racism is institutionalised because it relies on ‘white’ group power (Essed 1991, p.40-41). In this sense, racism can be seen in a pattern of “culturally familiar and habitual lines of argument” (Wetherell 1998, p.400) not reducible to individuals but part of a broader discursive repertoire. These repertoires are of course are never static or always explicit, but change shape and appropriate other discourses.

Hence, whilst the need to make clear distinctions, for example, institutional/non-institutional or organisational/societal (see for example Mullard in Casciani, BBC 2009) is considered politically desirable, it is my contention that this obscures our understanding of racism and disguises the intimate relationship between forms and sites of racism. In this sense, the bureaucratic variety of racism that predominate accounts of racism in institutions cannot be divorced from broader ‘social’ accounts of racism. Institutionalised racism is thus better understood as symbiotic and part of a continuum of repeat victimisation (Williams 1985, p.330; Frost 2008, p.567).

This has been highlighted in fieldwork for several reasons. In particular in the way the weight of multiple institutions (state, intelligence, media) have come to bear on Muslim subjectivities within universities. Institutionalised racism thus accounts for the dialectic between institutions but also between spaces designated as ‘institutional’ and ‘non-institutional’. Institutionalised racism can therefore be understood to be directed at subjects operating in “zones of in-distinction”, beyond (but not excluding) disciplinary enclosures (Duked and Lausten 2002).

2.3.5. Institutionalised Islamophobia and ‘Muslim Students’ in Higher Education

Discussions of Islamophobia in education have largely attended to schooling (CBMI 1997, p.43-46; 2004; OSI 2002, p. 413-422; 2005; AMSS 2004; Richardson 2004; Van Driel 2004; Coles 2008; Shain 2011). This is perhaps a reflection of assumptions about the liberal and tolerant character of British universities (see Chapter One and Nine), particularly given increasing Muslim admissions in recent years (Modood 2004, 2006). However, there are growing indications of Islamophobia in universities (Weller et al 2001; FOSIS 2003; Tyrer 2003; 2004; FOSIS 2005; Ahmad and Tyrer 2006; Ansari 2006; Siddiqui 2007; Cook et al 2009).

Aware of an acute research gap, FOSIS aired their concerns in a report on Islamophobia in 2003 (FOSIS 2003). It cited negative images, union publications, attacks against hijabed women, bomb threats against prayer halls on campus and a lack
of provision within universities as key examples of the expression of Islamophobia (ibid. p.3). In terms of provisions, it highlighted institutional neglect, cultural exclusion, disregard on matters of prayer facilities, lack of access to a ‘Muslim chaplain’/advisor, catering halal meat, and lack of flexibility with regard to religious holidays and prayers (ibid. p.6). These factors have also been cited in subsequent research (OSI 2005, p.142; Cook et al 2007, p.17-23; Siddiqui 2007, p.12-13).

In the aftermath of the London bombings, FOSIS compiled a new report that went further in substantiating its previous claims. Conducting a quantitative survey with 450 Muslim students, they found that 47% of students (self)reported experiencing Islamophobia, and that 25% of these incidences had occurred on campus (FOSIS 2005, 1.3). The majority of respondents identified Islamophobia as ‘direct’ (77%) rather than indirect (22%), and as ‘verbal’ (68%) rather than physical (7%) or both (6%). 19% of respondents did not specify in what ‘form’ they had experienced Islamophobia (ibid.). These figures also varied by gender, with Muslim women reporting a higher incidence of Islamophobia on campus; a response also echoed in post 9/11 research on Muslim students (Appleton 2005a, p.303). This disparity is linked to the visibility of Muslim women in hijab, an issue also noted in teaching situations (Ahmad and Tyrer 2006 see also; Ansari 2006, p.14).

Although admittedly not a “full academic assessment”, FOSIS put forward the survey as a “base of empirical data”, directed at educational institutions (FOSIS 2005). They suggested that university and college authorities ought to investigate Islamophobic incidences on campus and allow students “accessible avenues” to report such instances (ibid. 1.3.2).

FOSIS’s findings have been supported with further insight in a report co-sponsored by the ESF (European Social Fund) and the University of Liverpool in 2006. It was argued that there were “ample reasons to believe racism persists” in the sector. “Institutional inertia”, and “subtle forms of institutionalised discrimination and favouritism”, were just a few findings to evidence this (Ahmad and Tyrer 2006, p.17-18). Broader institutional practices such as equal opportunities delivery, consultation, and Muslim representation within unions also affected student experiences (ibid. p.18).

Student experiences of equality infrastructures however, were not favourable. A number of issues cited included the university ‘fobbing off’ students to the union, equal opportunities remaining staff-centred, equality comprising of ‘cultural diversity’ rather than anti-racism, and a general “unwillingness to...address racism by name...exemplified
by the absence of any reference to Islamophobia in…policy documents” (ibid. p.20-21). Cook et al’s study echoed these findings when they noted that students felt that there was a “lower intolerance of Islamophobia…than …other forms of discrimination” and this was perceived to be a greater concern in higher rather than Further Education (Cook et al 2009, p.8). Together, what these reports indicate are the lack of an equality infrastructure that caters for Muslim student needs and a more acceptable culture of Islamophobia.

Attacks on Muslim students and prayer rooms have been widely documented in a range of media (Curtis, Guardian 11th July 2005; Rouse, Student Direct 5th December 2005; Buaras, Muslim News 31st March 2006; Choudhry, Education Net April 6th 2006; Manchester Metropolitan Students Union, 25th June 2006) and academic research (Tyrer 2004, p.44; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010). Islamophobic violence is also an issue taken up by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) (Ansari 2006).

Although rather polemical, and considered by the authors to be a “prelude to serious structured work on the issue” (ibid. p.2), the IHRC brought together some case studies that pointed to a broader range of Islamophobic discourse. Rather than focus on questions of provisions, the study featured cases where university management had been complicit in Islamophobia, and more generally where student political activity was considered unfairly regulated and repressed. One fundamental point however provides the sub-text for many of the cases; that claims of ‘extremism’ on campus were unsubstantiated, intrinsically racist and were deployed to stifle political expression (ibid.). This particular point resonates with my research, namely Chapters Four and Six, but also in other research (Tyrer 2003; 2004).

Muslim students were also noted as being subject to surveillance, MI5 pressure, as well as being detained (Ansari 2006). This issue has been raised in other research (Appleton 2005a, p.304; Hussain 2008) including my own. University complicity in state sponsored surveillance is, however, nowhere addressed in any literature, although has emerged in my research and is briefly discussed in Chapter Four.
In view of the aforementioned literature, claims that “it is highly probable that the perpetrators of racial violence are not aware of the religious affiliations of their victims”, (Poole 2008, p. 216) appear unconvincing. Many, if not all of these cases suggest that racism directed at Muslim students are not incidental, nor unwitting. Rather, they represent orchestrated attempts in which ‘Muslim students’ form the ‘object’ of repression and regulation. Together, this literature reveals some persistent concerns in Higher Education that tally with my own. Four key issues include; how the racialised stereotyping of Muslim students as ‘fundamentalists’ has been nurtured and institutionalised within the sector (Chapters Four/Six); the blanketing of Islamophobia as an institutional concern (Chapter Five); the regulation and repression of Muslim student activity (Chapter Six); and the way provisions for Muslim students are (in)directly related to all of the latter (Chapter Seven).

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter set out to identify key literature/concepts, elucidate their relevance and outline their shortcomings in view of empirical chapters. It is hoped that the relevance of each concept to this research is now clear. To summarise, Islamophobia is understood as a ‘post-colonial’ discourse defined by its governmentalising function. Its institutionalisation in universities has been identified through three key modes; ‘absence’, ‘presence’ and ‘inclusion’. The absence of Muslim formal recognition is understood as a hallmark of Islamophobia and a mode through which racialised governmentality is exercised. Macpherson’s statutory legacy is seen to exemplify this. In contrast, the equation of Muslims with fundamentalist discourse is identified as key in de-legitimising and curbing Muslim student interventions. This ‘hyper-visibility’ is understood to exceed mere ‘representation’ and is instead located within a broader repertoire of racism. Finally, ‘white multiculturalism’ has been identified as a mode of regulated inclusion. Hence, increased provisions in my campus cases are understood to provide a semblance of ‘anti-racism’ whilst concealing their governmentalising function. Underlining each of these modes is a more diffuse conception of racism which identifies a dialectic between (non)institutional spaces. This is consistent with an understanding of racism as an expression of routine liberal convention, symptomatic of the condition of coloniality. This theoretical framework can be seen to inform the analytical techniques and methodological backcloth to research. It is to the method(ologies) of research, we now turn.
Chapter Three

Method(ologies) and the Campus Cases

Introduction

The focus on institutionalised Islamophobia as an expression of racialised governance in universities is the culmination of a research journey that began in 2003. This journey is briefly narrated below as it reveals the progressive focus of research. The campus cases, their provisions for Muslim students and the key methods employed in fieldwork are then elaborated in some detail. Following this, my interviewees are briefly introduced before explaining the political conceptualisation of the category ‘Muslim’ students. This part concludes by summarising my discursive approach to the analysis of research material. Part Two turns to a political reflexive analysis of (my positioning within) research. Part Three concludes with an overview of equality infrastructures (and staff) at each university.

Part One: A Research Journey

3.1.1. From Muslim Identity to Institutionalised Islamophobia

In 2003, what began as a cross-cultural comparative study (Turkish, Pakistani, Iraqi) examining the religious identifications of Muslim women in Higher Education quickly turned into a gendered analysis of ‘British Muslim’ student activism in universities. This initial shift was largely precipitated by an increased politicisation of Muslim students on campus (Nabi Forthcoming) during the invasion of Iraq. The number of Muslim women participating in anti-war rallies\textsuperscript{31} for example, was notable. This revised focus certainly challenged orientalist caricatures of female Muslim victim-hood. However, it also led to an insight into ‘ummatic’ (Sayyid 2000) political identifications across British campuses generally. Although at the time, both of these strands comprised significant contributions to literature, they began to pale as research progressed.

In both research projects the university setting was to be the background against which Muslim identities/activism were to be explored. However, it was in the latter project that the institution began to acquire a more central focus. This was reflected in

\textsuperscript{31} For example, it was a female member of FOSIS that addressed the million strong anti-Iraq war rally on February 15\textsuperscript{th} 2003.
interviews where student experiences and the impetus behind activism at university were explored at length. This differed markedly from other research conducted around the same time which focussed on the political attitudes of British Muslim students at university (Appleton 2005a; b). Rather, key research questions included; Why are Muslim students actively engaging in political discourse, what are their concerns? What loomed large in student experiences was a discourse of Islamophobia that centred on misrepresentation and political marginalisation. In particular there was concern about how universities were (mis)handling student grievances and requests on routine matters. Exploring the impetus behind student activism thus morphed into a focus which considered the dynamics that emerged when Muslim students engaged with their respective institutions.

Each campus case had its own story that emerged across interviews. The two cases, Lomonde and Erdon, revealed distinct ongoing tensions, which preceded fieldwork but culminated in ‘resolve’ around the same time. The narratives flagged up on both campuses led to a more specific focus on the varying ways Muslim students were being managed within universities. In particular, these involved protracted dialogue between students and management on prayer-room facilities but also the way one university was involved in the disenfranchisement of Muslim students in union elections. The issue of Islamophobia in both of these cases emerged through (my interpretation of) student accounts. However, it was the liberal and conservative responses of university management, in particular, that directed my focus towards questions of racialised governance as an expression of Islamophobia.

Yet, this new focus did not emerge without cognizance of three key factors; the way throughout the nineties, ‘Muslim students’ had been identified as perpetrators of ‘fundamentalist’ violence in universities (CVCP 1998; Tyrer 2004); relatedly, the scarcity of literature on Muslim student experiences of Islamophobia in British universities (Tyrer 2003; 2004); and the lack of research on the way racism against Muslims functioned within universities, rather than upon application (see for example Modood 2004, p. 90; 2006, p. 249). My particular research converged upon and addressed these multiple voids. However, this focus was also prompted by a broader political context where state policing of Muslim communities was generating alarm.

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32 Students were involved in varying campaigns/fundraising initiatives on campus e.g. the invasion of Afghanistan/Iraq, Palestinian self determination, Fair Trade initiatives, anti-religious discrimination.

33 These are pseudonyms.
amongst those same communities (MCB 2004; An-Nisa 2009; Kundnani 2009). Paradoxically, it was this explicit form of governance which led to questions about what more routinised forms of racialised governmentality might look like in educational institutions. However, even in this exploration it was impossible to compartmentalise state/university interventions vis-a-vis Muslim students since state agendas were increasingly informing routine university matters (see Chapter Four).

Thus a closer engagement with institutional accounts enabled a more lucid perspective on various modes of racialised governance. The research journey thus settled on a project that focused on how Islamophobia was being institutionalised in Higher Education institutions. Guided, in part, by interviews, three key modes of racialised governance (‘absence,’ ‘presence’ and ‘inclusion’) were identified, in turn shaping the empirical chapters of the thesis.

3.1.2. The ‘Cases’

Fieldwork began in June 2004 at the annual FOSIS conference and ran through the following year up until November 2006. This conference formed a sampling springboard that helped establish a pool of potential cases. Students interviewed in this pilot research assumed key roles in the Muslim student movement. These initial interviewees were informative because of their insight into key issues affecting Muslim students on their respective campuses and within national networks. Thus, what initially informed campus selection was not the campus per se, but the activism of Muslim students who happened to study there. This later changed with the broadening of sample types, and subsequent reduction of focused case studies. Universities were reduced from five to four in November 2004 and then subsequently to two in mid February 2005.

Given that the sample was never intended to be representative of Muslim students in Higher Education, it was not considered methodologically unsound to reduce the number of focused cases (Mason 1996, p.90-93). As the research focus developed, the expansion of sample types to include union/university officials was deemed imperative. In turn, the case studies were reduced to allow for depth of analysis. Campus selection was thus grounded in the development of research questions and consolidated after extensive campus profiling.

In terms of campus selection, there were multiple factors considered when making this decision. These included university/campus type, facilities for Muslim students, equality infrastructures, institutional culture, degree of Muslim student
engagements, and student concerns on each campus. It was important that the campus cases were similar enough for comparison, but different enough to highlight the varied positionality and ‘success’ of student interventions, as well as differing institutional approaches to their Muslim student populations. Thus, Lomonde and Erdon were both institutions with a significant Muslim student cohort and large Muslim communities in their locality. They also both revealed varying degrees of dialogue with their Muslim students, notably on prayer-room issues. In contrast however, whilst Lomonde’s open campus could be broadly characterised (at face value) as liberal, progressive, developing a wider equality agenda and home to an active cohort of Muslim students, Erdon was a closed campus, conservative, limited in its equality agenda, and Muslim students did not enjoy a political presence in the union. Rather, they appeared to be actively marginalised. A sustained comparison of these institutions is further elaborated below, and an assessment of their ‘race’ equality infrastructures is detailed in Part Three.

3.1.3. The Case Institutions and Muslim Students

Lomonde

Situated in a large cosmopolitan metropolis with several other ‘new’ universities, Lomonde enjoys a prestigious reputation. Its campuses are numerous and sprawled across the city. The centre of this university campus is in close proximity to sizeable Muslim communities.

Lomonde has a strong history of student activism. For Muslim students however, the 90’s in particular, however, marked a turning point in their activism and greater participation in campaigns such as anti-racism. The ISOC has been described as ‘legendary’ in this regard. Having undergone several organisational upheavals the society has also involved numerous female activists. The activism of this society is thought to have attracted many Muslim students to the university.

Students at Lomonde classified from a home ‘ethnic’ background have risen over the years; a likely result of the universities expansion, but also of the inclusion of EU ‘BME’ students in its monitoring statistics (Lomonde Race Action Plan 2008-9).

At the time of fieldwork, the Muslim student population was difficult to gauge since Lomonde did not collate this information. However a figure of 2000 had been proposed by the president of the ISOC in 2005 (Interview; Yunus 2005). Muslim students on this campus were notably engaged with their union, assuming a significant
number of official union positions. Their established presence on campus however has not entirely translated into more or better provisions as further detailed below.

**Provisions**

In October 1989, the University of Lomonde granted Muslim students a small temporary prayer-room. However, as the Muslim student population grew, it became less viable as a prayer space. Subsequently, students were housed in a number of places, serially being shifted on and off campus. At one point students were using a shed at a local mosque before temporarily relocating to the top floor of the students union. Eventually this space also reached full capacity and students were at times praying in corridors. In the mid nineties requests for a larger space on the same floor were turned down by the union under ‘anti-discrimination’ policy. Instead union executive passed a motion which led to the displacement of prayer space and Muslim students to an abandoned building on the edge of campus. They argued that maintaining a ‘Muslim space’ in the union compromised the rights of other students. This solution was endorsed by university management who claimed no responsibility and reminded its students that it was a secular institution which could fund no religious group. Although students relocated to the edge of campus, this was not without major objection. Individuals in the ISOC threatened the union with court action. Unable to financially sustain this endeavour however, the case was withdrawn. Students remained in this building up until 2004, when amidst university re-structuring, students were again displaced. Throughout this period, students remained in formal dialogue with the university in the hope of securing and self-funding a permanent facility. However, after more than a decade, the university finally conceded to fund a permanent prayer facility at the edge, or as some students perceived, off campus.

The history of halal food provisions at Lomonde is equally patchy. It was only some time after fieldwork in 2007 that chefs at the university received comprehensive training on how to prepare halal meat, some two years after it was introduced as a refectory option. Up until 2005, halal food was not available in the main refectory, although the university had a sizeable and active cohort of Muslim students who had intermittently raised the question of provisions in the union. Students were also known to have been campaigning in early 2000 for halal provisions in several halls of residence. It is only in late 2005 when the university underwent significant re-structuring, that it adopted the halal resources of a nearby university. However, this was
nowhere advertised and reflected in the fact that a number of students frequenting the union were unaware that the refectory was providing halal food.

Questions of exam/coursework exemptions have also revealed some discrepancies. In the late nineties Muslim students had, for at least five years, been requesting exemptions from religious holidays in line with provisions for Jewish students. These were eventually accepted under the proviso that holidays would be authenticated by an imam. This practice was eventually phased out, but notices advertising exemptions warned that only *legitimate* religious requirements would be accommodated. Many students, although otherwise active on campus, were unaware this provision existed.

The university’s chaplaincy housed various denominational advisors, one of which was partly funded for international students. At the time of fieldwork, there were no ‘chaplains’ for Muslim students. Two ‘chaplains’ were appointed some time in 2008.

**Erdon**

Erdon is a popular university. Situated in a leafy quarter of the city, it is comprised of two enclosed campuses. Those identified as ‘BME’ students however, have decreased, albeit marginally, over the course of the decade.\(^{34}\)

At Erdon, it was not till the late eighties that the ISOC underwent political upheaval with the increased activism of a group of young ‘British Muslims’. Prior to this, the ISOC was managed by a group of post-graduate international students who were considered politically ‘inactive’ (Interview; former student 1989-1995, Khalil 2006). This new group of students voted Muslim members into the union and later secured the expansion of the existing box-sized prayer-room.

The Muslim student population at this university is also difficult to gauge since university reports subsume predominantly Muslim ‘ethnicities’ within other categories. A conservative estimate of 1,000 could be made based on *jumma* congregations and ‘Asian’ student figures provided by the university. Muslim students on this campus were less politicised compared to their Lomonde counterparts. Their official political presence in the union was minimal, although prayer facilities were housed there. In 2004/5, the ISOC were showing signs of increased activism although as case studies in

\(^{34}\) ‘BME’ entry rates were misleading since university reports noted that a number of BME undergraduates discontinued studies (*Race Equality Annual Report 2008*).
Chapter Six narrate, this was quickly curbed. Relatedly, members of this ISOC were involved in pressing the university to overturn their disenfranchisement in the union.

Provisions

The prayer-room at Erdon has been a relatively secure facility within the union building. Since early 2000 however, concern was expressed at whether the prayer-room ought to be relocated or expanded. This was in view of the lack of ablution facilities which had for some time generated complaints from Muslim and other students. It was, however, three years before university management commenced dialogue with students, around the same time a Muslim chaplain was appointed. Many university proposals were considered unviable by the ISOC. The most pressing issue at Erdon was not the question of funding, but the title to the prayer-room. This was also reflected in other incidents involving the union’s violation of prayer space.

Muslim students faced considerable antagonism from their union. In opposition to an extended facility, the union preferred to re-house students in the basement in spite of its unsuitable location next to a nightclub. Like Lomonde, they argued that an expansion of ‘Muslim’ space was unfair and discriminatory to others. After much contention, the prayer-room committee reached resolution when the university agreed to extend the existing facility with an ablution area as an interim solution.

In terms of halal food, there was one facility in the main union campus which offered students limited provisions. However, this service was withdrawn and not replaced. Religious exemptions at this university were in place at the time of fieldwork and policy appeared far more accommodating than Lomonde. Exemptions were, however, bound up in circuitous bureaucratic procedures. Although the university adopted a faith calendar, religious observance policy was not consistently practiced and varied significantly between schools.

Erdon did accommodate a ‘Muslim chaplain’. This post was entirely voluntary and fulfilled through off-campus contact. The chaplain fulfilled a diverse spiritual, and pastoral role, often compensating for the lack of union and university support in addressing Islamophobia on campus.

The focus on these campuses did not preclude an interest in others. In this regard, an ‘instrumental’ rather than ‘intrinsic’ case study approach was employed (Stake 1995, p.3). Hence, it was the issues these universities flagged up, rather than the universities themselves that were deemed significant. Thus, interviews on other
campuses, as well as with national student bodies (NUS/FOSIS), were also conducted as a means of verifying broader trends. Other reports (FOSIS 2005; Ahmad and Tyrer 2006; Ansari 2006; Cook et al 2009) were also useful in this regard.

3.1.4. Key Methods: Interviews, Participant Observation and Chance Encounters
In sum, there were a total of 66 interviewees.\(^{35}\) This included 41 Muslim students (See Appendix D/E), 14 university staff, (including university management, staff with an equality/welfare remit, and academic staff), 9 union officials, one former FOSIS member and one staff member from the ECU (Equality Challenge Unit)\(^ {36}\). Dialogue with some interviewees were maintained to keep abridge of local developments.

Interview schedules were developed in accordance with each sample type (See Appendix C)\(^ {37}\) and underwent revision accordingly. Consent forms were administered prior to interviewing, as was permission to record interviews (See Appendix A). Not all interviewees were happy to be recorded and in such instances, responses were written and summarised immediately post-interview. Some student interviewees expressed an interest in interview transcriptions and these were provided. All interviewees and institutions were accorded anonymity.

Supplementary to interviews, participant observation was also conducted. The use of participant observation however, was restricted for a number of reasons. First, at the time, it was not thought to be advantageous in terms of my initial research questions. Given that the research was concerned with why Muslim students were actively engaging in political discourse, it was considered limited in terms of providing substantive insights. It was thus only used to connect specific data generated by interviews. Thus, there were only three occasions where participant observation was conducted. These were all off-campus student conferences/meetings and enabled a better understanding of political dynamics in the student movement. Hence, participant observation was selective and always followed up with interviews. This partially explains some of the sequential interviews (See Appendix D). Second, this limited use was an attempt to veer away from largely ‘exoticist’ ethnographic formats (Fabian 1983; Appudurai 1988; Asad 1990; Abu-Lughod 1991; Narayan 1997), that have

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\(^{35}\) Technically 74 interviews were conducted since 8 of these were sequential interviews. This does not include E-interviews or those cited as ‘anonymous’. See Appendix D.

\(^{36}\) The Equality Challenge Unit was established in 2001 to support and guide Higher Education institutions in their equality commitments.

\(^{37}\) Interview schedules devised for staff with an equality remit were compiled with some guidance from the anti-racist tool kit developed by the Leeds ethnic and race team (See Philips et al 2002).
traditionally relied on racialised distinctions between self/other, and are now being replicated within ‘post-colonial’ settings (Trouillot 1991; Puwar and Raghuram 2004; Pugliese 2009, p.13-14).

Finally, resistance to this mode of enquiry must also be seen in light of my own researched status as ‘Muslim woman’. Besides the orientalist gaze through which the ‘Muslim woman’ has historically been captured (Yegenoglu 1998; Kahf 1999), my resistance to the voyeuristic pulse in ethnography also comes from my own experience as a Muslim academic being endowed with ‘object’ status (see also Karam 2002). Curbing this mode of enquiry must therefore be seen in the context of ongoing power relations and a refusal “to replicate voyeuristic scholarship” (Hutnyk 2006, p.79).

However, participant observation conducted in the project did provide insight into the nature and degree of institutionalised Islamophobia pervading student unions. One NUS conference in particular, exposed me to the way the presence and political engagements of Muslim students were ‘racially’ amplified and often met with contestation. In hindsight, it was therefore valuable in its own right.

In addition, there have also been numerous ‘non-formal’ methods (Law 2004) such as private conversations, e-mail correspondence, and chance meetings that have contributed to this research. The varied use of ‘secondary’ sources such as documents, have also been important. ‘Documents’ included university ‘race’ policies, action plans, annual/complaint reports, ethnic monitoring data, meeting reports, exemption and news circulars, union articles and constitutions.38 Print and web media, government and university reports, as well as those published by Muslim bodies themselves, have also been useful in terms of the consonance and dissonance they produce both amongst themselves and vis-a-vis interviewee accounts. It is misleading therefore to assume that although certainly large in number, interviews comprised the ‘primary’ mode of researching Islamophobia. Rather, it is better to understand the thesis as informed by an interactive constellation of ‘methods’.

It is worth elaborating on the status and relationship between these forms of inquiry. University documents in this analysis assumed a significant ‘sounding’ board against both student and institutional accounts. This is not because they were approached as value-free or neutral texts through which biases in interviews could be measured (Meyer 2001, p.339), but because quite significantly, documents presented a

38 Local police were contacted for ‘hate-crime’ statistics on campus, however information provided was too limited to be of any use.
key part of the way the institution sought to represent itself. Nearly every member of staff interviewed would direct me to a document of some kind to reflect evidence of their claims but also as examples of ‘good equality practice’ (monitoring statistics, ‘race’ objectives). This trail of documentation (Ahmed 2007b) thus formed an extension to institutional narratives. Documents thus acquired supplementary status and were often assessed in view of institutional accounts/student experiences (e.g. how consistent were they with institutional practices and student experiences?). However, documents often assumed a dual function since on the one hand, they disorientated other texts, as they rarely cohered with either student or institutional accounts and reflected a disjuncture between paper policy and institutional cultures. On the other hand, many documents also exemplified the disciplinary technologies of the university (e.g. prayer-room minutes, complaints reports, monitoring statistics), and in this regard were useful in suturing together the varying ways racialised governmentality was seen to function.

In terms of interviews, student accounts generated key interview agendas for the institution. Student accounts also often assumed a form of argumentation, (which I at times facilitated), with institutional narratives, since issues raised by students would be pursued in interviews with staff members and vice versa, to gauge perspectives on the same concerns. This process not only indicated how and whether ‘student’ and ‘university’ accounts corresponded but also how student concerns or grievances were translated, articulated or registered within the university. Within this process institutional accounts subsequently acquired greater critical attention, because this was seen to be the site which revealed the way racialised power was exercised. However, this only presented one part of the story as it became clear that the effects of racialised governance (i.e. self-regulation) were equally significant. Different stages in the research process thus brought forward or demoted each mode of inquiry; this was not a static process and unfolded in line with greater conceptual clarity.

3.1.5. The Interview Sample

In view of the refined focus of the thesis, the ‘sample’ was necessarily purposive (Mason 1996, p.100). Thus rather than treating ‘the sample’ as a pre-informed and independent stage in the research process, it was integrated into the research process and

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39 Alternatively when certain aspects of the institution did not reflect favourably, I had to pursue some documents (e.g. complaint reports).
subject to periodic review. This worked particularly well as interview patterns emerged and it became clear that other interviewees would be useful. There were two key groups of interviewees that made up the sample: 1. Students identifying as Muslim; and, 2. Union officials, university management, staff with an equality remit or involved in student welfare/complaints, and other academic staff.

Locating interviewees was a variable process. In terms of my ‘primary’ sample, students were located using different starting points in various stages of the fieldwork. A snowball sample was initially used since a systematic random sample was neither attainable nor desirable. Students from both campuses were contacted via the ISOC through notices in the prayer-room and via email. Requests for ‘British’ Muslim students ‘involved’ and ‘active’ in campus life yielded a number of forthcoming respondents. This method generated the majority of my interviewees. Interviews conducted with this range of students were also useful in directing me to contacts on the periphery of society circles. Although this sample was marked by exceptional diversity (See Appendix E), there was an organisational bias (e.g. ISOC).41

The organisational sample skew did not present a problem of representativeness (as it was never intended to be representative), but of comparison. That is, the sample was considered somewhat limited because it did not allow for a comparative assessment of those students not involved with the Islamic Society. Thus, in a sample re-assessment in May 2005, a broader range of students were pursued, although with little success.42 There were three categories of students that were deemed comparatively insightful: Muslim students from other ‘cultural societies,’ (e.g. Malaysian), students from other political groups (e.g. Stop the War) and students that did not belong to any society or grouping. It was expected that students who did not privilege their Muslim identity may emerge in these groups.

There was however a curious lack of response from these societies. This may well be because ‘(British) Muslims’ constituted a minority in these societies, as was confirmed by many union officials. However, the political climate may have proved a dissuading factor with some students not wishing to openly identify as ‘Muslim’. There was no way of verifying this, without spending a significant amount of time in each

40 The case universities did not monitor the religious background of their students.
41 The organisational prominence in my sample partially relates to the way formal political power is structured on campus, (i.e. various student collectives), and the way the university engages these ‘representative’ groups.
42 Efforts to locate other students through interviewees, the union, mailing lists and other forums yielded only one interviewee, who turned out to be a member of the ISOC. These notices were worded differently, calling for British students who were of ‘Muslim heritage’.

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student society, or through social gatherings; something not possible within the time constraints of research. The need to expand the initial student sample however, was also reflective of an earlier research agenda, in which political activism assumed prominence. Therefore, the existing cohort of interviewees remained significant for the views and experiences of racism they disclosed.

Most interviews were conducted in quiet locations on campus; either in union offices, or departmental rooms. Rapport with interviewees was established early in interviews when eliciting basic information about their background (see Appendix B). Students were, with some exception keen to relate their experiences. This was also reflected in the length of time shared, with interviews typically exceeding one and half hours, and some nearing twice that length. This largely depended on how reflective they were of their experiences in universities generally, but more specifically, varied according to involvement in student politics and experiences of Islamophobia.

Interviewees also typically assumed a shared understanding. This resulted in some basic but nonetheless valid questions being met with astonishment. For example, when asked ‘do you think the umma exists?’ students often look puzzled and responded categorically with ‘of course’. Expectedly, some students were also prickly about questions of identity. One student for example retorted he ‘didn’t care’ about such classifications, another wondered why ‘British Buddhists’ had little currency. These students had spent most of their adult life confronted with questions about who they really were and where their allegiances lay (see also Seddon 2004, p.141; Appleton 2005b, p.185-186).

Interviews with the ‘secondary’ sample were conducted midway through research. These became more significant as my research agenda shifted towards the institution. Establishing appropriate contacts posed no difficulty however, there were issues with accessibility. There was a general reluctance from university management and some staff with an equality remit to be interviewed. Requests would often be deferred under the pretext that there were more appropriate people to be interviewed or they would be ignored. This was perhaps due to discomfort in dealing with potentially sensitive issues. Of those interviewed, I was typically asked who else I’d interviewed. There was also some hesitancy about being recorded. This was often assuaged with assurances of anonymity, but also by consent forms which noted the research funding body.
At Lomonde, two Muslim members of staff at the university were interviewed. At Erdon, one Muslim member of staff was interviewed. In hindsight, it may have proved insightful to interview more ‘black’ and Muslim (academic) staff on each campus. It is possible that these staff members would be privy to student concerns and relate a perspective of the institution not available to students, nor aired by ‘white’ staff. Interviews with ‘white’ senior staff in particular schools (e.g. medical schools) may have proved equally informative. Who and how my ‘primary’ interviewees were identified is further explored below.

3.1.6. ‘Muslim Students’: a Political/Politicised Identity

Of the 40 Muslim students interviewed, they varied in terms of age, gender, ‘ethnicity’ (See Appendix E). The majority were British born undergraduates; many with parents hailing from Pakistan and involved in some way with their respective ISOC.

A common feature amongst these interviewees was an identification as ‘Muslim’ and although variable, a relationship to a post-national collectivity (i.e. umma). Many of these students were also affiliated to Muslim collectivities beyond the ISOC. This trend may have been reflective of the interview sample largely being drawn from the ISOC (conversely see Appleton 2005b), although it is consistent with the rise of political Muslim subjectivities in Britain more broadly (Mandaville 2001; Khan 2006a). Interviewee self-identification might be reason enough to employ the category ‘Muslim’ student(s). However, in Higher Education and beyond, the category ‘Muslim student’ also denotes a certain type of subjectivity. Corralled to discourses of ‘extremism’/ ‘fundamentalism,’ it is a descriptor often marked by transgression. A glance at literature, (discussed in Chapter Four), produced by or for Higher Education bodies is indicative (CVCP 1998; Glees and Pope 2005; DFES 2006), as are public and political challenges to these discourses from Muslim students themselves (see for example Khan, Guardian 21st April 2006).

There is clearly a dialectic in the ways both dominant social discourses about ‘Muslim students’ and student identifications as Muslim are deployed. In this sense they are “co-constituted” (Gunaratnam 2003, p.7). One way of distinguishing the former (hegemonic) from the latter (resistant) might be scare quotes or as a ‘Muslim student

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43 This should not suggest that students discounted other aspects of their identity, but rather, Muslim identifications were privileged over other forms. There are many reasons why this might be the case (see for example Eickelmann and Piscatori cited in Radcliffe 2004, p. 370).
subject’, as is sometimes used. Relatedly, another useful way of tackling this tension is to understand the descriptor Muslim (student) as a political identification, rather than a subjective (i.e. someone who calls themselves Muslim) or ritualistic one (e.g. adherence to certain practices) (Sayyid 2001). This is because it erases the political and contingent nature of Islam and Muslims (ibid). In this sense, ‘Muslim students’ can be understood, not in culturally essentialist fashion, but as a category that has emerged through ‘politicisation’ (Mandaville 2001, p.10). Politicisation refers to the process where political identities are contested by other political identities (ibid).

Thus, a ‘political’ Muslim identity makes sense when the political is understood as rooted in social antagonism, where “the self comes to see the other as a force seeking to negate its identity”. In this sense the political is not a “demarcated sphere of activity unto itself” (i.e. an institution) but a “mode of interaction...characterised by the negotiation of identity” (Mandaville 2001, p.9). The political in this understanding stems from our ontological condition; resting on the claim of one’s identity and having that existence recognized by others (Mouffe cited in Mandaville 2001, p.9-10). Antagonism arises when recognition is “withheld, or when the other attempts to force a discrepant identity” (ibid. p.10). This is why the political is understood as a “social relationship characterised by contestation” (ibid. p.10 Mouffe 2005). This relationship is always based on collective identities (Mouffe 2005, p.11). Hence Muslim political identities, like others, can be understood as relational and contested.

This particular understanding of Muslim identity, whilst not overtly expressed, in large part tallied with the way students articulated themselves. ‘Ethnic’ and national categories were often troubled as imposed and ‘discrepant’. These latter descriptors were also often contested with one student relating that the etymology of ‘ethnic’ was not favourable considering it had “barbarian” roots (Interview; Uthman 2005). Student articulations therefore certainly relayed signs of resistance but also identification with an ‘ummatic’ (Sayyid 2000) collectivity. This collective identity was often expressed through an identification with and consciousness of Muslims in other localities (e.g.

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44 According to Foucault, individuals are made subjects through exercises of power where they are “subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his/her own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates or makes subject to” (Foucault 1982, p.781). This repressive model of the subject however is later revised to articulate, as some argue, a model which allows for the capacity for agency and resistance (see for example Armstrong 2008).

45 These approaches dominate the social sciences, largely because of a desire to explain changing social behaviour through the measures of a positivistic tradition. In spite of anti-essentialist critiques of identity there is an abundance of work that quantify Muslim identity using ritualised criteria (e.g. dress, social habits etc). See (Modood 1997a, p.257; Anwar 1998, 1.1-11.16; Ameli 2002, p.133).

46 This is ‘politics’ itself, i.e. a set of practices and institutions (Mouffe 2005, p.9).
Palestine, Afghanistan), but also through the diversity of Muslim students on campus. However, these politicised identifications did not preclude what Sayyid identifies as ‘ritualised criteria’. This is partly because religious observance on campus was often subtly and explicitly contested or marginalised. Clearly, subjective ascriptions can continue to be political/politicised depending on the context. Here we turn to the ‘de-colonial’ methodological framework guiding this project.

3.1.7. Analytic Methodologies

‘De-colonial’ (Hesse 2004b, p.26 n.12) methodologies can be understood to interrogate ‘post-colonial’ forms of racism within liberal democratic formations. Influenced by post-structuralist thinking, the de-colonial can be traced in empirical research concerned with critiques of essentialism “whilst also seeking to legitimate the everyday ‘situated’ voices’ and experiences of research participants… as grounds for political action” (Gunaratnam 2003, p.7). Rather, it has meant that like other (post-structuralist, anti-racist, feminist) research, there has been a need to work within and against particular categorical, epistemological and methodological social science conventions (Gunaratnam 2003, p.29; also see Lather 1992, p.93; Wetherell and Potter 1992, p.68; Lawson 1995, p.450; Alexander 2004, p.141). Thus, departing from studies of governmentality concerned with maintaining methodological/epistemological purity (See for example Rose 1999, p.19 in Haggerty 2006, p.41-42), the thesis includes the experiences of those subject to (and resistant to) ‘governance’.

These negotiations have meant allowing the specificity of the research to direct the types of techniques employed (Howarth 1998, p.293; Sondergaard 2002). Guided by a de-colonial imperative, it has involved a multi-layered strategy that has worked to unravel dominant taken for granted discourses. Focusing on the various planes of racialised governance, analysis has assumed at various points, a thematic, interpretive, and broadly, a discursive approach. The particulars of this approach are detailed below.

3.1.8. Analytical Techniques

Following interview transcription, coded categories were developed using NUDIST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorizing) software. 48

47 This is not unrelated to Mignolo’s usage who considers it a particular kind of critical theory, although in tension with poststructuralist thinking. See (Mignolo 2007a; b).

48 This was conducted for student interviews only as these comprised the bulk and generally the lengthiest of interviews. ‘Institutional’ (staff) interviews were analysed in a separate equality report.
Each piece of interview text was categorised through multiple codes (e.g. prayer-room, space), eventually forming part of a larger branch of categories. These formed thematic clusters and were then summarised enabling dominant narratives to emerge within and across campus cases. Each summary, (e.g. ‘university provisions’, ‘campus politics’) provided a detailed account of key contentions (for example furore around elections, or securing a prayer-room for example), and drew on similarities and differences within and across campuses. This served to ‘establish’ the range of student perspectives and locate each campus in terms of their political histories vis-a-vis Muslim students. In this way, summaries provided accounts that were contextualised rather than an abstracted series of codes or quotes.

Institutional interviews were approached somewhat differently. A separate report was compiled focussing on institutional perspectives, equality commitments and infrastructures. This was essentially comparative but also detailed to include richer insights such as the positioning of staff in the institution, the length of their tenure, their historical involvement with Muslim students, and their recognition of Muslim student concerns. This allowed for individual perspectives to come through but also a more ‘collective’ pattern of attitudes (e.g. conservative, ‘progressive’) towards for example racism in the institution.

Both of the latter provided a ‘sorting’ exercise through vast tracts of material but also quite fundamentally led to the crystallisation of each chapter focus. These were loosely organised around the concept of (racialised) management and Islamophobia. At this stage, whilst some aspects of governance appeared quite transparent (e.g. in the prayer-room case) in others (e.g. ethnic monitoring) they assumed an opaque quality, disguised within other discourses and within the normalised bureaucratic procedures of the university. The key modes of governmentality that structured the thesis (absence, presence, inclusion) only crystallised much later through a more sustained engagement with literature and deeper analysis.

Interview transcripts were thus re-analysed on numerous occasions as the thesis focus became increasingly centred on how racialised governance in the university was enacted; thus categorical themes and codes were never fixed but ‘recursive’ (Frankenberg 2004, p.107) acquiring new light with each successive analysis. For example, whilst initially notions of the ‘secular’ were related to the character of the institution and reflected most explicitly in ‘institutional’ accounts (including documents), in the context of prayer rooms for example, and including students
accounts, the ‘secular’ subsequently acquired the status of disciplinary technology. This new meaning required a context\nualisation of such ‘codes,’ but also re-visiting transcripts to consider the more subtle ways in which ideas of the ‘secular’ were normalised. Thus, whilst the concept of governmentality informed analytical frames of reference, analysis of texts also altered the way it was seen to be exercised. From here-on in, analysis assumed a more cyclical dimension between ideas of discipline/governmentality and institutional narratives/student experiences. This ‘framed’ the lens through which analysis was conducted and illuminated various aspects of the institution (e.g. its technologies of management), and student accounts (traces of self-regulation and normalisation). This comprised the very latter stages of analysis and was integral to ‘writing up’. My key focus was to illuminate how these various ensembles functioned as governmentalising devices, and worked as forms of Muslim student (self)regulation.

My approach to this was critically discursive. My discursive framework for analysis however steered between varying approaches. Discourse analysis is a vast field comprising of many conflicting perspectives (see for example Wetherell 1998, p.402); from the conversation analytic (CA) approaches which focus on the internal sense of conversations to derive meaning, to those on the other end of the spectrum deploying discourse to describe the social field in its entirety such that meaning is always “internal to a world of signifying practices and objects” (Howarth and Stavrakis 2000, p.3 see also; Howarth 1998; Sayyid and Zac 1998, p.254-256). This reflects the Essex School of Discourse Theory (see for example Howarth and Glynos 2007). Somewhere in-between we can identify ‘critical discourse’ analysts who appear to traverse the latter end of this spectrum although vary considerably in their approach (see for example Meer 2006; Richardson 2009). Their singular shared aim however is to illuminate relations of domination.

Whilst critical discourse objectives have certainly informed the backdrop to analysis, this research has assumed a more selective approach. This neither focuses on the detail or structure of speech/text however, nor does it assume a ‘hard’ poststructuralist stance that focus on the ‘logic’ of political contingencies rather than texts per se. Rather, it situates ‘text’ within political context, an approach that looks to “broader forms of intelligibility running through the texture more generally” (Wetherell 1998, p.403). Thus it is through interpretive repertoires; “culturally familiar and habitual lines of argument comprised of recognisable themes and tropes” (ibid. p.400)
that institutionalised ‘common sense’ forms of racism are rendered visible. This approach seeks to identify connections between habitual lines of argument across various spheres and their relation to broader dominant discourses. This is consistent with the more symbiotic rather than static concept of institutionalised racism deployed in Chapter Two. It is important because rather than locate racism as idiosyncratic or the reflection of singular attitudes, the concept of repertoire keeps the pervasive and systemic aspect of racism in focus. The idea of ‘Muslim’ as a voluntary category disturbing more ‘established’ identities is for example one such repertoire.

My discursive techniques can therefore be outlined as follows; observing patterns and variability within ‘texts’ across the institution and their connections to broader ‘racialised’ repertoires (e.g. Muslims and multi-culturalism, secularism); interpreting the dissonance between varying accounts (i.e. within/between student and ‘institutional’49 accounts, including documents); highlighting the discursive silences and incoherence within racialised discourses (e.g. how and with what effect Muslim students have been made to ‘fit’ existing university paradigms); “troubling categories” (Sondergaard 2002, p.196) and discursive constructions (e.g. ‘ethnic’ categories, ‘fundamentalist’ discourses of hyper-visibility); and tracing the (essentialist) constitution and circulation of discourses about ‘Muslim student subjects’ within institutional settings. Together, these techniques offered ways of understanding how Muslim students are subjected to and the subject of governmentalising strategies.

The story of this thesis thus ought to be understood as a critical reading of empirical material (i.e. claims of equality practitioners, institutional literature, and student experiences) derived from ‘methods’ that have themselves informed the narrative being proposed (Law 2004). Thus, like all qualitative accounts, it is a partial and positioned account; partial because it comprises a snapshot of a period through a specific lens, and positioned (Abu-Lughod 1991) because it is marked by my location as a ‘Muslim’ (student) in a ‘white’ institution and as a researcher whose interventions have arguably been subject to forms of racialised governance. As suggested below it is also a narrative very much cognizant of and inflected by a broader political landscape.

49 Dominant ‘institutional’ accounts were also iterated by some students. The distinction between student / ‘institutional’ is therefore unstable and better understood as a dialectic.
Part Two: Political Reflexivity

3.2. Writing Myself In

It is now a post-positivist imperative for researchers to situate themselves and their investments in the research process (Kenway 2004, p.527; see also Punch 1998; McCorkel and Myers 2003; Gilliat-Ray 2005a; Spalek 2005). Subsumed within ethical research, reflexive practices have been encouraged as a means of accountability to both academic and researched audiences. However, what often marks the reflexive endeavour is a tendency for autobiographical descriptors (Birth 1990, p.550; Alexander 2004, p.138) where the ‘personal’ or cultural status of the researcher (see for example Werbner 1990; Jeyaraj 2003, p.68) is invoked. This is without due consideration to political relationships and context arguably resulting in a de-politicisation of the reflexive project. In what follows, a brief discussion of three aspects of research largely under-explored in ‘ethnographic’ research are addressed; political context, student agency, and racialised dynamics in ‘elite’ 50 interviews.

3.2.1. Political Contextuality

‘Race,’ gender and class are often invoked as modalities of difference that need to be reflexively accounted for. However what is often eclipsed in this quest is the political contextuality of research (see for example Maira 2005, p.66). Said reminded us long ago that research does not exist in a political vacuum (Said 1978, p.9-15). Sites of research are not neutral spaces of ‘reception’. Nor can they be approached without recourse to the broader political context of which they are a part: a fact historically ignored by many anthropologists (Hutnyk 2006, p.77) and recently highlighted in the way social science research funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is being directed to counter-terrorist ends (Keenan, THES 9th Feb 2007).

How the ‘war on terror’ for example bears upon the various aspects of this study, particularly in light of the fact that ‘Muslim students’ have been implicated in the ‘terror-nexus’ cannot be overlooked (see for example Spalek 2005; Gilliat-Ray 2005a). The ‘site’ of field work therefore needs to be understood beyond the spatial confines of the campus and upon broader political terrain. This “politics of connection” (Gunaratnam 2003, p.178) shaped student perspectives and my research approach.

50 It is acknowledged that the idea of ‘elite’ interviews is contested. Here it is used only to refer to university management (See Neal and Mclaughlin 2009, p.695,699; Smith 2006, p.645-646).
Once the primary purview of ethnographic enquiry, Britain’s Muslim communities are now subject to a host of intrusions from state, intelligence and media agencies. This has been widely reported (Ansari 2006; Fekete 2009, p.102-113; Kundnani 2009; Mohammed and Verkaik, Independent 7th April 2010), but also became apparent in fieldwork where it transpired that students had been ‘picked up’, questioned, and released by security services, whilst another had been detained for a significant time (see also Derfoufi, Guardian 26th May 2009). In the wake of the controversial Glees Report (Glees and Pope 2005), media agencies were also known to be approaching unions in search of ‘the dirt’ on Islamic societies (Day, Guardian 10th March 2006), requesting ISOC membership lists (Interview; Lomonde Union Official Brian 2005) and details of proscribed groups under the Freedom of Information Act.51

The governments ‘Prevent’ Strategy, discussed in Chapter One and further elaborated in Chapter Four has caused considerable alarm. It is within the context of Prevent that draft versions of the 2006 Department for Education and Skills (DFES) report (DFES 2006) were asking lecturers to monitor ‘Asian looking students’ (Taylor et al, Guardian 17th October 2006). Although this particular recommendation was subsequently omitted, anecdotal evidence suggests universities are “beginning to put into place frameworks for implementing the report's advice that academic staff should monitor and report on the expression of [Muslim student] political views” (Tyrer Forthcoming-d).

Perhaps once the stuff of conspiratorial talk, these ‘surveillance’ experiences are now considered unsurprising, are met with unperturbed satire,52 and are indicative of the way state surveillance is understood as “an intimate part of everyday lives” (Maira 2005, p.79). This climate of surveillance is an issue that affected how forthcoming students were, the terms on which they chose to engage and what they opted to disclose.

3.2.2. Access and Resistance
During fieldwork, gaining access to students and being privy to settings normally off limits (e.g. private student meetings) was a result of the seniority of contacts made earlier in the study. Equally important was the recognition that I was a hijab-wearing

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51 Relayed to me by a source at a university in the North-West who received a copy of this request.
52 For example, in his blog, the President of FOSIS casually mentions “I was detained and questioned by the Department of Homeland Security and Border Control for nigh on five hours. It was an interesting experience to say the least. I must say that the American people were very welcoming, and I was absolutely taken by the consummate professionalism of the British Consulate in LA” (Khan 2006a).
Muslim student of similar age, very much like many of the ‘sisters’ on campus. In the contentious climate surrounding ‘British Muslims’ where the *hijab* has figured as a politicised marker of difference, it is likely to have been perceived as indicative of a religious and political commitment and therefore subject to fewer ‘gate-keeping’ procedures. Whilst such recognition did not permit limitless access, it is worth noting that gender difference did not pose a disadvantage as experienced by some female researchers suffering the chauvinism of male dominated research settings (Punch 1998, p.165; Gill and Maclean 2002). Rather than proving a disadvantage, the observance of religious etiquette allowed the research to be conducted with greater ease.

It was, however, often the case that those students assuming official roles, notably those in authority, were not comfortable being recorded in interview. Interviews with these students were often preceded or followed by ‘cross-examination’ pertaining to funding, campus choices, and organisational affiliation. Very aware of the concerns that might be driving this suspicious line of questioning, the importance of gauging ‘grass-root’ student perspectives was explained. This did not always assuage fears and as the fieldwork unfolded it became increasingly apparent that any assumed ‘insider’ (see for example De Andrade 2000; Narayan 1997) status was unstable. This was no doubt affected by a climate where Muslims were being deployed by the state to spy on fellow Muslims (*Derfoufi, Guardian 26th May 2009*), where new faces were showing up at Jumma suspected of this (Interview; Firaz 2005) and where it was being reported that students were being asked to ‘pose as Muslim’ to spy on Islamic societies (*Jayanetti and Lay, London Student 9th March 2006*).

Ironically, as Mcloughlin has noted of his research, being recognised as an ‘outsider’, or “safe *gora*” (‘white’) (Mcloughlin 2000) has proved favourable precisely because it has alleviated suspicion of Muslim cooption (Appleton 2005b, p.173). Clearly, this further highlights the pitfalls of culturally essentialist positioning in research as promulgated by some (see for example May 1993; Phoenix 1994, p.66; McCorkel and Myers 2003, p.204), and contested by others (De Andrade 2000, p.28; Alexander 2004, 141-142, 145). Thus perhaps once an unlikely suspect, my presence in meetings did raise suspicions about who I was ‘working for’. Although suspicions were presumably short-lived as I became a recognisable face in the student circuit.

That students felt surveyed however, exceeded state or media intrusions. A discourse of surveillance was also very much knitted into union life where Muslim students were often the subject of excessive scrutiny as discussed in Chapter Six. On
occasion, one would find students looking both ways, lowering their voices or seeking assurances that information would not be misused. The gravity of such sensitivities were made uncomfortably clear to me in one interview in which the respondent asked me to turn the tape off and began asking a series of questions about my key motivations and how anonymity could be ensured. These particular sensitivities were informed by potential repercussions from the university, but also in light of previous interviews with Muslim journalists who had misrepresented the interviewee. Resistance to academic inquiry thus comprised part of a need to manage the host of surveillance attention Muslim students were subject to.

Indeed, interviewees also revealed an array of anti-surveillance strategies (see also Haggerty 2006, p.34). In view of media intrusions for example, students were not playing to racist agendas. For example one interviewee revealed he had been broached by a newspaper for ‘proofs’ of a fundamentalist hotbed on campus. However, when he refused to conform to expected stereotypes he was labelled ‘boring’ (Interview; Shabaz 2004). Another interesting example reported by an interviewee was of a journalist seeking a story on the types of activities Muslim women were involved in whilst away from home. As Sameena recalls, “so I got these five outspoken girls and they said ‘I’m sorry whatever I do at university is the same thing I do in front of my parents’ so I kind of stitched her up and she probably missed her deadline - but she deserved it” (Interview; Sameena 2005).

There was also often a strategic posturing born out of an awareness that what was being said would be ‘broadcast’ to academic audiences and beyond. Thus, whilst my position as ‘insider’ was often invoked, I was also responded to as ‘a site’ in which the hegemonic gaze could be contested. This emerged in interviewee responses that were clearly seeking to manage their representations. Iqbal for example often seemed to be speaking to a much wider audience;

when it comes to issues such as Palestine and issues such as Iraq we do feel strongly, because they are our brothers and those are our lands and we don’t want the Americans or any other superpower or any force to occupy their lands and to make them homeless (Interview, Iqbal 2005 Emphasis Mine).

Political issues notwithstanding, the tone and positional ‘we’ of this statement looms large. Excluded from ‘we’, the interview transcended the spatial and subjective confines

53 This was in light of a fellow Muslim student who was said to have failed his medical degree on account of his pro-Palestinian activism.
of our dialogue, speaking to and about a much wider political relation. This is one example of the way interviews were themselves grounds for political resistance, not the product of neutral social spaces (Alexander 2004, p.143).

3.2.3. A Note on Political Reciprocity

The problem with projects that seek to ‘give voice’ to marginalised communities is that they risk eclipsing the fact that marginalised communities have a history of agency and activism (Kalra 2006; for an example see Appleton 2005b, p.173). In this research, ‘giving voice’ to Muslim students appeared somewhat facile in the context of a vocal and rising student activism. For as usually presupposed, it was not just a case of the researcher bringing her investments to the research (Troyna 1995, p.403), but of research actors bringing their investments to the research(er). Indeed, in light of the over-exhausted ‘fundamentalist’ representations that have marred Muslim (student) identity, many students recognised the value of participating in interviews. In view of this, the research provided another site for students to engage.

Whilst not making the banal claim of ‘giving voice’ to ‘the oppressed’, the project has entailed a degree of reciprocity unfamiliar to conventional research; ranging from the mundane practice of making transcripts available to respondents to more direct interventions in student politics. One example is where I was invited to speak at one union to counter the derogation of hijabi women in the women’s movement. Here my perceived authority and knowledge as researcher were considered useful to such interventions. In this instance, rather than seeking to obliterate the hierarchy of power inevitable to researcher/researched relations, it was deployed as a means of resisting racist discourse (See Back 2004b). Underlining this reciprocity is an important acknowledgement that we cannot a-priori claim ‘insider’ status. Rather, the status of ‘insider’ has to be understood as a contingent political category, for what ‘makes’ this position is not being ‘inside’ but ‘on-side’. However, as detailed below, I was also considered by some interviewees to be on the ‘Other’ side.

3.2.4. Governance in Research

‘White’ university and union officials comprised a significant cohort of interviewees that were variable in their reception to my research. Those who were most reflexive about ‘white’ power and racism in the university were more forthcoming in being interviewed, although even some of these perspectives were circumscribed by
institutional imperatives (see for example Chapter Five).\footnote{One exception was Chris, a ‘white’ staff member at Erdon who was exceptionally critical of institutional practices.} However, it is notable that these staff members were all in some way marginalised in the institution themselves through modalities of gender, sexuality, ‘race’ or religion.

Other ‘white’ staff presented different problems. ‘White’ ‘Non-Muslim’ union officials for example were often sceptical of my enquiries. In one instance at Lomonde, my status as bona fide researcher came under suspicion and I was refused interviews on grounds that it might be used for political ends (e.g. in the ISOC). This explained the astonishment with which I was met when I presented an official letter of research to validate my research claims. At Erdon, some union officials were equally cautious and reluctant to correspond in writing, preferring instead to invite me to the union.

Indeed, all interviews to varying degrees can be understood as an “emergent property of the interactions between and among differently constituted and located individuals” (Gunaratnam 2003, p.8; see also Mason 1996, p.40). However, (racialised) power differentials and vested interests clearly affect interview dynamics. Like most institutions, these universities were concerned about self-representation in ways that would be favourable to them. This was particularly the case amongst senior staff. Thus although comprising an “interesting twist in systemic positionalities” (Puwar 2004b, p.35), (i.e. ‘black female’ interviewing ‘white elites’), interviews were often accompanied by polite introductions that would read ‘how are you and how can I manage you today?’ (see also Neal 1998, p.12-14).

It became quite obvious at both campus cases, that university officials were in different ways seeking to manage my research interventions. I often detected institutional contrivance. At Erdon for example, there appeared to be a consensus between interviewees that claims of racism would not be openly discussed. Whether this was a-priori agreed or not, it reflected a conservative attitude and reluctance to engage with the issue of racism. This was not, however, considered a gap in information but indicative of the anxieties being induced in an institution not ready to confront or reflect on its ‘whiteness’. Hence, whilst one university official (the complaints manager) refused to respond to an interview request, three others, including two members of staff with an equality remit, were quick to close discussions of racism in the institution through varied means. For example, one senior manager, Richard, detracted from questions of racism by proceeding to remind me of union protocol. This had the effect
of positioning me as another ‘Muslim student’ subject to the liberal teachings of a ‘white’ university.

Janet (Senior Manager), on the other hand, was more comfortable discussing (my own presence notwithstanding) the plight of ‘Muslim women’ and considered such issues far more pressing than anything I sought to unravel. Disclosures about significantly high drop-out rates amongst ‘Pakistani’ students also came with the warning that I needed to be careful how I ‘used’ the material. Yet of all the explanations provided as to why this group of students were ‘dropping out’, racist practices or marginalisation in their school was not one of them.

Tucked away in a top tower office, Lionel (In-house University Advisor) appeared cagey about the topic and shuffled for a ‘correct’ answer. His final retort however, was that he was unaware of any ‘race case’ where the university had been “found wanting”. The only exception to these narrative obstructions were the reflections of Sally, a younger ‘white’ female diversity advisor in personnel, who centred her criticisms of racism upon ‘white’ male power and the stuffy attitudes of the university; a revelation in the context of this rather insulated university. Erdon thus often assumed the character of a clique maintaining a pact of silence.

Conversely, Lomonde was keen to show off its equality credentials as a ‘recovering’ ‘white’ institution. When arranging an interview with a senior manager, Tim, it transpired that he had also invited Margaret, another senior staff member, and a Muslim staff member, Isaac. Given that these staff members had already previously been interviewed, this ‘set up’ revealed some interesting dynamics. The interview began with a ‘hearty’ warning from Tim, regarding ‘presentation’ of my interview material. Further, whilst Isaac and Margaret would often concur with Tim (Senior Manager), Tim would also take the liberty of seeking approval from his Muslim colleague. This ‘set up’ meant that difficult questions would be deferred to each other in a way that was more comfortable. It assumed a coherent institutional account that did not want to be troubled by contradictory assertions; although in view of responses from earlier interviews with these same colleagues, there were many. The presence of the Muslim staff member was clearly a pride symbol of the advancements the university had made, serving to blunt any suggestion that the university was not adequately tackling its racism. He softened the admission of institutional racism, ‘yes it was happening, but we are tackling it’. Interestingly however, whilst Tim was quick to concede (to my questions) that racism needed to be tackled in the institution, Isaac reserved his harshest critique for the
institutions practices on disability, rather than racism; “our provision for staff, excuse me Tim, is appalling and we all recognise that” (Interview; Isaac with Senior Manager, 2006). This appeared at odds with an earlier interview where this same professor explained how he had been a victim of institutional racism.

It was therefore very apparent that the group interview inhibited as much as it revealed. This was not however, simply symptomatic of staff group dynamics, but also of the way the interview(er) was being managed. Including a senior Muslim academic from the institution both authenticated Tim’s perspective, but also allowed his perspective to prevail against the potential critique of a ‘Muslim student’ intruding on institutional space.

My response to this type of management would vary between staff and topic. At times, in spite of being perturbed by some views, I would assume a more compliant role and simply acknowledge viewpoints. However on other occasions, I would pursue a very direct line of questioning, in part to, see what type of response this would elicit (e.g. do you think it fair that Muslim students are being asked to fund a multi-million pounds prayer facility?). This was in an effort to disrupt to the ‘institutional line’ and preparedness with which staff came to the interview since many had requested interview schedules in advance. It also served as a reminder that I was ‘investigating’ the university and dissatisfied with neat answers. This would often leave staff stumbling for answers, deferring to others or contradicting themselves. The exercise of ‘elite’ racialised power was therefore unsettled and rarely static (Neal and Mclaughlin 2009, p. 695; see also Smith 2006) forming part of a complex web of (self)management.

Overall however, it was possible to discern the way racialised governance was being enacted in the research process itself. Clearly, this was not a straightforward exercise. Rather, assumptions about the status of interviewees (i.e. ‘disempowered’ Muslim students versus powerful ‘white’ ‘elites’) defied ethnographic convention (Smith 2006).

In the final part of this chapter, we turn to the state of ‘race’ equality in Higher Education and the equality infrastructures of each campus case.
Part Three: A ‘Race’ for Change?

3.3. “What is this Macpherson Report?”

In Higher Education, an equalities remit (excluding religion) has been developing since the late eighties. By the late nineties it was “almost universal across the sector” (CUCO 1997 cited in Pilkington 2004, p.21). Prior to the Macpherson report any activity on the issue of ‘race’ and racism was largely mute or submerged within broader equality agendas (Farish et al 1995; OPM 2004b, p.5). The effect of Macpherson’s inquiry, alongside reports issued in the same year, (Dearing 1997; Bett 1999; Carter et al 1999) together with state endorsement forcibly placed ‘race’ equality on university agendas.

Whilst the Macpherson inquiry precipitated a key shift in anti-racist practice, it was the RRAA (2000) in particular that obliged universities to review their ‘policies, practices and procedures’ in order to tackle racial discrimination, as well as pro-actively encourage racial equality. Thus, the rather vague commitments to equality documented in the early nineties (Jewson et al 1991) have since been succeeded with the appointment of equality staff and ‘race champions,’ the organisation of steering groups and conferences, anti-racist charters, a portfolio of web material and a repertoire of ‘race’ equality jargon. Generating a “flurry of activity” in the sector (Pilkington 2004, p.21-22; see also Ahmed 2007b, p.592), much like the teaching quality assessments in the early nineties (Shore and Wright 1999), the first step in this racial overhaul was to provide a written statement on their ‘race’ policy (CRE 2002b, p.32). Universities were supported by the ECU (Equality Challenge Unit), who as early as summer 2001 were briefing staff and providing guidance on draft policies, but refusing to go as far as writing policies for those who preferred ready-made solutions (Hill and Kusemamuriwo 2004, p.124). In 2002, an anti-racist toolkit was also developed by staff at the University of Leeds (Philips et al 2002). This was the first of its kind, although was not as successful as hoped (Crace, Guardian 14th December 2004).

It was expected that three years after legislation, universities would have met the specific duties of the Amendment. These included the maintenance of a ‘race’ equality

55 This question was posed by a university registrar during a discussion on institutional racism (Gulam 2004, p.7).
56 David Blunkett wrote to the chair of HEFCE in 1999 asking him to “encourage institutions to give proper emphasis to race in their statements” (ibid. p.8), later noting that the state of equal opportunities in the sector was “deplorable” (Blunkett 2000, p.27, 92 cited in Hill and Kusemamuriwo 2004, p.120). However by 2003, Blunkett was said to be “retreating from the Macpherson agenda” altogether (Travis, Guardian 15th January 2003).
57 Although the Macpherson Inquiry is often used as a short-hand to include the requirements of the RRAA, this convergence is contested. Statutory requirements in 2000 followed on the heels of the Macpherson inquiry (1999), although Macpherson and his advisors did not directly provide their input. These were produced by Home Office ministers (Correspondence with Dr. Stone, advisor to Sir Macpherson Cluny in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, July 2008).
policy, an assessment of the way institutional policies affected staff and students of different ‘racial’ groups (e.g. race impact assessment), the collation of ethnic monitoring data of student (admissions/progress) and staff career development. The availability of published reports reflecting this and progress assessment was also key. According to the CRE, the structures for impact assessment were expected to have been completed by May 2005. However, HEFCE’S commissioned reports on the progress of the sector indicated that “few HEI’s have reached the point where all policies have been reviewed” (OPM 2004b, p.19, 21). Like most universities at the time (ibid. p.19; also see Schneider Ross 2003 in Turner 2006, p.161), neither case study university had conducted, or were even in a position to conduct Impact Assessment.

Although purportedly comprising the most significant ‘race’ driver in Higher Education (Gulam 2004, p.7), the Macpherson report has, according to some, generated “little evidence of serious reflection in institutional culture” (Pilkington 2004, p.22, 24). Rather than presenting a discourse for social change, ‘institutional racism’ has instead become submerged in an audit culture (Turner 2006; see also Shore and Wright 1999) and been translated by practitioners as a legislative and bureaucratic burden (Ahmed 2007b); dominating, rather than developing equality agendas. These claims certainly resonate in my own fieldwork and are briefly discussed below in the context of the ‘race’ equality infrastructures of each university.

3.3.1. **Lomonde and Erdon: The ‘Race’ Agenda**

Amidst university restructuring in the early part of this decade, Lomonde established an ‘equality and diversity’ unit at its secondary campus. Prior to this, the university had one equality and diversity officer dedicated to staff and a student disability officer. There was no centralised unit and no one with a specified remit for students. The staff officer, John, made it clear that students were never a priority in his equality remit, and that it was never intended to be publicised as a service because “there was a fear of doing that, if I provide advice I would have just ended up doing case work” (Interview; John 2005).

Located in the service division, the new unit housed six dedicated staff; the director, two data analysts, three equality and diversity advisors and a secretary. This reflected the universities more unified approach to ‘equality and diversity’ and a coherent management strategy to tackling the diverse needs of the student/staff body.
Accessing the new unit was straightforward and staff response was forthcoming. The unit was in a period of major transition; seeking to develop a coherent monitoring system, yet to establish an equality steering group and also pre-occupied with (re)writing race policy.

In terms of policy, equality practitioners were conscious that the university;

...had archaic out of date equality policies and...a lot needed to be done on the paper side to set things out in order to then move on and do the work (Interview; John 2005).

Predominating RRAA university initiatives, this appeared to be a generic problem where “you end up doing the document rather than doing the doing” (Ahmed 2007b). This ‘politics of documentation’ Ahmed argues, has instead of overcoming institutional racism, worked to sustain it. This is because good race equality policies are often translated into “being good at race equality” thus concealing the “very inequalities the document was written to reveal” (ibid. p.597). This issue was also prevalent at Erdon, further discussed below.

Comparatively, locating the appropriate ‘equality’ contacts at Erdon was notably cumbersome. This is because the web of staff with an equality remit was partial and dispersed. The university’s web profile also appeared somewhat misleading because staff listed as dealing with students on ‘race’ equality were no longer in post. The staff member who assumed this post was also listed as attending to students although her remit never extended beyond ethnic monitoring. Thus, beyond the semblance of an equality team, there was no centralised unit dealing with ‘equality and diversity’ issues and university management were said to be largely uninterested in making this a university priority (Interview; Sally, Equality Staff, 2005). Hence, staff working with an ‘equality’ remit spanned the academic quality unit (monitoring) the legal office (policy/compliance) and personnel (staff diversity officer). The latter role had been appointed only that academic year. The development of ‘race’ policy was deferred to the in-house advisor who was also a member of the university steering group. The

58 This university was nominated as one of the top ranking institutions in a UK wide equal opportunities benchmarking exercise.
59 Lionel’s role however was not listed on the universities equality website, nor was he in the university directory. It was only after circuitous correspondence with general enquiries, personnel and the registrar’s office that his role was
steering group comprised of staff members from different sectors of the university. Erdon also had a ‘race staff group’ for Black academics to air their concerns.

Thus, in uncovering the substantive roles at Erdon, it transpired that there were no equality advisors for students. This was partly because it was understood that the union served this role for student voices to be heard. However, this was at odds with the university’s race equality policy which emphasised consultation and regular forums with ‘ethnic minority’ students to assess the impact of its policies (Race Equality Policy, 2002).

The university’s glowing profile of ‘equality champions’ and steering groups was also inconsistent with the university’s outdated equality policy. At the time of fieldwork this was being revised. The officer in charge of revising policy spoke of “beefing [it] up” for it to be seen as a “living document” (Interview; Lionel 2005). He was thus concerned with, ‘doing the document’ rather than translating ‘race’ policy into meaningful anti-racist practice. Significantly, this ‘beefing up’ was in response to recommendations made by HEFCE in 2004 regarding the university’s weak race equality progress (ibid.)

Although Erdons equality commitments were severely outdated, they were nonetheless considered indicative of the university’s longstanding equality credentials. Janet, for example, argued that “I would like to think it [RRAA] was superfluous that it wasn’t telling us to do anything we weren’t already doing” (Interview; Janet 2005). In her view, the ‘Race’ Amendment was simply codifying the university’s existing commitments.

The emphasis on staff rather than students however, was not unique to either of these institutions. In HEFCE’S 2003 assessment for example, staff monitoring was seen to be more advanced whilst there remained “a lack of robust strategies to address student diversity” (OPM 2004b, p.6). This assessment was echoed at Lomonde in 2006, when senior staff members prioritised staff recruitment and progress; student participation was said to be ‘covered’ by the university’s widening participation initiatives (Interview; Senior Management, 2006).

Indeed, it is peculiar that although both universities were lacking in a developed infrastructure and culture required to sustain any meaningful discussion on racism, both nonetheless had dedicated units to widening participation. I was encouraged on more
than one occasion to visit the widening participation unit who were renowned for their
good work. At Lomonde for example, a widening participation office had been
established six years before an equality unit was established.

In both cases, this was something universities received funding for, perhaps
explaining the dry legalised approach to racial equality and the dynamic approach to
widening access. This is problematic since university efforts to recruit under-
represented groups need to be matched with an equally rigorous culture of anti-racism
once those groups are admitted. HEFCE also registered this concern (OPM 2004b, p.8).

3.3.2. Student ‘Ethnic’ Monitoring

The staff/student discrepancy was underscored in each universities collation of student
data. A glance at Lomonde’s 2003-2004 monitoring statistics for example is indicative.
The only data held comprised of the admissions of UK domiciled students registered as
‘ethnic minority,’ and these were not organised by student level (e.g. UG/PG). Although
a statutory duty under the Race Amendment, student records clarified they held no data
on progression or graduation rates. In contrast, staff monitoring was collated by grade,
gender, disability, and ‘ethnic’ minority status (Monitoring Data, 2004). This
shortcoming was recognised in the university’s 2003 ‘race plan’ (Race Equality Policy,
2003) and its need to develop a comprehensive monitoring system to support the
process of Impact Assessment. However, in 2006, monitoring student progression or
failure rates was still not being uniformly assessed. The only school to have received
any attention was the medical school as a result of its independently conducted research
and CRE interventions based on the differential admission of those identified as ‘ethnic
minority’ students (Interview; Senior Management 2006).

Comparatively, in spite of Erdon’s fragmented equality set-up, there appeared to
be a more rigorous approach to student monitoring. This is because the university
already managed a student data system in academic quality which relied on schools
submitting information. This enabled them to integrate student data on ethnicity by
school/year for the preceding five years. However, although far ahead of Lomonde,
these advances ought to be understood in the context of the institutions existing
infrastructure, rather than any radical overhaul on the university’s part. This is similar to

60 Widening participation is based on allocating students places according to postcodes. Concerns were raised that
universities in the same city were informally dividing localities so they were not competing for entrants from the
same area (Interview; Tanweer 2006). See also (Copland 2000, p.73).
the way the university tended to apportion equality work to existing and not necessarily qualified staff (see also Ahmed 2007b, p.592). Further, measures of student 'progression' were only introduced for the first time in 2005 and did not include research students. Nor was 'ethnicity' measured in tandem with gender and other variables (e.g. student level). This is of significance because of the disclosure that there were unusually high failure rates amongst ‘Pakistani’ male students. Significantly, this discrepancy did not emerge as a result of the university’s monitoring system, but due to a school disclosure. Clearly, monitoring was not being conducted as rigorously as Janet suggested, however, nor was it being acted upon as noted below.

At both universities, it was some time after fieldwork in 2008 that these anomalies were partially rectified, although as further discussed in Chapter Seven, with significant limitations. At Lomonde for example, the university’s annual 2008 ‘race’ review provided a more comprehensive overview of ‘BME’ student intake and graduation rates. This certainly represented an advance in the development of student data. However, these also presented further problems in view of the way EU students were being collapsed into ‘BME’ aggregates. This certainly clouded the ‘British’ intake, and served to amplify figures relative to previous years.

In 2008, Erdon also sought to reorganise its ‘ethnic’ data. Its ‘BME’ cohort for 2006-2008 for example included overseas students, distorting the average percentage and reflecting a significant increase compared with previous years (Race Equality Annual Report, 2008). In turn, it ranked itself amongst the best universities with the highest undergraduate ‘BME’ intake (ibid). Of course, it was unclear as to how other universities had organised their data and if it comprised a fair comparison.

This data reorganisation is of concern since it has emerged that some universities seek to embellish their ‘BME’ figures through somewhat dubious practices. This was brought to my attention when a former equality practitioner at a local university informed me that some universities were ‘recycling’ 2001 data on their ‘BME’ intake and others were known to subsume ‘white’ western European students within such aggregates (Interview; Tanweer 2006). Other literature has suggested that ‘BME’ participation rates are being “massaged opportunistically” by collapsing overseas students within British ‘ethnic’ minorities (Cousin 2002, p.48). How

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61 How Erdon measured progression from year to year was problematic. A student was counted as progressing on the basis of them not re-sitting. This approach did not account for variations in progression prior to and in the final year of study.
widespread these practices are, are unclear, however it certainly raises questions about why ethnic monitoring is being conducted in the first place (Dyke and Gunaratnam 2000a, p.342, n.342). Hence, at Erdon, the redundancy of student data was clearly articulated by Janet who argued that “we’re having to collect information and it’s not clear what we then do with it” (Interview; Janet 2005). Monitoring data was therefore being archived. This was exemplified by the fact that in 2008, four years after the problem of excessive ‘Pakistani’ medic drop-out rates had been identified, the issue was yet to be addressed (Race Equality Annual Report, 2008). Lomonde revealed a similar problem when a number of academic appeals from ‘BME’ students had been acknowledged five years earlier (Race Action Plan, 2008-9). Ethnic monitoring data thus appeared to comprise a ‘black body count’, stalling rather than spurring anti-racist action.

In view of the contrast in equality infrastructures briefly surmised here, one might assume that Lomonde/Erdon were in different respects (e.g. monitoring, established units) more ‘race’ equality savvy and that this was reflected in the degree of ‘inclusion’ and provisions for their Muslim students. These basic differences however, appear to have had little impact on the way Muslim student needs were addressed (See Chapter Five/Seven/Nine). This is because the patch-work of provisions noted earlier have not emerged through statutory imposition, but largely through the sustained engagement of Muslim students themselves. It would also be mistaken to assume that the implementation of the RRAA (or lack of) is a useful indicator of the way Islamophobia in institutions is tackled.

More broadly however, institutional differences did reflect how Muslim students were incorporated in the institution, as Chapter Seven and Eight illuminate (e.g. through a corporate and unified ‘diversity’ approach/or a fragmented, ad hoc and concessionary approach). Indeed, as proceeding chapters suggest, in the ostensibly ‘better’ profiled institution we do not find an absence of Islamophobia, but simply a different mode of its institutionalisation.

3.4. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been threefold. First, to trace key developments in the thesis focus, interview sample and case selection. Relatedly, it has been important to provide an insight into aspects of fieldwork not always illuminated in empirical chapters. This has been through grounding the research in its political context, but also through
locating my positionality in research vis-a-vis students and staff. These reflexive insights convey the partial lens through which fieldwork has been experienced and its translation into theoretical frameworks.

Finally, it has been important to establish campus settings, and the place/provisions of Muslim students in their respective institutions. In particular, surmising the ‘race’ equality infrastructures and commitments of each university has established the patchy and complex framework in which Muslim students operate; a topic further developed theoretically and empirically in Chapter Five. For now, we turn to an earlier chapter in Muslim student history.
Chapter Four

Hyper-Visibility and the Racialised Presence of Muslim Students in Higher Education: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective

Introduction: The Presence of ‘Muslims’

In the aftermath of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry in 1999, an article in the Muslim News lamented that “Muslims were [only] presented as the agents of racist violence rather than its victims” (Rashida, Muslim News 26th March 1999). In 2003, Tyrer observed a similar paradox. He noted that whilst ‘Muslims’ remained ‘absent’ and ‘unknown,’ they were nonetheless recognised as a ‘fundamentalist’ presence (Tyrer 2003, p.21 see also; Archer 2009, p.175). Like earlier claims about the conspicuous ‘over-representation’ yet absence of ‘Black’ students in universities (Modood 1993, p.168), these observations are pertinent, for they point to the ‘hyper-visible’ status and “amplification” (Puwar 2004b) of racialised groups within ‘white’ society.

In view of Muslims, this hyper-visibility has emerged most forcefully in the shape of the ‘fundamentalist-extremist-terrorist’; an amalgam that is rarely distinguished or unpacked (see for example Sayyid 1997, p. 7-30). My concern in this chapter is to chart the way the ‘hyper-visibility’ of Muslims has formed (and continues to form) a governmentalising device. Here governing ‘Muslims’ can be discerned through:

…control and discipline...through populist racist ascriptions and moral panics which inform the limitations placed on [their]...spatial mobility…political participation and social visibility (Hesse 1997, p.100).

In this regard, Higher Education is no exception, for Muslim students have historically been cited as agents of ‘fundamentalism’. Thus, as this chapter aims to convey, the ‘F’ word has been repeatedly deployed to repress, undermine, discipline and manage the behaviour of ‘Muslim students’ and often their political activities. As a mode of racialised governmentality, ‘Muslim’ hyper-visibility has emerged and achieved its fixity and durability through historical constructions and contestations. Thus, in what

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1 Hyper-visibility can broadly be understood to refer to the way racialised groups are projected into the public sphere through popular stereotyping, although their status is otherwise characterised by absence or invisibility. Hyper-visibility is thus bound up in dominant forms of racialisation, and in the absence of recognition as a legitimate collectivity. See also (Tyrer Forthcoming-e).
follows, this chapter seeks to narrate the emergence, reification and ‘trans’-formation of this ‘fundamentalist’ ‘hyper-visibility’ in Higher Education.

Part One begins with a brief prelude into the ‘origins’ of the ‘British Muslim’ ‘fundamentalist’ phenomena, and proceeds to consider how notions of a Muslim ‘fundamentalist’ presence have been nurtured and institutionalised to Islamophobic effect in HE. This part outlines key reports and interventions in the sector and their contested status.

The effect of this ‘fundamentalist’ formation can be traced in Part Two which denotes the shift from discourses of ‘‘fundamentalism” to contemporary charges of ‘terrorism’. Here, the ‘counter-terrorist’ (PVE; Preventing Violent Extremism) context of fieldwork and its specific focus on ‘Muslim (students)” as a ‘suspect’ population is introduced.

Several reports (and a political tract) are considered. Following this, the way the state’s ‘war on terror’ merges with the disciplinary technologies of the university to manage the ‘threat’ posed by ‘Muslim students’ is highlighted. This is exemplified through the increased regulation of some provisions (e.g. prayer rooms) and the encouragement of others (‘Muslim chaplains”).

The chapter concludes by highlighting the way some universities have been complicit in the state project to survey, and regulate ‘Muslim students’. Here we observe the contradictory ‘liberal’ and ‘autonomous’ status of universities where they simultaneously inflate, justify and resist state power. First we turn to a much earlier period in ‘British Muslim’ history.

Part One: ‘British Muslim’ ‘Fundamentalism’ and Muslim Students

4.1.1. Rushdie’s ‘Fundamentalists’

It was in resistance to Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* that Muslims were suddenly projected as a;

…dangerous fifth column, subversive of western freedoms: A Trojan horse in the heart of Europe with a deadly cargo of ‘fundamentalist’ religiosity (Lewis 1994, p.1).

This conception lay in the way Muslim resistance to Rushdie’s book was reduced to a violent ‘book-burning’ and ‘fatwa’, which served to (retro)actively erase the variety and
development of Muslim protest at the time.\(^2\) Homi Bhabha was alert to this when he wrote;

There exists what has been identified as a Muslim ‘fundamentalist’ position. This seems to include everything from the Ayatollahs death edict and the internal politics of Iran, to the more problematic position of British Muslims who may feel that Rushdie has violated the received wisdom of the Koran, but are resolute that this should not lead to illegal acts of incitement and violence (Bhabha 1989 cited in Appignanesi and Maitland 1990, p.114).

Thus, in the dearth of literature that explained the protest, a curious detour back to essentialised notions of ‘Muslimness’ prevailed: Muslims were backward, uncivilised, barbaric and insane. Explanations were of a purely tautological nature: Muslims protested not because they found Rushdie’s work hugely offensive, blasphemous or distasteful, but because they were Muslim (for example Weldon 1989, p.80; Modood 1990, p. 261-262; Pipes 1990, p.106).

Charges of Muslim misconduct were all the more problematic in an increasingly Islamophobic climate where racist thugs were making death threats, vandalising ‘Asian’ property and abusing their neighbours (See Griffiths, New Statesman 31st March 1989; Sanders, New Statesman 26th May 1989). Although in terms of ‘white’ Britons, this did not invite quite the same charges of transgression. It is during this period that the term ‘Muslim’ had become a popular term of abuse. Children were coming home crying that they were being taunted a “dirty Muslim”, (Alibhai-Brown, New Statesman 24th February 1999) and ‘Rushdie’ had become a popular Islamophobic insult equivalent to that of ‘Paki’ and ‘Nigger’. There were also the “governing classes” who were said to be using the Satanic Verses “as a stick with which to beat the immigrants” (Asad 1990, p.259).

It is in this Islamophobic climate that a distinctively ‘British Muslim’ identity was said to have emerged. However, although readings of the Rushdie affair rendered it a beginning of sorts,\(^3\) this juncture signified the hegemonic formation of a Muslim political identity as “‘fundamentalist’”; here ‘Muslimness’ was essentialised and over-politicised (see for example Tyrer 2003, p.19-44). This descriptor, with all its

\(^2\) This refers to diplomatic engagements preceding the book-burning, countless letters to the press and refused interventions of Muslim writers. See (Appignanesi and Maitland 1990, p.45-49)

\(^3\) In light of the tendency to centralise Rushdie one should not overstate its place in British Muslim political history, for it is misleading to assume that prior to this a political articulation of ‘Muslimness’ did not exist. See for example (Kepel 1997, p.103-125; Ruthven 1991, p.75-78).
transgressive and retrograde connotations was to become a short-hand that explained (away) ‘Muslim’ political behaviour (Modood 1990, p.265). However, it was also deployed to governmentalising effect, since it comprised a means to routinely discredit Muslim political expression. In this sense, the stigma of ‘fundamentalism’ can be understood to de-authorise and regulate Muslim behaviour. As further elaborated below, British universities were no exception.

Indeed, just as Muslim communities in Britain were engulfed by charges of ‘fundamentalism’, British universities were also saturated with unrelenting claims of a Muslim student ‘fundamentalism’. However, in universities these claims were not grounded in popular re-presentations of an illiterate working class Muslim clergy, incapable of grasping the finer points in Rushdie’s novel (Appignanesi and Maitland 1990, p.64; see Asad 1990, p.248). Rather, claims of Muslim student ‘fundamentalism’ were bound up in a somewhat different Muslim ‘subject’; an educated cadre of young Muslim men preaching an ‘intellectual’ Islamic revivalism on British campuses. Epitomised in the alleged ‘mass’ presence of Hizb al-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun⁴; their transgressions were related to violence, anti-Semitism and a general disruption to campus harmony.

However, throughout the nineties, knowledge of a Muslim ‘fundamentalist presence became institutionalised with little scrutiny in British universities. To varying degrees, this institutionalisation has been documented in accounts of student polemics in the NUS during the nineties (IHRC 2000; Mcroy 2001; 2004; Bodi, Guardian 5th March 2002; Tyrer 2003; 2004; Leary 2004). It is worth briefly re-visiting this period for several reasons; it provides a background to the ‘hyper-visibility’ problematic, it (in)directly informs recent HE reports (for example ECU/UUK/SCOP 2005) and it also resonates with many interviewee accounts. It is thus not possible to speak about institutionalised Islamophobia in the current period of research without an understanding of the ‘fundamentalist’ formation of the nineties.

⁴Hizb al-Tahrir is a Muslim political group that emerged in the mid-eighties on university campuses. Recent studies attempting to elaborate on the scope, structure and strength of the Hizb have shed little light on how active and widespread the Hizb (and its new front groups) are. Claims about the Hizb are heavily contested and ambiguous. Whilst leading broadsheets have claimed that the Hizb was “known to operate on every major university campus” (Toynbee, Guardian 8th August 2005), recent studies indicate that the government is still attempting to ascertain their “actual strength” See (Mukhopadhyay 2007; Hamid 2007). Al Muhajiroun was a breakaway group which achieved notoriety for its controversial and racist views in the mid-nineties (Taji-Farouki 2000). It was however short-lived and suffered its demise in 2004 (Connor 2005). Although a cause for concern on select campuses (Tyrer 2003), the scale of their antics in this period have never been ascertained. By the time of fieldwork, the group had disbanded.
4.1.2. Muslim Students and Rushdie: We are all HT

Invisibility may take the form of people not being seen because one “knows” them in virtue of some fabricated preconception of group formation (Goldberg 1996).

Universities were not impervious to the racist politics that accompanied the Rushdie protests. Whilst the Satanic Verses was being wielded “as a stick with which to beat the immigrants” (Asad 1990, p.259), Muslim students were experiencing similar ‘beatings’. According to Mcroy, it is at the Rushdie juncture that Muslim students begin to experience their initial “estrangement” within the NUS (Mcroy 2001, p.75). In March 1989, for example, the ISOC at Imperial College London were under pressure from their student union to condemn Khomeini’s fatwa or face being banned (ibid). However, at Cambridge University Muslim students were rejecting this ‘fundamentalist’ litmus test. Instead, expressing the need to assert themselves as Muslims without being depicted by the media as the “ultimate threat of the nineties” (Ahmed, The Times 2nd May 1992).

Although Muslim students of varying persuasions were to suffer the racist fallout of the Rushdie affair, it was groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir that came to epitomise and symbolise an endemic ‘fundamentalist’ threat. By 1995, the Hizb had acquired “fundamentalist” status, receiving annual condemnation at national student conferences and meriting publicity in a spate of French articles claiming that “British universities acted as the breeding ground for a new generation of ‘fundamentalists” (Bright, Guardian 1st November 1994).

With uncanny similarity to accounts of the Rushdie affair, leaflets distributed by the Socialist Workers Party, claimed that the Hizb “were being used as a stick to beat all Muslims” (British Muslim Monthly Survey 1995). Tyrer narrated of the same leaflet that NUS conference had seen the arbitrary branding of all Muslims as “stupid, backward and ignorant” with “indiscriminate allegations of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ levelled against visibly ethnicised delegates” (Tyrer 2004, p.37).

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5 Rather than reflect Muslim estrangement within the NUS, this example underscores the climate of racist hostility and the spectre of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ in unions more generally; since at the time Imperial College was not a member of the NUS and had not been since 1923.

6 According to student reports, delegates witnessed Muslim students being harassed by the police at the 1994 NUS conference following scuffles between the organisers and HT (Bristow, Times Higher 2nd August 1996).

7 The British Muslim Monthly Survey is produced by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at the University of Birmingham. They have produced monthly abstracts of press reporting on Islam in Britain since 1993.
Such observations were said to characterise NUS (anti)racist politics for the proceeding decade; a period which also reflected the lack of an organised ‘Muslim’ presence (Q-News, 27th September 1996; Nabi Forthcoming). At the 1995 NUS conference, according to Tyrer, “never before had the presence of Muslim students in the traditionally elite domain of British higher education been so openly debated” (Tyrer 2004, p.36). However, that the focus of the debate was formulated as “an alleged threat to the academy and to non-Muslims posed by the spectre of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’” (ibid) was decisive. It paved the way for NUS anti-racist fetes and their high-profile campaigning against small unrepresentative Islamic groups (Leary 2004, p.2).

However, that such campaigning extended itself to (implicitly) include all Muslim student political activity, including solidarity with Palestinians and Bosnians, was becoming a source of grievance amongst NUS delegates. Further, NUS support for its Muslim membership was considered highly circumspect. For whilst Muslim students were claiming to be routinely subject to violence and political suppression, the NUS were said to be “failing to mention” such instances, and instead favouring other ‘liberation’ campaigns relating to women and sexuality (British Muslim Monthly Survey 1995).

The deployment of ‘fundamentalism’ was thus seen by many students as a political device. As argued by one long-standing member of the NUS during fieldwork, it was positively “harnessed” in ways that branded Muslim students the chief perpetrators of racist violence, rather than its routinely ignored victims (Interview; NUS official, Stephen 2006). Questions of anti-Muslim racism in the nineties thus appear to have been short-circuited and ‘fundamentalist’ formed a shorthand descriptor for Muslim students who defied their political exclusion. The conflation of Muslim political identities with ‘fundamentalism’ meant that within the terms of Islamophobic discourse, all Muslim students were rendered ‘HT’. This racist ‘fundamentalist’ discourse enjoyed broad appeal. The details of this are elaborated below.

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8 The activism of Black students during this period, on what terms they organised and their role in campaigns for Palestine are not explored. The history of the Black Students Movement within the NUS, and the involvement of Muslim students within it deserves further research. Fieldwork revealed a complex relationship between the Black Student Movement, FOSIS and those (notably Muslim women) that navigated between these constituencies.

9 Such campaigning was institutionalised in the successive endorsement of ‘liberation’ motions. NUS motions banning HT include those submitted in 1994, 1995, and 2004. For example NUS motion 116 (1995) condemned HT for preaching death, hatred, inciting violence and denying the holocaust. In 2005, a motion was submitted to remove HT from the ‘no platform’ policy on grounds that claims of racism/extremism were made on ‘false accusation’. This was not upheld (Observed at the 2005 NUS conference, Blackpool).
4.1.3. The Campus Watch Scare

It is on the back of Campus Watch, an ‘anti-racist’ hotline set up in 1994\(^\text{10}\) that charges of Muslim student ‘fundamentalism’ reached a notable pitch. This was played out in media discourse. For example, in October 1995, NUS president Jim Murphy remarked in a leading broadsheet that “Hizb al-Tahrir was the biggest single extremist threat at the moment” (Carvel, Guardian 31st October 1995). He went on to claim of this putative ‘fact’ that;

The college authorities know it, the police know it, and it is astonishing that Michael Howard, the home secretary, is doing nothing about it (ibid).

According to a separate article, on the basis of Campus Watch, the NUS were calling for the DfEE (Department for Employment and Education) and the Home Office to ban the Hizb (Bright, Guardian 7th November 1995); and the Secretary of State for Education and Employment had “promised to push the Home Office to take action” (Sanders, Times Higher 3rd November 1995). Thus, within media reportage Muslim students loomed large as ‘extremists’ within the campus body. It is peculiar however, that an unsubstantiated dossier was providing the basis for promises of Home Office action. Although media reportage claimed over 70% of extremist attacks were logged as being perpetrated by Hizb al-Tahrir (Bright, Guardian 7th November 1995),\(^\text{11}\) how victims identified their perpetrators (as opposed to other groups/individuals) was never clarified or openly documented by Campus Watch.\(^\text{12}\)

At the time, the Muslim magazine Q-news noted that the “high profile anti-racism hotline” was making far-reaching claims “based on anecdotal reports, none of which were independently verified” (Q-News 1995, p.2 cited in Mcroy 2006, p.189). These same concerns were later raised by academic researchers who noted that these fundamentalist scares were rooted in the “lobbying activities” of students rather than “empirically reliable research” (Tyrer 2004, p.37; Mcroy 2006).

\(^\text{10}\) This was set up by the (UJS) Union of Jewish Students and Searchlight in 1994 for victims of racist hate-crime on campuses. The report was jointly co-authored by the NUS and UJS.

\(^\text{11}\) These were reported to include more than 100 instances of offensive literature, 50 reports of offensive meetings, 47 threats of violence and 31 acts of physical intimidation or harassment (Carvel, Guardian 31st October 1995).

\(^\text{12}\) There were also confused media accounts of HT, making references to the ‘Hitz uh tahrir’ and ‘Hizbollah’ (Honigsbaum, London Evening Standard 1st August 1994). Hizbollah is a Shia Lebanese political and armed resistance group initially formed in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The confusion may explain heightened responses to the Hizb.
Questions around substantive evidence however did not prevent such claims from being publicly circulated and authorised by consecutive NUS presidencies. For example, in 1996, NUS president Douglas Trainer, praised Campus Watch as a “massively important project” claiming it had “received hundreds of phone calls from students who had been verbally abused by far right and Islamist groups” (Jewish Chronicle, 23/08/96 cited in British Monthly Muslim Survey, August 1996). Although publicly challenged for having “done nothing to lessen anti-Muslim prejudice” (Bristow, Times Higher 2nd August 1996), Trainer dismissed this “revolutionary communist” (Trainer, Times Higher 9th August 1996) perspective as unrepresentative of student views. Instead, he reminded his audience that “the real situation on campus has been well documented by the THES and by other national media” (ibid. Emphasis Mine). Recourse to national media to substantiate claims that emerged within interested student circles, was however, circuitously tautological. For rather than elucidate the basis of such claims, Trainer drew attention to the way media reports authenticated his claims; reflecting back the same putative charges of Muslim student ‘fundamentalism’ circulating Higher Education. In this sense, Muslim student ‘fundamentalism’ began to form an internally consistent and pervasive “hegemonic formation” (Howarth and Stavrakis 2000, p.14), that was stabilised through repetition, rather than substantiation and through the occlusion of ‘Other’ forms of knowledge (Said 1978, p.22-23). Indeed, in spite of the scepticism associated with the helpline report, its claims quickly suffused Higher Education and beyond.13

4.1.4. The ‘Fundamentalist’ Effect
As one interviewee retrospectively observed of this highly racialised climate, by the time these notions “filter down to student unions, it’s fact, and…the average student officer isn’t going to be particularly discerning” (Interview; Stephen, February 2006 Emphasis Mine). This observation certainly resonates with two instances reported by the media in 1995, around the same time the NUS were involved in campaigns against ‘fundamentalism’.

The first involved the case of Imran Choudhry, President of University of North London Students Union. He found himself at the centre of NUS and media attention

13 Generating equal alarm in NATFHE, it was reported that “fundamentalist Islamic groups pose the most serious threat to the safety of gay and lesbian staff and students on university and college campuses in Britain” (Johnston, Times Higher, 16th August 1996 Emphasis Mine).
when along with five other Muslim students, he was elected on to the union executive. He stood accused of being involved in a ‘fundamentalist’ coup. However, when it transpired Choudhry’s role was actually ‘sports representative’, these charges quickly dissipated (Bright, Guardian 7th November 1995; Hussain, Muslim News 23rd July 1999). Such pre-emptive readings of Muslim political activity can be seen as the direct fallout of NUS campaigning. In particular, the specifically ‘fundamentalist’ terms in which they were articulated, as opposed to a liberal democratic one (based on egalitarianism in the union, or a renewed interest amongst students in sports, for example), suggests that ‘Muslim students’ were the subject of prior assessments. These assessments involved the essentialisation of Muslim political activity as necessarily transgressive. This can also be detected in the following example.¹⁴

In October 1995, it was reported that London Guildhall University made an unprecedented move in closing the university amidst fears of a ‘fundamentalist’ attack when the Hizb were found demonstrating in close proximity. According to the NUS, this was to verify the dangers posed by the Hizb (Bright, Guardian 7th November 1995; Trainer, Times Higher 9th August 1996). However, according to more discerning media reportage, the Hizb were not bent on threatening university staff, students or its premises. They were said to be demonstrating against a racist attack involving a ‘young Asian woman’ being assaulted by a member of the rugby club (Bright, Guardian 7th November 1995; Sanders, Times Higher 13th October 1995). However media claims of a “300-strong demonstration by the group” (Charter, The Times 31st October 1995) meant that questions of racism on campus remained unaddressed. Further, instead of focussing on the young woman who had suffered the racist assault, the NUS were instead focussing, at least in all public reportage, on a ‘fundamentalist’ threat.

This latter case exemplifies a much broader problem with NUS campaigning. That is, the way the NUS magnified a perceived ‘fundamentalist’ threat, yet simultaneously marginalised the racism Muslim students were subject to. These disparities were to persist. According to Tyrer, the NUS failed to “make any noteworthy stand on the questions of Islamophobia until the 2001-02 session and even then [did so]... grudgingly” (Tyrer 2003, p.96). Further, that this admission was “tacked on to the end of one of its routine campaigning statements on fundamentalism” (ibid. p.132 n.10), reflected the way attending to Islamophobia remained a secondary afterthought.

¹⁴ Other examples include the closure of prayer rooms (Hamid 2007, p.149).
Interestingly, these ‘admissions’ appeared to be in response to growing critiques that NUS anti-‘fundamentalist’ campaigning was unduly focused on the Muslim student community. This explained subsequent claims of the “sterling work of the NUS” with regard to its Muslim membership; its role in “leading the campaign to fight Islamophobia” (NUS 2002); and that ‘anti-racists’ were challenging Muslim ‘fringe’ groups for the protection and “wellbeing” of “all...students, particularly Muslim students” (Major, Guardian 5th November 2001).

4.1.5. Extremism and Intolerance on Campus; the ‘CVCP’ (Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom) Report

*Campus Watch* can be considered the first in a series of interventions regarding ‘Muslim student fundamentalism’. This paved the way for the 1998 ‘CVCP’ report *Extremism and Intolerance on Campus* which emerged in response to the alleged “experience of extremism and intolerance of various kinds on...campuses in recent years” (CVCP 1998, p.5). “Disquiet” expressed by the Muslim News ahead of the report appeared justified (*Muslim News 1996 cited in British Muslim Monthly Survey 1996*). For it quickly became apparent that the ‘various kinds’ of extremism to which the report referred appeared to be of the ‘Muslim’ kind, (Yaqub 1998 cited in Gilliat-Ray 1999, p.41; Tyrer 2004).

Three key aspects of the CVCP report were subject to academic and popular critique. These included ‘Muslim’ (only) exemplars of extremism, the racialised precedent upon which ‘extremism’ was to be detected, and the lack of consultation with Muslim students. Here, these critiques are briefly outlined but also further contextualised by elaborating on the racialised, legal and disciplinary thrust of the report.

First, the report employed several exemplars of ‘extremism’. However, these appeared to function as a substitute for a clear definition of extremism. They also pertained to incidences either involving Muslim students or regarding claims circulated about Muslim students.\(^\text{15}\) Thus although these exemplars were referred to as “generic examples of conduct” (CVCP 1998, p.29), they all coincided with “unsubstantiated allegations of Muslim hate crimes” encountered during Tyrer’s fieldwork (Tyrer 2004, p.29).

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\(^{15}\) These included for example; coercion to religious conformity such as dress or praying, attempting to ban another group or society, intimidating or harassing other groups on campus, disrupting meetings and circulating racist leaflets (CVCP 1998, p.29).
Of particular concern however, was that all of the exemplars implied that Muslims comprised the chief perpetrators (not victims) of racist violence. It is important to note however, that this discourse of Muslim perpetration was being invoked within a context of a legal deficit that ignored the protection of Muslim groups. This is significant since the report located itself within existing legislation against which “universities must operate” (CVCP 1998, p.12; see also Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.40). Such legislation (i.e. Part 3 of the Public Order Act) precluded the specific protection of religious groups. The report reproduced these omissions in its ‘key exemplars’ of misconduct (e.g. distribution of racist leaflets and racial harassment) (CVCP 1998, p.29,44). Hence, whilst the exemplars of ‘extremist’ behaviour focussed on ‘Muslim’ perpetrators, victims were defined in exclusively ‘racial/ethnic’ terms. This produced a blind-spot. Whilst Jewish and Sikh students were to fit comfortably within the CVCP’s ‘racial/ethnic’ framework, Muslim students were at once rendered legally invisible, yet hyper-visible in their role as ‘fundamentalist’ perpetrators. Challenges to this racist hegemonic narrative in the Runnymede Trusts report on Islamophobia (CBMI 1997) clearly went ignored (Hussain, Muslim News 23rd July 1999).

Second, the report was considered “dangerous” reading (Tyrer 2004, p.40) because it relied on racialised precedent. For example, in view of detecting ‘extremist’ behaviour, it claimed that;

…reasonable belief or suspicion will suffice. This may arise through previous experience, whether at that institution or elsewhere. We do not think it is possible or indeed desirable to attempt to be more specific as to what is meant by reasonable belief or suspicion in this context (CVCP 1998, p.16).

This led Tyrer to argue that;

the logics of the CVCP report are the logics of all racist miscarriages of justice, recommending that judgements do not even need to be based on fact but simply on patterns of crime assumed to be related to particular groups (Tyrer 2004, p.39-40).

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16 This article was based on Phd research conducted in the late nineties around the time the CVCP report was issued (Tyrer 2003).
However, the report also asserted that “each particular event must be considered on individual merits or facts” (CVCP 1998, p. 20-21). Clearly, the logic of this guidance was inconsistent, but also so loosely threaded that universities could attribute guilt by association, particularly since the report was basing its understanding of ‘extremism’ on “common sense” (ibid. p.12) and through a series of exemplars closely related to Muslim students.

However, the racialised precedent upon which the report was based could also be discerned through other aspects of the report. For example, the report appeared to serve as a disciplinary tool with which to endorse pre-emptive action against ‘unruly’ students. This can be garnered from other aspects; notably those that encouraged student depoliticisation through restricted funds, and within draft model guidance, suggestions that student posters or flyers should “normally be presented in English” (CVCP 1998, p.43); clearly a heavily racialised directive aimed at bi-lingual and international students. Students (and management) were thus, in the finest detail, being told how to be political and of course how to identify ‘extremism’. Indeed, the Chair of the report was not merely advising universities how to manage and regulate student behaviour on campus, he was also suggesting that such abiding behaviour ought to be a precondition for university entry (ibid, p.7). The report could therefore be viewed as endorsing disciplinary powers only previously considered, but enabled by the widespread view that (Muslim) ‘extremism’ posed a significant threat to students and staff on British campuses. This certainly resonated with the views of other Muslim critics, that claimed; “none of these powers have ever...been used against any group other than Muslims” (Bodi, Guardian 19th March 2002), suggesting that Muslim students posed a specific threat.

It is worth noting that in the context of fieldwork in the academic session 2005-2006, the CVCP report had implicitly become institutionally recognised as a legitimate

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17 The time-scale allowed for the report, (e.g. the consultation process and interim report of May 1997) suggest that it was not a knee-jerk reaction but as the report claimed, “carefully considered” (CVCP 1998, p.5). That Zellick, the chair of the report, had mentioned the issue some two years earlier, suggests that Muslim student political activity was on the agenda; “I am sure other heads of institutions will find it extremely valuable to have some clear advice on matters such as when I can and cannot stop meetings” (Richards, Times Higher 1st November 1996).

18 The report bases this recommendation on earlier guidance (Students Unions: A Guide 1995, DfEE) noting that funds for political activities ought to be re-directed to “street lighting” rather than to “pay for coaches to transport students to demonstrations” (CVCP 1998, p.32, 50).

19 This suggestion was made before the report (Tyrrell, Independent 23rd January 1997).

20 Bodi was a former student at the University of Manchester in the early nineties and involved in campaigns for Palestine. Exceptions to his point can be seen in several cases in recent years disqualifying Christian unions on grounds that they abrogate equal opportunities policies in terms of a Christian only membership and presidency (Bates, Guardian 23rd November 2006).
basis upon which to proceed and legislate Muslim student activity. University management, for example, quite un-problematically resorted to its disciplinary powers. This became apparent in an interview with one senior staff member at Erdon, who cited some of the reports specific guidance on ‘free speech’ and union protocol for ‘external speakers’;

For example if they [Muslim students] wanted to bring a speaker to the union…if we thought that that speaker was likely to incite racial hatred or violence then we would have to take that very seriously as to whether that person would be allowed (Interview; Janet 2005).

Whilst another staff member at Lomonde referred to the report as a ‘guiding’ document pertaining to Muslim students (Interview; Margaret 2005). The reports directives were also being wielded by various union officials, an issue further explored in Chapter Six.

The third aspect of the report that invited considerable criticism was the lack of consultation with Muslim students. In spite of an interim report, and nearly fifty responses from interested parties (CVCP 1998, p.5) the list of consulted parties indicated no Muslim institution, academic, or student group. Although reflecting broad (student and teacher) union participation and several Jewish institutions such as the UJS (Union of Jewish Students), JBD (Jewish Board of Deputies), as well as the Inter-Parliamentary Council Against Anti-Semitism, the views of the Muslim student body and recognition of racism directed at them were conspicuously absent. This discrepancy did not go unnoticed, as Gilliat-Ray noted, FOSIS were “sensitive to [their] recent exclusion from the [CVCP] consultation process”, especially considering their “reminder” to the CVCP of their willingness to co-operate (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.133). In spite of this exclusion, the CVCP denied any Islamophobic bias, maintaining that “we took everyone’s view on board” (Q-News 1998 cited in British Muslim Monthly Survey 1998).

In the same Q-News article, the CVCP defended its lack of consultation with Muslim students on the premise that “it would have been up to the NUS to represent organisations like FOSIS” (ibid), although this type of representation was not considered sufficient for the UJS. However, the NUS confirmed there had been no consultation between itself and any other Muslim student body in the process of the report (Q-News

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21 This was amidst statements from the JBD noting that “the truth of the matter is that the report is in response to complaints by Jewish students who have been victims of Islamic extremism”. This was denied by the CVCP, although certainly reflected in the reports bias towards a Jewish constituency (British Muslim Monthly Survey 1998).
Thus, neither the CVCP nor the NUS considered it reasonable to consult those students whom the report was most likely to adversely affect. Herein lies a central contention of the report; Muslim students were collectively subsumed within a ‘fundamentalist’ discourse, but remained absent as a consultative constituency and moreover, as potential victims of racism.

It is with each successive reference to the CVCP report, the ‘fact’ of an all pervasive Muslim ‘fundamentalist’ threat to campus harmony was being made ever more convincingly, yet without adequate basis, research or it would seem, referencing. For example, in 2006, Michael Whine presented a paper at RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) citing the CVCP report. He claimed that of the thirty two institutional responses to the interim report “the majority [had noted] that students were being intimidated” by groups such as HT and Al Muhajiroun (Whine 2006). However this claim was neither made in the initial report, nor is it suggested in Whine’s subsequent reference (Birt 2002). Claims reporting such figures were in fact being circulated in a handful of media articles pertaining to Campus Watch (Carvel, Guardian 31st October 1995; Bright, Guardian 7th November 1995) and by the JBD (British Muslim Monthly Survey 1998), but not the CVCP report.

4.1.6.  Ever So Lightly Does It...

From listening to NUS historically you would have got the impression that the main racist threat on campus is not the BNP, far right groups, institutional racism but actually was a small marginal Islamic group such as HT and Al Muhajiroun. That’s what’s been portrayed (Interview; Stephen 2006).

It was in 1999, following the CVCP report, that the UJS and NUS jointly published, *Racism: A Light Sleeper*, an anti-racism handbook. Introduced by the NUS president, he asserted that “the threat from Islamic extremist organisation continues to bring fear to many campuses” (NUS 1999, p.3 cited in IHRC 2000, p.17). Like earlier *Campus Watch* and CVCP reports, there was no consultation with FOSIS, or other Muslim students. Nor was there mention of Muslim students as potential victims.

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22 Michael Whine is International Affairs Director at the Community Security Trust, the defence agency of the UK Jewish community, and Defence and Group Relations Director of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.

23 The handbook is no longer available.
victims of racism with the exception of one uncontroversial example referring to lack of halal food provisions (ibid. p.36).

The report noted that the;

UJS... worked with the British organisation of Sikh students, the National Hindu Forum, the National Black Student Alliance against a common threat from Islamic extremists (ibid. p.25).

Again, the conspicuous absence of FOSIS implied the culpability of Muslim students generally in the ‘extremist’ problem. This was not only implicitly assumed through their absence, but explicitly present in a list of ‘extremist’ scenarios that curiously resounded with exemplars from the CVCP report; “anti-Zionism literature on the Jewish notice board”, and a “Sikh girl being verbally abused by Muslim extremists in your foyer” were just two of the specific examples listed (ibid. p.36). Whilst death threats against Muslim students for proposing anti-Zionist motions might qualify as ‘extremist’ or racist, such examples failed to be included.

Thus, whilst none of these racist scenarios included Muslim students as likely victims, they were personified as ‘extremists’. One way this was achieved was by listing anti-Zionism as a form of racism (ibid. p.36). However, in eliding the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, Muslim critics of Israel were consequently stigmatised as ‘extremist’ and anti-Semitic.

This conflation has historically formed a significant point of contention for students campaigning on the Palestinian question and those seeking to defend Israel (See for example Webber 1993 cited in Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.40). Whilst pro-Palestinian campaigning has typically centred on critiques of Zionism as a nationalist (colonialist) and more recently, apartheid, project involving the dispossession of the Palestinians (for example Macleod, Guardian 26th February 2002; Tyrer 2003, p.149; Young 2004; Howe 2004), Pro-Zionists in the NUS have often equated Jewish identity with Israel.25

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24 This was reported at the University of Manchester in 1996. The student claimed to have been pressured by the university into withdrawing the motion (British Muslim Monthly Survey 1996b).

25 Although as many orthodox and radical Jewish groups/individuals signify, (Jews for Justice, Jews against Zionism etc) this is contested. Following this, whilst anti-Semitism can be understood as racism against Jews, anti-Zionism refers to resistance to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, not to Jewish self-determination. Whilst this distinction is often obscured, most recently in view of claims of ‘a new anti-Semitism’, it is maintained throughout the thesis (see for example Klug 2005; Butler 2004; Pappe 2004).
Inevitably, this equation has effected definitions of anti-Semitism but also functioned to propel Islamophobic discourse as elaborated below.

4.1.7. Context and Pretext: Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and Islamophobia

The NUS handbook both supplemented and complemented its CVCP predecessor. In turn, the CVCP report was reliant on the controversial and unsubstantiated Campus Watch Report. These three ‘texts’ can be understood as key pillars in the ‘fundamentalist’ strategic formation that emerged and crystallised throughout the nineties. Comprising a tightly knit constellation, each formed a precedent for the other, (re)affirming and re-enacting the ‘fundamentalist’ threat.

However, it is not possible to understand either of these reports claims of Muslim student fundamentalism without recognising their preoccupation around ‘free speech’ and the right of Muslim students to organise on the Palestinian issue. Indeed, the issue of banning, intimidation, anxieties around meetings and public speaking, as well as restricting eligibility for some national and religious societies in the CVCP report (CVCP 1998, p.6,49) directly reflected these concerns.

The CVCP report was considered by its critics, to “confer unprecedented powers on universities to ban Muslim individuals and groups from campuses for exercising freedom of speech” (Bodi, Guardian 19th March 2002). These unprecedented powers, Bodi argued, far exceeded merely curbing the activities of the Hizb and Al Muhajiroun (ibid), as some of his critics were claiming (Mckenna, Guardian Letters, 12th March 2002). Rather, they brought within its remit any activity, speech, meeting, leaflet, demonstration or motion that might induce anxiety in students with Zionist inclinations. Resultantly, the report was claimed to serve as an institutional mandate to curb criticisms of Israel.

Bodi’s critique resonates with other accounts and experiences. At the time, Muslim political mobilisation on the Palestinian issue led to countless attempts by pro-Zionists to stifle debate and stigmatise activists as anti-Semitic. This was expressed in the conflation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism in the NUS ‘anti-racist’ guide, but was also indicative of a much broader NUS stance that sought to “render all criticisms of Israel

26 The most recent contentions have involved unions and the UJS seeking to adopt the 2004 EUMC definition of anti-Semitism; defined as a “hatred towards Jews” which may also “target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity”. See (EUMC 2004; Omonira-Oyekanmi, Guardian 29th March 2009; PSC, Palestine Solidarity Campaign 2010).

27 The CVCP’S guidelines governing, posters, notices, temporary signs and the distribution of literature reflect this preoccupation with student activities on the Palestinian question (CVCP 1998 para 8. p.43).
anti-Semitic” (Tyrer 2003, p.149). This blurring has been reported in various media over the past two decades (Birt, Q-News 2002; Bodi, Guardian 5th March 2002; Macleod, Guardian 26th February 2002; Mcroy, MAB Online 7th October 2004; British Muslim Monthly Survey 1996), and contextualised in case analysis by human rights organisations (Ansari 2006, p.15-17) and other Phd research (Tyrer 2003, p.137-173) including my own (See Chapter Six). It also persists, by definition, in more recent accounts of ‘extremist’ Muslim activity on British campuses (Glees and Pope 2005, p.81).

It is arguably this conflation of anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism that has relied on and allowed the discourse of ‘fundamentalism’ a prominent role in ‘anti-racist’ campaigns. This was a recurrent and banal theme during fieldwork, both amongst NUS activists and on campuses where there had been pro-Palestinian activity. For example, it was repeatedly claimed by a number of interviewees that anti-Muslim racism was instrumental to the activities of Zionist supporters. As one longstanding member of the NUS asserted;

Instead of being challenged in the student movement and the leadership of the student movement, it [anti-Muslim racism] has either been neglected or harnessed by sections of the leadership to silence critics of the Israeli occupation (Interview; Stephen 2006).

Following this, the ‘anti-racist’ agenda within the NUS and in select campuses was said to be defined through its exclusion of Muslims. The picture that emerged, was that muffling the Palestinian question altered the very structures and tenor of the NUS anti-racist movement altogether, through its definitive exclusion of Muslim students. This was symbolised at the time of fieldwork by the peculiar absence of Muslim representation on the anti-racist committee. This committee reserved two positions for Black and Jewish students and one for Irish students (ibid), however allowed no representation for Muslim students, although they were an active constituency. Attempts to prevent the full-time role of an NUS Black students officer were not unrelated. The Black Students movement was generally supportive of Palestinian self-determination. However, that it took over ten years of campaigning to secure the position of an official NUS Black Students Officer, (achieving full status in April 2002) in spite of having an ‘anti-racist committee’ was considered another obstacle to pro-

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28 This can also be seen more broadly in the work of some ‘Black’ anti-racist feminists who are keen to articulate the nuances of the Zionist settler state, yet feel justified in claiming that “Muslims all over the world (unlike most Palestinians however) equate Zionists, Israelis and Jews” (Yuval-Davis 2007). According to this, ‘Muslims’ are predisposed to anti-Semitism (see also Tyrer 2003, p.137-151).
Palestinian campaigning.\textsuperscript{20} This pattern of NUS (‘anti’) racist discourse was iterated by several students/staff at Erdon. Chris (lecturer) and Haider (Phd student) argued that Zionist supporters “colonised anti-racist organisations” to ensure sure that those organisations were unable to direct their criticism towards the Israeli occupation. Comparing this with White Apartheid South Africa, Chris noted how those involved in ‘anti-racist’ groups attempted to deflect attention away from potential critique to preserve their racial hegemony. In the case of pro-Zionists it was to “keep a focus on anti-Semitism” (Interview; Chris 2005).

In this sense, ‘anti-racist’ campaigning was perceived to be an “instrument” of Zionism that would “intimidate and bar the participation of Muslim students” (Interview; Anon. 2006).\textsuperscript{30} However, whilst this concurred with some of the accounts noted above (see for example Birt, \textit{Q-News 2002})\textsuperscript{31} it also tended to obscure the way other groups, such as the BNP, and Hindu nationalists (Hindu Vivek Kendra) also instrumentalised the ‘fundamentalist’ phenomena (Tyrer 2003, p.175). Indeed, in recent years numerous groups and alliances have publicly mobilised against alleged claims of a Muslim (student) ‘fundamentalism’ (Leary 2004; Akhtar et al 2005; AWAAZ 2007; Coleman 2007).\textsuperscript{32} On one campus for example, alliances between groups as diverse as UJS, Labour and LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transvestite), were formed in opposition to the ISOC during union elections. This was accompanied by heated speculation about the ISOC’s alleged ‘fundamentalist’ activities (Interview; Anon. 2005).

Although certainly effective in curbing dissent, as illustrated by several requests for anonymity and as further discussed in Chapter Six, these tactics did not inhibit Muslim student participation altogether. Rather, it served, in some quarters, to achieve a more organised and determined Muslim student constituency (El-Shayyal 2006; \textit{Lewis, Guardian 4th April 2006}; Nabi Forthcoming). However, in spite of an increased student activism\textsuperscript{33}, during fieldwork, the spectre of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was firmly

\textsuperscript{20} This irregularity was raised at the Black Students conference in Birmingham, 2006 by the Black Students president at the time, Pav Akhtar.

\textsuperscript{30} This interviewee preferred to remain anonymous for fear of repercussion.

\textsuperscript{31} Birt is commissioning editor of Kube Publishing and has authored numerous academic works on Muslim politics in Britain, see for example; (Birt 2005; 2006a; 2009).

\textsuperscript{32} Awaaz is a South Asia citizens web forum focussing on the far right in India and globally.

\textsuperscript{33} The exponential rise of Muslim students attending NUS conference under the FOSIS \textit{jamaat} is notable. Between 2001-2006 Muslim attendance more than quadrupled from 7 to 120 students. Although this figure has since dwindled (70 in 2007 and 50-60 in 2008) FOSIS has retained a secure foothold within NUS politics (Interviews; Amun, Yunus 2005; Correspondence with FOSIS President, April 2008 and (FOSIS 2006c).
entrenched, providing the basis for numerous claims of Muslim student terrorism and subsequently, state interventions. This is further discussed in Part Two, but first, a glance at more recent sector guidance.

4.1.8. ECU Guidance: A Belated Corrective

Inundated with requests from universities, the ECU (Equality Challenge Unit), in conjunction with Uuk (Universities UK) and SCOP (Standing Conference of Principals) produced a report to guide institutions on how to address hate-crimes and intolerance on campus. The report was timely and framed, not by (state) security considerations that were being prioritised at the time, (further discussed below), but by a need to tackle hate-crimes within a revised legal framework to its predecessor (CVCP 1998). Bearing in mind critiques of the 1998 guidance, the ECU led report explicitly stated that it was not to supplement earlier CVCP guidance, but to “replace” it altogether (ECU/UUK/SCOP 2005, p.7).

This introduction set the tone, departing significantly from the 1998 report, both in the way it was conducted and in its descriptions of Muslim students. Thus, it rejected a “one size fits all approach’ and advocated a “case by case basis” approach (ibid. p.7). It also undertook extensive consultation with numerous bodies, taking care not to exclude Muslim students. Offering a revised legislative context (i.e. the RRAA 2000, Employment Equality regulations 2003 and the then forthcoming incitement to religious hatred), it included religious collectivities and individuals as key targets of hate-crimes. Recognising an increased ‘Islamophobia’, it was also alert to the way in Higher Education “hate crimes and intolerance may take new forms” (ibid. p.10).

It is not difficult to discern the subtext for many of the examples provided, for instance, “negative coverage of particular groups” (ibid. p.10) and examples pertaining to lawful speech (ibid. p.33) appear to be direct reference to Muslim students. Significantly, it stated that students had the right to freedom of expression, including “criticising a particular regime” (ibid. p.42), a reference, most significant for pro-Palestinian campaigners. Crucially, however, Muslim students were identified not simply as perpetrators of hate-crimes but, in a new climate, as its key victims (ibid. p.13).

The report certainly represented a radical departure from its 1998 predecessor, addressing a number of retrospective and prospective concerns pertaining to Muslim students. Significantly, in a context where racial/religious equality had been suspended
as a government priority, the report sought to maintain the sector’s commitments to a clear set of equality principles.

Although certainly welcomed amidst the barrage of state directives aimed at containing Muslim student political expression (further discussed below), the ECU report was also criticised. Seven years after the initial CVCP report, this new guidance was seen (by some) as a belated admission and an implicit corrective to a history of institutionalised Islamophobia. In particular, it was seen to side-step the “appalling record...of abuses against the Muslim student community” (Interview; Anon, 2005). This it was argued, was to be found in the way the inclusion of right-wing political extremism and animal rights extremism was a detraction, a “red herring” from the way the sector had been complicit in nurturing Islamophobia. Thus, although addressing all forms of ‘hate-crime’, it was considered to be;

…shying away from the core issue which is, we have tarnished and problematised the Muslim student community, as a specific issue, and we are not now honest enough to admit we have all been complicit in that targeting and villification (ibid.).

This critique invoked a much longer and broader history of institutionalised Islamophobia in Higher Education, than the report conceded. It also alluded to the singularity with which Muslim students had been problematised; something reflected in the number of conferences, reports, and public addresses devoted to Muslim students.

Thus, although a corrective to earlier guidance and presenting a much needed balance against the state’s heavy-handed approach to Muslims, the report was silent on the sectors culpability in (re)producing and nurturing Islamophobic discourses. Instead, it located racism as an articulation of student groups and individuals; nothing to do with universities. Indeed, the role of universities in the racialisation of Muslim students emerged with some concern during fieldwork and is further discussed below.

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34 The updated 2007 guidelines sought to clarify the position of universities amidst revised counter-terrorist legislation (e.g. Terrorism Act 2006) and balance this with the sectors obligations under the Race Amendment (2000) (ECU 2007).
Part Two: The ‘War on Terror’, Prevent and Muslim Students

4.2.1. Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)

Laden with prior and often pathological assessments about Muslim students, the discourse of Muslim ‘fundamentalism’ in the early nineties produced some enduring reverberations. Proceeding beyond 2001, and within the more immediate ‘war on terror’ geo-political context of fieldwork, this ‘fundamentalist’ formation has not only been maintained (albeit with some variation), but buttressed with more serious undertones.\(^{35}\)

For claims of Muslim student extremism were no longer being played out in student politics,\(^{36}\) or inviting criticism from university authorities, but more directly, beginning to inform state and intelligence interventions in Higher Education.

In 2004 for example, restricted government reports identified the profile of ‘extremist’ Muslims as “well educated” “with degrees or technical/professional qualifications” (FCO 2004). At the time, talk of surveying extremist activity on select campuses formed part of an exploratory, rather than conclusive programme. Significantly, it was considered that a number of ‘radicalised British Muslims’ were ‘groomed’ by ‘extremists’ outside of university religious/ethnic societies (ibid. p.12), even though some of these societies were considered a cause for concern. It is on this basis that the FCO sought to sponsor particular Muslim student group activities (ibid. p.14).

The London bombings in July 2005, however, sharpened the government’s counter-terrorist strategies. Whereas before the approach had ostensibly been to assess and survey, these earlier designs were now fast-tracked into a government programme so extensive in scope that it has been described by Liberty’s director as “the biggest domestic spying programme ...in Britain in modern times” (Dodd, Guardian 16th October 2009). Further, it was said to comprise of “information-gathering” and “spying... directed at people because of their religion, and not because of their behaviour” (ibid). This is not to suggest that prior to 7/7 Muslim students on British

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\(^{35}\) Al Muhajiroun, for example, were implicated in Chechen terrorism and Muslim students from North Africa and the Middle East were also said to be monitored by MI5 (Wilson et al, Guardian 24th February 2001).

\(^{36}\) For example, in the ‘war on terror’, the routine stigma associated with groups such as the Hizb in student politics began to stale. Instead, it was those Muslim students that were being voted into the NUS executive that were being singled out as ‘Islamist’ infiltrators through their MAB (Muslim Association of Britain) connections. At the 2005 NUS conference, for example, the AWL (Alliance for Workers Liberty) and UJS (Union of Jewish Students) circulated a leaflet listing MAB as a proscribed organisation. The leaflet did not however “sufficiently distinguish between banned groups and the Muslim association of Britain which was a perfectly legitimate organisation” (Henry 2005 para 2.1.6, p.6). This represented a significant shift since prior to the British anti-war movement, MAB received no attention in the NUS. These strategic shifts in the student movement were a response to growing Muslim activism and a renewed anti-war alliance between socialist/Muslim groups.
campuses were not subject to surveillance (Hollingsworth and Fielding 1998, p.12, 176 cited in Birt 2006, p.697; Tyrer 2003, p.231-234; Ansari 2006, p.21). However, it is in the aftermath of the July Bombings, that Muslim communities fall under the Prevent microscope. Here-on in Muslim communities in Britain are defined “en bloc as a risky, suspect population” (Mythen et al 2009; see also Fekete 2009, p.48-57; Kundnani 2009, p.6) with ‘Muslim students’ in particular identified as a significant cohort within this ‘suspect community’. Consequently, as related in Chapter One, the HE sector has been a key site for counter-terrorist surveillance and intervention.

The most controversial and widely cited aspect of Prevent has been its surveillance and co-option strategies. The former has openly been recommended in a spate of (non)governmental reports pertaining to Muslim student ‘extremists’ (Glees and Pope 2005; Draft Version DFES 2006). Government directives have also recommended university lecturers and administrators report on and vet their students through routine procedures such as attendance, student ID’s, (Curtis, Guardian 14th April 2009) and the expression of ‘radical’ political views (DFES 2006; Sanders, Times Higher 20th October 2006). Co-option to intelligence agendas has emerged through media, FOSIS accounts and fieldwork as noted below. Whilst there has been resistance to these proposals in Higher Education more broadly, there are also signs of compliance and routine practices in universities are beginning to merge with state imperatives. This is further discussed below with a focus on several key political tracts, reports and empirical research.

4.2.2. Muslim Students: A ‘Suspect Community’

In September 2005, Ruth Kelly, Education Secretary, advised Vice-Chancellors and principals at a Universities UK conference that they had “a duty to inform the police of ’possible criminal acts’” (Fekete 2009, p.107). This appeared to be a warning that universities would be subject to greater scrutiny and securitisation. At the same time, the Social Affairs Unit published When Students Turn to Terror (Glees and Pope 2005). The report argued that British universities were unwittingly and greedily harbouring a variety of extremists, of which “extremist Islamic elements” (ibid. p.25) were deemed most problematic. Universities were charged with a naked self-interest, as well as blindness to the hordes of potential ‘Islamists’ (read ‘extremists’) entering universities through clearing. These Islamists, it was argued, were using universities as ‘terrorist’ safe havens (ibid. p.68).
The report was widely discredited due to its lack of academic rigour (Baty, Times Higher 14th October 2005; Joint Statement from Muslim Groups, Guardian 16th August 2005; Nabi 2005; Renton 2005; Ansari 2006), and in particular its ‘media based methodology’, which resulted in every Muslim student suspected of ‘extremist’ activity since 1993 being named based on media reportage. This included those released without charge or charged for petty visa related offences (Ansari 2006, p.5-6). This was clearly of concern to universities and Vice-Chancellors since the grounds on which they were listed in the report appeared insufficient.

The report was nonetheless authoritatively cited by the media without due attention to its claims of evidence (see for example Taylor and Smithers, Guardian 16th September 2005). Although widely refuted for its partisan (‘right-wing’) agenda, the report certainly ‘chimed’ (Glees 2005) with governmental agendas, as further discussed below.

Shortly after the Glees report, draft versions of the 2006 DFES report (DFES 2006) were asking lecturers to monitor ‘Asian looking students’ (Taylor et al, Guardian 17th October 2006). This was subsequently retracted amidst public criticism (ibid; FOSIS 2006a), however, the published report maintained its focus on Muslim students urging universities to “isolate and challenge extremism that leads to or promotes violence” (DFES 2006, p.4). Although radically departing from the ECU’S more balanced approach discussed above, particularly through its thinly glazed counter-terrorist agenda (DFES 2006, p.18-20), the report nonetheless positioned itself alongside ECU guidance. This was apparent in its appropriation of a more welfare-orientated framework. However, in this revised framework, Muslim students were psycho-pathologised as vulnerable to ‘extremist’ ‘grooming’ (Furedi, Times Higher 31st January 2008; DFES 2006, p.7), a narrative also aired in Bill Rammell’s address discussed below.

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37 David Renton is a writer and historian and was formerly a Natfhe official involved in anti-racist work. He was also involved in the Natfhe Muslim members forum.
38 Of 195 citations, over 100 were media based. Of the universities named and shamed in the report, all were noted in the media prior to the reports publication.
39 For example, one finds that of all six references implicating The University of Manchester, two are un-sourced, and the remainder include a ‘Trotsky’ website, an interview with the UJS, the Sunday Times, and an intelligence journal. The singular primary source used is from a Zionist organisation not renowned for its favourable views on Muslims.
4.2.3. **Rammell’s Southbank Speech**

Whilst the Glees report was never taken too seriously, at least in academia, in comparison Rammell’s speech at Southbank University in May 2006 (Rammell 2006) was deemed comparatively more acceptable and ostensibly reasoned. This is perhaps because it was the outcome of nine months of consultation with Muslim students in various universities.\(^{40}\) Although entitled, *Towards a Vision of Tolerance and Understanding: Issues around the Muslim Experience of Higher Education Today*, the majority of Rammell’s speech was dominated by ‘Muslim student extremism’. Setting the tone, he began by talking about 7/7 and how “it was immediately obvious” that he had to “talk to [Muslim] students in colleges and H.E”. Although, why it was ‘obvious’ was never made clear, what emerged from his ‘consultative’ tour with Muslim students was they were apparently too demanding; a viewpoint further explored in Chapter Seven. This was affirmed in the following logic;

1) Muslim students are making unreasonable demands (i.e. requests for prayer rooms); and “there are big dangers arising from such demands”.

2) They set themselves up for a fall because they cannot all be met “when unreasonable demands are made and are not met, there is a real danger disaffection spreads”.

3) When expectations are not met, they become disillusioned and assume extremist tendencies;

If someone becomes wrongly convinced that a college or university should be able to meet every supposed requirement of a religion, then when that doesn’t happen there is disappointment. There may be resentment. The risk of impressionable young people coming under the influence of the dangerous fringe increases (ibid.).

Thus lowering expectations equated fewer problems and hence, fewer ‘extremists’. Herein lay a spectrum of excess firmly couched in the state agenda of rooting out Muslim ‘extremism.’ What began with ‘unreasonable’ (requests) was bizarrely located within a trajectory of ‘extremism’. Following this, the way to address ‘unreasonable’

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\(^{40}\) This was conducted under the Prevent programme. I attended this address.
Muslim students was to lower their cultural aspirations and inculcate the ‘right’ expectations in a bid to curb disillusionment and ‘extremist’ tendencies.

Although advocating a liberal, and ostensibly reasonable perspective, Rammell echoed the Glees report in two key ways. First, like Glees, Rammell identified ‘subversive’ or demanding behaviour as a precursor to (sympathising with) ‘extremism’ (Glees and Pope 2005, p.5); both operating along a continuum which essentialised Muslim political identities through a pre-defined course of transgression. This explained why Muslim students were considered “impressionable” and vulnerable to “dangerous fringe” groups (see also DFES 2006).

Second, Rammell’s thesis was grounded in the ‘demise’ of multiculturalism (Allen 2007a; Kundnani 2007b). As such, it was underpinned by the notion that “Muslim students [were] finding it difficult to integrate in universities”. For Rammell, this was a concern regarding the over-emphasis on diversity (i.e. ‘sleepwalking into segregation’) and as narrated above, its purported consequences. This same logic appeared in the 2006 DFES report which identified ‘ethnically segregated communities’ as “increasingly common” in universities and a precursor, alongside other factors, towards ‘extremist’ behaviour (DFES 2006, p.8).

Similarly, Glees and Pope’s reports understanding of campus extremism was grounded in exhausted tropes of a confused immigrant identity and a failure to “fully integrate” into multi-cultural society (ibid. p.30, 67). This explained why integration into ‘British habits’ are recommended as a corrective to ‘Muslim radicalism,’ although not considered sufficient in view of the BNP’S racist enclaves or animal liberation activists.

Indeed, in spite of the very different methodologies informing each of these interventions on ‘Muslim extremism’ (i.e. Rammell’s nine months of direct consultation with Muslim students in comparison with a report that failed to interview any Muslim students), Rammell’s and Glees’s depictions were not that dissimilar.41 Significantly, neither of these interventions considered the ‘white’ institutional context, normalised student lifestyles and racisms as factors which affected the ways some Muslim students chose (or not) to engage. Instead, what emerges is a highly racialised and essentialist

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41 Recommendations such as implementing a student screening programme and revising courses glorifying violent revolution (Glees and Pope 2005, p.71) are echoed in government initiatives. These can be gleaned in pressure to vet university reading lists resulting in the withdrawal of some teaching courses (Sabir, Guardian 5th February 2010) and in the introduction of Atas (Academic Technology Approval Scheme) by the FCO in November 2007; a compulsory vetting scheme to monitor the entry of international students undertaking WMD related subjects (FCO 2007).
portrait of Muslim (student) communities as culturally undeveloped yet fundamentally transgressive, betraying a pre-disposition towards ‘extremism’. Ultimately, it is a narrative where “cultural risks” are equated with “security risks” (Malik 2008 cited in Mythen et al 2009, p.743).

Signifying the broader unravelling of multi-culturalist thinking and the installation of ‘citizenship’ re-training (Kundnani 2009, p.33), Rammell and Glees exemplify the way strategies of ‘pursuing’ and ‘preventing’ ‘terror’ have become so broad in scope as to include mundane requests for Muslim provisions. This blurring is exemplified by pastoral recommendations for Muslim students on British campuses, further discussed below.

4.2.4. Pastoral Provisions?

Indeed, Vice-Chancellor’s were likely comforted by Rammell’s words because any pressure to accommodate their Muslim student populations had been neatly assuaged. Although this ‘new’ attitude to provision-making was not official policy, it signalled a “concerted” (Choudhry, Education Net 6th April 2006) shift that resounded across university campuses. For example, on several campuses, prayer rooms were confiscated and re-designated (ibid), demolished (2005/6) and without consultation, opened up to various student groups (Interview; Sobia Queens Mary College, 2008 Blair, Pluto 1st November 2008; ISOC 2010; Newman, Times Higher 5th September 2010).

Curiously, at the same time, pastoral provisions for Muslim students were also being recommended for the care of the community, most notably in the form of ‘Muslim chaplains’ (Rammell 2008b; a). Although this initiative preceded the July bombings43 (Birt, Q-News 2002), this can be seen as part of the general ‘professionalisation’ of Muslim religious figures in various British institutions in recent years (Birt 2006a, p.695, 698-700). In particular, post 9/11, the role of ‘Muslim chaplains’ became key to government agendas in much the same way as the ‘good imam’, a figure who extols;

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42 This is expressive of the trend to subsume ‘community cohesion’ projects and equality related work within the Prevent agenda; an aspect that has recently come under considerable criticism (An-Nisa 2009; HMG 2010, para 173).
43 Around 2002, the Council of University Sheikhs was created to establish a network of Muslim university ‘chaplains’ to mirror its established Jewish and Christian counterparts. In 2001, the Council had affiliated imams on 17 campuses (Birt, Q-News 2002). The Association of Muslim Chaplains in Education (mainly FE and HE) was launched in 2008 at Brunel University (Amced 2008).
Indeed, given claims of a demanding cohort of Muslim students and the reigning in of ‘excessive’ provisions, the encouragement of ‘Muslim chaplains’ appeared contradictory. It was however, consistent with a state (and university) agenda seeking to better manage ‘undesirable’ contingents within the Muslim student community. This questioned the uses to which pastoral services were being appropriated.\(^{44}\) In particular, it invoked, as Birt hints through the ‘shepherd-flock’ analogy, a form of ‘pastoral power’\(^{45}\) that centred on the welfare of the Muslim population at the same time as (re)directing it in particular de-politicised ways. Like British imams (Birt 2006a, p.687), Muslim chaplains have been ‘assigned’ key roles in tackling extremism and are (un)wittingly “caught up” (Gilliat-Ray 2010, p.175) in governmental agendas.

In the report commissioned by Rammell on Islam in Universities (Siddiqui 2007), Muslim students certainly welcomed the idea of a Muslim advisor (ibid. p.50-54). However, concerns were raised as to the limited function and lack of ‘independence’ from the institution. Given concerns about Islamophobia, an equality based framework was deemed important (ibid. p.51-52), although appears to have been ignored.

In part, these concerns seem well founded. As one Muslim lecturer argued in a recent grassroots report;

PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism] is underlying both of the leadership/chaplaincy initiatives, and I have been increasingly shocked and appalled at what I see unfolding (Khan 2009).

The renewed impetus for university appointed chaplains became apparent in Prevent reports which identified existing and future Muslim chaplains in universities as key to preventing extremism (DCLG 2007; see also Shepherd, Guardian 12th June 2007).\(^{46}\) The DIUS recommended that in line with the minimum standards being developed for

\(^{44}\) Two Muslim chaplains (one female/one male) at Lomonde were appointed following fieldwork. Their appointments appeared unusual in the context of a staunchly secular university that had historically allocated a peripheral role to religious facilities (See Chapter Seven); although consistent with broader political shifts encouraging Muslim chaplains and the universities interest in attracting more international students.

\(^{45}\) Pastoral power refers to a form of power rooted in the Christian pastorate that focussed on the salvation and obedience of individuals. This developed into modern forms of state governmentality centring on the welfare, improvement and security of individuals (Hinde 1996, p.118-123).

\(^{46}\) The appointment of the Muslim chaplain at Erdon precedes the Prevent agenda.
all ‘state employed Imams’, Muslim chaplains in universities would be ‘trained’ according to the relevant packages developed by Government (DIUS 2007). The minimum standards for ‘Muslim chaplains’ in public institutions were piloted through Prevent funding (£64,000) (ENGAGE 2009 see also; Gilliat-Ray 2010, p.174). As Gilliat-Ray has observed, these ‘standards’ potentially “undermine [their] right to act as critical independent voices in relation to those in power” (ibid. p.174). The regulation of ‘Muslim chaplains’ has therefore been identified as a particular form of “religious engineering” (ibid. p.175); one which functions through community “self-regulation” (Birt 2006a, p.700).

In 2008, under the Prevent scheme, FOSIS was consulted regarding the “framework for recruiting Muslim chaplains” (FOSIS 2008). Whilst FOSIS was keen to provide their input, this consultation also elicited a clear response that Islamic societies would be “student-led” and “student-run” (ibid). This alluded to the problematic history and function of ‘Muslim chaplains’ in universities failing to discriminate between bona fide ‘chaplains’ and those with ‘illiberal’ agendas (e.g. seeking to preside over or undermine Islamic societies) (see for example Birt, Q-News 2002; FOSIS 2008). Some Muslim students also raised concerns that “government-imposed chaplains” were encouraging a “spying environment” (Cook et al 2009, p.36). Media reportage also suggested that ‘moderate’ university chaplains have played a role in keeping ‘radical’ Muslim students at bay (BBC Radio 4, 14th November 2006). The identification of universities with ‘illiberal agendas’ are not however isolated, as reports throughout fieldwork reveal. These are further discussed below.

4.2.5. Muslim Students and University Complicity in the ‘War on Terror’

The range of reports and directives pertaining to Muslim students in the aftermath of the July bombings were inconsistent with the equality and ethical commitments of universities. This could be discerned most notably in the 2005 ECU report which retained a strong pastoral and anti-racist perspective. Publicly the report represented a solid stance against the states counter-terrorist agenda (see also NATFHE et al 2005). This stance against government proposals was also maintained by various unions (Macleod, Guardian 11th October 2005; Muslim News, 24th November 2006) and senior university managers concerned about civil liberties.

47 This is in reference to Musa Admani, the first imam appointed to a British university who has been widely noted to resist ‘radical’ incursions at London Metropolitan University. In 2009-2010, this same university was in direct receipt of £60,000 of Prevent funding (Hansard 2009).
In view of the prospect of profiling Muslim students, for example, a senior manager at Lomonde was unequivocal about the DfES guidelines;

I feel very uneasy about them, mostly because they have the potential to undermine the university of its inclusiveness...I think we will give the minister assurances that we are a law abiding institution...I don’t actually like the legislation very much, I would be uncomfortable with some of it but it is in fact the law of the land and I don’t think the guidelines add anything helpful to what the legislation [Terrorist Act] already provided... profiling and reporting on behaviour which is different to our own seems to me antithetical to the idea of the university.. So I could see myself being unable to continue as VC over this because on the one hand it could be argued I am terribly irresponsible allowing students to extremist influences and not taking enough steps ...and I do think I and I told Bill Rammell that the strongest thing the university can do is to create a sustainable secure civil society is to pursue this tolerant inclusive advocacy of humane values (Interview; Senior Management 2006).

This perspective appeared consistent with the general ethical ethos of the sector, going against recommendations that universities ought to be sharing information with the police (DFES 2006, p.16). However, it shared, or at least conveyed little awareness of the degree of special branch activity on British campuses.

For example, there have been numerous reports of Muslim students and staff being intimidated, questioned, searched and detained by police and special agents (Chapman, Muslim News 27th October 2006; Derfoufi, Guardian 26th May 2009; Mohammed and Verkaik, Independent 1st April 2010; see also Mythen et al 2009, p.744; Sabir, Ceasefire 20th August 2010). The extent of this problem was evidenced in 2009, when FOSIS created a civil liberties division dedicated to compiling information on those students being approached, detained and stopped by the police or intelligence services (FOSIS 2009). Heading this division, Zin Derfoufi related how students had been left fearful, depressed and paranoid by their encounters with authorities (Derfoufi 2010, p.30-31). Some students in London universities refused to join their Islamic societies or even request basic provisions from fear of being spied on or branded ‘extremist’ (Cook et al 2009, p.6, 37).

Ansari reported of how one senior ISOC member was shown “her statements made in private meetings” and “photographs of her at certain events and demonstrations on campus” in an attempt to persuade her to join them (Ansari 2006, p.21). More recent

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48 Derfoufi is a graduate from Queens Mary College, London and advisor to the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
episodes have seen Muslim students being arrested at gunpoint at Liverpool John Moores university and later being released without charge, and without apology (Cobain, Guardian 18th May 2010; Times Higher 2009).

Although, the OSCT (Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism) claimed that allegations of ‘spying’ within Prevent are “completely unfounded” (HMG 2010, Para. 26, 31), during fieldwork, a broad range of surveillance of Muslim students was a very real and serious concern. For example, in the aftermath of the July bombings, the NUS, along with other unions, were broached by MI5 requesting the names of Muslim students from universities with large concentrations of Muslim students and in Muslim populated areas (Interview; Daanish 2005; Ansari 2006, p.21). Akin to Prevent strategies, these requests were not based on risk assessments, intelligence or historical precedent, but in “direct proportion to the numbers of Muslims in an area” (Kundnani 2009, p.12). It also reflected recommendations made in the Glees report to access society membership details and disperse Muslim students to prevent their concentration in any single institution (Glees and Pope 2005, p.71).

Although ISOC membership lists have generally been denied to agencies, recent reports have indicated that the information of approximately 1,000 British Muslim students were shared with US intelligence agencies through data protection breaches at the University College London. Information was reported to have been provided by the union and university registry office, resulting in the homes of fifty students being visited, albeit without arrest (Mohammed and Verkaik, Independent 1st April 2010; Muslim News 23rd March 2010).

In other examples, one student at a London university was picked up by special branch and asked to identify (through a photograph) a senior FOSIS member (Interview; Firaz 2005). This same FOSIS member believed he was being monitored and also that the presence of new faces during Friday prayers was one way in which students were being monitored (ibid). Another student was arrested and detained for over three hours on his return from a trip abroad (Interview; Uthmaan 2005).

However, it was not only Muslim students that have been broached. For example, one Muslim academic, in a discipline and university with a large Muslim population, reported being visited by a member of MI5’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). This was reportedly in a bid to convert them to the government’s agenda (Anon. E-

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49 JTAC was established in 2003 to research and assess terrorist threat levels. It is a collaborative agency working closely with MI5-6.
correspondence, 2008). Apparently, this analyst was said to be “doing the rounds in an effort to recruit academics to keep an eye on Muslim students”. A Male Muslim academic from a Northern University was also contacted by MI5 seeking to recruit members following the 7/7 bombings. He was approached in such a way that suggested he was one of many academic staff being approached for this purpose (Dr. Ghannam, Conversation, December 2009). Clearly, it is not simply Muslim students that are being profiled, but certain Muslim academics considered potentially useful to the government’s surveillance regime.

It is unclear in any of the aforementioned cases, to what extent university authorities were aware of intelligence activity.\(^{50}\) Certainly, universities have generally positioned themselves as guardians of a liberal agenda against excessive state encroachment. However, this narrative betrays the way universities are becoming sites of complicity and surveillance.

Indeed, in 2007 towards the tail-end of fieldwork, it was reported that a meeting with senior managers at a Northern university had been held at the behest of special branch. The university was being asked to report on the expression of radical views, although these meetings were being kept low-profile. The infrastructure for student surveillance and notifying special agents were being put into place (Anon. E-correspondence, 2007). Several cases at other universities and colleges are indicative of this (Kundnani 2009, p.33). One such case includes that of a student being reported by his lecturer for attending a meeting on Gaza (Dodd, Guardian 16th October 2009). Many incidents are of course rarely publicised. However, one such case that attracted considerable attention was that of Nottingham University student, Rizwaan Sabir, further detailed below.

### 4.2.6. The Case of Rizwaan Sabir

In May 2008, Rizwaan Sabir was arrested by anti-terror police because he had downloaded an al-Qaeda manual (also available on the internet in various versions), for his Phd research on terrorist organisations. Although wholly inconsistent with DfES’s guidelines on the matter,\(^{51}\) and in spite of his research topic, university authorities

\(^{50}\) One case university was known to have been contacted by Special Branch requesting information on Islamic society members. At Erdon, the university registrar was the first point of contact and the request, rather than being refused was instead deferred to the union, who eventually refused on legal grounds (Anonymous correspondence, 2006).

\(^{51}\) In the DfES report, education providers were asked to initially investigate themselves, talk to other students, consult local organisations, bring together internal players and contact the police “if and where necessary” (DFES 2006, p.15).
reported Rizwaan to the West Midlands CTU (counter-terrorist unit). He was subsequently arrested on campus, along with a Muslim member of staff on suspicion of being involved in the “commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism” (Yezza, Guardian 18th August 2008). Both were subsequently held in solitary confinement for six days whilst their family homes were raided, their friends questioned and their belongings confiscated (ibid). In a personal account of events Rizwaan relates;

I couldn't eat. I was too scared to pray, lest that be used against me. My property was seized, forensically examined, and my family evicted. My car was compounded and my friends and lecturers repeatedly questioned. I was photographed, fingerprinted, foot-printed and DNA-swabbed (Sabir, Guardian 5th August 2010).

Both Hicham and Rizwaan were later released without charge, (Buara, Muslim News 23rd May 2008; IHRC 2008b; a) although Hicham faced the threat of deportation and was detained for a further nine months on immigration charges.

In a subsequent interview with Rizwaan, it was revealed that although the university claimed their actions were based on “risk analysis”, requests for this ‘analysis’ were refused on grounds that the university did not retain such records (E-Interview, Rizwaan, 2010). However Rizwaan argued, “there was no record of a risk analysis because no risk analysis was conducted”. Clearly, any risk analysis would have involved rigorous protocol, exhausting all relevant internal sources, including the most obvious; terrorism expert and Rizwaan’s prospective Phd supervisor, Rod Thornton. Had this route been pursued, Rizwaan insisted, it may have “ended this whole fiasco within minutes”. Instead, Rizwaan believed the university’s response was “evidence of their practice of racism” (ibid).

His reasons for this were clear. The actions of the university appeared to be based on racialised deductions since public readings of the Al-Qaeda manual at the same university by academics and students merited no such action. In his view, the university’s actions were akin to those aired by the counter-terrorist officer involved in Rizwaan’s case; “had this been a blonde, white, Swedish PhD student, this would never have happened” (ibid).

Subsequently, the university came under severe criticism from students and staff, leading to a campaign for an apology amongst other things. However, in spite of

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52 This was reported to have been said to Rizwaan’s personal tutor during interview with a counter-terrorist officer (E-Interview, Rizwaan 2010).
HE minister, Bill Rammell’s assertions that academic freedoms were to be protected (DFES 2006, p.10), the university refused to acknowledge its misguided role in the affair and considered the manual “illegitimate” research material (Newman, Times Higher 22nd May 2008).

Significantly, the issue of racism was submerged in favour of questions surrounding the status and (illegitimate) ownership of the manual. In subsequent meetings with university management, Rizwaan was held responsible for his own miscarriage of justice;

I was invited to a meeting with the Registrar and the Head of Security, in which both men, rather than apologising for the hassle, justified their position and justified why they reported me as a suspected terrorist. At one stage, the Registrar even shouted at me and blamed me for the whole occurrence (E-Interview; Rizwaan 2010).

Rizwaan’s ordeal did not, in view of the university, warrant an apology. In spite of the trauma caused by their behaviour, the university sought to expel him from the university because of the public embarrassment and criticism associated with his case.53

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter provides a broader perspective through which the racialised governance of Muslim students can be viewed. In particular, it has attempted to reflect the hyper-visible status of Muslim students in universities; first through historical discourses of ‘fundamentalism’ circulating campuses in the nineties and second, through the political context of fieldwork, in which Muslim students comprise a ‘suspect community’. These distinct but interrelated parts reflect a singular trajectory from charges of ‘fundamentalist’ to suspected ‘terrorist’. In this sense, the ‘fundamentalist’ scares of the nineties can be considered a precursor to more serious claims about Muslim student terrorism.

Part One provided insights into the construction of ‘Muslim students’ in Higher Education, both through student politics and sector guidance. Exposing the way

53 In a separate conversation, Rizwaan revealed that contrary to normal marking procedures, his MA thesis was subject to two external reviewers, in addition to the Vice-Chancellor’s Office, Registrar and Head of university Security Services. His mark was subsequently lowered from 75% to 62% preventing him from pursuing a Phd at the university. However, due to an administrative error he continued. Rizwaan left the university to pursue doctoral research at the University of Strathclyde. In April 2011, a detailed account of Rizwaan’s case was presented by Rod Thornton, his former supervisor, at a conference on Terrorism Studies, see (Thornton 2011). This led to Thornton being suspended from the University of Nottingham and following this, an international campaign to reinstate him.
discourses of ‘fundamentalism’ have been nurtured and institutionalised with Islamophobic effect, three key themes emerge: ‘Muslim students’ are construed as perpetrators of ‘extremist/racist violence, rather than as victims; this is achieved partly through ‘anti-racist’ campaigning in which Muslims remain conspicuously absent; and finally, the ‘fundamentalist’ formation reflects the hyper-visible status of Muslim students through its governmentalising function, most explicitly in the way it has been deployed to inhibit Muslim activism.

Part Two shifts to the contemporary context of fieldwork, in particular, the Prevent surveillance regime. In this context, Muslim students comprise a ‘suspect community’. Here we see a number of patterns emerging within HE. First, there is a dual shift vis-a-vis Muslim students. On the one hand we see, through, for example, the ECU corrective, a commitment to protecting Muslim students and an acknowledgement of Islamophobia. On the other hand, various examples of university co-operation with special agencies suggest equality principles are being suspended. Clearly, the degree to which universities are now complying with a hostile government agenda, remains varied and contested. In some cases, intelligence agencies appear to be by-passing university authorities and harassing, or even arresting students/staff on campuses. In others, universities are privately co-operating with agencies to implement surveillance and reporting procedures. Here, university authorities have proved compliant and functioned as informants to the detriment of innocent Muslim students and staff. At times, this has abrogated Dfes/DIUS guidelines, breached data protection laws and inflicted massive trauma on those involved.

What has concerned students is that such university complicity is premised on racialised profiling and surveillance, rather than adequate risk assessments. However, what is perhaps of greatest concern is the way equality related remits/provisions are being revised according to ‘security’ imperatives. In particular, ‘pastoral’ accommodations in universities are being moulded by governmental agendas to install ‘moderate Muslim’ constituencies; a trend being rehearsed across Britain.

One could perhaps locate these ‘revisions’ to university practices as a shifting alignment towards a government agenda, undermining general (union) resistance to state interventions. However, this ought not to obfuscate the way, barring state interventions, universities can be found to routinely racialise Muslim students with Islamophobic effect. Indeed, many examples throughout this chapter, and in subsequent chapters reflect similar modes of racialised assessments. In this regard, universities can
be considered to be *extending* rather than aligning their practices. Whilst this chapter has focussed on the historical, and contemporary racialisation of ‘Muslim students’ through their ‘hyper-visible’ presence, the following chapter focuses on the racialisation of Muslim students in universities through their ‘absence’. It is to this we now turn.
Chapter Five

The ‘Absence’ of Muslims Students: No Muslims No Problem

Introduction

At the beginning of Chapter Four, I referred to a distinct paradox; one in which the (institutional) absence of Muslim students in universities was accompanied by an ‘institutionalised’ discourse of a ‘fundamentalist’ presence. Chapter Four has charted the entrenchment of this ‘fundamentalist’ presence in Higher Education. In this chapter, the absence of ‘Muslims’ in the bureaucratic calculations of the university is explored. Further, the institutionalised Islamophobia this invisibility nurtures, and the way this functions as a mode of racialised governmentality that is normalised through the disciplinary technologies (Foucault 1977) of the university.

This chapter is divided into three parts. Part One outlines the legislative, institutional and (multi)cultural ways in which ‘Muslim’ students fall outside the traditional equalities remit in the sector. This provides a useful lens through which to locate the status and ‘place’ of Muslim students within existing equality agendas.

Part Two provides estimates of the Muslim student population in HE in view of their absence as a formally recognised group. Following this, case material (documents/interviews) is used to examine the insistence on and resistance to ethnic monitoring categorisations in the university. Here, ethnic monitoring practices are identified as a disciplinary technology that construct ‘appropriate’/ ‘valid’ and ‘inappropriate’/ ‘deviant’ student-subjects, informing the way students are registered (or not) in the university.

This leads us to Part three. Part Three focusses on complaints schema in universities as an example of ‘what happens’ when Muslim students fail to be registered as Muslims within the university and in turn, the processes of racialised (self)governmentality this sets in motion. Drawing on case material, three key themes are identified; the way complaints procedures and assessments are structured and racialised; the significant divergence between institutional and student accounts on questions of racism and complaints and finally, the repressive culture of complaints that inhibit Muslim student complainants.
Part One: Muslim Students and University Equality Structures

5.1.1. University Equality Structures and the Absence of Muslims

In the eighties, religious identity and diversity on campus received inadequate attention as an equal opportunities question (Weller 1992). Although religious diversity on British campuses was said to have occurred on “a significant scale” by the late eighties (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.26), the question of religious inclusivity in universities was viewed as a concern for international, rather than ‘home’ students (Jewson 1991 cited in Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.98; Weller 1992, p.53). Equality practices pertaining to Muslim students began developing in piecemeal fashion in the late nineties (Tyrer 2003, p.258 n.251). Although attending in large numbers, provisions for Muslim students in new universities were said to be relatively limited due to lack of resources (Acland and Azmi 1998, p.82-83).

More recently, it is primarily through Muslim student organisation that universities have in part, registered Muslim student needs, though not always favourably acted upon them. This is partly due to the fact that ‘Muslims’ do not qualify as a group recognised or protected by legislation under the RRAA (2000). Thus universities have generally not pursued a coherent or consistent approach, varying with regard to their respective Muslim student populations. Practices pertaining to Muslim female attire in the sector, is one such example.

The 2003 employment directives (see for example OSI 2005, p.75-76) introduced to protect employees from religious/belief discrimination have thus far proved equally limited in view of students. For instead of closing existing legal gaps, it has arguably created another hierarchy within universities in which the impetus to protect Muslim students from racism remains vague. These limitations were substantiated by staff at the ECU (Equality Challenge Unit), the supporting body on matters of equality in HE (Interview, ECU Staff, Rifat, 2006). This was also reflected

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1 Comparatively, Muslim students in Northern Ireland, are protected from religious discrimination in Further and Higher Education, but not in primary or secondary education (OSI 2002, p.394, n.144).

2 For example, as late as 2003-2004, in spite of a large Muslim student population which had registered its presence, the equal opportunity aims of Lomonde included no explicit reference to religion. It specified that no student was to receive less favourable treatment on the grounds of race, colour, nationality, ethnic origins, gender, sexuality, marital or parental status, disability, creed, political belief or economic class. The inclusion of ‘creed’ can be read as a more muted description; of a system of belief, rather than a source of identity. Comparatively, Ersdon made explicit reference to religion as a potential source of discrimination.

3 After the London bombings in July 2005 queries from equality practitioners regarding student identification was increasingly commonplace, such that specific equality guidance was required on the matter. At Lomonde for example, equality advisors were querying how they should handle student identification with niqabed (veiled) women. In late 2006, senior management at Lomonde claimed the issue of Muslim female student identification followed clear protocol, although there remained no formal policy obliging staff to adhere to it (Interview, Senior Management, 2006).
in the way both campus cases indicated no inclusion of students in light of this regulation, nor deemed it relevant to protecting Muslim students from discrimination.⁴

This absence of a basic ‘check’ has been further exacerbated by the general staff focused equality remit across universities, also evidenced in both campus cases (See Chapter Three).⁵ This was also exemplified by the ECU, which initially included students on “generic” issues (Hill and Kusemamuriwo 2004, p.121). In 2006, the ECU expanded their remit to include ‘faith’, namely Muslim students.⁶ However, the approach the ECU has been obliged to negotiate in view of Muslim students is one of compensating for legislative deficits by encouraging ‘good practice’ and ‘good campus relations’ (Interview; Rifat, ECU staff, 2006). The ECU ‘extended’ RRAA (2000) recommendations to promote positive ‘ethnic/racial’ relations, to include Muslim students. The outcome of this commitment however has been far from clear, and anecdotal responses in 2006, suggested this expansive role was met with considerable resistance (ibid). The success of intervention is also likely to be affected by the ‘friendly’ relationship the ECU has with universities. Clearly however, such Muslim inclusive initiatives are also working against well over a decade of institutionalised ‘fundamentalist’ stigma, as related in the previous chapter. The belated inclusion of Muslims as ‘victims’ of racist ‘hate-crime’ on campus, (ECU/UUK/SCOP 2005) as a ‘corrective’ to previous guidance (CVCP 1998) is one such example.

Besides the statutory limitations noted above, the chequered ‘absence’ of Muslim students within university equality structures is also related to the status of religion within HE generally and the place of Muslims within dominant liberal models of (institutional) multiculturalism specifically. Indeed, like all other institutions in Western Europe confronting varying groups of racialised minorities, certain identities, and conventions have been historically established and promoted (Modood 2007, p.25). In universities, religious diversity has arguably “disturbed an

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⁴ Some universities have acknowledged its relevance to ‘faith students’. A ‘new’ university in the same city as Lomonde for example included a note to the effect that under the employment directive and students of faith did have legal recourse if they felt discriminated against on the grounds of religion (Guidance Notes on Religious Observation 2004).

⁵ This should not suggest that ‘BME’ staff are necessarily faring ‘better’ in universities than students, as research suggests the persistence of racialised hierarchies. See for example (Carter et al 1999; Puwar 2000; 2004a; Gulam 2004; Chan 2005).

⁶ In 2006, the ECU’s role was expanded to include students. During 2008, the ECU was holding ‘religion and belief’ discussion groups with interested parties with the aim of producing practical guidance. ECU interventions however are not explored or reflected in case-studies as fieldwork was conducted before its expanded role.
earlier...secularising, status quo” particularly in the way “the presence of other faith groups on campus highlight the historical legacy of Christian traditions” (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.143/145).

Historically, university accommodation of non-Christian groups has been affected by university type (e.g. collegiate, ‘new’ ‘civic’) (ibid. p.150). Although as noted in Chapter One, these foundations are perhaps less significant in view of Muslim students given their problematised status in broader ‘war on terror’ politics. ‘Muslim students’ have been construed as figures that encroach upon and transgress the secular status of the liberal university (see for example Rammell 2006; Feldman, *Times Higher 14th December 2007*). This is now a generic theme circulating HE and is notable in universities espousing a Rawlsian neutrality. This secular neutrality has often been formulated to deny, withhold or prolong requests for provisions by Muslim students (See Chapter Seven).

The ‘disruptive’ status of Muslim students can, however, be attributed more broadly to the ‘illegitimacy’ of Muslims within conventional liberal models of multiculturalism (See for example Modood 2002; 2007, p.63-86) and are grounded in biological ideas of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ (Meer 2008; Sayyid 2008; 2010, p.13-14). In this chapter, the ‘absentee’ status of Muslim students within universities is identified as grounded in statutory deficits. These deficits can be seen to inform and be informed by dominant models of liberal multicultural secularism which re-affirm the disruptive and exceptionality of Muslim student needs. As elaborated in Chapter Seven, secular liberal models of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995 cited in Modood 2007, p.21; 2010), can be observed in discourses of institutionalised Islamophobia.

Together, the factors charted above depict an unfavourable equality infrastructure for Muslim students. This unfavourable context has tended, with few exceptions, to be accounted for in terms of a lack of provisions (e.g. halal food, prayer rooms, religious holidays) (see for example Weller et al 2001; FOSIS 2003; 2005; OSI 2005; Cook et al 2007; Siddiqui 2007). These reflect basic institutional shortcomings, and remain significant indicators of how far universities are lagging in

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7 Secularism can generally be understood describe the absence of religion as a source of guidance in public affairs (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.13). It can also be understood normatively as the separation between religion and politics that can be “more or less restrictive” (Modood 2010, p.4). The regulatory governmentalisng effects of ‘liberal secularism’ are explored in Chapter Seven.

8 These demarcations do not account for more recent differences that span the ‘old’ and ‘new’ divide, e.g. Russell Group Universities etc. Further, the assumption that ‘new’ universities are relatively ‘equality savvy’ with regards to their Muslim student populations is misleading. See for example (Equality and Diversity at Middlesex University 2005/6; Middlesex University Students Union 2005/6 ).
realising equality aspirations. However, in the following parts of this chapter, it is the culture of Islamophobia this institutional ‘absence’ nurtures vis-a-vis Muslim students, and further, how this absence signals a mode of racialised govermentality that is of greater concern.

Part Two: ‘Ethnic’ Monitoring and Muslim Students

5.2.1. ‘Ethnic’ Monitoring: Muslim Guess Estimates

Universities adopted ‘new commonwealth’ categories from the census in the early 1990’s, contributing to a more systematised racialised campus. In his 1996 study on ethnic monitoring in Higher Education, Bird argued that such categories were “resonant with the history of colonialism” yet did not resonate with the self-identification of students (Bird 1996, p.96-97). Today, census categories are much revised from earlier monolithic forms of classification (‘West Indian’/’Asian’). In universities, the basic ‘commonwealth’ ‘ethnic’ model (‘White’ ‘Black’ ‘Asian’) has been maintained, with further ‘racial’, geographical, national and ‘other’ subdivisions). The singular distinction fundamental to such categories however has configured around ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ identities, with ‘white’ typically presented at the apex of a ‘racial’ hierarchy.

In terms of classifying their student populations today, universities have inherited the flaws and contentions of the national census. For example, those students who do not typically fall within the ‘commonwealth band’ of ‘minorities’, but who would otherwise be categorised as UK domiciled students, remain uncaptured and concealed within ‘White’ (see for example Connolly and Gardener 2005, p.10), ‘African’, ‘Mixed’ ‘Other’ and ‘Unknown’ data. In terms of those students from Muslim backgrounds for instance this might include students of Yemeni, Algerian, Iraqi, Iranian, Somali, Turkish (Cypriot), Eastern European, or Kurdish background. Thus problems within national classifications are duplicated at university levels. However, this is with one important exception; neither HESA, nor the majority of HEI’s have chosen to adopt all categories revised in the census.

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9 This was in direct response to a CRE investigation which found St. George’s Medical School guilty of sexual and racial discrimination in its admissions process (Modood 1993 cited in Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.491).
10 Categories revised in 1991 were deemed to be “similarly flawed” particularly in light of the lack of attention paid to hybrid identities (e.g. British Pakistani) and the explicit positioning of ‘white’ as a singular unproblematic category at the apex of a racial hierarchy (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Brah 1992).
11 Universities are thought to model their ethnic monitoring systems on the census, in line with HESA’s adoption of national classifications. However revisions in the 2001 census, notably the inclusion of ‘Other’ categories, (e.g. White Other, Black Other etc) are not consistently reflected in university practices.
namely the voluntary question on religious affiliation. Although, universities are under no obligation under the RRAA (2000) to monitor religious affiliation, as they are with ‘ethnic’/‘racial’ categories, it remains a conspicuous absence (Weller 1992; Tyrer 2003; Cook et al 2007, p.1; Cook et al 2009, p.26). Estimates of Muslim students are therefore difficult to gage and submerged within broader categories.

Guess estimates of ‘Muslim’ student entrants for a given year are thus normally reduced to a statistical base that is reliant on ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Bangladeshi’ students. In 2006/2007, there were a total of 20,925 students in their first academic year identifying as ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Bangladeshi’; a figure that has more than doubled in the past 10 years (HESA 1996). In the same academic year, the total baseline figure for this set of students reached approximately 51,000. In other words, in the academic session 2006/2007 there were at least approximately 51,000 ‘home’ students of Muslim background registered as studying in British HEI’s. Of course there is the added complexity of accounting for international students who comprise a sizeable proportion of the Muslim student population in Britain. Based on statistics provided by HESA (See Appendix F) on non-EU international students, conservative estimates indicate that in the 2006-07 academic session, there were a total of at least 22,586 ‘international’ Muslim students in the UK. However this figure is likely to be in excess of 34,956. Total combined estimates of home and non-EU international students therefore indicate that in the 2006-07 academic session there were at least 85,956 students from Muslim backgrounds in HE. Given that this figure does not include all international students, ‘home’ Muslim students (e.g. non ‘South Asian’), or Muslim students from EU countries, this is likely to be in excess of 90,000 students, a figure that tallies with FOSIS’s 2005 estimate (FOSIS 2005). In 2006-7, this comprised approximately 10.2% of the total UK student population (HESA 2008c).

These sizeable estimates however should not of course obscure the many difficulties faced by some Muslim students; the increased vetting of Muslim students

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12 Data courtesy of HESA (HESA 2008c).
13 Non-EU international students comprise approximately 224,000 of the total student population (HESA 2008b).
14 22,586 is an underestimate and only includes students from those countries in which the Muslim populations is 95% or more e.g. Jordan. The latter figure of 34,956 is a fairer estimate that includes the latter plus only 50% of those students hailing from countries with a Muslim population of 60% or more e.g. Malaysia. This figure excludes the large number of students hailing from Nigeria (11136) for the academic session 2006/07, which has a Muslim population of 50.4%. Muslim population figures were obtained from the 2009 Pew Report on Global Muslim populations (2009). Note; HESA estimates included 1248 students identifying as ‘unknown’ and did not include any students identifying from Palestine. Those from the Western Sahara were included under Moroccan sub-sections.
from listed countries under the ATAS Scheme (FCO 2007); the ‘ethnic penalty’ for some ‘British Muslims’ in ‘old’ universities,\(^{15}\) (Modood 2004, p. 90; 2006, p. 249); ‘South Asian’ Muslims studying in less resourced institutions (ibid. p.249) or furthermore that overall, Muslim graduate employment rates in the labour market in 2004 fell 12% short of the national average (DWP 2005).

Yet, ascertaining the size of the Muslim student population is only one difficulty in view of this statutory absence. More broadly, it has meant there is no institutional record in any aspect of the student life cycle in which those students identifying (and being identified) as ‘Muslim’ are registered. Thus from the point of entry, through academic progression, course drop outs, course completion and formal complaints, there is no ‘official’ information (although plenty of anecdotal knowledge) held indicating the very basic milestones of Muslim student experience (see also Dyke and Gunaratnam 2000a).\(^{16}\)

Specifically however, the absence of Muslim students has also led to a dynamic of insistence upon and resistance to ‘ethnic’ classifications. These are further discussed below.

5.2.2. ‘Ethnic’ Monitoring: A Disciplinary Technology

The lack of correspondence between student identifications and university classifications has several implications. For example, it must have some bearing on why in the 2006-7 session 124,000 students in the UK abstained from providing their ‘ethnicity’ (HESA 2008a). This is now a persistent feature of returned ethnic monitoring data within the sector (Bird 1996, p. 96-97; Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.492; Cousin 2002). This did not escape the attention of staff dealing with data monitoring. At Lomonde for example, the problem of ‘unknowns’ was so acute, that the university felt it necessary to make it incumbent upon students to disclose their ethnicity and nationality at registration (Lomonde Race Impact Scheme 2008-9). The same year Erdon found that students were refusing to provide details of their ethnicity. They did not proceed to investigate why this might be the case, instead

\(^{15}\) The ‘ethnic penalty’ in ‘old’ universities refers to the lesser success rate of some ‘ethnic’ groups in gaining a place at these universities. This was contested by HEFCE when it reanalysed the same data, claiming that the original study had been ‘flawed’. According to Modood however, the divergence in findings had not been explained (Curtis, Guardian 20th November 2005).

\(^{16}\) Some universities do voluntarily monitor the religious background of their students, however further research is required as it is not clear how this information is being translated across the broader functions of the university. See (ECU 2009c, p.4).
noting that “action was being taken to encourage more students to disclose their ethnicity” (Erdon Race Equality Report 2008).

These university responses suggest that the absence of student submissions on the ‘ethnic’ question was not addressed as a problem potentially inherent to the classification system itself, but as inherent to students. Moreover, university impact assessments, (ostensibly designed to root out practices which may contribute to ‘institutional’ racism), have instead required students to conform to listed classifications. Thus rather than approach these classifications as provisional or subject to “reflexive monitoring” (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.498), existing classifications have been imposed as a template of normalcy. This is in spite of the redundancy and contested status of these categories for some students.  

Hence, Muslim students traversed a range of ‘ethnic’ categories but failed to be captured within the university paradigm. This explained why in interviews with senior staff, references to Muslim students were often collapsed into ‘ethnic’ classifications with ‘Asian’ often unwittingly used as a short-hand. Muslims not of ‘(south)Asian’ descent however, were of course eclipsed by this casual synonymity between ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’. Further, given that Muslims identifying as “White” comprised 11% of the total graduate Muslim population (DWP 2005), there were clearly no ‘ethnic’ short cuts available to describe the Muslim student population in its entirety.

The insistence on ‘ethnic’ categories however, can also be seen as indicative of the way ‘Muslimness’ is seen to be superfluous to a sturdier and socially scientific framework in which religion is only incidentally included; a point exemplified in accounts of ‘institutional’ racism further below.

Clearly, ethnic monitoring practices and the types of identities they uphold or refute reveal a tension between social control and social equality. For on the one hand, ethnic monitoring practices are universally construed as the vital ingredient in a successful equality remit. In universities and other institutions generally, they are

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17 At Lomonde, the religious background of staff was retrospectively being accounted for under Religion and Belief (2003) employment legislation (Interview; Emily 2005), although this had not been extended to students presumably because it was not a statutory requirement.

18 The Labour Market Survey (DWP 2005, para 7 Table 1) reveals a complex portrait of Muslim student graduates. It reveals that whilst the largest number of Muslim graduates were classified as ‘Pakistani’ (39%), those registered as “Indian” and “Other” represented the second highest proportion of students (14%) compared to for example, those classified as ‘Bangladeshi’ (9%). This breakdown duplicates ‘ethnic’ categories listed in the National Census and thus disguises the numbers of students from Turkey, the ‘Middle Eastern’/Central Asian or Eastern European backgrounds. These figures only account for Muslim graduates in the British labour market.
seen to function as a prerequisite for effective equality delivery (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.488) and often cited as an indicator of ‘good practice’.\footnote{The way student demographics are utilised by universities is worth exploring. For example in ‘widening participation’ agendas, and in the practices of Medical schools, postal codes are used to determine social background (Popovic 2007, p.162; Copland 2000).} However, on the other hand, such practices also appear to function as a means of better ‘handling’ racialised populations. Of course, one ought to bear in mind that the very designation ‘ethnic minority’ infers far more than a numerical descriptor for a section of the population, but a racialised inference grounded in ‘postcolonial’ hierarchical relations of power (Asad 2003, p.175).

In the latter view, if we approach the university as a “disciplinary institution”, or more specifically as a “disciplinary block” (Foucault 1986, p.425-6 cited in Grant 1997, p.106), then we can begin to approach the question of ethnic monitoring in a somewhat different fashion.\footnote{This means we expand the Foucauldian convention of observing disciplinary technologies in educational institutions through pedagogic practices (Foucault 1982, p.787; Foucault 1986 cited in Grant 1997, p.108) (e.g. assessments, sitting exams, attending a lecture). That is, to include bureaucratic practices more generally as these also comprise normalising functions.} In this view, the university is saturated with relations of power; norms are inculcated through the various disciplinary technologies and students are the subject of and subjected to these technologies in a confined and concerted fashion (ibid. see also Foucault 1982).

Significantly, disciplinary technologies operate through the “classification” and “objectification” of subjects (Grant 1997, p.107-108), seeking to normalise certain behaviours. In this sense, disciplinary technologies are fundamentally routinised and regimented processes. Hence, ethnic monitoring can be regarded as a “ubiquitous practice” (ibid. p.109), that is (through statutory imposition) attached to, even if not coherently fulfilled, all university functions (except unions) that may impinge on students or staff identified as ‘BME’.

From this perspective, ethnic monitoring functions as a “panoptican-like” mode of surveillance and a form of “regulated communication” (ibid. p.106) alongside others within the institution that are woven into university practices. The use of ethnic monitoring can therefore be seen, as further detailed below, to inform the way students are registered in the university (or not), and ultimately managed.
5.2.3. No ‘Muslims’: No Problem

‘Ethnic monitoring’ categories are based on pre-supposed classifications against which students (and staff) are required to align. As Murdoch and Ward suggest;

Counting leads to the articulation of ‘norms’ whereby people are considered ‘normal’ if in their characteristics they conform to the central tendencies of statistical laws; those that do not are considered ‘pathological’ (Murdoch and Ward 1997, p.312).

In this regard, ‘ethnic’ classifications are approached as the essence of social relations,21 reified through statutory legislation as a straightforward “translation of the social” (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.489). However, as others have pointed out (census) classifications work to “closet” some identities (denying the validity of their presence and instilling self-discipline) and bring others into view. This offers a sense of bureaucratic “reliability”, but forsakes social “validity” (Brown and Knopp 2006, p.225).

The value of bureaucratic categories is in their amenability to intervention (Murdoch and Ward 1997, p.308), particularly their “acculturation into the rationality of government” (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.489). As Hacking explains;

…the collection of statistics and the proliferation of inscriptions, with their technologies for classifying and enumerating become effective techniques of governmentality, allowing civil domains to be rendered visible, cultivable and, therefore, governable (Hacking 1990, p.312 cited in Murdoch and Ward 1997, p.489).

However, if governmentality makes little sense without the centrality of population data or put another way, if census classifications are quintessential to governmental power, what then is the place of Muslim students who are rendered statistically and thus formally invisible?

Present literature would suggest that the absence of ‘Muslim’ students within the bureaucratic measures of universities implies an absence of governance (Murdoch and Ward 1997; Bonnett and Carrington 2000; Legg 2005 cited in Brown

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21 This is of course resonant with the centrality of the census in colonial settings in producing categories and ordering racialised populations accordingly (Dirks 2001, p.196). The regulatory function of enumerating Black populations can also be observed in ‘post-colonial’ contexts, on questions of immigration for example (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.490).
and Knopp 2006, p.225). However, if we understand discipline through its normalising capacity, as noted in Chapter Two, then the absence of Muslims within the official registers of the university can actually be seen not as mere oversight, but “directly related to the exercise of white governmentality” (Tyrer 2003, p.246). In this view, the absence of Muslims is not an expression of de-racialisation but one of ‘deviance’ from a hegemonic racial order. This deviation can be seen to interrupt the bureaucratic calculations of the (‘white’) university. As further highlighted below, this was reflected in student accounts, but also in institutional responses to my questions about Muslims.

Amongst my interviewees for example, it was evident that many students were disrupting this classic ‘ethnic/racial’ schema;

So I ticked other and where it said please specify I wrote Islam, because what does ethnic mean, if you look to the etymology of that word, it’s got quite a negative meaning actually, it means barbarian (Interview; Uthman 2005).

Uthman highlights the minoritised status of ‘ethnic’ within the status quo (e.g. ‘barbarian’), but also infers its contingent rather than ‘natural’ character. Clearly, by pointing to its etymological ‘roots’, Uthman was also underlining its ‘negative’ historical application. Following this, Uthman’s assertion of an identity related to Islam was germane. It concurred with the majority of student interviewees and their identifications as ‘Muslim’ with other variations (‘British Muslim’ ‘Muslim British’). This was nothing new and has been reflected in the mass of ethnographic literature dating back to the mid-nineties (Lewis 1994; see also Archer 2001).

However at the same time, during the course of field-work there was another discernible pattern of responses to questions around Muslim student concerns and complaints. Hence, responses were often couched in a language of ‘non-statutory’ complacency. In short, because HE institutions were not obliged to monitor the religious identifications of their students it was rendered justifiable not to do so. In turn, this provided a comfortable and legitimate buffer against specific queries regarding religion, provisions and discrimination.

22 There were a number of critiques on this issue. In particular, student critiques of ethnocentric forms of classification, the political expediency and contingency of ‘British Muslim’, of being subject to classification at all, and the considerable discomfort with the perennial theme of loyalty that underpins any debate on Britain’s Muslims.
In my interview with Janet, this type of deflection was explicit in my questioning of how students hailing from ‘Arab’ backgrounds might be identified within the existing monitoring system. Rather than answer the question, Janet instead proceeded to chart the available categories (e.g. ‘Indian’, ‘Pakistani’) and then categorically stated;

*But no, that’s the extent and we’re not required to differentiate further by law. If you wanted to particularly to know how many Muslims we’ve got, you might want to talk to the chaplains and see what sort of congregation they’ve got* (Interview; Janet 2005).

Janet’s response was illuminating, for in this curt statement she revealed a number of issues relating to the broader racialisation of Muslim students within the university. In particular, we can observe the way religion was designated a minor place in university life outside of the ‘traditional’ equality remit. Most germane to this discussion however was the position, *we’re not required to differentiate further by law*. Janet was clearly positioning herself and the institution (we’re), within legal parameters. My line of questioning was posited outside of these parameters and rendered both inappropriate and irrelevant to university practices.

Generally, this typified the approach to anti-racism in the sector; where equality was reduced to a legal technicality “stunted by the minimalist requirements of the law” (Callaghan 2000, p.31), rather than a matter of social justice that accounts for the needs of a diverse student population. It is precisely within this minimalist approach that a sense of legitimised complacency emerged and was justified on statutory grounds. Legal requirements incumbent on the university were thus invoked as normative, irrespective of any limits they entailed.23

This same attitude prevailed at the University of Lomonde. Margaret, another senior staff member with an equality remit, responded to my request for a complaints report noting that whilst she “may” have a better idea on ethnicity “*We don’t record anything about religion*”. She later reiterated, without considering why it might be helpful or as a possible avenue of inquiry, that “I know you’re particularly interested in Muslim students but we just don’t record that information” (Interview; Margaret 2005). These routine ripostes availing no information about Muslim students were

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23 Janet’s response suggested that university practices reflected and corresponded neatly with statutory requirements. This was questionable given the shortcomings outlined in Chapter Three.
confidently asserted as something the university simply ‘doesn’t do’. Given the longstanding history of Muslims at this particular institution and Margaret’s equally longstanding ‘management’ of their concerns, this unyielding position was indicative of the anomalous status Muslim students were accorded in the university. Such institutional posturing was not read as an evasion of information. Rather, it reflected a legitimisation that was normalised as unproblematic, as a reflection of social reality that warranted no further discussion.

In this regard the exclusion of Muslim identities was not simply a bureaucratic error, or simply a reflection of statutory imposition but actually central to understandings of Muslim identities as ‘religious’, and hence not subject to ‘institutional’ racism. This was exemplified in my extended discussions with a senior manager in the university. For example, when asked if he would include different religious groups in his understanding of ‘institutional racism’ he asserted that;

I would yes, but only really, only because they tend to be concentrated in constituencies from which we are bad at recruiting (Interview; Senior Management, 2006).

In other words, Muslims were only considered discriminated against incidentally. This was not directly as ‘Muslim’ but through established ‘constituencies’ (e.g. ‘Indian’). This same logic was also apparent in interview with another female equality practitioner at Erdon. The universities drive to recruit more ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Bangladeshi’ staff was considered by default to include Muslims (Interview; Sally 2005).

These patterns of ‘inclusion’ were consistent with Macpherson’s definition, with the statutory commitment of the university and its inflections in various bureaucratic and discursive processes. It arguably formed a distinct racialised repertoire (Wetherell 1998, p.400) that rendered Muslim identities as secondary, super-imposed and hence transgressive. In this sense, as discussed in Chapter Two, the refusal to recognise racism against Muslims was bound up in the refusal to recognise Muslim identities. Interestingly then, this exclusion was not a reflection of a university that failed to recognise racism within its ranks, since comparable to Erdon, Lomonde was more willing to embrace the idea of ‘institutional racism’.
Rather, it expressed particular account of racism that followed Macpherson uncritically, reproducing a narrow understanding of racism in the university. Thus it was “structural”, “unconscious”, ‘reproductive’ and bound to a lack of equal opportunity for “different races” (Interview; Senior Management 2006).

Clearly, underpinning this repertoire was an ‘ethnic/racial’ schema firmly tied to institutional impact assessments. However, not only did this framework fail to dislodge institutional processes that excluded students from identifying as ‘Muslim’, they instead served as a rationale for insisting on them. In this regard, far from comprising a reflexive exercise, the enumerating techniques of ‘anti-racism’ as enshrined in the RRAA, formed a central component in legitimating the absence of Muslims. Grounded in disciplinary power, this schema functioned ubiquitously both through disciplinary technologies and the discourses around ‘Muslim’ student subjects these technologies engendered. However, discipline also dovetailed into a governmental strategy “which assume[d] the right to oversee, interrogate...include [and] exclude” (Hesse 1997, p.100). Overall, this can be seen to nurture an approach towards Muslim students characterised at best by legitimate complacency and at worst, into a reading that implied the absence of Islamophobia.

As explored in subsequent parts, the very absence of Muslim students within the bureaucratic procedures of the university can be understood as signifying their transgressive status and following this enabling exclusionary modes of (self)management. This is elaborated below through the example of university complaints schema.

Part Three: University Complaints Schema and Muslim Student Complainants

5.3.1. University Complaints Structures: Structuring Student Complaints

Under the RRAA (2000), universities are obliged to monitor the progression of students, assess all practices relating to such progression and publish these results in an accessible manner. Complaints records comprise one such aspect of monitoring ‘racial’ equality in the university. They would, for example, provide an insight into who is complaining, why they are complaining, if they are legitimate complaint-makers and so forth. However, this university practice, as outlined below, is highly structured with regulating effect. My concern it is to establish how it is structured,
what it served to conceal and reveal of racism generally, and of racism against Muslim students in particular.

Lomonde had begun to log complaints in the summer of 2005, and they did this retrospectively for the academic years 03-04. Any information prior to this was not collated, although it comprised part of the statutory obligation under the Race Amendment (CRE 2002a, p.6).24

In spite of there “significant number” 25 (Annual Complaints Report 2005) none of the complaints logged included any of those withdrawn, resolved or quashed at earlier stages (i.e. at programme, departmental level). These were considered ‘informal’ and thus any complaint made lower than faculty level was not registered in any report. The practice of resolving or closing complaints at the point of origin spanned both universities and was perceived as central to the success of an effective complaints system.26

In the report made available to me for the academic year 2003-04, the complaints were subdivided in ways that made it impossible to assess the complaints system by ‘ethnicity’. This is because all ‘BME’ groups were homogenised into a single cluster. Any further break down was considered “far too much detail to report” (Interview; Margaret 2005). This lack of transparency also emerged in cases of harassment and discrimination. Although the university were obliged to report the number and nature of such cases; these were not detailed in the report for that or any subsequent year.

This type of anaemic reporting however was not consistent. In the same report for example, it was (foot)noted that EU students were included in the category ‘International Students’ because it was;

24 Margaret was interviewed twice in 2005, and then as part of a collective interview with senior management at the university in 2006. Initially, Margaret stated that there was no formal record of complaints. However, in a subsequent meeting with her during questioning on RRAA monitoring obligations, she stated that the university was indeed monitoring complaints in this regard (Interview; Margaret 2005).

25 Although these complaints were considered ‘informal’ and not collated (Interview; Margaret 2005), the author of the complaints report appeared cognizant of their comparatively high volume (Annual Complaints Report 2005).

26 Once the complaints procedure was exhausted internally, students had the right to refer their complaint to the OIA (Office for Independent Adjudicators). The OIA however did not effectively deal with matters relating to academic judgement or cases of discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, or disability (OIA 2005, p.7).

27 It is worth noting that student ‘ethnicity’ was not logged within the complaints procedure but retrieved from student records. Thus, for the number of ‘BME’ students who had not self-identified upon registration, of which there were many (figures were nearly equal to those who had registered an ‘ethnic’ identification) this information would be logged in exactly the same way in their complaints record. This small detail is interesting because it reveals no opportunity for students to re-register their ‘ethnicity’ or omit it, if they wish to do so. The fixity of such bureaucratic procedures fails to account for the fact that in the course of university experiences, students may begin to acquire new identifications; a feature pertinent to my fieldwork.
…felt that for the purpose of considering factors relating to appeals, complaints and
discipline issues, cultural differences may be more relevant than level of feeds paid

This is indeed a curious note given that ‘BME’ UK domiciled students remained
banded under a single cluster regardless of their cultural differences. Given a decade
of discussion with Muslim students on issues of prayer facilities, for example, the
university was not unaware of such ‘cultural’ differences.

This marked discrepancy, however, revealed the way ‘BME’ identities were
bureaucratized in homogenous ways (as ‘Home Ethnic Minority) and implicitly
registered as ‘non-British’ compared to their “Home White British” counterparts, a
reference particularly symbolic of their ‘othered’ status.

These discrepancies were not simply misguided nomenclature. They appeared
embedded within explanations for the significantly higher number of ‘international’
complainants compared to their ‘home’ counterparts. Thus when explaining why
plagiarism was significantly higher within this student cohort, it was considered
“understandable” given the higher fees paid, and because of the “greater family and
cultural pressures on them to succeed” (ibid). ‘Cultural pressure’ was clearly not
referring to pressure from ‘white’ parents, home or abroad.

The un-reflexive institutionalization of such attitudes revealed that such
bureaucratic procedures, were neither neutral, standardised, nor consistently applied;
either in the way they were registered, collated or in their articulation to university
management. Rather they formed part of broader processes of racialised
stereotyping, in spite of claims from staff that the “racial” background of students
was not “something [she was] ever aware of when ...dealing with individual cases”
(Interview; Margaret; 2005).

In view of the way complaints were, as far as possible, sieved at the point of
origin (i.e. departmental level), it was therefore hardly surprising that Margaret could
claim “numbers are relatively small compared to the size of the institution” (ibid). At
Erdon, Janet typified this conviction;

I mean we have something like 25,000- 30,000 students, and the number of
complaints we get to deal doesn’t end up in double figures, it’s really very low and
that seems to me suggest that we’re doing something right. Either it’s a totalitarian
approach and nobody gets to say anything or what I think is more likely that
students feel they are comfortable and the issues they raise get addressed very quickly at the right sort of level, I think compared with most universities of this size and complexity we probably have few of these issues (Interview; Janet, 2005).

Janet’s response concluded with an inference to complaints of racism; ‘we probably have few of these issues’. This inference is later iterated in her remark that we don’t “get very many” (ibid). Clearly, complaints reports were being deployed to rationalise the absence or minimal significance of racism, where fewer complaints meant fewer complainants. What was noteworthy is this response was indicative of a broader repertoire of racism; where racism was quantified and articulated proportionally, relative to the size of the (student) population, and hence rendered exceptional. Its exceptionality, furthermore was attributed to the success of the university ‘we’re doing something right’, yet remained articulated in muted terms; as an ‘issue’. This articulation however appeared to represent a tension; between the need to represent the university as anti-racist (we don’t get very many) without wanting to talk about racism. It embraced the ideal of ‘racial’ equality without wanting to handle ‘prickly’ questions of racism in the university, as further discussed below.

Clearly however, questions of racism in the institution were eclipsed from view and a-priori marginalised in a system designed to exclude ‘local’ complaints both from view and from developing any further. Moreover like every other bureaucratic procedure in the university, the university was governing through an ‘ethnic/racial’ schema which failed to account for the presence of Muslims as Muslims.

Although I sought to clarify Janet’s claims further, the manager in charge of complaints at Erdon failed to reply to my requests for an interview on at least three separate occasions.28 However, at Lomonde, it is indeed revealing that of all the complaints that reached a formal stage and were upheld as legitimate, a significantly higher proportion (compared to their ‘home’ ‘white’ counterparts)29 were from ‘ethnic minority’ students. This was a consistent and persistent problem at the

28 Janet did confirm however that complaints were monitored by ‘ethnicity’ and that ‘overseas’ students tended to complain on finance related issues (Interview; Janet 2005).
29 ‘Ethnic minority’ students comprised nearly half of the total ‘home’ student complainants in academic appeals. Academic Appeals were those against exclusion on the basis of academic failure and a failure to satisfy work/attendance requirements (Annual Complaints Report 2005-6).
university. Complaint reports in every subsequent year raised similar disparities and every year it was noted that impact assessment work with the equalities office was ongoing. Yet, none of these reports dating from 2003 to 2009 indicated how this discrepancy was specifically being dealt with. The latest report reviewed (Lomonde Race Action Plan 2008-9) simply noted it would “investigate this further” (ibid). This brought into question the quality and purpose of this very belated impact assessment, but also reflected a confessional discourse of (non)-performativity. That is, where declarations of racism metamorphose into anti-racist practice (Ahmed 2004).

This ‘racial’ discrepancy within academic appeals appeared to tally with other discrepancies across the university. At Lomonde, Zeenat (a female medic) was of the view that Muslim students in the medical school had been failing in large numbers compared to their ‘white’ counterparts, and this had been happening year after year. She gave me the impression that it was because of the ‘high numbers’ of Muslims in the medical school. When speaking with a senior Muslim staff member, he indicated that there appeared to be “differential admissions” and lower pass rates amongst ‘BME’ groups generally; although did not claim a difference in failure rates amongst particular groups because this information wasn’t collated (Phone Interview; Isaac 2006). At Lomonde, these discrepancies were not something peculiar to the Medical school. It was found that ‘BME’ students across all faculties were awarded lower (under-graduate) degrees and this was not peculiar to any socio-economic background (Degree Attainment, Lomonde 2008/2009). This was consistent with other national studies (Broecke and Nicholls 2007).

Yet, since these ‘racial’ discrepancies broadly and in the medical school were submerged within broader ‘BME’ categories, it was not possible to verify claims of

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30 The year of fieldwork (2005-06) academic appeals from ‘ethnic minority’ students were significantly higher against their overall percentage in the university (Annual Complaints Report 2005-6).

31 At the time of fieldwork, those registered as ‘Asian’ at Erdon constituted a significant proportion of the total student intake doing the MBCHB (Bachelor Of Medicine and Surgery) (Interview; Janet 2005). Figures at Lomonde were not verified.

32 At Erdon, however, it was confirmed that ‘young Pakistani men’ in the medical faculty were failing in high numbers in spite of having good qualifications on entry. This had been flagged up by the faculty itself (Interview; Janet 2005). These findings can broadly be understood in a UK context where ‘British Asian Male’ students have disproportionately failed in clinical (i.e. face to face) examinations in spite of entering with good, if not above average grades (BMJ 1995; Esmail et al 1995; Law 1996, p.179-180; Wass et al 2003). Research in this area however, is not conclusive as to why ‘Pakistani’ male students fail and has for example been attributed to ‘social background’ (e.g. deprivation factors), rather than ‘ethnicity’ per se (see for example Popovic 2007). This also explains why medical schools at select universities have developed a pre-application aptitude test designed to create a “level playing field for applicants from diverse educational and cultural backgrounds” (Ford, Guardian 19th January 2006).
Muslim student failures or account in any detail for the disproportionate and persistent number of ‘ethnic minority’ complainants at Lomonde.

Moreover, questions of racism were also submerged in categories pertaining to student performance (i.e. student appeals) thus detracting from the institutionalised racism that potentially informed such complaints. Albeit the staff member in charge of compiling complaints reports was well aware of their messy and complex nature, she inclined towards blanketing questions of racism: “there’s a mixture of things that tend to be academic in a number of guises”, leading her to assert that allegations of (racial) discrimination had “no major part to play” in the complaints she had encountered (Interview; Margaret 2005). Margaret appeared to be suggesting that students embellished ‘academic’ complaints with claims of discrimination.33

This implicit suggestion however was problematic for a number of reasons. First it appeared to be at odds with Lomonde’s policy (Race Equality Policy 2003) which claimed to take as its starting point the Macpherson’s definition of a racist incident as “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person” (see Macpherson 1999). Policy stated it would “ensure this definition is used consistently” (Race Equality Policy 2003).

Second, it comprised an inversion of accounts given the marked racial disparities flagged up in the annual complaints report. These disparities suggested that it was not that student complaints were superimposed with racialised insinuations, but those repeatedly found to be upheld indicated a deep-seated pattern of institutionalised discrimination.

This ‘pattern’ of course brought into view the reductionist ways complaints were registered (e.g. academic appeals) on the university’s terms. It seemed these bureaucratic procedures functioned in ways that prevented or limited questions of racism from emerging in the first place. It is worth noting that even with the noted discrepancies amongst ‘ethnic minority’ students, ‘racism’ was never named but only referred to loosely as “an underlying issue” (Annual Complaints Report 2005).

However, not naming racism was not simply a categorical failure but one that appeared to span, albeit perhaps unevenly, the breadth, of the university. This can be gleaned from other examples. First, complaint procedures required students to make explicit their complaint and if in any way 'racial' or 'racist' to evidence this. However

33 For example, she recalled that one student was excluded following a termination of a placement and subsequently raised issues of disability. This complaint was not upheld.
since institutionalised racisms can be couched in other (even benign) terms, expressed subtly, perhaps marked by what is not being said or done, student experiences of racism were unlikely to be articulated in ways that would be registered by the university as worthy of consideration. This brings to mind several students that had been in touch with the staff equalities officer at Lomonde. These cases indicated, as he’d reported, that students had concerns about racism. They felt they were being victimised for being racially 'different', but were unable to articulate these fears in ways that the university would be receptive to. Significantly, the equalities officer at the time was carefully positioned to avoid a ‘student caseload’ (See Chapter Three). Thus rather than ‘endorse’ such complaints, he insisted that he would “never...label something when someone came to see me”. Instead;

I would know their view of it and they may have a particular perception ...and their tutor or whatever may have a very different perception of what that treatment is…

(Interview: John, 2005).

Thus the question of racism here appeared to be obscured rather than clarified. The equalities officer in the university was unwilling to name racism as anything but ‘a perception’. This of course undermined student experiences and left them with little ‘concrete’ grounds upon which to proceed. They therefore went away quietly, presumably questioning what it was they were experiencing.

Another way in which we can see this ‘capping’ of questions of racism is through institutional displacement. Since whilst students were entitled to complain this did not necessarily equate the university conceding responsibility. It is worth quoting Grant when she states;

The culture of autonomy and individualism at the university constructs students who believe that success or failure lies with them. Thus, solely responsible for their academic success, they seek to take care of themselves, and in this way the institution takes care of itself. When there have been concerns about the quality of learning, or student failure, the individual has been the focus of study, and not surprisingly, it has been a short step to therefore assume 'he' is the problem (Grant 1997, p.110 Emphasis Mine).

Grant’s observations clearly point to the broader liberal economy of the university and governance of its student-subjects. Specifically, however, this also tallied with
some of the ways in which Muslim students were anecdotally registered within the university. For example, in the way Muslim women ‘drop-outs’ were attributed to arranged marriages, or the pursuit of an education as dowry material in the ‘marriage market’ from undue gender and family pressure (Interview; Janet 2005). Yet conversely, Muslim women being pressured not to don the hijab/niqab, or dropping out of medical school in significant numbers because the niqab was prohibited in clinical practice was not flagged up with the same concern. Equally, in the case of the unusually high failure of ‘Pakistani’ males in the university, it was not inferred that the medical school was culpable in any way, except unwittingly in how the faculty might be transmitting its knowledge or how the students might be learning (ibid). Finally, when questioned on what kinds of problems Muslim students might face on campus Janet’s response veered away from the institution; “I don’t know to what extent they are asserting themselves in making themselves clear when they might have problems” (ibid). Clearly, student characteristics (a lack of assertion, clarity) rather than institutional inequalities loomed large as the source of the problem (see also Dyke and Gunaratnam 2000b, p. 328).

It is however misleading to suggest that Erdon was somehow unique in its ‘self-censorship’ on questions of racism. For example, at Lomonde, Emily considered herself very advanced on the ‘race’ agenda. She initially hesitated in describing racism against Muslims as Islamophobia. Although proceeded to identify it as such in the context of media coverage of ‘terrorism’ which in turn had repercussions for Muslim students in terms of “heightening racial tension” leading to “things... happen[ing]” (Interview; Emily 2005). Racism was thus configured as encroaching upon the university from a broader political terrain.

However, immediately following this Emily steered away from university racism in a somewhat arbitrary manner to a lengthy discussion on arranged marriages; a topic clearly unrelated to the subject at hand. When probed further on the university, she related that there was “nothing specific on campus” (ibid). In this case one suspected unease in talking about Islamophobia on campus as opposed to

34 Made emphatic in the pronouncements that “I would see that [arranged marriages] as a far bigger problem if you like for some of these Asian families, than the kinds of things we’ve been talking about [racism]” (Interview; Janet, 2005).
35 Emily had formerly assumed the role of equality practitioner at another university and had worked on “issues around race for many many years”. Within 12 months of being in post at Lomonde, Emily left along with another colleague from the same unit (Interview; Emily 2005).
the more comfortable topic of ‘arranged marriages;’ possibly, in fear of ‘misrepresenting’ the university, thus explaining her subsequent retraction. Whilst at face value this was understandable, what was of more concern was in seeking to deflect questions of university racism, this and other equality practitioners were willing to objectify Muslim students as ‘victims’ of their own culture. That these tropes were so readily available was indicative of the way racialised stereotyping was so pervasive that it was even being rolled out by those ostensibly in place to counter it.

In other parts of the university, Islamophobia was talked about quite openly, without prompt or hesitation. One member of union management for example was the only official to openly talk about ‘Islamophobia’ per se when asked about problems Muslim students might face;

The prospective rise of cases of Islamophobia which is reflected throughout UK I think at the moment- I’d be very surprised if that wasn’t reflected in aspects of campus life but bear in mind it might not be a student on student thing as the campus is in the middle of a big city and you might get attitudes that are reflective of rather more nasty elements of British society- on campus, this might not be a student thing it might be an external thing (Interview; Union Management, Connor 2006).

Yet, even in this instance, not only does Connor locate Islamophobia as part of a current trend (rather than part of a much longer historical trajectory on campus), but it is repeatedly implied as something located more broadly in the ‘UK’, an ‘external thing’ to do with other ‘nasty elements’. The idea that the union would be home to racism was later quickly dismissed, as a place “not conducive” to a student environment (ibid).

Indeed, these types of self-assessment of Lomonde union were ingrained with such certainty that union management did not consider it necessary for the union to be subject to ‘race’ review legislation. Rather, this manager scoffed at the idea. He was not alone in this view. Most equality practitioners did not consider the union an area to be scrutinised on its ‘race’ equality practices. Yet it did appear to be at odds with the view of one equality practitioner who, only two weeks earlier, indicated that ‘race’ impact assessment would be introduced in the union “within the year” since it was considered a “service provider” (Conversation; Pamela Equality Advisor 2006). The university had not implemented this nor included the union in its 2008/9 ‘race plan’.
That equality legislation (RRA 2000) had not been applied to either student union in spite of revealing themselves as (re)markably racialised sites, as further elaborated in Chapter Six, was a persistent concern and something raised with the ECU in 2005/6 (Interview; ECU Advisor, 2005). Although of course, even this would not apply to Muslim students as a collectivity.\(^{36}\)

Clearly, these range of institutional responses suggested a distinct lack of meaningful engagement on issues of Islamophobia on campus. This was unsurprising in some quarters since the disciplinary technologies of the university rendered Muslim student voices inaudible and the university un-attuned to their concerns. Muslim student complaints were thus only heard ‘off the record’. However, even when accounts of Islamophobia cropped up, they were reconfigured along a ‘cultural’ frequency, or as in the case of the union, as problems to do with ‘other places’. It is on this note, we turn to students.

### 5.3.2. The Complainants

From the perspective of the institution if complaints are not made or registered by the university at a formal level, then there are no complainants. This particular institutional narrative, albeit of great comfort and pride to these senior staff was of great concern. This is especially since in the course of fieldwork, it transpired that the ISOC at Erdon had compiled a list of complaints which had gone unheard and were left unresolved by the university.\(^{37}\) According to interviewees, ‘fobbing students off’ (see also Ahmad and Tyrer 2006, p.20) was common practice at Erdon. This was institutional procedure in which complaints emanating within the union remained bracketed within union politics. Muslim students concerns about vandalism,\(^{38}\) violations of prayer space, bullying, and issues pertaining to the freedom to campaign on the question of Palestine were not considered aptly dealt with by the student executive or union management; precisely because they were seen to be collusive in these very problems. Moreover the university stood accused

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36 The ambiguity of the RRA in view of unions was also raised by the *All Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Semitism* (Macshane 2006, para 202). In March 2009, the ECU issued a report addressing this grey area (ECU 2009b, p.3).

37 This ‘file’ dated back at least five years and was mentioned to me by several Muslim students and a ‘white’ academic particularly concerned about the status and victimisation of Muslim students at the university. Despite numerous attempts to obtain a copy of the report this was not possible.

38 Just to provide one example, Erdon ISOC had to repeatedly advertise events because those publicised near the prayer-room were ripped down or defaced. This had occurred on so many occasions that they eventually installed a display unit which required a key.
of endorsing racist practices in the union due to its lack of intervention (See Chapter Six).

The university’s legal obligation under section 22 of the 1994 Education Act clearly laid out that “the university’s governing body must take all reasonably practical steps to ensure that the students union operates fairly and democratically” and that “there is an effective and fair complaints procedure” (Bell et al 2006, p.46). However, the university persistently failed to intervene. It was fairly typical, according to interviewees (staff and students) that this obligation was abrogated and Muslim student complaints were persistently deferred back to the union. This served to underscore the illegitimacy of such complaints and the complaint makers, comprising a scenario of “secondary victimisation” (Hesse 1997, p.88). Secondary victimisation refers to;

…problems victimised communities have in reporting their experiences to public agencies who cannot perceive or refuse to address the logic of racism (ibid).

Thus whilst the university refused to address repeated violations of Muslim student rights, it allowed some union members the scope to mobilise racist discourses without impunity. The extent of this problem was illuminated by a group of Muslim students, who, left with no procedural recourse within the union or university, sought to independently press the university.39 Details of these cases are elaborated in Chapter Six within respective campus histories. Below, institutional responses to student complaints are explored.

When speaking with Richard, a senior manager at Erdon, he was very keen to underscore the union as the rightful place for student complaints about the union and its members. It was particularly difficult to gage his response on complaints he was privy to, although his position included a remit for student welfare and regular contact with union representatives. However, given the catalogue of complaints made by various Muslim students, in hindsight, this difficulty was understandable. Like earlier ripostes, he attempted to foreclose the discussion with “I probably wouldn’t know if they were Muslim or not” (Interview; Richard 2005). However, when probed further, he vaguely recalled a single case in 2003 in which

39 In comparison, at Lomonde, the displacement of student concerns to the union was not a significant concern. This was presumably because, at the time, Muslim students were well represented in the union and their primary concerns did not revolve around the union, but the university.
“inappropriate” comments (which he couldn’t recall specifically or even generally) were made by union officers.

The reluctance to name these comments as anything other than “inappropriate” was more comfortable institutional speak for racist jibes. Since it had occurred in the union, this incident did not, according to Richard, warrant anything more than recognition that the comment made by union officials was “inappropriate.” However, had this occurred and been taken up by students in the life sciences department for example, proper formal procedures would have involved a disciplinary and possibly expulsion depending on the degree of abuse or ‘racial’ harassment. Since Muslims qua Muslims do not fall under the rubric of the university’s ‘race’ policy, and the union escaped the force of the Race Amendment, an apology was deemed sufficient. Out of view of the dreaded ‘race’ impact assessment and its mantra of ‘policy, practices and procedures’, the site of the union presented an institutional loophole. This explained why a Muslim staff member at this university insisted that there “need[ed] to be more formative infrastructures in place to hear the voice of Muslim students” (Interview; Khalid 2005).

Unsurprisingly then, the question of implementing ‘race’ impact assessment in the union was not particularly high on this university’s agenda. The staff member in charge of refining race policy remained silent on this issue.40 However, another equality practitioner in personnel was quite clear that the union was “independent of the university” and on this basis would not be included in any ‘race’ based assessment (E-Correspondence with Sally, October 2006). This was in keeping with the way ‘race’ equality in the union was considered distinct from the university but also in terms of the marginalised role of equality generally at this university.

Richard’s choice words (‘inappropriate’) however, reflected a much broader pattern amongst senior management and other staff (with an equality remit) to evade or gloss over questions of racism. Another manager for example, considered the “problem of racism” as particularly “isolated”, and this was based on none other than the very few incidences of racism reported to him between 2002-2004 (Anon, Erdon Student Chronicle, 2004). The individual in charge of re-writing ‘race’ policy for the university considered racism in the university an anathema and remained “unaware of anywhere where the university has been found wanting” (Interview; Lionel 2005).

40 This staff member failed to respond to a query in October 2006 regarding ‘race’ impact assessment in the union.
This was somewhat baffling when at the time, the university was being pressed by students claiming ‘racial’/religious discrimination. Although senior management at the time were fully aware of these particular Muslim student grievances, I was assured it was “no longer an issue” (Interview; Richard 2005). Similarly, one ‘equality champion’ at Erdon quietly dismissed the possibility of racial or religious discrimination as “anecdotal” and “incidental” (Interview; Janet, 2005). Indeed, since the official channels and conventions of the university did not recognise racism against Muslim students, it could only present itself ‘anecdotally’.

This generic reluctance to acknowledge Islamophobia on campus concurred with other findings revealing a general “unwillingness to acknowledge and address racism by name” (Ahmad and Tyrer 2006, p.20-21; see also Cook et al 2009, p.45). Moreover, this reluctance to intervene in ‘union racism’ was considered by a Phd student to be an arena where the university assumed a problematic role as complicit bystander (Interview; Haider 2005). This was reiterated by a ‘white’ academic at the university who noted that in terms of Muslim students, “there [was] a lot of bullying going on that is institutionalised, and the university is complicit with it, it knows it’s happening” (Interview; Chris 2005). A Muslim staff member privy to the history of institutionalised Islamophobia at this university also felt that in view of Muslim student attempts to raise questions of Islamophobia; “I don’t think they find many answers to be honest” (Interview; Khalid 2005).

5.3.3 A Repressive Complaints Culture

Many of the ‘procedural’ issues noted in previous sections do not account for the repressive ‘culture of complaints’ that transpired during fieldwork. It is arguably this culture of complaints that provide vital clues to the disciplinary technologies of the university and the effects of racialised governmentality on Muslim students.

At Lomonde, I heard several accounts of Muslim students who had made informal complaints about their school, sought advice from the union and subsequently decided not to proceed. A number of these complaints were reported both first-hand and through various union officers. Most of these complaints were about the medical school,41 where as noted previously, a disproportionate number of Muslim men had been failing in large numbers.

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41 Research published by the British Medical Association has indicated that over a third of medical students have been bullied in hospitals and this included racial and sexual discrimination. A fifth of students also believed that
A discernible pattern that seemed to emerge was the way these Muslim students in particular suffered bullying on account of assertive ‘public’ religious practice; where they congregated for meetings, made a public display of Islam (e.g. Islam Awareness Week) made requests on grounds of religion, or for (visibly) being part of a Muslim collective (see also Chapter Six and for example Nasir 2006 and responses). At Lomonde (and Erdon), students related many accounts they considered to be racist. They all involved overt hostility from (senior) staff members; students being followed and turned out of classrooms by staff for praying; being publicly shouted at for ‘offending others’ by praying in the medical school; ‘caught’ praying and sent to the dean’s office to be told, “we’re not having any of that here”; rescheduling lab sessions during Friday prayers and refusing to re-allocate these in spite of availability; deducting marks from students who were unable to submit work due to religious holidays;\(^2\) professors threatening the cancellation of Islam Awareness Week; being prevented from using lecture facilities although officially booked, and in one instance being verbally abused in front of other classmates prior to an exam, resulting in failure, and unfortunately a year of re-sits.\(^3\) Being banned from wearing the niqab in the medical school was also raised as a discriminatory practice, although had been rationalised by both universities to be an obstruction to medical practice (Interview; Senior Management 2006, Phone Interview; Isaac 2006).\(^4\) Some of these instances are further explored in Chapters Six and Seven. Others are elaborated below. It is worth recalling one student’s account at length:

There was a lecture and pbl [peer based learning] right next to each other and a five minute space in-between and that was the only space during the day I had to pray, so I had to pray inside the med school building and I found a nice quiet corner where no-one was around, but somebody from two floors above me could see I was there from the balcony, so I was about to pray with two or three other people and somebody standing on the second floor of the balcony who was actually a professor at the university, shouted down and said ‘what are you doing you can’t pray in this building!’ and we were like, ‘but why not, we’re not

\(^2\) This issue was raised by a female Muslim student in a science department at Erdon (Interview; Salma 2005).
\(^3\) These examples were related from numerous interviews with students (Hala, Sajid) and student union officers (Mohammed, Yunus, Rebecca).
\(^4\) At the time of fieldwork there was a de facto policy at Lomonde Medical School that prohibited the niqab in clinical practice. This was on communicative grounds. However, some students reported that following anti-terror legislation, friends who wore niqab in the medical school were pressured to remove it (Interview; Amun 2005). At Erdon the niqab was officially prohibited in clinical medical practice as it was also seen to prevent ‘patient-practitioner’ communication.
blocking any alley ways or anything like that, there’s no fire hazard, so why not’, and the man was like ‘well some people find it offensive’, and we were like tucked away, so you’d have to go out of your way to find us, never mind being in people’s faces, erm so I thought that was completely out of order, so I came to the student union and I spoke with the academic affairs officer erm who said he would look in to it but nothing was really made of it (Interview; Yunus 2005).

Yunus’s account reflects a desire to pray discreetly and avoid the public gaze by being ‘tucked away’. However, he is overlooked and surveyed by a professor who finds their mini-congregation ‘offensive’. From Yunus’s perspective, this professor had clearly ‘gone out of his way’ to scrutinise their behaviour, publicly reprimand them and eject them from their ‘quiet corner’.

This excerpt reflected the way some Muslim medics at Lomonde felt that staff were ‘going out of their way’ to bully them. That most of these instances occurred within the same school and within the same time-frame, suggested these were not isolated instances, but indicative of a pattern of Islamaphobic hostility towards a Muslim presence in the school. Yunus’s account reflected a public displacement and demarcation of secular space which Muslim students were seen to be in violation of. This incident appeared to be underlined by an insistence that Muslim students self-regulate and ‘mind their Muslimness’; something also evidenced at Erdon (See Chapter Seven).

Indeed, questions of racism within the ‘med school’ were repeatedly flagged. It was the opinion of one senior ISOC member and union officer at Lomonde, that the medical school was particularly “anti-religious” (Interview; Ali 2006) and this explained much of the hostility and inflexibility towards a visible Muslim cohort. At face value, this appeared convincing, especially in light of the way students at Erdon and Lomonde had been reprimanded for violating the ‘secular’ ethos of the school. Their presence, it seemed, was to be tolerated, provided they did not ‘flaunt’ themselves as Muslims. Cases of racist hostility in the medical school however, were certainly not exhaustive of the institutionalised racism some Muslim students experienced (See for example Chapter Six and Seven). 45 Nor, one ought to add was Islamophobia the only form of racism identified in the campus cases, as discussed in the following chapter.

45 Racism across university disciplines requires further exploration, particularly in view of research that has suggested comparatively higher incidences of bullying and harassment in medical schools, see (Rautio et al 2005 cited in Wood 2006, p.664).
What was of particular concern in my cases however, was that students did not “feel they were in a position to argue” due to fear of repercussion (Interview; Hala 2006). This fear and vulnerability was re-counted in another interview with a union officer who related that many Muslim students had approached him with complaints about the medical school;

...a lot of the time people just don’t want to chase it up, there’s always this fear there, that hang on their senior professors, we don’t wanna tick them off, cos you know, and also the medical school is very hard, it’s hard to excel in the course, so people don’t want to get on the wrong side of the professors (Interview; Yunus, 2005).

This was again echoed by another Muslim union officer the following year, who revealed that once students had logged a complaint, it would often be retracted. Based on the experiences of older medical students;

It’s been known in the past that if the staff know you’ve complained about them then you’ll pretty much suffer in the next exam period (Interview; Ali 2006).

Thus the general culture was not to log an official complaint, but to “keep your head down and nose clean” (Interview: Hala, 2006). Clearly, what was dictating student behaviour was a fear of aggravating senior staff, and hence a desire to stay on the ‘right side’ of their professors (see also Cooke et al 2003, p.9). However, as the ‘subject of’ institutional regulation and “their own conscience” (Grant 1997, p.108) this position was underlined by a sense of their own racialised status in the institution.

Students were clearly not unaware of their marginalised and problematised status in broader political context and the university, something addressed in varying ways and perspectives in Chapters Three, Four and Six. It is worth briefly highlighting this cognizance here as it routinely cropped up across a whole range of subjects. In discussion with Amun for example, a third year history student at Lomonde;

We live next door to students and we have a shared drive-way so there’s politics in terms of the car and, because you know the neighbour can’t park to save her life and she’s always impinging on our space, so it’s like how do you deal with that person, and especially, as a Muslim, you have to be very careful how you go about talking to people, any random person can go and rant their head off, -and he’s just angry,
he’s just a complete pillock, he’s ranting his head off, but if you’re a Muslim, you’re an aggressive Muslim, terrorist person shouting his head off again… so you have to be very very careful (Interview; Amun 2005).

Amun draws attention to a self-conscious and racialised Muslim subject. She underlines with particular clarity, the caution and potential consequences involved in asserting a Muslim voice. The vulnerability of this positioning was underscored by another student in the context of union politics;

There’s actually a big problem involved, because if somebody religiously discriminates against you it’s fine, if they discriminate you because of your race then there’s a problem (Interview, Yunus 2005).

Other ‘white’ union officials were also aware of the (racialised) constraints some Muslim students had experienced. The welfare officer for example noted that she encountered many anecdotal rather than formal accounts of racism about Muslim students and these were often unresolved;

Like I said the ISOC don’t necessarily raise things at a higher level but generally cushion and support people when things happen” (Interview; Lisa 2005 Emphasis Mine).

The problem of retraction however, was not specific to the medical school and was also noted by an equality practitioner who was receiving informal complaints within other schools that were not pursued (Interview; Emily 2005). These often involved research students of ‘Asian’, ‘African’ and ‘Oriental’ background who felt the credit for their roles in projects were either undermined or not adequate for their expertise, whilst other ‘white’ colleagues were allocated more prestigious ‘high profile work’ (ibid; see also Modood and Fenton 1999 cited in Puwar and Raghuram 2004, p.3).

At Lomonde, this culture of (not) complaining was further compounded by unfavourable responses from the medical school Dean. Hala wrote to the Dean following an incident during an exam when a tutor “verbally assaulted her” (Interview; Hala 2006) in a class full of medical students prior to sitting her exam. Shaken by the event, Hala fell one percent short of the pass mark, and was

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46 This resonated with other reported cases of Korean students suffering racist attacks at their university, but fearing “too much noise would have a negative effect on their status at college” see (Pai 2005 cited in Ahmed 2007b, p.600).
subsequently required to re-sit the year. Hala complained to her tutors who were said to be “unhelpful”, and to the union who were unable to pursue her case. She eventually complained to the Dean in writing, who, according to Hala, was sympathetic but “not willing to address the issue” (ibid)

Whilst the Dean was seen to dismiss her complaint, the union assumed a somewhat redundant role. Her complaint, as with others, failed to be taken up because the union felt “there was nothing they could do...it was like banging there head against a brick wall” (ibid). In spite of formal union representation, that the authoritative weight of ‘white’ senior staff appeared insurmountable in at least one case, was of concern, particularly since it questioned the power of student unions within universities; a much broader issue to which we return in Chapter Six.

Similarly, at Erdon, complaints and grievances remained un-pursued within the institution. As one staff member put it;

I think there’s a lot of reluctance, it’s hard enough as it is and this campus is very middle class, white, it’s not easy to negotiate, if you go to UCE its kinda different (Interview; Chris 2005).

At Erdon there was one particularly complex case (See Chapter Seven). This spiralled from a singular incident involving the bullying of a female Muslim student to an arbitrary policy of limiting religious posters in the medical school and following this, complaints about Muslims students using the multi-faith facility in the school (Interview; Noreen 2005). This student had been reprimanded by senior staff in the medical school for offending the secular principles of the school through an Islam Awareness Week Exhibition. In spite of feeling discriminated against and policed by staff in the school, she was discouraged from complaining;

Even though there was a point when I really wanted to challenge what had happened and I really wanted to find out what our rights were at the med school, a lot of the sisters that I knew they were like, no I think you should leave it (ibid).

These responses however, were not simply about the potentially negative effects this would have on Noreen, but fears of repercussion for Muslim students in the medical school in general (e.g. confiscation of prayer-rooms). Further, as noted earlier, Erdon
was home to an accumulation of grievances, symbolised in the complaints file maintained by students from the ISOC. However, in their case, it was not retraction but limited institutional recourse that was central to their secondary victimisation.

In view of these accounts, it was of concern that much of the Islamophobic hostility recalled had gone unreported, and unchecked, leaving those particular Muslim students disadvantaged. It also nurtured an environment of quietism for other Muslim students. In late 2008, this concern was echoed in a report compiled by Lomonde. It found that whilst 14% of students (in a survey of 120) at the university had personally suffered bullying or discrimination due to their religion or belief, nearly 90% of these students had not reported such incidences (Lomonde Race Action Plan 2008-9) (see also Cook et al 2009, p.8). This did not inspire much confidence in university complaint systems expected, one would imagine, to provide an outlet for student grievances.

5.3.4 Racialised Governmentality; Calculable Effects & ‘Good Practice’

Complaints schema in universities can be seen to produce calculable effects which are fundamentally racialised and reliant on a culture of repressing student voices. As Grant observes of practices of domination;

> They produce calculable effects, that is, their purpose is to limit the field of possible action and thus control the behaviours of their subjects (Grant 1997, p.109).

Thus, the very act of not complaining (for fear of inviting the repressive tendencies of the university, from unfavourable experience, from an unwillingness to partake in a series of bureaucratic procedures, or fear of not being taken seriously) can be seen as an effect of governmentality. However, in the case of Muslim students interviewed it was precisely an awareness of their marginalised status (their absence), their ‘subjectedness’, and the unspoken sense of hyper-visibility that inhibited their complaints. In other words, it was the “crushing object-hood” (Fanon 1967, p.106 cited in Hesse 1997, p.100) produced by narratives of hyper-visibility (discussed in Chapters Four and Six), and invisibility (e.g. ethnic monitoring) that served to temper student voices. As noted earlier, the absence of Muslim students in the institution was not a mode of ‘de-racialising’ Muslim students, but part of a broader repertoire of racialisation. Coupled with their hyper-visible status, this
‘transgression’ can be seen to affect their manoeuvrability. It functioned as a self-regulating facet of the complaints schema allowing the university to govern on racialised terms with racist effect. Clearly, this aspect was not formal procedure, but it was nevertheless central to the proclaimed efficacy which suggested we ‘don’t get very many’.

However, even for those Muslim students who did complain, complaints categories were structured in ways that prevented, limited and or disguised questions of racism (e.g. academic appeals). Thus, the calculable effects of a racialised governmentality can be evidenced both as internal to the complaints schema (i.e. complaints categories and processes) and external to it (culture of repression), in so far as it regulated the prospects of Muslim students (and others) complaining.

It is thus ironic, then, that in spite of the submergence of Muslim subjectivities in the bureaucracy of the university, they nonetheless acquired a certain institutional visibility. That is, as recipients of proactive gestures, and as beneficiaries in excess of a liberal equality remit (see also Chapter Seven). ‘Muslim’ students thus figuratively occupied the site of ‘good practice’. At Lomonde for example, staff at the equality unit were absolutely clear that fulfilling the university’s equality objectives meant that “statutory requirements take priority” (Interview; Emily 2005). Secondary issues thus automatically assumed the status of ‘good practice’. ‘Good practice’ thus tended to comprise of anything non-statutory, and since Muslims were a ‘non-statutory’ collective in the world of equal opportunities, anything pertaining to Muslim students signified ‘good practice’.

This pattern of equality delivery was certainly well meaning and paralleled the work of the ECU. However, it maintained a logic of equality premised on deficit. Muslim students were thus being compensated for, as the story goes with a proactive model of equality. As Emily noted;

The university’s got a difficulty in that it’s never had any statutory obligation to monitor, so it doesn’t have data that’s very specific but it’s very proactive in what it does to meet religious needs (Emily; Lomonde 2005).

This notion of going beyond and in excess of normal requirements was repeated in various ways, by staff with an equality remit and by university management. Janet,
for example, was keen to point out that “there’s a lot of leeway made for students of religion” (Janet; Erdon 2005) (See also Chapter Seven).

Thus, one can begin to see how it is that Muslims occupy a paradoxical status, which at once formally denies their institutional status but in which these ‘non-statutory’ identities continue to be cited as symbolic of ‘good practice’ for the many ‘concessions’ they receive. It is indeed one of the many ironies of institutional anti-racism that this discourse of ‘good practice’ only makes sense in the context of a racialised schema that excludes Muslim qua Muslims. In other words, Muslims can only possibly figure as ‘good practice’ in a schema that by design excludes them.

5.3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has focussed on the invisibility of Muslim students within the formal structures of the university. This absence has been explored through institutional and student accounts. It has been argued that this ‘absence’ has nurtured a culture of legitimised complacency that infers there are no Muslim complainants. Yet, this chapter has highlighted a number of cases of racism and a repressive culture that inhibits student complaints. Thus, it has illustrated how both universities were endorsing a self-fulfilling narrative in view of their Muslim student population. If there are no ‘Muslims’ complaining on account of their ‘Muslimness’, then we are left with the assumption that there is no racism directed at ‘Muslim students’. The absence of Muslim identities within official university (complaints) procedures therefore equated the absence of racism against Muslims; a logic symbolised in the equality policies of both campus cases which failed to explicitly name the problem of Islamophobia.

It is indeed ironic that the RRAA (2000) became part of this legitimising complex and was routinely invoked when unaccounted questions of religious or ‘ethnic’ specificity were raised. Paradoxically, the RRAA, and the way it is a legitimate resort was arguably nurturing an existing institutional complacency which did not require universities to account for religious identifications, and register them in equal opportunities policies. From this perspective, ethnic monitoring practices can be viewed as disciplinary rather than emancipatory.

Following this, the interplay of a deeply entrenched secular and statutory culture of equality meant Muslim student concerns were deflected with considerable ease; trivialised as a ‘cultural’ problem or displaced as something to do with the
world beyond the university. It is with confidence that staff could suggest there were no obvious problems concerning Muslim students within the institution, or with the institution. Instead, the non-statutory status of Muslim students meant they were treated as subjects of ‘good practice’.

Some Muslim student experiences however, suggested otherwise. This comprised of singular cases of racism going unheard, but also included ‘secondary victimisation’ that ensued when there was no place for racism to be spoken about, or where cases of racism were downplayed as ‘no longer a problem’. What loomed large however, was a culture of not complaining. This culture was seen to be symptomatic of the broader racialised status of Muslim students. Together, this ‘complaints culture’ and lack of official recognition was seen to nurture a repertoire of racism that ultimately sustained Islamophobia within these institutions.

Of course, whilst some Muslim students have been constrained in their choices, this has not prevented them, as we shall see in Chapter Six, from short-circuiting university complaints systems, interrupting these modes of governmentality and seeking redress on their own terms. It is to this part we now turn.
Chapter Six

‘Space Invaders’: ‘Super/Vision’ and the Racialisation of Muslim Students in Union Politics

Introduction

Over recent years it has been well documented that students hailing from ‘BME’ backgrounds have a greater initial participation rate in universities than their ‘white’ counterparts\(^1\) (Broecke and Nicholls 2007; Sims 2007, p.i). However, what these acknowledgements often elide are the racialised dynamics and “transruptions” (Hesse 2000) that this ‘Black’ presence elicits. As Puwar observes, with “the increasing number of black and Asian bodies” in ‘white’ institutions, “there is a socio-spatial impact to be witnessed” (Puwar 2004b, p.32). This can be seen in the way some ‘Muslim students’ disrupt the “racialised aesthetics” (Tyrer 2003) of the campus unsettling ‘white’ sartorial and somatic norms (Puwar 2004b, p.35). My focus in this chapter however, goes beyond the “amplification” of black bodies in ‘white’ institutions or the ‘white’ “disorientation” (ibid. p.42, 48-50) they elicit. Rather, it is concerned with strategies of racialised governmentality that ensue when ‘Muslim students’ attempt to intervene in traditionally ‘white’ spaces. This exceeds a focus on ‘somatic’ norms to consider other dimensions of racialisation.

Part One thus draws on various examples to highlight the ways students identified as ‘Muslim’ are racialised and penalised when they intervene or appear to operate collectively in union politics. What emerges are the way discourses of ‘fundamentalism/extremism’ are invoked as a form of regulating Muslim students, and the types of racialised surveillance this facilitates.

Part Two focuses on the racialised disenfranchisement of Muslim students at Erdon. It locates this episode in historical and political context, examining the governmentalised status of ‘Muslim student subjects’. This case highlights three key themes; the ‘interactive’ racialisation of Muslim students where claims of ‘Islamist’ imposition rely on older ‘cultural’ tropes; the denial of Islamophobia through an ‘inter-faith’ paradigm, and the (re)production of racist discourses across various sites in the university (e.g. between the university and union). The chapter concludes by summarising these key themes and highlight key theoretical shifts in view of empirical research.

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\(^1\) Variations within these groups have been noted (Connor et al 2004; Modood 2006, p.248).
Social spaces are not blank and open for anybody to occupy. There is a connection between bodies and space, which is built, repeated and contested over time. While all can, in theory, enter, it is certain types of bodies that are tacitly designated as being the natural occupants of specific positions. Some bodies are deemed as having the right to belong, while others are marked out as trespassers, who are, in accordance with how both spaces and bodies imagined (politically, historically and sexually), circumscribed as being ‘out of place’. Not being the somatic norm, they are space invaders (Puwar 2004b, p.8).

Puwar draws our attention to the status and impact of ‘Black’ bodies within ‘white’ institutions. Following Mills (Mills 1997), she argues that institutional racism operates in subtle ways, through the designation of a ‘white’ somatic norm (Puwar 2004b, p.9, 33). This somatic norm is illuminated and disturbed by the arrival of ‘black’ bodies in ‘white’ spaces (ibid. p.32). This is better described in what Puwar terms disorientation;

The claims black bodies make on institutions by occupying spaces they are not expected to be in are constantly challenged by a look, which abnormalises their presence and locates them, through the workings of racialised framing as belonging elsewhere... at the same time as the black body is fixed by a white gaze, the white gaze itself is disorientated by the close proximity of these foreign bodies (ibid. p.42).

Disorientation is thus “a disturbance of a certain order” where “a racialised episteme is interrupted” (ibid.). This process of ‘white’ disorientation illuminates the ‘space invader’ status of racialised bodies in privileged spaces, but it also as Ahmed notes “tells us more about what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives” (Ahmed 2007a, p. 157 Emphasis Mine).

Puwar’s account of ‘black bodies’ in ‘white’ spaces informs the general framework for understanding the ‘amplification’ of Muslim students within ‘white’ institutional settings. This is elaborated below in the context of political student intercourse. However, Puwar’s focus on ‘Black bodies’ requires further specificity; these are largely presumed to be ‘Black’ (i.e. those associated with the African and South Asian diaspora) (Puwar 2004b, p.171 n.1). Yet, since not all racialised groups are phenotypically ‘black’, and not all ‘Black’ groups are racialised in the same way (see for
example Modood 1990), Puwar’s focus remains somewhat limited. This is probably because Puwar’s account of ‘space invaders’ rely on pheno-typical discourses of ‘race’ drawn from the racial dualisms of the American experience (Mills 1997). Thus whilst the particularity of the ‘Muslim menace’ is acknowledged in a footnote (Puwar 2004b, p.175, n.115) these nuances are not sustained throughout her discussion.

Clearly, if we understand Islamophobia as marked by degrees of difference from an assemblage of ‘white’ norms, then we cannot understand racialised bodies in ‘white’ institutions as ‘received’ and regulated in the same way. This presupposes a monolithic and homogenous understanding of racism. This chapter therefore adapts Puwar’s insights, amongst others, to highlight the sophistry of Islamophobia. In particular, it considers the basis upon which Muslim students are marked out as trespassers, and moreover how they are subject to forms of racialised governmentality. It is to these examples we now turn.

6.1.2. (Re)Covering Whiteness

Ahmed notes, “white organisations can recover from disorientation, and they can use disorientation to recover” (Ahmed 2007a, p.163 Emphasis Mine). One way of reading this is to understand ‘white’ disorientation as a strategy of ‘recovery’ within racialised governmentality. In other words, the regulation of Muslim students can be seen as a response to the disorientation their presence and interventions elicited in ‘white’ spaces. This was exemplified when Muslim students emerged collectively in their respective unions and the NUS.

The 2005 NUS conference in Blackpool represented an example where Muslim students appeared to be singled out for their ‘balcony led’ ‘bloc vote’. Although all student factions operate collectively to vote in particular candidates, Muslim students became the target of several public complaints. These centred on the prohibition of (Muslim) balcony observers because they were said to be ‘intimidating’ delegates into ‘undemocratic’ voting (NUS Conference 2005). Delegates voted on whether observers ought to be banned from the balcony. This was not passed.

One Muslim student delegate was critical of these objections;

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3 A ‘bloc vote’ is when students from particular groups operate in concert to steer the union agenda and vote in particular candidates. The ‘balcony led’ ‘bloc vote’ refers to the observers balcony which is lined with different student factions (e.g. FOSIS, Socialists, JSOC). It is important to note that this type of tactical voting amongst Muslim students has emerged out of a history of racism and lack of representation both within unions and the traditionally labour led NUS (Interview; Stephen & Shabaz, NUS activists, 2005). On the Muslim student vote see (Patel, Guardian 26th May 2004; Nabi Forthcoming).

4 I was present as an observer at this conference.
To be honest with you I don’t think that was our problem because there were so many groups doing it and a lot of people don’t like the balcony and to be honest with you I’m against the balcony, I’ve always been…/ but to follow a political line, I mean friends of labour do it, UJS do it…(Interview; Shabaz 2005).

One of the reasons for this selectivity it was argued, was the racially marked visibility of Muslim students;

It’s more visual when you’ve got brown faces… I went down and had a look and I mean it does stand out, Muslims sitting there does clearly stand out (ibid.).

In this setting, Muslim students were clearly identified as a ‘non-white’ contingent in a conference dominated by ‘white’ students. Here, the ‘space invader’ status of Muslim students was notable. Disrupting the ‘white’ secular equilibrium of the student conference, these students exposed (pre)existing norms through the ‘look’. Following Fanon, the ‘look’ is, central to “the somatic dimensions of racialisation”. It is the seal of “crushing object-hood” where “dissected under white eyes” the ‘black’ body is “fixed” and “told to stay within bounds, to go back where [it] belong[s]” (Fanon 1986, p.110-116 cited in Puwar 2004b, p.41 Emphasis Mine). Clearly, these responses reveal as much about the transgressive status accorded to ‘Muslims’ as it does about the ‘white’ middle class spaces they appear to have ‘intruded’ upon.

Shabaz’s interpretation of being racially marked was also echoed on other campuses. In response to much received criticism about the ‘bloc vote’, Yunus was of the opinion that;

Those who talk most about the quote on quote ‘bloc vote’...they usually got in on a ‘bloc vote’ themselves, but it’s a much more subtle ‘bloc vote’. With the ISOC its completely blatant because seven hundred Muslim students walk into the union and vote, so for other groups it’s much more subtle...With a labour student you can’t tell by looking at them, similarly with Jewish students you can’t really tell by looking at them...only the people who are heavily involved in politics know about it, so we know that there’s a ‘bloc vote’ with Labour, LGBT and JSOC (Interview; Yunus 2005).

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5 As related by some of my interviewees, rather than experiencing ‘direct’ discrimination, “it was more a case of the way people view you, they view you with suspicion, and they tend to look at you a lot differently” (Interview; Adam 2005). As Sadiq put it “I think it’s more about the looks, I find that when I am walking towards the library I get those looks” (Interview; Sadiq 2005).
Muslim students are identified by Yunus as a visible and racially marked contingent in comparison with other ‘white’ blocs who remain ‘racially’ un-interrogated. The socio-spatial impact of a visible Muslim presence can be understood within a discourse of racialised ‘amplification’. As Puwar explains;

Intrinsic to the dynamics involved in amplification of numbers is the phenomenon of visibility, threat and terror. As bodies out of place or unexpected bodies, they are highly conspicuous. This is a visibility that comes from not being the norm. It is a process that is not all that different from the way in which racialised minorities are visible on the street, and especially in particular locations heavily demarcated as white places (Puwar 2004b, p.49).

‘Amplification’ is thus indicative of the way “bodies do not simply move through spaces but constitute and are constituted by them” (ibid. p.32). Similarly, Ahmed notes that “spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that inhabit them” (Ahmed 2007a, p.156). White institutions are deemed collective spaces that are “shaped by the proximity of some bodies and not others” (ibid. p.157). White institutions extend the shape of ‘white’ bodies which find themselves “at home” (ibid. p.158). In contrast ‘black bodies’ in ‘white’ institutions are often in some way “stopped” (ibid. p.161) and obstructed. Thus, whilst ‘white’ bodies ‘flow’, racialised bodies ‘stutter’ since they do not cohere with the spaces they occupy.

Muslim student activity in union politics can be seen to reflect the type of racialised ‘amplification’ and ‘obstructions’ theorised above. For example, there was a general consensus amongst interviewees that the union, or rather, various student contingents often targeted Muslim students at election time because of their large numbers. This was seen as an attempt to dissolve or at least undermine the Muslim ‘bloc vote’.

At Lomonde, a Muslim union officer describes this in the types of attitudes Muslim students encountered during election times;

Yeh I’m sure we’re [monitored], they do try to make elections a bit difficult, we always have issues every year...trying to disqualify candidates on little rules and receipts and stuff so in that sense, that’s when you can feel the tension and stuff, in those times it is quite erm het up/ ISOC is quite singled out, and you’ll see the tension in general office their very very [particular] with the ISOC candidates (Interview; Iram 2005).
In the context of student elections another student recounted how a significant number of ballot papers for Muslim candidates had curiously been “put aside” (Interview; Sajid 2005);

Then you think well, that’s not an accident, that’s what happened, and if it wasn’t scrutinised, then it might not have been seen and that person might not have been elected (ibid.).

Another student involved in the NUS expressed her frustration at not being informed of important meetings and processes. She recalled instead having to “go through other people who…[to] pick up bits and pieces” (Interview; Lena, 2005). These types of racialised ‘obstructions’ were understood by Lena to be “never said” but nonetheless implicit in the workings of student political life. Bound up in spatial politics, this had the effect of disrupting Muslim participation in the union. As Lena recalls;

For example we have hustings for the election and everybody knows how the Islamic society for years has been an integral part of … union life and people know you just don’t hold hustings in a bar because Muslim candidates will refuse to attend on religious grounds and this year was really interesting because we didn’t do that well and it was partly down to the anti-Muslim feelings and the returning officer is really really dodgy, he just doesn’t like the ISOC at all and he made life very difficult and he didn’t advertise hustings at all and like three hours before he announced hustings, he held it in the union bar which is just typical, there were four people running for executive positions and yet he’s totally not considered the needs of a significant minority on campus even though the president of the ISOC spoke to him and said look this isn’t on, you know you can’t do this, and there was a last minute delay of hustings to sort it out and get it moved, so what happened was they had hustings for the Muslim candidates or anyone that didn’t want to be in the bar in the café, and then they moved it back down to the bar, which wasn’t right anyway because I wanted to attend hustings for everyone but I couldn’t do because it was in a bar (ibid.).

That the very organisation of political processes were seen to be ‘anti-Muslim’ was also echoed at Erdon. As Iqbal relates;

Bearing in mind that when we were in the month of Ramadhan, we had union meetings, at tarawih [Ramadhan Prayer] time at 6.30 p.m. and we said that we had religious obligations we pray in the night, they know that very well because it’s been happening for the past two or three years and obviously if we take [catering] provision from you guys to get people in from outside, so obviously they know, and they said sorry, we won’t do it next time, we said thank you very much (Interview, Iqbal 2005).

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6 Hustings refer to public meetings where prospective candidates put forward their case for election.
7 This lack of accommodation appears to have persisted in the NUS in spite of nearly a decade of active Muslim student engagement. Interviews with senior/former NUS members reveal a host of similar instances (Interview; Danyaal & Stephen, NUS activists 2005). Also see (Gilbert, Guardian 22nd August 2008).
In both cases, Muslim students felt their political participation was being strategically minimised by unsympathetic and hostile union representatives. This was seen to be characteristic of the way racism was articulated in the union;

> I didn’t think about it but there’s a lot of discrimination in the union but *that’s not your ‘out on the street’ blatant discrimination that’s more through political process, more cunning* (Interview; Sajid 2005).

Although Islamophobia was understood as institutionalised implicitly through routine political procedures, this did not mean that it was not also recognised through the explicit racist stigmatisation of Muslim students on campus. For example, at Lomonde, the publication of campus articles branding the ISOC an ‘extremist bloc’ was a case in point. These types of ‘print’ interventions were common in student politics and a useful way of gaging the types of discursive formations circulating the camps. It is worth examining one such campus article in more detail, particularly in light of interview material. This is because together, they reveal the types of ‘super-surveillance’ (Puwar 2004b, p.61) or ‘Super/Vision’ (Goldberg 1996) Muslim students were under when they engaged in political processes. This is further detailed below.

### 6.1.3. White Fantasies and ‘Super-Surveillance’

It is not coincidental that the article in question emerged in 2005 when Muslim students at Lomonde were organising themselves politically and seeking to maintain a foothold in union politics. The article was published in the official student paper by a key member of the editorial team.

The article described the ‘Muslim vote’ as “militant”, “a minority fringe group”, “tainted” and “distasteful”, because of the religious affiliations involved in bloc voting. The ‘Muslim bloc’ was also described as under-confident for not letting the “people decide”, thus implying an undemocratic and authoritarian process. This system, it was argued, was un-meritocratic and ideologically driven. Further, it presented the election of Muslim candidates as “dangerously unrepresentative”, producing candidates with little “skill or specialist experience” (Anon 2005).
Hyper-Visibility

My intention here is not to discuss the (de)merits of ‘bloc voting’ but to unravel the Islamophobic discourses upon which these interventions were based. First, the most striking aspect of this article was that the ISOC were named without reference to other societies such as Labour or JSOC. Although the article initially also mentioned the SWP (Socialist Workers Party), they were very quickly dwarfed by racialised references to Muslim students as noted above. In particular, that “it is embarrassing that one society can mobilise nearly 100% of its voters” (ibid.) was a clear reference to the ISOC, which on this campus was renowned for its member support.

This critique of the Muslim ‘bloc vote’ represents striking parallels to the 2005 NUS conference and the way Muslim students would suffer particular criticism on matters in which many groups were implicated. As one Muslim union officer critiqued in view of the article;

So this student obviously thinking they were being independent was being anything but independent and obviously there was no mention of any other political groups that were trying to get people into all the other positions (Interview; Yunus 2005).

Yunus clearly questions why it is that Muslim students have become the subject of critique, whilst other students have escaped scrutiny. Goldberg’s assessment of racial (in)visibility in this instance is apt;

…visibility and invisibility are not simply states or conditions of being. Rather they characterise, express, reflect, or they are the effects of strategic relations. As such, visibility does not necessarily advance the interests of those so defined, nor does invisibility necessarily constrain or delimit the satisfaction of such interests. Constitutive or reflective of strategic relations, visibility and invisibility each can serve contextually as weapons, as a defensive or offensive strategy as a mode of self-determination or denial of it (Goldberg 1996, p.181).

Goldberg’s insights are useful in terms of understanding the way Muslim hyper-visibility is not coterminous with increased recognition (i.e. status) but rather, key to undermining Muslim self-determination. However, Muslim ‘hyper-visibiity’ has to be understood as the effect of strategic relations which typically render Muslims as transgressive.

This focus on strategic relations exceeds Puwar’s focus on somatic norms. Here ‘race’ is better understood not as property or corporeal signifier of the Other (Hesse 2007, p.654, 645), but as a relationship that is “definitive of Europeanness and non-Europeanness” (ibid.). This relation thus not only attends to how ‘black’ bodies are
received and encountered, something reflected in the fixity of Puwar’s somatic approach, but how they are managed, regulated and governed.

Thus, in the article in question, Muslim students are corralled to unsavoury characteristics. Although the author does not describe the ISOC as ‘extremist’, his description is firmly located within the same discursive framework; as “militant”, “fringe”, and “dangerous” (Anon 2005). Since they fail to be mentioned, it is inconceivable to consider other student groups (e.g. Labour/Conservative) in these terms. This absence of visibility, as Goldberg suggests, can be seen as an effect of racialised strategic relations; that is, of an assumed neutrality and power to name and frame ‘others’ in undesirable ways, but also to seek to regulate behaviours as further elaborated below. Thus, the invisibility of some students and the hyper-visibility of others can be seen within strategic relations that are fundamentally racialised. Indeed, that Muslim students form the subject of this article is itself indicative of these strategic relations, which has also to some degree been normalised.

Rationalising Islamophobia

Highly reminiscent of the way ‘fundamentalist’ ascriptions were applied to Muslim students in the nineties (See Chapter Four), students on this campus can be seen within a similar discourse of transgressive hyper-visibility. It is notable however, that these racist characterisations invited little criticism from other students. Thus, although Muslim students complained to union officials and the issue was also raised in union meetings (Interview; Yunus/James Union Official 2005), their “claims of Islamophobia” (ibid) were reduced to a matter of unfortunate phrasing. One senior union official for example expressed that; “the wording wasn’t particularly sensitive, but even so I don’t think there was an offence meant by the article” (ibid.). Claims of Islamophobia were quickly diffused to a matter of interpretation, which were seen to be plausible, but dismissed on grounds of lack of authorial intention. The article was therefore not judged on the basis of its highly racist ascriptions, but on assumptions about the author’s intentions.

These intentions he argued were “meant as an encouraging article that would get students to vote” (ibid.). This is interesting because it revealed the degree to which the racialisation of Muslims was normalised in student politics as a basis for political intervention.8 It was considered acceptable to attribute Islamophobic ascriptions (i.e.

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8 According to interviewees, this was repeated annually prior and post elections. For example, some have gone as far as to make analogies between Muslim student elections and the much disputed 2006 electoral victory of the Palestinian
‘dangerous’/‘militant’) to Muslim students if this would encourage an otherwise apathetic student population to vote. That these ascriptions were intended to appeal to a student audience indicates that the article was expected to resonate with popular Islamophobic stereotypes, regardless of whether claims about ISOC ‘militancy’ were unfounded. This appeared perverse to an Islamic society that had united with the union against groups such as Al-Muhajiroun and the Hizb (Interview; Yunus 2005).

Thus, in spite of major objections from Muslim students, the Islamophobic content of the article was denied. There remained a reluctance to name this article or the author as racist and its content was instead rationalised through authorial intention, broader political discourse and grammatical perspective. Although he acknowledged that “it’s easy to interpret how offence would have been caused”, the key bone of contention in his view was “how they’ve couched it” (ibid.). However, this acknowledgment reduced the racist content of the article to a matter of presentation suggesting that perhaps alteration of a few words would suffice. This clearly ignored the broader racialised repertoire in which the article is steeped as further elaborated below.

**A Burden of Representation**

There was a key assumption in the article that candidates with a ‘non-religious’ affiliation would be ‘more representative’ and less ‘distasteful’, for this would ensure “a candidate who [would] represent your interests” (Anon 2005). It was therefore assumed that ‘mainstream candidates’ were more representative than Muslim candidates since they did not have a parochial agenda. They were candidates acting in neutrality with ‘universal’ interest. Indeed, like many racialised collectivities, Muslim students suffered a “burden of representation” as they were “seen to represent the capacities and groups for which they are marked and visible” (Puwar 2004b, p.62). This particularity however, also implied the universality of those not mentioned; a process that established an unspoken relationship of hegemony (Yegenoglu 1998, p.103). In terms of the article however, the very question of Muslims representing themselves did not raise the question that this was perhaps due to their marginalisation and lack of representation in the union. This failed to be addressed in the article since religious affiliation was frowned upon as a distasteful and partisan

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Hamas. Again these contain the same normative assumptions about who should be representing students in the union; “like it or not they are in, you can’t stop them just because they shouldn’t be” (Anon, Lomonde Student 8th May 2006). Other articles reported to me made analogies between Muslim students and the BNP (Interview; Ali 2006).
alignment. Yet, how ‘mainstream’ candidates would prove more representative, rather than partisan, remained unclear.

**Infantilisation and Super-Surveillance**

The notion that the Muslim ‘bloc vote’ produced unskilled candidates appeared to be the raison d’etre of this article. This argument was however, not only being circulated in print, but according to other Muslim union officials being propagated by members of other societies (Interview; Lena 2005). This functioned, it was argued, to undermine prospective candidates and those in post, stigmatising them as inferior and incompetent (Interview; Yunus 2005).

This type of infantilisation where racialised groups are deemed to have lesser capacities can be understood as one of the ways in which racism is articulated (Fanon 1986 cited in Puwar 2004b, p.60). This became apparent in interviews with students actively involved in the union. For example, Iram observed, “I think you feel you suffer discrimination because everyone sees you as like [having] sheep mentality”. They “feel that ‘they [Muslims] don’t know what they’re doing…they’re not qualified for their positions, they just want the power”. When asked who had these attitudes, she noted;

> Just erm union people that you meet, people in general office, the way they treat you when you get your mandate form initially, but when you’re running for it, general comments that people make, different union officials, they’ll joke about the ISOC ‘bloc vote’…people have said stuff, like…please ISOC, don’t back anyone unless they’re really good for the job, we’re like whatever (Interview; Iram 2005).

Although this type of infantilisation contradicted the assertion that “the ‘bloc vote’ succeeds because it is organised” (Anon 2005), it revealed the perennial “burden of doubt” (Puwar 2004b, p.59) haunting Muslim candidates. ‘Muslims’ were not normative figures of authority and hence “there [was] a niggling suspicion that they [were] not quite proper and [couldn’t] quite cut it” (ibid.).

This ‘burden’ certainly resonated with the experiences of some Muslim students. This was most evident in the aftermath of the 2006 elections when one Muslim candidate assumed a position in the student newspaper traditionally held by ‘white’ students. In response, he suffered a sustained campaign which sought to oust him from his position. This included his co-workers resigning, an e-campaign to galvanise support against him and the proposition of a ‘no confidence’ vote. Central to this campaign were claims of his
incompetence and inexperience. These were repeatedly aired in various publications. However, there was according to some (Interview; Ali 2006), including my own perusal of the paper, little difference in readership experience.

Rather, Ali, another union official at the time, was of the view that this campaign was a question of “political orientation” because in his view the student paper had “always been very right wing” (ibid.). This, he argued, was quite central to the backlash against this Muslim student who was accused of turning the student union into a “theocracy” (ibid.). This same theme can be traced in another student article describing his victory as “an Islamic/Socialist coup of the union” (Local Student Article, Failure of Democracy, Sept 2006). Other reportage revealed that the editorial team were unhappy with the paper’s new focus on international issues, particularly its criticism of Israel (London Student Paper, Sept 2006). The political orientation of the paper was therefore clearly an issue, reflected in editorial claims that paper was no longer seen to ‘represent’ the student population (Lomonde Student Paper; Oct 2006).

Of course, it is impossible to verify with any certainty whether this Muslim candidate was any more or less ‘incompetent’ than his predecessors or contenders, especially given that nothing was ever to my knowledge, substantiated. Yet, in view of the types of criticisms that emerged, there appeared to be a greater problematisation of his political/religious affiliation than his skill set. These criticisms were grounded within essentialist racialised scaremongering (coup, theocracies) that not only presumed his ISOC affiliation, but also attributed the ISOC with a conspiratorial agenda.

The irony however, was that although he stood accused of assuming his position on the ISOC ‘bloc vote’ he ran his campaign as an independent candidate (Interview; Ali 2006). The racialisation of this candidate thus represented more than a singular character assassination, but revealed much about how Muslim student interventions in the union were perceived within union quarters. It was also indicative of the racialised ‘super/vision’ of Muslim students and the way their abilities were placed under the “spotlight of intense racialised optics” (Puwar 2004b, p.61, 63). His performance as a ‘Muslim student’ it seemed was itself evidence of his ‘misplaced’ authority.

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9 It was therefore interesting to speak to another union official a year earlier describing a rather different portrait of the Muslim presence in the union. She was of the opinion that “given that there is a high level of representation in terms of bums on seats it is surprising that more issues aren’t raised through council…specifically to do with Muslim students” (Interview; Union Officer Lisa 2005).
‘White’ Fantasies

There appeared to be considerable resentment that a Muslim candidate had assumed a position that had historically been assumed by ‘white’ conservative students. This theme can also be traced in the student article. For example, the author argued that the ‘bloc vote’;

...would not be a problem were all students to turn out and vote, as the ‘bloc vote’ would represent a negligible percentage of the overall electorate (Anon 2005).

This was revealing for it suggested a ‘white governmental fantasy’ (Hage 1998). This is indicative of a position that allows ‘Others’ to participate providing they do not predominate. As Hage remarks of ‘white multiculturalism’, it is about “getting the [‘ethnic’] mix right” where;

One dominant (White) group among non-migrants is not a problem since that group imbued unlike others with democracy tolerance and the principle of freedom of speech by its very essence, is not predisposed to create ethnic tensions. It is only predisposed to solve them through numbering, measuring and mixing (ibid. p.124).

Central to this ‘balance’ is a position of White hegemony, where it is ‘white’ union officials that assume the capacity to ‘number, measure, and mix’ appropriately. Thus, as ‘distasteful’ as Muslim religious affiliations were, they were tolerable if they remained numerically “negligible” and hence non-influential. Providing they did not disrupt the traditional White political balance, the campus was deemed safe.

This presents an incoherent narrative, for it is not the argued un-meritocratic system of the ‘bloc vote’ that was problematic, but the ‘disproportionate’ number of Muslim candidates it produced. Thus, the key contention was not one of an undemocratic political process as suggested, but ‘white’ anxieties; a “worrying whiteness” (ibid. p.124), about Muslim candidates predominating. Like the ‘white’ worker Hage alludes to, this student was “quite happy to tolerate Muslims while there [were] only a few of them, but not now when they [had] become too many” (ibid. p.92). These sentiments were not only confined to print articles but were also aired by other union officials in more subtle ways. For example, when talking about Muslim student activity in the union, welfare officer, Lisa was quite clear that they had;

...good representation...I think our council is ...quite large, it might even be over representation (Interview; Lisa 2005).
Later she spoke of the “real domination” of Muslim students in the union. This suggests that Muslim students were seen to be disproportionate to their numerical size and their minoritised status.

The article, it seemed, was concerned with maintaining the negligibility of this unsuitable ‘Muslim’ minority contingent. For the assumption that the ‘bloc vote’ produced “unqualified candidates” who would normally be “weeded out by the democratic process” (Anon 2005) was decisive. Muslim candidates “weeded out” by democratic process were represented as an undesirable overgrowth, spoiling the harmony of political life on campus. They were, in their excess, rendered unmanageable. Thus, although the authors concerns were couched in terms of producing a democratic outcome, they can be convincingly read as concerned with the management of this perceived Muslim incursion on to a ‘white’ mainstream space.

This intolerable situation can only be rectified by the actions of “all students” the “majority” rather than “fringe minority” (ibid.). This presumably ‘white’ majority electorate would therefore be positioned to vote for ‘white’ mainstream candidates and re-balance any such ‘racial’ anomaly. One might consider this an implicit ‘white bloc vote’ or rather, akin to a (White) racial contract (Mills 1997) where a ‘white’ majority vote in ‘white’ candidates to represent ‘white’ interests. Of course, herein polemics concerning a Muslim bloc vote begin to unravel. This is further elaborated in Part Two using a case study at Erdon.
Part Two: Disorientation to ...Disenfranchisement

6.2.1. Disenfranchisement at Erdon

Union council in my opinion...looked at the race of the elected candidates and compared it with years gone by. They did not like what they saw so they compiled this outrageous report which reminds me of Tony Blair’s dodgy dossier and the ridiculous claims with it...why is it that ...white students can represent the university and ...black students can’t (Report of Elections Body, 2004).

During the course of fieldwork, the ‘extra-visibility’ of Muslim students was most clearly evidenced at Erdon. The excerpt above is an indictment of the disenfranchisement Muslim students experienced when they attempted to assume union positions tacitly reserved for their ‘white’ counterparts. In late 2004, Erdon’s Muslim students engaged in political process and secured a number of seats. One student interviewed remarked, “never in the history of the university of Erdon has that happened” (Interview; Iqbal 2005). This was unprecedented in a union that had the year before only seen one Muslim student elected (Interview; Junaid 2005).

Several of the students interviewed at this campus were involved in these elections. As they narrated, and as was confirmed by other union and university officials, two days after the elections, these candidates were informed that “the elections had not been held democratically” (Interview; Iqbal 2005). Apparently, “too many people cheated” and there was “enough evidence to say that those elections weren’t fair” (Interview; Sian, Union Officer, 2005). These claims of misconduct were compiled in a union report and referred to a member of the university executive who declared the elections void.

The university decision was contested by the Muslim students involved. They informally appealed to the union and the university to no avail. The contested status of the elections committee report initially remained formally unchallenged because there were no channels for redress. Rather, Muslim student perspectives remained confined to union meetings which were of no consequence to the university’s final decision. This brought to light the differential status accorded to complainants and the subjects of complaints. Although the students involved pressed the university to overturn the decision, it failed to intervene. The university also ignored student claims of racism. It was some time later that the university claimed the episode was a result of communicative difficulties.
This issue of a lack of recourse was not however, peculiar to this situation alone. It was characteristic of the way pro-Palestinian campaigns had historically been de-legitimised through various forms of racialisation, in which claims about the presumed ‘fundamentalist’/‘anti-Semitic’ nature of Muslims assumed significant prominence.

It is worth taking a brief detour here to elaborate on this history, before returning to the details of this case. This is significant as it is not possible to understand this episode without understanding this particular history of racialisation in which Muslim students loomed large as aggressors. This is especially since the elections furore was not without precedent, nor was it the first time Muslim students had been accused of ‘rigging slates’.  

6.2.2. The Palestinian Question: A History of Racialisation

In early 2000, Erdon’s union denied students the right to set up a Palestinian society (PALSOC). During field-work, some of the older and former students recollected the politics surrounding this issue. They claimed that JSOC denied the establishment of the PALSOC on several grounds. These included; it would become a ‘platform for terrorism’, it would ‘create more divisions’, it would ‘invite racism’ into the union and Palestine wasn’t a ‘nation’ so they couldn’t have a society. Although there were numerous other well established societies, including a Jewish society dedicated to preserving Israel’s status, the union was considered justified in refuting the establishment of a Palestinian

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10 Rigging slates refers to organising preselected candidates to determine an electoral majority. On one previous occasion recalled by Khalid, a Muslim member of staff, a young Muslim female student was accused of ‘rigging a slate’. These accusations were subsequently directed at the Islamic Society, finally culminating in a raid on the prayer-room. At the time, Khalid noted a host of procedural irregularities in the unions conduct. These included the absence of impartial investigators, consultation, and proof of an offence. The officer in question was also never able to produce a ‘slate’ and nothing was shown to corroborate his claim. However, he neither issued an apology or an adequate explanation (Interview; Khalid 2005). This account was verified by another member of staff (Interview; Chris 2005).

11 These reasons were recalled by interviewees (Interview; Chris, Haider 2005), evidenced in union minutes and also posted on the Palestinian website. The PALSOC initiative was made up of various students but was closely aligned with the ISOC.

12 The JSOC was a member of the UJS (Union of Jewish Students), a national collective which had as its key aim an “enduring commitment” to Jewish identity and Israel (See http://www.ujs.org.uk/about-us/). The extent of this commitment can be gleaned in the way the UJS hosted annual ‘birthright’ trips which involve a ten day holiday to Israel with 40 fellow students for free (ibid.). The emphasis on birthright reflects the UJS’s commitment to a sovereign right of return for the Jewish diaspora considered central to ‘Zionist’ ideology. This commitment is evidenced in NUS politics which has historically seen the consistent prevention of discussion/campaigns on the Palestinian question and the equation of anti-Semitism with Anti-Zionism (See Chapter Four; Young 2004). This same politics was being played out on Erdon campus through its member JSOC. The term ‘Zionist’ is therefore used to describe the political persuasions of JSOC students, whilst recognising other ‘pro-Israeli’/‘Friends of Israel’ stances that also acknowledge, in
society. This was highly unusual given this same union also housed a paintballing, fetish and poker society but these were not prevented on grounds of their disputed ‘national origins’. Nor were other human rights or campaign groups such as Amnesty International or the Environmental People de-legitimized on this basis. Comparatively, the JSOC was notably well attended and listed as having the greatest number of active members (Listed Information obtained from Union official, 2005).13

This rationale was not without objection, as some heated exchanges revealed. One member of the PALSOC for example wrote to the union;

Intentionally obstructing the Palestinian Society from organising on campus, attempting to smear them as a minority on campus as violent and racist, treating them as something alien/other, controversial (I could go on and on…) is I believe racist… Try and imagine if the same thing happened to the J-soc before it had its society… recognised by the union… Why do you and the union find this particular group of students so exceptional and why do you feel legitimised in treating them differently to other minorities on campus? (Exchange between union members, 2003/4).

In response, the rationale for this racism was explained as “based on the results of similar societies …on other university campuses”. The union, it was argued, was being “cautious” to “avoid internal conflict within the university” and keen to provide “a safe environment…where people do not feel threatened” (ibid.). This appeared to be an allusion to similar claims at other universities during the same academic session where pro-Palestinian campaigns were equated with anti-Semitism (Tyrer 2003, p.143). This was also in line with the NUS definition (NUS 1999) which “repeatedly asserted… that to criticise Israel is something anti-Semitic” (Interview; Stephen, NUS Executive 2006.)

Indeed, that this rationale was based on unverified precedent at other campuses was highly reminiscent of the CVCP report (CVCP 1998) discussed in Chapter Four. This based its proposals to ban groups based on “reasonable belief or suspicion” (ibid. p.16). Clearly, this rationale did not account for the principled basis upon which the PALSOC was seeking to establish itself. Nor did it consider the way the repression of the Palestinian cause was not diffusing, but contributing to political tensions. Equally, as one

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13 This perhaps explains the absence of Pro-Palestinian Jewish peace groups on this campus, which according to one interviewee had been vigorously repressed (Interview; Chris 2005). Comparatively, the JSOC at Lomonde was significantly smaller. During the 2004-5 academic session, Lomonde was also home to a group called ‘Jews for Palestine’, although they were short-lived and their status was said to be thoroughly contested by some “hard-line Zionists” (Interview; Union Official Lisa, 2005).
of my interviewees argued, it failed to recognise the way the equivocation of anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism “devalue[d] antiracism on campus” and posited an essential Jewishness authenticated only through attachment to Israel (Interview; Chris 2005 see also Butler 2004, xvi).

That pro-Israeli students were “not comfortable” with a pro-Palestinian presence and sought to restrict their activism was indicative of the power differentials that marked Erdon’s union. Conversely, that pro-Palestinian activists were ‘not comfortable’ with the status quo rarely achieved constitutional status, nor was allowed to be debated within union premises for it would be in contravention of union policy. The perceived transgressions of pro-Palestinian students and concerns surrounding harmony on campus thus appeared misplaced.

When the PALSOC was finally recognised by the union several years later, it did not acquire full society status and was subject to a probationary period. Speaking to a range of students, including union officials, they argued that the PALSOC was subject to a whole host of de-politicisation strategies. These were numerous; from vetoing constitutional discussions on Palestine (Interview; Haider, Junaid 2005), banning meetings in the union (Interview; Sian, Union Officer 2005, Chris 2005), complaining about posters and having them removed (ibid.), print censorship (Interview; Chris, Junaid 2005), threatening to close down the PALSOC website,\textsuperscript{14} disallowing fundraising for Palestine (Interview; Shagufta 2005) and repeated claims of anti-Semitism (Interview; Chris, Haider 2005). Print censorship for example included the union president objecting to the PALSOC using the word “Palestine” in any publicised document because it assumed a political stance (Interview; Haider 2005).

Indeed, what many of these de-politicisation strategies indicate is that the experience of Palestinian activists was defined by obsessive complaining,\textsuperscript{15} (in)formal warnings and disciplinary action. According to Haider, the PALSOC was the subject of more discipline than any other society (Interview; Haider 2005). For example, on one occasion Palestinian activists were subject to ten separate complaints. However, the complaints process was considered flawed because they were subject to a hearing in which the judging panel was dominated by JSOC members contesting the very status of

\textsuperscript{14} This emerged in a letter from an executive member to the PALSOC (Letter from Union Exec, May 2003). The PALSOC also received hate-mail (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{15} This was little different to Lomonde where Muslim students were often the subject of inquiry when they chose to campaign on the Palestinian issue. The Vice-Chancellor and the member of staff recalled several external complaints from members of the Jewish community to prevent these activities. This led to staff monitoring of Muslim student activities (Interview; Margaret 2005).
the PALSOC (Interview; Chris 2005). Although this was in contravention of the constitution which stated that “No member …shall hear a case in which (s)he has an interest”, the president at the time considered it reasonable to proceed. The absence of a member of the university also made the hearing unconstitutional. The hearing was eventually closed on account of the lack of impartiality (Complaints 'Hearing' 2004 & Interview; Chris 2005). The soliciting of complaints was described by Chris as a form of institutionalised racism;

The racism that goes on here, it’s all rehearsed within the bounds of not actually saying anything discriminatory but working behind the scenes to solicit complaints and prevent things from happening and working to derecognise stuff, it’s so insidious and you unravel it and you can see whose doing it and actually they’re doing it quite well in this institution (ibid.).

This issue of complaints was also noted by a union official at the time of fieldwork, who recalled the flurry of complaints that would reach Executive;

[there were] complaints about bans on literature and there were loads of issues about the Palestinian society website, some of that stopped because they were told to take their discussion board off because we couldn’t manage the content and they couldn’t manage the content and the complaints were just ridiculous, so it was like, go!.. I think it stopped people complaining (Interview; Sian, Union Officer 2005).

Indicative of the unions general (dis)position towards the PALSOC, this excerpt revealed the vigilance with which activists were being managed; a process underlined by complaint-making as Chris notes above. These complaints reified the power differential which objectified Palestinian supporters as a problem, a source of anxiety, and a contingent to be restrained. This perspective was so deeply entrenched that even at the time of fieldwork pro-Palestinian activism was explained in similar terms;

And the Palestinian Society...have either been well behaved or less active. But certainly for me this year, I haven’t had to deal with any major ruckuses between societies...Maybe they’re all run by nice well behaved people /they haven’t been very active this year, because they’ve got a reputation for causing trouble [Laughs] (ibid.).

The de-politicisation of PALSOC members was equated with ‘nice inactive’ people, whilst the ‘major ruckuses’ of previous terms was associated with pro-Palestinian
...
Thus, although these claims often played themselves out in view of the Hizb and Al Muhajiroun, objections to pro-Palestinian discourse “assumed the inherent predisposition of Muslim students towards anti-Semitism” (Tyrer 2003, p.138). Both of these groups were banned at Erdon. However, emails sent out to the ISOC specifically reminding them of this (Interview; Junaid 2005) was an indication of the way Muslim students were being aligned with the purported ‘extremist’ views of these groups. This led the ISOC president to proclaim that “it’s not like we are the Hizb or Al Muhajiroun so there was no need for them to marginalise…Muslims” (Interview; Mahmood 2005).18

The racialisation of Muslim students as transgressive through ‘proof of their affect’ (fears of anti-Semitism) worked to guarantee their status as unviable speaking subjects. This, no doubt, came to determine the way they were positioned in the union as objects of racialised governance. One gained a clear sense that the ISOC felt it was under the watchful eye of the union executive, a relationship most societies would find peculiar within a body that was meant to represent them. The ISOC it seemed, was not represented by the union but regulated by it. The union was not considered welcome terrain that enabled political participation but rather a stifling environment which was obstructive;

I’m trying to encourage myself to be more politically active but each hurdle I take is like a brick wall placed in front of you and you have to try and get around it (Interview; Junaid 2005).

This was also recalled by students in the way union regulations were altered to incorporate more stringent vetting procedures. Daanish, for example, recalled a ‘rigorous’ process to minimise the number of Muslim students who were attempting to secure positions on the student council;

There was a whole Muslim majority there, but when this blew up [Palestinian controversy] they reduced it vastly (Interview; Daanish 2005).

Freedom of speech forms for student talks also became mandatory and this was considered a “direct consequence of all that tension” (ibid.). Further, when Muslim students sought to engage with the union’s anti-racist forum, the chair at the meeting

18 Mahmood appeared to reflect a position that was claiming more (ISOC) legitimacy (‘we’re not like them’) than the Hizb and Al Muhajiroun. This was also prevalent at Lomonde where the ISOC repeatedly distanced itself from both these groups.
exclaimed it had been “HIJACKED by people who do not represent [us]”. Although a Muslim attendee pointed out that this was “Islamophobic” and reminded the chair that the forum had an open membership (Letter to chair of Anti-Racist Forum 2003), the chair rationalised her choice of expression by noting that the meeting was “not correctly represented” and she “did not want to alienate anyone actively involved” (Letter to Muslim attendee 2003, Emphasis Mine). Here we can observe how excluding Muslim students from membership in anti-racist forums (by depicting them as extremist saboteurs, rather than a group of students wishing to partake in an anti-racist forum), also de-legitimised them as victims of racism. It rendered them unviable.

It is in this context that we can begin to understand why many Muslim students had become weary of complaining and lacked confidence in the union. Students from the ISOC, many of whom were interviewed in the 2005 academic session, began to feel disillusioned and less entitled to putting forward complaints of racism. For example, when Palestinian posters were ripped down outside the prayer-room they asked fellow ‘white’ campaigners to go and challenge it with the executive (Interview; Chris 2005). This type of mediation only made sense in a union that had effectively racialised Muslim students as unviable speaking subjects. This was perhaps nowhere more symbolised than in the complaints file that ISOC had collated over the years due to their grievances being left unheard and unresolved.

In sum then, we can see how the PALSOC debate was absorbed into a discursive economy rooted in Islamophobia (e.g. ‘Muslim fundamentalist’/‘anti-Semitic’). Put another way, we can see how discourses of Islamophobia were instrumentalised in the repression of Pro-Palestinian campaigns. This conflation however, should not obscure other equally virulent forms of racialisation. This is further explored below.

6.2.3. Disenfranchisement: Re(as)sembling Muslim Crimes

It is bearing this history in mind that we return to the elections and find a number of consistencies. Indeed, this recent episode can be seen within the same racialised trajectory which positioned Muslim students as transgressive and unviable; as the subject of complaints but not complaint-makers.

At the time, student commentary also reflected this unviable status. Hence, the electoral outcome was described as “highly anomalous given the strong historical support for candidates from other societies in such elections” (Erdon Student Literature; 05). Other papers considered the outcome an “unusual trend” (Erdon Union Literature; March
05). This represented a significant contrast to responses in previous elections which as many interviewees noted had seen a significant JSOC contingent. They were applauded;

Hats off to J-soc for being motivated, for having a plethora of qualified candidates, for campaigning and voting en masse. It’s not their fault for being dedicated to a cause (Erdon Union Literature 2003).

Instead, a host of claims began to circulate the campus about these Muslim students. They included “fiddling with ballot papers”, “blackmail”, and “coercion and harassment” (Interview; Junaid, Iqbal 2005). Implicit to these logged complaints was the notion that Muslim students were part of an ISOC conspiracy (Interview; Noreen 2005). Student literature reporting the elections firmly attached the candidates and voters to the ISOC. However, as several of my interviewees noted, many of these Muslim candidates had no association with the Islamic Society, “they were just random people from the university/that happened to be Muslim” (Interview; Junaid 2005). However, Muslim students were bound into a singular association which was, in turn, used to explain the electoral outcome as clandestinely put together by ISOC. These essentialist assumptions clearly precluded alternative, more complex relations between these Muslim candidates.

As noted earlier, the basis of these reported claims remained thoroughly contested by the elected candidates, not least because they failed to be substantiated by any of the anonymous complainants, the elections body, the legal office or the senior university member of staff involved in the case. Indeed, that none of the alleged evidence was ever presented or substantiated in any way, left the students doubting there was any evidence at all. Rather, according to the candidates in question, the elections body report was based on a smear campaign against Muslim students (Interview; Junaid 2005), and was considered to demonstrate a “lack of credibility” (Union Report, 2004). Significantly, evidence for these claims were based on oral testimony (ibid.), none of which was verified at any stage of the investigation, nor presented in the elections committee report.

It appears then, that it was simply sufficient that complaints had in fact been made for this to count as evidence. This was implied by one union official who explained that;

There were lots of complaints about slates which we don’t allow and lots of emails going around and it was decided that there had been too many complaints to have the elections (Interview; Sian, Union Officer 2005).
That Muslim students were the subject of complaints was deemed evidence in itself to warrant their dismissal;\(^\text{19}\) such that there frequency, commonality, and the common Muslim subject to which they referred, became a way “of linking together, simply through analogy, a whole series…of …acts that are not illegal, and of piling them up in order to make them resemble the crime itself” (Foucault 2003, p.19 cited in Pugliese 2009, p.15).

At the time of fieldwork, this issue of complaints was again a major source of contention \(^\text{20}\) as Junaid argued;

> The constitution was so flawed that you can’t actually complain if a decision is made against you, you can’t complain, and not only that, you’re not even told the reasons, they don’t have to tell you the reasons why (Interview; Junaid 2005).

Union officials confirmed these complaints procedures (Interview; Sian 2005). Thus, it was indeed paradoxical in a case which claimed of Muslim bullying to hear of one of my interviewees being threatened by union executive during this same episode. As Salma recalls;

> I happened to step over a certain line and I literally stepped over it, ‘hand it back’, she was like, ‘where have you been’. She was rude to me, erm, tore up my paper in front of everybody, in front of me. When I told the other sister I was going I’d only just met in the line..she was a niqab wearing sister, she shouted at the sister, and said ‘if you continue to talk I’ll rip your paper up’. I told her that there were no signs up saying that she couldn’t talk in the first place. I went and apparently after I went somebody else heard her say, ‘we should do that to all of their votes’ (Interview; Salma 2005).

In view of this public humiliation, Salma attempted to complain on three separate occasions. However, on each occasion, union officers failed to direct her to the appropriate official and claimed “they actually didn’t know themselves” (ibid.). Given the defined roles assigned to each officer, it would not be misplaced to suggest that Salma was being thwarted from logging a complaint. This certainly presented a stark contrast to

\(^{19}\) According to the union constitution if there are any questions relating to the validity and conduct of elections, then one can raise this before the opening of the ballot to the elections committee. This raises the question as to why the alleged claims of ballot fraud were not forthcoming prior to elections.

\(^{20}\) The alternative ‘underground’ student paper also noted “several inconsistencies in the unions account” that were “blocked …at the time as anything we would have printed may f**k the unions position” (Alternative Paper, Commentary 2006).
the way the union was reported to have been inundated with complaints about suspect Muslim involvement in the elections.

6.2.4. University Complicity
In view of the highly contested status of these allegations, it was of concern that the university endorsed union action against these Muslim candidates. How is it that senior executive members of the university were able to conclude that the elections had been held un-democratically? Why is it that these assessment of Muslim students as fraudulent, and conspiratorial were accepted without sufficient investigation?

This endorsement generated even greater concern when it emerged that the decision to invalidate the electoral outcome was partly authorised through the legal office. This office housed a member of staff with a significant equality remit. This staff member refused to engage on the topic. Similarly, the senior manager who regularly engaged with the union on student welfare considered the matter “no longer an issue” and insisted that in terms of the;

…long established regulations …they have to be applied to ensure the elections are legitimate and we have seen that the application is quite difficult (Interview; Richard 2005).

Both members of the university thus refused or failed to question the basis of the allegations, or union protocol on the matter. Instead, they implicitly affirmed the illegitimacy of these Muslim candidates. Whilst Muslim students were being reminded of the sanctity of “long established regulations”, it was curious that nowhere was the union scrutinised for the absence of adequate recourse to complaints. Instead, it was reified as a site of fair process. These blanket responses however, were not inconsistent with the way the history of Palestinian repression was repeatedly brought to the attention of university management with little effect.21

How can we explain these attitudes amongst senior members of the university? One such explanation relates to the construction and availability of tropes deployed to undermine Muslim student activism. In view of this particular case, it is difficult to understand the actions of the university without considering the way these Muslim students, notably all male, were racialised in particular ways.

21 The university received formal letters from student activists complaining about their constitutional repression (Interview; Haider 2005). According to students, the university did nothing to intervene.
6.2.5. ‘Fundamentalist Masculinities’

The idea that a group of Muslim men intimidated fellow students into voting can be understood within the terms of an “Islamophobic hoax” (Tyrer 2003, p.184). This is based on the idea of the racial hoax as;

A mode of racism that demonises entire peoples and effectively renders them victims of a “daily onslaught of black crime stories played out in the media, which unfailingly portray Blacks [or in this case Muslims] as ignorant and criminal” (Russell 1996 cited in Tyrer 2003, p.184).

The success of the Islamophobic hoax is “a reflection of the willingness of society to believe tales of black criminality” (ibid.). As narrated in Chapter Four, in Higher Education this has centred on the idea of Muslim men as a ‘fundamentalist threat’. In popular and academic discourses, fundamentalism has largely been defined through male authoritarianism and violence. This particular gendered and racialised configuration, it is argued, marks a shift from ‘victim’ to ‘aggressor’ (Alexander 2006, p.266 also see; Goody 2001, p.433-434) and can be traced in what Alexander has called the rise of the “Asian male gang”. The ‘Asian male gang’ developed in the public sphere in the nineties and invited a host of social surveillance and control (Alexander 2000, p.124). These representations have;

…drawn on, and translated, dominant discourses (both popular and academic) of black masculinity, constructed through images of deviance and violence, to legitimate this reinvention (ibid.).

‘Asian’ Muslim Masculinity is thus seen to emerge from within a discourse of the black folk devil associated with “muggers” and “rioters” of the seventies. “Asian and particularly Muslim men” are “positioned in the same ideological space as their African-Caribbean counterpart” except they have been reinvented within a ‘new’ cultural formation (ibid. p.129). This formation is most closely associated with the Satanics Verses affair and the 1995 Bradford riots (Alexander 2000, p.126; 2006, p.258 see also; Goody

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22 Tyrer explores the success of the racial hoax in student politics in early 2000 identifying a number of consistencies between various group claims of ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ (Tyrer 2003, p.184-200). Similar examples can be found in recent conferences held by the National Hindu Students Forum at the London School of Economics. These centre on claims of Male Muslim students engaging in the ‘forcible conversions’ of Hindu and Sikh girls (AWAAZ 2007).

23 For an example see (Ruthven 1991, p.5; Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992) and in critique (Sayyid 1997, p.15).
Central to this formation is the notion of a ‘raced’ and criminal underclass (Alexander 2000, p.127).

Alexander later develops this process of criminalising ‘BrAsian youth’ within a complex of “one of two guises- ‘the gang’ or ‘the fundamentalist’” (Alexander 2006, p.266). These are considered to be two distinct trajectories, both implicitly Muslim with neither generating the same amount of concern as non-Muslim identities (ibid. p.267, n.12). Although distinct, both of these are held to share many of the same assumptions about low male self-esteem, racial rejection and identity conflict (ibid. p.267). These ‘folk devils’ are thus seen as “two sides of the same culturalist coin” with both “visioned as male, and defined through increasingly similar forms of hyper-masculine behaviour, notably violence” (ibid. p.268).

Alexander’s theorisations are certainly insightful. However, they do not account for two key shifts. First, the way more recent notions of fundamentalist masculinities traverse ‘ethnicities’ beyond her ‘brAsian’ focus. Second, since the 7/7 London bombings, ‘Muslim extremists’ have been repeatedly claimed to infiltrate universities through religious/ethnic societies (See Chapter Four). Here, the concept of dangerous Muslim masculinities have been increasingly associated with “loose” ‘middle class’ Muslim networks (FCO 2004). The leaked Home Office report on Muslims and Extremism identified those susceptible to extremism through a profile of ‘underachievers’ as well as “educated undergraduates” or those with “technical professional qualifications in engineering or IT” (ibid.).

Thus, whilst Alexander’s ‘fundamentalist folk devil’ is a ‘street devil’; an incarnation of ‘brAsian’ youth underlined by the spectre of disadvantage (Alexander 2006, p.268), the discourse of the ‘fundamentalist’ Muslim student is bound to an intellectual cadre of the relatively privileged (see also Hamid 2007, p.150). Alexander’s ‘folk devils’ thus fail to attend to this newer ‘middle class’ profile; one which holds greater resonance in the context of campus cases.

6.2.6. Interactive Racialisation

Alexander’s contributions can be located within a nuanced concept of Islamophobia in so far as she makes no clear periodical or ideological distinction between (old) ‘phenotypical’ and (new) ‘cultural’ racisms. However, in view of the types of claims

24 ‘BrAsian refers to settler communities that “articulate a significant part of their identity in terms of South Asian heritage” but “in a direction away from established accounts” (Sayyid 2006, p.5).
being made about some of my interviewees, they reflect a more complex set of racialised presuppositions that invoke both the spectre of fundamentalist masculinity, (intimidation/authoritarianism/violence) but also popular stereotyping of Asian ‘communities’ (e.g. electoral fraud/passivity) 25 thought to to be institutionalised from the eighties (Bridges and Fekete 1985, p.50-51).

Indeed, claims of Muslim misconduct circulating Erdon’s campus rely not simply on fundamentalist masculinities, but on a combination of a number of other well established stereotypes to achieve plausibility. First, the “misguided” and “manipulable” ‘Asian’ (ibid. p.52) and second, more specifically ‘South Asian’ victims suffering ‘Muslim fundamentalist’ imposition; a theme that has acquired significant academic (and media) currency since the late nineties (Bhatt 1997; Tyrer 2003, p.24-27). Hence, Erdon’s predominantly ‘Asian’ student community was being bullied by ‘Muslim’ (read ISOC) candidates. This idea of Asian timidity, one ought to note, was also discernible more broadly across campus. One senior manager for example, considered the smaller less intimidating campus of the university more appropriate for ‘Asian’ groups, notably women, in the university (Interview; Richard 2005).

We can therefore understand Alexander’s cultural formation not simply as a question of Muslim men inheriting an ideological position previously occupied by ‘Afro-Caribbeans’, but as assuming a complex position derived from multiple discourses of racism. To be clear, this does not mean that my interviewees were subject to two distinct types of racism, but a hybrid form that reflects the “interactive racialisation” (Meer and Modood 2010) 26 of Islamophobic discourse. Thus virulent claims of Muslim misconduct, voter intimidation, and conspiracy can be understood within the terms of an ‘Islamophobic hoax’ that centres on a ‘fundamentalist’ Muslim masculinity. However, the ‘Islamophobic hoax’ can also be seen as working interactively with older culturally racist tropes about Asian fraudulence and passive Asian masculinities. This presents us with a dynamic of affirmation. For whilst Erdon’s ‘Asian’ student constituency are absent as vocal agents, they are implicitly invoked for their qualities of victim-hood which serve to

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25 In more recent years, ‘Asian’ electoral fraud has been reported by media as bound up in “Family loyalties, the dominance of men and the existence of the “biraderi clan system among British Asians” which “provide perfect conditions for widespread rigging of postal votes” (Dale, Birmingham Post 1st September 2009).

26 Modood’s concept of interactive racialisation focuses on the internal logic of Islamophobia, namely the way Muslims become the object of racialisation through anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic hostility. It is this fluidity in which Muslims become the target of racism through ‘religious’ and ‘cultural racism’ that is argued to be interactive, something that over a period of time, as in the case of Jews, is void of distinction (Modood and Meer Forthcoming see also; Modood 2005, p.9-10). My usage of interactive differs from this in so far as I focus on the dual ‘object’ of racisms (‘Muslim’/‘Asian’). In addition to buttressing its internal consistency, this form of interaction highlights an ‘external’ logic i.e. the relationship between different forms of racialisation.
guarantee Erdon’s ‘fundamentalist’ actors. In other words, in this example, the Islamophobic hoax requires two interrelated modes of racialisation for its efficacy. The former (passive Asian) functions as alibi for the latter (aggressive Muslim), achieving a smoother and more unified internal consistency. This can be seen to be augmented by a further power differential between ‘fundamentalist’ ISOC candidates and ‘Asian’ voters; where the voters were manipulated and bullied by the candidates.

In this reading, Puwar’s stress on ‘somatic’ norms again presents us with limitations, precisely because of the fixity with which racialised bodies are articulated. Puwar appears to rely on a pre-given notion of ‘race’, where ‘Black’ bodies are a-priori racialised in specific ways before entering ‘white’ spaces. Although this functions in tension with her emphasis on the dynamic and transformative quality of spaces (Puwar 2004b, p.1-2, 8) her ‘corporeal’ approach overlooks the shifting and interacting trajectories of racism within ‘white’ institutions.

6.2.7. Fabricated Pre-conceptions
Dominant accounts of the elections were clearly steeped in racist assumptions that guaranteed a transgressive Muslim subjectivity. It is arguably through such prior assessments that the university made its ‘informed’ decision. It was informed, not through substantive investigation, but through “fabricated preconception[s]” (Goldberg 1996, p.180) about Muslim identities. These fabrications however also required the mythologies of (masculine) ‘whiteness’ against which these constructions of deviancy were being authorised. Symbolised through claims of “long established regulations”, protocol, and democracy, this ‘whiteness’ was rehearsing an entrenched repertoire; one of teaching its recalcitrant (undemocratic/authoritarian) Muslim subjects the values/norms of White western civilisation (see also Goldberg 2002b, p.151); which Muslim students were considered in breach of.

In hindsight, the university’s failure to retreat from its position of endorsement is indicative of the way racialised discourses about Muslim students were deeply entrenched. That these claims were harnessed and circulated through meetings, reports and student literature with considerable ease is indicative. Indeed, the university’s role in endorsing these stereotypes, reflect the success of this ‘Islamophobic hoax’.

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6.2.8. *A ‘Union’ of Racism or a Racist ‘Union’?*

It is interesting to note that when the university invalidated the elections, many students in support of this outcome went further to invoke the universities stance to justify their own position. For example, these students reiterated that the decision to reject the (electoral complaints) report was not in the “jurisdiction of this committee but of the university officer” *(Elections Body Report 2005)*. This view was iterated by several ‘white’ union members. However, since the university’s decision was based on a union report, to argue this union body had no authority in view of the university at best appeared tautological and at worse, disingenuous. Subsequent meetings revealed that a majority of students in the union elections body were against the university explaining its decision. This appeared unusual since one might expect students, and in particular those active in the union, to question university judgement. However, key members of the union body and university executive appeared to be mutually affirming each other’s position. *They relied on each other* to justify their assertions about Muslim students.

This contrasts significantly however, with the way the union was championed as the site of ‘real’ equality and justice for students, in contradistinction to a conservative university. Underpinning this demarcation is the structural and ideological distinction maintained between ‘union’ and ‘university’. This distinction is misleading as the electoral example exemplified the way racism was reciprocated across these sites.

The union was certainly not as ‘independent’ of the university as either party claimed. The union was subsumed within university governance in financial, political, and statutory terms *(Bell et al 2006, p.45-46)*. In particular, it was the university’s legal obligation under the 1994 Education Act to ensure that the union operated with an “effective and fair complaints procedure” *(ibid. p.46)*. On this campus, the distinction maintained between ‘union’ and ‘university’ functioned to conceal the way the university legitimised and ‘oversaw’ union racism, both procedurally and ‘ideologically’. Managements involvement and complicity with ‘the union’ remained coveted by assumptions that it remained independent and aloof from student activity; a site of ultimate resolve but nothing to do with the racialisation of Muslims.

6.2.9. *Denying Islamophobia*

During the elections furore, charges of racism by Muslim students failed to be acknowledged, by either the union or university. When one of my interviewees
complained that the timings of hustings had not accommodated Muslim students, it was recommended that;

One of the best ways to improve this is for students of different faiths to become more involved so that things such as conflicts with religious discrimination can be avoided (Union Report 2004).

None of the union speeches in favour (from the president, chair and other members) of the cancelled elections addressed the issue of racism. Rather, these were repressed under the guise of greater interaction on the part of Muslim students. The response to this complaint was thus to ‘become more involved’ to avoid being excluded. Clearly, not only was it being suggested that Muslim students were responsible for their lack of accommodation, but the question of racism was blanketed under claims of their minimal engagement. This seemed a peculiar recommendation to students who had suffered disenfranchisement, as Junaid exclaims;

the president of the union … said to me I am really happy that Muslims are starting to get involved…and stuff, because its important, and it seems very contradictory because this year Muslims did take a very big part and they did campaign very hard and they did get votes…and they turn round and say this! (Interview; Junaid 2005).

Further, it is important to note that Muslim student concerns about racism were being fudged under the purview of faith engagement. This can be most fruitfully theorised under the rubric of ‘secondary victimisation’ which as argued in Chapters Two and Five occur when charges of racism are themselves repressed or dismissed. Clearly however, the way racism against Muslims is repressed is key in understanding how it is institutionalised. For in this case, ‘secondary victimisation did not comprise an outright dismissal of racism but the disarticulation of racism in terms that fit more comfortably with ‘Muslim’ students as a faith constituency. This ‘de-racialised’ model can be seen to parallel the ‘race relations’ paradigm. This has historically depoliticised questions of racism in favour of inter-group contact. In doing so, it has placed the onus on racialised communities to tackle their exclusion, rather than attend to broader power differentials (see also Hesse 2004a, p.146 n.110). In the ‘faith’ model, racism against Muslim students was being muted through an emphasis on their ‘religious’ status. This eclipsed from view the way ‘Muslim’ students formed a racialised collectivity, rather than simply a faith constituency which failed to have its needs met.
In view of university management, questions of racism were also blanketed and considered a non-issue, although in somewhat different terms. When the university finally conceded that these students were not guilty of misconduct, the notice of apology stated that there had been “failings in the conduct of the investigation” and attributed this to “communicative problems” between the various parties involved (Erdon University Admission 2005). The vilification and disenfranchisement of Muslim students was thus laid to rest as a ‘misunderstanding’. Student complainants were not brought to account, nor were their claims and motivations ever held open to scrutiny. Instead, the issue was buried. Clearly, the university was seeking closure on claims of racism.

6.3. Conclusion: ‘Space Invaders’ and Racialised Governmentality

Muslim students can be seen to represent the archetypal ‘space invader’. Eliciting ‘white’ disorientation, they can be seen to ‘startle’ the ‘white’ liberal spaces and aesthetics of the university campus. Puwar certainly provides a useful point of departure in framing Muslim hyper-visibility in the university. However, as this chapter has illustrated through the contextual and empirical richness of case material, there has been a need to develop a broader critical framework beyond the somatic dimensions of Puwar’s ‘space invaders’ to consider the strategic, interactive and affective dimensions of racialisation.

Thus Part One highlighted the way Muslim students appeared to be under ‘white’ Super/vision, where their perceived ‘encroachment’ in traditionally ‘white’ spaces invited discernible patterns of racialised governance. Hence, the racialised obstructions, surveillance, infantilisation, burden of doubt and representation, and ‘white’ governmental fantasies to which they were subject. These elements of racialised governmentality were seen within a broader strategic relation of (in)visibility, rather than fixed on somatic norms.

Part Two focussed on a case-study at Erdon offering a detailed history of Muslim student racialisation. This account centred on the de-legitimisation of Muslim students within campaigns on the Palestinian question. Here we observed how the stigma of ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ (extremism/anti-Semitism) became key to de-legitimising the Palestinian question.

In particular, it highlighted the way through affective and strategic relations, Muslim students had become objects of racialised governmentality that rendered them ‘unviable’ as speaking subjects. Hence, Muslim students were the subject of (and subjected to) complaints, but were unable to occupy the status of ‘complaint-maker’; at
least within the confines of the university. This symbolised their racialised status as objects of governance in the union and more broadly within the university.

The racialised status of Muslim men in particular was closely aligned with that of ‘fundamentalist’ aggressor. In distinction to Alexander’s ‘fundamentalist folk devil’ however, this construction was neither ethnically defined nor the product of a working class ghetto. Rather, in the university setting and tapered by the politics of the campus, as noted above, this fundamentalist aggressor was upwardly mobile, articulate and shrewdly manipulating an ‘Asian’ population to succeed electorally. This discursive shift emphasised the nuances of this Muslim fundamentalist hyper-visibility.

Further, this case also emphasised the interactive nature of racialisation, and the invocation of older and newer tropes. Islamophobia was therefore not seen to succeed other forms of cultural racism but to rely on them for its efficacy. This highlighted the way different ‘types’ of racism can co-exist quite comfortably, and interact to produce a regime of truth about ‘Muslim’ and ‘Asian’ students.

More broadly, what this case exemplifies is not a singular incidence of Islamophobia, but a “scenario” that reveals “various types and levels of recurrent victimisation” (Hesse 1997, p.88). It suggests that Islamophobia is not institutionalised through a singular mode of practice or via a particular set of individuals; it is diffused through various sites in the university and mutually reified to different purposes. This repertoire of racism clearly defy narrow notions of ‘institutional racism’ conceived in terms of ignorance or thoughtlessness, but rather, can be seen as disguised yet “consistent in…strategic affect” (Hesse 2004a, p.144); characterised by calculated tactic and “arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (Foucault, 1991, p.93).

Yet, even this chapter does not exhaust the various ways in which Muslim students have come to be ‘known’ and problematised in university settings. For what has achieved equal currency in recent years is the idea of ‘misplaced Muslims’; these are ‘misguided Muslim students’ that make demands on their liberal secular institutions decimating its ‘multicultural order’. This has been most exemplified in the context of university provision-making. It is to this chapter we now turn.
Chapter Seven

Multicultural (In)Equality, Racialised Governmentality and Institutionalised Islamophobia

Introduction
In recent years, it has been claimed that universities are pandering to “routinely privileged” Muslim sensibilities (see for example Feldman, Times Higher 14th December 2007). This narrative achieved a public hearing at London South Bank University when Higher Education minister, Bill Rammell, told universities not to feel pressured by Muslim student demands, as recounted in Chapter Four. This he argued, provided fodder for the far right, but also led to high student expectations which universities ought to be lowering if they were to be fair to all students (Rammell 2006).

Grounded in the ‘demise’ of multiculturalism (Allen 2007a; Pilkington 2008), Rammell’s argument lay in the assumption that universities were being far too accommodating of a fussy Muslim cohort. Whilst the “majority of institutions… [were] at pains” to make adjustments for religious minorities, in some universities he argued, this bordered on the ridiculous1 and exceeded the secular norms of universities. Instead, he invoked the banning of the niqab at Imperial College as an example of a more “balanced” approach. In contrast to the “unreasonable” and misguided students who resisted this ban, Rammell considered Imperial a reasonable institution with the ‘right’ cultural expectations who “may well have got it right in its amended code”2 (Rammell 2006).

Rammell’s critique suggested that Muslim students were responsible for decimating the multicultural order of British universities. Yet this narrative stood in contrast to Muslim student perspectives. For example, FOSIS’s nationwide empirical study conducted less than a year earlier highlighted a series of institutional failures and provisional shortcomings in view of Muslim student experiences (FOSIS 2005, 1.4). The report followed a national campaign to address the lack of adequate prayer-rooms on campus. Further as other research has indicated, including my own, Muslim students have been known to pray in huts (Choudhry, Education Net 2006), in rooms presenting

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1 Hence, “separate prayer-rooms for men and women have been rebuilt because it was found that one was slightly larger than the other. In a case like this, wouldn’t most people think that something has gone wrong?” (Rammell 2006).
2 The amended code maintained a ban on the niqab. Rammell’s account of the affair however reflected some confusion over what was banned. This mistakenly claimed Imperial had initially banned the hijab (Rammell 2006; See also Traynor, The Independent Voice December 2005).
a health hazard (Ahmad and Tyrer 2006, p.23) and often without wudhu facilities (e.g. Erdon). Prayer spaces have also been confiscated (Choudhry, Education Net 2006) or demolished (Middlesex University Students Union 2005/2006) and in the absence of any facility, students have been obliged to make circuitous routes to find prayer space (Lomonde ISOC Prayer Room Petition, 2006; Curtis, Guardian June 18th 2004; Shepherd, Times Higher 10th March 2006). Another noteworthy trend are the recent closures of Muslim only prayer-rooms and without consultation, the opening of multi-faith facilities (Conversation Sobia, Queens Mary College 2008; City Isoc, 12th October 2010; Newman, Times Higher 5th September 2010).

Thus, whilst one third of HEI’s in the UK provide separate facilities for Muslim students, although to varying quality, (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.95) and some have been cited as exemplifying ‘good practice’ on prayer facilities (ECU 2009c), the issue remains a key concern.

Steepled in a series of racialised binaries (reasonable/un-reasonable, liberal/transgressive), universities were assumed by Rammell to be the reasonable and liberal guardians of these potentially wayward students. He also suggested that when these (‘white’) ‘liberal’ norms were contested they needed to be enforced through the disciplinary technologies of the university (e.g. banning/ regulation). We can interpret Rammell as advocating the regulation of Muslim students through the hegemonic norms of (‘white’) universities.

This narrative can also be traced in my research in the subtle ways universities choose to ‘accommodate’ ‘include,’ ‘guide’ and ‘tolerate’ their Muslim student population. It reflects a ‘white multiculturalism’ (Hage 1998) and the way routine discourses of equality provide avenues to manage Muslim students and their claims for provisions. This is the topic of this chapter and is divided in two parts. Part One examines institutional and student accounts to consider how Muslim students are accommodated within the university through religious observance exemptions. Part Two follows detailed case studies at Lomonde and partly Erdon, focussing on the types of discourses that emerge when students engage with their respective institutions on prayer-room provisions; how they are managed, and resisted, and what, when they are granted facilities, this means.
Part One: Including Muslim Students?

7.1.1. ‘White’ Hegemonies, ‘Inclusion’ and Governmentality

If we cast our mind back to Chapters Three and Five, we can recall that Lomonde and Erdon were both institutions with significant Muslim student populations. Lomonde comprised an open campus, considered self-progressive, was in the midst of developing a wider equality agenda, and did acknowledge in some ways, questions of ‘institutional racism’. In contrast, Erdon was a closed campus; characteristically conservative, limited in its equality agenda, and tended to blanket questions of racism. We can also recall that their notably different equality infrastructures were not considered significant in determining the broader status of Muslim students at either university. It is with this in mind, that the following analysis of religious observance exemptions can be approached.

Reminiscent of Rammell’s speech, the notion that universities were going to extraordinary lengths to cater for their Muslim student population was echoed by staff at Erdon. Janet (Senior Manager with Equality Remit) in particular, was keen to state this;

> I know in instances, where schools have to make special arrangements for them to complete assignments, so I think there’s a lot of leeway made for students of religion, not just Muslims. We try not to hold key events on Friday afternoons or prayer times…It’s quite a minefield, if you had to take out every single religious festival or whatever, you’d hardly get anything done, so we do try to work our way through all of them and make sure if we’ve got people for whom religious observance is important that they notify us of that (Interview; Janet, 2005 Emphasis Mine).

This excerpt reveals a number of factors worth exploring. First, it is clear that the university is viewed as overstretching its capacity for ‘faith students’ in terms of the ‘special arrangements’ and extended ‘leeway’ granted to cases that fall outside of normal procedures. In Janet’s view, this is not only a hindrance to the running of the university for; “if you had to take out every single religious festival…you’d hardly get anything done”, but a danger (a ‘minefield’) to an otherwise uncomplicated secular system. Muslim students appear to be marked not only with the potential to “decimate an orderly campus-based timetable” (Pickerden 2002), but more significantly, as detailed below, a danger to the natural order of entitlements.

Clearly, Janet did not have in mind students of Christian background who were entitled to Christmas and Easter breaks without special request; an unstated
contradiction in the ostensibly secular status of the university. Yet, that some students must periodically notify staff of religious holidays suggested that these requests were in fact part of the way the university ostensibly included ‘religious others’. Thus, rather than reflecting the university’s receptive attitude to student requests, Janet actually illuminated the way the university maintained and institutionalised the minority status of ‘other’ religions.

The very practice of some students having to periodically request time off as a special allowance signified how this group of students were obliged to depart from ‘mainstream’ practices within the university. This concern was brought to my attention by students at Lomonde and Erdon. At Lomonde, for example, Muslim union officials expressed discontent with the fact that every year Muslim students would have to make requests which obliged them to single themselves out through paperwork (Interview; Ali, 2006). Instead, Ali argued that staff ought to be “required to take equality training” (ibid). This suggestion sought to underline and counter the routine ways in which some Muslim students felt minoritised.

The assumption that religious holidays would naturally be accounted for in an institution with a significant presence of Muslim students on campus, was also raised by a student at Erdon. As Iqbal recounted;

Iqbal: One thing I was disappointed with was erm when Eid came along I took that day off and unfortunately the very same day I had to hand in some homework and I was assuming that the lecturer would be kind enough to give me time to hand in the work later due to religious obligations, however to my surprise that didn’t happen and the lecturer marked me as 0.

SRN: Did you discuss this with him before Eid came?
Iqbal: Er, no, no. I assumed that with the Muslim students they would have realised this…(Interview; Iqbal 2005).

Penalised for not following university procedures, Iqbal’s assumptions were revealing. They implicitly questioned why the university had not worked out a basic procedural infrastructure that reflected an integrated policy, rather than one that was superimposed upon existing frameworks. Iqbal was genuinely puzzled by this.

Policy issued in late 2006 confirmed that students were obliged to notify the Head of School if they wished to take leave during term. This request would be dealt with in a manner “consistent with the response to requests for absence on other grounds”
(Accommodating Students Religious Observance, Erdon, 2006). Thus, rather than being granted special dispensation as Janet suggested, requests on grounds of religious observance were treated generically as any other absence. In this sense, the university was not revising any fundamental procedure as much as it was slotting these faith ‘incursions’ into existing bureaucratic frameworks.

Further, the assumption of ‘leniency’ on students wishing to take religious holidays was not as Janet inferred, consistently applied. When speaking to Salma, an engineering student, she narrated a scenario with her lecturer who timetabled a deadline on the day of Eid;

He had the deadline on Eid and I went to him to complain and was like ‘you need to take in to consideration that it is a religious festival’. And he turned around to me and I was furious when he said this ‘but I can’t help it if other people, I can’t take in to consideration everybody’s religious differences’ he goes, ‘some people might want to take a Sunday off’ and I was like ‘are you trying to compare Eid to a Sunday, like a Christian Sunday?’…I could not believe it, my friend had to literally drag me out of that room I mean I wasn’t the only person that handed it in late, other Muslims did. (Interview; Salma 2005).

Salma’s refused request incurred a loss of 5% of her overall mark. Her request was dismissed by her lecturer as excessive and unfair to others who were not requesting dispensations. That the other ‘holiday’ is a Christian Sunday appears to Salma, comparatively unfair, not least because Sunday, in the running of a university was not a working/teaching day, nor was it a celebrated religious festival as such. Echoing Janet’s proclamations of the arduous task of accounting for ‘every single religious holiday’, this lecturer refused to accommodate Salma or direct her inquiry to departmental level.

There were several issues in this encounter that reflected dominant modes of equality practice across both case institutions. First, the ostensibly ‘neutral’ policy of allowing nobody special courtesy appeared to be common parlance in universities. What was of concern is the way the ostensibly ‘secularised’ culture of equality was invoked to deny Salma her rights a student, in spite of a university multi-faith calendar and clear religious observance policy.

According to Janet, the university made every effort to ensure that staff applicants were aware of its equality policies. However, even though it had been indicated to me by several equality practitioners that staff were ‘leafleted’ upon the
introduction of religious employment directives (Interview; Sally/Lionel 2005), it was clear that this was not entirely effective, or possibly resisted, since institutional procedures were in this instance, not pursued. Thus, in spite of formal policies which both institutions claimed as evidence of inclusion, in practice these were limited by the individual discretion of lecturers or the school involved as advised in policy (Religious Observance Policy, Lomonde 2007). Even at Erdon where there was no policy encouraging the discretion of individual schools, there were significant discrepancies between students in religious studies, philosophy and engineering.³

This unwillingness to accommodate Salma was also symptomatic of the patchy, marginalised role of ‘equality’ within both universities; also reflected in other university practices (See Chapter Three). In particular, however, students were not confident that the university would or could accommodate their needs. This was reflected in the way they negotiated their way through university life. Some students were under the impression that university policy prohibited time off for religious reasons (Interview; Sameena, Lomonde 2005); remained unaware of university procedures (Interview; Salma/Iqbal, Erdon 2005); had requests refused (Interview; Abid, Lomonde, Salma & Iqbal, Erdon 2005); or did not ask for time off, instead forgoing their religious holidays (Interview; Rabia, Lomonde & Yasmin, Erdon 2005). Yasmin for example said;

I just get by, I don’t usually let anything get in the way, for eid there was a problem, we had an exam on the day so we had to come in for that (Interview; Yasmin 2005).

This mixture of positions suggested that in spite of formal religious observance policies, such measures had not been normalised to a degree to be considered culturally acceptable in the university. This conveyed the way the dominant culture of the university outweighed its ‘inclusive’ measures.

In the case of Salma, it is noteworthy that had procedures for religious observance been followed, she would have been disadvantaged by university policy which stipulated that course work must be submitted in advance of religious holidays. This was hardly an exemption but nevertheless stipulated as a “reasonable

³ Students in religious studies noted that exams were not scheduled on Friday afternoons (Interview; Shagufta 2005), students in philosophy related that late submissions were allowed under mitigating circumstances (Interview; Sadiq, 2005) and instances in engineering suggested, at least in one case, that no accommodation was made (Interview; Salma, 2005).
accommodation for faith” (Accommodating Students Religious Observance, Erdon 2006). Lomonde had a similar policy.

This obviously raised questions as to how accommodating and ‘reasonable’ universities were in view of Muslim students, but further, what constituted ‘reasonable’, and what discourses framed what counted as ‘reasonable’. It is evident from fieldwork that ‘reasonable’ in the context of the racialised university often cohered with practices that did not disturb ‘white’ Eurocentric norms. Salma’s example is a case in point, but can also be gleaned from other responses;

If anything we tend to perhaps be over-careful to ensure that we don’t discriminate and there must be occasions I think when some of the majority groups feel their being discriminated against because the minorities are getting all the attention (Interview; Janet 2005).

Racialised ‘minorities’ were viewed as disturbing the natural position of the (‘white’) ‘majority’. However, this comment only makes sense within a racialised logic that presupposes ‘white’ dominance. For it suggested that Muslim ‘privileges’ subtracted from the dominance of ‘majority’ groups and unsettled the natural order of entitlements. Within this racialised equation, ‘white’ privileges were disguised, giving rise to the very idea of minority ‘privilege’. Of course one can only construct a ‘provision’ as a privilege if it departs from ‘mainstream’ norms of entitlement. Thus whilst some norms/entitlements were embedded in institutional practices, ‘others’ were considered disruptive because they were attracting “all the attention” (ibid).

This logic of privilege however, presented a tension; between the notion of an egalitarian multi-faith campus and the capacity of an institution to bestow (and withdraw if it chose to) ‘special privileges’ to some students. It revealed a racialised power differential in which constructions of privilege were central to managing “the demands of marginalised groups in ways that incorporate[d] them without disturbing the hegemony of the norms that marginalise them” (Brown 2006, p.36).

Janet’s proclamations however, cannot be understood in isolation as the singular view of a rather un-reflexive ‘white’ director. For it was increasingly apparent that the general ‘white’ middle class profile of Erdon and the racialised hierarchies prevalent
amongst staff (Interview; Sally 2005) were a significant factor in the type of exclusive culture that was being (re)produced. As a Muslim staff member at Erdon remarked;

If you look at any committee, white, middle aged, middle to upper class...Do they have a real understanding of Muslims and their issues, I think probably not (Khalid; Erdon 2005).

Thus as much as ‘reasonableness’ and ‘common sense’ were advocated in the spirit of fairness and campus harmony, in the university these were clearly not value free, but maintained and sedimented within the racialised norms of the university. This idea can be traced in the reflections of a younger female equality practitioner in personnel;

I think sometimes people say well we always want the best people here, we don’t care what colour they are, what religion they are, they have a certain fairly naïve view of it and I think culturally that’s quite a big shift for us (Interview; Sally, Erdon 2005 Emphasis Mine).

In Sally’s account, the culture of the university served as a key explanation in the definitive ‘whiteness’ of the institution. It was this ‘non-diverse’ ‘whiteness’ that made the ‘shift’ to include ‘Others’ a ‘big’ one; something the university was perhaps not quite ready or willing to undertake. Thus, in spite of policy designed to be more inclusive, as noted above, this sheer weight of ‘whiteness’ was proving difficult to dislodge.

7.1.2. Examining Disciplinary Technologies

Lomonde and Erdon were not identical in the way they sought to manage religiously observant students. In examinations for example, Erdon appeared more sensitive to religious requirements, whilst Lomonde maintained a stern penal approach in dealing with religious difference. For example, in 2006, Erdon indicated that if examinations could not be timetabled to avoid religious holidays, they would endeavour to arrange a separate sitting. In the same academic session, Lomonde stated that whilst every effort would be made to accommodate legitimate religious requirements, the university

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4 ‘BME’ staff in the university comprised 13.3% of total staff, although were “spread” unevenly across posts. For example, only 6.5% of senior staff were listed as ‘BME’ compared to 92% of senior ‘White’ staff. 1.5% of staff were listed as ‘unknown’. BME staff also included overseas staff, which were said to be disproportionately conflating the overall and ‘Asian’ figures (Staff by Ethnicity; Erdon 2005).

5 It acknowledged the “rights of students to observe their own religion”, whilst remaining faithful to “its secular origins” (University Guidance on Accommodating Religious Observance, Erdon 2006).
reserved the right to hold examinations if alternatives could not be found. In 2007, this statement altered slightly to suggest it would be at the schools discretion to accommodate students, but ‘normally’, it entailed an examination the following semester which would involve an interruption or extended study.

Lomonde’s observance policy thus appeared dissuasive and would most likely discourage the submission of an application given the considerable interruption it would cause. Whilst it was offering concessions, it was doing so on its own terms; terms that would potentially negatively affect student achievements and parity with fellow students. Given the staunch secularist iterations directed at Muslim students at this university, perhaps a more useful way of reading this ostensibly ‘inclusive’ guidance would be its regulating function; to minimise the encroachment of religious sensibilities in mainstream practices. This ‘guidance’ on religious observance can thus be seen as a form of “regulated communication”;6 (Grant 1997, p.106) directing the behaviour of racialised Others. This can be seen in the policy texts described and in the “panoptican-like” surveillance (ibid) exemptions procedures entailed.

At Erdon this involved students registering their absence with the examinations office by completing a form which also needed to be authorised by a personal tutor or school officer. At Lomonde, students were required to complete their forms at the office of student administration (Examinations and Religious Observance, Lomonde 2005-6). The very task of applying for these ‘exemptions’ involved students making themselves visible to the administration of the university. Listing ones details, including name, religious background and so forth was also subjecting students to a more routinised form of surveillance. This ‘exposure’ was made even more (rather than less) apparent by assurances that student details would not be “used for any other purposes” (ibid), stored on file, or passed to third parties as stated in guidance.

Besides the dissuasive character of such policies at Lomonde, they can also be seen to comprise a powerful tool in marking out mainstream norms, not simply in the application procedure as noted above, but by highlighting the disruptive consequences religious observance would have on the university and the student. Read in these terms, this was not simply a policy of inclusion, but a disciplinary technology that marked out the norms against which students were being measured, judged and surveyed. Being

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6 This refers to the way institutional communications comprise part of a ‘disciplinary block’ alongside relations of power and ‘objective capacities’. These are seen to function in concert with disciplinary effect (Foucault 1986 cited in Grant 1997, p.106).
included by the university, thus also meant being subject to its exercise of disciplinary and racialised power.

7.1.3. **Racialised Hierarchies**

The differences between Lomonde and Erdon could be interpreted as a reflection of their differing historical legacies and respective “radical” as opposed to “moderate” secularities (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p. 150). Whilst this provides one explanation for the more stringent attitudes of Lomonde, it does not explain the racialised hierarchies of recognition/provision at this institution. Jewish and Christian comparisons were revealing in this regard. For example, in view of observance exemptions (i.e. time off for religious holidays), Muslim student requests were met with repeated deferrals for at least five years in spite of equivalent exemptions for the Sabbath. When the university finally conceded, it culminated in a provision that rested on proving the authenticity of Eid (Interview; Former Student, Tanweer 2005). This stipulation was eventually omitted from university practice, but left its traces in the form of warnings that only “strict” religious practices would be considered (*Examinations and Religious Observance, Lomonde 2005-2006*). Since the Sabbath would not have typically affected the university timetable, this difference initially appeared negligible. However, given that notices were advertised around various schools, it offered a particular public and symbolic recognition not accorded to Muslim students.

It is difficult to locate these discrepancies on the part of Lomonde as representing a mere lag in adjusting to a diverse student population. The religious diversity of the student population has been evident for the past two decades (Gilliat-Ray 2000), as has the assertion of Muslim student rights on this particular campus. Rather, a more convincing explanation can be found in the way such disparities were reflective of a racialised and hierarchical distinction between ‘en-whitened’ (europeanised) and not so ‘en-whitened’ students.7 These racialised hierarchies can perhaps be seen to explain why in some universities there has been a “longstanding tradition” of “discretion” and “flexibility” towards Jewish students, on a de facto and de jure basis (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.117).8

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7 ‘White’ is not an ‘ontic’ identity but a political formation of privilege which has historically and with some versatility included a range of previously excluded groups (Bonnett 2000; Twine and Gallagher 2008, p.18). It has also conversely ‘othered’ Muslims pheno-typically identified as ‘White’ (Franks 2000). For discussion on the ‘en-whitened’ Jew, see (Sacks 1997).

8 The exclusion of Jews in British universities in the 19th century has been noted (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.22/27/37).
Another example of a similar discrepancy which often pales from view is the established presence of Christianity on campus. For example, one equality staff member at Lomonde referred to the ‘multi-faith’ chaplaincy to illustrate the university’s pro-active approach towards its Muslim students (Interview; Emily 2005). Similarly, another senior manager at this university cited the chaplaincy as catering for the university’s ‘faith’ communities (Interview; Senior Management 2006). This raised some obvious tensions.

The chaplaincy is an autonomous, self funding institution whose services on campus since the seventies have focussed primarily on Christian denominations. Although this has changed in recent years, there were no Muslim advisors in this ‘multi-faith’ set up; instead Muslim students were referred to local mosques. Indeed the only known ‘proactive’ instance pertaining to Muslim students involving the chaplaincy was in 1996 when the university approached the chaplaincy on behalf of the prayer-room association to locate prayer space. This was rejected presumably because the chaplaincy wished to retain its Christian character.

Further, the invocation of the chaplaincy by university officials revealed two contradictory trends. This depended on what was being asked of the university and the discussion context. On the one hand, in view of Muslim student requests, the chaplaincy was cited as independent of the university that was “run and funded by the Anglican churches” (Interview; Margaret 2005) and hence distanced from mainstream practice. On the other, it was invoked as an example of the way religious identities in the university were included (Interview; Andrea, Equality Staff 2005, Senior Management 2006). Yet, in terms of the latter, this could be said to indicate the way Muslim identities were compartmentalised outside of university life (e.g. deferred under chaplaincy remit) into ‘religious’ spaces. Moreover, at the time, there was no evidence of Muslim representation in this chaplaincy.

The ‘independence’ of the Christian chaplaincy however, also had the effect of eclipsing its more diffuse presence in the university. This can also be seen in the detail of religious observance policy discussed earlier. For example, rather than admit that the university adhered to a Gregorian Christian calendar, (a position that would undermine the university’s secular stance in view of Muslim students), Lomonde instead articulated this as incidental to the vacation period;
Note that the major Christian festivals occur during vacations and hence are avoided automatically by examination periods (Policy on Religious Observance, Lomonde 2007 Emphasis Mine).

This differed from Erdon which acknowledged;

In common with other UK institutions, the university calendar is structured around the Christian calendar with breaks over Christmas and Easter (Accomodating Students Religious Observance, Erdon 2006 Emphasis Mine).

Indeed, whilst Lomonde’s policy seemed to be coated with a veneer of neutrality, Erdon appeared to be more upfront about the historical status and established presence Christianity enjoyed at this university. In view of both universities, however, the implied suggestion that ‘other’ religions, (whom the institution was making concessions for), were encroaching on the university’s secular terrain, was difficult to sustain. This was further undermined at Lomonde in view of its partial funding of a chaplain for international students; perhaps a reflection, as later discussed, of the university’s new priorities.

7.1.4. Eurocentric Concessions and Logics of ‘Inclusion’

Claims that universities are ‘bending over backwards’ to accommodate Muslim students are questionable. Indeed, such a portrayal belies a structural and cultural hegemony that maintains the minority status of Muslims. Sharma’s observations on the multicultural curriculum raises obvious parallels when he notes that it comprises of “additive forms of inclusion” that are “structured so as to produce a domesticated otherness that fail to challenge existing Eurocentric frameworks” (Sharma 2004, p.112).

“White multiculturalist” (Hage 1998) forms of inclusion can thus be seen to preserve the status quo; for whilst equality initiatives remain disproportionately centred on ‘ethnic minorities’, institutional cultures of ‘whiteness’ remain undisturbed (Puwar 2004b, p.135). This reflects a logic of inclusion that pivots on bringing ‘others’ into a ‘white’ fold, rather than unravelling the fold of ‘whiteness’.

This logic can also be traced in dominant notions of institutional racism, which define racism as the failure to provide for ‘non-white’ others because of their difference (Ahmed 2004, para 18). This definition characterises racism in institutions by inaction,
as if anti-racism is about what ‘whites’ can or should do for minoritised groups. In this understanding, granting provisions is read as signifying the absence of racism.

However, the assumption that racialised minorities are gradually being included within the structures of the university (via provision-making) is mistaken if we accept this signifies an egalitarian position. For not only does this view provision as an end in itself, it is “lacking in an analysis of racial privilege” which does not “grasp the full scope of whiteness” (Olson 2002, p.385). This is because, shrouded in a semblance of diversity, this logic of inclusion not only conceals ‘white’ privileges, but also the racialised governance involved in managing ‘others’.

Thus, in view of a semblance of formal provisions, the degree to which Muslim students were being suitably accommodated on either campus was questionable. Claims of alleged privileges accrued by Muslim students quickly begin to unravel in my case studies. Policies of religious observance suggested inflexibility, reliance on departmental discretion, and rather than comprise significant ‘leeway’ as suggested by equality practitioners, were tacked on to existing procedures governing generic absence. Further, these ‘provisions’ indicated that students were expected to accommodate themselves through advanced submission. These forms of religious ‘inclusion’ arguably reified hegemonic norms through dissuasive administrative procedures. In sum, rather than reveal an exemplar of ‘multiculturalism gone wrong’, such ‘provisions’ were actually more revealing of the ‘white’ hegemonic norms of the university.

We now turn to the most decisive aspect of provisions concerning Muslim students.
Part Two: *Prayer-Room Politics*

7.2.1. *A National Concern*

Over the past decade, Muslim students across the UK have appealed to their institutions to provide adequate prayer facilities (Michael 2004 cited in Cook et al 2007, p.18; FOSIS 2005; *MUSU Middlesex University Students Union 2005/2006; Choudhry, Education Net 2006*). The provision of adequate prayer facilities has been a key mode through which some (prospective) Muslim students have assessed their universities. This has largely been because of the need for Muslim students to fulfil their obligatory prayers in between their timetabled university schedules. The question of prayer-rooms appears just as pressing now, as it was in early 2000 (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.90).

During fieldwork, it quickly became apparent that questions surrounding prayer-rooms far exceeded their spiritual dimension and were entangled in student, institutional and even national/security politics. For example, one university had been pressured from neighbouring institutions not to provide a facility because they feared having to compete (Interview; Mohsin, *Adarn* 2004). At Lomonde, staff refuted the idea of a prayer facility on grounds that the university was a ‘secular’ institution (Interview; Margaret, Senior Management, 2005/2006). At Erdon, pro-Israeli/Zionist groups sought to marginalise Muslim students from union politics and thus sought to relocate the prayer-room underground (Interview; Muslim Staff Member, Khalid 2005). Other prayer-rooms had also, without consultation, been transformed into multi-faith facilities (*Blair 2008, Pluto 1st November 2008; Conversation; Sobia, Queens Mary College, 2008*). In the ‘war on terror’, student prayer-rooms have also been discouraged and figured as sites of state/media surveillance (DFES 2006; *Sanders, Times Higher 20th October 2006*).

The latter part of this chapter focusses on the types of discourses that emerge when students engage with their respective institutions; how they are managed, and resisted, and what, when they are granted facilities, this means. In particular, it examines the modes of racialised governmentality across and peculiar to each campus. These include the philosophical (the secular basis for refusing prayer-rooms), structural (the formalisation of prayer-room dialogue), and spatial (the allocation of ‘particular’ spaces for Muslim students) aspects of racialised governmentality. The chapter concludes with a critical account of what such provisions might signify when they are granted.
7.2.2. **Racialised Governmentality: Secular Installations**

Many Muslim students are familiar with a common ‘secular’ riposte from their universities when requesting prayer-room facilities. This riposte insists on the secular status of the university within a multicultural logic that “equalises down” (Modood 2002, p.124), refusing to privilege one religion over another. This ostensibly progressive form of reasoning has enjoyed durable, although somewhat contested status, providing universities with ample power to withhold or negate the possibility of dedicated facilities for their Muslim students (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.90, 96; Tyrer 2003; Bodi, Guardian March 5th 2002; Choudhry, Education Net April 6th 2006).

Remarkably, this secular argument has even been used to rationalise the closure of existing prayer facilities for Muslim students (Taneja, BBC 1st April 2010). This secular narrative was with significant import, reflected in prayer-room politics at Lomonde. It is worth considering the projections of this secular argument. For not only is it indicative of Muslim student experiences across various British campuses, it is also key to the racialised management of Muslim students.

As far back as the early nineties, the university of Lomonde refused to provide a dedicated facility for Muslim students maintaining the stance that;

> Under its charter it could not discriminate against, or show favour to any particular group...the university did not make provision for Jewish or Christian students (Lomonde Prayer-room Report, 2000).

Thus it was under the semblance of a formal ‘association’ that students were obliged to seek funding for their own permanent facility. In the early years of the association, the few occasions on which students were noted to have contested this arrangement, the secular charter was invoked as an almost legal precedent that could not be abrogated (ibid).

University secularity was thus intimately tied to campus harmony. Preserving the ‘natural’ balance of rights between religious groups was central to Lomonde’s belief that it should neither fund nor maintain a Muslim prayer facility. Although other

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9 The association’s meetings were documented by the university and students had copies. To my knowledge no issues were raised in view of content. There were however issues with a meeting that went un-documented leading to a conflict of interpretation (Interview; Ali 2006).

10 According to meeting reports, this was not very often; questions of funding were only raised by students twice in 2000 and then not again until a final solution was afoot in 2004/5. This of course does not include the legal case regarding the prayer-room that preceded the prayer-room association.
research has suggested that radical secularism has not proved effective in “maintaining real equity between traditions” in universities (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.146), the realisation of Muslim requests was rendered a distinctly violating prospect that would distort the natural harmony of the campus.

This secular framework can be located within a much broader racialised repertoire. Following Asad (Asad 2003), Razack for example, draws our attention to how the secular/religious (and attendant modern/premodern) distinction functions to regulate racialised citizen subjects in ‘post-colonial’ Western states (Razack 2008, p.164). The installation of a;

...secular/religious divide...functions as a colour line, marking the difference between the white, modern, enlightened West, and people of colour, in particular, Muslims (ibid. p.148).

Razack thus demystifies the assumed neutrality of the secular, and identifies its governmentalising power in regulating racialised Others. The regulating power of secularism as deployed by the state can be seen to be mirrored at Lomonde where it was invoked to regulate Muslim subjectivities. Thus, assuming the position of the “unbiased liberal subject” Lomonde secured its hegemonic position as neutral arbiter achieving definition “through comparison to the racialised subject (viewed as communitarian and hence bias)” (ibid. p.160). Here, the request for a prayer-room is construed as a ‘particular’ and misguided need out of sync with the progressive liberal ethos of the university.

Following this, the secular terms and conditions imposed on students had the effect of positioning the university as generous beneficiary; although the university would acquire a facility it would neither have to maintain nor fund. As Sameena argued;

We’re having to pay for it...and yet they want to call it the Lomonde university prayer-room (Interview; Sameena 2005).

Yet it is precisely in ‘departing’ from its ‘secular’ position that the university was able to couch its ‘facilitation’ of prayer space as a favour entirely for the benefit of students. For example, in the early years, when students questioned their status as equal members of the association, (i.e. their capacity to vote on the suitability of a facility) they were
quickly reminded that dialogue on the prayer-room was a privilege which should not be (con)test for they had “already won an argument for the provision of a permanent prayer facility” (*Prayer-Room Meeting Report, 1995*). Yet, at this stage, students had neither won the ‘argument’, nor the provision. Students were however, being assured to believe they had secured a degree of permanency on campus, and this was *their* success.

The university’s response to Muslim students who questioned their “minoritised” (*Laguerre 1999*) status within the formalities of the association was revealing. It reflected a discourse of secular benefactor (university) and minority beneficiary (Muslim students). During an interview with one of the chairs, this same positionality was aired, although more subtly. When questioned about the funding of the prayer-room, she stated;

> *We’re happy for a university building to be leased for this purpose subject to these funds being raised because the university won’t be putting funds into the refurbishment itself, but is making the land and building available on a rented basis* (Interview; Margaret 2005 *Emphasis Mine*).

This paradigm of beneficence can be seen to be underwritten by a racialised dialectic of toleration where;

> All otherness is deposited in that which is tolerated, thereby re-inscribing the marginalisation of the already marginal by reifying and opposing their difference to the normal, the secular, or the neutral (Brown 2006, p.45).

‘Tolerance’ can thus be understood as a disciplinary discourse of ‘white’ power (ibid) in which Muslim students figured as a tolerated racialised contingent. It can, as Hage has suggested, be seen as a “form of symbolic violence in which a mode of domination is presented as a form of egalitarianism” (*Hage 1998*, p.87).

Yet, that these terms remained largely uncontested up until late 2000 is testimony to the regulating power and efficacy of the ‘secular’ in directing and containing Muslim student requests. This secular straitjacket worked to bind Muslim students to its hegemonic rationale and is therefore also traceable in some student accounts. During the late stages of fieldwork, a point at which the university was requesting considerably large amounts of money from Muslim students, the university’s
secular position was being endorsed by some students;

Their selling us the land *which is good*, well their leasing it for 50 years, *which is the longest you can possibly can get, so that’s good* (Interview; Iram 2005).

Iram failed to question why the university was not only requesting large sums of money from Muslim students, but why it was only *leasing* the land. This can be read as indicative of the degree of governmentalisation the university had cultivated on account of its secular principles. Instead, Iram rationalised this arrangement as ‘good’ for Muslim students;

In a way it’s better than owning outright because the university pays for our electricity, water, that kind of stuff and if we have break-ins university staff can come down and help because it’s an official building, *so that’s quite good* (ibid).

Although Erdon was generally not as staunch in its secular outlook, this more ‘compliant’ attitude was also discernible amongst some of its Muslim students. Allocated a small facility, the attitude of students was both cautious and grateful, neither of which suggested they felt accepted in the institution. For example, Daanish was pleased with “the fact that we even have it to be honest” (Interview; Daanish 2005). Whilst Yasmin reminded me that;

You’ve got to remember we are in a non-Muslim institute…it would be nice if we had facilities but the sink is enough for me (Interview; Yasmin 2005).

Clearly, students were relaying dominant discourses inferring the secular norms of their institution. The notion that their ‘place’ within the institution required self-regulation (e.g. not asking for ‘too much’) was germane. This made emphatic the vulnerability of their position but also suggested that these students viewed themselves through these norms; norms by which they “assessed the adequacy” of their expectations, and which “help shape[d] their sensibilities and guarantee their experiences” (Asad 2003, p.14). The dominance of these repeatedly secular invocations at Lomonde require unpacking. This is discussed below.
7.2.3. Contested Formations

The ‘secular’ basis upon which Muslim students were being refused a permanent facility was weak. There are many reasons for this. Maintaining secular principles in spite of an increasingly diverse and observant student population introduces some obvious tensions. First, it appears anachronistic to remain bound to legacies of secularism which at one point may have proved useful in maintaining peace between Christian factions, but now prove discriminatory in view of ‘post-colonial’ populations. As Gilliat-Ray argues “the changing composition of the population in an institution necessitates change” (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.156). In view of a broader trend of de-secularisation on British campuses, and other more amenable ‘moderate’ forms of ‘secularism’ (ibid. p.96-97), Lomonde’s secular stance appeared unduly unethical. It functioned in tension with the broader principles of equality and progressivism to which Lomonde subscribed. This is particularly so where upholding secular norms had the effect of placing religious Muslim subjectivities in perpetual abrogation of its claimed neutrality, contributing to their further racialisation and marginalisation.

Second, the provision of a temporary facility at Lomonde suggested that this was not a question of ethics (i.e. of maintaining campus harmony as implied). In view of this temporary accession, the ethical argument appeared increasingly outdated. Moreover, rather than reveal a commitment to the value of a secular campus, it exposed the selective invocation of secularism when it demanded little of the university. Retrospectively, this suggested that the university was unwilling to make a financial commitment towards Muslim student needs when it reaped no prospective dividends. Only in the context of an increased number of international students did the university concede to funding as further detailed below. This emphasised the way the ostensibly ‘fair’ principles the university adhered to functioned as a disciplinary tool until it proved advantageous for them to be abandoned. This underscored the governmentalisng power of secularism and the deployment/suspension of secular law as “a set of tactics” (Butler 2004, p.52).

Third, maintaining secular principles under the guise of neutrality between religions was, and continues to be, misleading. For;

most institutions, even ‘secular’ ones have inbuilt structural biases that empower and privilege some faiths and worldviews rather than others (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.142).
As Parekh also argues many current practices derive their energy from this [Christian] religious history (Parekh 2006, p.189). In light of this, claims of secular equality appeared somewhat misplaced, even disingenuous. Indeed, given the history of institutionalised differences between Muslim and Jewish students at Lomonde, assertions of secular neutrality further camouflaged these racialised discrepancies. The notion that the provision of a prayer-room violated the secular status of the university may of course have withstood criticism if there were no other signs of religion on campus; the centre of campus was home to a Christian chaplaincy and a university funded international chaplain.

Finally, although some students appeared to iterate Lomonde’s secularist stance, many were also unravelling these claims by making reference to other provisions on campus. For example, when students compared their needs and university services generally, they noted a disparity;

If comparing to other campuses yes they were quite good, however if comparing to the city and the number of foreign students- and the other facilities such as the bar and the alcoholic environment that Muslim’s don’t use… the prayer-room was really not satisfactory (Interview; Abid 2005).

Abid thus brought to the fore taken for granted and ‘mainstream’ sites of the campus. In this account, the prayer-room is located as another service amongst many. Thus in line with the wide array of pastoral and welfare services available to students on campus (chaplaincy, counselling), the prayer-room could be seen as consistent with the holistic range of amenities available on campus. Within this framework, the idea of provisions as being either ‘secular’ or ‘religious’ becomes redundant.

This brings us to an aspect of prayer-room dialogue that within the schema of secularity was hastily eschewed. That is, the opposition between the ‘secular’ university and the ‘religious’ prayer facility reduced the latter to a place of religious observance. As fundamental as this was for observing students, that the prayer-room functioned in numerous other ways went ignored. For example, affording Muslim students a socially safe space on a predominantly ‘white’ secular campus was something students on both campuses could not stress enough. The social, spiritual, welfare, political and educational networks the prayer-room sustained highlighted the centrality of the mosque to the Muslim community on campus. Beyond providing a place of worship
their mosque was articulated as a multiple site, providing a “home to a community” (Prayer-room Petitioning Report, Lomonde Union 2006; “the hub of university life” (Interview; Amun 2005) a “primary social scene” (Interview; Uthman 2005); and its absence, a “disastrous threat for Muslims students on campus” (Interview; Yunus 2005). The social function of the mosque was however perhaps best highlighted by a humanities student;

Many students in [Lomonde] would probably meet new people and make new friends through going out socialising in pubs and bars. My way as a Muslim is through meeting up in mosques (Letter from Habib; Prayer-room Petitioning Report, 2006).

Dominated by the union bar, Habib pointed to the social vacuum on campus that the mosque replaced. The concentration of social activity in the prayer-room can thus be read as symptomatic of the social exclusion some Muslim students felt in a ‘white’ institution. This was also relayed in appeals to the Vice-Chancellor “to develop a greater appreciation for the services that a simple prayer-room can provide to its students” (Letter from Farhan, ibid. Emphasis Mine).

Beyond its social function, the prayer-room was also a sanctuary away from hate-crime. In the aftermath of 7/7 for example, a female student fled to the mosque after she was physical assaulted in the centre of campus (Interview; Union Officer Julia/ Sameena 2005; Prayer-room Petitioning Report, 2006, p.11).

Indeed, the broader context of an exclusionary campus lifestyle elucidated that the funding of prayer facilities exceeded the neat secular/religious dichotomy that often framed this debate. It brought back into focus the broader racialised context of prayer-room politics. This latter point has been obscured by recent recommendations for multi-faith facilities, where rooms can be booked in advance and rotated in terms of users (ECU 2009c, p.8). This more utilitarian approach has emerged in a context which has emphasised greater integration and the discouragement of Muslim only prayer-rooms (DIUS 2008, p.9). Besides lack of flexibility, this recommendation appears to have ignored the way Muslim prayer-rooms have often exceeded their spiritual function and compensated for exclusionary campus spaces.
7.2.4. **Racialised Governmentalities: Prayer-Room Talk**

The formalisation of dialogue between students and university management on the prayer-room issue is significant in gauging the ‘minoritisation’ of Muslim students. The Lomonde case is particularly insightful,\(^{11}\) because although the prayer-room association was presented as a democratic forum dedicated to serving student interests, as argued further below, it served to curb Muslim student voices and institutionalise their subordinate status. The association is thus seen as a key disciplinary apparatus which both engaged with and simultaneously disavowed the ‘equal status’ of Muslim students.

It was in 1994, when students were displaced from the union to the edge of campus, that the university introduced the idea of a prayer-room association. It is perhaps not coincidental that this arrangement emerged in the aftermath of the threat of legal action from Muslim students.\(^ {12}\) Under the association’s terms, the university made no commitment to providing funding, a position firmly maintained and iterated by senior representatives during fieldwork in 2004/05. For example, one of the committee chairs plainly stated that “right from the word go the university had said it wouldn’t fund it itself, but it would help facilitate” (Interview, Margaret, Senior Staff 2005).

The university’s role was thus limited to identifying ‘suitable’ space. Indeed, once the association was established, the university was unwilling to talk to other Muslim students not involved and thus effectively barred dialogue with anyone resisting on other terms (Interview; Ibrahim, 2006). Students were locked in this arrangement for the proceeding decade.

In nearly every aspect of the association’s organisation we can observe discrepancies which conveyed a façade of mutual cooperation. First, from the outset, Muslim representation was markedly limited with the majority of attendees made up of university and union officials. Although the balance of representation altered slightly from meeting to meeting, Muslim representation was more often than not dwarfed. The initial meeting for example was not attended by anyone from the ISOC, but two former students one of which was designated as ‘community representative’. However, even

\(^{11}\) Meetings at Erdon were un-minuted, informal and kept confidential. They were also fairly weighted in terms of Muslim representation, less protracted and not conditional on students raising funds. However, it took three years before dialogue with university management was established, around the same time a Muslim chaplain was appointed.

\(^{12}\) Student accounts suggest that the prayer-room association emerged without full endorsement of the ISOC. Interviews with ex-students suggested that the ISOC had been “out-maneuvered” by other former students who proceeded with this ‘parallel track’ unilaterally. Hence, some students in the ISOC ignored the association (Phone Interview; Ibrahim, former student, 2006), whilst some didn’t even know it existed (Interview; Zachariyya, former student 2006).
the idea of a ‘community representative’ was not sustained. On many occasions there were no ‘community representatives’, and student choices on the matter went ignored (Interview; Yunus 2005, Ali 2006). This is perhaps because university criteria for the ‘community representative’ was geared towards exercising a “moderating influence” over students (Margaret; in interview with Senior Management, 2006). Thus even the most senior Muslim representative in the association was unlikely to resist the university’s terms.

However, as the ISOC was becoming more organised (from around 2000), it sought to interrupt the arrangements of the association. For example in March 2003, it was considered that in addition to other union executive, the outgoing and incoming chairs of the ISOC should be part of the association for continuity. However the head of administration objected that there was already a sufficient balance of representatives (Prayer-room Meeting Report, 2000).

Yet, whilst the question of numbers was insightful, the assumed democratic status of the association was far more revealing. For example in August 1994 when one Muslim representative suggested the ISOC “have the final say on which site would be chosen”, university officials stated that they could not accept “any one group or person to veto any decision”. At this point another official presented an ultimatum; for the “association to be dissolved” or “to continue along the present route of …co-operation” and “consensus” (Prayer-room Meeting Report, 1994).

Whilst on appearances this ultimatum sounded reasonable (i.e. official consensus versus Muslim unilateralism), it belied the power differential at the heart of the association and the university’s right to refuse, withdraw, and withhold access to land on campus. Indeed, the very fact that it was university officials that had the power to make such an ultimatum was itself indicative. In this sense, the university was the association. The notion of consensus between Muslim students and the university obscured the position of a ‘white’ power holding majority in which Muslim representation could only figure to stall dialogue or concede to the university. The notion of a democratic consensus thus functioned to camouflage the racialised power differentials at play in the association. Of course, bearing in mind Muslim students, were students in the university, they were not “positioned as equal adults” but from a “position of relative weakness” (Grant 1997, p.103) which always rendered them subordinate in comparison to senior staff.
Yet as was revealed to me in late 2006, the association did not officially exist (Margaret in Interview with Senior Management, 2006). Rather, it seemed to provide a semblance of officialdom; a site in which Muslim students could ‘represent’ themselves but not exceed the bounds set for them. The idea that the interests of Muslim students were safeguarded by the association was questionable. As one student put it;

We’ve got to be careful, they’re not exactly watching out for us we’ve got to watch out for ourselves (Interview; Sameena 2005 Emphasis Mine).

This became apparent in nearly every aspect of discussion in which students had little input in negotiating their stakes on campus. For example, although dedicated to locating suitable land, students were often told that “there were no other development sites available” (Interview; Margaret 2005), were dissuaded from other sites and were given unsatisfactory options with proximity or safety concerns. This position was recounted in reports some ten years earlier, where Muslim representatives appealed to management to “pursue all avenues”; university officials insisted “there was no reason to seek alternatives... no alternatives could be brought to mind” (Prayer-room Meeting Report 1994).

In addition to the fundraising required for the prospective facility, students faced the additional task of convincing the university to fund the maintenance of the existing facility. This issue had up until 2004/2005, never been resolved, but left successive generations of Muslim students with massive debt.\textsuperscript{13} By this stage, the association was in a perpetual state of abeyance.

By the time of fieldwork in 2004/2005, an off-campus location had been identified. Like most factors in prayer-room ‘negotiations’ however, this site was not eligible for consensus. It was “dictated by the university, because it was always, this is the situation and this is what you guys have to do…” (Interview; Ali 2006). This proposition was for a significant period of time entertained as a viable option, and left students in a situation where if they could not raise the funds, they would not be allocated a prayer facility. The prayer facility was thus “subject to these funds being

\textsuperscript{13} In 05/06 there was approximately £8,000 worth of debt covering the cost of building repairs, security and utility bills (Conversation; Nahid, ISOC representative 2006).
raised” by students; the university was only “making the land and building available on a rented basis” (Interview; Margaret 2005)

However, this large sum was repeatedly contested by students who objected to the university’s use of its own architects (Interview; Yunus, Sameena 2005, Ali 2006), and felt that on this point the university was quite exploitatively assuming “we don’t know any better” (Interview; Sameena 2005). As Sameena recounts;

Another thing we’ve been messed about on is the estimates they gave us and we went to our own people who have worked on major projects like the London Muslim centre and… they have looked at everything in detail and they’ve charged us more or less double than what it actually is so they’ve just messed us about completely. The stage we are at now is we want to bring our architects with the university architects (ibid).

Further, others considered the question of students funding the facility a “raw deal” that was “bang out of order” (Interview; Abid, Former ISOC President 2005). Abid argued that the university wanted the “best of both worlds” (ibid). Hence;

The university wants to have a place for Muslim students but they don’t want to have to do the work for it, so the university is taking advantage of the students who they know are committed to having a mosque, and would do pretty much anything to have it. They knew we would eventually capitulate… (ibid. Emphasis Mine).

The terms the university had imposed on students suggested it was doing much to deter students from securing a facility. This frustration was articulated by students in 2004 who in assessment of the university, were resolute that “if you do the maths, they don’t really want to give us the prayer-room” (Interview; Yunus 2004/05). Another union official felt the project was being entertained, but not “being taken very seriously” (Interview; Ali 2006). This was echoed by a union officer who noted that when she joined the committee in 2004 it was “stale” and that officials were continuing meetings, but with no real dedication to finding a solution. She was of the view that it was

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14 The prospect of raising money from overseas sponsors was effectively obliterated since sponsors would not invest money for leased land of 25 or 50 years. This particular issue was recurring and the university was not unaware that this prevented students from securing funds from overseas dignitaries. This issue had been clarified by Muslim representatives in November 1996, Feb 1997, December 2000 and October 2004. During this period the length of lease had shifted from 10, to 25, to 50 years, with the latter only expanded because the land was off-campus. On each occasion, students were reminded that the leasing of land was a term enshrined in the terms of the association and non-negotiable (Prayer-room Meeting Report 1997-2004; Interview; Patrick, Union Management, 2006).
something they attended to be seen to be facilitating prospects for Muslim students (Phone Interview; Union Officer, 2004).

Arguably herein lay the governmentalising function of the association. For although it ostensibly served as a conduit to serving Muslim student needs, securing their permanent status on campus, the ‘association’ actually functioned to stifle student dissent, and for some time effectively thwarted alternative possibilities. Rendered the only legitimate channel for ‘negotiation’ the ‘association’ functioned, particularly in the early years, as a disciplinary technology. Indeed, the revelation in subsequent interviews with senior managers that “we were never really certain the money would ever turn up” (Interview; Senior Management, 2006) was particularly illuminating with regards to its disciplinary function. It suggested that student ambitions were being entertained but with little prospect of them being realised. The association thus appeared to present “the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (Foucault, 1991, p.93).

Yet, whilst the association functioned as a disciplinary and regulating technology, by the time of field-work, it remained fundamentally unstable as students were preparing to launch an “all out campaign” (Interview; Yunus 2005) at the centre of campus. The attitude at this stage was not of compliance, but defiance;

So hang on let me be a bit more clear...the worst thing the university who wants to be a top university… the last thing they want is that you end up with 600 students praying juma on the [campus] road, as well as massive press releases to the Guardian as well as the entire students union being pretty in support of the Islamic society, and they know if it really came down to it we could pull all the strings, and they’d be in a lot of trouble (ibid).

By this point the students clearly had little faith or intention of seeking resolve in the association. Their only solution was to bypass the association and seek alternative strategies. In 2004, this is precisely what students did. However before turning to this final episode in the prayer-room saga, it is important to first turn to an analysis of the spatial elements of governmentality that were intrinsic to the question of the prayer-room.
7.2.5. **Racialised Governmentalities: Racialised Space**

If we understand (racialised) governmentality as always spatialised (Huxley 2008, p.1644), then the location of prayer-rooms is exemplary in this regard. The allocation and authorisation of prayer-room spaces epitomise the way Muslim bodies are spatially regulated, depoliticised and rendered inactive. If we accept that all social identities are inherently spatial, then there “can be no minority without minoritised space” (Laguerre 1999, p.95). Minoritised space functions to contain, regulate, and hierarchically (re)produce (ibid). In the order of the multicultural city, this has been documented by many (Goldberg 1993, p.185-205; Keith 2005; Chappell 2006).

In this we can identify analogies with the ‘white’ campus. As a ‘multicultural’ location, the campus contains and marginalises racialised subjects through spatial demarcation. This is not to suggest that ‘white’ campuses represent a microcosm of British cities. Rather, logics of spatial racialisation follow a discernible set of patterns involving regulation, containment, and the reproduction of hierarchies through spatial ordering. Spatial regulation is not however, simply about literal spaces but the normalisation of spaces through the “proximity of some bodies” to ‘white’ institutional space (Ahmed 2007a, p.157).

The (re-)‘housing’ of Muslim students on campus cannot be separated from their marginalised status. Of course, prayer-rooms also comprise a retreat from the norms of the campus providing a “spatially productive experience for the recovery and assemblage of non-white racial identities” (Mclaren et al 2000, p.115). Minoritised space is thus also a site of resistance (Laguerre 1999, p.112), a source of social capital, networking and significant in generating political blocs (Keith 2005, p.265). Yet, even as the prayer-room can figure as a site of “counter-conducts” (Huxley 2008, p.1647), this is what it can be-come within determined relations of power which authorise where and whether Muslim students should be (re)located. Prayer-rooms spaces are therefore identified as “interstitial space” (Laguerre 1999, p.111), that is, racialised sites of resistance created within ‘white’ disciplinary institutions.

Of course, in the context of the university campus, the spatialised dimensions of racialised governmentality is not maintained through any de jure policy restricting the mobility of Muslim bodies. Rather these emerge in the most banal encounters on the ‘white’ campus. In both case institutions, it emerges in de facto arrangements in terms of what the institution rationalises as ‘good for’ Muslim students, ‘where’ they are deemed best placed on campus, and who is authorised to intervene on spatial
arrangements. They can be considered a site through which we witness the 
(re)production of racial(ised) marginalisation (Goldberg 1993, p.187) on campus, or as 
in some cases, off-campus. Accounts of students praying in stairwells, huts, portakabins, 
corridors, libraries, and disused basements provide some obvious examples.

The centrality of space to governmentality is exemplified when it is racialised. 
As noted in Chapter Three, when Muslim students at Erdon were seeking a larger space 
with wudhu facilities within the union, university management and union executive 
proposed that Muslim students be relocated underground. Of course one cannot escape 
the symbolism in this spatial shift from what was a central political arena, to a space 
underground with socially frivolous connotations. This move was supported on the 
premise that the union was meant to be a place for ‘all’ students, not just some. For 
some time university management also encouraged the relocation underground. 
Students contested this proposal on numerous counts, (e.g. the loss of spiritual and 
physical security by being positioned next to a night-club). Understandably, students 
expressed concern about the prospect of praying tarawiyya next to a nightclub, in spite 
of promises that it would be made soundproof (Interview; Sadiq, Iqbal, Shaista, Yasmin 
2005). However, the manager involved attempted to (re)name this space in less 
objectionable terms. He was quick to point out that “it’s not a basement because it’s got 
ground floor access from outside and windows” (Interview; Richard 2005). This was 
curious since even the student handbook described this space as a ‘basement’ and it was 
generally recognised as such amongst students.

This ‘out of sight’ solution however was contested and students were not happy 
being ‘demoted’ into an “isolated basement” area (Interview; Sadiq, 2005), even with its 
significantly larger dimensions. Of course this resistance to being driven underground 
cannot be understood outside of the broader political marginalisation and racist 
harassment that plagued some Muslim students at this university. Thus many felt this 
was an attempt to maintain the de facto political disenfranchisement of Muslim 
students, who had, if we recall from Chapter Six, begun to make significant 
interventions in union politics to the concern of other students. Even students who were 
notably shy of political involvement were keen to maintain the centrality of the prayer- 
room in the union. This can be heard amongst broader objections to being moved into 
the basement;

15 Similarly, in the medical school disused rooms in the basement were allocated to Muslim students who spent 
considerable time cleaning and re-arranging them to make them adequate for prayer (Interview; Noreen 2005).
It’s in the underground and the underground has parties...I think we’re going to say no because they have parties and drinking and it is a walk through as well, it has a corridor which cleaners constantly use...so we’re not getting the privacy and seclusion, and we’re not getting the comfort with the fact that there might be drunk people running around, because the basement is two floors down, the fact that we’re at the centre of the union is pretty good, whereas the basement your away (Interview; Yasmin 2005 Emphasis Mine).

Indeed, although the prayer-room was housed in the heart of the union, Muslim students very much excluded from its political structures “we’re here in the union, but we are generally on the outside” (Interview; Daanish 2005). Their racialised marginalisation was thus not literal but “periphractic”; involving limited access and an implied dislocation (Goldberg 1993, p. 188).

In this case, Muslim students did not simply face the prospect of being relocated outside of ‘white’ space, but were being evicted from political space. As Grosz notes;

The more one [is coerced] to disinvests one’s own body from [a] ...space, the less one is able to effectively inhabit that space as one’s own (Grosz 2001, p.9 cited in Puwar 2004b, p.39).

Attempts to de-suture these Muslim students from the spaces they were beginning to routinely inhabit, ‘produce’ (Gunew 2004, p.100) and thus ‘own’ can be understood within the workings of racialised governmentality and attempts to manage Muslim bodies within the ‘white’ campus. Since Muslim bodies do not ‘naturally’ cohere with the spaces they inhabit (as noted in Chapter Six), their perceived spatial-political ‘infractions’ necessitate strategies of spatial containment, exclusion, or control. The campus in this sense does not figure as a neutral space but a site in which various quarters are (ear)marked by the (en)whitened bodies that ‘naturally’ inhabit them, and resist their transformation (Hesse 1993, p.171). This becomes clearer in the following section.

7.2.6. Governmental Belonging

In both institutions, locating a prayer-room was underlined by a spatially racialised politics. This can be seen in the way Muslim students were recast outside of student-hood, and as interrupting ‘mainstream’ spaces; both of which functioned as “discursive extensions and derivatives” (Hook 2005, p.4) of ‘whiteness’. Unsettling the political
status quo, Muslim students had intruded on a space not tacitly ‘reserved’ for them. In turn this propelled a “constantly vigilant” ‘white’ paranoia, “an anxiety that unleashes its own so-called 'protective' symbolic and physical violence” (Puwar 2004b, p.49).

The investments of ‘en-whitened’ student groups in harbouring union space as their own and attempting to retain their authority within it, was evident on both campuses. In the early 1990’s in Lomonde for example, Muslim students had exceeded the capacity of their small union room. Praying in corridors, they were said to be causing other students “discomfort and safety problems” (Prayer Rooms, Lomonde Union 1994). Health and safety issues aside however, what was perceived to be of greater concern was the increasingly organised and growing contingent of Muslim students on campus. This it was argued, was causing the largely “pro-Zionist” executive, equal if not more discomfort (Interview; Zachariyya, 2006).

Following these tensions, requests for a larger space on the same floor were turned down by the union under ‘anti-discrimination’ policy. Instead the union executive passed a motion which led to the displacement of Muslim students and their prayer space to a disused building on the fringes of campus. They argued that maintaining a ‘Muslim space’ in the union compromised the rights of other students. Housing Muslims students beyond union premises was considered ‘fair’ in its approach since ‘particular needs’ “should be met in a particular way” (Prayer Rooms, Lomonde Union 1994).

At Erdon, ‘white’ union executives were also seeking to authorise particular spaces. It was argued that the union was a ‘mainstream’ student space to be utilised by all students (Interview; Khalid 2005). Muslim space was thus minoritised from the outset and bracketed as a particular space for particular students. The use of other facilities such as the union bar merited no such particularisation as a site which only some students might frequent. Rather, the remainder of the union was itself conceived as a universal space for all students, although it was said to attract largely ‘white’ middle class students (Interview; Chris 2005). Indeed, the conflation of these particular customs with ‘student-hood’ served to erase the traces of their particularity, and their universalisation within an ostensibly multicultural union. This culturally specific enunciation can be described as “particularity with power” (Sayyid 1998, p.382). The effect of this “particular masquerading as universal” (Yegenoglu 1998,

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16 Zacchariya was a student at Lomonde during 1991-1994 who frequented the union.
17 Chris was a staff member and at the time of interview had been at Erdon for 11 years.
meant that departing from this ‘white’ social paradigm, Muslim students were problematised as consuming too much of this ‘generic’ universal (‘white’) space. They were spilling over beyond their pre-scribed borders unsettling the unions ‘regulars’.

In both campus cases, the possessive investment in union space was not simply a question of two groups of students struggling to make a spatial claim. Rather, it was indicative of a racialised relation of power in which ‘white’ students assumed the authority to direct the allocation of Muslim student space. The authorisation of particular space by ‘en-whitened’ students, is akin to what Hage describes as ‘governmental belonging’. In his narrative of ‘white supremacist fantasies’ in multicultural societies he argues that governmental belonging is “not equivalent to formal state or government power”, rather it refers to;

… the feeling that one is legitimately entitled in the course of everyday life to make a governmental/managerial statement about the nation...to have a governmental managerial attitude towards other, especially those who are perceived to be less nationals or non-nationals, to have a view about who they can be and where they can go (Hage 1998, p.46).

Although Hage is focusing on a particular nation-centred discourse, he is actually referring to the processes involved in ‘white governmentality’ and the valorisation of ‘whiteness’ as a legislating feature which presumes the “right to oversee” (Hesse 1997, p.100).

What is of particular interest on each campus was the way spaces were designated with labels that corresponded to the racialised hierarchies prevalent within the union (e.g. ‘mainstream’/’all’/’particular’). Perhaps more pressing was the very ability of these students to make such possessive claims of ownership, about what should belong to whom. This question of ‘white’ ownership’ was particularly manifest at Erdon. When realising Muslim students were not being convinced into the basement, union executive began to assert proposals which would make the expansion of the prayer-room conditional. Under these terms, the ultimate title to the prayer-room would be held by the union (Interview; Khalid, Muslim Staff 2006) and this meant the union could rent the prayer space for other functions at will. Union executives were thus seeking to exert ultimate control over its status as ‘mainstream’ space.

This proposal brings into question why the basement space deemed suitable for Muslim students was not viable as another site for the activities the union executive had
in mind? It is also particularly revealing of the desire to control and oversee Muslim space. This desire was not without historical precedent. It was only three years earlier that without consultation or the process of union protocol, a union executive raided the prayer-room on alleged claims of ballot fraud. This incident raised questions as to the status and ownership of the prayer-room (ibid). The sanctity of the prayer space was violated, but it is clear that union executive construed it as another space which they could intrude upon at will; *it was still really their ‘white’ space*. The sense of ‘spatial entitlement’ (Gunew 2004, p.97) invoked in these violent encounters reveals the sense of propriety exercised by ‘en-whitened’ students.18 This was ‘governmental belonging’ in action.

This sense of propriety however, was also apparent in other cases at Erdon. This is worth recounting at length as it raised a number of correlating issues concerning the governmentalising function of secular spaces and the related fear of repercussion. In the academic session 2005-6, student exhibitions organised by members of the ISOC in Erdon’s medical school were removed. This was authorised by professors on grounds that their views on Islam and science were inappropriate to the teachings of the School (Interview; Noreen, 2005). They also threatened to cancel the forthcoming week of exhibitions if students objected to their decision. As Noreen recounted;

> We had three senior members of the med school who approached us and they said that that was wrong what we were doing and they told us that we will take the things down and erm/ when they came to take off the exhibitions they said that if we objected to them taking the exhibitions off, then we were not allowed to hold anything throughout the whole week, so basically, our Islam Awareness Week would be cancelled and obviously you’ve got to think about your priorities, would you rather have those exhibitions taken off and something else put in place or would you challenge them and have no IAW at all/ because I happened to be an ISOC rep, it was my right to speak and ask them why they were doing what they were doing, and to be honest, *we didn’t speak much and we didn’t respond much to what was going on, we didn’t know what the effects was going to have on the Isoc or us…these happened to be senior members of the med school and you know that the moment you speak out, you know that tomorrow you’re probably going to see a letter through the post saying, you know…*(ibid).

Yet what little Noreen did say (who the ISOC should speak to on the matter) was met with reproachement and she was regarded as “lippy” (ibid). According to Noreen;

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18 Vandalising literature outside the prayer-room and regulating its content comprise others (Interview; Khalid, Muslim Staff Member; Adam, ISOC Member; Chris, Staff Member 2005).
...they didn’t want anything, *they didn’t want any kind of response, they just wanted you know, for us to take what they said and I do feel that was discriminating* (ibid).

Subsequent rulings regarding public notices in the school 19 were directed at this same student who was beginning to feel under the watchful eye of school staff;

Somebody from the same office who deals with events...she had taken off all our posters round the med school that were advertising events and she had given them to me and she said that we were not allowed to hang posters round the med school because it was a fire hazard. *But we’ve always put posters around the med school and we’d been holding circles for a whole year last year and we’d put up some 8-9 posters on average every week and we never had them taken off, and there were other societies posters, you know it’s not a known thing that you’re not allowed to put posters up around the medical school* (ibid. *Emphasis Mine*).

This focus on the presence of Muslims in the medical school left Noreen and fellow Muslim students fearing that the prayer-room would be confiscated. Indeed, following this surveillance, the viability of the prayer-room was questioned on grounds that it was not being used as a ‘multi-faith’ facility and was being occupied by Muslim students (Phone Conversation; Noreen 2006). Although the room was not closed or confiscated, the fear it aroused had been instilled.

This incident represents an example of the way the ostensibly neutral site of university space was actually highly regulated and racialised. It was marked by a sense of ‘white’ secular propriety. The encounter brought to the fore a spatially inscribed dialectic of ‘gender/race’. The secular purity of the school (and its ownership) it seemed, had been breached by this assertive Muslim presence. The repulsion invoked by this assertion, led these senior ‘white male middle-class’ staff (see Ismail 2008, p.25) to reclaim the symbolic value of *their* space by disciplining Muslim students. Hence, the removal of the exhibition, the threat of further confiscations, and school rulings on public posters. When their (‘white’ male secular and senior) authority was perceived to be challenged (by a ‘Black’ female Muslim student); she was recast as ‘lippy’. This of course, symbolised a further violation; Noreen exceeded her designated ‘place’ and role of compliant/mute Muslim woman (see also Chow 1993 p.28 cited in Puwar and Raghuram 2004, p.5). This perhaps explains the sequence of events that followed (i.e

19 A member of research staff in the school confirmed that there was no such policy (E-correspondence; Jameson, 2006). This new ruling only emerged in the context of Islam Awareness Week which suggested it was not established regulation.
questions surrounding the viability of the prayer space) instilling fear of repercussion (See Chapter Five), not just in Noreen, but others who had come to quickly learn about that day.

The notion of spatialised/racialised governmentality on campus thus exceeded questions about ‘housing’ Muslim students on campus. It can be traced through multiple sites in the university through various modalities of ‘whiteness’ (i.e secular, universal, ‘mainstream’). Where they coalesce is in the way these spaces are disrupted by recalcitrant Muslim student subjects.

### 7.2.7. Minoritised Space

Protracted negotiations at Lomonde were equally insightful. During fieldwork students were asked to vacate the prayer facility due to health and safety concerns. Although as one student recounted, the university had been “threatening us for ages” and on each occasion providing different reasons and shorter timeframes to “frighten students” (Interview; Sameena 2005);

> To be honest you can laugh at it, it’s like how Tony Blair came out with different excuses for the war on Iraq…first it was going to be part of the new…building, then it was going to be a health and safety hazard, and then they said it was going to be a building for university execs, and now they’ve gone back to, oh it’s a health and safety hazard (ibid).

Following this, for a brief period Muslim students were without an alternative before they were eventually re-housed in a make-shift cabin off-campus. This was the exact site which eventually became available for lease. Students were told this piece of land could be leased for 50 years since it was not directly on campus (Interview; Patrick, Union Management 2005/6). This extended lease functioned as a bargaining chip ‘encouraging’ Muslim students off-campus. Accepting this proposal was not difficult since no other land was made available, the previous facility was being re-used for other purposes and the prospect of being “dotted around campus” in random rooms without wudhu facilities was not appealing (Interview; Sameena/Yunus, 2005). It seemed students had effectively been cornered into an off-campus solution.

At the time, aware that Muslim students were in need of a facility, the union feared Muslim encroachment. This could be gleaned from their pre-empted response which “reaffirm[ed] that the union building would not be able to accommodate any prayer facility” (Union Report, 2005). Squeezed between the pincers of the union and
university, Muslim student were yet again displaced from the centre of campus.

It is worth noting that whilst Muslim students were being drawn off the campus map, the university was expanding into a modern development. The ‘development’ context in which the old prayer facility was demolished was marked by stinging irony. Rather than being a health and safety issue per se, this was part of a campus-wide development programme. University literature indicated that a “significant proportion of the plan will be funded by disposing of… the university’s most outdated and underused facilities” (University Developments, Lomonde 2006). Of course, the prayer site was far from underused, and when withdrawn, left students;

…praying in libraries and corridors over the Christmas period…that was the worst time and there were constant emails and calls about when are we going to have a place to pray (Interview; Ali 2006).

In view of campus developments, the prayer facility equated disposable space and like city sites of urban ‘renewal’ became a site of white reform’ 20 (Mclaren et al 2000, p.115).

Although the union manager insisted that the new location was “valuable campus space” (Interview; Patrick 2006), other indicators, not least its location, revealed that this was a ‘black’ residential area into which Muslim students would be conveniently inserted. This area was home to a long-standing Afro-Caribbean community and its deprived residential status appeared markedly different from other sites on campus.

The spatial displacement of Muslim students off the (‘white’) modern campus and into a black residential area suggested that they were being ghettoised. These were ‘particular’ students that were accorded particular ‘spaces’, and within the racialised imaginative geographies of the campus, Muslim difference was being folded through distance away from the ‘centre’ (Gregory 2004, p.17; see also Gilliat-Ray 2005b, p.301-302). 21

In the context of estates planning, this ‘difference’ comprised not a spatial deferment, but for a time, complete erasure. In the advertisement of new university

20 The old facility used since 1994 was then considered the edge of campus, however by 2004 amidst university expansion it acquired a more central and valuable location.

21 Other less dramatic examples involve ISOC elections held in the medical school being interrupted by senior staff on grounds that they “had a religious facility on campus” (Interview; Yunus 2005/Ali 2006), even though rooms had been booked through central timetabling.
plans, the new prayer location was not documented, apparently to avoid “staff rumours” (Interview; Patrick, Union Management 2006). In campus maps, the prayer-room appeared as a remote appendage jutting out of an otherwise linear campus. Relative to its Christian counterpart in the centre of campus, the peripheral location of this facility signified the racialised cartographies of a Muslim enclave in ‘white’ space.

It is within this relation between Muslim bodies and designated spaces for Muslims that discourses of multicultural equality quickly begin to unravel. In discourses of multicultural equality, the very existence of a prayer-room would be accepted as an inclusionary site and symbolic of the equality credentials of the university. However, through the prism of racialised governmentality the prayer-room functions as ‘minoritised space’.

7.2.8. **Multicultural Equality: (Neo)Liberal Governmental Rationalities**

It is somewhat confounding that in both universities, management conceded or at least appeared to submit to student requests for prayer-rooms. As reluctant, and tortuous the question of provisions has been, this is not out of sync with trends that suggest some universities are demonstrating signs of increased provisions in view of their Muslim student body (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.115; Cook et al 2007, p.18-19; ECU 2009c). However, the fact of a provision reveals nothing of the broader function or logics surrounding provision, nor the very particular context in which they emerge. Arguably, this is key in unearthing the governmentalising rationalities that underpin and facilitate prayer-room ‘concessions’.

At Erdon, the university accepted the extension of the existing prayer-room in spite of union objections. This suggested the university was beginning to take its Muslim students seriously. One might suggest however, that the university was particularly cognizant of its Muslim student population for other reasons. It is not coincidental that this resolution was achieved around the same time that the university (partially) conceded its mistreatment of a number of Muslim students. The fact that the ISOC and prayer-room were at the centre of this furore suggested that Erdon’s decision to extend rather than relocate the facility was part of an attempt to dissipate claims of institutionalised Islamophobia. This would be consistent with Erdon’s general approach to questions of racism (See Chapter Five) and the way the university managed specific claims of racism, as noted in Chapter Six.
The expansion of the prayer-room can thus be seen as an attempt to blanket and deflect charges of racism. Diffusing claims of institutionalised Islamapobia, (‘we can’t be racist, we look after our Muslim students’) the prayer-room functioned as an anti-racist shield. Forming part of the many “happy stories of diversity” (Ahmed 2007a, p.164), the prayer-room functions in this instance as a central technology “of concealment” (ibid.). Symbolising Muslim inclusion, the prayer-room thus exudes the university’s liberal anti-racist credentials. Thus, rather than denote equality imperatives, the expansion of the prayer-room can be read as more indicative of the govermentalising function of the prayer-room and its capacity to de-politicise and mute student concerns. This was, if we also recall, a fear that emerged in the context of the Medical School.

At Lomonde, the radical shift that precipitated a commitment to funding a prayer-room could be attributed to a shift in student strategies. Steering away from the confines of the association, students instead appealed directly to senior management. This rested on a pivotal meeting and a prayer-room petition that charted the history of Muslim students on campus. It highlighted the importance of the prayer facility to the university’s long-term vision (Prayer Room Petitioning Report, p.12).

It would be naïve to suggest however, that in such a staunchly secular institution it was Muslim student interventions per se that secured a new facility. Rather, there was considerable reason to believe that the provision of a prayer facility was bound up in broader university agendas to significantly increase its international profile. Lomonde’s broader equality agenda was firmly placed within its mission to establish an internationally reputable institution. Besides university ambitions stating as much, management rationale in terms of student accessibility, together with countless other references to international students and universities was indicative;

*A substantial number of Muslim students might simply be unable to participate in the university...so I see it actually as an equality of opportunity matter and I’ve talked to lots of VC’s in lots of countries around the world and that would be I think that would be the strongest justification for it, we are creating facilities which allow Muslim students to participate in the life of the university in ways that they might not otherwise be able to (Interview; Senior Management 2006 Emphasis Mine).*

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22 Management’s decision to fund the prayer-room was not based on a consensus amongst senior staff. Many objected and considered the university to be in breach of its secular commitments (Interviews; Senior Management, 2006, Union Officer, Union Manager 2006).

23 University material acknowledged that increasing its high fee paying international student body was key to its overall development and directly helped to fulfil other resource ambitions (Lomonde Planning, 2008/2009).
This emphasis on allowing Muslims to fully participate could of course only occur with the recognition that a ‘substantial’ number of Muslim students were and would be choosing this university. This contrasted with previous management attitudes which insisted that Muslim students were numerically insignificant to warrant a permanent provision (Interview; Tanweer, Former Student 2005). The reminder by Muslim students that they “generate[d] an indispensable source of revenue” and that “to compete in a global… market place…it should have such facilities” (Letter from Khan to Management, Prayer Room Petitioning Report, 2006.) comprised an important impetus. Of course, the university’s ‘international’ ambitions could only figure as “cognate to the idea of not excluding anybody who could benefit from the university” (Interview; Senior Management, 2006).

From this reading, this radical shift in funding a prayer facility can be seen as governed by neo-liberal market imperatives rather than the sole and principled desire for social justice. This is certainly not out of sync with the way prayer-room facilities have become part of the business case for ‘diversity and equality’ in institutions competing for international students (Acland and Azmi 1998, p.84; Gilliat-Ray 2005b, p.301; Bartley 2007, p.301; Cook et al 2007, p.5).

Of course, this turnaround was remarkable and was also acknowledged by many students aware of the decade long struggle to secure a permanent facility. Yet, there were two further issues that suggested that this concession did not signify the inclusion of Muslim identities per se, as much as signify a new corporate vision in which Muslims students were included in a carefully qualified manner.

First, management’s choice description and rationale for the prayer space as “prayer-room” rather than more explicitly “mosque” was telling (Interview; Senior Management 2006). As the Muslim staff member present at the time pointed out, “in our particular faith, we call any room a mosque” (Isaac; ibid). The managers perspective becomes clearer upon elaboration;

I think I would begin to have a problem if the prayer-room as I’ve been calling it became associated with a particular imam or position that was controversial within the Islamic community, I would think that would be a position that university would be very uncomfortable about and would disassociate itself from…the disassociation between a prayer-room and mosque is meaningless from your point of view, for me it actually, the mosque is going beyond the prayer-room to provide another range of support and advocacy and activity, this is a fairly loose distinction…a prayer-room doesn’t need a full time religious cleric (Senior Management; ibid, Emphasis Partly Mine).
This reflected a cautious attitude, perhaps in light of the many secular objections to the facility in the university. Moreover, this idiosyncratic explanation can also be seen as bound up in a broader racialised repertoire and ‘panics’ about mosques and controversial ‘imams’ or ‘clerics’ in Britain (see for example Birt 2006a). Yet this distinction was not only of little relevance to Muslim students who in their petitioning report, routinely referred to the prayer space as a mosque, its basis was also questionable, since the ‘prayer room’ also supported Muslim students in numerous ways and housed various activities. Notwithstanding this rather arbitrary demarcation however, this manager appeared to want to maintain a neater, ‘cleaner’ image of the ‘prayer room’; one that was not ‘overly religious’ or too assertively ‘Muslim’, something that did not invite too much interest or involve the Muslim community at large.

This politics of naming (see also Gilliat-Ray 2005b, p.288) can also be seen in the ambiguity over student identifications under the university’s ‘race’ schema. Following the university’s concession to the prayer facility, the university was advancing its equality profile. This marked a significant shift. In early 2000, the closest the university had got to embracing its religious adherents had been as a ‘creed’. In 2008, the university referred to its commitment to “equality of opportunity on racial or cultural grounds” as including religious or other beliefs (See Chapter Five). However, in spite of this welcome and expansive agenda, the report proceeded to retreat into a discourse of ‘race’ and ‘race’ legislation. It noted that the ‘ethnicity and nationality’ data required at registration would be made mandatory whilst students of faith would be consulted through a multi-faith forum. Thus, in spite of an increased recognition of religious diversity on campus, the university continue to resort to a classic grammar of ‘race’.

It is in view of these two broader points, the ‘inclusion’ of Muslim students cannot be read as straightforward acceptance of Muslims as Muslims. The particular qualifications surrounding the prayer-room can also be matched then by a further distinction. That is, between equality of opportunity for Muslim students as advocated by management and their equal status; which, paradoxically, even with the ‘prayer-room’ facility remained ambiguous. This distinction reflects Lomonde’s ‘corporate’ approach to ‘diversity’, further unpacked in Chapter Eight.
7.3. Conclusion: Muslims and Multicultural Inclusion

This chapter began with the oft cited claim that Muslim students are key beneficiaries of an excessive ‘multiculturalism’, which now must be rebalanced to restore the rightful order of British campuses. In Part One, this was detected in claims about the generosity of religious observance exemptions offered to Muslim students at Erdon. Taking a closer look, how Muslim students were ‘included’ and accommodated within the university was examined through stipulated policy and student experiences. It was demonstrated that rather than reveal an exemplar of ‘multiculturalism gone wrong’, such provisions actually revealed the ‘white’ hegemonic norms and structures of the university. This was gleaned from observance policies that required students to make themselves ‘known’ in ways that marked them out as deviant from the institutional norm. Further, formal policy was also seen to be inconsistently applied, inflexible, and outweighed by a dominant culture which posited Muslim identities as excessive. There were also examples of discrepancies between various groups at Lomonde, suggesting that the ostensibly secular level playing field promoted by this university actually belied a history of racialised hierarchies.

Part Two focussed on prayer-room provision at Lomonde, along with numerous examples from Erdon. It was argued that the way provisions that were made available, negotiated or granted could not be read as a straightforward acceptance of a Muslim presence. Rather, the question of prayer-rooms were entangled in the exercise of racialised (self)governmentality. These were identified in the secular basis for refusing the funding of prayer-rooms. That is, the way the secular has functioned to maintain the racialisation of Muslim students as misguided and excessive, encroaching on the secular purity of the university. Yet, at the same time, surreptitiously positioning the university as generous benefactor in view of its ‘facilitation’ of prayer-room projects. This mode of governmentality was accepted and contested by different students.

The formalisation of prayer-room dialogue (the ‘association’) was also seen as a key disciplinary apparatus which for some time, ‘locked’ students into university terms whilst prohibiting alternative avenues and options. It is only in bypassing this structure that students made advances in securing a facility. Following this, the allocation of ‘particular’ spaces for Muslim students was seen as powerful symbol of their marginalised status.

In the case of Erdon, proposals to relocate the prayer space underground, was seen as another way of managing Muslim students on campus. These proposals
expressed a sense of ‘white’ governmental belonging; the desire to authorise and oversee Muslim space. In the case of Lomonde, students were relegated off-campus amidst Black residents. This spatial displacement was seen to be fundamentally racialised where the prayer-room functioned, not as a site of inclusion on campus, but as ‘minoritised space’. Thus overall, Lomonde was seen to ‘incorporate’ Muslim prayer-space into the campus, but not in a manner that was indicative of their equal status in the university.

Overall, we can observe how symbols of institutional inclusion in these campus cases (observance policies, prayer-rooms), comprise a mode of racialised governmentality which ultimately maintain the ‘minority’ and transgressive status of Muslim students. Seated in broader discourses of toleration, this ‘white’ multiculturalism’ (Hage 1998) can be seen to normalise the institutionalisation of Islamophobia. Like, the ‘absence’ and ‘hyper-presence’ of Muslims then, this form of regulated inclusion can be seen as another mode through which Islamophobia is sustained. How each of these modes ‘co-articulate’ is the subject of the final chapter.
Chapter Eight

Co-Articulating Islamophobia: Racialised Governmentality in Universities

In this thesis, three key modalities of Islamophobia have been identified; ‘fundamentalist’ hyper-presence, (statutory/official) absence and (regulated) inclusion. Although these modalities have been raised in literature on Islamophobia, to differing degrees, and through various conceptual apparatus, here they have been recast as expressions of racialised governmentality. These have been used to explain how Islamophobia is institutionalised and in large part, have been explored as quite separate discourses. This chapter briefly surmises these discourses, and through an engagement with conceptual literature and broader debates considers how they ‘co-articulate’ (Venn 2006, p.178).

8.1. Co-Articulating Absence and Hyper-presence: Racialised Discrepancies

Chapter Four, Hyper-visibility and the Racialised Presence of Muslim Students provided a historical context to the way Islamophobia has been nurtured across the sector. Dating back to the early nineties, it identified some key university-led and student interventions that have contributed to the construction of a ‘fundamentalist Muslim’ hyper-presence. These functioned, it was argued, as a ‘hegemonic formation’ that established and institutionalised a Muslim student hyper-presence. This hyper-presence has centred on some key precepts. In particular, it has identified Muslim students as perpetrators of racism and extremist violence, whilst maintaining their absence as victims of racism. This was conceptualised as one technique of racialised governmentality circumscribing the mobility and participation of Muslim students.

Part Two of Chapter Four attended to more recent interventions within Higher Education, centring on somewhat ‘revised’ claims about a ‘Muslim’ threat on campus. Here we observed how the state’s ‘war on terror’ merged with the disciplinary technologies of the university to manage the ‘threat’ posed by ‘Muslim students’. Although seemingly disparate, both elements of this chapter reflected a singular trajectory, from the figure of the ‘fundamentalist’ to suspected ‘terrorist’. In this sense, the ‘fundamentalist’ scares of the nineties were considered a precursor to more recent claims about Muslim student terrorism.
This chapter thus set a scene. Narrating a particular discursive trajectory it served as a central plank and prelude to subsequent chapters. Chapter Six, (*Space Invaders*), for example, revisited the theme of Muslim student racialised hyper-visibility through specific campus cases. This chapter highlighted the strategies of racialised governmentality that ensued when ‘Muslim students’ attempted to intervene in traditionally ‘white’ spaces. In particular, it considered how through processes of ‘super-surveillance’ Muslim students acquired hyper-visible status which rendered them ‘unviable’ as ‘speaking subjects’. In this regard, parallels with Chapter Four were obvious. For whilst Chapter Four highlighted a ‘fundamentalist’ discourse about ‘Muslim students’ whilst maintaining their absence as victims of racism, in Chapter Six we observed how similarly, Muslim students were ‘complaint-bearers’ rather than ‘complaint-makers’. This effectively determined their position in the union as the objects of racialised governance; as bodies to be patrolled, through spaces to be allocated, with their activities monitored. Both chapters also pointed to the way racialised discourses about Muslim students were deeply entrenched in various echelons of the university/sector.

The hyper-visible presence of Muslim students certainly represented a dominant mode through which Muslim (students) were registered. In this sense, this plane of governance certainly coincided with conventional accounts of Islamophobia which have focussed on the demonology of Muslims. Where this thesis departed from these accounts however, was in locating these ‘representations’ as part of a discourse of racialised governance that both produced and acted upon Muslim subjectivities. As discussed through various campus cases, this was politicising as it was paralysing, altering the way Muslim students articulated, intervened and positioned themselves on campus. We can characterise this plane of governmentality as largely restrictive and repressive.

Whilst Chapter Six was presented in schematic continuity with Chapter Four, comparatively, Chapter Five, *The Absence of ‘Muslim Students’* was set in contrast. It focused on the invisibility of Muslim students within the official registers of the university. It illuminated the distinct absence of Muslim students in the bureaucratic calculations of the university. This was illustrated through a patchy equalities agenda, through ‘ethnic monitoring’ and university complaints structures that abided by a ‘race relations’ schema. Within this schema Muslim identities were eclipsed from view and
remained submerged within other ‘ethnic’ categories. Consequently, as in Chapter Six, although somewhat differently, there were, as such, no ‘Muslim’ complainants.

Yet this official absence also guaranteed much more, since it limited how racism against Muslim students was registered in the university. In turn, racism against Muslim students was de-legitimised, only emerging anecdotally and remaining trivialised. As a result, one of the conclusions reached was that equality agendas in universities actually functioned to institutionalise Islamophobia. For rather than comprise a reflexive exercise, the enumerating techniques central to anti-racist practice (e.g. RRAA) constituted a central component in institutionalising the absence of Muslims. This nurtured an institutionalised discourse of Islamophobia because it paled Muslim identities and their experiences of racism from view, attributing them with ‘transruptive’ status. In this regard, equality practices functioned as a precursor to institutionalised Islamophobia and were also constitutive of it.

Following this, the absence of Muslims in Higher Education as an officially recognised collectivity can be seen to denote a rejection; a refusal to endorse Muslim identities. Yet how can we reconcile this refusal to endorse Muslim identities, with an insistence on regulating them?; where Muslim identities remain officially and institutionally invisible, yet at once institutionalised as ‘hyper-visible’?

In fieldwork, this paradox occurred with considerable ease. In interview with the same senior staff members, one would find references to ‘guidance’ pertaining to Muslim students and yet in response to data requests about Muslim students; that ‘we just don’t record that information’. The effect of this discrepancy was equally palpable amongst interviewees, most notably in the train of self-regulation that their official absence induced. As discussed in Chapter Five, the culture of not making complaints, retracting them, opting for ‘white’ interlocutors or being discouraged by repercussions was not unrelated. These inhibitions reflected fears of the routine stigma associated with Muslim identities (e.g. ‘anti-Semitic’, ‘fundamentalist’) that is, their un-viability as ‘speaking subjects’ but also a lack of confidence that their concerns ‘as Muslims’ would be addressed in the university. ‘Keeping your head down’ (Chapter Five) or just making do with ‘wudhu in the sink’ (Chapter Seven) were signs that some Muslim students were complying with institutional norms, bearing the “crushing object-hood” of the ‘racialised other’ (Fanon 1967, p.106 cited in Hesse 1997, p.100). This racialised and disciplined object-hood was perhaps most symbolised in the appeal from some Muslim students at Erdon for a ‘white’ colleague to represent their concerns. This dialectic of
hyper-visibility and invisibility thus functioned with (self)-regulating effect allowing the university to govern on racialised terms and with racialised affect. Like hyper-visibility, the invisibility of Muslims also entailed forms of self-regulation.

Broadly speaking, this paradox of Muslim (in)visibility can be seen in the racialised discrepancies (Hesse 2000, p.16) of White ‘post-colonial’ nation-states. This discrepancy refers to the ways in which racial inequalities are marginalised by dominant discourses and “conventionally repressed as a subject for discussion” and where within national debates “non-whites...figure powerfully, although their presence may be denied, disguised or obliterated” (ibid). The Muslim (student) subject is archetypal in this regard. Thus, where Muslim students have figured most powerfully, is precisely in debates about them and in discursive constructions that have rendered them ‘hyper-visible’, and where they have suffered obliteration is in their institutional status as legitimate Muslim actors.

This (in)visibility however, is not a “condition of being” but a “strategic relation” (Goldberg 1996, p.181) that is contextually determined and bound up in “social structures” (Fanon, 1952, p.81 & 1967, p.100 cited in Goldberg 1996, p.186, 189). Clearly, this ‘strategic relation’ is bound up in the exercise of ‘White’ power, reflecting what is authorised or prohibited, what is brought into full view and what remains shrouded, what is universalised as a (‘white’ European) ‘norm’, and what is particularised as (‘racially’) deviant. Thus when overcome, or destabilised, it is “by its very nature a political act, one that requires symbolic murder” (Fanon 1967, p.198/9 cited in Goldberg 1996, p.187).

Following this, if we recognise that the invisibility of some identities are predicated on the visibility of others and that these are not discrete but relational, then we can understand this ‘symbolic murder’ in two inter-related ways. First, the hyper-visibility of Muslim students, like Muslims generally, actually relies on the absence of recognition of a legitimate Muslim political identity. Recognition of Muslim identities have been withheld, most often disavowed through notions of ‘fundamentalism’ amongst other arguments (Sayyid 2008). Thus, if Muslim identity achieved recognition as a political (rather than official1) identity, then the hyper-visibility of Muslims would be deflated, or at least severely undermined, and lose its hegemonic grip. In turn, this

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1 This distinction is maintained because in the ‘war of terror’, state engineering of ‘moderate’ identities has not resulted in the legitimacy of Muslim political subjectivities but the endorsement of some against others (Kundnani 2009).
would alter the way Muslims were recognised in institutions. In this regard, the paradox of in/hyper-visibility is actually bound up in the legitimacy of Muslim identity, and neither can be resolved without it.

Second, the racially discrepant status of Muslim identities cannot be reduced to an internal tension. For as noted in Chapter Two, it is bound up in the problem of European identity which has been defined though its exclusion of Muslims (Sayyid 2003, p.92 see also; Hesse 2007, p.654, 645). Indeed, it is not incidental that Islam and its adherents are oft invoked in ‘postmodern’ critiques of Western modernity (Almond 2007, p.2).

Adjusting the racialised discrepancies of post-colonial polities requires a broader and sustained de-colonial agenda in which the ‘West’ loses its proclaimed universality and is re-imagined as one amongst many. Only then can we claim, as Fanon did, that the “European game has finally ended” (Fanon 1990, p.252 cited in Almond 2007, p.4).

8.2. **Co-Articulating Absence and Inclusion: Recognising Muslims (as Supplement)**

How can we claim the absence of Muslim recognition amidst a range of provisions for Muslims? Indeed, one might assume that equality for Muslim students might have been fulfilled in Chapter Seven (*Multicultural Equality*), with its focus on inclusion and provisions. This betrayed the promise that Muslim students were somehow being included as Muslim students. However, if Chapters Five and Six denoted rejection and repression respectively, then Chapter Seven was more indicative of resignation.

There are many reasons why the ostensible inclusion of Muslim students in these case universities can be identified as resignation to, rather than recognition of Muslim identities. The most obvious can be discerned through the persistence of a formal absence together with a patchy and ad hoc semblance of provisions. Some might assume such ‘provisions’ are symbolic of Muslim advances in ‘white’ institutions, and hence indicative of recognition. However, this is arguably fundamentally flawed. If we accept as Vertovec argues, that recognition signifies an “equal and positive public place” (Vertovec 2002, p.33), and further, that this is signified by the accommodations accrued by Muslims, then the distinction between recognition of and resignation to becomes blurred. Equally problematic is the notion that the symbolism of religion incorporated in university paper policies reflect a “significant” (Gilliat-Ray 2000, p.143) shift in attitudes. Arguably, the status of religious groups cannot be read as self-evident from their provisional concessions. Both these arguments assume that Muslim advances
provisions) and paper policies are straightforward reflections of Muslim recognition.

This approach also implies that racism is best tackled and ameliorated through a string of provisions. It relies on a conception of racism that associates equality with an equal distribution of “goods” rather than an institutionalised form of “social control” (McWhorter 2005, p.547). This represents a key oversight, for, in the context of this research, the latter arguments fail to recognise both systemic and more subtle forms of Islamophobia; for example those which shape-shift within liberal discourses of inclusion. Take Lomonde for example, it had taken nearly over a decade of ‘dialogue’ before the university conceded to paying for a Muslim prayer-room. Significantly, it was partly because of Muslim student perseverance that university authorities were compelled to address the issue of prayer space. As welcome as this was, and notwithstanding the remote location of the prayer facility, it was not accompanied by broader, or formal recognition. Instead, the university was reluctant to publicise the prayer-room, remained ambiguous over its status, and in view of an expanding equalities agenda acknowledging religious identities, it maintained its conventional grammar of ‘race’. Thus it is in spite of the prayer-room provision, that the university maintained the formal ‘absentee’ status of Muslim students.

This ‘provisional’ resignation to Muslim identities was also discernible in other provisions for religious observance (e.g. university timetabling/exemptions) which actually revealed the ‘white’ hegemonic norms and structures of the university. In fact, such provision-making could be seen to comprise a powerful tool in reifying mainstream norms by highlighting the disruptive consequences religious observance would have on the university and the student. Read in these terms, these measures of ‘inclusion’ formed a disciplinary technology that marked out the norms against which students were being measured, judged and surveyed.

As these examples suggest, and in view of the straightforward approach to provision-making inferred by Vertovec and Gilliat-Ray, more provisions are not themselves a guarantor of less Islamophobia, nor are they indicative of a cultural shift in the university. This approach ignores the sustained denial of recognition and protracted dialogue preceding provisions. Ultimately, it precludes the (racially) governmentalising logics in discourses of inclusion; the way provisions function as disciplinary and (self)regulating tools in the university, maintaining the marginalisation of Muslim students and de-politicising broader concerns about Islamophobia (e.g.}

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(Chapter Seven). This of course does not mean the status of Muslims has not altered at all, that they have been attributed no recognition, or that all provision-making is necessarily bound up in practices of racialised governance. It simply questions how they have been altered in view of broader institutional arrangements.

Thus, it is in the peripheral ‘prayer room’ location, and its ambiguous status, (including that of Muslim students) that we see “a rejection of the language of exclusionism, and simultaneously a vigorous assertion of a particular mode of inclusion” (Hook 2005, p.6). Hence, the insistence on Muslim participation but within the hegemonic terms of a ‘white’ university. This mode of ‘inclusion’ can mistakenly be viewed as “a contradictory combination of progress and stasis in racial institutions” (Winant 2006, p.988). Alternatively, however, one might view this contradictory semblance as an effect of racialised governmentalisation in regulating the encroachment of ‘other’ bodies in ‘white’ or mainstream spaces (Tyrer 2003, p.227), through a “compensatory liberal multiculturalism” (Sharma 2004, p.107). Within this model, according provisions to ‘minority ethnic’ groups is no less significant than the regulation of these groups. This is because this “white multiculturalism” (Hage 1998) fosters “ethnic life and ethnic value” (ibid. p.128) by marrying cultural with economic value. This is a “productive diversity” (ibid. p.129) in which ‘ethnic’ bodies are embraced for their ‘surplus value’ (e.g. the marketisation of diversity). This involves a “far more complex process of positioning” (ibid. p.133) which does not contain through exclusion but through modes of regulated inclusion.

Hence, an arguably better way of reconciling the formal absence of Muslims with their ostensible inclusion can be found in theories of governmentality that re-assess the way liberal discourses function. In this regard, Tyrer has shed some light. Adopting Hesse’s concept of ‘White governmentality’, he identifies dominant models of liberal multiculturalism as “the most effective means with which Muslim students can be subjected to the normalising exercise of white power” (Tyrer 2003, p.258).

This perspective is also noted in Chapter Two. Here liberal multiculturalism is identified, through a de-colonial perspective, as a mode of contending with the “social interiority of non-whites” (Hesse 2000, p.11). This view exceeds the ‘cultural’ focus of multiculturalism to consider its governmentalising function. Clearly, however, if we understand governmentality as a disposition, rather than imposition of power (Foucault 1991, p.93) then this requires closer attention not only to racialised subjects of governmentalisation, but the techniques through which this racialisation is authorised.
In other words, it requires us to keep in focus the specific co-ordinates of racialised governmentality.

Hence, taking this paradigm further, liberal inclusions are more precisely identified as ‘white’ ‘incorporation’ characterised by toleration (Brown 2006, p.27). Here, toleration is understood as a discourse of power that incorporates and regulates the presence of an intruding other. It presents a middle road, as Brown argues, between rejection and assimilation (ibid. p.25, 27). Secular liberal models of multiculturalism are grounded in discourses of toleration which although appear egalitarian, “presuppose ‘white’ control over what is tolerated” (Hage 1998, p.89).

Toleration is most obviously highlighted in the awkward status attributed to Muslims within ‘multiculturalism’. In this instance, Muslims are not conceived as simply an additional minority to be ‘catered’ for. Rather, traditional models of multiculturalism continue to position Muslim subjectivities as an excess to its ‘ethnic’ schema. This has posited Muslims in “contravention of liberal discourses” (Modood and Meer 2009a, p.445).

This awkward positioning has meant student requests have fallen outside of routine procedures and the secular ethos of the university. In turn, this has guaranteed Muslim student requests the status of exemption, special courtesy, concession and ‘good practice’ as discussed in Chapters Five and Seven. Reflecting the logic of leading liberal multiculturalists (Modood 2007, p. 26-27), the exemption model is clearly inscribed by toleration;

Tolerance...often emerges when formal egalitarianism is retrenched or limited in some way, when the liberties of a particular group are restricted...or when a group is marked as ineligible for full equality. Here tolerance appears as a dynamic supplement in liberal formulations of equality and citizenship (Brown 2006, p.36).

This dialectic is exemplified by Derrida’s supplement. There are two meanings to supplement. The first is “the supplement adds itself, it is surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence” (Derrida 1976, p.144 cited in Yegenoglu 1998, p.76). According to the second meaning, the supplement “adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it as if one fills a void” (Derrida 1976, p.145 cited in Yegenoglu 1998, p.77). The supplement is thus always in exterior relation and other than that which it supplements. The commonality between both meanings is that they undermine a “self-sufficient originary presence”.

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The supplement is thus rendered an appendage to the 'original' yet compensates for its lack since it is required to “restore the fullness of the one” (Yegenoglu 1998, p.77).

If we apply this model of supplementarity to discourses of liberal equality, as Brown does, then the accommodation of ‘Muslims’ can be seen to restore liberal formulations of equality whilst as the same time revealing a fundamental void. Grounded in discourses of exemption/tolerati, the ‘inclusion’ of Muslims can be seen to conceal the “shallow reach of liberal equality and the partiality of liberal universality” (Brown 2006, p.36). In the face of ‘unruly’ Muslim subjects, this ‘partiality’ is exposed (Ismail 2008, p.25-26). This liberal restoration thus reflects a way of containing a liberal crisis (Brown 2006, p.36); broadly indicative of the de-centring of the ‘West’ (Sayyid 1997, p.128). The irony here of course is that as the figure of the ‘Muslim’ denotes an excess to a liberal racial schema, this figure helps to sustain the vitality of liberal discourses through discourses of beneficence ‘good practice’ and ‘exemption’, as discussed in Chapters Five and Seven.

The figure of the Muslim, however can also be seen to sustain the vitality of (neo)liberal discourses through, as noted above, a ‘productive diversity’. This particular expression of ‘diversity’ in Higher Education has been noted as a corporate philosophy that has succeeded the language and practise of anti-racism (Ahmed and Swan 2006, p.96) to focus on ‘what Black bodies can do for ‘us’’. Within this newer repertoire, diversity (e.g. black bodies) itself has been treated as a “human resource” (Ahmed 2007b, p.604). This, Ahmed argues functions as a “neo-liberal technique of governance” (Ahmed 2004, para 9), that is bound up in “changing the perception of whiteness rather than changing the whiteness of the organisation” (Ahmed 2007b, p.605). This re-imaging merely functions to conceal the inequalities behind the branding of diversity. Indeed, if Muslims figure as supplement to a (neo)liberal order, it can also be seen in the way they reflect the logic of ‘diversity’ as a resource to be managed. Perhaps this is what Hesse had in mind when he argued that ‘white governmentality’ was concerned with the conduct of ‘Non-Europeans’ “as variously a threat, a resource, a fantasy or an epigone to be regulated” (Hesse 1997, p.100 Emphasis Mine).

In view of these ‘inclusions’, the de facto inclusion of Muslims can therefore be observed at the same time as denying the legitimacy of Muslim identity. It is a surreptitious inclusion that is rationalised on grounds of the retrogressive status of Muslims (relative to their ‘advanced’ western counterparts). In the context of
Islamophobia, this is not simply through a focus on ‘threat, fantasy and epigone’, but also through a translation of Muslim collectivitites as a ‘resource’ to be regulated.

Disguised by its semblance of equality, such liberal ‘inclusions’ can therefore be recognised as another “register” (Tyrer 2008, forthcoming) of institutionalised Islamophobia. This ‘register’ is subsumed within a discernible pattern of liberal concepts; multicultural equality, secularism, tolerance, diversity and harmony. This suggests that racialised governmentality and the Islamophobia it institutes is not exercised outside of a liberal order but inhere within the ostensibly progressive elements that harbour it. In this regard, as Hook argues, racism has “not gone unutilised by liberal democratic forms of governmentality”. Rather, it is “obscured by a series of acceptable values” (Hook 2005, p.9). Institutionalised Islamophobia is therefore no liberal lapse or aberration but an “unremarkable technique of social governance” (Hesse 2004b, p.21).

This brings us full circle. For if racism is routinised within the “political conventions of western culture” (Hesse 2004b, p.23), then the idea of the liberal university as noted in Chapter One is not all that paradoxical. British universities can be seen as another site through which the liberal rationalities of government (Hindess 2001) are articulated. This point is of course especially significant to contemporary universities which have come to symbolise liberalisms key precepts of universality, autonomy, progress, inclusion and social equality, yet can also be seen as sites of racialised hierarchy and exclusion. This can be placed within the broader history of the “liberal paradox” (Goldberg 1993, p.6).

8.3.  **Co-Articulating Hyper-Presence and Inclusion: ‘Control Racism’**

The absence/hyper-presence of Muslim students in British universities can be understood as a racialised discrepancy inherent to White ‘post-colonial’ polities. The absence/inclusion of Muslim students can be read as indicative of a liberal crisis seeking to contain an undesirable Muslim Other. How, then, can we best articulate the dialectic between the ostensible ‘inclusion’ of Muslim students, with the threat of the hyper-visible ‘fundamentalist’ other?

In my case studies, it is clear that where Muslims were construed as a ‘fundamentalist’ threat, as encroaching upon ‘white’ spaces, or as disrupting the political/’racial’ status quo, they became the subject of racialised governance. As the thesis has explored, this has manifest itself in a wide range of interventions; from sector
guidance, reports, directives, to conference protocol, electoral rulings, (in)formal complaint–making, and racialised hoaxes. Managing this Muslim ‘encroachment’ however, has *always* involved the protection of other actors/interests. Indeed, it is precisely on this basis that Muslim student activity has been legislated, because Muslim students have been seen to distort, impinge or subtract from the claimed harmony, human rights, or political democracy of other groups/identities and even the university itself.

In this dynamic, we can broadly observe the logics of bio-racism, where the state, as noted in Chapter Two, distinguishes ‘racially’ (amongst other modalities) between the health, welfare and security of the nation and those who threaten its existence (see for example Brown 2006, p.26-28; Razack 2008, p.9-10). Indeed, the *PVE* agenda surmised in the introductory chapter is indicative of the need to differentiate and profile Muslim populations so a threat does not even emerge; a preventative bio-racism.

This same logic is also evident in debates about protecting British society from the dangers of an excessive multiculturalism and the terrorism it spawns (see Modood and Meer 2009a, p.491 n.494); of which the ‘new integrationism’ (Kundnani 2007b) is a key outcome. As alluded to in the Introduction and elaborated in Chapter Four, one way of regulating this threat of the ‘fundamentalist’ other has been to engineer a social/political discourse pertaining to more acceptable forms of Islam. This has sought to distinguish Muslims through various processes of de-politicisation; to sift the ‘good’ Muslims from the ‘bad’, the ‘extremists’ from the ‘moderates’. This can be seen as an attempt to cultivate ‘enlightened’ Muslims in line with the West’s image of itself, through liberal rule (including compulsion), where the population has proved recalcitrant. ‘Mainstreaming’ Muslim identities can for example be seen in cases of ‘hijab management’ that have sprung up across Europe (Ismail 2008).

This project of political differentiation can be seen to denote the shift from ‘disciplinary’ to ‘control racism’ (Tyrer Forthcoming-e). This racism, as noted in Chapter Two, constitutes part of “a new assemblage of power”; an assemblage that works in tandem with the disciplinary binaries of modern racisms but functions along a more subtle spectrum of difference. This spectrum is situated within a *control society* (Deleuze 1992) where identities are *integrated* into a (White) racial order and undergo a series of modulations. This understanding is derived from *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987);
Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face…from the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be (ibid. p.197).

Hence, the bifurcation of Muslim identities as ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists’, can be seen in their ‘degree of sameness’ to the universal ‘white’ male (Tyer Forthcoming-e). In this regard, Muslim moderacy does not signify the assertion of the ‘true’ or authentic voice of Islam, but proximity to a Western template. Whether it be ‘disciplinary’ or ‘control’ racism, then, the template it seems, remains the same; it is only the social logic and technologies by which it is sustained that changes. Both continue to remain bound to processes of normalisation.

The university provides an interesting site of disciplinary power in which to observe the effects of the control society. The notion of ‘control racism’ has been detected through various examples in the thesis. For whilst Muslim assertions were on occasion met with outright rejection, there were many more occasions in which the distinction between the “religious” and the “more religious” (read ‘fundamentalist’/‘extremist’) (Bayat 2007) formed the sub-text for including Muslims in the university. Broadly, it can be seen in the way processes of including Muslims were inflected with concerns about possible fundamentalist incursions. The ‘prayer room’ status and its leadership at Lomonde represented a good example of this (Chapter Seven). Also, discussions around the rights of Muslims on campus, which would often begin or end with qualifiers about unacceptable forms of Muslim student politics (Chapter Four); and also, of course, amongst Muslim students themselves who were often compelled to either rebuke or defend the activities of Muslim student groups that had been proscribed or stigmatised (Chapter Four/Six). In this regard, the inclusion of Muslim students within the university very much depended on their perceived distance or proximity to acceptable levels of ‘Muslimness’; levels that only made sense against the sheer weight of ‘whiteness’. Thus even the inclusion of Muslim students was often subtly scripted through a discourse of Muslim hyper-visibility.

8.4. The Co-articulation of Racialised Governmentality: Islam’s Excess
The hyper-presence or hyper-visibility of Muslims has come to be seen as characteristic of Islamophobia. The absence of Muslims has been registered, although become
normalised as expressive of the natural order of social (‘race’) relations. ‘Inclusion’ however, has largely remained submerged because it resides within models of multicultural equality. Through its complex, more acceptable expression, it represents perhaps the more insidious form of institutionalised Islamophobia, with ‘absence’ not far behind.

However, these complex co-ordinates of Islamophobia are perhaps not as disparate as they may first appear. Whilst they can be conceived along a spectrum of visibility, with hyper-presence being the most obvious and multicultural inclusion being the least, they all coalesce under the same logic. What they have in common is the type of Muslim identity they guarantee and authenticate. As such, they are all key in producing the Muslim subject as transgressive. This signifies the transruptive (Hesse 2000, p.17) quality of Muslim identities having ‘gone public’. That is, in their refusal to be repressed, retreat or suffer dilution, they have threatened the coherence of Eurocentric liberal social practices, in particular a White liberal racial order. Hence, it is in their refusal to ‘self-discipline’ as dictated by liberal modes of governance, that we observe the desire to instil discipline, mould and recast Muslim identities according to a Eurocentric trajectory.

The modes of governance explored in this thesis are however not exhaustive, nor are they fixed or static. Rather these are likely to change, merge, collapse, and evolve according to shifting political contexts and in the face of a growing, assertive and politicised Muslim population. In view of this, the fixity of formulaic approaches (open/closed approaches) to Islamophobia appear in large part redundant; anaemic for their lack of scope and un-attuned to the way Islamophobia functions within, not in spite of liberal inclusionary discourses. Racialised governmentality thus ought to be understood as a shape-shifting form of governance that is neither fixed in its technologies of governance, nor discrete in form. In this context, it can be identified as a chameolonic and heterogenous exercise of power that derives legitimacy from Eurocentric universals.

The concluding chapter now concludes with a broad summary of key themes highlighting key areas of contribution and scope for further research.
Chapter Nine

Institutionalised Islamophobia: Key Themes and Contributions

Introduction

As many lament Macpherson’s unfulfilled agenda of tackling ‘institutional racism’, the state has extended its institutionalisation of racism more vehemently and explicitly than before. Its most recent incarnation, in a decade consumed by the ‘war on terror’, can be seen in Preventing Violent Extremism. Symbolising the architecture of racialised governance,¹ this program has been dedicated to surveying and re-training Muslim populations.

The production of this thesis and its foci on the racialised governance of Muslim students in Higher Education cannot be divorced from this broader context. The ‘absence’, ‘hyper-presence’ and ‘inclusion’ of Muslim students in universities betray discernible reverberations with broader national/institutional and state discourses; predominantly in the way Muslim subjectivities are construed as a threat to be regulated and managed. However, the way universities have attended to their Muslim student populations has assumed a largely mundane pitch. This ubiquity has been explored in the various chapters of this thesis.

Advancing the provisional concept of ‘white governmentality’ offered by Hesse in the mid nineties, this is developed in the context of Muslims and within ‘white’ institutions to develop a concept of ‘racialised governmentality’. Institutionalised Islamophobia is identified as an expression of racialised governmentality and emerges through a synthesis of ‘post-colonial’, or rather, ‘de-colonial’ understandings of racism with (post)modern forms of racialised power. This fusion can be seen as advancing current literature on Islamophobia, but also theories of governmentality.

This summary chapter outlines these contributions in the context of empirical research in the university and through present literature. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the implications of equality (monitoring) practices in universities for Muslim students.

¹ The new coalition government is due to dismantle Prevent in early 2011 although it is not clear what elements of this programme will be retained (IRR 2010).
9.1. **The Liberal University**

Addressing racism in Higher Education has not been straightforward. Writing prior to Macpherson’s report, Neal warned that it was “a mistake to assume the receptiveness of Higher Education to equal opportunities issues” (Neal 1998, p.x). Neal’s observations hint at a resilient sector; one in which racism has since been described as “highly durable, protean and impervious to intervention” (Law et al 2004, p.vii). That it has taken nearly 40 years since the first Race Relations Act (RRA 1965) for universities to begin developing some semblance of a coherent strategy on ‘race’ equality offers particular credence to these claims (ibid.). As does the fact that recent ‘race’ activity has only been taken up because it is a statutory requirement (ibid.).

In view of these observations, the romanticised version of the liberal university alluded to in the introduction appear misplaced, betraying a lack of knowledge about the (re)production of racist discourses in universities. They also reflect the degree to which universities continue to be held in liberal esteem; as sites of liberal autonomy, racial mobility and equality. Such perceptions of the academy have been buttressed by the belief that somehow racism and education function in mutual exclusivity. Here, racism is construed through a ‘white trash’ thesis, as “something to be studied in the world beyond the campus” (Williams 1989, p.8 cited in Neal 1998, p.xi). The tautologies inherent in this perspective (educated folk are not racist and racists are not educated) has nurtured the “cognitive incapacity” (Moghissi 1994, p.223) of liberal institutions to recognise their racism.

Examining racism in universities has therefore been key in unearthing some of the myths surrounding the liberal university. In view of the skewed focus of ‘whiteness’ studies which has been said to “concentrate... almost exclusively on de-industrialised working class ‘whites” (Garner 2006, p.269), the site of the white university is significant. Following Macpherson’s report (Macpherson 1999) on ‘institutional racism’ there has been little empirical or conceptual research on racisms in British universities (Law et al 2004; Chan 2005). Besides one exception (Tyrer 2003), there are to my knowledge, no qualitative or conceptual studies on the way Islamophobia is expressed in ‘white’ higher education institutions.

Whilst other human rights, grassroots and student reports have been issued (See Chapter Two), the comparative lack of academic research on Islamophobia in institutions, notably universities, makes this study an important intervention. Overall, the thesis can be seen as making advances both in terms of a particular racialised
minority, but also providing part of a much wider narrative, beyond the ‘ethnic’ penalties associated with Muslim minority entrants (Modood 2006; 2004) and research on student attainment (Broecke and Nicholls 2007). Below, some key themes and contributions are summarised in view of present literature and areas for future research.

9.2. Denying Islamophobia

The denial of racism in universities is now a common theme and has been noted by others working in the field (Gulam 2004; Back 2004). This research has also revealed a culture of denial. Erdon typified this denial in its routine approach to blanketing questions of racism. This was most exemplified in the university’s claim that the disenfranchisement of Muslim students was a ‘misunderstanding’ that resulted from ‘communicative problems’. Denial was part of an accumulative practice across the university involving foreclosure of discussion through a series of evasions, deferrals, and dismissals of racism. This was indicative of a logic of ‘secondary victimisation’; where following racist scaremongering about the abuses of Muslim men in the university, questions of racism were fudged in terms of democratic protocol and the need for Muslim students to engage as a ‘faith’ constituency. Racism against Muslim students was thus depoliticised by a more comfortable ‘inter-faith’ paradigm. This highlighted the specificity with which Islamophobia was denied; suggesting that the denial of racism is as divergent as its expression and further, inextricably related to its ‘subjects’.

This latter point is of acute significance in view of Muslims. This was exemplified on both campuses where the denial of Islamophobia was fundamentally sustained by the denial of Muslim identities. The denial of racism against Muslims can be seen as perhaps more fundamentally entrenched since it is bound up in the very question of what counts as a legitimate social and political order. In this regard, ‘race’ conventions enshrined in the Race Amendment (2000), were seen as complicit in the (re)production of institutionalised Islamophobia. This is important since it illuminated an aspect of Islamophobia that has thus far been overshadowed by other flashpoints (e.g. 9/11) and addressed thinly as legal deficiency, rather than as indicative of a broader discourse of governance.

Significantly, this official absence worked in various (self)-regulating ways to sustain Islamophobic discourses. By revisiting Foucauldian thinking, (racialised) governmentality was reassessed. In contradistinction to dominant theories which posit
the visibility of populations as intrinsic to governmentality, the lack of (Muslim) visibility was identified as a key plane of governmentality, alongside others. Future research ought to be attentive to uneven patterns of Muslim visibility.

9.3. Racist Admissions?
Denial was not the only means through which racist practices were sustained. As pointed out by ‘race’ activists in HE, “institutions are far too sophisticated to be outrightly contemptuous or openly resistant”. Instead, racism lurks in “neutral terms” (Gulam et al 2003, p. 41-42; see also Pilkington 2004, p.24). Thus, even a culture of admissions (Back 2004) can metamorphose into signs of ‘good practice’ and self-congratulatory measures of good performance (Ahmed 2004, para 9).

As demonstrated at Lomonde, admissions of institutional racism inferred no individual responsibility. Rather, it was an unconscious institutional culture that provided a useful depository for charges of racism (Ahmed 2004, para 19). The admission of racism was therefore tied to narrow Macpherson-type conceptions of racism. This was further highlighted in the way Muslims qua Muslims were not included in some of these admissions. Recognition of racism was instead reserved for “established [ethnic] constituencies”, or as something that was imported into the campus. The denial of racism (Erdon) and its admission (Lomonde) were therefore not as divergent as one might assume.

Following this, if we recall from Chapters Three and Seven, the character of each institution (e.g. Lomonde’s progressive agenda versus Erdon’s conservative character and tendency to blanket questions of racism) was not considered significant in determining the broader status of Muslim students at either university. Whilst one might have assumed that Lomonde was more ‘race’ equality savvy and thus more ‘inclusive’ and generous with their provisions for Muslim students, this has proved misleading. In fact, these basic institutional differences appeared to have had little impact on whether Muslim student needs have been addressed. However, more broadly, university approaches did reflect how Muslim students were incorporated in the institution, as Chapter Seven illuminated (e.g. through Lomonde’s corporate and unified ‘diversity’ approach/or Erdon’s fragmented, ad hoc and concessionary approach). This suggests that in the ostensibly ‘better’ profiled institution we do not find an absence of Islamophobia, but simply a different mode of its institutionalisation. This means that how we assess the adequacy of equality practices in universities requires greater
scrutiny, beyond an audit style approach as further noted below. Ultimately of course, what is required is a ‘racial’ institutional overhaul that forms part of a much broader ‘de-colonial’ shift.

9.4. **Dialectics of Racism**

Of course, amidst signs of racism there were hints at ‘good practice’ thinking (see also Cook et al 2009, p.49-52; Ahmad and Tyrer 2006) and reflexive attitudes. However, it is not coincidental that these were aired by staff members that were in some way marginalised in the institution. Signs of ‘good practice’, however, were not characteristic of anti-racism in the sector, nor should they be confused with a primary commitment to issues of social justice on campus. This is particularly when the accommodation of Muslim students seemed to emerge simultaneously with their marginalisation in the university. Campus cases certainly exemplified this ‘(anti)’racist dialectic. This suggests, as argued above, that provision-making in universities cannot be read as self-evident of either the status of Muslim students, or the way, if at all, universities choose to tackle Islamophobia. Rather, they can, in instances, be seen to be bound up in a matrix of racialised governance; an approach more indicative of concession for compliance.

In terms of existing literature on equality in HE, these findings present challenging but also complementary insights. They challenge dominant tabular approaches to provision-making for Muslim students, but also elaborate on arguments that locate liberal multiculturalism as a conduit for Muslim student management (Tyrer 2003, p.226-262). Here, attention to the numerous discourses of governance surrounding provisions for Muslim students in universities has involved a much richer and broader historical/institutional framework.

9.5. **Repertoires of Racism: Universities, Unions and Other University Functions**

The role of university unions in institutionalised Islamophobia proved equally complex and problematic. Firstly, the focus on student unions historically (Chapters Four and Six) and in contemporary context (Chapter Six) illuminated the way union politics formed an instrumental route through which Islamophobic sentiments had been harnessed. This represents a significant contribution as it has extended many ‘grassroots’ concerns, typically absent in academic accounts. It is precisely in highlighting the site of unions, that a key legislative blind-spot was brought to light;
namely the ambiguous status of student unions under the ‘race’ amendment (2000).

Moreover, as my case examples demonstrated, in view of Muslim students, the relationship between the union/university was less oppositional than typically presented. This was exemplified in the way Islamophobia was found to be institutionalised in mutually affirming and reciprocal ways across the university/union.

Of course, whilst the thesis has involved an examination of key university functions/areas (e.g. monitoring data, union politics and welfare/observance provisions), this has been to the exclusion of other potentially insightful areas. Student learning/classroom experiences, curricular content (see for example Siddiqui 2007) or research activities pertaining to Islam or Muslims, for example represent key areas which may shed further light on the way islamophobia is institutionalised and reproduced in higher education.

9.6. Hybrid Racism

Islamophobia in the university was not of quiet composure, or expressed covertly as many have postulated of racism in institutional settings (Carmichael and Hamilton 1968, p.4; Mills 1997, p.75; Macpherson 1999, 6.17; Parekh 2000, p.57-59; CBMI 2004, p.14). Rather, it reflected a hybrid discourse which explicitly framed Muslims in racially vilified terms, but also coded them as transgressive through other routine processes such as ‘ethnic monitoring’. Indeed, the assessment that racism in (educational) institutions, and in medical schools in particular “is not an ‘overt’ experience” (Popovic 2007, p.114), certainly appeared at odds with the accounts of several Muslim medical students on both campuses. As argued in Chapter Two, this suggests that we need to attend to the multiplicity of racism in institutions rather than assume its uniform expression.

9.7. Interactive Racialisation: Racism as Discourse

Whilst the university can be seen as home to a broader dialectic of racist practices (e.g. ‘overt’/ ‘covert’ i.e. disguised), it can also be seen as home to a multitude of ‘interactive’ racist discourses. As narrated in Chapter Six, Islamophobia was symbiotic in the way it relied on other forms of racism for its relative stability (i.e. notions of ‘South Asian’ passivity against fundamentalist imposition). In this regard, racisms

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2 This ambiguity has more recently been taken up by the ECU (ECU 2009b; a).
appeared to cohabit and nurture each other, rather than exist discretely as entirely separate discourses. This raises two important points. First, the predominance of Islamophobia has been repeatedly noted with the epithet that it remains the ‘last acceptable form of racism’. This however, ought not to suggest that it has replaced or surpassed other forms of cultural or ‘biological’ racisms. Rather, it should encourage an exploration of the way distinct racist discourses co-articulate.

Second, this case example highlighted the way university institutions are home to popular discourses of racism, and that at times these can influence institutional outcomes, perhaps more than ‘processes, procedure, practices’. In this sense, what this, and other examples pointed to (e.g. the notion of ‘absence’ in Chapter Five) was how university practices and regulations were part of a much broader repertoire of racism. Islamophobia was never expressed through procedural anomalies or irregularities alone but in the way such procedures often rationalised and legitimised broader discourses of racialisation and racism. The official absence of Muslims in the institution represented a good example of this. Whilst this was a routine institutional practice, it was sutured to a number of discursive offshoots that rendered Muslim identities transgressive, trivialised Islamophobia, and in turn nurtured an environment that inhibited Muslim student complaints. This affirmed the need to resist formulaic approaches to recognising racism. Rather, as this thesis has illustrated, viewing racism as a shifting set of discourses than can intersect and appropriate other discourses provides a better way of understanding the complexity of racism in institutions. In particular, it highlights the way racisms are institutionalised, and sometimes informed by popular discourses of racism, rather than at some abstract level residing in ‘institutional’ policy.

Finally, in view of a burgeoning body of literature concerned with the racialised governance of Muslims in the ‘war on terror’ (Birt 2008; Tyrer 2010), this contribution is germane and the site of the university is certainly novel. The implications and impact of the ‘war on terror’ on Muslim students in British universities clearly deserves further exploration than offered in this thesis. This is of paramount importance in a context in which Muslim students have formed the ‘subject’ of institutional policies and interventions.

However, at the same time, the focus on institutionalised Islamophobia in the ‘war on terror’ has also exceeded the site of the university. As illustrated in Chapter Four, the securitisation of the Muslim student community meant that their regulation and surveillance in the university was subject to the interest of various institutions (e.g.
media, intelligence, governmental) including the university. This has implications and alters the way racism in institutions are conceived endogenously, as intrinsic to the workings of a single site. From this research, institutionalised Islamophobia can be better understood as directed at racialised subjects but traversing various institutions.

9.8. **Monitoring Muslim Students**

Significantly, as the law has expanded to include equality for religious groups in public institutions under the Equality Act (2010), religion has assumed a statutory status, although not entirely at par with other previously protected characteristics (i.e. ‘race’). Whilst under draft regulation, ‘religion and belief’ is to be subject to impact assessment, universities will still not be obliged to monitor students by religion/belief, although are being encouraged to do so. Within this model, Muslims as Muslims will be protected under *direct* discrimination laws (ECU 2009a, p.4). It also means that unions will also potentially be subject to greater scrutiny. This is a significant shift given the chequered legal history and secondary status attributed to Muslim identities. It may mean Islamophobia achieves greater recognition within universities and treated with more seriousness than research has revealed.

In the context of these legislative shifts and a growing recognition that some institutions are monitoring the religious backgrounds of their students, the role of ethnic monitoring, its purpose, and how it translates into effective patterns of equality delivery are vital. Indeed, the role of ethnic monitoring in informing equality provisions in both universities appeared to be of limited value. As Chapters Three and Five highlighted respectively, monitoring data was being archived rather than utilised, and even when discrepancies were found between ‘BME’ groups, intervention appeared lacking. Monitoring data was nonetheless cited as ‘good practice’.

Notwithstanding its limited value, ‘ethnic monitoring’ in universities has been identified as a “problematic *necessity*…that [itself] needs constant monitoring” (Bonnett and Carrington 2000, p.487). Yet, others writing in the field have rejected such data as foundationally flawed because of the way it maintains a minority/majority racialised relation on campus (Tyrer 2003, p.238/247). Both of these views have recognised the governmentising function of monitoring data in view of post(colonial) populations. Their differences reflect a tension between the drive for social equality and social control; the former can be seen in the MCB’s push for the religious question in the 2001 census (Sherif 2003), and the latter, the ‘mis-use’ of this same data on Muslim
populations for the government’s counter-terrorist Prevent agenda (Thomas and Jones 2000, p.2).

This same tension is prevalent in universities. For whilst equality bodies such as the ECU place emphasis on the potential of accurate student data in terms of ‘religion and belief’ (ECU 2009c, p.4) and its translation into effective equality delivery, Muslim students are concerned about the divulgence of personal data (e.g. ISOC membership) to intelligence agencies (See Chapter Four). In the present context, it is unlikely that monitoring by universities will bode well, particularly in light of ongoing concerns that universities are caught up in a state-sponsored web of surveying Muslim students. The success of monitoring may very well be affected by the unwillingness of students to provide their religious identifications.

Clearly, then, critiques of the absence of monitoring data on Muslim students, should not be confused with the straightforward recommendation that monitoring is a solution or would necessarily transform their status on campus. Indeed, the problems associated with there being “too few” (Tyrer 2003, p.237-238) or ‘too many’ (Glees and Pope 2005, p.71) Muslims in any one university institution, raises questions as to how favourable monitoring would be. As a university endeavour, it could only potentially work if there were existing direct links in place to help orientate a clear equality agenda.

The assertion that religious data monitoring would inform better provision-making for ‘faith’ students (ECU 2009c, p.4) however, also ignores the role of Muslim students historically in securing, or at least highlighting the inadequacy of provisions. They have engaged with their institutions, alongside the demands of learning as students. Indeed, historically Muslim students have registered their presence on campus in campaigns for prayer rooms, and university management have often been privy to estimates of their Muslim student populations. This raises two final points. First, that the underlying concern here is not more accurate estimates, but the very status of Muslim identities in ‘post-colonial’ institutions and moreover, the very acceptability of Islamophobia in contemporary Britain.

Finally, it draws our attention to the agency of Muslim students and their resistance to Islamophobia in the university. Of course, this returns us to the thesis foci explored at the very beginnings of this project; student activism and in particular, resistance to Islamophobia. Indeed, whilst the present thesis alludes to varying examples of resistance to Islamophobia, this ought to be studied in its own right, and in particular, through a fuller conceptual engagement than has been offered here. This is because
Muslim students have demonstrated the wherewithal and passion to challenge, subvert, undermine and outsmart racist subjections. Indeed, even as they have formed the ‘subjects’ of intense governance, they have proved themselves to be recalcitrant actors. Hence, it is important to recognise that wherever we find the exercise of racialised governmentality, we also certainly find articulations of resistance. The relationship between racialised governmentality and resistance to it represents an important line of enquiry that deserves further exploration.
Appendix A

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: “British Muslim” Students: An Analysis of Activism in Higher Education
Name of researcher: Shaida Nabi
Institution: Department of Sociology, Roscoe Building, University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL
Contact Details: Tel- 0161 275 7852/ 07855 949 539 Email: witness_7732@yahoo.com

Description of Research Project:

I am conducting research in to the political activity of “British Muslim” students in Higher Education. I aim to examine the nature of political (dis)engagement amongst “British Muslim” students, what informs their politics and what challenges Muslim students face whilst at university.

In the interview conducted today I will ask you to complete a personal questionnaire form. I will then ask you a series of questions in the form of a semi-structured interview. The interview will be recorded with your permission only. All notes will be transcribed and coded thematically for research purposes. The interview will take between 1-2 hours. You can, however, stop the interview if you feel uncomfortable at any time.

All information collected regarding yourself and your place of study will remain confidential and anonymous. Interview transcriptions will be archived at the University of Essex and will be kept confidential. The material will be preserved as a permanent research resource for use in research and publication.

I have been given information about the research project and the way in which my contribution to the project will be used.

- My contribution will be kept safely and securely with access only to those with permission from the researcher.
- I understand that I can withdraw my consent at any time by contacting the researcher.
- I agree to take part in the above study.
- I hereby assign the copyright in my contribution to Shaida Nabi

Please tick either:

□ I give my permission for the information I am about to give to be used for research purposes only (including research publications and reports) without preservation of anonymity

□ I give my permission for the information I am about to give to be used for research purposes only (including research publications and reports) with strict preservation of anonymity

Signed ……………………………………………………….
Respondent……………………………………… ID No:……….. Date……………………
Address…………………………………………………………………………………………….

Signed ……………………………………………………….
Researcher……………………………………………………….. Date……………………

This information will be retained separately and securely from the data collected
Appendix B

Personal Information Questionnaire

Please note all information is confidential and your anonymity will be respected.

Name: __________________________

Age: __________

Sex: __________

Marital Status: __________
Do you have children? How Many?
Do you live at home or in student accommodation?
____________________________________________________________________

Ethnic Origins: ________________
(i.e. parental ancestry)

Languages Spoken: ________________

Family Members/ Ages and Occupations:
[Please include parental occupations]
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

Family History:
Years of Migration if your parents migrated to Britain and their initial reasons for coming.
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

Have you or your family lived anywhere else besides the U.K.?
____________________________________________________________________

University: ____________________________

Subject/Year:
Please specify qualifications sought, i.e BA, MA etc.
Appendix C

Interview Schedule Student

Name:  ID No:

A1. University Choice

What made you choose this university?
Factors involved?

2. University Services

Are you happy with University facilities for Muslims? (Prayer facilities/Food/Time off/Social Spaces/Services for discrimination?)

What about Halal food? Are you happy with what university provides?
So do you eat on campus then?

What about social spaces at university?

What about services in terms of discrimination, who would you go to if you felt you were discriminated against?

If not, have you gone about dealing with these issues?

How have you done this?

3. Non-Student Relations
(Academics/Other staff/Secretaries,Tutors, HOD)

Do you feel comfortable participating in class?

Do you have a good relationship with your teacher(s)?

How do you think you have been perceived in classroom/campus?

Do you feel you have been treated as other students? Less favourably, more favourably?

If not, have you done anything to respond to this?

Do your teachers know that you are involved with the ISOC or have been involved in campaigns?
Have you had any problems with any other member of staff? HOD, Secretaries, librarians etc

4. Islamophobia/Discrimination On Campus

Do you feel safe on campus?

Where do you feel most safe? Why?

Less Safe? Why

Have you faced any particular problems since you came to University?

Do you feel you have suffered discrimination of any kind? On account of your race, religion, gender, abilities?

Have you responded to this? Privately/Officially etc?

How has university dealt with your concerns? Who in particular?

If not, why did you not report it?

If you were discriminated against, who would you go to?

5. University and Politics

Do you think coming to University has made you more aware of politics?

If so, which aspect of being at university?

What else has? Non-curricular activities- Study circles/Camps etc..

Are you careful about the way you might be active?

Are you concerned about how you may be perceived? -by other (non)Muslim students/staff?

If so, why is that?

B.ISOC/Student Society

1.* Are you involved in the ISOC or other Student Societies?  [check q’aire]

What does your role involve?

What are the main challenges in this role?

Is there anything you feel inhibits the society from working effectively?

Is there anything you would like to see changed within the society?
2. Gender relations

[Do brother/men and sisters/women tend to work together or separately?]  
Are you happy working like that?  
Do you think it’s the most effective way of working? Why?  
Do you feel you have adequate input in to decision making?  
Do you feel br’s/s’s- men/women generally, have adequate input in to decision making?

3. Campaigns

Have you been involved in any campaigns or particular society issues?  
Which ones?  
Why these ones?  
Are there any particular campaigns/issues that have taken up most of your time?  
Are there any particular campaigns/issues that have dominated [society’s] agenda?

3a. Campaign mediums [if involved]  
What have been the main mediums of communication for Campaigns?  
Emails  
motions  
petitions  
protests  
stalls  
sit-ins  
exhibitions  
Conferences  
flyposting  
informal contact  
What do you think has been the most effective means of gathering momentum?  
Have you been involved with a campaign another society was involved in?

4. Competitors/Allies: Key Relationships

Do you feel your competing with other societies or individuals on campus?  
Why?
Is there a society, group or person you feel challenged by or wary of?

Who would you say are your key supporters on campus in campaigns or elections?

**Relationships with Student Bodies/Groups**

5a. Student Societal Relations

Do you know students from other societies?
e.g. Palestinian/Pakistani/Bengali/Arab] [Jewish/Christian/Hindu/Sikh] [Stop the War/Socialist/Ethical]

Do you have a good relationship with them?

5b. Local ISOC/S National FOSIS

Is there a close relationship with other ISOC’s in the area?

Do you work together? On what kinds of issues?

What is your relationship with FOSIS? (ISOC’S)

*5c. International (Muslim) Students

Proportion of Int. Muslim students on campus?

Do int. (Muslim) students get involved in the society?

If so, what types of things do they get involved in?

Does it tend to be mainly brothers/men or sisters/women?

If not, do you have an idea of why not?

5d. Other (non-ISOC) Muslims

Do you spend time trying to recruit Non-ISOC Muslims?

How do you go about doing this?

And, How do you think they perceive you?

Have you received support from Muslim students not involved in any of the societies?

5e. Class mates
Do you encourage your class mates to be politically active?

Do you inform them of Campaigns you are involved in?

And, How do you think they perceive you?

5f. The Union

What is your relationship with members of the union? (ISOCS)

Do you think the soc has a positive relationship with the union generally?

Or

have their been any problems or tensions that you know of?

Are you comfortable being in the Union?

Have you always felt comfortable in the Union?

5g. NUS

Are you familiar with the NUS? e.g. Have you attended NUS Conferences as a delegate?

5h. Fringe Groups.

Has ISOC dealt with groups such as HT/AM?

Have their been any personal encounters?

Do you know if these groups tend to join the ISOC?

5i. Support Groups Outside of university

Do you receive support from organisations off campus?

What kind of support?

Do you work with other (non)Muslim groups outside of university?

Have you received their support in your campaigns?

Which ones?
* Affiliations With other organisations [refer to Q’air]

How Long have you been a member?

What role have you assumed in these organisations?

Has it helped or better equipped you on campus?

6. Surveillance:

Do you think the university/union has set boundaries on your activities?

Do you feel restricted in what you are able to do?

If so, Where does that restriction come from?

Do you think the university are/were aware of your activities?

Do you feel monitored by the university/Union/other societies?

If so, Why do you feel monitored? What makes you think you are?

C1. The Political

What do you think it means to be political?

What kinds of things would you consider to be political? i.e, party politics, boycotts, hijab, demanding halal food?

Do you think there are different ways of being political?

Do you think it is possible to be political- but not be ‘active’ about it?
What kind of things do you think are ‘inactive’?

Do you consider yourself a political person?

Do you think politically? What issues concern you?

Would you consider yourself an ‘activist? If not why not?

If not, what do you think would make u an activist?

If so, is this because you ‘actively’ campaign?

Do you think being Political and being Muslim is viewed positively or negatively?
   - By Muslims
- By Non-Muslims

Is there a group or category that you might identify with politically?

2. General Voting/Family political culture

Do you vote in local or general elections?

European Elections?

Who have you voted for in the past?

Do you come from a family that tends to vote?

Do all your immediate family vote?

Whom did they vote for? Which Party?

Did you vote in this (2004) local/European election?

Who for?

If not, why not?

Do you think it is important to vote?

Do you think it can effect significant change?

3. Political Influences (Sources of Activism) & Sites of Influence.

3a. Sites of Political Influence

Do you think it’s important to be politically active?

Why do you think this?

Do you consider it a right/a responsibility?

Are there any particular incidents you can think of that facilitated your ‘activism’ or was it a gradual process, circle of friends, particular environment?

Who or what has been of influence in your participation/approach to politics?

Family

Friends: non-Muslim

Particular Muslim groups: MPAC, MAB, MCB?

Academic study

Religious Circles

general political climate

Particular issues
Deen

3b. Islam and Politics

Does Islam encourage or discourage you to be active?

Are there any Islamic thinkers that have influenced you in particular? (in terms of you being active)

Do you consider yourself to be part of Islamic Movement’?
Is there a particular approach/strand of thinking in your Islam? Can you describe it?
[e.g. Do you follow a madhab?]

Where do you take your religious teachings from? For e.g. books, internet, classes, scholars etc.

Does the ISOC refer to Islamic sources or scholars to guide its activities?
If so, Which ones?

9/11
Did 9/11 impact on your university environment and relations with others?
If so, how?

Did it alter the way you have behaved towards other students on campus?
Muslim and Non-Muslim?

The way staff/ students/NUS/ Others behaved towards you?

Diasporic Politics
Are you aware of the politics of your parental country?

Does it concern you?

How involved are you in the politics of your parental country?

Sites of Influence
Do you think you have made an impact (politically) on your family
friends
on campus
with strangers?

What kind of impact? Positive/Negative?
D. Identity
Muslimness & Diasporic Identity

1. Social Networks
Who is your main social network made up of?
Which ethnicities/gender/Age groups/?
Are your friends also active on campus? More or less than you?
- and off campus?

2. Community Belonging
Do you feel you belong to a ‘Muslim community’ locally? In your area? on campus?
What do you think makes this a ‘Muslim community’?
Do you feel you ‘belong to’ other communities or groups?

3. Umma
What do you think is meant by the umma?
Do you think the umma exists?
Do you feel part of the umma? Why?
Is this something recent or have you felt like this for a long time?
Period: (Pre-university, college, school for example? Other sources?)
What do you think has influenced this belonging (or not?)
Do you think being more active has influenced it?

4. Self identification,
How would u describe yourself ? Your identity?
What about other aspects of your identity? (gender, ethnicity etc)
Are you comfortable describing yourself as a ‘British Muslim’?
Do you think it’s important to classify yourself in this way?
Do you think it’s a term that’s been imposed on you?
Have you ever described yourself in cultural terms? In which context? When was this?
What about in any other context? I.e. your parental homeland?

Do you think theirs’ been a change in the way you identify yourself?

**E1. Post-uni Engagement**

Do you think you will continue to be ‘active’ when you leave university?

What kinds of things do you see yourself being involved in?

If not, why?

**2. Career Aspirations**

What do you hope to do after you finish?

Why?

**3. Other**

Is there anything else about your university experience you would like to talk about?

Could you recommend any one else I could speak to?

*Interview transcriptions confirmed for those who requested.*
Appendix C

Union official schedule
(Welfare/Gensec/Societies)

1. What is your role within the union?

2. What types of issues have you had to deal with?

3. Have many Muslim students come to you with any concerns?

4. What about other students, Sikh, Hindu, Jewish etc

5. Have any issues been particularly dominant amongst Muslim students?

6. Do you know if Muslim students have suffered discrimination of any kind?

7. SOC – Which is the largest society on campus?

8. SOC - Do you know from your experience if there are many Muslim students in other societies apart from the ISOC? [is it possible to retrieve membership figures for each society?]

9. SOC- Has any society breached regulations?

10. SOC- Have you ever had to adjudicate between societies because of tensions etc?

11. G – How does the complaints system work within the union?

12. G- Do many students use it?

13. W/G - I believe your also on the complaints committee- what types of complaints have you been privy to?

14. W/G- Do you think the student complaints system works well?

15. W/G- Have you ever had to refer a complaint to the university?

16. W/G - Do you have any contact with university officials in your role i.e. complaints officers, registrar?

17. W/G - Are you aware if any complaints have been passed on to the Office for Independent Adjudicators?

General

18. Is there any thing you would like to see changed within the union?

19. Is it possible to obtain a copy of all motions that have been passed in the past 5 years? [those relating to Muslim students, those in which Muslim students would have been involved]
Appendix C
Equality Interview Schedule:

Equality Objectives & Commitments

1. If you start by telling me what you actually do, what your role is?
2. Who is in your team and what are their key responsibilities?
   [are their dedicated student officers?]
3. Who directs the Equality Work?
4. Who is responsible for ensuring that the Equality team meets its objectives? That policy is put in to action?
5. What does the Equality team aim to fulfil at the university?
7. Is there a general equal opportunities policy or is there also a separate racial equality policy?
8. How did the university respond to the Employment Equality on Religion legislation? What type of action did it take?
9. What are the Equality teams most recent additions/amendments to its vision?

Equality Operationalised

10. What is understood by ‘Equality’ and ‘Diversity’?
11. How does the team go about fulfilling its equality objectives?
   [advertising, literature, forums, research, training days etc]
12. Which staff receive equality training?
13. *What is equality and diversity training at the university supposed to achieve?
14. How does your work feed into various university departments?
15. Is there a rep in each dept that oversees the implementation of policy?
16. How often is the unit in touch with HOD’s/Head of Faculty on equality matters?
17. Does the university policy on equality cover all students and staff?
18. Does policy protect students against religious discrimination?
   [was this in response to anything in particular?]
19. In terms of your anti-racist strategies, do you consider how the institution itself may contribute to racist practices?

20. Do you have targets that you are required to meet? [e.g. in terms of recruitment, courses etc]

21. What challenges do you face in implementing policies?

22. Who collects data for you to assess your policy? How do they obtain this data?

**Assessment:**
23. Do you come in to direct contact with students?

24. How do you monitor the impact of your policies on students from different racial/religious groups? [duty 4a of race relations act 2000]

25. *In reviewing your policies, how do you consult with students? [Which students have you consulted with?]*

26. For example have you had any contact with any of the union student societies?

27. How do you gage what problems racial/religious minorities are experiencing? [What are the mechanisms in place to ensure student voices are heard and responded to?]

28. What kinds of criteria are used to measure progress?

29. Do you annually publish policy and assessment results? How can this be obtained? [race relations Amendment requires this]

30. Do you know if the unit refers to any particular anti racist toolkits in its work?

**Muslim Student Needs**
31. Do you think the university generally meets the needs of its religious minorities? Muslims specifically?

32. Are you aware of what kind of provisions/services have been made?

33. Do you know what kinds of problems Muslim students face on campus?

34. Are you aware of any cases of religious, racial or gender discrimination? Does the Equality Unit deal with these cases/who does?

35. Is there a Muslim advisor on campus?

36. Are halal food provisions made available?

37. Is it possible to obtain student numbers by ethnicity and gender?
### Appendix D

#### Interviewees

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³ Figures in brackets denote sequential interviews
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| Total Interviewees | 66 |

278
Appendix E

Muslim Student Interviewee Demographics

Student Breakdown by Campus

36 students were ISOC members (including 2 former students)
7 students were union officials (including 1 former student)

Students by Level of Study

Students Living at Home/Away During Studies

---

4 Detailed information such as family history and discipline have not been disclosed to preserve the anonymity of students. This data does not include E-interviewees.
Students by ‘Ethnicity’

*‘Ethnic’ categories are for reference only and not how students self-identified.

Students by Age Range

Students by Gender

---

5 *‘Ethnic’ categories are for reference only and not how students self-identified.
## Appendix F

<table>
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<th>&gt; 60%</th>
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*Muslim Population statistics obtained from the Pew Research Centre on Muslim populations (PRC 2009).
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