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Editorial

The Socio-Economic Integration of Ethnic Minorities

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Abstract

One of the most striking features of the contemporary world is the scale and complexity of international and internal migration and the rapidly increasing size of indigenous ethnic minorities in the national populations of many countries. International migration continues to be mainly from poor to rich nations but the more recent years have seen migration patterns becoming multidirectional, with migration flows moving between developed countries, amongst developing countries as well as from developing to developed countries. The scale of internal migration in some countries is dazzling. For instance, an estimated 260 million ‘peasant workers’ have moved to cities in China. The number of indigenous ethnic minorities in the country has also grown substantially, now reaching 106 million. These and other features of population change pose a serious challenge to policy-makers and the general population in many counties, in terms of making and implementing policies of social inclusion for migrant and indigenous ethnic minorities, ensuring equal access to educational and occupational opportunities, and taking measures to facilitate societal acceptance of the ethnic minority groups. With this in mind, we have, in this thematic issue, collected papers that address issues of ethnic integration in both developed and developing countries.

Keywords

ethnic minority; migration; social inclusion; socio-economic equality

Issue

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1. Introduction

The equal treatment of all social groups in socio-economic lives is a fundamental principle which is enshrined in the law in many countries. Ethnic minority groups, whether immigrants, their children, or indigenous minorities, have been found to face various disadvantages. In the past few decades, most ethnic studies in Britain, USA, continental Europe and many other parts of the world have tended to focus on ‘visible’ ethnic minorities who migrate from developing to developed countries in search of a better life for themselves and their children, or asylum seeker trying to flee war-torn zones, famine or political persecution in their home countries. While the disadvantages for many such groups are persistent and sustained efforts must be made to assess the causes, manifestations, consequences and possible changes of such disadvantages, new efforts are needed to study both the plights of indigenous ethnic minority groups within the national boundaries, and the integration difficulties faced by less-visible immigrants who move between developed countries and amongst developing countries, which is becoming a more prominent feature in our increasingly globalizing era.

2. Types of Ethnic Minorities Covered and Challenges for Research

The ethnic minorities covered in this issue could be put into four broad types. The first type refers to immigrants
and their children who moved from developing to developed countries. This is the archetypical immigrant group on whom most attention in ethnic studies has been paid. The second type refers to ethnic minorities who are indigenous without immigration histories but who occupy a minority status in the national populations such as in China where, thanks to preferential treatment, they are largely exempted from the family-planning policy and have thus increased their numbers at a much faster rate than the majority population. Yet their economic situation remains disadvantageous due to poverty and harsh local conditions. While some specific, localized, studies have been conducted such as that by Han-nan and Xie (1998) on ethnic stratification in the north-western province of Xinjiang, more comprehensive research on their current socio-economic situation is merited. The third type also pertains to people having a minority status but being not necessarily visible. In the last decade, many individuals have moved between EU countries and they often face issues of ‘in-betweenness’, being fully integrated in neither their home nor their destination countries and encountering obstacles of social acceptance, as they are often perceived or treated as a ‘quasi-ethnic other’ (Ryan, Sales, Tilki, & Siara, 2009). And the fourth type is not necessarily minority in terms of numbers but, being migrant workers, they are not part of what is called the ‘charter population’ (Heath & Cheung, 2007, p. 1) and are treated as minorities. An important example is the situation of Arabs in Qatar, who face constant obstacles of social integration even though they share the same religion or language as the Qataris. These differences in minority types pose different challenges in research and the various papers collected in this issue have tried to meet this challenge. Theories developed to explain the situation of one type of migrant worker may well not apply to other types or to indigenous minorities.

As for the first type, namely visible ethnic minority groups, their contemporary socio-demographic development calls for renewed attention to the continued plights they face. Many of the groups, such as those in Britain, came over 60 years ago and their third or even fourth generation has come of age. Many such groups, such as black Caribbeans, black Africans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, have suffered decades of disadvantage or discrimination. As many observers (Li & Heath, 2008, 2010) have noted, immigration is a rather disruptive process, rendering migrants’ human and social capital of less or little use in the destination country. Moreover, as many of the immigrants came from poor countries, they did not have much economic capital in the first place. The relative lack of socio-cultural-economic resources, deficient language skills, and direct or indirect discrimination by employers (Wood, Hales, Purdon, Sejersen, & Hayllar, 2009) all combined to produce disadvantages in employment, occupation and earnings for the first generation. But even the second generation who were born and educated in the destination country and who had better education than the majority group may still be disadvantaged in gaining employment opportunities (Li & Heath, 2016), a phenomenon aptly termed ‘ethnic penalty’ (Heath & Cheung, 2006). What about the third and fourth generations? Lessard-Phillips and Li (2017) provide an analysis of their educational outcomes. They found that the first generation were highly self-selected but the 1.5th generation did poorly due to the disruptive processes of their families’ migration (their families were poor upon arrival and they may have opted for the labour market rather than staying in school); however, the second generation outperformed the white British but the third and the fourth generations did not keep up the momentum but rather showed a ‘regression to the mean’, with education falling to the mainstream average. The educational trajectory over the generations thus suggested some kind of ‘integration’, but this may well be an incomplete integration as they may not have the same labour market returns to education as do the majority group.

The disadvantages faced by ethnic minority groups and the growing ethnic mixing in local areas have produced new challenges for research: is it the lack of opportunity (area poverty) or ethnic diversity that is mainly responsible for ethnic plights? This question is reminiscent of the ‘hunkering down’ thesis proposed by Putnam (2007) in trying to explain the declining social trust in the USA. Demireva and Heath (2017) show that neither area deprivation nor area diversity affects whites’ employment opportunities but they do have a rather negative impact on ethnic minorities, suggesting that discrimination might be at work. Furthermore, they found that ethnic embeddedness (that is, the concentration of minorities in particular areas) may have reinforced the traditional norms of some ethnic groups, especially among the female members who may, perhaps quite reasonably, think that as there are no jobs around anyway, so why bother looking for one? The poorer chances facing minority groups in Britain find their echo in Australia where Pietsch (2017) shows that skilled immigrants from Asia are much less likely to find themselves in professional-managerial positions than those from Britain or continental Europe.

While personal characteristics and resources, together with employer discrimination, may explain ethnic minorities’ disadvantages in capitalist countries such as Britain or Australia, political institutions and social policies may have a mixed effect on indigenous ethnic minorities in China, a state socialist country. On the one hand, the government instigated a household registration (hukou) system in the 1950s, forcing the majority of the population to remain as agricultural workers for life with little hope of upward mobility. On the other, a whole series of preferential policies were practised in favour of the ethnic minorities, exempting them from the strict one-child family policy, requiring lower entrance scores for colleges and universities, preserving cadre positions in government organizations for those from ethnic minority backgrounds within the ethnic au-
tonomous regions, and promoting economic development with quota recruitment, tax reliefs or loan preferences. How, then, have the two sets of institutional arrangement affected the minorities’ life chances? Li and Zhao (2017) show that, for the minorities with urban hukou status, the intergenerational mobility chances are little different from those of the majority but for those with rural hukou, the minorities suffered noticeably, with mobility chances being markedly lower than those of their majority counterparts.

While the foregoing discussed papers that focus on the ‘hard’ aspects of social inclusion, namely, educational and labour market attainment concerning ethnic minorities in Britain, Australia and China, we also have papers that focus on the ‘soft’ aspects, such as social acceptance. Diop and colleagues (2017) show that in Qatar where immigrant workers outnumber the citizens, nationals’ socio-economic conditions play a minor role whereas trust and bridging social ties have a positive impact on accepting Arabs and Westerners as next-door neighbours, highlighting the role of social capital and social relationships on out-group acceptance.

We also sought a balance between papers using quantitative and qualitative methods, with five in each batch. Konyali and Crul (2017) show that, whilst many second-generation people of Turkish origins have managed to find themselves in elite positions in Germany, they are still faced with an enduring stigma of low status birth, suggesting that gaining social acceptance is difficult even for elites among the ethnic minorities. In a somewhat similar fashion, Rouvoet, Eijberts and Ghorashi (2017) show that Italians in the Netherlands face an identity paradox, feeling isolated in the destination country and being an outsider in the home country. Success requires not only cultural but also identificational integration, a theme echoed by Mattes (2017) on the barriers faced by Muslims in Austria and Germany and by Fernández-Suárez (2017) on immigrant inclusion issues in Spain. And, finally, we include a paper by Hanwei Li (2017) who shows that, contrary to stereotypical images of Chinese students good at ‘learning by rote’, the students actually benefit more in their studies by constructing bridging social ties in German universities.

Overall, the papers included in the issue have sought to address both issues of enduring sociological significance and emergent ones using a variety of methods as appropriate to the tasks at hand. The papers bring out clearly the multidimensional nature of integration as well as the diversity of integration challenges. Thus, structural integration in terms of success in the labour market may not always be accompanied by social acceptance or identification with the new society. Shared religion or culture does not always lead to parity with respect to other aspects of integration. The major lesson perhaps from this collection is that simple distinctions, such as that between visible and less visible minority groups, can hide more than they reveal. Integration is a complex and dynamic process. The authors include both well-established and younger scholars. We hope that readers will enjoy reading the papers.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article


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Abstract

This paper examines the ethnic and household registration system (hukou) effects on intergenerational social mobility for men in China. Using national representative surveys covering almost two decades (1996–2014), we assess both absolute and relative rates of mobility by ethnicity and hukou origin. With regard to absolute mobility, we find that minority men had significantly lower rates of total and upward mobility than Han men, and those from rural hukou origins faced more unfavourable chances. With regard to relative mobility, we find men of rural ethnic origins significantly less likely to inherit their parental positions. Even with parental and own educational qualifications and party memberships controlled for, we still find ethnic minority men of rural hukou origins behind others in access to professional-managerial positions. Overall, our findings suggest that the preferential policies have largely removed the ethnic differences in the urban sector but ethnic minority men from rural hukou origins are faced with double disadvantages: in addition to the inequality of opportunity rooted in the institutional divide which they share with the majority group from similar backgrounds, they face much greater inequalities in conditions, namely, in having poorer socio-economic and cultural resources.

Keywords

China; ethnicity; household registration system (hukou); social mobility

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1. Introduction

The aim of this paper, drawing on national representative sample surveys in China, is to examine the social inequality in intergenerational class mobility in terms of ethnic and structural relations. We address ethnic and structural inequalities simultaneously by exploring the mobility differences between the ethnic minority and the majority (Han), and for people from urban and rural origins. The ethnic dimension is easy to understand but unlike the situation in western countries, ethnicity has added complexity in China due to the scale, diversity, geography and political importance of the ethnic minority groups. The structural differences refer to the inequalities embedded in the household registration (hukou) system which was implemented in the 1950s and which has limited the upward mobility chances of people from rural origins for over half a century. Any mobility research on China would be incomplete without taking into account the hukou effects. Quite a few studies have been conducted examining the hukou effects on mobility but to the best of our knowledge, no research has been conducted on intergenerational social mobility by ethnicity in China. To this end, this paper seeks to understand the
ethno-hukou intersection in contemporary China by providing evidence on both the absolute and the relative rates of social class mobility.

Social mobility research and ethnic studies are, as Li and Heath (2016) note, both concerned with the same underlying issue, that of social equality and social justice. Social inequality, be it manifested in terms of family background, ethnicity/race, gender, age, disability, sexuality or other ascribed characteristics, is economically inefficient, morally indefensible and politically illegitimate. In the western capitalist countries, ethnic issues are mainly concerned with the difficulties faced by immigrants and their descendants in education, employment and career advancement, and are thus a matter of inter-ethnic relations and of socio-economic integration. In China, ethnicity has, in addition to socio-economic equality, extra considerations such as political stability, national unity and border safety as most of the ethnic minorities live in the western part of the country which tends to be mountainous, under-developed and bordering other countries. The Chinese government attaches great importance to ethnic unity and equality and has, especially in the last few decades, instigated numerous preferential policies to try to help the minorities in their socio-economic development. Quite a few studies have been made to evaluate the effects of such policies but owing to the lack of appropriate data on parental class position, researchers have thus far been unable to assess whether ethnic minorities have similar mobility chances to those by the majority, the extent of difference, and the possible reasons that may underlie such differences. The present analysis wishes to provide evidence to these questions for the first time.

This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give a brief review of the socio-economic-demographic profile of China’s ethnic minorities, the preferential policies adopted by the Chinese Government towards the minorities to improve their life chances, and the research findings about the education, employment and income situations of the ethnic groups. A brief discussion will also be made of the main findings from the social mobility research perspective for the urban and rural populations in China. After that, we explain the data and methods to be used in the paper, followed by presentation of our findings on both the absolute and the relative mobility rates along ethnic and hukou dimensions. In the final section, we summarize our findings with some discussion.

2. Ethnic Minorities in China

China is a vast country with a very large population. It is also a multi-ethnic and multicultural country. There are currently 55 officially-designated ethnic minority groups in addition to the Han majority. According to the 2010 Census of the Population of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 114 million people were of ethnic minority heritages, accounting for 8.49% of the overall population (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).

Whilst ethnic minorities take up a relatively small proportion in the overall population in China, they occupy a strategically important position as they live in areas comprising around two thirds of the nation’s territory. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enacted pro-ethnic policies in its controlled areas even during the war years, promising equal rights for all ethnic minorities (Sautman, 1999). After the PRC was founded in 1949, the central government made numerous efforts to protect minority interests and promote their socio-economic development such as by giving them official legal status, creating written language for some of the groups, guaranteeing equal rights in the 1982 Constitution, promoting equal opportunities in the 1984 Law of Regional Autonomy and many subsequent laws and regulations at the central and provincial levels (Gladney, 1996; Lin, 1997).

Owing to the low population density and the vast areas of territory the ethnic minorities populate, the central government gave areas with relatively high ethnic concentrations a special political and administrative status called ‘ethnic autonomous regions’. Five such autonomous regions were created at the provincial level (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, and Xinjiang), 30 autonomous areas at the prefectural level and 120 autonomous administrative units at the county level (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Being an autonomous region does not necessarily mean that ethnic minorities comprise the overwhelming majority of the residents in the area. As a matter of fact, they only consist of 45% of the population in the five regions. But the overall socio-economic levels in the areas are below those in the rest of the country, especially the big cities and the coastal areas which have witnessed rapid development since the reform programme was launched in 1978.

China has a tradition of treating all ethnic groups as members of a big family in the nationhood building. In fact, in the Chinese language, the word ‘country’ (guo jia) literally means ‘nation family’. To ensure equal rights amongst the family members (the different ethnic groups in this case), the central government and the CCP have adopted many measures to enhance the political, social and economic wellbeing of the ethnic minority groups. Several social movements were launched in the 1950s and 1960s to combat Han chauvinism in minority areas, to show full respect to the cultural traditions of the ethnic minority groups, to avoid condescendence in attitudes, behaviours and practices when working with people of ethnic minority heritages, and to fight against discrimination of one kind or another, especially in recruitment and promotion (Chao, 1994; McMillen, 1979, p. 114). At the same time, tens of thousands of educated youths and technical personnel were sent from the majority population to the autonomous areas to help with the socio-economic development, and to strengthen the national security of the border areas (Attané & Courbage, 2000).
The ethnic minorities, like people in the rest of the country, suffered during the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), with minority cultural customs labelled as primitive, minority cadres exposed to ridicule, and pro-ethnic policies regarded as unnecessary (Dreyer, 1968; He, 2005, p. 69; Lin, 1997). Since the early 1980s, a wide range of policy measures have been adopted to mitigate the adverse influence of the Cultural Revolution and to support the socio-economic development of minorities including, most importantly, the 1982 State Constitution of China in which equal rights were enshrined in law for all ethnicities in the country. The previous autonomous administration system was reinstated at the provincial and lower levels, and numerous preferential policies were enacted and implemented from the central to the local governments to help the minorities, including exemptions from the one-child family-planning policy, lower marks for university admissions, economic assistance and tax reduction, and more favourable opportunities for recruitment and promotion. The overall aim of the policies was not only for the minorities to have better opportunities, but also to achieve the ultimate aim of equal outcomes among all ethnic groups (Chen, 1991).

As compared with ‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive discrimination’ programmes in some other countries, China’s preferential policies are, as Sautman notes, ‘broader (encompassing a wider array), deeper (affecting almost all minority people) and more variegated (due to decentralization)’ (1998, p. 86). Perhaps the most notable example of such policies pertains to the minorities’ exemption from the strict regulations on family planning. The one-child policy was implemented nationwide in the early 1980s, but most of the minority groups were allowed to have two children in the urban areas and three or four in the rural areas (Attané & Courbage, 2000; Bulte, Heerink, & Zhang, 2011; Sautman, 1999). Although the policy varied to some extent over time and across regions, the principle of showing respect to minority cultures by allowing them to have more children remained unchanged. Yet, as we are going to see, this preferential treatment in the form of ‘greater opportunities’ may have yielded an unintended consequence, in the sense of aggravating the already existing inequality of condition and creating additional barriers for mobility. We shall come to this later when we discuss the findings. Here we focus on policies that might have had direct and positive impacts on the minorities’ life chances, including those on education, employment, and economic support.

With regard to education, China’s Compulsory Education Law (1992) covers all children for nine years, from primary to lower secondary schools. Yet full coverage was not achieved in the remote areas, most of which were in minority autonomous regions. Many people in these areas were in dire poverty and could not even afford the basic teaching materials. In order to improve the coverage and ensure the basic standard of education in the minority areas, the central government allocated special resources called the Ethnic Minorities Education Aid Special Fund. In 1994, the state raised the funding to one billion Chinese Yuan per year, a fivefold increase as compared with the previous years. With the assistance of the fund, hundreds of boarding schools were built in the remote areas. Students were exempted from fees for tuition and books and, in many cases, were guaranteed free food, clothing, lodging, and supplementary study materials (Sautman, 1998, p. 91). Ethnic autonomous regions were also encouraged to develop their own curriculum and use their own language in the local schools. These programmes catered for the special needs on language, culture and historical traditions of the local ethnic communities, and the expenses in teacher training, curriculum designing and extra printing were partly funded by the government budget (Postiglione, 2009, p. 504). Yet the special treatment for teaching ethnic languages and cultures also added to the students’ difficulty in learning, making them proficient in neither the local nor the national language and lowering their prospects for advancing into higher levels of education.

As for higher education, ethnic minority students enjoy a range of preferential policies. For university admission, ethnic students were given extra points on the basis of their original marks in the national entrance examination or were offered a lower threshold for admission. For example, Sautman (1998) reported that in Xinjiang in 1987, the Han (majority) students needed an average score of 470 points in science and 445 points in liberal arts for access to key universities, while the minorities only needed an average score of 313 and 269 points respectively. In addition, the government has established more than 20 universities for ethnic minorities, mostly located within the minority areas, so that the minority students could have access to higher education near their hometown (Huang, 2000). These universities mainly enrol students from minority backgrounds and offer special subjects based on the needs of different ethnic regions. In order to enhance the education quality of minority students, the state has initiated a programme for top national universities to form partnerships with those in minority autonomous regions for cooperation and assistance, such as teacher training, facility donation, library resource sharing, and various other forms of exchange (Yang & Wu, 2009).

The preferential treatment does not stop at education. Ethnic minorities in China also enjoy favourable treatment in recruitment and promotion, especially in the autonomous regions. The 1993 Regulations on Work with the Urban National Minorities called on enterprises to recruit more minority workers in return for lower taxes or tax breaks. As in the case of university admission, when examinations were required for job seekers, minority applicants would have bonus points. For instance, in the employment examination for an oil and chemical factory in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang autonomous region, applicants from the Han majority needed 250 points whereas the minimum for minorities was 120. In some cases, the minority status is necessary as employers need...
to meet the job quotas to reflect the ethnic composition of the population in the local area (Sautman, 1998).

The preferential policies give even greater advantages to ethnic minorities for access to cadre positions or promotions within government agencies. According to the 1982 State Constitution of China, the head of ethnic autonomous regions must be a member of the ethnic group that comprises the majority of the population in that particular location, and the preference was then extended to such an extent as to prioritise minority candidates in the recruitment of lower-level government personnel as well (Gustafsson & Li, 2003). As a result, many places have seen an upsurge of hiring and promoting minority cadres since the 1980s. Of particular note in this context is the fact that China has a dual leadership system, consisting of CCP leaders and administrative officials at all levels of government agencies and state-run enterprises. The party leaders in the minority areas do not have to be members from the ethnic minorities and thus the minorities are more represented in the administrative than in the party organisations.

The Chinese government has not only provided financial and other kinds of help to individuals of ethnic minority heritages in education and employment but also enacted favourable economic policies for the autonomous regions where minority ethnics tend to reside. In the more recent times, the government has initiated two grand projects, The Development of the Western Region (2000) and The Silk Road Economic Belt (2013), in which all the five autonomous regions were included as key areas for national and international investment. In addition, various preferential policies were introduced to support economic growth in minority autonomous areas. As instigated in the 1982 Constitution, the minority autonomous areas are allowed lower tax rates and greater fiscal controls over their local revenues (Zang & Li, 2001). At the meso level, programmes such as government-subsidized microcredit have also been set in motion prioritising poor households in minority areas, and direct subsidies and tax breaks have been granted to these areas and to businesses run by minorities. Given the vast array of economic and other favours enjoyed by ethnic minorities, having an ethnic minority status is, or is perceived as being, advantageous, which can be seen from the fact that millions of people changed their ethnic identity from Han to minority status in the 1980s and the 1990s to benefit from the preferential policies conferred upon the minorities (Sautman, 1999, p. 286), and those of mixed ethnic backgrounds have also been found to prefer a minority identity, which have contributed to the increase in the proportion of the minorities in the overall population (Hoddie, 1998). A study using a more recent census data arrived at a similar conclusion, namely, that children from inter-ethnic families are more inclined to be registered as minority ethnic rather than as majority Han (Guo & Li, 2008).

Given the breadth and depth of preferential policies implemented in China in the last few decades, one might ask whether ethnic minorities are still disadvantaged or whether they have caught up with or even surpassed the majority group in socio-economic life. Existing studies have explored this question from different perspectives and we here give a brief summary of the effects in education, income, and occupational attainment.

With regard to educational attainment, studies have shown that, after decades of government assistance, ethnic differences in primary schooling have been largely removed, but disparities remain at the transition to lower and higher secondary schools (Hannum, 2002; Hong, 2010). As for college education, although the number of minority students has been increasing rapidly, the percentage is still lower than expected. The ethnic minorities accounted for 8.41% and 9.44% of the national populations in 2000 and 2005 respectively, but only 5.71% and 6.10% of the university students came from minority backgrounds in the two years (Zhu, 2010). Moreover, one-fourth of these students were enrolled in ethnic minority colleges, which means the percentages of students studying at universities outside the autonomous regions were even lower (Qin, 2004).

Why are ethnic minorities underrepresented in higher levels of education? Scholars believe that regional economic differentiations and household socioeconomic disparities were the most important factors. The ethnic disadvantages tended to increase after the market transition as the local economic conditions have been playing an increasingly important role in local school resources and educational quality (Hannum, 2002). A lower level of proficiency in Mandarin has also been reported as a crucial contributing factor to the ethnic minority children’s poorer school performance. Minority students with a family background using Mandarin were around twice as likely to be enrolled in high school as those who used minority languages at home (Hong, 2010). Bilingual education using Mandarin plus a minority language was an attempt to preserve minority cultures, but it added burdens to minority students from poor homes who were already struggling with their studies (Lin, 1997), incurring dissatisfaction among ethnic parents (Ma, 2007). On the other hand, the preferential policies enjoyed by the minority students also caused dissatisfaction from among the majority students and their parents who lived alongside the minorities in the minority regions (Ma, 2008).

Turning to income, findings are mixed. Some studies have shown that minorities are economically worse off than are the Han majority. For example, Gao and Teng (2006) showed that the ethnic regions in northwest China had an underdeveloped industrial economy

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1 The data on the proportions of ethnic minorities in China for 2000 and 2010 are from the Censuses of the Population in the two years, but those for 2005 are from the 1% population sampling survey. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qrkpcgb/200603/t20060316_30326.html. Thus while all three proportions (8.41%, 9.44%, and 8.49% for 2000, 2005 and 2010) are official figures on ethnic compositions, that for 2005 may not be as accurate as the other two.
which accounted for the ethnic poverty in those regions. Gustafsson and Sai (2009) found that the minorities had a poverty risk almost twice as high as that for the majority in rural China, but they attributed the difference to location. When location and household characteristics are both taken into account, they conclude, ethnicity does not ‘have much of an independent effect on poverty status’ and the most promising policies for narrowing the inter-ethnic poverty gaps should, according to the authors, be those ‘promoting growth in low-income villages (that are concentrated to western China) irrespective of the ethnicity of the inhabitant’ (Gustafsson & Sai, 2009, p. 604; see also Gustafsson & Li, 2003). In other words, the authors believe that, in fighting against poverty-related inequality, it is location, rather than ethnicity, that matters.

Yet ethnicity is found to matter in terms of occupational attainment. Hannum and Xie (1998) examined occupational differences between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. Using census data from 1982 and 1990, they found a rising occupational dissimilarity between Han and the minorities. For example, the overall percentage of the labour force in agricultural occupations declined from 58.9% to 49.6% between the two-time points, but the percentage for the minorities increased from 69.4% to 76.7%. The rising concentration of the minorities in agricultural work was accompanied by a falling representation in almost all other occupational categories, and educational inequality was held as a key factor for the increasing dissimilarity, especially in the attainment of high-status occupations. In a similar vein, Sautman (1999) found that whilst ethnic minorities had an overrepresentation of cadres as benefiting from the preferential policies in cadre appointment, they were underrepresented among technical and professional occupations. As both studies were based on Xinjiang, it is not possible to know whether the findings would be generalizable to the ethnic occupational difference in the overall population.

These and other studies which we have not been able to include here due to space limit of the paper have much enhanced our understanding of the ethnic minority disadvantages in the different domains of socio-economic life in China. Yet, there is one common feature, or rather a common limitation, in all such analyses, namely, the lack of information on parental social position which has prevented researchers from exploring the family origin effects on the ethnic minorities’ mobility chances. In other words, much work has been conducted comparing the inequalities of opportunity but little work has been carried out that examines the inequalities of condition and the consequences of such inequalities on life chances between the minority and the majority groups.

With regard to studies that do explore the effects of family class, another deficiency is shown. Parallel to what Li and Heath (2016) observed for Britain, ethnic and mobility research scholars in China have also been traveling on separate tracks with the former ignoring family class and the latter ignoring ethnic effects. China’s situation is more complicated than that in Britain though, due to additional layers of stratification. The most significant of such layers is that of the household registration (hukou) system. As earlier noted, this system was implemented in 1955 requiring all new-born babies to be registered following mother’s status, forcing the great majority of the Chinese people at that time and in most of the subsequent periods to have rural hukou, unable to enjoy the benefits provided by the government to urbanites in education, employment, housing, medical insurance and a host of other areas. For decades, the hukou system has served as the most important institutional divide preventing rural citizens from upward mobility. Given this, almost all important mobility analyses in China have taken hukou into consideration.

Within the mobility domain, one of the most important studies is that by Wu and Treiman (2007). Using a national representative sample called Life History and Social Change (conducted in 1996), the authors conducted a thorough analysis of intergenerational social mobility for men in China and found a large-scale downward mobility into agriculture, a feature not elsewhere found in international mobility research. Yet this apparently surprising finding is exactly what would be expected from the hukou system: rural sons cannot follow in their fathers’ footsteps if the fathers were professionals or managers working in the countryside such as teachers, doctors or cadres but their mothers were agricultural workers (peasants). Only a small proportion, ‘the best and the brightest’, of those from rural origins could gain entry tickets to urban life, mainly by gaining admission to university. On the other hand, given the huge size of China’s countryside, even a small proportion from the rural backgrounds who managed to achieve hukou transition could make a big presence in the cities and, what is more, the exceptionally gifted, highly educated, new urbanites tend to take up elite positions. The hukou system had a hugely negative effect on rural people’s mobility chances, which is also reported by Chen (2013) using the 2005 and 2006 China General Social Survey (CGSS). More recently, Li, Zhang and Kong (2015) used more data from the CGSS (2005, 2006, 2008, 2010) for China, and the General Household Survey (2005), the British Household Panel Survey (2006) and the UK Household Longitudinal Survey (2010) for Britain to compare the mobility profiles in the two countries. They found that social inequality in China was much greater than that in Britain, especially for Chinese women. This, the authors showed, was chiefly due to the hukou system. Within each hukou sector, social inequality in China was little different from that in Britain.

Yet, in spite of the advances in mobility research in China, none of the available studies have looked at the ethnic differences in mobility chances. Thus, sadly, ethnic research has failed to look at the family origin effects just as mobility research has neglected the ethnic dimension in social stratification. Given this, it is imper-
ative to know whether social reproduction mechanisms operate in a similar way among the ethnic minorities to that among the majority in China, or whether the ethnic minorities face additional barriers over and above those caused by class origin and hukou status.

3. Data and Variables

In the present study, we use the Life History and Social Change (LHSC, 1996), China General Social Survey (CGSS, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) and China Labour-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS, 2014). Although conducted by different institutions, all three survey series employed multistage probability sampling methods to draw national representative samples for mainland China. While there are some differences in geographical coverage between individual surveys, overall, all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in mainland China are covered in the surveys. The CGSS series also includes data for 2003 but that survey covers urban residents only and is therefore not used in the present analysis.

In this study, we use ‘ethnic minority’ as an overall category without further differentiating between the 55 minority groups. This by no means implies that they are homogeneous. The Korean minority, for instance, have been found to have the best educational attainment in China (Lee, 1986). Thus, different ethnic groups do have considerable demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural differences including fertility, mortality, education, occupation, and use of Mandarin (Ma, 2008, 2010; Poston & Shu, 1987; Yusuf & Byrnes, 1994). We group them together based on two considerations: first, all ethnic minorities enjoy similar preferential policies despite their specific historical and cultural characteristics, which sets them apart from the Han majority. Secondly, as the minorities account for less than 10% in the population, further differentiations would lead to very small sample sizes for the groupings, making it untenable in statistical analysis.

With regard to father’s and respondent’s class, we use the EGP class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979), which is the most widely used class schema for intergenerational social mobility research adopted by practitioners in many countries including China (Chen, 2013; Li et al., 2015; Hannum & Xie, 1998; Wu & Treiman, 2007). We acknowledge that other markers of institutional division such as workplace unit (danwei), hukou status or political power might add strength to the social stratification of the Chinese society, and mobility students on China may apply class-, status- or power- based schemas. In order to take account of the unique characteristics of the Chinese society and to make the results comparable to mobility findings from other countries, we adopt the EGP schema. In our further analysis, we also, where appropriate, control for other attributes relevant to mobility such as age, education and CCP membership. We take the hukou-ethnicity combination in much of our analysis as a key explanatory variable on people’s mobility trajectory alongside father’s class. The EGP class schema is based on employment status and occupational position (current or last main job). All information with regard to respondent’s and father’s employment status and occupational position was collected in the surveys and was coded in a consistent way into own and parental class variables. In the present study, we differentiate, for fathers and respondents alike, five classes: (1) professional and managerial salariat, (2) routine non-manual (clerical), (3) self-employed (own-account), (4) routine manual, and (5) agricultural workers (also called ‘peasant’ in China). For hukou status, we use the respondent’s origin hukou, namely, the status in the adolescent years (around age 14–18). We confine our analysis to men aged 16 to 65 in this analysis, and exclude those who have never worked such as students, which gives us a sample size of 35,147 for analysis. Gender and workplace affiliation (danwei) are also very important dimensions of social stratification in China (Li et al., 2015; Lin & Bian, 1991) but space limitations do not allow us to explore these in this paper.

4. Analysis

Following standard approaches in the literature we address both absolute and relative rates of mobility by ethnicity and hukou status. To assess absolute mobility rates, we start with the class distributions by the various ethnic-hukou groups, supplemented by an analysis of gross and net amounts of mobility. The former is measured by using the dissimilarity index (DI) and the latter by using Lieberson’s (1975) net difference index (NDI). The DI indicates the percentages of cases that would have to be reallocted to make the two distributions identical and thus measures the overall difference between any two distributions. As the DI is insensitive to the local concentrations in or the direction of differences between, father’s and son’s classes, we use the NDI to show the net class decline or advancement of the son’s relative to the father’s class. Proceeding from this, we analyse the total,

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2 The data files, including technical reports, for LHSC, CGSS and CLDS are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.1175/M889V1, http://www.cnsda.org/, and http://css.sysu.edu.cn/Data respectively. Qinghai and Ningxia were not covered prior to 2010 and Xizang (Tibet) was only covered in 2010. Nevertheless, this is the best social survey series available covering mainland China. The response rates in the CGSS are 62.1%, 60.4%, 59.9%, 74.3%, 72.6%, 71.5% and 72.2% for 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The CLDS is a panel study, with the wave 2 (2014) response rate being 75.7% of the wave 1 (2012). See http://css.sysu.edu.cn/Data/List?type=%e4%b8%ad%e5%9b%bd%e5%8a%a8%e5%8a%a8%e5%8a%a8%e6%80%83%e8%b0%83%e6%9f%a5

3 The NDI is defined as $NDI = \frac{pr(X > Y) - pr(Y > X)}{1 - pr(X = Y)}$ and further defined as $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{n_i}{n} \cdot \frac{x_i}{y_i} - \frac{y_i}{x_i}\right)$, where, in our case, $X$ indicates father’s class and $Y$ that of the respondent. It is noted here that we reversed the class order in calculating the NDI with 1 referring to agricultural workers and 5 to the salariat.
upward and downward mobility rates and examine each by ethno-hukou differentiations. To address relative mobility, we use loglinear and log-multiplicative layer effect (also called uniform difference, UNIDIFF) models. These are then supplemented with logit models on son’s access to the professional-managerial salariat controlling for ethno-hukou status, father’s class, and a range of socio-demographic attributes.

4.1. Overall Distributions and Absolute Mobility

We begin with the overall class distributions of fathers and sons, distinguishing the Han majority and the ethnic minorities and, for each, within the urban and the rural sectors. The data are shown in Table 1 where we also show the DI and the NDI. Looking first at the urban sector, we can see that there is not much difference between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities in terms of father’s or son’s class distributions. Minority fathers have, if anything, a somewhat higher percentage in salariat positions (27.3%) than Han fathers (25.2%). Minority sons are less likely to find themselves in salariat or clerical, and more likely to find themselves in own-account, positions relative to their majority peers. When we look at the rural sector, we see a clear manifestation of ethnic divide. As expected, the overwhelming majority of fathers from both groups were agricultural workers, 80% for Han and 84% for minority fathers, and there is little difference in the distributions to the other class categories. Yet, this overall similarity in fathers’ distributions is not shown for sons. Sons from the Han majority group were clearly more likely to occupy higher social positions, from the salariat to the manual working class and are therefore much less likely to find themselves in agricultural positions (44.6%) as compared with minority men (64.8%). The DI and the NDI also show greater gross mobility and net class advancement by Han than by minority men, and that in both urban and rural sectors.

The data in Table 1 thus show that men from ethnic minority backgrounds were disadvantaged. This, of course, is an overall profile, without taking into account the effects of father’s class on son’s class. In Table 2, we show the class distribution of sons by father’s class. For simplicity, we do it by ethnicity but in the ‘summary statistics’, we also report findings from further analyses by hukou status and by the ethno-hukou combination.

The ethnic differences are clearly shown in the two panels. For those from salariat families, we see that 38.2% of Han but only 28.7% of minority sons were able to get salariat positions and the risks in downward mobility into agriculture was three times as high: 34.5% versus 10.5%, or a difference of 24 percentage points. The difference in intergenerational stability in agricultural jobs is at a similar level: 68.5% for minority sons and 49.3% for Han sons. And comparing the figures under columns 1 and 5, we can see that the majority (Han) sons from each class backgrounds were more likely to find themselves in salariat, and less likely to find themselves in agricultural, jobs.

The data in the two panels of Table 2 are colour-coded and presented in row percentages. Had we conducted the analysis in cell percentages, we could have easily obtained the total immobility and mobility rates, with the latter further differentiated into upward and downward mobility. The details are shown in the lower part of the table called ‘summary statistics’ where, in addition to ethnic rates, we also present the rates by hukou and, furthermore, by ethno-hukou combinations. Also shown are results of statistical tests with Han, Urban, and Han urban and as reference groups in the three domain respectively.

At the overall level, over half (53.5%) of the Chinese men were in different class positions to their fathers, with 41.8% having better jobs than their fathers and only 11.7% faring worse. Yet the ethnic differences were self-evident, with the minority men having significantly lower rates in both total and upward mobility rates than their majority peers. The hukou differences were less cut, though. Men of rural origins had lower total mobility rates than their urban peers but their upward mobility rates were actually significantly higher, and downward mobility rates significantly lower, than those of their ur-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Fathers’ (F) and Respondents’ (R) class distribution by ethnicity and hukou status.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Salarit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Clerical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Own account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Routine manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Agricultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilarity index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net difference index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ban peers. This is most likely due to the occupational upgrading witnessed in the last thirty years, with 260 million migrant workers moving to cities to find jobs not all of which were routine manual in nature. Further analysis shows that of those from rural origins and currently still holding rural hukou status but not engaged in agricultural work, 13% were doing professional or managerial work, and 9% were doing clerical work. The rural sector has been held at a much lower place since the 1950s and it is thus easier for rural residents to move up and more difficult for them to move further down relative to the urbanites. And looking at the data on the ethnohukou combination, we find what we have suspected: minority men of rural origins have benefited least from the socio-economic development of the country—they have significantly lower rates in both total and upward mobility than do the urban majority peers.4

4.2. Relative Social Mobility

We now turn to a different way of looking at class reproduction, namely, relative mobility. Our research questions can be expressed as follows: do we find a weaker association between class origins and destinations among the minority than among the majority group? Do we find a ‘perverse openness’ where minority status tends to ‘trump’ class so that minority men are held back irrespective of their fathers’ class situation?

Relative mobility (often termed ‘fluidity’ or ‘openness’) refers to the competition between people from different origins in obtaining advantaged and avoiding disadvantaged destinations, and is expressed in odds ratios. The closer the odds ratio is to 1, the weaker the class reproduction (and the greater the level of social fluidity or openness). Our interest, then, is whether the odds ratios for the minority group are closer to unity than they are for the majority group. Standard techniques for testing the relationships are to fit three models: the conditional independence model which serves as the baseline; the common social fluidity model (CmSF), which allows for an association between origin and destination but not the three-way interactions; and the log-multiplicative layer effect (also called uniform difference, or UNIDIFF) model which provides an assessment of the extent to which the minority group differs from the majority in the magnitude of the origin/destination odds ratios. This third model provides us with a general test of differences in fluidity, testing whether there is a uniform pattern for the odds ratios to be closer to (or further away from) 1 in a particular layer of the table. To save space, we do not provide the statistical formulae of the three models (interested readers could see Li & Heath, 2016). For the same reason and as the model fit statistics are quite abstract, we are not going to show the statistic details here (results available on request). Basically, none of the three models fit the data by ethnicity, hukou, and ethnohukou combination to an acceptable degree but the UNIDIFF models do provide a significant improvement in fit over the CmSF models. Yet, it is of interest to present the UNIDIFF parameters for the ethnohukou combination (Figure 1), which shows that the association between father’s and son’s class positions is significantly weaker for the minority men of rural origins than for the majority of urban origins.

The UNIDIFF model is good at capturing the magnitude of difference in the origins-destinations association between one layer and another, but it is not good at pinpointing the aspect in which the odds ratios defining the origins-destinations association is particularly strong or weak. As Li and Devine (2011) and Li and Heath (2016) show in the British context, the relative mobility can be much more salient in some aspects of the class competition than in others. To see this more clearly in the Chinese context, we show the symmetrical odds ratios.

As we pooled the data from 1996 to 2014, the question arises as to whether there are significant changes in the net association between father’s and son’s classes over the years covered. Our analysis shows, quite reassuringly (see Footnote Figure 1 below), that whilst some fluctuations manifest themselves in the year-by-year pattern, the changes are not of a clearly directional order or to a significant extent. It is also noted here that as the LHSC and the CGSS are individual-level samples and the CLDS is a household-level survey, we randomly selected one adult respondent from each household in the CLDS.

Footnote Figure 1. UNIDIFF parameter estimates and confidence intervals for survey years.
### Table 2. Class distribution by class of origin (percentage by row).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of origin</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel 1: Han</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Salarit</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Clerical</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Own account</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Routine manual</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Agricultural</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel 2: Minority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Salarit</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Clerical</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Own account</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Routine manual</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Agricultural</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Upward</th>
<th>Downward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han (ref)</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>40.4***</td>
<td>28.9***</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By hukou</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (ref)</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>55.1***</td>
<td>42.6***</td>
<td>8.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By ethno-hukou</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han urban (ref)</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han rural</td>
<td>52.6***</td>
<td>44.2***</td>
<td>8.4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority urban</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>33.1*</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rural</td>
<td>37.4***</td>
<td>28.4***</td>
<td>9.1***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significance tests are conducted on the summary statistics. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Minority rural men have significantly lower levels of total and upward mobility than Han rural men at the 0.001 level in both respects.*

---

**Figure 1.** UNIDIFF parameter estimates and confidence intervals.
The data in Table 3 show the relative social advantages and disadvantages associated with different classes and along the ethnicity, hukou and ethno-hukou dimensions. Take the top left-hand cell of the table for example. The figure (1.93) means that for men from the majority group (Han), they are nearly twice as likely to find themselves in salariat rather than clerical positions if they are from salariat families as compared with men from clerical families in the same kind of competition (for salariat rather than clerical jobs). The figure below it (2.45) refers to the odds ratio for the ethnic minority men. The minority figure is slightly higher than that for the majority but the difference is not significant.

Now if we turn our gaze to the top-right cell, we see 16.99 and 8.26 as odds ratios for the competitions between Classes 1 and 5 for the majority and the minority men respectively. Thus, among the Han, as compared with a peasant’s son, a salariat’s son is 17 times as likely to find himself in a professional or a managerial position rather than as an agricultural worker. Compared with the majority, the minority is less unequal, with the odds ratio being half the magnitude, and the differences between the two sets of odds ratios are significant at the 0.001 level. The lesser inequality as shown here implies a much greater disadvantage faced by the ethnic minorities in being less able to inherit their father’s superior class positions.

### Table 3. Symmetrical odds ratios for mobility tables by ethnicity, hukou and ethno-hukou combination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Panel 1: by ethnicity</th>
<th>Panel 2: by hukou</th>
<th>Panel 3: by ethno-hukou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>3.68</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The odds ratios in each cell are for Han and minority in Panel 1; for urban and rural hukou origins in Panel 2, and for Han urban, minority urban, Han rural, and minority rural in Panel 3, respectively; For cell counts below 5, the odds ratios are not shown (as indicated by -); Significance tests are conducted with Han in Panel 1, urban in Panel 2 and Han urban in Panel 3 as reference groups. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
There are, as expected, pronounced hukou effects on mobility chances, particularly surrounding Class 5 (agricultural workers). Thus, as we see in Panel 2, men of urban hukou origins tend to have more favourable chances, at three times or higher, than do men of rural origins in the class competitions, namely, in competing to avoid agricultural positions. For instance, in the Classes 1 versus 5 competitions, the odds ratios are 18.3 and 6.4 for urban and rural sectors respectively, and 16.3 and 5.8 for the routine manual versus peasant sons, both pairs being significantly different at the 0.001 levels.

There are thus both ethnic and hukou differences which are most concentrated in the class competition in trying to arrive at higher, and to avoid agricultural, jobs. The combined effects, as shown in Panel 3, bring the disadvantages of minority rural men to the sharpest relief. It is true that among these men, coming from salariat families still have an advantage of around 3.3 times being themselves found in salariat rather than peasant jobs as compared with their peasant peers in the same kind of competition, but this is less than half than for their Han peers (7.2), and well below that for the urban co-ethnics (26.3) or for the urban Han (16.5). Further analysis, using minority rural men as the reference group, shows that all three groups are significantly more advantaged (p. 0.001, 0.016 and 0.009 respectively).

We have, in the preceding analysis, looked at the absolute and the relative mobility rates associated with ethnicity and hukou origins. Family class, ethnicity and hukou statuses are shown as being very important markers of social inequality in China. There are, however, other factors which we could not consider due to constraints in descriptive and loglinear modelling. For instance, minorities tend to reside in underdeveloped areas and face more structural barriers. In our data, only 22% of minority men as against 35% of the Han have high-school education or above. The former are also less likely than the latter to be CCP members (12% and 15% respectively). In the remaining part of this section, we turn to logit analysis on access to professional-managerial salariat to try to control for these and other factors. We construct five models. Model 1 includes father’s class and respondent’s own age; model 2 adds father’s education and CCP membership as well as respondent’s ethnocracy status (we use rural Han as the reference group for modelling stability as this is the largest group in our data); models 3 and 4 add respondent’s education and CCP membership respectively (as indicators of cultural and political capital); and model 5 further adds an interaction term for ethnocracy and education (level of education is used as a continuous variable here following Li & O’Leary, 2007).

With regard to data in Table 4, we find, in model 1, strong effects of father’s class, and with clear gradients. Even with age differences taken into account, coming from salariat families is highly conducive to one’s career life, increasing the odds of salariat access by around five-fold \((e^{1.064} = 4.97)\). When father’s education, CCP membership and respondent’s ethnocracy status are entered in Model 2, we find that these have highly significant effects and that the effect of father’s class, albeit reduced, is still highly significant. In Model 3, respondent’s own education is taken into consideration which is shown as being of chief importance in explaining salariat access while the effects of father’s education and CCP membership as well as respondent’s own ethnocracy status are reduced to a general insignificance, suggesting that these effects are mediated via respondents’ education. Surprisingly, we see that father’s class is still highly significant. In Model 4, we further control for respondent’s own CCP membership which is found to be highly conducive to salariat access (in our data, 37% of the salariat, 23% of the clerical workers but only 8% of the agricultural workers are CCP members: joining the CCP is usually a first step in one’s career advancement in China). Finally, in Model 5, we control for the interaction effects of ethnocracy status and education. The pattern of the coefficients for the other variables in the model are little changed as compared with those in Model 4 but we do find that the returns to the majority men of urban hukou status are negative, echoing Wu and Treiman’s (2007) finding that given the institutional divide, only the ‘best and brightest’ from rural origins could gain their passport to urban life via higher education and those who do manage to do so tend to occupy the elite positions. Also noticeable is the fact that the coefficients for the minority rural men remain strongly negative and persistently significant from Models 2 to 5.

Finally, we present a bird’s eye view of mobility chances conditional on father’s class and ethnocracy status (Figure 2). The data are obtained from the predicted probabilities based on Model 5 of Table 4, with the effects of the covariates taken at their mean values. Hence the data pertain to the net effects of father’s class and ethnocracy statuses. The stratification order is clearly shown. Other things being equal, a minority man of rural hukou origin would still have a smaller chance of becoming a professional or manager than his Han compatriot with urban hukou even if the former comes from a salariat family and the latter from agricultural origin (typically working on state farms): 21.5% versus 22.6%. And the disparity runs seven times as high between urban Han men from salariat families and rural minority men from peasant families in the competition for salariat destinations (44.9% and 6.6%).

5. Discussion and Conclusion

We have, in this paper, made what we believe as the first attempt to study intergenerational social mobility by ethnicity in contemporary China. Drawing on the best available data containing the key variables for the analysis (father’s and own class, ethnocracy statuses and a range of other factors), we conducted the analysis of both absolute and relative rates of mobility for men from minority and majority ethnic groups and of rural and urban
Table 4. Logit regression results on access to the professional-managerial salariat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father’s class (peasant = ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Salarit</td>
<td>1.604***</td>
<td>0.889***</td>
<td>0.793***</td>
<td>0.790***</td>
<td>0.728***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>1.247***</td>
<td>0.666***</td>
<td>0.458***</td>
<td>0.460***</td>
<td>0.431***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own account</td>
<td>1.032***</td>
<td>0.666***</td>
<td>0.457***</td>
<td>0.474***</td>
<td>0.384**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine manual</td>
<td>0.823***</td>
<td>0.376***</td>
<td>0.256***</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
<td>0.213**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log age</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>−0.624</td>
<td>−0.787</td>
<td>−0.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s education (primary = ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher professional+</td>
<td>0.931***</td>
<td>−0.178</td>
<td>−0.130</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professional</td>
<td>0.807***</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>−0.067</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary</td>
<td>0.594***</td>
<td>−0.038</td>
<td>−0.021</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>0.498***</td>
<td>0.174**</td>
<td>0.183**</td>
<td>0.191**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Father’s CCP membership</td>
<td>0.192***</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
<td>−0.121</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethno-hukou (Han rural = ref)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Han urban</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.957***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority urban</td>
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<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.079</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority rural</td>
<td>−0.473***</td>
<td>−0.234*</td>
<td>−0.234*</td>
<td>−0.478*</td>
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<tr>
<td>R’s education (lower sec = ref)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree+</td>
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<td>Higher professional</td>
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<td>3.043***</td>
<td>3.326***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professional</td>
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<td>2.152***</td>
<td>2.282***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher secondary</td>
<td>1.439***</td>
<td>1.314***</td>
<td>1.320***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R’s CCP membership</td>
<td>0.900***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.887***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-hukou*education (Han rural = ref)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han urban</td>
<td>−0.329***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority urban</td>
<td>−0.030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rural</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−2.007*</td>
<td>−3.297**</td>
<td>−2.281</td>
<td>−1.600</td>
<td>−1.611</td>
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<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
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<td>32990</td>
<td>32753</td>
<td>32753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The coefficients for years (1996 = ref) are not shown. We also checked using the list-wise approach (using the same data as available in all models) and found the same patterns (data from the list-wise approach and those on years are available on request). * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Figure 2. Predicted probability of access to the salariat.
**hukou** statuses. Our main findings can be summarised as follows.

In terms of gross mobility, we found that minority and majority men from the urban sector were not much different from each other but those from rural origins had greater mobility, especially those from the majority group who had the greatest net class advancement. This is most likely due to the massive internal migration in the reform period where an estimated 260 million people of rural status went to cities to find jobs in the burgeoning and rapidly developing industries and commercial enterprises. Rural men of minority backgrounds also made use of the opportunities but to a lesser extent. Coming from a much lower starting point, ethnic minority men from rural origins not only had lower total mobility, but their upward mobility rates were also the lowest as compared with the other groups. They had fewer family resources to start with and even those from similar backgrounds were less able to inherit their family resources, as shown in the ‘symmetrical odds ratios’, resulting in the significantly weaker association between origins and destinations. Even with parental and own cultural and political capital taken into account, we still found that ethnic minority men from rural origins were significantly behind other groups in access to the salariat. The net mobility profiles, as we saw in Figure 2 on predicted probabilities, show a clear stratification order in China with three main features. Firstly, family class has a very important influence for all ethno-*hukou* groups but more so for the majority men from urban origins than for others. Secondly, those of minority rural statuses faced the gravest disadvantages, much more so than their majority peers from similar (rural) origins. Thirdly, ethnicity is also shown to have some influence for the urban sector but the effects are generally weaker than for the rural sector.

How do we explain the findings? A great deal has been written about the household registration (*hukou*) system in creating the barriers against the rural citizens in upward social mobility (Bian, 2008; Chen, 2013; Li et al., 2015; Lin & Bian, 1991; Wu & Treiman, 2007) and the disadvantages faced by rural citizens are expected. We have also seen above that a whole range of preferential policies, especially in the last thirty years or so, have been adopted by governments at all levels to create more favourable opportunities for the ethnic minorities, and such policies cover a host of areas from education, employment to economic development. Given such favourable opportunities, why do ethnic minority men from rural origins still lag behind?

There are of course many reasons accounting for our findings the most important of which would be the longstanding poverty due to the relative underdevelopment of the local economy in the minority regions, especially in rural areas. The government assistance, in the forms of preferential policies, direct funding and investment, has no doubt helped the minority populations to ameliorate the situation. Without such generous support, the ethnic gaps in mobility would have been much larger. Yet some of the policies, well-intended as they were in respecting and preserving minority cultures such as the exemption from the family-planning policies, might have had the unintended consequences of perpetuating their poverty. For rural ethnic families already struggling in poverty and with rather limited upward mobility chances available in the local economy, having three, four or more children would only reduce their chances for improvement as compared with urban families with smaller family sizes or even with the majority peers in the rural, more developed, area where the family-planning policies were generally reinforced.

The bilingual education adopted for some ethnic schools may also have had the unintended consequences of adding to the learning difficulties of ethnic children, making it harder for them to compete with Mandarin speakers (Lin, 1997; Ma, 2007). This might not be a serious problem in the developed areas with high quality of education, such as areas where ethnic Koreans are located, but it may have aggravated the educational disadvantage for most of the other ethnic minority groups. Furthermore, the lower marks required of ethnic students for college admissions, whilst a clear boost to ethnic equality, may also have lowered their competitive edge as compared with that of the majority students studying in national universities. In an increasingly market-oriented economy, demonstrated competence, rather than a formal diploma or certificate, is becoming the order of the day in China.

There are many other reasons which we cannot cover here. Overall, we would say that ethnic minorities may have enjoyed equal or better opportunities (as entailed in the preferential policies) relative to the majority group but it is the inequality of condition that sets the two groups apart. Thus, the government should do more, rather than less, to help the minorities, especially those in the rural, poverty-stricken, regions.

Finally, we need to draw the readers’ caution that, even though we have used what are the best data sources currently available for ethnic mobility analysis, there are limitations in our study. Firstly, due to the lack of data between 1996 and 2005, we could not explore mobility trajectories in the intervening years. On the other hand, given the pattern as shown in Footnote Figure 1, there is little reason to believe that the mobility trajectories in those years would have diverged greatly from what is revealed in the analysis had data for the years been available. Changes in the mechanisms of social reproduction usually take place at a rather slow pace, as the voluminous mobility research in the world over half a century has shown. Secondly, although our pooled data cover all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia were underrepresented as they were not covered in the earlier years. Thus, the minority groups in those areas were less represented than in other areas. While this is less than desirable, we need to bear in mind that the minority groups in these provinces are mainly Zang and Hui ethnic minorities who are also found in large numbers in other provinces and cities such as...
Sichuan, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Gansu, Henan and Shanxi which were well represented in the data used in the analysis, and this would give us fairly good reasons to believe that the mobility chances of their co-ethnics who were surveyed in the other provinces will have been generally representative of their own trajectories. This having been said, the lower growth rates of the local economies in the three provinces in the last few decades might have had negative effects on the upward mobility chances of the ethnic minorities, resulting in an underestimation of the ethnic gaps in the provinces concerned. This needs to be further examined in future studies if and when appropriate data become available. Thirdly, as the minority groups constitute only a very small proportion in the overall population, we have not been able to make further differentiations amongst the ethnic groups in the present study. Fourthly and for similar reasons, we have not been able to examine the spatial effects on ethnic stratification. Our findings of overall similarity between the minority and the majority groups among the urban sector suggest, as Gustafsson and Li (2003) and Gustafsson and Sai (2009) showed in their poverty studies, that there might be strong spatial effects. Maybe ethnic mobility chances are similar in the more developed, coastal, provinces. Overall, while this is the first systematic study of social mobility by ethnic groups in contemporary China based on the best data currently available, there are many other domains of social mobility that we have not been able to explore. Our analysis has also opened up some new channels of exploration which future analyses could undertake, with more and better-quality sample surveys that are being collected in China.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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ment of the ethnic minorities in Western China [in Chinese]. Society, 30(2), 45–73.

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Article

Minority Embeddedness and Economic Integration: Is Diversity or Homogeneity Associated with Better Employment Outcomes?

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Abstract
Using data from the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey 2010 and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, we explore the activity and employment outcomes of majority and minority individuals in the UK, and examine their association with a variety of ethnic embeddedness measures. We do not find that white British respondents living in areas of high deprivation and diversity experience lower levels of economic activity or bad jobs. Deprivation rather than minority embeddedness stands out as the factor that serves to compound both majority and minority disadvantage. In the case of minorities, embeddedness does have some negative effects, although these are greatly attenuated once one takes into account the level of area deprivation.

Keywords
activity; employment; occupational attainment; migrants; minorities

Issue
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1. Introduction

Recent attempts to quantify social inclusion in Europe have been focusing almost exclusively on the rates of activity and employment among migrants and their offspring (Kahanec, 2013). Policy makers have been widely supportive of this pragmatic approach. In a world facing a number of shortages, be it jobs or housing, continuing migrant dependency on the state rather than contribution has the potential to upset the social status quo, to unnerve a majority population concerned with falling standards of living and to undermine the social pact that provides support for welfare regimes in particular, and democracies in general. Furthermore, many politicians remain sceptical of selective acculturation, multiculturalism and a strong reliance upon the co-ethnic community (Cameron, 2013), and often question whether migrants and minorities can prosper under scenarios where minorities remain apart from the mainstream and live ‘parallel lives’. In the context of the UK, the impact of migrants on employment prospects featured significantly in the debates surrounding Brexit and are an indispensable part of any immigration speech (Cameron, 2011; May, 2012). In contrast to this popular sentiment of escalating fears, the academic stance has been that migrants contribute to the system rather than undermine it—they usually have better health outcomes than the average Briton, pay more in taxes and do not really compete for jobs with the majority (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014).

Whereas this optimistic picture of migration can very well hold for the aggregate, different commentators have argued that it obscures the dire state of traditional working class white communities exposed to ‘unbridled’ diversity and the acute competition for resources in places which ‘have been left behind’; that is to say, the ones that lack the structural means to weather profound changes (Casey, 2016; Goodhart, 2013).

Using data from the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey 2010 and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, we explore the activity and employment outcomes
of majority and minority individuals in the UK, and examine their association with a variety of measures of community embeddedness. We do not find that white British respondents living in areas of high diversity experience lower levels of economic activity or bad jobs. Quite the contrary, they appear to benefit in such scenarios. Deprivation rather than percent migrant and minority in the local area stands out as the factor that serves to compound both majority and minority disadvantage.

2. The Impact of Minority Embeddedness and Deprivation

This paper focuses on the economic prospects of the white British, and migrants and minorities, accounting for their embeddedness in local communities. In order to do so, we take into consideration not only individual characteristics but characteristics of the local areas as well such as deprivation, degree of urbanization and level of minority embeddedness. We interpret minority embeddedness as the share of migrants and minorities present in the local area. The greater the share, the greater the minority embeddedness. Effectively, we consider the distinction between the white British on the one hand and on the other hand individuals who are ‘outgroupers’; that is to say, the latter belong to an ethnic group other than white British. In this way, we argue that the paper is able to capture a fundamental distinction at the community level between the white British majority and a range of minority groups (comprising of migrants and the second generation); we can consequently comment on the overall implications of ethnic concentration and diversity both on minorities themselves and on their white British neighbours. However, we acknowledge that our sample sizes are not sufficiently large to permit a fine-grained analysis of specific local conflicts between particular ethnic groups and the white majority.

2.1. White British

Minority embeddedness for the majority group essentially entails more diversity (Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015). The literature on this association has focused on social trust rather than economic outcomes, but for a few exceptions. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013), Dustmann, Frattini and Halls (2010) and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) show that regional migration flows hardly affect the mean wage; however, there are indications that majority members positioned at the lower end of the majority wage distribution are adversely impacted by incoming migrants who create a surplus in the economy by virtue of having greater human capital than the majority population while being ready to settle for unskilled jobs. In other words, low-skilled majority members are possibly worse off due to migration.

One thing to point out is that, unlike the research on social trust, these studies focus on the consequences of migration rather than on the consequences of diversity, and explore regional differences rather than local area variation. In this paper, we have chosen to align ourselves more closely with the postulates of conflict theory, which suggest that as societies diversify, there is growing competition for resources which brings about tensions between the majority groups, migrants and their descendants (Putnam, 2007). Our focus is on local communities. Conflict can be expected to be greater in deprived areas—the fewer the resources to be redistributed, the greater the competition. The literature from the US finds some support for these ideas (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007); however, the data from the UK suggests a much more moderate effect of diversity which usually disappears once controls for deprivation and economic competition are introduced at the community level (Demireva & Heath, 2014; Laurence, 2011; Laurence & Heath, 2008; Letki, 2008; Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Read, & Allum, 2011). It appears that, at least in Britain, it is deprivation that undermines the social glue rather than diversity.

In this paper, we argue that similarly to social trust, the economic prospects of individuals merit greater attention. Some authors speculate that with growing diversity there might be greater competition for jobs (Reyneri & Fullin, 2011). Under such conditions, it is not only the wages of majority members that can be undercut. It is possible that their labour market activity as well as the opportunity to achieve a higher status job is threatened. Other scholars insist that migrants and the majority occupy different economic niches and that this occupational segregation can extend to the second generation as well (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014). If the latter is true the activity and employment status of the white British should be unaffected by diversity. This association can be of particular interest to policy makers who are concerned with the levels of unemployment both among majority and minority members, and the possible burden on the welfare system (Cameron, 2011).

If minority embeddedness induces greater competition for jobs, we would expect that:

Hypothesis 1: As diversity increases, the employment probability of white British respondents will decrease. If migrants and minorities are rewarded proportionately to their human capital, there will be greater competition for high status jobs since migrants in general have higher levels of human capital than white British individuals (Dustmann et al., 2013); and the second generation has surpassed the majority in terms of educational attainment (Heath & Brinbaum, 2007).

Yet, it is possible that diversity just captures the selective sorting of individuals—white British individuals with poorer economic prospects concentrate into more deprived areas that happen to be also more diverse. Thus:

Hypothesis 2: Deprivation rather than levels of diversity will account for the deterioration in the economic social inclusion.
2.2. Migrants and Minorities

The question of whether it is possible for migrants and minorities to achieve upward social mobility while being embedded in communities of co-ethnics and pan-ethnics has been a long standing concern for migration scholars and policy makers. Notably, segmented assimilation theory postulates that some immigrants (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993) may never catch up in terms of earnings with the white middle class, acculturating into the poor, underdeveloped segment of the receiving society (Zhou, 1994); while for others strong ethnic community may nevertheless lead to economic advancement.

Providing a consistent empirical test for segmented assimilation has proved difficult. Segmented assimilation places a focus on the second generation and their chances of occupational mobility (Zhou, 1994). Yet, it is in the first generation that the impact of ethnic embeddedness can be particularly strong: migrants who have little knowledge about institutions in the receiving society can be greatly helped by the existence of co-ethnic organizations that facilitate the first contact with majority employers (Waters, 1999). Important jobs can exist in ethnic economies that minimize unemployment spells (Alba & Nee, 1997). In contrast, other scholars argue that over time, for women, and in the second generation, this positive impact can attenuate and even disappear (Koopmans, 2015). Women with little access to the mainstream society can be encouraged to observe strict social norms and withdraw from the labour market; reservation wages for the second generation individuals with strong co-ethnic ties can be high, leading to higher levels of unemployment. Ultimately, the quality of jobs in the ethnic economy (similarly if these have been obtained through ethnic networks) can be poor; thus, creating the opportunity for stickiness of low status outcomes across generations. Policy makers are particularly suspicious of growing minority embeddedness, usually interpreting it as refusal to embrace integration (Cameron, 2011). Such segregation from the mainstream society is often brought up as a possible explanation for the poor employment prospects of South Asian Muslim communities in Britain (Phillips, 2005).

If these pessimistic predictions hold:

Hypothesis 3: We will observe a negative association between levels of minority embeddedness and the employment prospects of migrant and minority members.

Hypothesis 4: If however, occupying migrant/minority niches reflects on a number of selective processes and constraints (apart from preferred proximity to family and co-ethnic support networks) such as the availability of cheap housing at the point of migration, when we control for deprivation, this association will disappear.

Thus, we will argue that if migrant and minority individuals (Fryer, Pager, & Spenkuch, 2011) are concentrated in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and regions—the ones with greater economic volatility, unemployment, and bad jobs—leaving behind poor employment prospects can prove near impossible. Local area deprivation can impact both the pool of available jobs as well as the information transmitted about openings (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1997).

Several studies provide an examination of segmented economic assimilation with UK data. Using UKLFS 1992–2009, Patacchini and Zenou (2012) find some support for a positive association of local social interaction between people of the same ethnicity which is significant for Bangladesh and Chinese workers, but not for Pakistanis or Indians. These associations are strongest for the most recent arrivals. Feng, Flowerdew and Feng (2015) establish that the ethnic penalty associated with the risk of becoming unemployed and the probability of finding employment is partly explained by geographical deprivation. Ethnic diversity helped women to retain employment but did not affect men. Deprivation partially explained the ethnic minority disadvantage in the English labour market. This research was based on the ONS Longitudinal Study (1991–2001). These studies demonstrate the need for a more comprehensive investigation of local area embeddedness and for a distinction between majority and minority populations; and the present paper aims to fill this important gap.

2.3. Data and Methods

In order to test our hypothesis, we need data for both majority and migrant and minority members. This study makes use of two major datasets with comparable questionnaire structures designed to measure a range of economic, social and political outcomes. Both were administered in 2010. The first is the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey (MCDS). This survey was a random location quota sample of 1650 individuals: 864 white British respondents; and through an ethnic minority booster sample, 786 minority individuals.¹ The second dataset is the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) which focuses only on minority respondents. We would have liked to be able to use the British Election Study 2010 for our majority sample; however, this survey does not ask about the activity and occupational status of respondents. The EMBES was a random probability sample that covers the major ethnic minority groups in the UK with

¹ Of the 1666 respondents, there were 5 missing values for the variable age. All retired respondents and students have been excluded.

Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 20 –31
a sample of 2782 minority individuals. Thus, while the first dataset allows us to compare white British individuals with migrant and minority ones, the second brings us closer to understanding the differences between minority groups. The minority sample in MCDS is small and does not allow for a fine distinction between migrant and minority groups; yet, we achieve this with EMBES.

2.4. Geographical Units

A frequent criticism of diversity studies, such as that of Putnam (2007), is that they employ area units of analysis that vary greatly in size and, therefore, in their potential diversity mix, and are thus incomparable (Dawkins, 2008). The MCDS uses Middle Super Output Areas (MSOAs: minimum number of households 2000, maximum 6000) as the primary sampling unit while the EMBES sample uses Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs: minimum number of households 400, maximum 1200). Compared to wards, MSOAs and LSOAs are felt to be more appropriate for this analysis due to the fact that wards differ greatly in size. We are also better placed to capture economic local area effects along the lines of ethnic niches through MSOAs and LSOAs rather than regions. We acknowledge however the difference in size between the two geographical units and the difficulties this may present for the analysis. However, the use of two datasets, bearing in mind their constraints, allows us to cross-check our results; and in this way yields the analysis to spatial sensitivity. The MCDS sampled 200 areas with the average of 7.95 respondents per unit. The EMBES sample consists of data points spread across 582 LSOAs with the average size of the cluster being 5.5 individuals.

2.5. Dependent Variables

We distinguish between several outcomes which reflect the economic prospects of individuals: the probability of being active (excluding retired respondents and students) and the probability of being employed, which are standard measures of labour market engagement (Van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004). To this, we add a measure of occupational status which reflects on the mobility prospects of individuals (Heath & Yu, 2005). Unfortunately, the measure of wage remuneration is imprecise, with lots of non-response, in both datasets. In addition, in MCDS, the occupational status variables captures occupational status of current or any job that the respondent has held, with those that have never held a job excluded; while in EMBES, the measure refers to the status of the current position of the respondent.

2.6. Independent Variables

2.6.1. Demographics

2.6.6.1. Ethnic Group

The UK studies on minority embeddedness highlight the necessity of distinguishing between the outcomes of different ethnic groups (Patacchini & Zenou, 2012). We distinguish between the outcomes of the majority and four minority groupings with MCDS data: Black Caribbeans and Black Africans, Indians, Pakistani and Bangladeshis and other respondents. With EMBES data, we can draw a more detailed distinction between minority groups. Unfortunately, however, EMBES has poor coverage of other white respondents, which we acknowledge as a limitation of the data.

We know from previous research that age, gender and generational status (Lessard-Phillips, 2015; Luthra, Platt, & Salamonska, 2014) have profound effects upon the opportunities and constraints faced by migrant and minority groups, with South Asian minority women experiencing lower levels of activity and second generation members usually hypothesized to have similar outcomes to the majority. Our EMBES data would allow us to closely examine generational patterns.

At the individual level we distinguish between co-ethnic organizations and co-ethnic friends which have been shown to be very important as they reflect on the bridging and bonding opportunities of individuals (Demireva & Heath, 2014; Heath & Demireva, 2014; Lancee, 2012).

2.6.3. Deprivation

The possible negative effect of socio-economic disadvantage will also be examined through looking at the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)—economic cleavages are strong predictors of societal disintegration and may signal higher rates of competition (Laurence, 2011; Sturgis et al., 2011). We use IMD 2010 which is an official measure of small areas. It is based on seven domains: income, employment, education, skills and training, health, crime, barriers to housing and services, and living environment deprivation (for information on its range, see the Appendix).

We have replicated the results with percentage of co-ethnics as well. Full tables are available upon request.
2.6.4. Other Individual Level Factors

Qualifications are at the heart of the human capital framework (Heath & Yu, 2005). We introduce them in our last model because we want to compare their explanatory power with that of community level predictors. Thus, community level measures can hold an important place in the aggregate but individual selection along the propositions of the human capital framework can be a much more powerful predictor of disadvantage. Social housing has been shown to significantly lower the odds of different ethnic groups in terms of trust and engagement (Demireva & Heath, 2014); and religiosity can potentially tap important cultural differences (Koopmans, 2015). With the MCDS data we can also control for factors such as residential stability and degree of urbanization.

2.6.5. Models

Our response variables are dichotomous; therefore we use the logit link:

\[
\Pr(\text{economic integration outcome} = 1) = \beta_0 + \beta_{\text{age}} + \beta_{\text{gender}} + \beta_{\text{marital status}} + \beta_{\text{ethnic group (in minority models) }} + \beta_{\text{generation (in minority models) }} + \beta_{\text{percent non-white British [Model 0]}} + \beta_{\text{co-ethnic bonding [Model 2]}} + \beta_{\text{IMD [Model 3]}} + \beta_{\text{religiosity}} + \beta_{\text{education}} + \beta_{\text{organization}} + \beta_{\text{degree of residential stability [Model 4]}}
\]

We also have models with degree of urbanization and tenure and those are available upon request.

2.6.6. Interpretation of Effects

We use average marginal effects, computed at different values of the X variables. This allows us to interpret the results intuitively as percentage point differences and provides a basis for comparison between different coefficients.

### 3. Descriptive Statistics

Several clear patterns emerge from the descriptive Tables 1 and 2. As is well-known, minorities are much more likely than the white British to live in diverse areas. Thus on average white British respondents in MCDS live in relatively homogeneous areas (containing on average 22 percent minorities) whereas minority respondents are much more likely to live in diverse areas: Pakistanis and Bangladeshis for example live in areas where roughly 50 percent of residents belong to a minority group. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis also live in areas with the highest scores on the index of multiple deprivation. However it is important to note that not all spatially concentrated minority groups reside in very deprived areas. Indians, who live in areas with a relatively high presence of minorities, nevertheless experience less local area deprivation than the black or other South Asian groups. However, if we zoom in on the most deprived areas (those above the 75th percentile of deprivation), we see that the levels of minority presence jump for all groups—for example, white British respondents who live in these most deprived areas are much more likely to have minority neighbours (the percentage of minorities in their area rising from 22 to 36 percent). These patterns highlight the importance of conditioning on deprivation when analysing the effect of minority embeddedness.

The ethnic groups differ not only in regards to the areas in which they live but also in terms of their individual characteristics as well. In general, minority respondents in our data are younger than their white British counterparts, especially the combined Pakistani/Bangladeshi group. Minorities on average appear better educated (higher percentages with degrees) than the white British. In the EMBES data, Black Africans and Indians are among the most educated respondents; almost half of the respondents in these two groups have a degree.

### Table 1. Demographic, socio-economic, and community characteristics by ethnic group. Source: MCDS (2010); 298 retired and 113 in full time education respondents excluded from working age sample of 1666.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Mean Prop Non-white Brit</th>
<th>Mean Prop non-white Brit at high deprivation</th>
<th>Mean IMD</th>
<th>Education Degree</th>
<th>Co-ethnic Organization</th>
<th>Co-ethnic Friends</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Mean Prop Co-ethnic</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>35.65</td>
<td>42.71</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>57.41</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean and African</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>42.66</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>37.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>60.12</td>
<td>12.27</td>
<td>20.25</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani and Bangladeshi</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>44.06</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>66.43</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>50.45</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>56.68</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 It is possible that having Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in a joint group in the MCDS masks the disadvantaged position of Bangladeshis in this respect. In comparison, the proportion of Bangladeshis with a degree in the EMBES sample is 0.22 well below the 0.29 for white British.
Table 2. Demographic, socio-economic, and community characteristics by ethnic group. Source: EMBES (2010); 238 retired and 277 in full time respondents were excluded from sample of working age population of 2753.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Mean Prop Non-white Brit</th>
<th>Mean Prop non-white Brit at high deprivation</th>
<th>Mean IMD</th>
<th>Education Degree</th>
<th>Co-ethnic Organization</th>
<th>Co-ethnic Friends</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Social Housing</th>
<th>2nd Generation</th>
<th>Mean Prop co-ethnic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>28.81</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>42.04</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>37.52</td>
<td>56.28</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>49.81</td>
<td>33.79</td>
<td>47.52</td>
<td>40.27</td>
<td>48.47</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>49.15</td>
<td>41.70</td>
<td>46.76</td>
<td>65.70</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>32.08</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>32.34</td>
<td>23.41</td>
<td>56.29</td>
<td>66.62</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>36.98</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>22.59</td>
<td>26.32</td>
<td>62.59</td>
<td>67.04</td>
<td>43.70</td>
<td>25.93</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicity</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>21.50</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>71.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

degree. Social housing, which is closely related to deprivation is high among Black Africans and Bangladeshis whereas the proportion of social renters among Indians is rather small.

4. Multivariate Analysis

Tables 3, 4 and 5 present logistic regression results on the likelihood of achieving economic integration. In each table we show the results for three sets of model, one set looking at rates of economic activity, the second set looking at the probability of employment (among those who are economically active), and the third set looking at the probability of achieving a professional or managerial position. We first introduce the potentially ‘confounding’ variables of age, gender and marital status (and the ethnic minority groups and generation in the models confined to minorities in Tables 4 and 5). We then introduce a measure of minority embeddedness (the percentage in the area who are not white British) in order to provide a first test of Hypothesis 1. This measure has no significant effect whatsoever on the economic activity or employment chances of the white British, and surprisingly has a significant positive effect on white British occupational chances. Furthermore, the more nuanced measures of co-ethnic organization and friends in model 2 also prove to be non-significant in the case of economic activity and employment chances, although they have contradictory effects (which will tend to cancel out) in the case of occupational attainment.

These results thus rather conclusively lead us to reject Hypothesis 1: the presence of minorities does not harm the employment patterns and prospects of the white British. If anything the reverse is the case especially in terms of occupational attainment with this positive association stronger controlling for deprivation.4

Moving on to our test of Hypothesis 2 with model 3, we find that area deprivation impacts negatively on the chances of the white British being economically active, gaining employment and securing higher-level jobs. Model 4 shows that educational level has the expected

4 Full tables with interaction effects available upon request.
strong and positive effects on all three outcomes, and that it also partially explains the effects of area deprivation. (This could be due either to negative selection of less educated individuals into deprived areas, or it might be that living in a deprived area lowers educational attainment. Both processes may well occur but we cannot disentangle their importance from cross-sectional data such as we are using here). Nevertheless, the effect of area deprivation remains significant and negative for all three outcomes among white British respondents. This thus provides strong support for Hypothesis 2, namely that it is deprivation rather than diversity which accounts for any white British disadvantage, at least with respect to economic activity and employment chances.

In Table 4 we then use the MCDS dataset to explore the effects of embeddedness and area deprivation on the economic outcomes of ethnic minorities. First we find some significant differences between minorities, with the Black and combined Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups having lower rates of economic activity, employment and occupational attainment than the Indian group. This is consistent with previous research using other sources. We also find that age, gender and marital status work in the same way as they did for the white British in Table 3, although among minorities the effect of gender on economic activity is much stronger, while the age effects are relatively small. This raises some interesting questions for future research about minority career progression.

Moving on to the test of Hypothesis 3, we find that, unlike the situation among the white British, minority embeddedness does indeed have significant negative effects on economic activity, supporting Hypothesis 3, although not on the other two outcomes. Moreover, the more nuanced measures of embeddedness (at the individual level) in model 3 do not in general have the anticipated mediating role, except in the case of occupational attainment. The sign of the association differs in MCDS and EMBES but we are inclined to go with the much larger and richer sample of EMBES. The positive association with friends in MCDS could be due to the fact that the measure of occupational attainment captures the status of any job of the respondent and co-ethnic friends are perhaps important for holding a good job over the life time of the individual. Area deprivation does have the expected negative effect on economic activity and employment chances, supporting Hypothesis 4. In model 4 this effect turns out to be largely mediated by level of education, which, as in the case of the white British, is one of the most powerful predictors of occupational attainment.

In Table 5 we then check these results for ethnic minorities using the larger EMBES dataset, which also enables us to make finer differentiations between the minority groups. As with the MCDS data, models 2 supports the hypothesis that minority embeddedness has negative implications for economic activity; in the EMBES data embeddedness also has negative effects on employment and occupational chances, providing greater support for Hypothesis 3. However, area deprivation in model 4 proves to have large and significant negative effects, and substantially reduces the estimated effect of embeddedness for all three outcomes. Indeed embeddedness remains significant only for the chances of employment. The other interesting finding from EMBES is that co-ethnic friends tend to have a negative effect on economic outcomes whereas co-ethnic organizations tend to have either a positive or a non-significant effect.

The latter result is in line with the research of Lancee (2012). Thus, informal bonding with co-ethnics is associated with lower chance of getting the really good jobs, in contrast with bridging social capital which involves ties with members of the mainstream. Note that the survey was administered however at the end of the economic crisis in the UK when perhaps minority contacts were particularly weakened. In contrast, formal bonding with co-ethnics through organizational participation seems to have if anything a positive effect, perhaps reflecting the additional cognitive and practical skills which organizational membership is believed to foster.

Thus, on the whole, it is the deprivation of the area that appears to be associated with the undermining of the economic prospects of individuals rather than the mere presence of ethnic minorities, supporting Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4. Only in the models restricted to minority members (Tables 4 and 5) do we find that economic outcomes are negatively associated with minority embeddedness. However, these negative effects are attenuated once we take account of area deprivation. Moreover, we do not find that white British respondents living in more deprived areas suffer disproportionately from greater diversity—on the contrary, in such scenarios their occupational attainment prospects improve.

5. Discussion

This paper examines the predictors of economic integration—economic activity, being in employment, and occupational status. Our central focus is a comparison of the effects of ethnic diversity and area deprivation. Do we find that diversity hinders the prospects for both majority and minority groups alike, or is area deprivation the main factor leading to poor economic outcomes? And do these processes operate in the same way for the white British majority group and for ethnic minorities, or do we find that there is an asymmetry in the patterns?

While the results from the different datasets differ in detail, we also have some rather clear-cut conclusions. First, area deprivation is a major source of poor economic outcomes both for the white British and for ethnic minorities. Secondly, the presence of minorities does not appear to have any harmful effects for the White British—in none of the models in Table 3 were the effects negative. Thirdly, in the case of minorities, embeddedness did prove to have some negative effects although these were attenuated by controls for area deprivation.
Table 3. Labour market outcomes of white British respondents. Source: MCDS (2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef/se</td>
<td>Coef/se</td>
<td>Coef/se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnAge</td>
<td>0.343***</td>
<td>0.340***</td>
<td>0.320***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.072*</td>
<td>-0.077**</td>
<td>-0.084**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Embeddedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage non-white British</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Organization</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Friends</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnimd</td>
<td>-0.103**</td>
<td>-0.071**</td>
<td>-0.052**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (ref: Basic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.244***</td>
<td>0.132***</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Stability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; Results are explained as Marginal effects; The models of Active exclude retired respondents whose proportions is high among minority member; the employment and occupational models focus only on the Active population.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 Coef/se</td>
<td>Model 2 Coef/se</td>
<td>Model 3 Coef/se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InAge</td>
<td>0.361*** (0.068)</td>
<td>0.361*** (0.068)</td>
<td>0.367*** (0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>−0.281*** (0.036)</td>
<td>−0.280*** (0.036)</td>
<td>−0.281*** (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.077* (0.042)</td>
<td>0.075* (0.042)</td>
<td>0.074* (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage non-white</td>
<td>−0.327*** (0.096)</td>
<td>−0.332*** (0.098)</td>
<td>−0.257*** (0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Organization</td>
<td>0.044 (0.060)</td>
<td>0.040 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Friends</td>
<td>−0.012 (0.052)</td>
<td>−0.010 (0.051)</td>
<td>−0.019 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnimd</td>
<td>−0.062* (0.036)</td>
<td>−0.043 (0.037)</td>
<td>−0.051*** (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ref: Basic)</td>
<td>0.159** (0.060)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.286*** (0.061)</td>
<td>0.065* (0.036)</td>
<td>0.065* (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Stability</td>
<td>0.025 (0.022)</td>
<td>−0.011 (0.014)</td>
<td>−0.011 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; Results are explained as Marginal effects; The models of Active exclude retired respondents whose proportions is high among minority member; the employment and occupational models focus only on the Active population, controls also for ethnic group and generation.
Table 5. Labour market outcomes of minority respondents. Source: EMBES (2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnAge</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>0.285***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.243***</td>
<td>-0.241***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.038*</td>
<td>0.038*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>1st+ citizen (ref:1st)</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
<td>0.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Embeddedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion</td>
<td>-0.082*</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white British</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Organization</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>-0.035*</td>
<td>-0.033*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td>LnIMD</td>
<td>-0.058**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0.158***</td>
<td>0.071**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ref: Basic)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.383*</td>
<td>0.284***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2485</td>
<td>2485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; Results are explained as Marginal effects; The models of Active exclude retired respondents whose proportions is high among minority member; the employment and occupational models focus only on the Active population; controls also for ethnic group and generation.
Concerns about the effects of competition from minorities on the economic fortunes of the White British do not therefore receive any support from our data. In contrast concerns about ethnic embeddedness appear not to be wholly without foundation. This is in line with recent research by Zucconi and Platt (2016) who, using linked census data, show that growing up in areas of high minority embeddedness leads to lower levels of economic activity subsequently. They interpret this as due to the preservation of traditional gender norms and roles in homogeneous minority communities. This argument has considerable plausibility, although we note that, in our data, area deprivation attenuates these negative effects of minority embeddedness. This suggests that it may be the lack of alternative opportunities that may provide the conditions for traditional norms to be perpetuated. We suggest that policy-makers should concentrate on providing greater opportunities for people, white British and minority alike, who live in deprived communities.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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sis across ethnic and generational lines. Sociology. doi:10.1177/0038038515609030

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Diverse Outcomes: Social Citizenship and the Inclusion of Skilled Migrants in Australia

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Abstract
The sociology of citizenship is concerned with the social and economic conditions of citizens of a national community. Drawing on T. H. Marshall's contribution to the theory of social citizenship this article argues that some groups of migrants and ethnic minorities in Australia, particularly those from non-British and European Backgrounds, face a number of social and institutional barriers which prevent them from reaching their full potential as members of Australia's multicultural community. Evidence from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data shows different socioeconomic outcomes for migrants from British and European backgrounds compared with migrants from Asian backgrounds, despite having similar educational qualifications and length of time living in Australia. As such, it is argued that achieving social membership and inclusion continues to be a struggle for particular groups of migrants. A deeper commitment to the core principles of citizenship that is beyond mere notions of formal equality is needed if Australia is to address this important social issue.

Keywords
Australia; inclusion; migrants; social citizenship; socioeconomic status

Issue
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1. Introduction
Social theorists have long been interested in the concept of citizenship which links individual entitlement on the one hand and ideas and attachment to a particular community on the other (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Debates about citizenship and multiculturalism are often sparked by social or political events or crises, which bring to the fore perceptions of weak ties among a particular racial, ethnic or religious group to the nation. For example, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe's 2015 refugee crisis, numerous political leaders around the world have denounced multiculturalism as a failure, and have instead emphasised the need for migrants to demonstrate their loyalty to the laws, values and traditions of their country. The resurgence of support for far-right wing parties and other populist representatives in the West demonstrates the growing amount of pressure on governments to withdraw from progressive and inclusive social citizenship policies for new migrants.

In order to enjoy full membership, members of migrant and ethnic minority groups have frequently had to adopt the majority culture through societal pressures to assimilate. Some groups have found this easier than others due to cross-cultural differences in terms of language, culture, political background and religion. Drawing on theories of social citizenship, this research shows that since the 1990s there is evidence of differential socioeconomic outcomes for European and non-European migrants in Australia, particularly in terms of income and professional employment opportunities relative to education. In doing so, this research looks at whether ‘race’ in the form of being ‘white’ or ‘non-white’ is a barrier to social inclusion. Stephen Castles (2000, p. 41) shows that through a process of social segmentation and social
exclusion, various migrant and ethnic minority groups tend to remain in disadvantaged labour market positions, which is then passed on to subsequent generations. It is therefore necessary to look at practices of systematic social exclusion, which can lead to social segmentation and differential outcomes for particular groups of migrants and ethnic minority groups.

In Australia, at first glance, the absence of migrants from non-British or European backgrounds is noticeable in leadership positions within national institutions and organisations, suggesting that, even though Australia has adopted a multicultural citizenship model, attitudes of racial and ethnic superiority may continue to pervade Australian institutions and organisations. For example, according to Southphommasane (2014), the poor representation of Asian Australians in federal politics “appears to replicate a pattern of invisibility that exists within Australian culture”. This pattern of invisibility similarly exists in other institutions and organisations, particularly at senior levels where important decisions are often made. While nearly 14 percent of Australians come from non-British and European backgrounds, such cultural diversity is not represented within the senior leadership positions in Australian institutions and organisations (AHRC, 2016). This can have flow-on effects in terms of the social exclusion of citizens from migrant backgrounds in shaping the future of Australia. To find out whether social bias and discrimination might be playing a role, using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census data between 1970 and 2011, this article examines whether there are any differences in the socioeconomic outcomes of groups that have similar levels of education and have lived in Australia for a similar length of time. First, this article examines theories of social citizenship as a framework for the empirical analysis of the ABS Census data.

2. Theoretical Background

The social construction of citizenship in Western democracies which predominantly focuses on the legal and political responsibilities of citizens frequently overlooks the obligations that states have towards their citizens in terms of providing an inclusive social citizenship that addresses the reality of racial inequality and social class. British Sociologist T. H. Marshall divided citizenship into three dimensions, namely civic, political and social rights (Marshall, 1950, 1977, 1981). Social rights were institutionalised in the form of the Welfare state and included a range of social entitlements such as education, health, employment benefits and employment opportunities (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In the incorporation of social rights within the Welfare state, it was argued that citizenship could alter patterns of social inequality. In developing the work of T. H. Marshall, sociologists have since redefined citizenship “as a set of social practices which define the nature of social membership” (Turner, 1993, p. 4). While there are many criticisms of T. H. Marshall’s understandings of citizenship such as the fact that it is historically and culturally specific to Western cultures and framed solely within the confines of the nation-state (Barbalet, 1998; Hindess, 1993; Janoski, 1998; King & Waldron, 1988; Ong, 2005), there is no doubt that in Western democracies groups of citizens with civil and political rights are denied basic social rights such as equality of opportunity, employment and income due to various forms of discrimination and racial prejudice.

In culturally plural societies, migrants and ethnic minorities struggle to attain full membership and social inclusion. Talcott Parsons originally defined social inclusion as the process by which previously excluded groups attain full citizenship or membership in a society (Parsons, 1994, p. 145). Since then, studies have shown a multidimensional approach to understanding full membership and social inclusion. The World Bank (2007) for instance defines social inclusion in terms of financial, physical, human and social capital and emotional and functional satisfaction. Other studies define social inclusion in terms of material resources, social relations, civic activities, basic services, neighbourhood inclusion, achievement, participation and social connection (Greef, Verté, & Segers, 2015; Ogg, 2005). Migrants and ethnic minorities can be denied social inclusion due to their cultural background, linguistic differences, political or religious background or the distance between their country of origin and host country (see Dahlstedt & Bevelander, 2010). This article further looks at social inclusion in terms of income and occupational status opportunities, both of which can impact on leadership opportunities and levels of autonomy within an organisation. To be a full member in society, migrants and ethnic minorities need to have opportunities to not only participate in society but also shape the future of a society by utilising their various strengths and skills.

One of the significant barriers for migrants and ethnic minorities is the growing demands for linguistic assimilation in terms of English or national language proficiency, accent, style and pronunciation which some researchers have viewed as a form of racial discrimination (Colic-Peisker, 2005; Creese & Kambere, 2003; Hill, 2008; Piller & Takahashi, 2011). In fact, Piller and Takahashi (2011, p. 371) observe that “social inclusion policies are often blind to the ways in which language proficiency and language ideologies mediate social inclusion in linguistically diverse societies”. For instance, in Australia and in other diverse multicultural societies, migrants and ethnic minorities wishing to attain citizenship must demonstrate English language proficiency in the form of passing a citizenship test written in English. This is just one hurdle towards full membership. In applying for a professional job or a position of leadership, some groups of migrants and ethnic minorities also need to overcome social bias due to their place of birth, skin colour, distinctive accent, etc. While place of birth is not always known, visible and audible markers such as skin colour and accent are often used as replacements for social bias (see McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008). For those with minority group as-
cribed characteristics, social inclusion and full membership may become an unreachable goal unless the majority accepts various forms of ascribed cultural and linguistic diversity as equal.

3. Citizenship and Social Inclusion

Together with formal modes of citizenship, socioeconomic achievement relative to opportunity is a necessity for the social inclusion and full membership of migrant and ethnic minority groups. Despite detecting a general pattern of upward socioeconomic mobility over time, research finds that some migrant and ethnic minority groups are less likely to experience upward socioeconomic mobility over time than others, thus providing evidence of social exclusion. In fact, in some cases, they may experience downward mobility because of a number of social and institutional barriers (Basran & Zong, 1998). A number of reasons emerge from research into the experience of migrants to explain these disparities. First, some areas of the labour market could be influenced by direct and indirect discrimination (Fox, 2013). In these areas, dominant groups in society exclude other groups from positions of influence. Weber (1978) referred to this phenomenon as a form of ‘social closure’, whereby one group excludes the other from scarce resources, and in doing so, is able to maintain the dominant group’s privilege and social position.

Research evidence suggests that across Western migrant societies, race and birthplace origins can have an effect on whether or not some groups will experience upward socioeconomic mobility (Bauder, 2003; Frank, 2013; Valtonen, 2001; Weedon, 2002). This has been shown to be the case for ‘non-white’ ethnic minorities who, despite having very high levels of education, are particularly vulnerable to social exclusion. For example, with an overall shift from unskilled to skilled migration, higher levels of socioeconomic status as well as access to professional and managerial occupations are to be expected among first-generation migrants, thus negating the traditional pattern of overall income increase in later generations. However, this assumes that new skilled migrants do not face direct or indirect discrimination in the workforce. Inglis and Model (2007) find that, in contrast to people with European ancestry, ‘non-white’ migrants and ethnic minorities often remain disadvantaged for several generations. To examine whether there is a pattern of this occurring in Australia, in the next section this article examines the socioeconomic outcomes of Asian and European migrants with similar education backgrounds and length of stay in Australia. All things being equal, it is expected that both groups should have similar outcomes in terms of income and occupational status.

4. Diverse Entry Outcomes for Skilled Migrants

First, it is important to look at overall migration patterns in Australia in order to establish a contextual understanding of the diverse socioeconomic outcomes of different groups of migrants in Australia. Results from the ABS Census in Figure 1 show that over time the patterns of migration from the United Kingdom have remained fairly steady, with very little change over four decades of expansive immigration programs. However, as a proportion of the overseas-born population, their numbers have steadily declined from 41 percent of the overseas-born population in 1976 to 21 percent in 2011. There has been a similar pattern of steady immigration from other parts of Europe. However, since the 1970s, the proportion of Australia’s overseas-born population in each major European group has declined. The sharpest declines in the proportion of the overseas-born population have been from the United Kingdom, Italy, former Yugoslavia, and Greece. For example, the Italian-born now comprise three percent of the Australian overseas-born population, compared with 11 percent in 1971; the Greek-born now comprise two percent of the Australian overseas-born population, compared with six percent in 1976. The decline in European migration is partly attributed to economic growth in Europe, which has rendered emigration to Australia less attractive than in the immediate post-war period.

The pattern of migration of people born in Asian countries has moved in the opposite direction. For instance, Figure 1 shows the exponential rise in numbers of migrants from Asian countries. Much of this increase can be attributed to the rapid growth in migration from China and India. As a proportion of Australia’s overseas-born population, the Chinese-born population has increased from less than one percent in 1971 to six percent in 2011 (see Table 1). One of the contributing factors to this increase was the Australian government’s decision to grant temporary and permanent residency status to students from the People’s Republic of China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, which then brought their family members to Australia through the family reunion scheme. The Indian-born population has similarly increased from one percent of the overseas-born population in 1971 to six percent in 2011 (see Table 1). Overall, in 2011 migrants born in Asian countries comprised 37 percent of the overseas-born population of Australia, not far behind the numbers of European-born migrants, who made up 40 percent of the overseas-born population. In Table 1 it can be seen that within the Asian group the top source countries are China, India, Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia.

In terms of Australia’s population more broadly, the results in Table 2 show the overall birthplace origins of the Australian population. The findings show that Australia’s migrant population is much more diverse than in the 1970s when the majority of migrants came from the United Kingdom or countries in Europe. In recent times, Australia continues to accept significant numbers of United Kingdom and European migrants, however, there has been a significant increase in the numbers of migrants from Asia (up to 9.2 percent in 2011) and other
regions including the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific Islands (up to 7.4 percent in 2011).

So far, the Census data shows that Australia’s racial and ethnic make-up is gradually changing over time with an increase in migrants from non-British and European backgrounds, many of whom might be classified as ‘non-white’ in North American or British classification systems. In Australia, it is difficult to accurately measure the numbers of ‘non-white’ migrants and ethnic minorities beyond the first-generation because in the Census the Australian-born are only asked if they have parents born overseas and not where their parents come from.
Table 2. Birthplace origins of the Australian population, percent, 1971–2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former UK Colonies/Nations</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Australian population (n) (12,755,620) (13,437,725) (14,576,294) (15,602,198) (16,850,288) (17,752,874) (18,769,240) (19,855,287) (21,507,719)

Source: ABS (2011a).

However, the Census includes a question about ancestry among the Australian-born and those born overseas. In looking at the results in Table 3, the figures show that 0.9 percent of the Australian-born and up to 33 percent of first-generation migrants identify as having an Asian, Middle Eastern or Sub-Saharan African ancestry of which most (though not all) could be classified as ‘non-white’. Overall, the Asian pan-ethnic group represent the fastest growing ‘non-white’ group in Australia. As such the remainder of this article focuses on the experiences of Asian migrants in particular and compares their experiences with migrants from the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe, of whom the majority in Australia have British or European ancestry.

In order to demonstrate the diverse socioeconomic outcomes among European and Asian first-generation migrants in Australia, the following results present comparisons in education, income and occupation of three separate migrant cohorts from the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia. Table 4 reveals that a higher proportion of migrants from Asia than from other countries hold a bachelor or postgraduate degree, which could be attributed to the fact that a greater proportion of recent migrants to Australia are arriving as highly skilled migrants who have met the requirements of the competitive points system. Nevertheless, even when the education levels of Asian migrants before the 1990s are taken into account, it is apparent that migrants from Asia are more likely to hold a university qualification than migrants from other countries. More than 28 percent of Asian migrants within each of the migration waves other than Vietnam hold a university qualification (see Table 4). A smaller proportion of migrants born in the United Kingdom and Europe arriving in the migration wave before the 1990s hold university degrees.

Given the higher levels of educational attainment among migrants born in Asia, one would expect there to be a higher proportion of Asian migrants than European migrants in high-income professional occupations, particularly among those groups who arrived before the 1990s. However, the findings in Figure 2 show diverse outcomes for two groups from different regions with a

Table 3. First mentioned ancestry origins of the Australian population, 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancestry Origin</th>
<th>Born in Australia (n)</th>
<th>Born in Australia (%)</th>
<th>Born Overseas (n)</th>
<th>Born Overseas (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oceanian</td>
<td>(4,592,267)</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>(581,983)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West European</td>
<td>(6,774,794)</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>(3,051,313)</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern European</td>
<td>(467,499)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>(1,330,608)</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North African and Middle Eastern</td>
<td>(43,850)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(409,155)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asian</td>
<td>(7,285)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>(525,321)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asian</td>
<td>(35,675)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(894,412)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Central Asian</td>
<td>(7,966)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>(627,908)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples of the Americas</td>
<td>(7,049)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>(118,184)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>(3,560)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>(149,927)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(16,203)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>(45,481)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>(291,698)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>(166,895)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total overseas born (n) (12,247,846) 100 (7,901,187) 100

Source: ABS (2011a).
Table 4. Migrants in Australia with a university education, by year of arrival, percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(125,778)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(16,388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(4,692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>(3,366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(7,300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(12,493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(11,016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(4,328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(7,061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>(8,535)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>(10,655)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(1,494)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>(54,866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(66,376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(25,532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(40,418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(25,815)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(19,974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>(10,901)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(8,445)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS (2011a).

similar education and period of arrival in Australia indicating that for some groups there might be barriers to reaching their full potential. In terms of income, for those who have lived in Australia since before the 1990s, the outcomes for Asian migrants and migrants from the United Kingdom are fairly similar, showing that over time Asian migrants eventually catch up to other groups and even overtake other groups such as those from other parts of Europe.

For new migrants, the story is very different. New migrants from the United Kingdom tend to receive a much greater return on their education than new migrants from Asia. Over 30 percent of recent arrivals from the United Kingdom are employed in the highest-income bracket. The proportions of new migrants from Asian countries in the highest-income bracket are much smaller, with only 14 percent of Asian migrants in the highest-income bracket. It is possible that the differences in entry earnings capacity among recent Asian cohorts could be explained by the heightened emphasis on English language ability. However, given that skilled migrants from Asia, especially those with a university education, are usually fluent in English, this is less likely to explain the variation. Instead, it is more likely that other factors could be playing a role such as skin colour, accent or simply employer-based discrimination.

Another explanation might be related to the fact that many Asian migrants are students without Australian citizenship. However, while the majority of overseas students from Asia do not have citizenship, the results in Figure 2 only look at the experiences of migrants with citizenship. In looking at whether there are differences among those with citizenship and those without citizenship, the results in Figure 3 show that a higher proportion of new migrants from the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe earn a high income compared to the Asian cohort. Only six percent of recent arrivals from Asia without citizenship earn a high income compared to 28 percent of those from the United Kingdom and 19 percent of those from other parts of Europe. Asian migrants who arrived before 1990 end up doing comparatively better but it appears that it takes longer to achieve similar or better outcomes in terms of income status than their European counterparts.

The differences in outcomes might be explained by a number of other factors. For example, it is possible that the earlier cohort of Asian migrants to Australia who arrived before 1990 came from different origin countries than those who have arrived later. For example, we might expect those from English-speaking Hong Kong to have better outcomes than recent arrivals from non-English speaking countries in Asia. There are also likely to be differences among those from English-speaking Northern European countries and those from non-English speaking European countries in Southern and Eastern Europe. To explore this in a more detail, a re-
Figure 2. Percentage of migrant citizens on high incomes by year of arrival.

Figure 3. Percentage of migrants without citizenship on high incomes by year of arrival.

Regression analysis is conducted to control for background factors such as English proficiency, timing of arrival, age, education, gender and citizenship status to determine whether there is a correlation between country origins and income status.

Table 5 draws on a sample from the 2011 Census, which is provided in the confidential unit record files (CURFs) and is based on a one percent sample of the Census population. The effects of country origins and timing of arrival is clearly evident in the multivariate results.
shown in Table 5. In terms of birthplace, migrants from South Asia and North-East Asia, as well as Southern and Eastern Europe, are less likely to earn a high income compared to migrants from the United Kingdom and Northern Europe. Newer arrivals are also less likely to earn a high income compared to migrants from previous migration waves, as the earlier findings demonstrate.

Up to 45 percent of the total sample of South Asians and 70 percent of new arrivals from South Asia have completed a bachelor degree or higher such as a postgraduate degree. This compares with 38 percent of the total sample of North-East Asians and 70 percent of new arrivals from North-East Asia. Among the total sample of Northern Europeans, only 24 percent have completed a bachelor degree or higher and among the new arrivals from the Northern Europe only 55 percent have completed a bachelor degree or higher. This is significantly less than the proportions of those with a bachelor degree or higher from South Asia and North-East Asia (70 percent). With such differences in the percentage of those with university education qualifications between those from Asia and those from Northern Europe, one would expect a positive relationship between Asian country origins and income status. Instead, the opposite is the case, indicating the possible existence of racial or ethnic discrimination.

Table 5. OLS Regression Model estimating effects of origins and background on income, Census, 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(β)</th>
<th>(β)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Birthplace</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Asia</td>
<td>−0.68</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia</td>
<td>−1.22</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>−0.67</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ancestry of Parent 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Central Asia</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ancestry of Parent 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Central Asia</td>
<td>−0.17</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<td>North-East Asia</td>
<td>−0.38</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.76</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Language Spoken at Home</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Asian Languages</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asian Languages</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>South-East Asian Languages</td>
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<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
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<td>Northern European Languages</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Well or Well</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing of Arrival</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived 2000 or before</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived 2001–2005</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>−0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ 0.18

In terms of occupational status, Table 6 finds a similar outcome. Given that a higher percentage of migrants from Asia in the CURF sample have a university education compared to migrants from Northern Europe, one might expect a higher percentage of migrants from Asia to be employed in a professional occupation. However, the findings in Table 6 indicate the opposite to be the case with a negative relationship between South Asian and North-East Asian birthplace origins and professional occupation status. For instance, the odds ratios (Exp (B)) are less than 1, showing that those from South Asia and North-East Asia are less likely to be employed as professionals compared to those from Northern Europe, even after controlling for language spoken at home, English proficiency, timing of arrival, education, age and citizenship status. The odds ratios are also highly significant (sig.=.000). This pattern suggests that migrants from the United Kingdom and Northern Europe, despite having lower levels of educational attainment, are more easily able to move into high-income professional occupations shortly after their arrival in Australia.

5. Discussion

The findings presented reveal that there are several barriers to a high income and occupational status among new migrants from different countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Logistic Regression Model estimating effects of origins and background on occupation, census, 2011.</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
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<td>1.27</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>0.95</td>
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<td><strong>Ancestry of Parent 2</strong></td>
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<td>0.29</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
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<td><strong>Timing of Arrival</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrived 2000 or before</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived 2001–2005</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.11</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.15</td>
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<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nagelkerke R square</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

migrant groups, even for those groups with high levels of education, which result in ethnic labour market segmentation and social exclusion. In terms of income, new migrants from Asia in Australia are less likely to enter professional or managerial positions with a high income than new migrants from Northern Europe. Because the ABS Census survey does not ask whether migrants obtained their educational qualifications in Australia, it is difficult to determine whether there is an issue with the recognition of overseas qualifications or whether racial and ethnic discrimination is affecting the socioeconomic outcomes of migrant groups.

Research in Canada has shown that employers in Canada tend to favour migrants from English-speaking countries with comparable training systems (Hawthorne, 2007). Consequently, ‘non-white’ ethnic minorities from Asia often find that their skills are either not recognised or devalued. A similar phenomenon occurs in Australia, given that the qualifications and requirements to work in Australia depend on the type of occupation. Assessing overseas qualifications for employment purposes is usually a separate process to applying for a job where, as in all occupations, the employer decides whom they will employ. This tends to ensure that, as in Canada, employers can devalue legitimate qualifications and skills (i.e. human capital) held by ‘non-white’ migrant and ethnic minorities from Asia.

Comparative research has shown that employers tend to be less inclined to hire a migrant than a locally-born candidate (Heath & Cheung, 2007; Lindbeck & Snower, 1988). These forms of discrimination are thought to originate from the idea that people generally identify more with people who look like themselves (Lancee, 2012). For example, in his seminal work, Becker (1971) argued that ‘personal preferences’ or ‘tastes for discrimination’ on the part of employers and organisations were the main reasons for labour market discrimination.

In a 2012 study on discrimination in Australia, Booth et al. compared employer attitudes to Anglo Saxon Australians with employer attitudes to Indigenous Australians, Italian Australians, Middle Eastern Australians and Chinese Australians (Booth, Leigh, & Varganova, 2012). As part of their experiment, the researchers applied for entry-level jobs using distinctively Anglo Saxon, Indigenous Australian, Italian, Chinese and Middle Eastern surnames. Their study found that applications submitted to employers with Anglo Saxon names had a mean callback rate from potential employers of 35 percent. Applications with Italian surnames had a slightly lower callback rate of 32 percent, and those with distinctively Chinese and Middle Eastern surnames had mean callback rates of 21 and 22 percent respectively. Chinese applicants in Sydney hoping to get an interview would have to put in 92 percent more applications than applicants with Anglo Saxon names (Booth et al., 2012, p. 567). Racial and ethnic discrimination, therefore, may prevent highly educated migrants from gaining professional employment opportunities with high incomes and potential leadership opportunities.

Another approach to explain the labour market differences found in this research is to consider social capital theory, which implies that migrants who are equipped with social resources (i.e. social networks and resources of others) perform better in the labour market (Aguiliera, 2002; Flap & Völker, 2004; Franzen & Hangartner, 2006). Social capital in terms of social networks and the resources of others provides an important gateway into the labour market. One way to further understand the influence of social capital is by distinguishing between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ capital (Leonard & Onyx, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Schuller, 2007; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Bonding capital refers to social networks formed ‘within’ groups and bridging capital refers to social networks formed ‘between’ groups. According to Lancee (2012, p. 159), the acquisition of bridging capital tends to result in higher income and occupational status whereas the acquisition of bonding capital (such as those formed by established family or co-ethnic networks) does not.

On the surface, it seems that migrants from countries with similar cultural, political and historical ties to Australia’s ‘white’ British and Northern European majority are more quickly and more easily able to transfer their education, skills and experience. This may partly explain why Asian migrants face greater challenges in gaining meaningful employment in line with their educational qualifications, skills, and experience in the initial period after their arrival. It does not, however, explain the whole picture. This is because many Asian migrants have in fact gained appropriate qualifications since arriving in Australia, or hold quality qualifications from internationally recognised higher education institutions in Western democracies. Alternatively, many have been successfully awarded qualification recognition by the Australian government or a peak industry body for holding one or more qualifications from internationally recognised higher education institutions within their own country. However, as mentioned, the requirements to work in Australia depend on the occupation and local employer organisations. The employer alone decides whom they will employ, regardless of the applicant’s qualifications and skills. This leaves new migrants highly vulnerable to the attitudes of employers.

In summary, the findings presented suggest that there are a number of barriers to a high socioeconomic status among new migrant groups, even for those groups with high levels of education, which result in racial and ethnic labour market segmentation. In terms of income, new migrants from Asia in Australia are less likely to enter professional and managerial positions with a high income than new migrants from the United Kingdom. Because the ABS Census survey does not ask whether citizens obtained their educational qualifications in Australia, it is difficult to determine whether there is an issue with the employer recognition of foreign qualifications or whether racial and ethnic discrimination is af-
fecting the socioeconomic outcomes of migrant groups. However, the results do suggest that racial and ethnic discrimination may prevent highly educated migrants from non-British or European backgrounds from gaining professional employment opportunities with high incomes and potential leadership opportunities. It is therefore important to ensure that university-educated and experienced non-British and European migrants are not denied full membership in terms of social citizenship and are able to contribute meaningfully within Australia’s leadership ranks and the future direction of the country.

Acknowledgments

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

References


About the Author

**Juliet Pietsch** is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University. Her research focus is in the area of public opinion, immigration politics and the political integration of migrants and ethnic minorities in Australia.
### Table A.1. Coding of variables for Table 5 and Table 6.

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<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Birthplace</strong></td>
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<td>Southern and Central Asia=1, Else=0</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Southern Asian Languages=1, Else=0</td>
</tr>
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<td>South-East Asian Languages=1, Else=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern European languages</td>
<td>Southern European languages=1, Else=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern European Languages</td>
<td>Northern European Languages excl. English=1, Else=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English Proficiency</strong></td>
<td>Very Well, Well=1, Not Well, Not at All=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing of Arrival</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived 2000 or before</td>
<td>Arrived 2000 or before, Else=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference Category is Arrived 2006–2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Certificate=1, Diploma=2, Bachelor's Degree=3, Graduate Diploma=4, Postgraduate Degree=5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Article

Social Stratification of Education by Ethnic Minority Groups over Generations in the UK

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Abstract

A large body of research has been conducted both on the social stratification of education at the general level and on the educational attainments of ethnic minority groups in the UK. The former has established the increasing fluidity in the class–education association, without paying much attention to ethnicity, whilst the latter has shown reinvigorated aspirations by the second generation without fine-grained analyses. This paper adds to this literature by examining the re-relationship between family class, ethno-generational status and educational attainment for various 1st, 1.5, 2nd, 2.5, 3rd and 4th generations in contemporary UK society. Using data from Understanding Society, we study the educational attainment of different ethno-generational groups. Our analysis shows high educational selectivity among the earlier generations, a disruptive process for the 1.5 generation, high second-generation achievement, and a ‘convergence toward the mean’ for later generations. Parental class generally operates in a similar way for the ethno-generational groups and for the majority population, yet some minority ethnic groups of salariat origins do not benefit from parental advantages as easily. An ‘elite, middle and lower’ structure manifests itself in the intergenerational transmission of advantage in educational attainment. This paper thus reveals new features of class-ethno relations hitherto unavailable in UK research.

Keywords

class; educational attainment; ethnicity; minorities; multiple-generation groups; social stratification; UK

Issue

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1. Introduction

The national origins of ethnic minority groups to Britain have changed in recent decades. While Britain has had a very long history of immigration, most of the main visible ethnic minority groups came after the end of the Second World War via post-colonial, economic, asylum, or family reunification routes. For instance, members of the black Caribbean group mostly came from Jamaican islands in the 1950s and 1960s, Indians from India and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the 1970s and 1980s, and black Africans in the 1980s and 1990s. Of course, many members of visible and non-visible ethnic minority origins such as Chinese and Eastern and Western Europeans did not come in groups in the same manner as the (mostly) post-colonial groups above, but individually, later joined by families. Some of these groups have been in the country for a very long time (Castles & Miller, 2009; Cheng, 1994; Cheung & Heath, 2007; Lessard-Phillips, Fleischmann, & van Elsas, 2014; Li & Heath, 2016). A considerable proportion of the visible minorities came at a quite young age, and a signifi-
cant and a growing portion were born in the country, being second or even third generation at the current time (see Lessard-Phillips, Galandini, de Valk, & Fibbi, 2015, for details on the terminology). The share of ethnic minority groups in Britain has thus increased from 2.9% in 1951 (Cheung & Heath, 2007, p. 512) to 14% in 2011 (Office for National Statistics, 2012) and has been predicted to grow to approximately 20–30% over the next few decades (Livesley, 2010; Rees, Wohland, Norman, & Boden, 2012). Those born in Britain or those who arrived at a young age will have received their schooling in Britain and have entered the labour market with British qualifications. The extent to which they fare well in the educational and occupational structures, as an integral part of socio-economic integration, has been a major concern of academic and policy research.

The inclusion of ethnic minority groups in British society, including both the migrant generation and their descendants who grew up in the country, is, as Li and Heath (2016) commented, at the forefront of current policy debates, despite the lack of clear policies attempting to tackle the issue. Recent British governments have placed an emphasis on integration as an important societal goal (e.g. Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012; Casey, 2016), and the current government has set up a ‘Race Disparity Unit’ under the Cabinet Office to try to gauge ethnic disadvantages in education and in the labour market. However, such programmes tend to focus on piece-meal responses to local issues rather than implementing relevant policies (Hepburn, 2015). For instance, the centralist New Labour government put much emphasis on ‘Education, Education and Education’ but failed to tackle the underlying class difference in educational stratification (Goldthorpe, 2010). It is also apt to point out that race and ethnic issues remained largely out of the ‘Middle England’ political orientation. The coalition and Conservative governments claimed to place their priorities on the promotion of social mobility (Cabinet Office, 2011; Civil Service, 2016) and social justice (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012), but the strategies largely failed to engage with the particular challenges faced by marginalised groups, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds. Without effective evidence-based policy interventions, the potential for marginalised groups to improve their mobility and integration chances is likely to be limited.

In this paper, we aim to provide evidence on the educational attainment of ethno-generational groups in Britain. In order to do this, we followed and developed the novel approach by Li and Heath (2016) in combining the stratification and ethnic studies traditions and, furthermore, making a more refined differentiation of ethno-generation groupings than found in any existing studies in the UK. In so doing, we seek to determine the socio-ethno-generational factors underlying educational attainment. Our results suggest a complicated story of immigrant advantage and a ‘regression to the mean’ for later generations. Our approach brings greater complexity to analysis on education and highlights the need to consider the diversity of origin and the multiplicity of generation along with family class in investigating educational stratification as a means of promoting social inclusion.

2. Educational Attainment: Bridging Stratification and Assimilation

Education is one of the most important components of human and cultural capital (Becker, 1962; Bourdieu, 1986) and its importance for the labour market position just as for other domains of people’s socio-economic life is undisputed. Social scientists, sociologists in particular, have long been concerned with the unequal opportunities in educational attainment. Yet, there has been a sort of ‘division of labour’ on educational analysis, with the mainstream sociologists focusing on family class differences and ethnic studies scholars on ethnic differences in educational attainment (Li & Heath, 2016). Part of this divide is due to disciplinary traditions and part due to data limitations. Prominent mobility scholars have conducted studies on the class-educational association (Bukodi, Erikson, & Goldthorpe, 2014; Devine & Li, 2013; Halsey, Heath, & Ridge, 1980; Paterson & Iannelli, 2007) but ethnicity rarely enters the picture. Attention is focused on class gradients or on the extent and direction of possible changes in social fluidity in education (Breen, Luijkx, Müller, & Pollak, 2009). Early students of migration and ethnicity, on the other hand, have been concerned with the ethnic disadvantages in education rather than with family class effects (Bhattacharyya, Ison, & Blair, 2003; Connor, Tyers, Modood, & Hillage, 2004; Dale, Shaheen, Kalra, & Fieldhouse, 2002; Drew, Gray, & Sporton, 1997; Heath & McMahon, 1997), but this is changing (Jackson, 2012; Lenkert, Caro, & Strand, 2015; Rothon, 2007).

From the point of view of mainstream stratification research, the primary concern is how origin class uses its superior socio-economic-cultural resources to help the educational attainment of their children, how social inequality is maintained over time and across countries, and whether or to what extent this rigidity is being loosened (Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Breen et al., 2009). If we think about the Origin-Education-Destination (OED) model of status attainment (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Sewell, Haller, & Portes, 1969), the focus is on the relationship between parental social origins and education, and the ways in which class-origin advantages are transmitted in the educational realm. Among the ways in which these advantages are transmitted, the focus is on social capital (Coleman, 1988), cultural capital (DiMaggio, 1982) and economic capital (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1999). Within this stream of research, there is no reason why origin class would function in different ways for different ethno-generational groups, and ethnicity is thus rarely acknowledged within social stratification research on education even though class may work differently for different eth-
nic groups (Platt, 2016). There have also been recent attempts to add migrant/ethnic status to the OED model (see, e.g., Heath et al., 2008; Li & Heath, 2016; Zuccotti, 2015), but research is still in its infancy.

From the ethnic studies perspectives, a long-held view foresees a gradual process of ethnic convergence across generations. The revised straight-line assimilation theory, as espoused by Alba and his colleagues (Alba, Lutz, & Vesselino, 2001; Alba & Nee, 2003; Waters, Tran, Kasinitz, & Mollenkopf, 2010) and reformulated from the classical assimilation theory developed by the founders of the Chicago School of Sociology, predicts a ‘process of interpenetration and fusion’ of early 20th-century migrants with the host society (Park & Burgess, 1921, p. 735). The defining features of the process include the successive generational upward mobility, greater integration into the mainstream, and reduced ethnic distinctiveness in terms of language use, residential concentration and marriage patterns for most minority ethnic groups (Gordon, 1964). The most important implication of this revised theory for our present purposes is that, overall, the second and higher generations can be expected to make educational progress which will facilitate increasing integration into the host society’s socioeconomic life. But origin class effects are overlooked in this account. In this latter regard, we need to note that the ‘segmented assimilation theory’ proposed by Portes and colleagues (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, & Haller, 2009) does acknowledge the role of parent class but only suggests a binary structure.

The foregoing discussion has suggested that as the proportion of ethnic minority groups in the UK has increased with many being second and higher generations, the educational disparities with the mainstream population may have reduced. Recent research shows that ethnic minority members tend to do well and some groups even outperform the majority group in education (Demack, Drew, & Grimsley, 2000; Rustmann & Theodoropoulos, 2010; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; Jackson, 2012; Rothon, Heath, & Lessard-Phillips, 2009; Strand, 2014). Yet there are various unsolved issues in existing research. Firstly, the distinction between ethnicity and generation is not explicitly made and research on third generation education has not been possible due to data limitations. Secondly, we do not know whether the possible increasing fluidity in the class-education association in Britain is due to narrowing class inequality as suggested by Breen et al. (2009) or to increasing ethnic outperformance over whites in spite of their lower parental class positions. By combining the stratification and the ethnic studies traditions could thus not only shed light on the apparent mystery in Breen et al.’s findings but also help us gain a deeper understanding of the class-education associations over different generations of ethnic groups in Britain. It could help test whether the revised assimilation theory could find its support in the British context.

With these considerations in mind, we aim to address the following questions:

- Do the minority ethnic groups over different generations in the UK have the same level of educational attainment as their White British peers without an immigration background?
- Are patterns of ethnic overperformance found in the existing literature supported when a more granular measure of ethno-generational status is used?
- Is social advantage and disadvantage (SAD) transmitted in the same way for minority ethnic groups as for the majority group?

Answering those questions will help further our understanding of the education of ethno-generational groups in Britain and provide a strong evidence base for studying the educational mobility of ethnic groups across generations.

3. Data and Methods

We use the first three waves of the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Survey, also called Understanding Society (USoc; University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, & National Centre for Social Research, 2013) for this study. We pooled them together to maximise sample size. Our analytical sample size (N=37,846) includes individuals with valid values on all variables used in the analysis. The USoc has ethnic boost samples and contains information about grandparental, parental, and respondent’s place of birth which, given its large sample size, allowing us to differentiate 48 ethno-generational groupings with sufficient sample sizes for analysis (see note 2 of Table 1). This is more refined than any existing research in the UK has attempted. We were able to differentiate, whenever possible, between individuals from the first generation (individuals born outside of the UK and who arrived to the UK after age 16); the 1.5 generation (individuals arriving to the UK during compulsory schooling—ages 6 to 16); the second generation (individuals born in the UK of non-UK born parents or who migrated before age 6); the 2.5 generation (individuals with one immigrant and one UK-born parent); the third generation (individuals born in the UK with at least one non-UK-born grandparent); and the fourth generation (individuals born in the UK with UK-born parents and UK-born grandparents). We were also able to differentiate between many of the ethnic groups usually found in British survey data. This allowed us to have fine-grained ethno-generational categories that also take into account immigrant parentage for the white groups, something not often found in research but nonetheless important given historical migratory flows to the UK from neighbouring or Old Commonwealth countries. Ethnicity is based on ethnic self-classification, a measure that is subjective and a changeable one’s life course (Simpson, Warren, & Jivraj, 2015) and may imply a mismatch between reported and externally perceived ethnicity. We focussed our analyses
Table 1. Ethnicity by generational status in Britain, respondents aged 25–64 (2009–2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation (% of group)</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>1.5</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>29,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Other</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>37,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Weighted analysis and unweighted Ns (authors’ analysis). Row totals may not add to 100% due to rounding errors; 2. Cell counts under 30 are considered too small for analysis and merged with the ‘Other group’. Source: Understanding Society.

We investigated the patterns and trends of educational attainment in the UK by different ethno-generational groups in the following way. We constructed a measure of parental class by deriving the 3-class version of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) from the 2010 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC2010) of parental occupation when respondents were 14 years of age. Using the dominance approach, which will often use the occupation of the non-immigrant parent in the 2.5 generation, the three-fold parental class schema covers (1) professional/managerial salariat (I-II), (2) intermediate class (III-IV), and (3) manual working class (semi-routine, routine, V-VII). With regard to education, and given the importance of university-level education for gaining high-level occupations and for fostering social mobility (Garratt & Li, 2005), we looked at the respondents’ highest level of educational attainment and differentiate between those with degree-level or above qualifications and those without. We also used indicators of age and sex of the respondents (the descriptive statistics of age, sex and parental class are shown in Table 2). In the analyses, we first look at descriptive statistics to examine gross differentials. We then use a logit model of degree-level attainment for the full sample, comparing each of the ethno-generational status groups with the 4th generation white British (our reference category), to investigate ethnic differentials in educational attainment. Our models include parental class as the main explanatory variable and controls for age and sex. As the logits (log odds ratios) from the models are less intuitive to understand, we present average marginal effects (Mood, 2010).

Table 2. Main control variables and their distribution in the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>25–64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest parental class (%)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Understanding Society.

4. Results

Figure 1 portrays the percentage of university degree holders among the various ethnic groups by generational status.

Before we enter detailed discussion, we alert readers that unlike bar charts we usually see in academic papers, the bars in Figure 1 do not add to one hundred percent. Rather, for each of twelve ethnic minority groups, we have ‘stacked’ the percentages of respondents in each generational status who have degree-level education or above. For large ethnic groups such as white British, we could differentiate six generational statuses (1st, 1.5, 2nd, 2.5, 3rd and 4th generations) whereas for small ethnic groups such as Chinese, we could only differentiate two generational statuses (1st and 2nd). The 4th generation white British comprise the largest majority of all groups on respondents aged 25–64. As we can see from Table 1, there is quite a variation in the generational status distribution among the various ethnic groups, which tend to follow the migratory patterns of the different groups (Lessard-Phillips et al., 2014).
in our data. As such, they constitute the ‘core’ of the population and serve as the meaningful reference group for all other groupings.

Looking in closer detail at the patterns in Figure 1, we find features which tend to go unnoticeable in standard ethnic studies due to the crude measures of ethno-generational groups but which are brought into great relief thanks to our refined measurement. Firstly, we find clear evidence of first-generation positive selection for white groupings and for most of the visible ethnic minority groups alike, rendering support to claims by Borjas (1987) in the American context and to Li and Heath (2016) on the selection effects on ethnic social mobility. Thus, white British, white Irish (those from the Republic of Ireland), white Other (from North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, and Central and Eastern Europe), mixed (namely, white and black, white and Asian), Black African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other Asian, and ‘Other’ respondents of the migration generation are all highly educated, with two thirds of Chinese and over half of Indian first-generation respondents having degree level education or above. This forms a very sharp contrast to the 23.7% for the white British mainstream (fourth generation) with university education.

The first generation ethnic minority groups, in spite of their high level of education, tend to face great difficulties in the British labour market as their qualifications were obtained overseas and are not usually seen as having the same ‘values’ by employers. Thus, they tend to face higher levels of unemployment or find themselves in menial jobs (Heath & Li, 2008; Li, 2010). One of the possible implications is that those arriving in the young ages may, given the precarious employment position of their parents and financial difficulties in their families, opt for the labour market rather than continuing education at the end of compulsory schooling. Thus, we find that the 1.5 generation respondents of black Caribbean, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi heritages are all less likely to have degree levels than either their 1st or 2nd generation peers. This notwithstanding, it is also the case that other 1.5 generation respondents are not less likely to have degree levels than their 4th generation white British peers and this may indicate a pattern of additional investment to avoid hardship or discrimination on the labour market (Heath et al., 2008).

Thirdly, we find a quite consistent pattern of second-generation advantage among most groups (as compared to the 4th generation white British) that also applies to members of the 2.5 and 3rd generations, with very few exceptions. There also seems to be a clear case of ‘regression to the mean’ with regard to more established generations in the white groups. For these groups, the percentages with degree level qualifications decline over generations towards that of 4th generation white British, our core group (although some may be due to the younger age profile of some of these groups). This is a sign of ‘inte-

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**Figure 1.** Degree-level attainment by ethno-generational status. Source: Understanding Society.
migration’ although it speaks of ethno-generational groups losing the competitive edge in education. We are unable to look into this issue further for ethnic minority groups because of sample size issues, but if their skin colour remains an inhibiting factor in employment and career advancement, this kind of integration could work to the disadvantage of visible ethnic minority groups.

The patterns highlighted above could be due to many factors, including selectivity and generational change in overall levels of education or different ages or historical times of arrival with different educational opportunities open to them, resulting in group-specific attainment profiles. But we also need to look at the profile from a class perspective. The data are shown in Figure 2, which depicts the distribution of degree qualifications by parental class and ethnic group. The patterns here are more in line with a narrative of higher educational attainment among higher parental social classes. This appears to hold for all ethnic groups, with the sole exception of black Caribbean respondents in the salariat. There are, however, some groups where the percentage of degree holders is much higher than for the White British across all socio-economic categories. This is especially the case for the Chinese and Indian groups. It is also worth noting that among those from working-class families, all other ethnic groups are more likely than the white British to have degrees, with the Chinese four times as likely (46.0% and 12.1% respectively). Thus, at least at prima facie level, class does not work in the same way for the majority as for the minority groups. The way in which class and ethno-generational status interact will be further investigated below.

To further explore the interrelations between class, ethnicity and generational status on educational attainment, we turn to the regression results. With regard to ethnic effects, as shown in Figure 3, the data points for most ethno-generational groups are clearly above the horizontal line denoting distance in degree-level attainment compared to the core white British, and there are no groups having lower levels of attainment than the mainstream white British. For most ethnic minority groups, we see a clear net effect of ‘second generation advantage’ that outweighs the ‘first generation selectivity’ once controls are added. Moreover, there is a trend of ‘regression to the mean’ among different generations of white British and mixed respondents, and a somewhat similar patterning among the white Irish and white Other groups. The black Caribbean respondents, for all their generational groupings, exhibit no signs of educational advantages as do most other groups who outperformed the white British. Class is, of course, very important for children’s educational attainment, but to an expected and mostly similar extent across ethno-generational groups; there were very few significant interaction effects between ethnicity and class. An examination of the AMEs for ethnicity at each level of parental class show a

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**Figure 2.** Degree-level attainment by ethnicity and parental social class. Source: Understanding Society.
complex pattern of variation that generally reproduces the pattern shown above. Moreover, these results also show that the negative effects for the 2.5 generation black Caribbean respondents tend to be concentrated among the highest parental class and that 1.5 generation respondents of Pakistani (salarit) and Bangladeshi (intermediate) origins fail to achieve degree-level attainment. We have also conducted loglinear and unidiff analyses to look at the relationship between education and class for the different ethno-generational groups. The results (available on request) are largely in support of our discussion. For space reasons, we do not present the detailed modelling results here. Taken altogether, these results suggest that most ethno-generational groups seem to exhibit a greater defiance of origin effects, especially for more recent generations.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

With this paper, our aim was to further our understanding of the inclusion of ethno-generational groups within the UK educational structure by examining the educational attainment of ethnic groups across detailed immigrant generations. We did this by using insights from the social stratification literature and from scholarship on ethnic minorities. This was done to investigate whether the trends in the ethnic literature were supported by using more diverse measures of origin using the interaction of ethnicity and generation as a starting point for analyses. We also wanted to investigate whether the transmission of social advantage and disadvantage operates in a similar fashion for individuals with and without an immigration background. Using Understanding Society to investigate this, we were able to look at the educational attainments of 48 different ethno-generational groups.

Our results suggest four main features of interest regarding to the attainments of ethno-generational groups in the UK. In the first instance, we see a clear story of high educational selectivity among the first generation for most of the groups under study, which fits established literature about the positive selection of migrants. Even for the Black Caribbean group, which exhibits levels of attainment similar to that of the 4th generation white British, the story is still a positive one. In the second instance, and in line with established research, UK-born individuals with immigrant parentage fit overall narratives of ‘immigrant advantage’ present in the literature (Kao & Tienda, 1995).

Aside from these ‘success’ stories in securing a place at the top of the educational structure, we also found two other important features. Firstly, we see that the 1.5 generation does not seem to build on the skills se-
lectivity advantage of the first generation or the ‘immigrant advantage’ of the second generation to the same extent. When it is possible to differentiate them from the 1st generation, we see that members of the 1.5 generation seem to experience some type of disruptive process of migration during the school-age years for their overall educational attainment. We suggested family financial disadvantage as a reason for their decision to enter the labour market rather than stay on in education, which is plausible but needs further corroboration. This is beyond the scope of this paper, requiring detailed data on both parents’ and respondents’ work-life histories and family financial conditions. Finally, for the more ‘established’ generations, we notice an overall convergence toward the level of attainment of the more established group, the 4th generation white British (or, in certain instances, lower levels of attainments relative to the comparison group). This also appears to be the case for individuals with some immigrant parentage, suggesting that having a non-immigrant parent may lead to convergence toward the mean rather than greater advantage. This supports the argument that, whenever possible, the 2.5 generation should be analysed separately, although for different reasons than those argued by Ramakrishnan (2004). Given that these groups tend to be relatively young, we will need to wait more time before we can say for certain whether this convergence is a trend or a demographic artefact. Moreover, more detailed analyses are needed to really disentangle the extent to which these ethnogerational effects add to the existing, separate, advantages and disadvantages of ethnicity and generation.

Overall, we see a complicated story of social advantage and disadvantage that highlights the need to take the diversity of ethnic, immigrant, and social background into account when looking into issues of educational attainments. This has mostly been ignored but tells interesting stories with regard to the inclusion of ethnogerational groups in the UK. This suggests that parental social background may work in varying ways within groups, as recently argued by Lenkeit and colleagues (2015) and that other influences may be at play. This approach may, we believe, be useful to study inclusion in other spheres, such as the labour market where we know important disadvantages exist.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Professionals Made in Germany: Employing a Turkish Migration Background in High-Status Positions

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Abstract

This article emphasises the experiences of the prospective elite among the second generation in Germany by analysing empirical data collected through in-depth interviews across three occupational fields (law, education and corporate business). In spite of their disadvantaged background, some children of lower educated migrant parents from Turkey managed to occupy prestigious leadership positions. Many use their ethnic capital in creative and strategic ways to seek opportunities and obtain access to leading positions. They are now embracing new professional roles and have moved into new social circles due to their steep upward mobility. However, they still have to contend with the fact that their individual mobility stands in contrast to the low-status of the group to which they belong.

Keywords

ethnic capital; occupational achievement; professional identity; second generation; social disadvantage; social mobility

Issue

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1. Introduction

Even though the Turkish presence has been part of everyday life in Germany’s metropolitan areas for many decades, there is still a continuous public demand for their integration based on assumed cultural differences. Against the background of a negative discursive context and in spite of their disadvantageous Turkish migration background† (Crl, Schneider, & Lelie, 2012; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008), some children of migrants from Turkey have made considerable achievements in Western European labour markets. Whereas extensive research focuses on the recurrent ‘failed integration’ thesis, professionally successful descendants have received less attention. However, the so-called second generation is entering ‘the mainstream’ as defined by Alba and Nee (2009). Climbing toward leading positions, they are embracing new roles and enter new social environments due to their steep upward mobility (Crl & Schneider, 2010, p. 1253).

Those very successful individuals are of course still so-called exceptions to the rule since their individual mobility stands in stark contrast to the overall group disadvantage of people whose background originates from Turkish migration into Germany. Therefore, this article aims to examine to what extent this contrast is mirrored in their self-conception; we want to examine the choices and reflections around making use of one’s ethnic background as part of one’s professional capital. The underlying assumption is that on the one hand, these professionals want to be evaluated only according to their merit. On the other hand, their professional selves are closely inter-

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† The term ‘Turkish migration background’ should not be understood as an imposed homogenization of this group. It is used as a conceptual simplification identifying Turkey as the parental country of origin.
twined with their social selves, and the way others see them. This often results in situations that require them to reassess their professional legitimacy because they do not want to be pigeonholed within an ethnic niche or as ‘the Turkish colleague’.

We will study this complicated process for the prospective elite among the second generation in Germany in three different occupational fields (law, education and corporate business). The two research questions of the article are: 1) What does it mean to acquire a high-status professional position in Germany by employing the fact that one belongs to a low-status group? and 2) How does this differ across occupational fields? Thereby, this article will provide an understanding of the patterns which emerge when individuals from a disadvantaged background attain privileged positions by examining the relationship between motivation, recognition and self-perception regarding their career. The data was collected through in-depth interviews with professionals who have lower educated migrant parents. In the following section, we will theorize the consequences of the exceptionally steep individual social mobility and its relationship with social status and group belonging. At the same time, we will discuss to what extent ethnic background resources can be instrumental for one’s professional capital. This theoretical framework forms the basis for analysing the professionals’ self-conceptions. In the conclusion, we will recapitulate the findings but also debate their implications for the theoretical debate on this issue.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Ethnicity and Low-Status Group Belonging

Ethnicity is a concept that distinguishes groups of people from each other, whereas the significance and implications of ethnic identities varies across space and time. Social contexts shape ethnic groups as much as these groups shape them. Human interaction, assignment and assertion construct ethnic identities. They are not fixed and static but changeable, contingent, and diverse (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). Barth (1969) defines ethnic groups as self-perpetuating, culture-bearing units that are distinguishable from others (p. 296). Thereby, ethnic identity becomes an imperative characteristic which defines peoples’ identities and their societal positions (p. 304). Barth’s definition emphasises the importance of circumstances by considering the persistent organizational relevance of ethnic identities, even if actual cultural differences might decrease over time (p. 318). This is in line with Brubaker’s (2004) definition of ethnicity as a perspective on the world. Challenging the ‘groupist’ tone in most theorizations on ethnicity, he propagates a focus on processes that are triggered by the ‘ethnic lens’. Our conception of ethnicity in this article will follow Brubaker’s emphasis on process in relation to social mobility.

According to various studies, descendants of low-skilled migrant parents from Turkey can be seen as the most disadvantaged group when it comes to the educational achievement of children of migrants in Germany (cf. Crul, 2015; Schnell, 2014). Therefore, the German case provides a good illustration of how, for pupils from a migrant background, any disadvantages that may be caused by their parents’ migration are combined with those which arise from social class affiliation. The first critical turning point having an effect on children’s future in Germany is the transfer from primary school to one of the three levels of secondary education. Ample evidence shows that this decision does not solely depend on individual performance, but also on teachers’ recommendations, parents’ level of commitment and local education policy. Studies demonstrate that the proportion of Hauptschule recommendations for migrant children is disproportionately higher (Kristen, 2002).

Children of migrants from Turkey tend to have higher ambitions than their peers which seem to be stimulated by the desire to be socially mobile (Salikutluk, 2016; Schneider, Crul, & Van Praag 2014). This desire is also reflected by their parents’ aspirations concerning their children’s educational goals (Relikowski, Yilmaz, & Blossfeld, 2012). Notwithstanding, only a very small minority of this group attends a Gymnasium (high school) and has thereby the opportunity to receive access to higher education (Crul, Schnell, Herzog-Punzenberger, Wilmes, Slootman, & Aparicio Gómez, 2012).

The effect of a potential disadvantage for children of migrants from Turkey is also visible in terms of there being a longer transition phase from leaving school to entering the labour market, while they also receive lower returns from education concerning occupational attainment (Kalter & Granato, 2007). For several reasons, there are a number of sectors of the labour market which contain very few people with a background of Turkish migration in Germany (Sürig & Wilmes, 2015, pp. 82-86). Only a minority of this group enters highly skilled positions in the labour market. Thus, in spite of the fact that considerable intergenerational progress has been observed, this generation still experiences disadvantages in terms of employment and income (Kalter & Granato, 2007; Worbs, 2003). These overall findings make individuals who have experienced steep upward mobility an exception to the rule.

Institutional arrangements in Germany tend to favour social reproduction which endangers the social mobility of members of the second generation (Worbs, 2003). Even when controlling for formal educational qualifications, descendants of migrants from Turkey remain disadvantaged, which can be attributed to specific labour market discrimination (cf. Seibert & Solga, 2005; also see Waldring, Crul, & Ghorashi, 2015, for a study on the Netherlands). However, there might be other potential causes of the specific ‘Turkish’ disadvantage within Germany. First, descendants of migrants from Turkey lack resources, such as instrumental parental support, to a greater degree than other groups. In addition, the ethnic composition of their friendship networks

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and the fact that they commonly lack language proficiency only further weakens their position (Kalter, 2006). Second-generation Turkish men, in particular, experience higher unemployment, lower re-employment, and higher income-mobility risks at the beginning of their careers due to a lack of country-specific resources which tends to compound their initial disadvantage (Hartmann, 2016b).

The persistence of inequalities is a phenomenon that is not independent of contextual circumstances. Viewing ethnicity as irrelevant because of a statistical insignificance would ignore “the potential causality between ethnicity and social class” (Van de Werfhorst & Van Tubergen, 2007, p. 434). In our qualitative study, we selected professional success as the dependent variable. As it was indicated above, the institutional arrangements in Germany make individual success dependent upon the availability of family resources and personal circumstances (Hartmann, 2016a; Kalter, 2006). This is what makes our respondents a very select group with exceptional occupational achievements in spite of the double disadvantage of coming from a lower class social origin and having a low-status ethnic background (cf. Crul, Keskiner, & Leleu, 2017). That is to say, one could justifiably claim that professionally successful descendants of migrants from Turkey, almost by default, can be expected to come from families that were very supportive of their children’s education (Crul, Schnell, et al., 2012; Schnell, 2014).

In order to overcome barriers towards attaining skilled positions, highly skilled members of the second generation in Germany have to overcome disadvantages associated with their status as being from a minority throughout their career trajectories (Schittenhelm, 2011). Achieving exceptional success with a devalued social identity might leave individuals with an “inordinate ambivalence and affective dissonance” (Fordham & Ogbu, 1986, p. 951) and what Ellis Cose (1993) called the “permanent vulnerability of one’s status” (p. 41). In spite of professional success, individuals could still be perceived as belonging to the inferior societal out-group. However, paradoxically for the upwardly mobile, ethnicity can also act as a useful social resource in specific professional contexts. For those that have to deal with a restricted career entry, social and cultural capital coming from their Turkish background and Turkish language skills can become relevant as part of their compensatory strategies (Schittenhelm, 2011, p. 115).

2.2. Ethnicity and Steep Upward Mobility

In order to comprehend the professional success stories of descendants of migrants from Turkey in Germany, it is necessary to take into account the relativity of structural inequalities for individual cases. This is illustrated by the exceptionality of our respondents and their success, which came about against all odds. But how can this success be explained?

In a previous publication, we described the so-called multiplier effect. We concluded that successful children of immigrants have to make more effort by being more active in using opportunities and loopholes in the system to be as successful as their peers of native descent (Crul, Schneider, et al., 2017). The multiplier effect describes how with each consecutive step in their career they accumulate new cultural and social capital which opens up possibilities to take the next step on the ladder, thereby multiplying their chances of success. This helps them to move up and away from less successful co-ethnics. Although descendants of Turkish immigrants have to overcome their double disadvantage (of ethnic and social origin), their background can also act as a resource which some have used to advance their careers. The reflexivity about their upwardly mobile social identity is an important cornerstone of the multiplier effect. Their starting position within a lower class and background as being a descendant of migrants motivates them and helps them to succeed, although they are aware that they continue to be seen as a representative of a disadvantaged group.

The juxtaposition of ethnic belonging and individual labour market activities is documented in the discussion about migrant entrepreneurship (see Volery, 2007). This type of research, traditionally, has given a lot of importance to ethnic and group-specific resources, arguing that specific cultural properties can enable labour market success (cf. Bonacich, 1973). Recently, there has been increased attention towards highly skilled migrants, often referred to as expats. The emphasis in these studies often lies on temporary skilled migration, knowledge transfer, spatial mobility and networking issues (see e.g. Ackers, 2005; Castles, 2002; Khoo, McDonald, Voigt-Graf, & Hugo, 2007), as well as transnational ties and the way in which they negotiate multiple identities in the context of well-connected global cities (Favell, 2008). However, in contrast to migrant entrepreneurs and highly skilled migrants, second-generation professionals were either born or raised in the country of their parents’ destination. The subjective experiences as belonging to a ‘low-status’ minority group (rather, being perceived as such) are likely to be more influential in shaping their ideas and their narratives about professionalism.

Individuals with an unfortunate social position have to adapt in order to navigate structural constraints (Merton, 1968). Exceptional cases of upward mobility contrast with the image of an unequal and underprivileged socio-economic situation of the migrant majority. Whereas social boundaries are (re-)created through everyday interactions (Elias & Scotson, 1965), Bourdieu argues that agents embody a deep understanding of appropriate behaviour and act within the structural limits of a field. Individual success depends on the convertibility of the different forms of capital an agent possesses (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In other words, ethnicity can be a social boundary that impedes social mobility as well as a social resource that individuals can mobilize in the context of upward mobility processes (Pott, 2001). Through the ethnic lens, in reference to Brubaker, the upwardly mobile professionals might be seen as ‘Turkish’ but they
The steep social mobility of the exceptional group we have studied in this article has led to its members being able to occupy professional positions in large (international) firms and organisations. Freidson (1999) views professionalism as specialized work that requires abstract, theoretical knowledge, which “cannot be performed mechanically because...the worker must exercise considerable discretion to adapt his knowledge and skill to each circumstance in order to work successfully” (p. 119). Schinkel and Noordegraaf (2011) additionally view professionalism as a form of symbolic capital. Accordingly, its substance is constantly at stake in power-driven internal and external contexts. People adjust to their new roles by trying out ‘provisional selves’ as possible professional identities, while individual and situational factors shape the repertory of possibilities (Ibarra, 1999). One could argue that professionalism necessitates the minimization of individual differences, but this does not mean that it is blind to individual differences. Especially in international companies, being able to deal with people from different nationalities is considered an important professional skill. Pécoud (2002) identifies the emergence of an economic dimension of multiculturalism, which views ethnic pluralism positively, as long as it contributes to the national economy.

The perception of ethnic difference is likely to be different across professional contexts, whereas it determines especially how ‘newcomers’ such as individuals with a disadvantageous, lower-status background perceive themselves as professionals. Accordingly, in the business sector, visible differences can be promoted as competitive assets. This can lead to achievement narratives of professionals who display their success as individuals who managed to turn their initial group disadvantage into an individual advantage (Konyali, 2014). Coming from a lower-class background and being of immigrant descent can also be a resource in the education and legal sectors because it can be employed in order to establish ties with a specific clientele (Rezai, 2017; Waldring, 2017).

Occupational fields offer distinct opportunity structures in terms of the employment of individual background resources (Crul, Schneider, et al., 2017). The fact that even the highly internationalized corporate business sector is not completely open to ‘newcomers’ is illustrated by various studies that provide further evidence to the existence of a so-called ‘glass ceiling’. The education sector with its emphasis on meritocracy and emancipation is principally against making differentiation based on class and ethnicity, although it is undeniable that there is a middle-class bias among the professionals working in the field. The legal sector with its intrinsic emphasis on equality by law for all social and ethnic groups is at the same time a highly elitist profession, making it necessary for individuals to adapt to the dominant means of behaviour while conducting business. Thus, there are also different dynamics to be observed across sectors with either an emphasis on, for instance, differentiation (business) or equality (education), which can affect the role played by background characteristics.

3. Method

3.1. Data Collection

The data consists of interviews conducted within three occupational fields (see Table 1, for an overview of the sample). We have selected individuals working in a professional job who work in mid-level or higher managerial positions. Apart from very few exceptions, most respondents possessed a higher education diploma. As was noted in the theoretical framework, these criteria make them a very select group of respondents. Since we deliberately selected individuals from lower educated families, most of the respondent’s parents had not been educated beyond primary school level. This meant that our respondents have usually shown a steep upward mobility. Moreover, individuals were only selected if they had been born in Europe or if they had been raised there and their parents had been born in Turkey. Data was collected through qualitative in-depth interviews in the German metropolitan area of Frankfurt am Main. The final selection of respondents in the business sector included professionals with organizational, managerial or employee responsibilities within a company, as well as professionals occupying a specialist or expert position. In the legal sector, we included lawyers who worked as associates or partners in corporate law firms, lawyers who worked independently or for smaller law firms. Finally, the respondents in the education field were drawn from various professional positions with educational responsibilities, including teaching, training as well as managerial positions.

3.2. Data Analysis

The semi-standardized interviews collected information about their educational and professional pathways. In addition, respondents could raise their own issues. The anonymity of all respondents was guaranteed beforehand and the authors changed the names displayed in this article. For the analysis, we made use of the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. The software enabled us to identify dominant themes based on the initial coding of the material. Subsequently, the analysis clarified how the themes related to one another (cf. Bryman, 2015). Two contrasting themes emerged: the first being the importance the respondents attach to ethnic background resources in the respective professional contexts. This was mainly observable by examining the role of their Turkish migration background at work (cf. Section 4.1). The second theme was the importance others attach to this background which was analysed through their reflec-
Table 1. Overview of sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and country of birth</th>
<th>Gender and Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Regional Head of Finance in a professional service company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, CEO in banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (Germany)</td>
<td>Female, Senior specialist in banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Senior specialist in a professional service company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 (Turkey); came to Germany before she went to primary school</td>
<td>Female, Head of Customer Service in banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Independent HR Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Partner in a professional service company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Head of Public Relations of an educational association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 (Turkey); came to Germany before she went to primary school</td>
<td>Female, Head of training for secondary school teachers at the teachers’ academy of the federal state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 (Turkey); in Germany since the age of seven</td>
<td>Female, Secondary school teacher/appointed to the delegation office in the Regional Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 (Turkey); in Germany since the age of two</td>
<td>Female, Legal trainer at key qualifications office of university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Chair of local educational umbrella association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (Germany)</td>
<td>Female, Project manager of a youth organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (Turkey); in Germany since the age of twelve</td>
<td>Female, School psychologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 (Germany)</td>
<td>Female, Independent lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 (Turkey); came to Frankfurt before he went to primary school.</td>
<td>Male, Partner in a corporate law firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Associate in a corporate law firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Independent lawyer, sharing offices in a small law firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 (Germany)</td>
<td>Female, Associate in a corporate law firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Lawyer in a corporate law firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (Germany)</td>
<td>Male, Independent lawyer/owner of a small law firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 (Germany)</td>
<td>Female, Independent lawyer in a small law firm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Analysis

4.1. Professionals Who Meet the Demands

Without exception, the interviewed respondents were aware of their disadvantaged starting position resulting from their belonging to a low-status group. Retrospectively, many managed to turn this disadvantage into their advantage by adapting themselves to the professional context in question. Their ability to convert their ethnic capital into a valuable professional resource is a key aspect of their upward mobility (cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Pott, 2001). This happens in different ways across the occupational fields. One way to do so is to carve out a niche by catering to a specific clientele or taking over responsibilities that relate to Turkey.

The business professionals operate in a predominantly internationalized corporate setting. Making use of background resources to build a professional profile was an important part of their narratives. In the following quote, a respondent working in the banking sector explains how he lobbied his own company to focus more on Turkish-speaking clients. Partly by making use of his ‘ethnic capital’ and corresponding vision of expansion, he was able to climb the ladder in his company:

“It was my initiative. Before I ended up at this position, I was already quite successful within this company by focusing on the Turkish community. ... I told the management that I have a concept in mind. ... They found it very interesting. Because, I think when you are try-
ing to work with Turkish people, it is important to be able to conduct that work in their mother tongue in order to show them that you share common values. That makes working with them much easier. Because it is like that, I mean in the end people want to understand and they want to be understood. This is not different in the financial sector. I have told them this very well. I have said that this is why I am so successful here and that we can spread this around the country by multiplying this concept. Eventually, they agreed and a project team was built.” (Male, CEO in banking)

In other cases, the use of ethnic resources was only important in a transitional period of careers. Nevertheless, the need to employ one’s background of Turkish migration for a competitive advantage was often present. In general, business professionals assumed that having migrant parents equipped them with skills that helped them succeed in a professional context:

“I think that my migration background has given me a lot of things. I mean it provided me with certain soft skills that enabled me to work towards this position. That for sure. However, nobody said, ‘he is a Turk and that is why we will promote him’. Not at all.” (Male, Regional Head of Finance)

The use of background resources seems to work slightly differently for professionals within the education sector. Many professionals we interviewed were intrinsically motivated, having idealistic reasons for working in the field. Most of them linked it to their own background and the felt need to make a difference. Their motivation to provide education is often linked to working for a clientele with a similar background to themselves. A belief in the necessity for change and their capability to contribute to this change drives them, no matter how small the subsequent changes might still be. These ideas also shape their career plans:

“But when I applied, it seemed important to me that this post will be filled with someone who has an immigrant background and not necessarily that they take me, so it should be someone who is well qualified for this place and, uh, that was what was important to me. I just told myself that it would be a pity if I do not apply and no one else with a migration background applies.” (Female, Secondary school teacher/appointed to the delegation office in the regional Ministry of Education)

The ability to recognize themselves as necessary new-comers in this field actually helped some of them to advance in their careers and to acquire their current position. But entering positions that were usually not occupied by persons with a migration background, they also have to cope with being the exception to the rule:

“I find that just I am somehow already quite exotic in my area, in my professional field. And unfortunately, some colleagues who worked here for some time already, are not used to that. So, they look at you and test you. It is not a normality, to say the least.” (Female, Head of training for secondary school teachers at the teachers’ academy of the federal state)

In the field of law, we interviewed both independent and corporate lawyers. Whereas independent lawyers usually have individual clients, corporate lawyers often advise national and international companies. Similar to the respondents in the corporate business sector, many of the lawyers seized the opportunity to specifically take over responsibilities relating to the upcoming market in Turkey and Turkish-German business clients in Germany. These efforts included building active networks in the field. This is illustrated by the fact that next to being a member of the regular German Bar Association, most lawyers we interviewed were also a member of the German-Turkish lawyers’ association. In particular, independent lawyers talked about how this gives them an inherent advantage when compared to other independent lawyers without a migration background:

“Unfortunately, I have to say that I see colleagues who have severe difficulties. Because I can offer a range of services that others cannot. I mean especially German colleagues who have language deficiencies. I have to say that my potential clientele is larger, I get more mandates, and I have more possibilities. For instance, being able to do something like a German-Turkish law firm, that makes a difference.” (Female, Independent lawyer)

Similarly, corporate lawyers have been able to move their career forward by actively forging ahead with the ‘Turkish’ agenda and more, in general, the international agenda of their company:

“I think I made myself quite well known in the last three to four years. I am considered as one of the leading consultants overlooking Turkish transactions, both in Turkey and here in Germany. So, the work I am now performing has a quite strong connection to Turkey. Right now I am managing an acquisition in Turkey. But not only there, also in India, I am responsible as an international advisor.” (Male, Partner in a corporate law firm)

Thereby they profit from the perception of others who think that they can bridge cultural barriers as trustworthy and competent professionals. Particularly for those in larger corporate firms, climbing the ladder is a crucial part of their identity as a professional, earning them respect in the company but it is also manifested in their self-perception.
The examples in this section show that ‘professional selves’ are not only highly affected by disadvantageous structural contexts that operate throughout their upwardly mobile career trajectory, but also by their individual background resources (cf. Ibarra, 1999). It provides them with an additional repertory for establishing themselves in a high-status position. The next section will show how our respondents cope with instances that remind them of the ambiguity that is involved when individuals experience a steep upward social mobility with the help of a background that is usually associated with low-status positions. This ‘double-edged sword’ is illustrated by situations and encounters that remind them of their disadvantageous background.

### 4.2. Better Than ‘Others’ but Still Inferior?

As we have argued in the theoretical framework of this article, having a Turkish background in Germany, means that one is considered as belonging to a low-status group with an inferior position in society (cf. Worbs, 2003). Most of our respondents already belong to a select group of individuals who have survived the stratified German school system that does not frequently provide the children of migrants from Turkey even the chance to reach higher education. However, as has been illustrated, the fact that there is a large population with a Turkish migration background in Germany and the intertwined business relations between Germany and Turkey can enable individuals to employ their background to their advantage. The tension caused by the usefulness of ethnic resources on the one hand, and the potential threat it poses to the equal treatment of individuals on the other, is present in our respondents’ reflections. It is striking that the three different professional contexts we researched each offer different coping mechanisms to refute questions regarding their professionalism.

Respondents in the business sector stated that the stigma of being of Turkish descent was a motivating factor to ‘do better’, whereas they also encountered instances which challenged their professionalism by problematizing their ethnic background:

“There were again and again cases of clients as well as colleagues where I would say that we were not a good match. This could have happened everywhere of course, but there were comments where I thought, ‘did he now really mean to confront me with this? Was this really the person he does not like, or the Turk?’” (Male, Senior specialist in a professional service company)

Coping with the fact that they belong to a low-status group plays a continuous role in their professional self-conception. They do not want to victimize themselves, which is why they hesitate to label potentially discriminatory encounters as such. However, they also do not want to deny the relevance of their ethnic and social background. The following quote shows that this asks for a constant alertness and continuous effort to be accepted as a professional in the company:

“I think that as a Turk in a German company, you have to make sure that you do not attract too much attention....Therefore, I think it is important that you are a little more eager to succeed. One at least always thinks about having to be better than the others are. There is some truth to that.” (Male, Partner in a professional service company)

Their motivation to be successful, at least partly, also seems to have its origin in their lower-class background as respondents always refer to the hard manual labour their parents conducted; a clear motivating memory to do better. They tend to display a strong individual achievement narrative in which they present their story as one of a constant search for opportunities against the background of a huge group disadvantage (also see Konyali, 2014). Although this entrepreneurial mindset does not protect them from discriminatory encounters per se, it provides them with a work ethic that is in line with the dominant self-made paradigm in the field.

The education sector is organized very differently. Professionals in this sector were either motivated to educate students, conduct research or move into administrative positions. They can have a sizable impact on the development of the field as well as on the planning of the educational system.

On the one hand, respondents argued that their ethnic and social background should be secondary in their professional context. On the other hand, they were aware of their exceptional position as someone with a Turkish background and they acknowledged that they are filling an important gap:

“What I am happy about is that children see, ‘oh as a Turk you can also reach certain positions’. For instance, here we do not have a single Turkish school principal. In the neighbouring city, we had one….She told me that children would go to her office to see if she can really speak Turkish. They tested her. And then they were happy, saying ‘I also want to become the head of the school’.” (Female, School psychologist)

Most of all, they tried to avoid being cornered as a ‘special expert’ on migrant children only. There is a very explicit desire for acceptance as a professional:

“Well, this certainly changed in comparison to the founding years of this association. For example, we organized a contest and then many parents of German children were also there of course—they were saying ‘you have many Turks in your association, we did not expect this!’—so they could not derive from the professionalism involved that many people with a migration background were part of the organization.” (Male, Head of Public Relations of an educational association)
It seems that, in the field of education, those individuals who wish to initiate change within the educational system want to downplay the perception that they work on something meant to exclusively benefit children with a migration background. The educational professionals are very aware of the dangers of being put in the ‘ethnic niche’, which could damage their image of being professional and competent.

Working in the field of law entails again other interactions with clients and superiors and other criteria for acceptance and professionalism. Lawyers are able to solve problems or represent interests but, above all, they are responsible for the compliance with rules by individuals, groups or institutions in all domains of society. In order to become a practicing lawyer, all respondents needed to follow a thoroughly institutionalized educational pathway, including completing undergraduate and graduate degrees, examinations and licensing procedures. Simply put, they had to be willing to commit several years to studying law in order to become a professional. This institutional set up can also become a legitimizing mechanism when their professionalism is contested:

“Having a foreign sounding name means that one has to prove oneself again and again. This started with my job interview here at this company. I was told the following: ‘please tell us something about yourself, so that I can hear if your German is really as good as you claim in your application’. There were of course others present during the job interview, and I said: ‘I hope your colleague sitting next to you is an expert in employment law in order to enlighten you about the consequences of such a question’.” (Female, Associate in a corporate law firm)

Consequently, there is also an observable difference among lawyers who work in corporate firms and those who are independent or work in smaller firms. Whereas the former group were motivated by their own success and individual motives, the latter often have the added ambition to provide help. However, what they have in common is their ambition to succeed in making a better living than their parents within a very prestigious professional position.

In general, we have shown that elements of individuals’ ethnic background can help them move upwards in the labour market. This is not to say that they do not complicate their experiences on the ‘way up’ at the same time. Even individuals who are professionally successful cannot avoid the experience of discrimination and of being ‘othered’. However, it seems that they are better equipped to reflect on their situation and thereby come up with coping mechanisms that help them avoid a further self-victimization (cf. Slootman, 2014).

5. Conclusion

In the German public discourse being ‘Turkish’, is a category that usually leads to the marginalization of individuals as being lower educated, doing lower level jobs and potentially forming a so-called Parallelgesellschaft. These generalizations are an almost daily experience for people of Turkish descent in Germany. This is not to victimize the respondents we discussed in this paper, but it is important to understand how their success was accomplished and seen by others with that societal perspective in mind. It truly happened ‘against all odds’, as they were not supposed to ‘make it’. Their own background, being of lower educated parents from Turkey is constantly reflected in their success stories. They have all attained leading professional positions although there are important differences across occupational fields as these each offer distinct opportunity structures within the given context.

The experience in the three occupational fields is different, which has an observable effect on the respondents’ claim of professionalism. To begin with, in spite of many recent developments towards internationalization of education, the nation-state continues to determine the arrangements in the educational sector. In contrast to the business professionals who act within an internationally standardized context where intercultural skills are perceived as a prerequisite, educational professionals face a much more ambiguous process of recognition by their colleagues and supervisors. Individual lawyers, in turn, can employ their migration background more straightforwardly in an entrepreneurial manner. Many have started independent law offices focusing on a clientele of Turkish origin. The corporate lawyers are very similar to the business professionals who work in an increasingly international context, which further legitimizes the position they acquired.

The findings indicate that the value of ethnicity as an individual resource across professional contexts is dependent on the organizational importance that is attached to individual difference. The risk of being pigeonholed by parents and other colleagues in the educational field stands in clear contrast to the way corporate companies perceive ‘diversity’ amongst their staff as an asset. This is not to say that business professionals are not confronted with instances that question their professionalism, as this is certainly the case. However, for corporate professionals, these confrontations occur more on a personal level, which is easier to cope with for individuals when they look at the issue from a professional point of view. Independent lawyers’ claim to professionalism and its contestation is similar to the business professionals and their entrepreneurial attitude, they do however lack the strong organizational backing and subsequent acknowledged professionalism that corporate lawyers enjoy.

With this article, we also demonstrated the nuances of “ethnical capital” and its relation to being a member of a low-status group. The findings of this article point out that employing one’s individual background is a ‘double-edged’ phenomenon. On the one hand, our respondents clearly benefitted from the employment of their Turkish migration background. On the other hand, they also
experienced encounters and situations that highlighted the dividing line between themselves and others in spite of their professional success. This underlines the cognitive dimension of ethnicity as “a way of seeing and interpreting the world” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 184). Even if one can see interactions as those displayed in the empirical material as part of the process of ‘normalization’, one should keep in mind the enduring impact of stigmatization based on being a member of a particular ethnic group, which can have detrimental consequences for individuals who are not in a position to employ ethnic background resources to their advantage.

Being successful in balancing making use of ethnic capital on the one hand and avoiding being stigmatized or pigeonholed on the other hand is an important reflexive quality our respondents needed to develop to be able to position themselves successfully as professionals in their sectors. As such, the often-strategic social identity building efforts and work they needed to undertake provides a further crucial building block to understand how the theoretical concept of the multiplier effect works for this specific group that is successful against all odds (Crul et al., 2017). They often need to carve out alternative routes to leadership positions involving the use of ethnic capital resources. However, they can only do this successfully if they can simultaneously avoid, or actively counter, narratives of stigmatization. The form this takes is different across sectors, but in all cases, it is crucial for the acceptance of their professional identity among colleagues, supervisors and clients.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Social Capital and Citizens’ Attitudes towards Migrant Workers

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Abstract
This study examines Qatari citizens’ attitudes toward migrant workers. While much research has been conducted on citizens’ attitudes toward the abolition, tightening, or loosening of the Kafāla system in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with regard to migrant workers’ residency rights, and on their contribution to the economic development of these countries, little is known about how citizens’ religiosity and social engagement impact their acceptance of migrant workers. In the present study, we address this question by examining the effects of religious and social capital on Qatari citizens’ preferences for having Arab and Western migrant workers as neighbours, drawing on data from two nationally representative surveys in Qatar. The results indicate that, even after controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic attributes, social capital in terms of trust and bridging social ties has a strong effect on the Qatari nationals’ preferences.

Keywords
Gulf Cooperation Council countries; kafāla system; migrant workers; public attitudes, social capital

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1. Introduction
The influence of migration on ethnic diversity and community cohesion has been extensively studied in the USA and Europe. Scholars have generally found that large inflows of migrants change the demographic composition of the receiving countries and have a strong and largely negative impact on community cohesion. Consequently, much of the discussion about migration is focused on the mainstream population’s (or nationals’) attitudes towards, and the socio-economic integration of, the migrant workers and their children. However, in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, surprisingly few studies have investigated these issues. In this context, the migration literature has mostly been centred around understanding the recruitment of migrant workers, their lives and working conditions in the host countries, their remittances to family members back home, the impact of remittances on the lives of their family members, and economic development in the sending countries. It was not until recently that the focus shifted slightly to an examination of the attitudes of nationals towards migrant workers and the kafāla system which regulates their employment and residential status in the GCC countries. In the GCC countries, ‘foreigners’ are guest workers who have little prospect of becoming naturalized citizens of the countries even though they may work and live alongside nationals.

More than anywhere else in the world, the countries of the Arabian Gulf are dependent on foreign labour to sustain their economic growth and development. Across the region, these workers play a vital role, carrying out jobs that are both mundane (e.g. janitorial services, domestic work) and critical to the national economy of
these countries (e.g. construction, natural resource extraction). Unlike in Europe, in the GCC generally, and in Qatar and the UAE in particular, these ‘foreigners’ constitute the majority of the population at the present time. These workers also bring with them their various religious traditions and customs, introducing significant diversity to countries for which Islam has long been overwhelmingly dominant. The growing presence of these workers has led GCC nationals to re-examine their nationhood and their place within society. According to some critics, these demographic changes have led some nationals to look inward, becoming more insular and less engaged civically within their local communities and neighbourhoods. This may be more pronounced in Qatar with the commitment to the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Such commitment has maintained or increased the need for migrant workers in the country to complete the infrastructure development projects but nationals’ attitudes towards ‘foreigners’ have so far remained under-researched.

In this context, we thought it high time that a systematic study be conducted which linked nationals’ religious and social-civic engagement with their attitudes towards migrant workers. We use Qatar as a case study because it typifies Gulf countries, which have a very highly proportion of migrant workers in the population (Ministry of Developmental Planning and Statistics, 2016). The insight from the study of nationals’ attitudes to and their preferences for migrant workers as neighbours, a fairly intimate form of personal interaction in the Qatari context, has important implications both for the on-going debate on immigration and social cohesion, and for the socioeconomic integration and well-being of immigrants. To carry out the research, we have used two national representative surveys that we conducted in Qatar. We find that religious affiliation, social trust, and bridging social ties play a significant role in citizens’ attitudes towards migrant workers.

This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give a review of the literature on social capital, social cohesion, and social trust. Based on this literature, we introduce our hypotheses, to be followed by the presentation of our data and findings. We conclude the paper with some discussions and suggestions for future research.

2. Literature Review

Social capital is a complex and highly controversial concept; nonetheless, it is widely used by scholars in various social science disciplines as a measure of connectedness at the individual, community, and national levels. Social capital theorists use the term to refer to resources inherent in the social networks, whether such resources are informational, material or psychological (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 2000). Such resources could be beneficial to individuals in terms of children’s education, job acquisition, career advancement, health enhancement, and a range of other outcomes. The benefits are not only for those in the networks, but extend to people who are onlookers or who are not directly involved in the networks. Thus, social capital is assumed to be helpful for community building too. Researchers tend to differentiate between two types of social capital: bonding and bridging (Putnam, 2000). Bonding refers to connections and networks within a homogeneous group, while bridging refers to social ties among people with dissimilar characteristics such as race, ethnicity, education or personal attributes. As such, bridging is more related to the concept of social cohesion (Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007) and is a point of interest for this analysis. A more comprehensive definition of bridging social capital is offered by Putnam, who says that it ‘concerns voluntary associations and horizontal ties based on common interests that transcend heterogeneous differences of ethnicity, religion and socio-economic status’ (2000, p.22).

Scholars have different views on how to assess the relationship between social cohesion and social capital. Putnam (2000) suggested that bridging social ties are a means of ‘getting ahead’ in society, as opposed to bonding social ties, which he describes as helping people to ‘get by’. The two forms of social capital tend to go hand in hand although they might serve different purposes: chicken soup for the sick and ‘sleeve-rolling’ for community building. He holds that, in order to maintain and enhance community cohesion, people need to acquire connections with members of other groups who may possess different types of social resources. However it is important to note, at this juncture, that as a political scientist, Putnam’s main interest was in the effect of social capital on social-political governance. Much of his analysis tends to link the state of democracy to the stock of social capital in a society. For example, he attributes the successful functioning of socio-economic life in northern Italy to the high level of social capital in the region and the opposite in the south, and different crime rates in the different states of his own country to the different levels of social capital in those states. In this regard, it would be fair to say that he has paid insufficient attention to the sociological causes of what he saw as the declining stock of social capital, which has been examined by sociologists investigating the determinants of bonding and bridging social capital and concomitants such as trust in capitalist countries like the USA or Britain (e.g., Hall, 1999; Li, Savage, & Pickles, 2003; Li, 2015; Paxton, 1999).

Sociological critiques of the relationship between social cohesion and social capital offer considerable insights. Cheong et al. (2007), for example, argue that more social capital does not necessarily lead to better social cohesion, as more social capital within groups tends to erode connections with other groups. Thus, for these authors, the ‘proposal to (re)create cohesive communities via social capital building may therefore be inter-

In the Qatari context, the term “immigrants” is used to refer to guest workers as there is no formal path to citizenship.
interpreted as a diversion from the fundamental injustices’ (Cheong et al., 2007, p. 36). Leonard thinks that even the transition from bonding to bridging social capital will reinforce existing inequalities through the affirmation of their existence and, therefore, ‘in order to set in motion the framework for bridging social capital to emerge, the conditions that led to the development of bonding social capital need to be undermined’ (2004, p. 927). This view is also echoed by Rajulton, Ravanera and Beaujot (2007), who show that a strong sense of belonging can be associated with low tolerance of diversity. But Rajulton et al. (2007) do not specify what kind of belonging leads to low tolerance. In this paper, we argue and demonstrate that personal belonging among family and kin is different from neighbourhood belonging: the former may be associated with low tolerance whereas the latter may foster tolerance in the Qatari context.

The socio-economic insecurity of individuals and communities has been found in numerous studies to be the main influence behind weak and falling levels of social capital and social cohesion (Fieldhouse & Johnson, 2008; Letki, 2008; Li et al., 2003). Viewed from this perspective, social cohesion is best achieved by battling poverty and correcting social injustice. A society that acknowledges diversity while ensuring justice and prosperity for all will more likely be a cohesive one. This, of course, does not mean that social connections, social belonging or civic engagement play no role in social cohesion. Beyond economic factors, we may find that bridging social ties and neighbourhood belonging have a positive effect on people’s attitudes or behaviour, especially in societies such as Qatar where citizens account for only a small proportion of the population.

Social cohesion is not unidimensional but encompasses different components such as trust and civic participation. Trust between members of society is a precondition for social cohesion. It would be difficult to imagine a well-functioning society composed solely or even predominantly of mutually distrusting and unconnected individuals. Maintaining social cohesion for ethno-culturally diverse societies is even more challenging when waves upon waves of immigrants from various backgrounds, religious traditions, and group identities come to the country. In Qatar, the high level of segregation between Qataris and out-groups offers a good opportunity to study the relationship between social interaction and intergroup cooperation.

A major issue in the conceptualization and measurement of social cohesion concerns individual versus group levels of social interaction (Friedkin, 2004). Individual-level interaction refers to one’s willingness to remain within one’s own social group and strengthen ties with it. Group-level cohesion refers to the breadth and depth of ties with out-groups. This is similar to the ‘bonding’ versus ‘bridging’ classification made by Putnam, but we can make more refined distinctions. Individual-level cohesion can be further differentiated into personal bonding with family and kin, extended friendship ties with others with similar or dissimilar characteristics, and meso-level acquaintances with neighbours and others in the local community. The effects of these connections on people’s attitudes and tolerance may be different: close bonding within family and kin may restrict people’s outlook whereas friendship with others, particularly with people of different ethnic backgrounds, may broaden people’s horizons, as will a sense of community belonging that bridges to out-groups. Almost all Qataris belong to the same group in terms of racial and religious affiliation; they are Arab Muslims. The traditional and conservative nature of Qatari society and the constant influx of immigrants from non-Arab and non-Muslim backgrounds may lead Qatari nationals to ‘hunker down’, or become apathetic or even antipathetic towards outsiders, but one might also expect those with bridging ties or a greater sense of neighbourhood belonging to be more open-minded. To understand how social cohesion operates in Qatar, we therefore need to understand how social Qataris are and how their identification with in- and out-groups might impact upon attitudes to out-groups.

The discussion of in-group versus out-group relations is related to the differentiation mentioned above between bonding and bridging forms of social capital. In our context, bonding ties can be seen to reflect interaction among Qataris or with the larger Arab groupings. Bridging concerns horizontal ties based on shared interests that go beyond differences of race, religion, and socioeconomic characteristics. In a way, social cohesion can be reached by realising the benefit of cross-community relations: the more the different social groups in a society work together, the higher the likelihood that all groups will benefit. In Qatar, the realisation of national-level social cohesion needs more bridging connections across groups, namely, between Qataris and immigrants who are different from them culturally.

Building strong bridging social capital is a way to ensure that the benefits of bonding social capital become society-wide rather than group specific. As Pieterse (2003) says, for bonding social capital to yield positive outcomes, bridging social ties need to be strong. Some authors, such as Leonard (2004) and Rajulton et al. (2007), also point to the potentially negative effects of bonding ties on social cohesion through increased prejudice towards members of out-groups, which is likely to develop when there are strong ties within tightly knit communities (see also Portes & Landolt, 1996). In Qatari society, there are many commonalities between Qataris, as almost all of them are Muslims and Arabic speaking. Also, most Qataris are tribally affiliated and therefore strong group ties are apparent (Al-Kathim, 1991). Apart from ethno-religious differences, immigrants in Qatar, and especially non-Arabs, are also socially segregated from Qataris through economic status, living conditions, and cultural boundaries. This social setting encourages each group to remain in their own spheres of life, which is not conducive to inter-group interactions. Qatari share strong ties amongst themselves due to tribal affiliations
and a specific image that includes traditions and religion as the core national identity. Yet, Qatars and immigrants also share workplaces, neighbourhoods and even the education system, making inter-group tensions and associated problems more likely to occur. Therefore, it is of considerable importance, in our context, to understand how the strong intragroup ties among Qatars affect their attitudes to immigrant groups.

One of the key indicators of social cohesion is social trust. The first extending trust is at the level of individuals (Levi & Stoker, 2000), and the second receiving it (Baier, 1986; Hardin, 1993; Luhmann, 1980). This relationship at the macro (generalized) and meso (situational) levels (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005). Defining trust in the Arab context is no easy task. As the Arabic proverb goes, “the most complicated of tasks is explaining that which is in no need of explanation”. Trust is a word we frequently use in our parlance and, more importantly, a practice that we even take for granted in much of our social life, a situation which is made possible through repeated social interactions.

Deutsch (1958) suggests that due to the expectation of a positive outcome, the trusting party would be more affected by betrayal of trust than affirmation of it. If you trust someone, you have decided beforehand that the outcome will be positive. If you are in doubt about the positive outcome you don’t have trust. Trust is therefore a relationship between two actors, the first extending trust and the second receiving it (Baier, 1986; Hardin, 1993; Luhmann, 1980). This relationship centres on the belief that the second party will react positively to trust by delivering on the subject of trust in a material or sentimental manner.

The concept of trust explains why one would take risks in dealing with others, participate in solving collective problems, or act in ways that seem to be in conflict with the definition of self-interest (Levi & Stoker, 2000). It has also been argued that it is sometimes in our own interest to trust, as this enables us to gain access to benefits that accrue when we deal with other people, lowers the cost of everyday business, and fosters reciprocation by others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Trust is mutually beneficial when it is reciprocal, when the trusting and the trusted parties act according to expectation. In highly diverse settings, the prospect of cross-group cooperation may be hampered by differences and tensions between groups. As earlier noted, the presence of trust presumes a predisposition to cooperation and a relative absence of tensions. For our study, this is the desired outcome, a state of mutual predisposition to cooperate and work together between Qatari citizens and non-citizen residents in Qatar.

It is therefore plausible to suggest that trust is a rational choice whereby both parties can expect to gain from the relationship. It is in the interest of the trusted party to maintain the trustworthy status through delivering on expectation (Guth, Levati, & Ploner, 2008). When the trust cycle is broken, both parties lose out. This is why social trust is seen by researchers as being sociological rather than psychological or purely economic (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). It is a result of social actions and repeated inter-actions. In order to get by and get ahead in our personal and social life, we need to work together and trust one another (Arrow, 1972).

However, just as with many other social factors, trust may have a downside. Bad, or so-called ‘blind’, trust is a situation where the trusting party extends trust without receiving the desired results from the trusted party because of the personal or ideological dispositions of the latter. This bad trust could lead to manipulative political and religious figures advancing their own agendas, which could do much damage to the social fabric. Arguably, voting for someone is partly a manifestation of trust that the candidate will deliver on his or her promises. Many Germans in the 1930s placed their trust in the Nazis and their leader to solve the country’s economic, social and political problems, but that trust led to a disaster for the world.

Good trust is the focus of our study. By this, we mean the kind of trust that encourages cooperation between members of different groups in society regardless of race, religion or nationality. Understanding what trust exists between Qatars and migrant workers and what factors affect it is the first step in advancing social cohesion. Good trust reaps the benefits of a cooperative society and avoids the dangers of prejudice and non-cooperation.

Trust as a measure in survey research has taken many forms. With regard to trusted parties, researchers identify three domains: trust in those we know, trust in institutions, and trust in undefined others. The first kind of trust, sometimes called familial, particular or thick trust (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Field, 2008; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Li, Heath, & Devine, 2015), is direct: the trusted party is known and the relationship is easily explained. Repeated co-operation within the inner circle provides an abundance of the information necessary for people to decide whether or not to trust someone (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). The second kind of trust, referred to as trust in political institutions (legislative, executive, and administrative bodies), is also fairly stable as such institutions have evolved over dozens or hundreds of years. However, trust in the office-holders could vary (Paxton, 1999). The final domain is commonly known as generalised trust, namely, trust in strangers with whom one has had no prior interaction. This concept is widely used in social science literature. Stolle defines it as ‘the potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and [the] abstract preparedness to engage in civic endeavours with each other’ (Stolle et al., 2008, p. 4).

Whilst some scholars regard generalised trust as inherently good, it is not without its critics. Arneil (2006), for example, argues that while generalised trust might function well in homogeneous societies, it is not as effective in ethnically diverse settings. This may be especially true in Qatar where the population is clearly divided into Qatars, white-collar, and blue-collar migrant workers, with racial and religious divides. Results from the Social Capital survey in Qatar (2011) show that levels
of generalised trust vary a great deal between the three groups. Qataris exhibited the highest levels of trust while blue-collar workers showed the least. This is intensified by the high levels of in-group trust and the extremely low levels of out-group trust.

The high level of trust shown by Qataris merits closer scrutiny. As Wilson (n.d.) says, a respondent may often be thinking of the intra-group relations when prompted to assess his or her trust in unspecified ‘others’ and therefore the answer may not accurately reflect the level of inter-group trust in society. This was confirmed by the fact that the level of generalised trust and of Qataris’ trust in Qataris was similar but it dropped significantly when discussing out-groups (Al-Emadi, Diop, Le, Al-Ansari, Jardina, Tessler, & Wittrock, 2011; Diop, Jardina, Tessler, & Wittrock, 2016).

These considerations on personal trust focus on the radius of trust, whereas the level of trust in the civic sphere relates to the intensity of civic cooperation in a society, which may or may not depend on personal acquaintance between fellow members in civic organisations. By analysing indicators of in-group and out-group trust, Delhey et al. (2011) conclude that it is possible to control for radius of trust. Their results suggest that societies with more familial and tribal ties tend to have a narrow radius of trust while more advanced societies exhibit a wider radius.

As Qatari society is highly familial and tribal, the expectation is that the strong social divide between Qataris and immigrants will yield a narrow radius of generalised trust that focuses on Qataris as a community rather than extending trust to the overall, highly diverse society. Qataris view themselves as ‘the’ group in society as they are citizens of the country while all others are simply sojourners. Yet, as they live in proximity to these immigrants, their perception of the ‘general’ public is also hampered by the way society is structured. For Qataris, it is easier to view society in a segmented way: Qataris and highly integrated Arabs; blue-collar non-Arabs, who mostly interact with Qataris in the workplace and in educational institutions; and white-collar workers, who very rarely have personal contact with Qataris (Diop, Le, Johnston, & Ewers, 2016). Overlaid on this economic divide are cultural differences, with much greater preference shown for Arabs than for Westerners and Asians. Given this, invoking particularised trust by asking Qataris about their trust in specific out-groups, identified by their background, is better suited to our research questions.

Underlying particularised trust is the extent of contact which a member of mainstream society has with members of out-groups, as has been demonstrated by much of the previous research (Forbes, 1997; Putnam, 2007; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Sigelman & Welch, 1993; Stein, Post, & Rinden, 2000). In Qatar, contact is of prime importance as different groups have different contact dynamics with Qataris. Arabs are more integrated, as they speak the same language as Qataris and share many social and cultural norms. Asians are usually found in low-skilled jobs which don’t give them many opportunities to have contact with Qatari nationals. Westerners, on the other hand, share very little with Qataris as most of them do not speak Arabic, do not live in Qatari neighbourhoods, and their children do not attend public schools. However, they are more likely than Asians to interact with Qatari nationals in the workplace as they are usually engaged in white-collar work. This social setting requires a measurement of contact that acknowledges these different dynamics.

Another factor in the Qatari context is related to religious affiliation. Religious and religious practice have been found to have a significant impact on inter-group trust (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Brambilla, Manzi, Regalia, & Verkuyten, 2013; Brenneman, 2008; Schmeets & Te Riele, 2014; Schoenfeld, 1978; Traumuller, 2011). The religiously conservative nature of Qatari society encourages an exploration of the relationship between religion and trust as immigrant groups include both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, religion is not the only aspect of Qataris’ conservatism: social norms are also highly important to Qataris.

Social conservatism and social attitudes in general affect social trust, especially towards immigrants. Low trust in members of other groups has been attributed to strong adherence to group-specific norms (Dawes, Van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988; Uslaner & Conley, 2003). The strong tribal nature of Qatari society elevates the significance of social conservatism as social norms for gaining an understanding of trust between Qataris and immigrants. However, it is also important to note that the increased presence of civic organisations and charities may increase the likelihood of Qataris interacting with immigrants in a new setting where more or less equal status is apparent through volunteering and charitable work.

The ever-changing social (and political) milieu is also important for understanding social trust. Immigration is becoming an increasingly important political issue in many parts of the world but, in the Qatari context, political orientation is difficult to gauge, as no political parties exist in the country. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring and the resulting chaos in the region have had a notable impact on all Arab countries and Qatar is no exception. Pro-Islamist and anti-Islamist propaganda flooded Arab media and generated high levels of public interest in Qatar. This allows us to test for the effects of Islamism manifested as, for example, a desire for out-groups to adopt Qatari customs.

The above discussions offer various ways in which we could seek to understand social trust and social attitudes in Qatar. Many of the factors are, of course, intertwined in the Qatari context. Understanding how religious, social, and political attitudes impact one another is necessary in order to determine how significant these effects are and which of them holds greater importance in explaining trust in and attitudes to immigrants and social inclusion.
3. Hypotheses

Based on the literature review, we have developed a number of hypotheses in order to explain Qataris’ preferences for having Arab and Western expatriate families as next-door neighbours and the impact of religiosity, social capital, and civic engagement on these preferences. For this purpose, we use separate models for each group (Arab and Western families) and estimate a series of logistic regression models. For each subgroup, the base model (Model 1) contains individual, household, and regional characteristics as control variables, including gender, marital status, education, age, employment, household income, region, and year of survey.

Model 2 introduces attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of religiosity. The former includes items such as social ties and relationships constitutive of social networks per se and the latter includes outcomes of being embedded in such networks such as trust, preferences for assimilation and, for our present purposes, preferences for neighbours. Based on the two domains, we present the regression in the sequence which follows.

Hypothesis 1.1: Religiosity is positively related to preferences for having Arab families as next-door neighbours, with greater religiosity associated with stronger preferences.

Hypothesis 1.2: Religiosity is negatively related to preferences for having Western families as next-door neighbours, with higher religiosity associated with weaker preferences.

The multitude of items discussed above can, following Putnam (2000) and Li (2015), be grouped into what might be termed ‘core’ and ‘derived’ domains of social capital. The former includes items such as social ties and relationships constitutive of social networks per se and the latter includes outcomes of being embedded in such networks such as trust, preferences for assimilation and, for our present purposes, preferences for neighbours. Based on the two domains, we present the regression in the sequence which follows.

The third model, Model 3, introduces elements of family and friendship networks into the model. The family network tests whether the family-inward orientation of Qataris has a negative impact on their preferences for next-door neighbours and the friendship network tests whether the diversity of close friends is associated with a positive impact on preferences for having Arab or Western families as next-door neighbours. With regards to family-inward orientation, respondents were asked how often they get together with family members including siblings or extended kin for a social event or family occasion. Responses with ‘daily’ and ‘more than once a week’ frequencies are coded as 1 and other responses as 0. As for friendship networks, the variable is coded as 1 if respondents have mixed friends, including Qataris, Arabs, Westerners or friends living in other countries, and 0 otherwise.

Hypothesis 2.1: Family-inward orientation is associated with weaker preferences for having Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.

Hypothesis 2.2: Diversity of close personal friends is associated with stronger preferences for having Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.

The fourth model, Model 4, introduces elements of civic engagement and tests whether volunteering for civic organizations or donating to charities has a positive impact on Qataris’ preferences for having Arab and Western families as next-door neighbours. Respondents were asked whether they had volunteered to civic organizations and whether they had donated to charities. Both questions used the twelve-month period preceding data collection as a time reference for each wave. The two variables are also dichotomized with 1 indicating positive, and 0 negative, responses.

Hypothesis 3: A high degree of civic engagement is associated with stronger preferences for having Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.

The fifth model, Model 5, tests whether generalised trust in Arabs/Westerners is associated with Qataris’ preferences for having Arab or Western families as next-door neighbours. Trust in Arabs and Westerners was rated on a 0–10-point scale.

Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of trust in Arabs/Westerners are associated with preferences for having Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours, with higher trust associated with stronger preferences.

Model 6 tests whether a desire for out-groups to adopt Qatari customs has a strong impact on Qataris’ preferences for having Arab families as neighbours and a weak impact on Qataris’ preferences for having Western families as neighbours. All respondents were asked to rate the level of importance of out-groups adopting Qatari customs as part of the requirements for seeking citizenship of Qatar. Responses for this question are coded as 1 for very important and 0 for other responses.

Hypothesis 5.1: The importance Qataris attach to out-groups adopting Qatari customs is associated with
stronger preferences for having Arab families as next-door neighbours.

_Hypothesis 5.2:_ The importance Qataris attach to out-groups adopting Qatari customs is associated with weaker preferences for having Western families as next-door neighbours.

_Model 7_ adds the respondents’ perception of neighbourhood belonging and _Model 8_ adds that of neighbourhood cohesion. The belonging question is worded ‘I feel accepted as a member of this neighbourhood’ on a four-point agree/disagree scale. This variable is dichotomized as well, with 1 equalling ‘agree’ and 0 otherwise. The cohesion question in _Model 8_ asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: ‘People here look out for the welfare of their own families and are not much concerned with neighbourhood welfare.’ We recoded the responses so that 1 means cohesive neighbourhood, namely, that people in the neighbourhood show concern for each other’s welfare, and 0 otherwise.

_Hypothesis 6:_ A positive sense of neighbourhood belonging is associated with stronger preferences for having Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.

_Hypothesis 7:_ A positive perception of neighbourhood cohesion is associated with stronger preferences for having Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.

### 4. Data and Results

Our analysis draws on data from the first two waves of the survey ‘From Fareej to Metropolis: A Social Capital Survey of Qatar’ conducted by the SESRI at Qatar University in 2011 and 2015 respectively. Both waves were funded by the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development. The survey adopted multi-stage stratified probability sampling and collected information on representative samples of the Qatari population focussing on three groups: Qatari citizens, high-skilled migrant workers, and low-skilled migrant workers. Overall, 4,821 interviews were completed between the two waves (2,268 in the year 2011 and 2,553 in the year 2015) including a total of 1,631 Qatari nationals, 1,605 high-skilled workers, and 1,585 low-skilled migrant workers. To explore the effects of social capital, religiosity, and civic engagement on Qataris’ preferences for having Arab or Western families as next-door neighbours, we restricted our analysis to data on the Qatari citizen sub-samples. The response rates were high (61% and 59% respectively). The data were weighted to account for probability selection and non-response. The analysis used in this paper is based on weighted data using STATA (version 14), which takes into account the survey design effect.

The survey asked a variety of questions on preferences from which we selected two as our outcome variables—preferences for having Arab and Western families as next-door neighbours. More specifically, respondents were asked whether they would have a *strong preference, slight preference, neither a preference nor an objection, slight objection, or strong objection for having Arab families as their next-door neighbours.* And they were asked the same question about Western families. The two variables are dichotomized—1 for strong preference, and 0 for the other response modes—and are used as our dependent variables in this analysis using logit models (further analysis using ordinal logit models yielded basically the same patterns). Our explanatory variables are summarized in Table 1.

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables listed in Table 1. Results from the substantive analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 4 with regard to Qataris’ preferences for having Arab and Western families as next-door neighbours respectively. Data in the last two tables pertain to average marginal effects (AMEs) derived from the logit models. While substantively the same, the AMEs show the effects in terms of percentage points rather than log odds as in logit models, offering easier exposition. Overall, only one in four Qataris (25%) wish to have Westerners as next-door neighbours, but over twice as many (55%) are happy to have Arabs as next-door neighbours.

Most empirical studies tend to explain findings in sequence. As our aim in this paper is to explain the socio-cultural determinants of Qataris’ preferences for having Arab and Western expatriate families as next-door neighbours as a dual dimension, it makes more sense to make an exposition of the effects of our independent variables on the two groups simultaneously. We have also conducted prior analyses on bivariate associations and found that all our independent variables are significantly associated with both kinds of preference (with the sole exception of gender on preferences for Arabs). To save space, we thus move directly to multivariate analyses as shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.

With regard to individual and household characteristics in the two tables, we can see that, in terms of net effects, most variables in this domain (marital, employment and financial status, gender, age, education) do not have notable effects: none of the variables are significant with regard to preferences for Arabs in any of the eight models in Table 3 (with the sole exception of richer families unwilling to have Arab neighbours in Model 8); and most of them have non-significant effects with regard to preferences for Westerners (with the exception of older and employed Qataris being less welcoming but richer Qataris more receptive in the first four models). With regard to regional differences, Qataris residing in al Rayyan and other municipalities have stronger preferences for having Arab families as next-door neighbours as compared to those residing in Doha (Table 3). As for Western families, Qataris living in Al Rayyan are little dif-
### Table 1. Dimensions and indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Demographic      | • Individual characteristics  
                   | • Household characteristics  
                   | • Year of survey  
                   | • Municipalities  |
| Religiosity      | • Self-reported religiosity  
                   | • Frequency of going to places of worship  |
| Trust            | • Trust in Arabs  
                   | • Trust in Westerners  |
| Networks         | • Frequency of getting together with family members  
                   | • Diversity of close personal friends  |
| Qatari Identity  | • Preferences of “adopting the customs of Qatar” for somebody seeking citizenship of Qatar  |
| Civism           | • Volunteering for organizations over the past year  
                   | • Donating to charitable organizations over the past year  |
| Neighbourhood belonging | • Feeling of being accepted as a member of the neighbourhood  |
| Neighbourhood cohesion (reverse-coding) | • People in the neighbourhood only look out for their own welfare and are not concerned with neighbours’ welfare |

### Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income $\geq 50,000$ QAR</td>
<td>1516</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very religious</td>
<td>1629</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily attendance of place of worship</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting together with family members on a daily basis</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of friends (yes)</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari customs for immigrants (very important)</td>
<td>1603</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering (yes)</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable Donations (yes)</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood belonging (yes)</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood cohesion (yes)</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational or less</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary &amp; post-secondary</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree, Masters, &amp; Ph.D.</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 years or younger</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–44 years</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years or older</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Rayyan</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other municipalities</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Arabs</td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Westerners</td>
<td>1470</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ferent from those living in Doha and only those living in other municipalities show positive preferences for having Westerners as next-door neighbours (Table 4). These results suggest that Qataris residing in Doha are less keen to have them as next-door neighbours.

With reference to the waves, the results show a positive and significant (at 0.1 level) effect for the year (2015) variable in all models, indicating improved Qatari attitudes towards Arab and Western families between 2011 and 2015. This pattern is in line with two major changes that occurred during that period, namely, the awarding of the FIFA 2022 World Cup and a 60 percent salary increase for Qatari nationals. Though the announcement of Qatar hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup was made in December 2010, it was around 2015 that outside scrutiny and criticism of Qatar’s policies with respect to the treatment and welfare of its guest workers reached a critical point and required a response. This in turn increased awareness of migrant workers’ issues among Qatari nationals. In addition, in 2011 the government increased the salary of Qatari nationals by 60 per cent. Taken together, these two events may have contributed to the change in nationals’ attitudes towards both Arab and Western expatriate families. The national mood was happier and more welcoming of guest workers.

Turning to religiosity and religious attendance, we find a weak and negative association with preferences for having Arab or Western expatriate families as neighbours, with religiosity effects barely significant (at 0.1 level) for Arabs, indicating that Qatari nationals who consider themselves very religious are less likely to want Arab families living next-door. This is an unexpected result as Qataris and most Arabs share the same language and religion.

Family and friendship networks seem to play an important role. Family-inward orientation has no significant role (albeit weakly negative) bearing on the Arab models but, as might be expected, a strong and significantly negative impact on Western expatriate families, indicating that strong bonds amongst family members tend to make Qatari nationals more disinclined to accept Western expatriate families as next-door neighbours. By contrast, we find in both tables that bridging social capital, as indicated by a diversity of friendship networks, tends to make Qataris more open and more willing to accept both groups as next-door neighbours, and indeed, more so for Westerners than for Arabs: around 10 percentage points for Westerners and 5 percentage points for Arabs. Whereas the impact is significant in early models (5 and 6) for Arabs, the effect becomes non-significant with models 7 and 8. On the other hand, the effect is fully significant for all models 4–8 with regard to Western families. Further analysis shows that the net effects of friendship diversity are significantly stronger for West-

Table 3. Average marginal effects (AME) of Qataris’ preferences for having Arab families as next-door neighbours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model1</th>
<th>Model2</th>
<th>Model3</th>
<th>Model4</th>
<th>Model5</th>
<th>Model6</th>
<th>Model7</th>
<th>Model8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 31–44</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 45+</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income ≥ 50,000 QAR</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Al Rayyan</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in other areas</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of survey (2015)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious attendance</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting together with family and kin</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of friends</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Arabs</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari customs for immigrants</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood belonging</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .10; Reference categories are female, non-married, with primary education, age under 30, non-employed, household income ≤ 50,000 QAR, living in Doha, survey year 2011, less religious, with less bonding and bridging ties, less desirous of foreigners adopting Qatari customs, less volunteering and donating, and less attached to the neighbourhood; 1 QAR = 0.27 US Dollar.
Table 4. Average marginal effects (AME) of Qataris’ preferences for having Western families as next-door neighbours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model1</th>
<th>Model2</th>
<th>Model3</th>
<th>Model4</th>
<th>Model5</th>
<th>Model6</th>
<th>Model7</th>
<th>Model8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>−0.4</td>
<td>−0.4</td>
<td>−0.5</td>
<td>−0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>−0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 31–44</td>
<td>−2.5</td>
<td>−2.5</td>
<td>−3.8</td>
<td>−3.6</td>
<td>−3.6</td>
<td>−3.5</td>
<td>−4.3</td>
<td>−3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 45+</td>
<td>−6.5</td>
<td>−6.2</td>
<td>−7.4</td>
<td>−7.2</td>
<td>−8.0</td>
<td>−8.3</td>
<td>−8.6</td>
<td>−7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>−3.5</td>
<td>−3.5</td>
<td>−4.1</td>
<td>−3.9</td>
<td>−5.2</td>
<td>−4.9</td>
<td>−4.4</td>
<td>−5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income ≥ 50,000 QAR (%)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting together with family and kin</td>
<td>−8.5</td>
<td>−8.4</td>
<td>−8.4</td>
<td>−8.2</td>
<td>−9.1</td>
<td>−9.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of friends</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>Donations</td>
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<td>Qatari customs for immigrants</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood belonging</td>
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<td>1310</td>
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</table>

Notes: a p < .01, b p < .05, c p < .10; Reference categories are female, non-married, with primary education, age under 30, non-employed, household income ≤ 50,000 QAR, living in Doha, survey year 2011, less religious, with less bonding and bridging ties, less desirous of foreigners adopting Qatari customs, less volunteering and donating, and less attached to the neighbourhood; 1 QAR = 0.27 US Dollar.

As discussed above, trust is viewed in much of the social capital scholarship as a vital ingredient of social interaction that generates mutual benefits (Coleman, 1988; Field, 2008; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). With regards to attitudes towards immigrants, previous studies have shown that nationals with higher levels of trust—variously defined as generalized trust, social trust, or personal trust—tend to hold positive attitudes towards immigrants. These findings are supported by our results with both Arab and Western expatriate families. Trust in both groups has a strong predictive power. Overall, Qataris exhibit different levels of trust towards the different subgroups that comprise the expatriate population in Qatar. Though this level of trust has increased significantly between the two waves, it is much higher for Arabs than for Westerners although the rate of increase is higher for the latter. On the 0 to 10-point scale, Qataris’ trust of Arabs increased from 6.18 in 2011 to 6.66 in 2015 while trust of Westerners increased from 3.57 in 2011 to 4.63 in 2015.

Regarding the importance Qataris attach to outgroups adopting Qatari customs as a requirement for obtaining citizenship, Qatari nationals seem to be more flexible with Western families. The variable is significant...
only for Arab families. Qataris who have a strong desire for people seeking citizenship of Qatar to adopt Qatari customs are here shown to favour Arab families as next-door neighbours but are rather neutral with regard to Westerners.

Neighbourhood belonging, as an indicator of local embeddedness or meso-level/situational social capital (Li et al., 2005) is also believed to foster feelings of tolerance and acceptance. Those who perceive their neighbourhoods as cohesive ones where people trust and help one another are also seen as being more open to Westerners. In our data, those with a strong sense of neighbourhood belonging show a strong preference for having Arabs and Westerners as next-door neighbours: around 10 percentage points more in both cases. In addition, those residing in cohesive neighbourhoods are, other things being equal, more willing by 11 percentage points to have Westerners as next-door neighbours.

5. Conclusion

While numerous studies have been conducted on the impacts of immigration upon local communities and social cohesion in receiving countries in western developed countries such as the USA and Europe, little research is available on the preferences of nationals in countries where immigrants outnumber the mainstream population. In this paper, we have carried out what we believe is the first systematic study on Qatari nationals’ preferences for accepting Arab and Western expatriate families as their next-door neighbours. We use preferences for next-door neighbours as an indicator of tolerance and openness in a highly religious, conservative social context. Drawing on data from nationally representative samples and using a whole range of socio-demographic and cultural variables—including civic engagement, bridging and bonding social ties, as well as social trust—as explanatory variables, we have obtained some important findings. Our main results can be summarized as follows:

- Whilst at the bivariate level most socio-demographic attributes are significantly associated with Qataris’ preferences for accepting Arabs and Westerners as next-door neighbours, net effects show that demographic-economic and educational differences do not have salient effects.
- Despite the fact that Qataris are predominantly Muslims, religiosity or practice per se do not have marked effects on Westerner acceptance, though it is weakly significant for accepting Arabs; rather, it is social trust that plays a significant role.
- Bonding social ties tend to be negative, but bridging social ties, in terms of diversity of friends, neighbourhood belonging, and perceived neighbourhood cohesion, are shown to engender greater tolerance and willingness to welcome out-groups.

Overall, while not negating the importance of socio-economic factors, we find that trust and socially engaged—in terms of diversity of friendship networks and active participation in neighbourhood affairs, which tend to result in a higher sense of belonging and cohesion—are seeds for tolerance, acceptance, and accommodation.

The implications of our research are manifold and we list three here. Firstly, as readers will know, social capital research reached its heights in the early 2000s, after Putnam’s (2000) book on Bowling Alone (see Field, 2008, p. 3; Halpern, 2005, p. 9). Academic enthusiasm in this respect seems to have substantially waned in recent years. Scholars’ interest may ebb and flow but the underlying social problems persist, as social capital in the form of trust and bridging ties show significant net effects even in a society where nationals comprise a relatively small proportion of the population such as Qatar. Seen from this perspective, we believe that our analysis has rendered a positive service, if not in reinstating the importance of social capital research, but at least in demonstrating the continued relevance of the concept of social capital in social life.

Secondly, as noted in earlier discussions, political scientists and sociologists seem to have travelled on separate tracks, with the former being more interested in documenting the rise and fall of the national stock of social capital and the relationship with democratic governance, and the latter keener to interrogate the socio-economic determinants of the differential possession of social capital. In the present study, we have managed to link both traditions in a simultaneous way in our comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic-cultural determinants of preferences for accepting out-groups in a fairly intimate way, as next-door neighbours. We have also conducted our analysis at both individual and meso-levels.

Thirdly, in terms of policy implications, we believe that our results on the positive effects of neighbourhood belonging and cohesion on Qataris’ acceptance of out-groups could be useful for authorities interested in making the country more welcoming and more inclusive. While it would be difficult to increase people’s level of trust (Li et al., 2005; Uslaner, 2008), it might be more feasible to enhance community cohesion at the neighbourhood level.

Overall, while we have shown that social capital does have a significant role to play in enhancing social inclusion in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural context, we wish to point out that there are many other aspects on which, due to limited space, we have not been able to report. These include findings related to policies on immigrants and their subsequent impact, such as immigrants’ sojourner mentality and an associated (un)willingness to interact with nationals. These and other factors could impact on one another, making it more challenging for researchers and for policy-makers alike. We hope to report more findings in due course.
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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Academic Integration of Mainland Chinese Students in Germany

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Abstract
This article presents an analysis of the academic integration experiences of mainland Chinese tertiary-level students in Germany. Using Tinto’s model, the article explores the challenges that Chinese students face during their academic integration, the strategies they employ, and the relationship between academic and social integration. The data were collected in spring 2016 by interviewing 26 mainland Chinese students studying either in German universities or universities of applied sciences. Four major challenges were identified and analyzed: language barrier, knowledge gap, pedagogical differences, and cultural differences. An important outcome of the study presented is that social integration serves as a facilitator for enhancing academic integration, but is not a prerequisite for academic success. Group learning with peers was found to enhance learning outcomes. Overall, Chinese students have exploited their own advantages in academic integration by exploring feasible strategies and benefiting from their past learning experiences. It is suggested that academic integration as a long and challenging process for international students should be acknowledged by the German HEIs, and that more institutional support and guidance are needed.

Keywords
academic integration; Chinese student; Germany; higher education; social integration

Issue
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1. Introduction
While the migration studies literature generally focuses on the integration of labor migrants, family migrants, and asylum seekers, there is less research focusing on the integration of international students. This is partly because international student mobility is often seen as ‘temporary’, and international students constitute a ‘less problematic’ group of foreign arrivals. However, the number of students pursuing studies abroad continues to surge as higher education institutions around the world compete for the most talented students, and university enrolment continues to increase worldwide. International students have become the key target of many countries’ battlefields of global competition for brightest and best. Canada, for example, has recently changed its electronic immigration selection system to make it easier for international students to become citizens. It counts half of students’ time spent studying in Canada toward the period of residence required for citizenship (Smith, 2017). Meanwhile, many European countries, such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Finland, have also pursued a policy of allowing international university graduates an extension to their residence permits for job seeking after graduation. International students are no longer classed as ‘temporary migrants’, rather it is hoped that their stay in the host country will increase motivation for long-term settlement, and that their temporary movement could be part of a deliberate strategy for permanent migration (Tremblay, 2005). Thus, integration of international students has become topical and deserves more scholarly attention.

Nevertheless, international students still only constitute a minority of the total tertiary student population. Chinese students are the most numerous of the international tertiary-level students (UNESCO Institute for Statis-
Chinese student migration mostly aims at the English-speaking countries (Chen & Ross, 2015; Gu & Schweisfurth, 2006; Kajanus, 2016), while Germany is the most popular destination among the non-English-speaking countries. According to the Institute of International Education, about 30,511 Chinese students were studying in Germany in 2015, making them the second largest group of international students in Germany (after Turkish students). The share of Chinese students of the international student population in Germany is around ten percent (Wissenschaft Weltoffen, 2016). Although most degree programs are still offered in German language (Bessey, 2012), Germany has become an increasingly popular choice for higher education among Chinese students.

Germany is a popular destination among Chinese students for several reasons. First, it is one of the few countries to offer all nationalities high quality higher education free of charge or for modest tuition fees, which is a major attractive factor for international students. Both English- and German-taught programs are provided for international students. Unlike many non-English-speaking countries that are recruiting international students for English-taught programs, most international students study on German-taught programs alongside native German students. German language is taught in universities across the globe and language institutes such as the Goethe Institut. Germany also arranges established standardized German language tests (DSH and TestDaF) in many countries in the world, where students can obtain a language certificate in support of their applications for studies in Germany. For those students who cannot reach the requirement to begin their academic studies in Germany, it is possible to start the studies in the Studienkollegs (Studienkolleg für ausländische Studierende) at German colleges and universities. These studies function as a ‘bridge’ to help international students enhance their German language skills, and become acquainted with German academic culture. Further, Germany has an organization specialized in promoting academic mobility between Germany and other countries. The German Academic Exchange Service DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) offers information on studying in Germany, on selecting a university, on admission criteria, and on preparing to embark on studies in Germany. It also offers various types of scholarships to students across the globe for exchange, studying German language, or studying on degree programs. The DAAD has offices in many countries of the world, including China, that actively offer information on how to apply to study in Germany, and on academic collaboration and mobility. For example, in China the DAAD has its own social network accounts on WeChat and Weibo that routinely distribute information on the application process for studying in Germany, presents introductions to specific German universities and cities, and reproduces testimonials from current students.

In addition, Germany is one of the first countries in the EU to actively seek to improve international students’ access to the labor market. In the context of the recent political debate, international students were identified as future skilled workers. The aim was to make access to the labor market easier for them, especially in the information technology sector. International graduates holding a degree from a German university are in a favorable position for getting job offers. Moreover, due to their linguistic skills and intercultural communication skills, international students can serve as ‘connectors’ between their countries of origin and destination. The latter factor is particularly relevant for the export-oriented German economy (Aksakal & Schmidt-Verkerk, 2014).

Given this policy context, there has been growing concern over the extent to which German higher education institutions (HEIs) manage to provide appropriate and responsive academic and personal support for the integration of international students. While numerous surveys have examined the macro-level trends in student mobility and the quality of German HEIs, less attention has been paid to the experiences of individual international students.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese students integrate into German academic environments, what challenges they encounter while studying in Germany, and what coping strategies they adopt for such challenges. The following research questions guided the study presented here: (1) What challenges do mainland Chinese students encounter while studying and living in Germany? (2) What strategies do Chinese students use to overcome challenges in their academic integration? and (3) Is there a connection between academic and social integration among Chinese students studying in Germany?

2. Integration of International Students: The Research Context

In earlier research on the academic and social integration and study progress of international students in a foreign academic setting, the terms ‘integration’, ‘adaptation’, and ‘acculturation’ have been used interchangeably in different settings, carrying largely similar connotations. This article chooses to use the term ‘integration’ because integration can be seen both as a goal and a process. When it comes to social relations, the goal of the German integration policy is that foreign newcomers will establish a relatively robust relationship with the host community, while not abandoning their home ethnic community and ethnic identity (Süssmuth, 2009). As
a goal integration refers a situation in which newcomers have attained at least a moderate level of language and cultural competence within the country of settlement that ensures their ability to thrive. It also implies that migrants actively try to become a part of the surrounding society (Budytá-Budzyńska, 2011). It can be said that a successful adaptation presupposes that newcomers integrate into their new living environments, which in turn is usually a result of a successful acculturation process.

2.1. Academic and Social Integration

Tinto (1975, 1997) developed a model of student attrition that laid a theoretical foundation for studying tertiary student retention. In his model, Tinto established the approximate parity between social and academic integration in their effects on dropout. The central concept proposed in Tinto’s model is that a student’s integration into the social and academic systems of the higher education institution is what ultimately results in perseverance or dropout. The higher the degree of integration of the students into the college system, the less likely they are to fail to fulfill a commitment and achieve goals leading to the completion of their degree programs. A person’s academic integration can be measured in terms of the grade performance and intellectual development achieved during studies. While international students enter university with various backgrounds and motivations, their integration into the higher education system will ultimately determine their perseverance or dropout. Tinto describes two imperative conditions for successful retention: (1) institutional experiences (involving the education system); and (2) academic and social integration. Those who feel at home, participate actively in extra-curricular activities, and feel connected with fellow students and teachers are more likely to persevere in their studies.

The predictive validity of Tinto’s model was tested in various settings. One study suggested that students’ academic integration, together with educational objectives, predicts their persistence in the HEIs (Bers & Smith, 1991). In addition to formal studies, informal interaction with faculty members plays a vital role in the students’ academic integration (Terenzini & Pascarella, 1977). However, Tinto’s model does not specify the process by which institutional experiences affect student learning. While student characteristics prior to entry may affect their academic integration, the institutional experience results in a certain study effort and ultimately in student persistence. A study by Severiens and Schmidt (2009) examining institutional experiences of student learning, found a direct positive effect of the learning environment on international students’ progress in their studies. A problem-based learning environment, more than conventional programs, helped students to develop their cognitive skills and stimulated them to acquire new knowledge. Problem-based learning also appeared to be successful in stimulating students to obtain credits, and achieve a higher level of social and academic integration.

One of the key themes among the studies using Tinto’s model is the relationship between academic and social integration. The findings of Mannan (2007) show that academic and social integration complement each other among undergraduates. However, Rienties, Beausaert, Grohnert, Niemantsverdriet and Kommers (2012), who examined the validity of educators’ impressions, found that international students are insufficiently adjusted to higher education in their host countries, both academically and socially, and that the extent of their academic success is multifaceted. International students with a (mixed) western background were better academically and socially integrated, and achieved a higher study performance than did domestic students. By contrast, international students with a non-western background were less socially integrated, but still achieved a similar study performance. The social adjustment of students was negatively related to their study performance. These findings suggest that the relationship between academic and social integration processes is complex in nature and merits further investigation.

Research on the social integration of international students has particularly emphasized the positive effect of establishing social networks with host nationals (Bochner, McLeod, & Lin, 1977a; Coles & Swami, 2012). Research has also shown that international students report less homesickness, less loneliness, and greater satisfaction if they have more host-national friends (Church, 1982; Hendrickson, Rosen, & Aune, 2011). Contacts with host nationals have also been shown to enable international students to develop local networks, attain a better understanding of local cultures, and acquire the necessary social skills (Li & Gasser, 2005). Yet in practice it may be difficult to make contacts with host-nationals. It is relatively easy for international students to form friendship networks with co-national students (Bochner, McLeod, & Lin, 1977b; Furnham & Alibhai, 1985; Hendrickson et al., 2011). While contact with co-nationals can play a vital role in the international students’ social networks, engagement with co-nationals may inhibit them from forming friendship networks with representatives of the host society (Church, 1982), and from acquiring or improving skills in the host language (Maudenedi, 2001), which impedes intercultural learning processes (Kim, 2000). Accordingly, Kim (2000) argues that co-national contacts only offer short-term support, while contacts and friendships with host-nationals are more important for social integration.

2.2. Chinese Learners in Western Higher Education

Studies focusing on the academic integration of Chinese students in western HEIs have produced mixed and sometimes contradictory results. Kennedy (2002) found that Chinese culture has an influence on Chinese students’ learning styles: Chinese students are low in individualism and high in collectivism, and exhibit a strong sense of belonging to a social group and a preference to work together to solve problems (Kennedy, 2002; Nield, 2009;
Sayers & Franklin, 2008) Some studies have found that students from a Confucian cultural background have more difficulties in adjusting to the western teaching style than do their western peers. They may adopt a less active learning strategy, and be hesitant about voicing their own opinions in the classroom, while western students are more used to participating actively in class (Auyeung & Sands, 1996; Duanmu, Li, & Chen, 2009; Strohschneider & Guss, 1999; Vita, 2001; Yuen & Lee, 1994). In addition, Cortazzi and Jin (1997) have shown that Chinese and British students are likely to have different expectations regarding students’ and teachers’ roles. The Chinese students expect a teacher to be a ‘knowledge model’ who gives students clear guidance for them to follow, while British teachers act more as facilitators of students’ learning by encouraging the learners’ own creativity and independence.

However, there are other studies which contradict these findings, suggesting that, contrary to the Chinese student stereotype, Chinese learners have a stronger preference for high-level, meaning-based learning strategies and prefer to avoid rote learning. Kennedy (2002) found that Chinese students can adopt new learning styles when the learning context changes and new learning approaches are needed. Thus, more active and communicative modes of learning may be preferred to a traditional teacher-centered style. According to Durkin (2008), Chinese students approach their learning tasks by adopting a strategic attitude to learning. She found that most East Asian master’s students opted for a middle way which synergizes their own cultural approach to critical thinking with western-style critical thinking and debate that are culturally acceptable to them. In this way international students, without being fully acculturated, become ‘empathetic insiders’, who understand and value the new practices, perceiving them as opportunities for growth and development. Zhang (2013) also found that some Chinese students would choose a middle way to improve their linguistic competence for better academic integration. Instead of approaching native speakers, some Chinese students tried to make friends with other non-Chinese students to practice their English and thus gain more confidence in intercultural communication.

2.3. Chinese Students in Germany

Given the relatively large number of Chinese students in German HEIs, little research has so far been conducted on this group. The existing literature suggests that Chinese students studying in Germany share some problems with those in other countries, such as language issues, financial stress, loneliness, and difficulties in academic integration. Zhu (2012, 2016) explored Chinese students’ academic adjustment in four phases: pre-departure, initial, developing, and final phase. She found that Chinese students’ insufficient preparation (language proficiency and knowledge about German universities) in the pre-departure phase led to difficulties in the initial phase. The students often described their initial experiences as a ‘catastrophe’, as they were not at all familiar with the academic system in Germany. In the developing phase, Chinese students reported progress in German language and knowledge about German universities, which facilitated their further development. One major challenge in the developing phase was to negotiate the difference in academic expectations between home and host universities. In the final phase, Chinese students showed understanding and appreciation of the expectations at German universities. German language proficiency, academic support, and personal effort together influenced the Chinese students’ academic adjustment at German universities.

Moreover, Chinese students studying in Germany with German as the language of instruction reported greater challenges in their academic and social integration (Zhou, 2009). The study by Mao (2011) showed that only half of the international students had studied German before arriving in Germany, while the rest began learning German only on arriving in the country. Consequently, less than one third of Chinese students taking part in the study could report that their proficiency in German was ‘good’ or ‘very good’, even though their studies in a German university had already begun (Mao, 2011).

By examining a group of German and a group of Chinese students, Luo and Kück (2011) examined the similarities and differences between these students’ learning behaviors and styles. They found that the learning styles of the two groups were amazingly close, as both groups were oriented towards improving their competence and being creative through self-motivation. In addition, they used similar learning methods, such as self-learning and asking questions, and viewed the lecturers as professional and moral examples in academic settings. This demonstrates that cultural differences do not necessarily affect the learning approaches of German and Chinese students.

Guan (2007) compared Chinese and German students’ adjustment at the University of Bremen and the University of Göttingen. His research at the University of Bremen, the former research suggested that the concept of self played an important role in the adjustment of Chinese students; while at the University of Göttingen he found that when facing difficulties Chinese students used different resources from their German counterparts to deal with the problem. Most Chinese students preferred to turn to books and media instead of talking with native Germans.

In sum, much of the literature on the academic and social integration of international students adopts a cultural perspective focusing on the tensions caused by attempts to cope with cultural differences in a new environment. The research presented in this article was contextualized in different literatures concerning the nature of international students’ intercultural communication and intercultural experience. Yet the emphasis was not placed on cultural difference as such, but encompassed various challenges facing the students arising from cultural, peda-
cultural, linguistic, and institutional perspectives that are also due to the stress of integrating into the larger societal context in addition to the academic context.

Meanwhile, while much attention has been paid to ‘cultural difference’, less has been paid to the processes of learning, which may be identical across different cultural and academic settings. As the foregoing literature review shows, learning styles may be similar among students from different cultural backgrounds. Strategies for the academic integration of international students may prove to be just as useful when implemented in a brand new academic setting.

For the purposes of the research presented here, the list of relevant questions concerned how students cope with pedagogical and cultural differences, participate in classroom and group learning, interact with teachers and classmates inside and outside class, and how they succeed in their assessments. Social integration refers to a process or state where students establish relatively robust relationships with host-national individuals or communities and take part in diverse social activities. Since the focus of this article is on the academic integration of Chinese students, the examination of their social integration is limited to whether their social integration facilitates their academic integration.

3. Data and Methods

Data collected through semi-structured interviews were used to explore the challenges and coping strategies of academic integration among Chinese students in Germany. The author interviewed 26 mainland Chinese tertiary-level degree students in two German universities during spring and summer 2016. Most of the interview questions (except those eliciting demographic information) were open-ended questions enabling students to talk freely and in depth within the range of the research questions, while also allowing flexibility to delve into topics which were not expected at the beginning of the study. All interviews were conducted by the author in Mandarin Chinese to lower the potential barrier of cultural and linguistic difference, while allowing the students to delve deeper into the subject of interest. Most of the interviews were conducted at two German universities. Both universities are large research and teaching HEIs offering instruction in the main academic disciplines.

Multiple methods were used to recruit interviewees. First, the author asked the international offices of the two participating universities to send invitations to all mainland Chinese students registered in these universities to participate in the research. The students who volunteered to participate in the research were contacted by email, instant message, or telephone. Second, snowball sampling was used. The research participants were encouraged to invite their friends and other mainland Chinese students who might be interested in joining the research. Third, a research assistant helped to distribute the invitation to interviews through the local Chinese students’ association network. Among the interviewees, 16 were female and 12 male students. All participants were in their twenties with an average age of 24 years for female and 26 for male students. The interviewees came from various academic backgrounds: five were studying natural sciences, four social sciences, three mechanical engineering, three medicine, three computer science, three sports management, two arts and humanities, two German linguistics, one English literature.

Most of the interviewees came from urban middle and upper middle class family backgrounds in China. The group of interviewees included students who had just come to study in Germany for one semester, and those who had come to Germany for more than five years. As the time interval and integration phases of the interviewees were diverse, the author was able to explore which features of academic integration manifest in different phases. Students who had moved to Germany recently had fresh experience of ‘culture shock’, while the senior students gave lively accounts of how they had managed to overcome academic integration problems in different stages and on their development trajectories. The interviews lasted from one to three hours. The shared language and cultural background facilitated communication between the interviewer and the interviewees. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interview data were analyzed using interpretative content analysis; particularly interesting insights were written down during the interview, but most of the analyses were carried out on the basis of the interview transcripts.

In the following section, the challenges and coping strategies of Chinese students’ academic integration into Germany will be discussed in detail. In presenting the findings, no such personal data is revealed that would make the interviewees recognizable. The anonymity of respondents is protected, and no real name is disclosed in the article. In the quotations, gender and major subject will serve to characterize the respondents. Citations from the interviews conducted in mandarin Chinese were translated into English by the author.

4. Findings

4.1. Challenges in Academic Integration

Most of the Chinese students in Germany were studying abroad for the first time in their lives. The challenges they encountered during their academic integration can be categorized into the following themes: language barrier, knowledge gap, cultural difference, and pedagogical difference.

4.1.1. Language Barrier

All Chinese students interviewed stressed the importance of German linguistic proficiency in their studies. Indeed, many interviewees had come to study in Germany specifically because they wanted to be fluent in German.
Some mentioned that they wanted to be fluent in German because they were influenced by German culture and its specifics, such as football or automobiles. Some interviewees estimated that, in addition to achieving academic success in their major subjects, fluency in German was a great added value for their future careers, as the quotation below shows:

It is very common for my generation to go to study in the UK, the cost is higher but you can graduate with your M.A. in one year (after completing the bachelor’s degree). However, I chose to study in Germany because there are relatively fewer people speaking German compared to English. When I graduate, I would not only have a diploma from a country with a good reputation for higher education, but also speak two foreign languages. (Female, Medicine)

The language barrier has been mentioned repeatedly in many earlier studies as a major challenge to the integration of international students. However, the extent and severity of the language problems among Chinese students are greater in Germany than in English-speaking countries for three reasons as follows: First, German is the second or third foreign language for most of the Chinese students. While there are international high schools that teach German as a foreign language in China, most of the students study German for one to two years in China or in Germany, and then take the German language test DSH or TestDaF in order to be enrolled in a German HEI. However, even if they succeed in obtaining the language certificate, their linguistic capacity is often far from sufficient to accomplish their academic tasks. The following quotations show that studying in German is not easy for Chinese students:

I think the most difficult challenge in studying here is the language. You don’t know what the teacher is talking about, don’t know what your classmates are talking about, and when you read the book you want to tear the book apart….You know that when we were in China, we studied English for many years from primary school to university and when we go abroad it is still difficult to use English. Not to even mention mastering German in the short term. Even if we had passed the language test, and had studied the language for two years, when we entered the classroom, we still found ourselves far behind. I think it is necessary for the German universities to reform the DSH test because most foreign students who passed the test are still not fluent enough in German. (Male, Media Studies)

Although I had passed the DSH exam, I still had difficulty adapting to using German language in daily life as well as in academic settings. I found that the German language that people used in daily life was totally different from what we studied in class back in China. The use of vocabulary is different, and people from different regions have different accents. They also tend to speak faster than the listening material we learned from in our classes. It took me about one to two semesters to get used to using German in my daily life. (Male, Sports Management)

Second, the German language taught in China was not the same as the German that the students used in their academic and daily lives. Even for the students of German linguistics it took some time to get used to this:

After coming here (Germany), I found that the things we learned in China were just on paper. I only realized after living in Germany that the (German) language is not spoken in that way (that we learned in China). The cassettes that we listened to in class were very slow, while in reality they speak much faster. When I listened to the German teacher explaining in German, it still took some time before I could truly adapt….I think it took around two months. (Female, German Linguistics)

For some other students not involved in studying German linguistics, it might take up to two years to get used to studying in Germany.

Third, the students who passed the German language tests were adequate in communicating in daily life in German, but their academic vocabulary for their major subjects was still limited. However, in the German-taught classes, German and international students studied together as the teachers did not take them and their special demands into account. This caused problems for some interviewees:

The teachers will teach according to the tempo of German students, without taking into consideration the difficulty of foreigners to follow the class in their second or third foreign language. The pace of the class is often really fast, and there is some vocabulary or even teachers’ writing on the blackboard that are incomprehensible for us. (Male, Electrical Engineering)

However, those students who had participated in the Studienkollege before they began their bachelor’s studies in Germany, generally had better linguistic proficiency than those who had only taken language classes before entering German universities.

By contrast, Chinese students on English-taught international master’s programs seemed to encounter fewer problems. Although they still needed to expand their vocabulary and improve their proficiency in spoken English, the language alone was less of an issue for them compared to those who studied in German.

4.1.2. Knowledge Gap

Notably, Chinese students studying their major subjects in either German or in English reported difficulties in understanding the contents of teaching:
At the beginning of my studies I could understand at most 30 to 40 percent of the teaching. For some classes that were difficult, my understanding was even less than 30 to 40 percent, because even if I had taken the class in Chinese I wouldn’t have been able to understand everything. I feel I was not as good as my fellow classmates. (Male, Electrical Engineering)

The difficulty of understanding the content of teaching was often due to gaps in the Chinese students’ knowledge background due to differences in curriculum content and structure between German and Chinese universities. Even for the students coming to study in Germany under bilateral agreements the courses they had taken in China were not entirely compatible with the German courses:

What we learn here is very difficult, combined with the abstruse language, it is really torture to understand what the book is trying to say. The classes in which we have background knowledge from classes we took in China were a bit better. But if we hadn’t learned something before, we needed to start from the beginning, and this the most difficult part….Once we were required to understand the mechanism of a machine. In China, we had never studied the mechanism behind this machine before. There were at least two to three classes of knowledge gap between our current knowledge reserve and the knowledge required to accomplish this task. We had to work for ten days from 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. in the library with help from others to solve that. It almost drove us crazy. (Male, Machine Mechanics)

The curricula and the focus of studies in China may be so completely different from those in Germany that some students had to study those courses over again. Failing a course was a frustrating experience for many:

Media studies in China generally focuses on practical issues, like how to do an interview and how to produce TV programs. But the courses we took here were more focused on the theoretical side. We have courses in sociology, history, philosophy, literature, etc. It makes me frustrated....It was often that after one semester, I still had no clue what some courses were about. I have never failed classes before, but failing classes here became so common that I became numb...many things I know in Chinese. But I don’t know how to express myself in German. Thus, although I have abundant knowledge in my head, I couldn’t tell it to others. (Male, Media Studies)

In the first semester, I could understand most of the basic courses. But for some classes that required content-specific background knowledge, such as one class that called Althochdeutsch (Old High German OHG), I basically could not understand everything. (Female, German Linguistics)

Surprisingly, failing a lot of classes was a common theme mentioned by several interviewees. Many of them mentioned that they had never failed a class in China, but after they came to Germany, the combined challenge of studying a rigorous module in a foreign language caused them to fail classes more often than before. According to the rules in Germany, if a student fails class three times, he or she will no longer be allowed to study that major in any German university. This increased the stress the Chinese students were enduring.

4.1.3. Cultural Difference

Some of the interviewees mentioned that their difficulties in academic integration were caused by differences in cultural practices. This was especially evident among students of humanities and social sciences. In most cases, the students were not able to specify what they meant by ‘culture’. This is understandable as cultural phenomena are often immanent, and hidden culture featuring tacit cultural knowledge (such as values and norm systems) is difficult to recognize. The situation was different with visible cultural characteristics. Cultural differences were obvious in cultural studies, for instance in learning experiences which required the students to read literature or review films. One of the interviewees said:

Sometimes in the class, the teacher mentioned a certain author, film director or element of a genre of film and my classmates immediately responded. However, I might not have any clue of what they were referring to, or at least I would not know how to express it in German. Also, the same element, such as a portrait of a dragon in a film, is also quite different in a German film and in a Chinese film. Such cultural differences often cause difficulty for me to follow in class. I found the same difficulty understanding a Chinese film when it was shown in my class. (Female, Film Studies)

In some cases cultural differences were reflected in different ways of thinking and approaching knowledge. One of the senior students compared the German tradition of analytical thinking and debate culture with Chinese traditions as follows:

I think integration is a very bloody word, that after you become integrated, the uncomfortable feeling will always accompany you that on the surface you look like a German, but in fact it is a burden you have to carry with you. Take the critical thinking and debate culture in Germany for example, they like to think this is a constructive way of solving problems....Germans like to tear the whole thing apart, and analyze where a problem is, then they will find the solution, and tell you point by point they are right. This kind of analytical thinking and debate culture is totally different from the humane way of dealing with conflict as low key as possible in China. It conflicts with the humane
touch of Chinese society where unnecessary conflicts are usually avoided. (Male, Higher Education)

### 4.1.4. Pedagogical Differences

While the classes in China often took the form of teacher-centered lecturing, the learning methods used in German classrooms may be more diverse, including group assignments, classroom discussion, and so on.

Having been provided with answers for many years and having being taught to respect the views of authority, some Chinese students found questioning and challenging peers and lecturers engendered acute discomfort (Wu, 2015). Most of the Chinese students interviewed reported that they would not join in the classroom discussion. The language barrier was the main issue preventing them from active engagement in class. The following students, who had already studied in German HEIs for four years, reported still having problems in taking part in classroom discussions:

Until now I can basically know what the teacher was talking about in class, because the teacher must be talking around the main topic. But I have no way to predict what the classmates were about to say. My response reflex is still much slower than the native speakers, and it is not possible for the other students to repeat the content again. That is why I couldn’t join in the classroom discussion so well, because I could understand what the teachers were talking about because their expressions are predictable, but following what the classmates were saying is still difficult. (Male, Sociology)

Many other reasons also contributed to a perceived lack of participation of Chinese students in class: First, accustomed to the Chinese teaching and learning environment, some Chinese students felt they were expected to give the ‘right answer’ to the teachers’ questions. They would be reluctant to articulate what came into their minds in class. Second, their silence in class might also be linked to individual personality traits, such as shyness and modesty. They were not accustomed to the western debate culture in class, and would prefer to say nothing. Lastly, a number of students felt a need to know more about the teaching content to provide their own feedback in class, as seen in the following remark:

In the beginning, I would not participate in the classroom discussion because I was really afraid that I would make a mistake if I spoke up in class, and that would make me feel ashamed. So I was basically answering the teacher’s questions by heart by myself. Even if sometimes I found the answers from my classmates were wrong, I would still not correct them. (Female, Computer Engineering)

Moreover, examinations in German HEIs take different forms from those in China. While in China most exams are written exams, the German exams may also be oral. This form of examination could be quite intimidating for Chinese students, since they had never encountered an oral exam before.

Besides different forms of exams, the final mark usually entails several pieces of essay writing. The students interviewed were still struggling to use German language or, lacking experience in essay writing, might fail to deliver what their teachers were looking for in their work. In addition, the students studying humanities and social sciences were often required to write several essays throughout the whole semester, which could be a daunting and demanding task for the Chinese students. As one of the students said:

There were four modules in our major for each semester. For each of the modules one essay of around 30 pages was required. Together we needed to write about 120 pages for one semester. It took me about one semester to adapt to such intensity of reading and writing. (Female, English Linguistics)

Some of the exams might also be group projects in which the students needed to collaborate to develop a business project or industrial model by themselves. Some of the students interviewed stated that this was the most difficult form of assessment since their knowledge deficit was still too big to fulfill the demand of completing the project by themselves. Coupled with the pressure from working with classmates from other cultural backgrounds this created acute stress for them to cope with. However, it was also a perfect opportunity for them to learn from their peers while doing a group project on their own.

### 5. Chinese Students’ Academic Integration Strategies

#### 5.1. Social Integration and Academic Integration

The research findings imply that social integration could facilitate Chinese students’ academic integration, but those students who were not socially integrated still managed to achieve their academic goals. This result is similar to the findings of the study by Rientes et al. (2012), but additional explanations and nuances can be presented in light of the present study.

Based on the interview data, it can be said that social integration facilitates academic integration mainly through enhancing the students’ proficiency in German language and their understanding of German culture. The interviewees explained their experiences as follows:

I intentionally chose to live in a WG (shared dormitory) with five German flat mates. They are very patient in helping me improve my German, and always speak more slowly when talking to me. One of my flat mates said to me, “Why you still say it the wrong way? You have to listen carefully how we say it.” I followed
While some students were frustrated by their initial failure and communication problems, and would prefer to socialize with only Chinese students, those who managed to step out from the co-national network had benefited from their efforts, which had facilitated their academic integration and enriched their personal lives:

I think one of the major losses of many Chinese after coming here is that they seemed to have lost the capacity to communicate with other people like they did in China. That they were all hiding at home, do not get in touch with the society or the people. I think a social network is not something that you only establish when you need it. Like some of the assignments I need to do for my class, I got help from a friend of a friend. An established network will also help you gain more trust when you are looking for a job. (Female, Mass Media Studies)

However, the students studying very demanding subjects expressed their frustration with the heavy burden of study assignments so that they could not afford to spend as much time on social activities as local or exchange students. For them, social integration might impede academic integration since their study tasks were so burdensome that the students needed to concentrate and devote all their time to their studies. To facilitate better academic integration, the students managed to achieve their study goals by utilizing their social networks with other Chinese students, especially senior ones, and relying on the professionals that they could find in the internet:

We often have group tutor sessions with senior Chinese students. They do not necessarily understand everything, but it is nevertheless helpful for us. (Female, Chemistry)

The findings show that, no matter whether with host-national, international or co-national students, teaching and learning from others greatly facilitates learning. As one of the Chinese students described his experience:

I often discuss with my classmates. Some knowledge I can read for a day without understanding anything. But discussing with others for one hour can be more efficient than studying by myself for many days. Some knowledge you don’t understand but others might have comprehended very well. Just a few examples and you will get the clue....Most of us are helping each other. Nobody can say that I understand everything in this class that I don’t need to discuss with others. (Male, Electronics)

Further, the Chinese students rely on online networks with other Chinese to facilitate their better academic integration in Germany. There are various online discussion forums, social media, or websites such as Zhihu¹ (similar to Quora) that are dedicated to helping netizens solve difficult issues. As in the example mentioned above, one of the students had a pressing task so that it was only with the help of professionals that the students found online through a Chinese website that they managed to complete the assignment.

It can therefore be stated in summary that social integration is helpful for Chinese students’ better academic integration, since it enhances their linguistic proficiency in German and enlightens them about German culture, enriches their personal lives, and helps them open doors to new opportunities. However, even without a host-national network, most Chinese students still managed to achieve their academic goals since they relied on their Chinese peers and senior students, as well as on professionals that they found online. Teaching and learning from others or in a team have proven to be an effective means to achieve better academic integration, no matter if the others are co-national, host-national, or international students.

5.2. Critical Thinking and Debate Culture

The Chinese students generally had to go through a phase of gaining a clearer understanding of the learning content, and then to the next stage of critical thinking. The most academically successful students generally developed their capability for critical thinking through their studies. Their better understanding of learning content generally built upon their improved German/English language skills. To compensate for the difficulties in following teaching in class, they would generally invest extra hours at home to digest the material before and after class. After their understanding of the learning material improved through intensive reading, the students would gradually develop critical thinking skills so that they began to form their own judgments about the learning material and express these in their academic work and in class:

Most of the education in China stopped at the phase of understanding. However, they didn’t teach the students to ask ‘so what?’ after they have acquired the knowledge. I think the main difference in German higher education is that they will give a broad perspective of the field by asking you to read different articles

¹ Zhihu is an online platform to ask questions and connect with people who contribute unique insights and quality answers.
and book chapters in one semester. After you have established a systematic knowledge of the field, you will need to critically form your own opinion. This is what is lacking in Chinese higher education. And the process of critical and innovative thinking is also the beginning of academic research. I think it will take a long process to adjust to acquire the critical thinking capability. It is an enlightening process, and this process is lacking in Chinese higher education system. (Female, German Linguistics)

However, there were also students who took a negative view of the critical thinking strategy as a learning approach in German universities. One of the interviewees said:

I think the critical thinking I witness in the classes here is quite superficial. Sometimes the students give their opinions and judgments on a certain topic based on their own experience or sometimes based on partial examples from reality. In the classes in China, the teacher told us in the first class: ‘I don’t expect you to give any opinion on the text for now. You need to fully understand the content first. So I will guide you to read the original text word by word so that you can have a better understanding of the author.’ (Female, Sociology)

5.3. Benefit from Past Learning Experience

While the challenges posed by studying in a German HEI were great, some Chinese students could benefit from their previous study experiences in China that smoothed the transition. Their previous education in China had trained them to be resilient and tenacious, so that the challenges they faced in Germany were overcome by a ‘can-do spirit’. One interviewee thought that Chinese students have been well trained to cope with learning tasks abroad after years and years of training in a highly competitive education system:

I think my western peers can be easily frustrated since they are more self-centered and used to getting what they want. And when they cannot get what they want, they feel pain. They are the best and brightest students so that they always feel they can control their lives. But for us, we are used to not being able to have full control over our lives. No matter where you are born, after being through a college entrance exam, we have all experienced an abundant amount of failure training. Most of the Chinese students I know, as long as they have the perseverance to proceed, can finish their studies. I have never seen anyone develop psychological issues because of study pressure. (Female, Law)

Unlike many studies that assume rote learning is only a surface learning method adopted strategically by students to pass exams, one of the interviewees said that through memorizing, he managed to achieve a better understanding than before:

There is an old Chinese saying that, read for a thousand times, the meaning will reveal itself. For some of the formulas I don’t understand I will try to memorize them. After reciting, reiterating, and comparing with other examples, slowly you will know what it is about. (Male, Physics)

Those students with adequate language skills felt that completing the study tasks was no longer a cause of concern. Adopting a strategic approach towards learning, one female student described her experience:

I think an exam is something that the Chinese worry about the least, because we grew up with exams. Although you don’t understand one hundred percent of what the teachers were saying in class, there is still hope. They will give us all the PowerPoints to study by ourselves. Even if you still don’t understand, you can ask the teacher. (Female, Medicine)

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, the difficulty of using a foreign language in academic contexts combined with knowledge gap, pedagogical differences, and cultural differences posed challenges for the Chinese students to achieve academic success. Many students expressed frustration at their lack of linguistic proficiency and adequate general knowledge causing them to fail many classes like never before. However, these challenges also served as a stimulus to come up with new strategies that were more appropriate for their own learning habits and personal dispositions.

Social integration has been proven to facilitate Chinese students’ better academic integration by enhancing their linguistic proficiency and improving their cultural awareness. Nevertheless, this is not an absolute prerequisite for better academic integration since the Chinese students without strong social ties with German students also managed to achieve their academic goals by turning to other Chinese for help. The key strategy for studying difficult subjects appeared to be learning in a team with others, regardless of nationality, so that through mutual teaching and learning, the students’ study efficiency was greatly enhanced.

The western way of critical thinking and debate was another key barrier that also revealed the underlying cultural difference between east and west. Some interviewees thought that criticism is a missing phenomenon in Chinese education, and that Chinese students only begin to achieve critical awareness after coming to study abroad. However, others doubt the efficiency of putting it into practice prematurely in class when the students have not yet reached advanced comprehension of the learning material. Meanwhile, analytical and critical thinking are claimed to be incompatible with Chinese cul-
ture, which emphasizes being humane and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

Contrary to the conventional stereotype of Chinese students who only rely on ‘learning by rote’ and passively listening to teachers in class, this research shows that the students were actually resourceful and innovative in pursing their academic goals through active participation and learning through various sources and platforms. Rote learning was utilized as a pathway to better deep learning. Some interviewees argued that the Chinese students are well-equipped to meet academic challenges in a foreign context since they are used to high pressure exams, and have acquired resilience and tenacity to meet the challenges of academic integration since they have lived through one of the most competitive education systems in the world.

Recognizing the challenges of Chinese students’ academic integration and the strategies used to cope with these challenges helps the HEIs to adapt to the demands of foreign students. Most German HEIs provide orientation lectures and activities to facilitate the integration of international students. However, according to the findings of this study, such orientation activities did not sufficiently address the challenges international students face in adapting to German academic environments. It is recommended that the German HEIs organize specific initiatives to address the academic integration of international students, such as mentoring projects that help the students to adapt to their new learning environments more easily. Offering extensive language courses would also be helpful for students using a foreign language in an academic setting. Lastly, academic institutions could organize more social activities with faculty members and students to promote social networking between international students, faculty members, and other fellow students, thereby enhancing international students’ class communication, and facilitating their integration into the academic and social environments of the host country.

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References


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Who We Are Is What We Believe? Religion and Collective Identity in Austrian and German Immigrant Integration Policies

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Abstract

Immigrant integration is a contested policy field in which boundaries of membership are drawn and re-negotiated whereby groups of immigrants are partially included and excluded. Building on the concept of collective identity and theories of boundary making, this paper illustrates how religion functions as a category to mark and fill notions of self and otherness. As several studies have shown, immigrants in Europe are increasingly addressed as Muslims, a development that also serves the promotion of a Christian ‘us’. Focusing on Austria and Germany, two countries where this is especially observable, the paper outlines the functioning of religion as symbolic boundary. The empirical study on national integration policies demonstrates how—within the relational process of boundary drawing against Muslims—a Christian identity narrative is established, how it functions as a marker of unity and how it relates to liberal and secular notions. Results from the qualitative content analysis of governmental policy programs from 2005 onwards show different patterns of boundary drawing on religion and the way they shape and limit the possibilities of inclusion. To understand this development, we have to look at Christian-democratic policy-makers, who currently dominate the political struggle for the power to define features of collective identity in immigrant integration policies.

Keywords
boundary making; collective identity; Christian-democrats; immigrant integration; Islam; religion

1. Introduction

As shown by various studies, Islam and Muslims have become ‘the other’ in European immigrant integration debates (Allievi, 2005; Grillo, 2010; Modood, 2009). The literature gives different explanations for the difficulty European societies experience with the integration of their Muslim populations. Within a broad spectrum of approaches, I identify four distinctive lines of argument. Some authors argue that Europe is essentially Christian, ‘deeply rooted in a Christian tradition’ and that Islam is therefore problematized in discourses on immigrant integration (Zolberg & Woon, 1999). In this view, the conflict comes down to the unwillingness to adapt predominantly Christian settings to religious pluralism and the refusal to include another religion into Christian self-perception. Conversely, other authors argue that Europe is essentially secular (Cesari, 2009; Foner & Alba, 2008), in fact the ‘most deeply secularized of all corners of the globe’ and the ‘real issue in the Islam challenge is a virtually felt religion meeting a thoroughly non-religious (but not other-religious) environment’ (Joppke, 2013, p. 611). This argument sees the Muslim presence (and the religious demands it might entail) as a challenge to the now essentially secular Europe. A third argument focuses on the essentially liberal identity of European states and the illiberal threat Islam might pose to it (Hansen, 2011). While similar to the idea of a secular Europe, this line of argument does not read the presence of a vibrant religion per se as a problem but the illiberal ideas it is argued to transmit. A fourth view on the problematization and the othering of Islam argues on a meta-level,
seeing ‘Muslim’ as a racialized category to name a ‘visible other’ to white Europeans in a ‘colour-blind’ Europe (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 16). This way of thinking would view the three other arguments as proof of the underlying—essentially racial—boundary at play. All these arguments have in common that they link the problematization of Islam to the constitution of the European self. This follows the logic of identity politics in which unity is produced by pointing out what is ‘not us’. While the portrayal of Muslims and Islam as problematic is common to most European immigrant integration debates, there is less clarity about the unifying elements of the perceived ‘us’. To put it bluntly: Are we all Christian, are we all secular, are we all liberal or are we just white?

Much scholarly attention has been paid to the application of ‘Muslim’ as a category of other-identification in immigrant integration debates and its exclusionary implications, but fewer studies analysed the resulting construction of the ‘us’ that is necessarily implied (valuable insights can be found in Brubaker, 2010; Eder, 2006; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014). Several authors have noted a new emphasis on Christianity as one particular aspect of this ‘us’ in European immigrant integration policies (Joppke, 2013; Modood, 2012). However, there is little understanding of this addressing of religion, how it functions as a marker of unity and how it relates to liberal and secular self-perceptions. The sole focus on the exclusion of the out-group obstructs any understanding of the underlying controversy over what makes up a collective identity. Not taking into account the political attempts to shape these perceptions, ignores ongoing power struggles over who ‘we’ are and what might or might not be in ‘our’ interest.

On that score, this paper focuses on the ways in which religion is involved in collective identities articulated in the context of immigrant integration. An empirical case study on governmental immigrant integration policies in Germany and Austria looks at the construction of symbolic boundaries that draw on religion as a marker for self and otherness. During the periods of observation (2005–2009 in Germany, 2008–2013 in Austria) both countries developed immigrant integration policy programs at national level, which were predominantly shaped by Christian-democratic policy makers (CDU/CSU in Germany, ÖVP in Austria). The analysis shows how Christianity is related to liberal and secular ideas almost to the same extent as Islam is assumed to oppose them. In the relational process of boundary drawing, Muslims (constructed as a homogenous group) are continuously portrayed as illiberal in their religious beliefs and practices while Christianity is constructed as an essential marker of unity in a variety of ways. Here, Christian-democratic parties might have found a way to overcome their struggle to successfully combine a Christian identity with a liberal democratic setting in increasingly secular societies. Rather than viewing this new emphasis on Christianity as a religious conflict, as a response to multiculturalism or as a sign of liberal disorientation, we can understand it as an expression of a political ideology Christian-democratic policy makers foster.

2. Collective Identity and Boundary Making in Immigrant Integration Policy

Immigrant integration policies produce membership boundaries through a notion of ‘into what’ immigrant populations are supposed to be integrated. As many authors have pointed out, it is the very idea of integration itself that provokes the issue of a common self-perception (Joppke, 2013; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014). This preoccupation with characteristics of a perceived unity allows policy makers to create and position narratives about ‘us’. Consequently, we can understand immigrant integration policies as ‘negotiations over how best to craft a shared national identity in a social context transformed by immigration’ (Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos, 2013, p. 115). National identity mostly revolves around the idea of a common past, ancestry and culture of the people living in a certain territory (Guibernau, 2004, p. 126). Viewing nations as ‘imagined political communities’, national identity has to be seen as a permanent discursive process resulting in a kind of habitus which people ‘internalize through socialization’ (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 153). It would be a foreshortened view to equate the aspects of identity promoted within immigrant integration policies with national identities. They are better understood as collective self-identifications, which is to ‘identify oneself and others at the same time: to speak not just of but for others, to subsume others, along with oneself, into a collective “we”’ (Brubaker, 2013, p. 2).

I use the term collective identity, as the construction of sameness does not necessarily rely on the notion of nation but mostly promotes a collective identity that is embedded in the European context as well as in particular national ones. Complementary to the ‘Europeanization of exclusion’, which subsumes the extensively researched othering of Islam across Europe (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 23), there might be a Europeanization of inclusion, which cannot be observed if promoted identities are analysed as nationally bound.

The promotion of collective identity serves the creation of a majority, as well as the making of minorities (Wimmer, 2013), both shaped by the ‘delineation of “us” and “not us”’ (Zolberg & Woon, 1999, p. 8). Theories of boundary making view this as a relational process whereby in-groups and out-groups form around boundaries. Scholarship on boundaries covers a multitude of micro- and macro-social and socio-political categorization processes (see Pachucki, Lamont, & Pendergrass, 2007). Interested in how religion becomes a feature of collective identity, this paper’s focus lies on categorization in governmental policy programs as a specific aspect of symbolic boundary formation.

Symbolic boundaries are ‘conceptual distinctions’ social actors make to ‘separate people into groups and gen-
erate feelings of similarity and group membership’ (La- 
mont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). State institutions, such 
as governments, are in a dominant position to make 
their preferred distinctions ‘politically relevant, publicly 
acknowledged and culturally legitimate’ (Wimmer, 2013, 
p. 64). In the literature on boundary formation, sym-
bolic boundaries are differentiated from social bound-
daries, which manifest in institutions and limit access 
to resources for certain groups (Bail, 2008). While so-
cial boundaries are reinforced and made salient using 
discrimination, collective organization and physical vio-
ence, means of symbolic boundary making include sym-
bolic actions and discursive practices.

This paper analyses symbolic boundary formations, 
which function along distinct modes. Andreas Wimmer 
describes these modes as mostly building on existing 
group concepts that might change through processes 
of contraction or expansion, transvaluation, positional 
moves or boundary blurring (2013, p. 57). Boundaries 
shift (contract or expand) when terms for member-
ship and non-membership are redefined, narrowing or 
widening the set of accepted attributes. Transvaluation 
ocurs, when the normative order of a stratified sys-
tem changes. Individual or collective positional moves 
might allow boundary crossings. However, bright bound-
aries can only be overcome by giving up distinctive ele-
ments of one’s identity as they require assimilation in its 
strictest sense (Alba, 2005) and persist despite individual 
crossings (Barth, 1998). When boundaries get blurred by 
contrast, the in-group and its structures change. Former 
characteristics of the out-group become accepted within 
the in-group, the overlapping of previously mutually ex-
clusive identity markers and multiple memberships are 
tolerated (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014). While especially 
Wimmer’s modes of boundary making are more complex 
and comprehensive, the general applicability to catego-
ration processes makes theories of boundary making 
a useful analytical tool to understand how institutions 
shape religion as a notion of difference.

3. Religion and Collective Identity

In terms of the composition of collective identities pro-
moted in European immigrant integration policies, there 
is broad agreement on two aspects: First, Muslims have 
become ‘the other’ to European immigrant integration 
debates, which strongly relate to the securitization of 
this policy field and the simultaneous regulation of Is-
lamic religion within it (Cesari, 2009). Second, there is 
a widespread acceptance that liberalism has become a cornerstone of the ‘us’ that collective identities refer to 
(Triadafilopoulos, 2011). The unifying element we can ob-
serve in most European integration policies of recent 
years is a postulated value consensus among the estab-
lished population (Adamsion, Triadafilopoulos, & Zolberg, 
2011). This consensus is mostly presented as building 
on a set of liberal norms and the upholding of human 
rights. Conversely, the addressees of immigrant integra-
tion policies are characterized as not having internalized 
this set of norms (yet). This characterization of an out-
group, marked by illiberal ideas (or the insufficient sup-
port of liberal ones) happens concurrently with conceiv-
ing immigrant populations as Muslims.

On the other hand, a renewed emphasis on Christian-
ity has been observed by several authors but is rarely dis-
cussed more closely. Tariq Modood views this new em-
phasis as a ‘response to the challenge of multicultural-
ism’ in the light of ‘the primacy given to religion as the ba-
sis of identity, organization, political representation, nor-
mative justification, etc.’ (2012, pp. 139–140). The problem-
ematization of Muslims is—as demonstrated by Riem 
Spielhaus (2011)—not self-evident, nor is it simply re-
lated to the presence of believers. Equally, I suggest, the 
ew new emphasis on Christianity cannot be viewed as a self-
evident reaction to the presence of Muslims in Europe 
and the primacy that is given to Islam. It is perfectly pos-
sible to encounter a religiously defined other with a non-
religious line of argument.

Liberalism is however, insufficient to promote a spe-
cific national identity, as the universal character of lib-
eral norms limits their scope to build a collective identity 
on particularistic elements (Joppke, 2008, p. 536). Chris-
tian Joppke therefore concludes that the new emphasis 
on Christianity is an attempt to capture a particularis-
tic identity element (2008, p. 540). This is unconvincing:
Christianity is not French, Austrian or German, it is just 
a Christian collective identity is neither particularistic— 
Christianity is not French, Austrian or German, it is just 
not Muslim—nor easily combined with liberal norms. Jopkge addresses this issue in a later paper by calling 
Christianity and liberalism ‘different words for the same 
things observed over time’ and attesting the term Chris-
tian to function as ‘a code word for national particular-
ism’ (2013, p. 612). This ignores not only the vital theo-
retical debate about the relation of Christianity and Liberal-
ism (Dombrowski, 2014; Gillespie, 2014; Laborde, 2013; 
Maffettone, 2014), but also the lively diversity of reli-
gious and secular political positions that exist within Eu-
rope and compete in many policy fields. In a way, this ap-
proach also contributes to the simplifying dichotomy of 
‘good religion/bad religion’ many authors speak of, when 
religion is endorsed by state actors as long as it is useful 
to their own agenda (Wilson & Mavelli, 2014, p. 19).

Rather than viewing the new emphasis on Christian-
ity just as a quasi-automatic response to the challenge 
of multiculturalism, as a search for particularistic iden-
tity elements of disoriented liberal states or even a reli-
gious conflict between Islam and Christianity, I suggest 
understanding it as the result of a contested process of 
competing sets of possible identity elements. The new 
emphasis on Christianity is primarily the expression of a 
political struggle for the power to define features of col-
lective identity.

I will argue that Christian-democratic parties are push-
ing for this new emphasis on Christianity to solve their 
internal dilemma with proximity and distance to religion. 
Parties of the radical right use anti-Islamic ideas to pro-

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mote a nationalist and exclusionary notion of ‘us’. Social-democratic policy-makers have the tendency to disregard the role of religion (and culture) for immigrant integration (Laurence, 2013), instead focusing on socio-political aspects as markers for equality and difference (Scheffer, 2011). Christian-democratic parties, however, are seen as traditionally concerned with ‘philosophical, ethical and, in a broader sense cultural issues’ (Dierickx, 1994, p. 17).

4. Immigrant Integration, Religion and Christian-Democrats in Austria and Germany

Immigrant integration programs from Austria and Germany are the empirical basis for this case study on religion as a marker for self- and otherness. The two countries share similar migration histories and resemble each other in their approach towards integration (Koopmans, 2005). Up until the 1990s, despite significant histories of immigration, politicians in both Germany and Austria widely refused to identify their country as a country of immigration. Like other countries that installed guest worker regimes, Germany and Austria neglected badly needed integration policies for long-term residency. Rather, measures were limited to the labour market while return migration was equally fostered (Bommes & Kolb, 2012). Not until the turn of the millennium did integration issues finally climb up on the governmental political agenda. Comprehensive and systematic development of integration policy in Germany began after 2005 under a grand coalition government. Similar efforts at national level in Austria only started in 2008 (for a detailed overview of both countries immigrant integration policy development see Zincone, Penninx, & Borkert, 2011). The empirical analysis focuses on this period in which immigrant integration became a more closely defined and actively addressed policy field in both states.

Over the period of this project, Christian-democratic parties shaped both countries’ immigrant integration policies. For Austria, it can be reasonably assumed that it was primarily the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) that shaped outputs from 2000 onwards: Holding the relevant office (Ministry of Interior until 2011, State Secretariat for Integration from 2011 to 2013) can be seen as exceptionally influential in that particular policy field. In Germany during the empirical study period (2005–2009), Christian Democratic Union (CDU) held the governmental offices in charge of immigrant integration policy (Ministry of Interior, Federal Chancellery). Therefore this papers’ findings are also limited to this party family.

Religion is a contested issue within those parties. In Germany, this became particularly evident during the ‘Leitkultur’ debate from 2000/01 onwards (Manz, 2004). This debate, in which CDU politicians picked up a term coined by the political scientist Bassam Tibi (1998), addressed the role of Christianity for collective identity. This was also contested within the party and it became one of many occasions when the meaning of the ‘C’ in the party’s name was discussed controversially. German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized the importance of Christianity in various contexts, from demanding migrants to ‘accept’ Christian values (Der Spiegel, 2010) to the call on young party members to be more ‘excited’ about their Christian beliefs (Schwarze, 2010). The role of religion for and within the Austrian ÖVP is also ambivalent but less openly debated. When the party was re-established after World War II, they did not call themselves Christian to address a wider electorate and to demonstrate distance to the pre-war experience of Catholic authoritarianism (Binder, 2001). Throughout its post-war history, emphasizing conservative values and the role of Christianity was frequently used to counter criticism on neoliberal economic policies (Müller, 2014, p. 245).

Concerning state-religion relations, Austria and Germany are classified as ‘systems of shared tasks’ (Minkenberg, 2002), characterized by the exclusive collaboration of state institutions and religious communities acknowledged in law. These selected communities enjoy tax benefits, state-funded religious education in public schools, special legal protection and other privileges. In Austria, the Catholic Church is in a particularly dominant position. Over sixty per cent of the Austrian population are members of this church and Christianity is granted an outstanding role in the public sphere (e.g. crucifixes in classrooms). Because of its history as a multi-ethnic empire, Austria officially recognized Islam in 1912, following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A state-recognized Islamic religious community was then established in 1979, long before Islam became a politicized issue. Many aspects of institutional embedding which are disputed in other European countries are regulated and not very contentious (Mattes & Rosenberger, 2015).

More than Austria, Germany is characterized by a distinct internalization of intra-Christian religious pluralism. Two Christian churches of almost equal size (Catholic and Protestant) dominate the religious landscape and, similar to Austria, enjoy the status of statutory bodies under public law. The state recognition of Islamic communities is a contentious issue that is not limited to religion politics but closely related to immigrant integration. The German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz, DIK) was established in 2006 to address both the institutional embedding of Islamic religious communities and the integration of Muslims in Germany (Rosenow-Williams, 2012). Participants included state authorities, Muslim representatives and individuals, as well as experts from academia and practice. In the course of the DIK it became clear that the initial hope for state recognition held by Islamic associations was only a distant prospect. While the DIK was at first scheduled as a three-year process, its mandate was renewed for the third time in 2014.

5. Methods and Material

Immigrant integration policies from Austria and Germany build a case in which processes of boundary
drawing on religion can be identified. The empirical work builds on a qualitative content analysis of immigrant integration policy documents. Two central research questions where addressed: 1) How are different religions constructed in immigrant integration policies? and 2) What is the relationship between these constructions and the collective identity promoted in immigrant integration policies? As immigrant integration policies developed at different tempos, it is more accurate to investigate periods surrounding a key event than choosing a concrete time span. The period of analysis starts with the initial development of national policy strategies and is limited to one term in office of the respective government. This allows to investigate a timespan in which most influential factors stayed constant and varied party strength did not affect policy outputs. German integration policy programs analysed cover the period between November 2005 and October 2009. Austrian policies were analysed from December 2008 to November 2013. During these periods, each government issued eight major documents (see Table 1) covered in this analysis. The data material also includes selected information material, campaigns and press releases that explicitly address the issue of collective identity.

In the initial round of coding, text passages that draw on religion in the context of collective identity have been identified. A coding scheme, derived from relevant literature on symbolic boundary formation (Alba, 2005; Bail, 2008; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014; Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Wimmer, 2013) was used to perform a qualitative content analysis using semi-structured coding (Mayring, 2008). The coding of categorization practices (‘defining relevant groups’ and ‘defining who belongs’, Wimmer, 2013, p. 46) and types of boundaries (as discussed above) allowed for the identification of recurrent elements. After several rounds of coding, clusters of similarly structured elements were identified, out of which three patterns of relating religion to collective identity emerged.

6. Analysis and Discussion: Three Patterns of Religion as a Symbolic Boundary

Below I will present and discuss three patterns of religion as a symbolic boundary identified in the empirical case study. Direct quotes from the data material (translated by the author) are used to exemplify the results of the analysis. The subsequent discussion focusses on Christian-democratic parties as drivers of the observed emphasis on Christianity that mostly occurs in relation to Islam. Other minority religions by contrast, are hardly ever referred to in the policy documents analysed.

6.1. Muscular Liberalism

This first pattern is particularly relevant because it is not an alternative to the other patterns identified, but mostly works as an underlying structure. The categorization practice in this pattern defines the majority as unified by liberal values. Here, religion is not a feature of collective identity. The out-group by contrast is named as Muslims, marked by lacking willingness or ability to implement liberal norms.

‘[T]he committee pointed out that it is now crucial to connect the given commitment to the value system of the Basic Law to issues of everyday life, such as equality of men and women and unlimited school attendance of children from Muslim families.’ (Deutsche Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 207)

Patterns like this have been discussed in the literature referring to ‘muscular liberalism’, which is based on the idea ‘that it is the business of a liberal state to produce liberal individuals and promote a liberal way of life’ (Modood, 2012, p. 143). Muscular Liberalism is not necessarily linked to religion and can be found in both Germany and Austria. In Germany, however, this pattern is most common in the context of the DIK. Muslim representatives had to profess their commitment to liberal norms throughout the process. The location of these claims of muscular liberalism in the context of the DIK links questions of shared values structurally to religion and to Islam in particular. Identity narratives are rarely found in general integration policy documents, while ‘collective identity and shared values’ is one of four core subjects of the DIK, almost like an outsourcing of value debates.

The boundary drawn here does not demarcate a clear in-group. Liberal is the only attribute the majority shares; no categories of difference are applied. The out-group however, is described as ‘Muslims’ and characterized as illiberal. This limits the possibilities of boundary crossing to individual positional moves. A formal ‘commitment to the value system’ by Muslim representatives is requested to allow for boundary blurring and the acceptance of the former mutually exclusive combination of ‘liberal’ and ‘Muslim’: Still, as the following statement from German National Integration Plan shows, boundaries might be uphold despite a given commitment:

‘[T]he committee pointed out that it is now crucial to connect the given commitment to the value system of the Basic Law to issues of everyday life, such as equality of men and women and unlimited school attendance of children from Muslim families.’ (Deutsche Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 207)

6.2. Christian Ancestry

Within the ‘Christian Ancestry’ pattern, doubts about the extent to which Muslims are able or willing to accept liberal and secular structures are opposed with the construction of both secularism and liberalism as a historical product of Christianity and therefore insolubly linked. This takes two forms:

In the first argument, Christianity is given an active role in the promoted collective identity as secular structures are attributed to this religion.
The German legal framework for the relation between the state and religious communities developed in the historical confrontation with Christian churches.’ (DIK, 2009, p. 264)

The historical role of Christian churches is applied as a boundary against Islam in the context of the DIK. Continuous references to the historic role of Christian churches in the development of a secular state order portray Christianity as a religion that is already fulfilling such secular standards and has even co-founded them. Islam is viewed as opposed to these values. This relates to Talal Asad’s view on secularism, as the effect of heterogeneous power relations, rather than as a substantial concept. As he argues, certain constructions of the secular are reproduced against Muslims, constructing them as ‘external to the essence of Europe’ (2003, p. 151).

In the second argument that works within this pattern, the description of Muslims as potential danger to liberal values is contrasted with the construction of these universal ideas as derived from Christianity and therefore essentially linked to it. Here universal values are portrayed as derived from Christian scriptures, Christian theology or Christian ethics, and the normative foundations of contemporary Europe are attributed to Christianity.

An example for such boundary construction can be found in the preamble of an early Austrian policy program:

‘The following discussion will show that the problem of integrating foreigners predominantly concerns members of the Islamic culture, to a lesser extent also those of other (for example African or Asian) cultures.’ (BMI, 2008, p. 18)

This statement is followed by a discussion of ‘Austrian values’, a listing of liberal norms. On the basic principle of equality the document states:

‘The principle of equality derives from statements of the Old and especially the New Testament, that all men are equal before God.’ (BMI, 2008, p. 20)

Despite a reference to the French Revolution as another source for the principle of equality that follows this statement, a binary opposition is constructed between liberal democracy, which is portrayed as a result of Christian belief, as part of ‘us’, and a certain idea of Islam, which is characterized by its non-compatibility with universal norms. Both membership and non-membership are defined on religious grounds. However, only few paragraphs in the analysed material are so illiberal in character. In general, references to Christianity are more carefully embedded in the discussion of collective values and identity. This quote from then Minister of the Interior in Germany, Wolfgang Schäuble, expresses this development:
‘[W]e have expectations of Muslims. Following the German legal and moral order, we understand the way towards a thriving coexistence as a process in which cultural and religious differences have to be acknowledged, but also in which the complete acceptance of liberal-democratic basic principles is required as a precondition. Within this order—which is shaped by Christian ethics, this has to be said—Islam has to find its place.’ (DIK, 2009, p. 15)

In different forms, this pattern of boundary drawing subsumes the construction of a Christian ancestry to which Islam and Muslims, as the other, are opposed. Christian-ity, Christian norms or Christian ethics are portrayed as a cultural tradition or a heritage, rather than an actual religion. Joppke calls this a ‘demotion of “religion” to the status of “culture”’. In Joppke’s argument this promotion of religion through a demotion to culture makes it less of a violation of the neutrality mandate liberal democratic states ought to hold (2013, p. 606). While Christianity is treated as a cultural element, it is debateable to what extent this treatment is a demotion and not just a decay or even an enhancement. It builds on the pattern of muscular liberalism that merges with a ‘neutralized’ Christianity. This only relates to a historic development but lacks any reference to believers, churches or religious prac-tice. Tariq Modood speaks of a ‘secular Christian’, ‘analogous to the term ‘secular Jew’ to describe someone of Jewish descent who has a sense of Jewish identity but is not religiously practicing and may even be an atheist’ (2012, p. 142).

Yet this apparently secular Christianity functions to keep Islam outside of the bright boundary of collective identity. More than in the pattern of muscular liberalism, this boundary defines members of the in-group. Compared to the pattern of muscular liberalism, this is a contracting boundary shift as membership is now defined narrower as determined by Christian ancestry.

6.3. Universal Religion

In this pattern unwanted, illiberal and radical behaviour is attributed to ‘wrongly understood’ religion (then State Secretary for Integration in Austria Sebastian Kurz in Kathpress, 2011) as opposed to a universal religion that reinforces liberal values. No longer is Islam explicitly the marker for an out-group and Christianity the in-group characteristic but a religious community (‘we’) is opposed by illiberal people who misinterpret reli-gious concepts.

This pattern of boundary drawing is particularly prominent in Austrian policy documents, e.g. in the statement below from the 2011 Integration Report:

‘A major factor in the integration debate is the question of religious practice….For acknowledged religious communities, there is a need to examine how privileges granted by the state can be utilized to support integration and in turn to impede or avoid behaviour, which is not in accordance with the constitutional laws, under the “cloak” of religion.’ (Staatssekretariat für Integration, 2011, p. 13)

Religion, portrayed as generally positive and compatible with universal norms, is differentiated from practices and beliefs described as happening ‘under the cloak of religion’. Overall the positive evaluation of religion’s ability to promote values comes to the fore, as in the following quote from Sebastian Kurz, on the topic of (Islamic) reli-gious education in public schools:

‘I believe that religion is very important to people in principle, that values are something important and religion is a good approach to examining personal fundamental values.’ (Die Presse, 2011)

This involvement of universal religion in immigrant integration is even recommended to influence other policy fields:

‘The Expert Council for Integration recommends a broad discussion among state actors, researchers and religious authorities about the role of religion in the public and private spheres. The findings of this process should not only influence religious education and ethics lessons in school, but should also be reflected in labour law, regional development and other legal issues.’ (BMI, 2013, pp. 25–26)

This pattern of boundary drawing on religious grounds is an enhancement of religion. ‘Universal religion’ as part of the collective identity promotes a shared value basis in which the religious, not the secular, is seen as universal. My usage of this term draws on Lori Beaman’s concept of the ‘will to religion’. Here she discusses a more general trend towards increasing the relevance of religion in various aspects of public life and its consequences. Beaman describes universal religion as ‘Christianity’s trans-mutation as representing universal values’, able to include a spectrum of religious traditions but remaining ‘fundamentally Christian in its shape’ (2013, pp. 149–151). While this opens up a possibility for the inclusion of Islam, at the same time it raises the questions of how to assess whether a religion is understood wrongly or rightly and who would be entitled to make this decision. Although integration policy documents do not name concrete examples, critical assessment of religion—as, for example, the Dialogue Forum Islam and its working group on ‘gender relations’, which aims to ‘strengthen women’s roles in community work’ (BMI, 2013)—is limited to Islam and never involves illiberal aspects of Chris-tianity. Islam and Christianity are not constructed in opposition but religion in general is understood as a positive, even necessary, part of Austrian society. A boundary is drawn between a collective identity of which religion is a central feature and some vague ‘other’ char-
characterized as incompatible with liberal norms and ‘under the cloak of religion’. We can understand universal religion as a boundary expansion: through an emphasis shift, it is no longer Islam in general that is associated with illiberal and therefore outgroup-characteristics but ‘misconceived religion’. The boundary that is maintained—the demarcation of misconceived religion, characterized as illiberal and problematic—is clearly used to address (some) Muslims.

All three identified patterns of boundary drawing (see Table 2) can be observed in both Germany and Austria, yet they are unequally distributed between the cases. In Germany, many integration policy documents avoid addressing collective identity and common values beyond references to the Basic Law as a set of universal norms. This focus on the constitution as a point of reference for collective identity, which is much less common in Austrian documents, brings to mind the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 1991; Sternberger, 1990). Unlike the Austrian constitution, the historical development of the German Basic Law holds a significant meaning for post-war German society (Kommers, 2012). Instead, the German debate on collective identity is mainly outsourced to the Islam Conference and therefore structurally connected to religion. The out-group here becomes defined a priori by the specific setting. The muscular liberalism pattern, whereby a boundary between liberal values and Muslims as an illiberal other is drawn, can be found within the DIK documents and beyond. The Christian ancestry pattern, which connects the liberal self to Christianity by ‘secularizing’ it, is also common in German policy documents and in particular in DIK documents or general documents that refer to the DIK. The opposite is true of Austrian policy documents. The muscular liberalism pattern is as common as in German documents, although it is not expressed through references to the constitution. While Christian ancestry is less present than in German documents, the pattern of universal religion characterizes Austrian immigrant integration policy documents of the study period. This might be related to the relatively active role of religion that can be found in Austria beyond the field of immigrant integration policies (Avramopoulou, Çorbacioğlu, & Sanna, 2012; Mattes & Rosenberger, 2015).

### 6.4. Two Christian-Democratic Parties Resolving a Common Dilemma?

While differences between Austria and Germany are small, the similarities are striking. A new emphasis on Christianity, in form of Christian ancestry and universal religion has been observed in both countries. As actors behave strategically to shape boundaries in their interest (Wimmer, 2013, p. 205) I want to discuss the particular strategies of Christian-democratic policy-makers, who shaped the immigrant integration programs analysed.

Historically, Christian-democratic parties emerged somewhat in conflict with the political system they operated in and often functioned ‘as interest groups within a system whose legitimacy the church continued to reject’ (Müller, 2014). Early Catholic parties were not in favour of the democratic development of European nation states. Obviously, this anti-democratic attitude has given way to a positive assessment of the modern liberal state and is no longer a characteristic of today’s Christian-democratic parties. The shift to a democratic and more liberal political orientation happened at the expense of a narrow Christian (Catholic) agenda (Van Hecke & Gerard, 2004, p. 316). Early on in their history, Christian-democratic parties experienced close ties to the Catholic Church as restraining. Not only did the influence of church officials constrain political margins, but the parties’ confessional character also narrowed their potential electorate. Christian-democratic parties found

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<th>Table 2. Patterns of religion as a symbolic boundary.</th>
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<td><strong>In-group characteristics</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Muscular liberalism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Christian ancestry</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Universal religion</strong></td>
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themselves in what Stathis Kalyvas calls ‘the confessional dilemma’ and had to figure out ‘how to escape from the constraints of their confessional origins while maintaining a distinctive identity’ (1996, p. 223).

The role of Christianity for today’s Christian-democratic parties is ambivalent and subject to intense internal and external debate. As Andreas Wagner demonstrates, traditional Christian positions on economic policies (aiming at a Christian understanding of a social market economy), welfare (oriented on the male-breadwinner model) or sexuality and gender (e.g. in opposition to gay rights) are controversial even within Christian democratic parties (2014, pp. 211–213). Nowadays, these parties mostly combine groups with different, more liberal, conservative or strictly Christian preferences. Calls for a stronger focus on Christianity—or even just for a reflection on religious foundations—are regularly heard. The central objection against this is the unpopularity of traditional religious arguments for an electorate increasingly unaffiliated to religion (Florin, 2014). The historical internal dilemma of Christian-democratic parties—to successfully combine a Christian identity with a liberal democratic setting—is highly topical today. Within the field of immigrant integration, however, this dilemma seems to be dissolved by promoting a collective identity that interweaves Christianity with liberal norms against an equally religiously defined other. While religion was always an explicit part of Christian-democratic ideology, the extent to which it was highlighted and communicated varied. Unlike in other policy fields, the emphasis on Christianity is hardly contested here. Apparently, the outsourcing of a broader value debate to the field of immigrant integration allows Christian-democratic policymakers to both solve their internal dilemma and position a collective identity narrative clearly associated with their parties.

7. Conclusion

To conclude, I want to go back to the rhetorical question I raised at the beginning: Are we all Christian, are we all secular, are we all liberal or are we just white? Analysing the construction of religions as symbolic boundaries has allowed assessing the role of religion in the collective identities promoted in German and Austrian immigrant integration policies. To start with the obvious: This analysis supports the well-established claim that liberal norms are a strong, if not the central, element that European collective identities draw on in the context of immigrant integration. The investigated policies correspond to the notion of muscular liberalism as described in the literature. Promoted collective identities are essentially liberal.

Regarding the question whether this liberal collective identity is Christian or secular in character, the analysis found both. As references to religion were the central focus of this study, notions of identity that draw on secularism were not analysed systematically. Here lies great potential for further research that relates theoretical debates on conceptualizations of the secular (e.g. Warner, Van Antwerpen, & Calhoun, 2010) to an empirical analysis of collective identity constructions. The focus on religion in this empirical analysis, though, clearly showed that Christian and secular values are not set in contradiction, which results in the notion of a ‘Christian secular’. If this, as Tariq Modood suggests, is an emerging identity that is Christian but not related to religious practice, the answer to the question if the observed collective identity is Christian or secular is: it is both. Taking into account the observed promotion of a universal religion somewhat changes the picture. Here a vital religiousness, not exclusively limited to Christianity, is promoted and results in a marginalization of the secular and the question becomes even less answerable within the limited scope of this study. These dynamics warrant further comparative research on a larger scale, in particular among countries with distinct experiences in terms of religion-state relations and party political settings.

Together the observed boundaries build a clear hierarchical order based on religion, establishing a superiority of Christianity as marker of Europeanness over Islam as the illiberal other. This analysis shows that religion—both Christianity and Islam—is used to uphold difference. Muslims are constructed as inferior to Christianity and the ‘truly’ European populations produced by it. This supports Fatima El-Tayeb’s argument of Muslim as a racialized category.

The way Christianity gets linked to secular structures, liberal norms and their transmission merges Christian-ity and the structural and normative foundations of Austrian, German and European societies. Within immigrant integration policies, the contradictions between those ideologies are argumentatively eliminated, often even reversed. The Christian-democratic policymakers who shaped those policies did not aim to promote a Christian identity instead of a liberal one but seem to have succeeded in equating the primarily liberal collective identities promoted within immigrant integration policies with Christianity.

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Identification Paradoxes and Multiple Belongings: The Narratives of Italian Migrants in the Netherlands

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Abstract
In a time identified by many as one of “multicultural backlash,” we can observe a growing negative discourse on the integration of migrants with Islamic backgrounds in most European countries. Criticisms are rooted in the assumptions that cultural and religious differences are the source of social problems and that these migrants are unwilling to integrate. The aim of this article is threefold. First, it criticizes the linear and simplistic assumptions of integration informing the present negative dominant discourse in the Netherlands. Second, it shows that sources of belonging are more layered than the often-assumed exclusive identification with national identity. Third, it broadens the scope of discussion on integration (which is now mainly fixated on Islamic migrants) by showing the somewhat similar experiences of Italian migrants on their path toward integration and belonging within the Dutch context. Through this study, we argue that the process of ethnic othering in the Netherlands is broader than the often-assumed cultural difference of non-Western migrants.

Keywords
discourse; identification; integration; migrants

Issue
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1. Introduction
At the turn of the 21st century, we observed excessive negative attention—or as some call it a “moral panic” (Parekh, 2008; Vasta, 2007)—toward migrants with an Islamic background. In most European states there has been a so-called “multicultural backlash,” with the Netherlands often mentioned as an example because of its shift from a tolerant integration policy toward a restrictive, assimilative policy (Vasta, 2007; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2009). The Dutch discourse of migration has been dominated by the arrival of the so-called guest workers in the late 1950s (Ghorashi, 2010a), despite a longer and diverse history of immigration to the Netherlands. Postwar economic growth and the need for unskilled labor forced the Dutch government to look beyond its borders, fostering labor contracts, first with Italy and Spain and later with Turkey and Morocco (Wilterdink, 1998). This background contributed to the persistent image of immigrants as being low educated and low skilled even as the reality of migration to the Netherlands became much more diverse. Despite this dominant image and the continuity in the policies from the 1970s until now (particularly in terms of attention for economic integration), we can see a clear shift in the Dutch discourse, particularly in how migrants’ cultures have been approached in policies and politics. In the 1970s, migrants (then guest workers) were encouraged to maintain their cultural traditions and identities, with the idea that they would eventually return to their country of origin. In the 1980s, when the idea of returning was revealed to be unrealistic, there was a shift in policies to-
ward promoting integration in addition to, but not replacing, the preservation of one's own culture. During that time, integration and the cultures of ethnic groups were not considered mutually exclusive. But by the turn of the century, we saw that the cultures and religions of non-Western ethnic others (including both migrants and their children) were increasingly considered to be the main source of social problems and disruption of social cohesion in society (Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010). This has been the backbone of the growing restrictive and assimilative turn in Dutch discourse. Loyalty to Dutch identity is increasingly presented as a dilemma for non-Western migrants: either they choose the Netherlands or they choose their home country (Scientific Council for Government Policy [WRR], 2007). This shift in the Dutch discourse, from integration to assimilation with an emphasis on loyalty toward Dutch national identity, is argued to be the result of the perceived failure of integration during the “multicultural era” (Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010; Vasta, 2007).

We aim to show that the complexity of the integration process goes beyond the binary division of success and failure. Our study shows that the process of integration is multilayered, ambiguous, and even paradoxical, not, as many assume, linear. We also aim to broaden the discussion on migrants’ integration in the Netherlands by focusing on an under-researched group in the context of migration, namely, European migrants within Europe, particularly the experiences of Italian migrants in the Netherlands. Most studies on migrants in the Netherlands focus on Turkish or Moroccan migrants (Prins, 2011; Vedder & Virta, 2005; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). This study focuses on the experiences of integration and belonging of two waves of Italian migrants who came to the Netherlands after 1960. With this choice we hope to add nuance to the assumption that the “integration problem” is a problem of non-Western ethnic groups who are considered to be others with very different cultures and religions. The main assumption within the multicultural backlash is that the cultural and religious contrast and apparent incompatibility of Western self and non-Western other is the major source of the decline in social cohesion and unrest. Anthias (2013, p. 2) rightly argues that this strong “culturalization of social relations” leads to the reification of difference as dangerous and blinds us to other broader sources of exclusion. The lack of studies on migrant groups considered to be closer to the European self-reinforces this assumption. For that reason, the aim of this research is to show the broader sources of exclusion, deconstructing the culturalist foundation of the present discourses of integration.

Finally, we aim to look beyond national identity as a single source of belonging. Several studies show that migrants today increasingly maintain ties with more than one nation, facilitated by technology (Castles & Miller, 2009; Glick Schiller, Basch, & Szanton Blanc, 1995). However, knowledge remains limited about the layered identification process within a new host society over time and the sources of belonging beyond national identity (see also Zontini, 2015). Using in-depth open interviews, we show the struggles of two generations of Italian migrants in the Netherlands to become a part of that society. We use the WRR’s (2007) concepts of functional and emotional identification to demonstrate the layers, dynamics, and tensions of different forms of identification over time. Moreover, the in-between position of these migrants (as both the European self and the non-Dutch other) provides us with challenging material for unraveling a number of assumptions, including linear integration.

2. Theoretical Framework

Duyvendak and Scholten (2010) argue that studies on immigration and integration are often squeezed into simplified theoretical models, whereas, in practice, the process is more complex, paradoxical, multilayered, and multilayered. A model that is often used by policymakers is Esser’s (2003) four dimensions of integration. These dimensions are presented as subsequent stages, where successful completion of the successive Culturation, Positioning, and Interaction dimensions will eventually lead to the final phase of Identification, where the immigrant feels she or he belongs to the new society. The importance of cultural adjustment (including language proficiency) to the society has become a benchmark of Dutch integration policies, visible in policy documents and in public statements (Entzinger, 2009). The prominence of policies as well as studies assuming integration as a linear process or a straight-line approach is being increasingly criticized, claiming that integration is a complex and multilayered process that, in practice, includes paradoxes (Alghasi, Eriksen, & Ghorashi, 2009; Brenninkmeijer, Geers, Roggeband, & Ghorashi, 2009; Eijberts, 2013).

A good example to illustrate this critique is language as part of cultivation. In a linear approach to integration, language is the key factor in the integration process because it contributes to societal inclusion by enhancing job opportunities (positioning) and facilitating contact with natives (interaction; Esser, 2003). However, other studies have shown the double-edged sword of language, meaning that it can be a source of both inclusion and exclusion. Ghorashi and van Tilburg (2006) found that refugee women from Afghanistan and Iran considered the Dutch language essential to obtaining a job in the Netherlands, but even when they were able to speak Dutch fluently, employers continued to perceive this as “not good enough” (positioning). Through their autobiographical research, Davis and Nencel (2011, p. 5) argue that, as immigrants—in their case, from the United States—they still have to deal with comments about their accent or grammar on a daily basis, despite their Dutch fluency and their living in the Netherlands for most of their lives (interaction).

Another example is the assumption that, once migrants are integrated into society economically and so-
cially, thus having passed the positioning and interaction stages, they will eventually enter the stage of identification with their host society (Esser, 2003). Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006) oppose this line of reasoning by showing how radicalized Muslim youths are not among those who are socially isolated or economically deprived; instead they are more active and involved in society and, as a result, sensitive to feelings of unfair treatment by the host society. The researchers describe this as the “integration paradox”: when migrants are actually eager to integrate into dominant society, they are most sensitive to feelings of exclusion (Buijs et al., 2006, p. 202; see also Ghorashi, 2010b).

Despite these critiques, the linear model is still prominent in the Dutch discourse on integration, and it still guides policymaking. There is growing pressure for migrants to adjust themselves to what it means to be Dutch (Ossewaarde, 2007; Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010). According to the WRR (2007), a Dutch scientific board that advises the government, this current understanding of integration and its link to belonging to the Dutch national identity should be revised to embrace the complexity of the process. First, considering belonging to be based solely on connection to a specific national identity limits the scope of belonging to a rather static notion of identity (e.g., identifying as Dutch; Eijberts, 2013). This is particularly problematic because the construction of Dutchness as such is exclusionary toward migrants and thus does not stimulate belonging (Davis & Nencel, 2011; Ghorashi, 2003; Ghorashi & Vieten, 2012; Vasta, 2007). Second, the national framing of belonging blinds us to the multiple ways and levels of creating and maintaining bonds with a society (WRR, 2007). One of the most imaginable identification routes for many is identification with the city they live in. Kasinitz, Mollenkopf and Waters (2002) have shown that immigrants in New York are more likely to identify as New Yorkers than as Americans. The authors argue that identification with the city is more open to diversity, whereas being American is less accessible because of its association with whiteness (Kasinitz et al., 2002). Another growing route of identification is the transnational sense of belonging that is becoming more imaginable for different diaspora groups (Ghorashi, 2016). Meer and Modood (2013, p. 309) argue that the transnational capacity of Islam, for example, provides youth with “emancipatory qualities” to create a sense of belonging and connection transcending the duality of choice between the territorial limitations of their past and present countries.

3. Methodology

We chose qualitative methods for this study, specifically, in-depth interviews with a biographical angle. This particular approach enabled us to understand participants’ dynamic and multilayered perspectives. Respondents’ narratives provided space for understanding the processes of negotiation in the past and the present, helping us to grasp the meanings that respondents attached to the central themes of this research (integration and belonging) and to get a picture of their experiences and challenges (Kvale, 1996). To facilitate the required openness, we avoided asking direct questions about “integration,” as this could limit the research due to the variety of personal interpretations and narrow concepts people may have about the topic. Instead, respondents were asked to share their experiences and talk about their lives in the Netherlands. Through follow-up questions we tried to obtain specific descriptions that helped us better understand the meanings they attached to these experiences. The biographical angle, as expressed in the chronological structure of the interviews, enabled us to capture the diversity of stories about participants’ choices and experiences in the Netherlands in different phases of their lives. The narratives gave us the opportunity to discover what was important to the narrators about their points of connection or disconnection to places and people in their lives, what and whom they identify with, and the meanings they attached to experiences (Bryman, 2008; Kohler-Riessman, 1993; Riley & Hawe, 2005).

3.1. The Sample

Interviews were conducted from January through June 2013. A combination of purposive sampling and snowball sampling was used. We looked at Italian migrants who have been in the Netherlands for at least 20 years to enable analysis of what changes have taken place in their identification with the Netherlands as well as their sources of belonging. We did not include more recent migrants, assuming that a certain length of stay was necessary to study belonging, which develops over time. The respondents had to meet certain conditions to be included: they had to be Italians living in Amsterdam at the time of the interview. All respondents had to be first-generation migrants who arrived in the Netherlands during either the 1960s and 1970s (first wave) or the 1980s and 1990s (second wave). This division allowed us to consider the impacts of time (age and length of stay) and context (policies) in the positioning of these two groups of Italian migrants. We were interested in the similarities and differences between the two groups. The phases covered in the interviews were the period before their migration, the first years after their migration, the present, and the future. In total, 22 interviews were conducted, 12 from the first wave and 10 from the second wave.

Interviews lasted 1–5 hours. Some of the longer interviews were conducted at two different times. To secure respondents’ anonymity, we used pseudonyms. Respondents comprised 13 males and 9 females. Males were largely overrepresented in the first wave because, at that time, Italian males were more likely to come to the Netherlands (Tinnemans, 1991). Most participants in the first group came from southern Italy and had low educational backgrounds and professional histories of un-
skilled or low-skilled labor (Lindo, 2000, p. 130). In the second wave, conversely, there were more women, and most of the respondents came from northern Italy and generally had higher educational backgrounds. This second group had more diverse backgrounds as well as different motivations for coming to the Netherlands. Some came for work, but most came because they had fallen in love with a Dutch partner.

3.2. Analysis

To understand the multiplicity of positions in relation to integration and belonging, we used identification as a sensitizing concept in analyzing the data. Jenkins (2004) argued that using identification as a concept provides opportunities to follow the dynamic and ongoing process of positioning while enabling researchers to locate different levels in the process. Throughout the analysis, we worked interpretatively and inductively, guided by what the respondents shared. An essential first step was to find patterns of similarity in the interviews (Kohler-Riessman, 1993). All interviews were transcribed, and a preliminary thematic analysis took place after half the interviews were conducted.

Through further analysis and by consulting theoretical and empirical literature about integration, we distinguished the two most dominant identification patterns present in the narratives, which the WRR (2007, p. 14ff) labels as functional and emotional identification. Functional identification refers to the functional aspects of participation in a new society, like having voluntary or paid work with which you identify and are identified with by other members of society. There is thus a greater focus on the individual and not so much on ethnic group membership. Functional identification entails having common goals as an institution or a society and interdependency (e.g., being invested together in improving the well-being of a society’s elderly members). There can be multiple functional identifications that can aid one’s social and economic integration in society (e.g., teacher and soccer player in a club). Emotional identification refers to having a “sense of belonging” (WRR, 2007, p. 16) associated with certain places and spaces. As the WRR points out and as we mentioned earlier, public discourse and policymaking in the Netherlands often emphasizes emotional identification, which is seen as a measure of ultimate loyalty—with the underlying premise that you can only emotionally identify with and feel loyalty toward one nation, thus often demanding of migrants an impossible choice. Functional identification, according to the WRR, does not receive a lot of attention, even though it can also provide an important bond with the host society (WRR, 2007, p. 14), as our findings below confirm. When using the terms functional and emotional identification, the WRR does not discern between self-identification and how one is identified by others, using both interchangeably for ascribed and achieved identification. However, as we shall see below, this difference is crucial in uncovering the complexities and layers of Italian migrants’ experiences in the Netherlands.

4. Empirical Data

4.1. Sources of Functional Identification

In contrast to the emphasis on emotional identification with the nation that is found within public and policy discourses in the Netherlands (see also Duyvendak, 2011), and partly due to the nature of the first wave of migration, work experiences (but also membership in a group or committee) were mentioned as a major source of identification with the Netherlands. Dante’s story is a good illustration of this. Dante came to the Netherlands in the 1960s, intending to stay for just one year. Once back in Italy, however, his “head was still in the Netherlands.” He returned to the Netherlands, married a Dutch woman, and had several jobs, which he talked about extensively throughout the interview. He emphasized his efforts to be active and “do good things,” such as volunteer work with elderly people. He proudly explained that he had also received appreciation for his work, illustrating how important it was for him to contribute to society through his work, to feel needed and appreciated by society.

The importance of work was also mentioned by several second-wave migrants, even though their motivations to migrate were more varied. Eva, who arrived in the early 1990s, said she migrated, not for economic reasons, but to increase her Dutch husband’s chances for a good career in the Netherlands, thereby leaving her own good job behind in Italy. At first she did not feel at home in the Netherlands. However, “the more I worked, the better I felt.” Working helped her reconnect with a part of herself, but also with members of Dutch society. As a teacher, she was surrounded by students who came to learn something from her and who appreciated what she taught them, which illustrates the potential power and value of functional identification—for Dutch society as well.

Many respondents talked about compliments they received at work, and how this helped them feel less foreign and more like a colleague, pointing to the importance of functional identification and work as such in being able to build bridges. Although work proved to be a strong source of identification with the Netherlands, the experiences were not all positive. This is because members of the majority group saw our respondents primarily as Italian ethnic others rather than as potentially valuable employees and full-fledged members of society. Matteo, a first-wave migrant, recounted how he had encountered discrimination at his job because of his ethnicity. This is in line with Lindo’s (2000) findings that Italian migrants initially encountered prejudice from colleagues and employers, which faded when Moroccan and Turkish labor migrants arrived (see also Wessendorf, 2007). Second-wave migrants mostly experienced a “subtle” form of discrimination, as this quote from Angelo, who worked in the construction industry, demonstrates:
While language in Dutch policy discourses is considered work immediately and started taking Dutch classes. (as we shall see later). Since conditions were better for Van Laer and Janssens (2011) argue that jokes are mentioned as one the manifestations of “subtle discrimination,” a form of discrimination that is less easily recognized, and which has an ambiguous character because the one who commits it often does so unintentionally. Though the act may be unconscious, the consequences are real; the “victim” may experience lower emotional and physical well-being in the context of work. In Angelo’s case, while language may have formed a barrier, by making jokes, his coworkers highlighted his ethnic otherness, thereby making it harder for him to feel included.

In summary, work (paid and voluntary) was a source of functional (self-)identification with the Netherlands for Italian migrants. They wanted to contribute to Dutch society. However, there were also experiences of (subtle) discrimination at work stemming from the majority group’s fixation on ethnic othering, which impeded respondents’ feelings of inclusion.

4.1.1. Language and Functional Identification

While language in Dutch policy discourses is considered an integral first step (a part of cultivation) in the supposedly linear integration trajectory (Esser, 2003), it was not always a part of the integration trajectory of Italian migrants. When the first-wave migrants arrived to find work in the Netherlands, there were no expectations or facilities for them to learn the language, which might have heightened their identification as “other” by ethnic Dutch people and thereby initially impeded some migrants’ functional (self-)identification and possibly even emotional identification with the Netherlands (as we shall see later). Since conditions were better for the second-wave migrants and not everyone in the second wave had to find a job immediately (because they tended to migrate for love), one might expect that, upon arrival, they would have quickly learned Dutch. Yet, 5 out of the 10 respondents preferred to speak in Italian or English and had low Dutch fluency. For them, it seemed that an English-speaking environment was an additional obstacle to practicing Dutch, which is illustrated in Barbara’s story. Barbara is a second-wave migrant who came to the Netherlands “out of love.” She did not need to work immediately and started taking Dutch classes. Despite the opportunity to learn Dutch at school, she encountered difficulties due to the lack of opportunities to practice Dutch:

My only frustration was when I was going around and when I wanted to speak in Dutch, people were answering in English. So I made a lot of effort to speak Dutch, and I think the people wanted to be nice and help me, but it was not a great help, because I wanted to learn Dutch. And then...I found a job where I didn’t have to speak Dutch. All of my jobs in the Netherlands...were in international firms, where people didn’t speak Dutch. So I speak Dutch, but I don’t feel as confident as in English, because I hardly speak it. Unfortunately.

Since Dutch language proficiency has become such an important marker of successfully following the supposed linear integration path, the past and present challenges for first- and second-wave Italian migrants to learn Dutch has likely encumbered their functional identification by Dutch colleagues and employers, as indicated in the previous section and by other researchers (Ghorashi & van Tilburg, 2006). Therefore, an important source of belonging for migrants may be difficult to obtain, and this may even impede the formation of emotional (self-)identification with the Netherlands (WRR, 2007).

4.2. Emotional Sources of Identification

When it comes to emotional identification, we see that there are different spatial levels of identification (neighborhood, city, continent, world) and that belonging can be quite complex and multilayered. Nationality- and culture-wise, most respondents entirely or predominantly identified themselves as Italian, but this did not imply that they did not feel at home in the Netherlands. An illustration of this is Roberio, a first-wave migrant who married a Dutch woman. He explained that he felt at home in both Rome, his city of origin, and Amsterdam. He is fascinated by Amsterdam and loves its “allure,” with all its museums, restaurants, and theaters. However, he emphasized that he felt 100% Italian at the same time. Thus, for Roberio, emotionally identifying as Italian and feeling at home in the Netherlands—that is, in Amsterdam—are not binary oppositions. Other first-wave migrants expressed similar feelings about Amsterdam and talked at length about all the different streets and places they knew in the city. The same connection was also found among the second-wave migrants. Eva, the only woman who had lived outside the city in the eastern Netherlands before coming to Amsterdam, stated that Amsterdam was “a different world” compared to the rest of the Netherlands. “I don’t feel different at all anymore. I am a foreigner, but not different.” Jano’s connection to Amsterdam took on a different aspect. He came to the Netherlands in the 1980s at the age of 17. He recounted feeling more at home in Amsterdam than in Italy due to his sexual orientation:

I felt safe here. [More] than in Italy, I felt more free in my spirit. Because soon I understood that Amsterdam was a gay city. And I was already convinced that I was gay. And I thought: Yes, that’s it...yes...
In addition to emotional identification at the city level, other levels were present as well. The neighborhood was mentioned by some as a strong source of emotional identification. Pasquale, one of the first-wave migrants, indicated he feels at home in the Jordaan neighborhood because he was received there with open arms.

At a higher/superordinate/transnational level, some identified with being European or as an international citizen. These identifications were mentioned exclusively by the second-wave migrants, which may be related to the gradually intensifying cooperation in the European Union and/or generational differences, for instance, the usage of technology and social media and easier access to affordable travel. Jano, for example, identified both with Amsterdam and as a European. He argued that, even though each country had its own characteristics, he considered all European countries to be related, based on their common history and Christianity. A more internationally oriented identification occurred among three of the second-wave respondents, one of whom identified herself as a world citizen, while the other two identified as expats instead of migrants. They mentioned that they felt less attached to one place solely, but to multiple places throughout the world. Barbara explained that she travels a lot and feels at home in three places now: the Netherlands, Rome, and New York.

In addition to places, we also identified sources of belonging connected to people. Family members served as an important source of belonging. This created tension for several migrants because they had children who were born and/or raised in the Netherlands, while their parents and other family members still lived in Italy. The lack of family support was especially missed by the women participants. However, children seemed to be a major reason for choosing to remain in the Netherlands, as participants often stated that they probably would have returned to Italy if they had had no children (for similar findings for Italian immigrants in the UK, see Zontini, 2015). They either decided to stay because their children felt at home in the Netherlands or because they considered the Netherlands a better place to raise their children.

A good example is Dori (a second-wave migrant), who feels emotionally divided between Italy and the Netherlands. She married a Dutch man, came to the Netherlands in the 1980s, and became pregnant. However, she felt homesick and returned to her family in Italy to give birth to her child. Nevertheless, she kept trying to return to the Netherlands. After six years, she finally decided to settle in the Netherlands to be with her partner and live together as a family. Her son is an adult now, and this has renewed her desire to return to Italy. She mentioned that she wants to spend her “old days” in Italy. She still identifies with being Italian and feels she will never be able to become Dutch like her husband, who was born “here.” Nonetheless, she also feels at home in the Netherlands, stating: “I have two feet, one in the one part, the other in the other part,” pointing to the fact that an emotional self-identification with being Italian can go hand in hand with a sense of home in the Netherlands, expressing different kinds of belonging.

Another example is Maria, a first-wave migrant, who came to the Netherlands as the wife of an Italian labor migrant and who also struggled with her emotional identification. Her children were born in the Netherlands, and her husband wanted to stay, but she longed to go back to Italy because she missed her Italian family. While working, this went “unnoticed,” as she was active. “[I] was young, 21 years, and I liked the work. Run here, run there, work, everything...it was nice, the work was nice.” Hence, her functional identification with her job in the Netherlands was able to override her emotional identification with Italy for a certain time. However, time went on and Maria found herself living in the Netherlands for 50 years, despite her desire to leave:

You should not stay too long, if you want to leave later. After three to five years in a different country, you should try to go back. Otherwise, you don’t make it anymore. Children arrive, and when children are born here, you have roots here, too....These roots become deeper, then you do not leave anymore. I am happy here, but I am always alone.

In sum, most respondents indicated various levels of emotional identification, but when it came to the national level, most identified with Italy rather than the Netherlands. Within the Netherlands, the highest emotional identification was at the city level for first-wave migrants and a combination of the city level and/or European level for second-wave migrants. Moreover, respondents from both groups did not exclusively identify with being Dutch themselves, but their children did. This generational difference can become a source of tension, bringing the well-being and preferences of the children into conflict with those of their parents—when the parents desire to leave, but their children desire to remain (see Zontini, 2015). The following section shows how tensions in emotional identification are related to functional identification, and the significance of age.

4.3. Functional vs. Emotional Identification

One paradox we encountered in the narratives was that an emphasis on functional identification in the early stages of migration might conflict with emotional identification with Italy at a later stage. An example of this was recounted by Jano, who was retired. He had tried to enter into Dutch social life, but upon his retirement, he did not know anyone in his neighborhood or any other Dutch people, which he partly considered his own fault:

So it also...was also our fault. Because we were both busy at work, full time, both of us. On holidays, we went to England and to Italy, so we didn’t stay here, we didn’t meet people on the street. We didn’t have occasion to have a chat, and so on, and so on...
For Jano, an emphasis on work limited his time to learn Dutch, and his travels to Italy did not leave room for building contacts with Dutch people. Now that he is at home more, increased contact with his neighbors has fostered a sense of belonging at the neighborhood level: “We are no longer the foreigners, the weird people. We are part of this group of people. And that is a good feeling.” In addition, he started Dutch conversation classes, which diminished his hesitancy to speak Dutch.

Not everyone is able to make these sorts of investments at a later stage of the migration process. In the first stages of her “integration,” Maria and her Italian husband focused on work. Now that her husband has died and she has retired, Maria admitted she is ashamed that she cannot speak Dutch fluently, despite having been in the Netherlands for 50 years. She spoke of wanting to engage in small talk with the baker, for instance, but does not do so as she feels she will not be able to express herself understandably. She really regrets not having had time to study Dutch when she was younger because of her focus on work and on raising her children. Nowadays, however, due to a lack of schooling and old age, her brain is no longer “open,” as she phrases it.

Hence, the proper positioning (Esser, 2003) in the labor market did not automatically lead to more interaction, that is, social integration, as is often assumed, even though, especially in their old age, the Italian migrants realize that is what they desire. Passing the successive stages of integration is no guarantee for developing an emotional identification with the Netherlands or even the often lesser-contested sense of belonging.

The second paradox we observed was that even those who did invest in contact with Dutch people (interaction) and learned to speak Dutch fluently (culturation) experienced problems with their emotional identification at a later stage. Chiara and Marta, two second-wave women who could be considered the most successfully integrated (they have a high Dutch fluency, good jobs and housing situations, and Dutch partners), were the only ones who indicated they did not really feel at home in the Netherlands. In the initial phases of their migration, they were ambitious to become part of the Dutch society, but after approximately 20 years, they have started to withdraw from Dutch social life, speaking about their emotional struggles with living in the Netherlands while still considering Italy their “home.” Chiara mentioned that, upon her arrival in the Netherlands, the first thing she did was learn Dutch. She regularly receives compliments for her level of Dutch, and she explained that she tried hard to integrate into Dutch society. However, she consciously decided to stop “integrating” at a certain point because she wanted to maintain her Italian identity:

You have to choose at a certain moment—do you want to be Italian? Because you cannot be schizophrenic, it drives you crazy. And then of course, around my 35th, I chose to bring my Italian identity forward. And that, because that is what I feel more comfortable with...Now, I am always busy with something Italian, with books, with people who speak Italian. And that gives me peace, that is nice… I think, I have really always tried my best to learn Dutch, integrate… I liked it, I had the energy for it... but at a certain moment then you recognize that it is exhausting, this urge to belong.

This illustrates that knowing the language, working, and seeking contact does not automatically lead to emotional identification with a new country. The paradox in the case of Chiara and Marta is that successful integration has led to higher emotional struggles with the Netherlands—which is also due to being seen as the ethnic other in daily interactions. Jano, for example, mentioned:

I have always found my way in the Netherlands...the only thing which still irritates me...not so much irritating but rather annoying me, is that, when you tell people that you have been here for 32 years, you are still Italian to them. They always ask about Italy and then you think, God, it is as if I just arrived here yesterday.

Or as Marta puts is: “There is a feeling of Us and Them, you know. You are from outside, so you do not belong, these kind of things... There is always a feeling of reticence toward the other.” This finding is in line with Davis and Nencel’s (2011) conclusion that “meeting the implicit and explicit criteria of integration does not ensure that newcomers can be taken up into the national imaginary available for thinking about ‘Dutch-ness’ in the Netherlands” (p. 482). It also relates to those of Eijberts (2013) and Ghorashi (2010b), who both showed that a high level of integration could actually become a reason for a lower level of emotional identification if the expectation of being accepted as a full citizen is not met. Our data also underline other studies’ findings of this so-called integration paradox (Buijs et al., 2006).

4.4. Embracing In-Betweenness

A strong line in the narratives was the simultaneous presence of Italy and the Netherlands and selective use of these two contexts to describe connections and loss, possibilities and impossibilities. Edward Said (1993, p. xxxi) refers to the condition of being both an insider and an outsider simultaneously as the condition of in-betweenness. Daniela, a second-wave migrant recounts this point:

At a certain moment in time, that breaking loose, leaving everything behind you, was of course nice, and probably I needed to develop my individuality, develop myself as an individual. I did not fit anywhere, and I did not want to fit anywhere. However, at a certain point, I decided to live here, and then I thought, I recognized, that I indeed did not fit here. And that this was no longer a good feeling.
According to Daniela, the key to living as a migrant is accepting that you will never be entirely at peace, you will always have “flying roots”:

I accepted that my emotional house is not in the Netherlands....What is inside of me, is not here, it is there....You have to be tough enough to say: there are my emotions, here is my future and my work; you are a bit schizophrenic. But it is a nice way to be schizophrenic.

While one is active, mobile, and ambitious to build a future through hard work, this in-between position is associated with positive feelings, as several migrants regarded being a migrant as an enriching experience. However, this feeling might become less positive at an older age when the level of mobility is reduced and the resources to connect are less accessible (see Zontini, 2015). For the older generation who no longer work and whose children have left the house, the position of being in-between has made them feel more of an outsider, accompanied by a sense of social isolation. The solution for them, as long as their health and resources let them, is to take long vacations in Italy and live the lives of pension- atos. Even then, some have discovered that, in Italy, they feel like tourists, as living abroad for so long had changed their connection to Italy as well (see Zontini, 2015).

This sense of social isolation was illustrated by Rosa, a first-wave migrant who came to the Netherlands as the wife of Bernardo, an Italian labor migrant. First, she remarked that living in the Netherlands for 50 years had made her Dutch as well. Nevertheless, later she stated: “There is always something, Since I am Italian. Do you understand what I mean? I cannot really become Dutch.”

Feeling different is strengthened by the lack of social contacts—Rosa indicates that lately she has “almost nobody anymore”—as well as an increasing number of unfriendly encounters. Although Rosa and Bernardo began their interview by emphasizing they never experienced problems with Dutch people, toward the end of the interview they recounted several instances of having been treated in an unfriendly manner due to their background. During a conflict with a neighbor, they were told to go back to their own country. This was an especially sore spot for Rosa, who repeatedly stated how much the comment hurt her. Bernardo said that Dutch people used to be nice, but that more recently they had become less friendly, which has been echoed by other migrant groups in previous research, as the public and political discourse on integration in the Netherlands has become harsher in tone (e.g., Eijberts, 2013).

Unfriendly and unwelcoming remarks were often mentioned by the first-wave migrants. This was less true of the second-wave migrants, possibly due to their greater focus on functional identification or their stronger feeling of identification as European. In sum, although both waves of migrants found themselves in an in-between position, this had become a stronger source of confusion and isolation for the first wave. Rosa, for example, stated: “Sometimes I really think, what am I actually? Not Dutch and not Italian. I am a strange person.” This outsider position, which some call a sense of social isolation, may increase as people age. Getting old had various consequences for this group. On different occasions, they indicated their frustration at being afraid or unable to deal with new technology that could help them to stay in touch with family and friends in Italy (see also Zontini, 2015); thus, for them it is more difficult to engage in transnational spaces, which could actually enhance integration in both countries. They do not feel as part of Dutch society and have lost connections with Italy both emotionally (because of the duration of their stay in the Netherlands) and physically (because of the lack of mobility they enjoyed when younger). Physical distance, combined with a lack of knowledge about new technology that could help bridge this distance virtually, has added to their sense of isolation. In this way, first-wave migrants feel both out of place and behind the times because of their age (Zontini, 2015).

5. Discussion

As demonstrated above, the narratives show paradoxical processes at work when Italian migrants talk about their lives in the Netherlands. Many had a very strongly developed functional (self-)identification in the Netherlands and wanted to contribute to society (especially in the earlier stages of their life and stay in the Netherlands). They wanted to be “needed,” as one respondent said, and be a valuable contributor to the welfare of their organization and society. In this sense, they can clearly be seen as an asset to Dutch society. However, their colleagues did not always recognize their efforts and approached them primarily as ethnic others, which led to their feeling excluded and may have called their self-identification into question. According to the WRR (2007), functional identification can be one of the most powerful means to fostering social cohesion and integration. However, overemphasis on migrants as ethnic others may hamper its effects.

Furthermore, at the level of functional identification, we heard narratives that challenged the assumption that language, as part of culturation, serves as a critical bridge to integration, a dominant assumption in the literature and policy discourse of integration in the Netherlands (Entzinger & Biezveeld, 2003; Esser, 2006). We refer to this contrast as the paradox of language. In the past, policymakers saw no need to focus on language because the migration approach of that time focused on the temporary stay of guest workers (Entzinger, 2009). However, migrants may realize later in life that their lack of language knowledge means they were unable to invest in a social life in the Netherlands outside of work. Thus, while their lack of culturation in terms of language did not result in a lack of positioning, positioning in turn did not automatically lead to more interaction, challenging the
assumed linear process of one following the other. However, in old age, social interaction with their neighbors was exactly what migrants desired, and the shift in importance from functional to emotional identification caused them to feel a longing for their country of origin.

However, with the second-wave migrants especially, it becomes clear that cultivation in terms of language does not open all doors either. This group of Italian migrants enjoyed higher education, and most of them worked in international environments. Some identified as expats, which could be considered a way of distancing themselves from the dominant image of the guest worker who is low educated and traditional. Though the label “guest worker” does not fit the second group of participants (from the 1980s and 1990s), they are often associated with it. Because of the “negative” image of this label, there is a clear pattern of de-identification by the second group, emphasizing their difference based on education (being more educated than the average Italian who came in that period), salary (gaining more salary than the average Italian in that period), and choice (choosing to migrate rather than needing to). In this way, they are maintaining the image of mobile migrants or Eurostars (Favell, 2008), who are from higher classes compared to the earlier group of Italian migrants. Even though all of the second-wave migrants were motivated to learn Dutch, half of them had not succeeded in learning enough to feel comfortable speaking it. The main causes for this were having a schedule that prevented the combination of working and learning Dutch, and being in a Dutch-speaking environment with Dutch people who switched to English.

However, even those who received compliments for their Dutch (culturation) and who had successfully socio-economically integrated (positioning and interaction) did not develop the emotional identification with the Netherlands predicted by Esser (2003) and the Dutch government. This might be partly due to the fact that these kinds of mobile migrants often combine their sense of mobility with a functional integration, as Favell (2008) has argued. Another argument could be that Amsterdam has been less permissive and open than it presents itself. In an ethnographic comparison between different European cities, Favell (2008) showed that Amsterdam is a deeply regulated and controlled city in which some processes of social and ethnic closure are ingrained in daily interactions. Thus, the linear assumption underlying Dutch integration policies does not even apply to European migrants in the Netherlands, who are considered culturally close. More importantly, the “integration paradox” applies to those who are most integrated, who have successfully passed all stages, in contrast to those who are less integrated and do not even feel at home.

Even more, in this study, we observed a rather different pattern—a clash between functional (e.g., economic) and emotional sources of identification. In the case of first-wave migrants, we showed that the exclusive emphasis on work in the first stages of migration could become a hindrance to emotional identification at a later stage. Their in-between position became a source of social isolation later in life. For the second-wave migrants, we found that those who had succeeded in learning fluent Dutch, who worked, and could be considered successfully integrated, as defined by Esser’s (2003) first three dimensions of integration, indicated that they felt neither Dutch nor at home in the Netherlands. Knowledge of the Dutch language and active participation in the workforce led to exposure to the exclusionary aspects of not being Dutch, which had a negative impact on their sense of belonging (see also Eijberts & Ghorashi, 2016).

In addition to the paradoxes of language and integration, we also identified layered sources of emotional identifications. Identification as “being Dutch” has become an important measure of integration in the Netherlands (WRR, 2007). As we stated earlier, several studies have shown that the construction of Dutchness is exclusive of difference, which does not provide space for a sense of emotional belonging for migrants (Davis & Nencel, 2011; Ghorashi & Vieten, 2012; Vasta, 2007). This is confirmed by our research: migrants in our study did not (or could not) fully identify with a Dutch identity but instead predominantly identified as being Italian. However, their sense of belonging was certainly much broader than identification with a national identity. The most prominent source of emotional identification was at the city level. The multicultural character and openness of Amsterdam proved an important basis for identification. This matches Kasinitz et al.’s (2002) results of immigrants identifying as New Yorkers rather than as Americans. In addition to the city level, we also found emotional identifications with particular neighborhoods and at the European level. Notably, European identification was only present in the narratives of the second-wave migrants. Their identification as expats along with intensified European cooperation and attempts to construct a European identity may have contributed to this level of identification. Identifying as European gave them an opportunity to connect their worlds (the Netherlands and Italy) and choose the best of both worlds when relating to the condition of in-betweenness. In contrast, we found that the first-wave migrants actually faced the downside of what Said (1993) refers to as the in-between position. Their focus on work in the earlier years of their migration, their limited contacts with Dutch people combined with social contacts mainly in Italy and with Italians in the Netherlands seem to have become a source of isolation in their old age (feeling out of place and behind the times).

In addition to these different (either overlapping or conflicting) layers of belonging to places, we identified family as an important core of belonging in both Italy and the Netherlands. For both migrant groups, we saw some contradictions at play, such as between the place one lives in (the Netherlands) and the people with whom one identifies (Italian family members in Italy) or the place...
where one’s children live (the Netherlands) and the place one wants to be (Italy).

6. Conclusions

This article aimed to demonstrate the complexity of the integration process and to broaden the scope of existing studies on migrants living in the Netherlands by including the experiences of Italian migrants. To understand Italian migrants’ routes to identification in the Netherlands, we distinguished between functional and emotional identification (WRR, 2007). The narratives showed that the experiences of the participants were complex, nonlinear, multilayered and did not fit a linear definition of “integration.” The narratives also showed that different forms of identification overlapped and clashed over time.

All respondents in our study had to deal with a new language, with finding their way in the Netherlands, and with re-figuring the question of who they are. A similarity in all the narratives, despite differences in age and migration background, was the in-between position of these migrants in Dutch society. The first-wave migrants in our study have a less positive narrative about this in-between position due to their age and isolation in Dutch society. They miss social contacts with their families in Italy, but when they are in Italy, they feel less at home, as over time they have come to feel like an outsider there as well. Yet, we saw that the second-wave migrants were better able to cope with this in-between position and profit from its positive aspects. As Eva put it: “...you have the ability...to look at both parts, from a distance. You can be more critical. That is fun. That is fun, yes.” The second-wave migrants are part of many places at the same time, are connected virtually to the world (but also to their friends and families in Italy), and have the resources to be mobile. Identifying as European, for many of them, is a way to make sense of this mobility and the multiple sources of connection. As Antonsich (2012, p. 7) argues: “Europe answers the needs of the modern individual to travel, to communicate, to exchange information and experiences. This clearly resonates with the image of the mobile European citizen put forward by Verstraete (2010).” Nevertheless, we agree with Favell (2008) that this notion of mobility should not be overemphasized, because the interactions of these mobile migrants are situated within specific national settings that also include exclusionary practices, as we discussed above.

This study has also shown that the struggle for integration and belonging in the Netherlands is not limited to migrants with Islamic backgrounds. There are many similarities in the paradoxes (of language and socioeconomic integration) present in the narratives of this research with those found in other studies on various generations of migrants and refugees with Islamic backgrounds (e.g., Eijberts & Ghorashi, 2016). We hope, with the results of this study, to weaken the “culturalist” foundation of the present discourse on integration. Moreover, we have provided a more comprehensive insight into the various ways identification takes place, beyond the singular source of national identification.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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The Design of Migrant Integration Policies in Spain: Discourses and Social Actors

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Abstract

Spain is one of the countries with the lowest social spending within the EU-15, and its welfare state has developed later and with less intensity. At the end of the 20th century, Spain became an immigration country, reaching 5.7 million immigrants in 2011. This article explores how the definition of migrant ‘integration’ is based more on a concept of universal rights and social cohesion by the main actors (political parties, trade unions, third sector organizations and immigrant associations) than on a notion of a cultural type. We will also analyze how the influence of European policies and restrictive liberalism have led to the implementation of programmes which aim to make civic integration compulsory for the renewal of residence and work permits. The empirical evidence for this article stems from 60 qualitative interviews with social actors in migrant integration policies during 2010 and 2011. The impact of the economic crisis on the foreign population, especially regarding its position in the labor market, will also be considered, explaining the reduction of specific and general policies targeting the migrant population. This cut in social spending has involved a deinstitutionalization of this particular policy field.

Keywords

actors; culture; discourse; immigration; institutionalization; integration; policies; political parties; Spain

1. Introduction

In this article, we will analyze how various actors, mainly political parties, have defined their vision for the integration of the foreign population. But we will also comment on the vision that the different actors involved have for the implementation of these specific immigrant integration policies. These policies directed at the foreign population in Spain are characterized by two factors: a) their strong decentralization, which assigns to various government levels (state, autonomies and municipalities) a degree of power in the implementation of such measures; and b) the substantial number of actors taking part in the implementation, deliberation and creation of such specific policies (political parties, governments, specialists in the various public administrations, trade unions, third sector organizations and the immigrant associations themselves). The analysis shows that there is a vaguely defined idea for the term ‘integration’ (Chari & Sandell, 2011, p. 146), which tends to be rooted in the social rights field rather than the cultural rights field.

At the end of the 20th century, Spain became an immigration country, reaching 5.7 million immigrants in 2011 (Arango, 2000, pp. 256–258; Fokkema & Haas, 2015, pp. 4–5; López-Sala, 2013, pp. 40–45). The economic growth that Spain experienced between 2000 and 2007 led to a widening of the labor market, along with a demand for intensive manpower in sectors such as construction and services with a low added value, and even in part-time jobs (Muñoz-Comet, 2016, p. 546). This need for manpower was largely satisfied by the arrival of immigrants (Mahía Casado, 2010, p. 10). The annual gross domestic product grew by an average of 3.4 points between the years 2000 and 2007, with immigration being responsible for 40% of that increase (Fundación Ideas, 2011, pp. 58–59, 83).
In Spain, at the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, there were 20.6 million people working. Of these, foreign immigrant workers made up 13.8 percent of the total; almost 2.9 million workers. Following the reduction of the labor market in 2016, the working population rose to 18.3 million people, of whom 10.8 percent were of foreign nationality, amounting to nearly 2 million foreign workers (Labor Force Survey, 2016). Ultimately, this period saw the disappearance of 2.3 million employed people, of which 876.4 were foreign workers, that is, 37.3 percent of working people who lost their job in this period were foreigners (Labor Force Survey, 2016). Unemployment rates for the foreign active population are about 20.5 percent in 2016—based on data available for the second third of the year. The most significant change in this period was the unemployment rates among the Spanish population, which was at 18.8 percent in 2016. Understandably, differences between nationals and foreigners in the labor market are affected by variables such as gender, country of birth, educational level and social class, along with the tendency to prefer certain nationalities over others, for example, in the case of immigration from Latin American countries (Amuedo-Dorantes & De la Rica, 2007, pp. 263–267).

Prior to the crisis, immigration was perceived by nationals to be a temporary necessity, a labor need, but in the end, it came to be perceived as being a burden for an ungenerous Welfare State. Spaniards stratified their migration preferences according to cultural proximity and religion (Cook-Martín & Viladrach, 2009, pp. 155–161). Latin American migration became the most preferred, followed by migration from the EU-28 and, finally migration from Sub-Saharan nations, with Moroccan immigration being the least accepted of them all.

Spain is one of the countries with the lowest social spending within the EU-15 and its welfare state developed later and with less intensity (Arribas & Moreno, 2005, pp. 110–111; Rhodes, 1996, pp. 5–8; Sarasa & Moreno, 1995, pp. 26–28). In the case of Spain, joining the European Union in 1986 and the inclusion of immigrant rights in the political agenda of extreme left parties were the factors that led to the first aliens act. In 1994, the first state plan for the social integration of immigrants by the Ministry of Social Affairs was in the hands of a socialist government, a plan that established a set of administrative measures and proposals for the care of migrants.

The arrival of substantial flows of immigrants, starting from the year 2000, justified to a great extent the increase in measures specifically aimed at the immigrant population. In 2001, with a conservative government, the second immigration plan was approved, under the name Plan GRECO¹ and marked by a vision of immigration as border control and integration as assimilation (Gil Araujo, 2002, 2010, p. 106).

Since 2004, there has been an institutionalization process of this specific public policy. This has involved a consolidation of this area in the political agenda (in the state, autonomous communities and municipalities), its stable presence in the parliamentary political discourse, a specialization in the management and implementation of this type of sector policy and, eventually, an extension of the responsibility of the implementation of these policies to various social actors throughout virtually all public administrations. In the years preceding the crisis, at a time when economic prospects were good and the government was in the hands of the social democrats between 2004 and 2008, there was an increase in social policy expenditure typical of the Welfare State, along with the development of specific policies for gender equality, youth, and the integration of foreigners.

The debate over the integration model for immigrants in Spain started in the late nineties and the beginning of the first decade of this century, when Europe abandoned both the assimilationist and the multiculturalist models. At that time, our political class seemed to be seeking a middle way between these two choices or, at least that is how the notion of interculturality that got conservative and left-wing political forces to work together, was perceived. This proposal continued to evolve, and the variety of forces taking part gradually adopted more reactive stances, under the influence of European trends, which were not very keen recognising the rights of immigrant people, favouring instead a restrictive liberalism, which enforces civic integration programmes aimed at the learning of language and values (Goodman, 2010, pp. 757–763, 2014; Guiraudon, 2008; Jacobs & Rea, 2007, pp. 270–274; Triadafilopoulos, 2011, pp. 865–890).

The following sections describe the methodology of this research, the main results, and finally, some brief conclusions regarding the policies for immigrant integration in Spain.

2. Methodology

This publication is based on data collected using qualitative methodology, which included in-depth interviews with key informants, as well as the revision of documents from the various social and political actors (programmes, regulations, memorandums, websites, leaflets, press releases, published news stories, etc.).

The interview technique was based upon a method expounded by Lewis A. Dexter in his classic work Elite and Specialized Interviewing (1970) for four main reasons. Political and professional elites: 1) have busy schedules; 2) hold senior roles in their field, are considered experts, and as such, they like being the centre of attention. 3) Political and professional elites hold privileged, first-hand information and employing a technique which might compromise their treatment of such data might prevent them from publicly sharing it. Finally, 4) the interviewees were allowed to direct the course of the interview towards topics they considered more relevant. This made the inter-

¹The Global Programme for the Regulation and Coordination of Aliens and Immigration, known as Plan GRECO, was passed on 17 April, 2001. Please see https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2001/04/27/pdfs/A15323-15343.pdf
viewees more comfortable and lead to better empirical evidence being produced (Dexter, 1970, pp. 48–50).

The total number of in-depth interviews was 60: 22 of which were conducted with representatives of political parties; 14 of these interviews involved decision makers in the state and autonomous community governments; 4 interviews were with trade union decision makers; 10 were with the main third-sector organizations involved with foreigners; and another 10 were with immigrant associations with a wide presence in great part of the state territory. Of these, 23 interviews took place at the national level: 14 in Catalonia, 13 in Madrid and 9 in Andalucia. Fieldwork was conducted between 2010 and 2011 (see Table 1).

The following 3 characteristics led me to choose Catalonia, Madrid and Andalucia: a) they are 3 of the 4 regions in Spain with the highest concentration of foreign population; b) the three regional administrations have a substantial track record of addressing their needs; and c) their regional governments were in the hands of different political parties: Madrid was ruled by the conservative Popular Party, in Andalucia the progressive Spanish Socialist Workers' Party was in power, and finally Catalonia had a government made up of socialists, environmentalists and left-wing nationalists.

The interview sample was chosen to be representative, and so included political parties represented in the State government and in regional parliaments, majority trade unions or NGOs and immigration associations which were present in State and/or regional participation forums. Also, in the case of immigrant associations, the key factor was that they were representative of the various national groups.

These interviews were transcribed in their entirety and subjected to a discourse analysis, which focused on the topics relevant for this study, namely: integration, policies, assimilation, rights, and cultural rights.

3. Discussion

3.1. The European Influence (and its Resistances) on the (Cultural) Integration Model of the Foreign Population

Criticism towards multiculturalism as an option for immigrant integration, based on its essentialist vision of culture and the risk of the fragmentation of society, has become a prevailing discourse among conservative political forces, also being adopted by traditional left-wing parties across Europe (Huntington, 1996; Joppke, 2004, pp. 242–247; Sartori, 2001). The fall of multiculturalism has made most member states of the European Union return to assimilationist stands and it has also led to the withdrawal of so-called multicultural policies (Faist, 2009, pp. 174–177; Joppke, 2004, pp. 243–248; Meer & Moddod, 2012, pp. 185–191).

When discussing multiculturalism, as it is linked to immigration, there are additional dimensions to consider: a) its philosophical proposal; and b) the actual multicultural policies that were implemented in the European states. These aspects are interrelated, but sometimes it appears that political discourses adopt the (diverse) ‘philosophical’ approach to multiculturalism—and, by association, to cultural relativism without distinctions—rather than addressing specific global ‘policies’ designed to foster the settlement of the foreign population.

The new assimilationist policies emerging towards the end of the 20th century are defined by the mandatory nature of civic integration for foreigners, where such integration can be measured as an effort to learn the language, the culture, the rules of social cohesion, in terms of the well-known immigrant integration contracts (Guiraudon, 2008; Jacobs & Rea, 2007, pp. 272–277; Triadafilopoulos, 2011, pp. 863–865; Wallace Goodman, 2010, pp. 760–764, 2014). Spain has not escaped this assimilationist twist, but its take on such contracts has remained in the category of ‘willingness’ to enrol in such courses when other criteria to renew residence and work permits are not met.

Such political measures call into question two paradigms within liberal democracies: the sovereignty of nation states over their interior politics; and the self-perception of liberal societies as institutions that can not only guarantee fundamental rights but also encourage the spreading of new rights to all citizens or to new sectors of the population (Freeman, 2003; Joppke, 2007, pp. 5–9; Loch, 2014, pp. 625–628; Triadafilopoulos, 2011, pp. 869–875).

The weakening of national sovereignty of states gives way to a greater geostrategic influence in the writing of policies and their design, resulting in a convergence

Table 1. Typological grid of qualitative interviews conducted in this research (2009–2010). Source: author’s compilation.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish State</th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Andalucia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Decision Makers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Associations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
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of discourses and in the type of similar responses in the various nation states (Freeman, 2003; Joppke, 2007, pp. 6–8; Loch, 2014, pp. 626–629). European policies for immigrant integration have been marked by the modus operandi of the open method of coordination, which respects the sovereignty of member states in their territory but tries to reach a consensus in discourses and policies for each particular area (Caviedes, 2004, pp. 290–294; Jacobs & Rea, 2007, pp. 268–272).

Liberal states are questioned for their role as institutions capable of expanding and granting rights, paving the way for a more restrictive liberalism that is ready to defend the values that they see as central to a society, reacting with coercive use of state power to the changes brought on by the rise of diversity in their societies (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, pp. 870–874). This shift involves an unprecedented attack on ‘multiculturalist’ policies. The reasons behind these new policies with such a strong assimilationist tendency are complex. We could talk about a loss of the economic and political hegemony of western societies which leads to breaching the political consensus (crises in the political party system with the emergence of populist far right forces), social factors (weakening of the Welfare State), and even cultural ones (diversity in our societies).

The alternative to multiculturalism in the field of cultural pluralism is the intercultural approach. This option seeks to counterbalance the rise of political xenophobia in Europe through the greater representation of parties that oppose immigration and assimilationism as the dominating model (Kymlicka, 2012, pp. 212–214). The accent on this policy lies in a further search for interaction and dialogue in the understanding that integration is a process experienced within each individual (Meer & Moddod, 2012, pp. 182–187).

The approval of the Common Basic Principles in 2005 was a turning point, giving rise to integration policies in the European Union countries which aimed to improve integration by stating that, for immigrants, “A basic knowledge of the language, the history and the institutions of the society is essential for integration”. Such principles have been fully adopted in Spain, in the first Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration of 2007–2010 (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, 2007), and subsequently incorporated in the following Strategic Plan of 2011–2014 (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, 2011).

In the Spanish case, consensus to go this ‘third way’ was apparently quite strong among conservative and progressive forces, because this was perceived as being a middle ground between assimilationism and multiculturalism; an indication of the lack of consistency within certain political visions. The empirical evidence collected in our fieldwork shows the existing difficulties experienced by the political class in accurately defining the meaning of the intercultural option, and it also illustrates how multiculturalism and assimilationism are perceived as disposable options. Without going into too much detail about the development of intercultural policies, within specific programmes they had their place in regions ruled by various political groups. In 2008, this lukewarm approach was formally broken when the main conservative force in Spain, the Partido Popular, promoted an integration contract at the time of the general election in 2008. Since then, interculturality has begun to disappear from documents and agendas produced by conservative forces and, at the same time, it has diminished in progressive policies due to fears of a welfare chauvinism effect among natives. In the Spanish case, such a turning point and the turn towards assimilation occurred later in comparison to other European countries such as Holland, France or Germany, which incorporated such programmes prior to 2011 (Michalowski, 2007, pp. 71–75), when an ‘effort for integration’ was added to the Spanish immigration regulations. In Spain, the ‘effort for integration’ was an optional choice concerning the most vulnerable immigrants, as it compensated for the lack of compliance with a requirement to renew the residence and work permit, and thus it was only implemented after the law on foreigners was passed in 2009.

The official definition of integration at state level established in the first Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (2007–2010), passed in the Council of Ministers on 16 February 2007, is as follows: “a bidirectional, dynamic process of mutual adjustment by all immigrants and all residents of member states”, where “integration implies the respect for the core values of the European Union” (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, 2007). As we can see, there is a clear influence of basic common European principles passed in 2005.

This notion has three key ideas: firstly that integration is, rather than a state of affairs at a given time, a dynamic social process that takes place over time, having to be continuously reproduced and renewed; secondly, integration requires mutual or two-way efforts to adapt to the new reality, such efforts coming both from immigrants and from the society receiving them; and finally, that these mutual efforts must be carried out within the framework of the core values of the European Union (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, 2007).

3.2. The Discourse of Political and Social Actors on the Integration of Immigrants in Spain

For a start, it should be acknowledged that multiculturalism as a critical approach is more easily linked to left-wing parties (Jupp, 2003), at least from the point of view of the most conservative parties. On the other hand, we find that left-wing parties perceive conservative parties as assimilationist forces, whose take on immigration involves the fear of the loss of the national identity. The left fears being defined as ‘woolly liberal’ and

The political discourse tends to classify and stratify foreigner(s) perceived as static, and for this purpose, some ethnic markers are taken into account, such as phenotypic features, language or religion. In Spain, this aspect of political and social discourses means that some policies have more impact on certain communities, for example: religious diversity measures, hiring intercultural mediators specialised in a certain national community, or the teaching of Spanish and other co-official languages in Spain. We can see traces of such discourses in the following quotes:

“I believe that ‘Izquierda Unida’ [a left-wing party] defends multiculturalism. It does” (An MP of the Popular Party)

“The Popular Party is in the assimilationist model” (An MP of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)

“The right, the Popular Party and Convergència [a conservative regionalist party can be said to be assimilationist in the sense that they want to impose an autochthonous culture—be it Catalan or the Spanish—, with each person renouncing to their origins. I believe that is the path they would follow.” (Decision-maker for Migration and Citizenship in Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Catalanian Green Party)

The political discourse tends to classify and stratify foreigners, according to their proximity to the Spanish culture(s) perceived as static, and for this purpose, some ethnic markers are taken into account, such as phenotypic features, language or religion. In Spain, this aspect of political and social discourses means that some policies have more impact on certain communities, for example: religious diversity measures, hiring intercultural mediators specialised in a certain national community, or the teaching of Spanish and other co-official languages in Spain. We can see traces of such discourses in the following quotes:

“I think that people who come to a country such as ours have to adopt our values, our law and our Constitution, as well as all that we have done to construct our cultural heritage over time....That’s why I believe that what the people who arrive to a country such as ours must do is to accept and respect all the progress that we have made; there are some nationalities that find that easier because of their culture to adapt to it and there are others that find it more complicated, more complex, because of their culture, because of what they have received and even, on many occasions, because of their lack of education, huh.” (A member of the parliament from the Popular Party)

“Spain has always historically prioritised, and the Spanish laws have alway prioritised, Latin America and the Philippines; former colonies. It sounds a bit outdated since Spain lost its colonies and so on. We believe we indeed should not break those ties with them, we have to further strengthen such ties. But, indeed, it’s basically Latin American countries [meaning those with the right to vote in the municipal election], and some other country nowadays for reasons of relationships, security, for fishing even, or commercial relations and so on—Spain is starting to open up to them, to deploy those options traditionally reserved for Ibero-American countries.” (Coordinator of the parliamentary group Izquierda Unida-Iniciativa per Catalunya-Esquerra Republicana de Cataluña in the 9th parliamentary term)

“The good one is the one which is culturally or religiously closer to us. And the bad one is the other one.” (Decision-maker for the Immigration Area of Partido Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, an environmentalist-socialist party)

A characteristic of the discourse on the integration of immigrants in Spain which runs through the various Public Administrations and territories is a difficulty to integrate those foreigners who from a cultural point of view are the farthest away, more specifically, the Muslim population concentrated in Catalonia. The cultural debates that have the greatest impact with regard to religious diversity centre around the building of mosques and the use of the hijab or the burqa in public spaces. Islamophobia as a type of xenophobia has an oblivious echo on many public discourses, this concept being understood as viewing Islam as a compact, monolithic block opposing social change; isolated and sharing no common values with other cultures it coexists with. It is viewed as being inferior to Western culture and perceived as sexist, irrational or primitive; it is seen as being linked to international terrorism and engaged in a clash of civilizations (Martín Muñoz, 2012).

The political and social discourse in Spain usually links immigration to employment; therefore, this is seen as the initial point of integration. Such a discourse is stronger among conservative stances, leaving arguments such as cultural enrichment to progressive forces. The economic recession experienced in Spain could have been one of the main motives for changing the positive acceptance of immigration, yet the downturn encouraged stereotypes linked to the traditional xenophobic discourses related to labor competitiveness (Cea D’Ancona & Valles Martinez, 2015, pp. 136–137)

In the discourse of left-wing political parties in Spain, we find a vision of integration that highlights egalitarianism regarding access to rights, the defence of the extension of political rights—voting in local elections—to foreigners being the most extensive proposal from far-left parties. Such discourses include standardising access of foreigners to the Welfare State, defending the need to implement policies of immigrant integration and, finally, a certain lukewarm position of interculturality (directed more specifically towards migrant and specialised audiences). Interculturality is incorporated as a technical term directed at experts, and as a halfway point for political positions but with a little practical development. The comments of a member of parliament from a peripheral, conservative regionalist party of Catalonia illustrates this point:
“We are located within interculturality, as everyone else in Spain. Now the discussion is what we mean by interculturality....I think everybody is formally into interculturality and nobody would nowadays defend a position which is purely multiculturalist or purely assimilationist. But neither do I think there is a particularly well-developed doctrine from political parties, and I believe that the practices in government tend to be misunderstood multiculturalism. Differences tend to be trivially emphasised, there’s a tendency to pigeon hole people under their origins and, from this, to promote associationism or integration policies. This ethnic approach to sorting types of immigrants is used to garner votes. My feeling is that this is pretty generalised and that’s why I say the rhetoric is always intercultural, but practice is a bad version of multicultural.” (An MP from Convergència i Unió in the Spanish parliament)

Basically, if we cross the axes of ideology and national sentiment we will be able to find four ideal types (see Table 2):

- a) the assimilationist model associated with forces that adopt a strong Spanish nationalist sentiment, and can be defined as conservative, as is the case of the Partido Popular. This will be the first force to enact in Spain the ‘integration contract’ which demands that immigrants make an effort to get to know the Spanish language and culture. In exchange for this ‘duty’, it’s understood that they will be entitled to Welfare State rights;
- b) the model of defence of standardization of access to the Welfare State and integration, based on ‘constitutional patriotism’, or legislative patriotism, which defends interculturality in education and cultural areas as an enhancement of diversity. This is characteristic of political forces that define Spain as a nation-state and are ideologically located on the left, such as the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and Izquierda Unida. The more left-wing the party is, the greater its defence of the rights of foreigners, particularly of their right to vote.

- c) the model of assimilationism for the immigrant population situated in regions perceived as peripheral nations with a culture and language of their own. This includes a defence of interculturality for specific matters (education, social cohesion and community involvement) which derives from the a positive view of ‘cultural diversity’ and is characteristic of peripheral regionalist parties that identify themselves as progressive, such as Bloque Nacionalista Galego (in Galicia) or Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalonia). These forces also defend the provision of greater access to the Welfare State for the foreign population and the extension of political rights for immigrants.
- d) The assimilationist model for immigrants which advocates multiculturalism in the centre-periphery relationships, which is characteristic of conservative regionalist stances such as Convergència i Unió (Catalonia) and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Country). It is important to keep in mind that the conservative Convergència i Unió advocated for there to be an ‘effort for integration’ from immigrants, in the 2011 regulations for aliens in the State, in exchange for parliamentary support to back those regulations.

Rhetoric on integration produced by trade unions, nonprofit organizations and immigrant associations plays a role in mediation or symbolic approximation between foreigners and those responsible for governmental discourses on immigration. Trade unions in Spain characteristically have a low membership, those with a greater representation in trade union elections are Comisiones Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores. Foreign members in the various territories still do not get close to representing foreign workers among the whole of the labor force, accounting for about ten percent of the total in 2016. At the national level, the percentage of foreign members in Comisiones Obreras is between 5 and 7 percent of the total, while these account for 3 percent of the total members of the Unión General de Trabajadores.

The view of trade unions on integration is mainly social, civic and political. Both organizations highlight that immigrants must be assured access to the Welfare State,

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ideological Axis (Left–Right)</th>
<th>Centralism–Peripheral Nationalism Axis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralism</strong></td>
<td>Defence of normalization and civic integration. Interculturality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peripheral Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>Assimilationism for immigrants at the cultural level. Defence of interculturality in specific areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right–Conservatives</strong></td>
<td>Assimilationism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assimilationism—Interculturality in the relationships of stateless nations (ie. autonomous communities of Spain).</td>
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Table 2. Stances regarding political recognition of the identity of each migrant community (2008–2011). Source: Author’s compilation based on empirical data.
which needs to be resized due to population growth. They also stress that the equality criterion must be central and advocate the normalization of services to foreigners. There is also a defence of increased political rights for the foreign population, and argument that is especially strong on the part of Comisiones Obreras. In terms of their cultural model, they advocate interculturality as a way to live together in a culture of diversity, rather than in a diversity of cultures.

Organizations that support immigrants, which are entities in charge of implementing integration policies, are the ones with the greatest level of development and influence on governments where immigrant integration is concerned. Such entities dominate discourses for the defence of human rights, they are key defenders of interculturality, are partially responsible for these kinds of programmes, and they fight for a standardised access to the Welfare State for foreigners. The standardization principle is present in the vast majority of discourses of all social actors, in terms of promoting foreigner’s access to the general public services instead of establishing services and specific benefits which specifically respond to the needs of the foreign population; nevertheless, it is also true that this approach needs support in order to achieve integration and social cohesion in the host society.

Immigrant associations have less influence on governments than trade unions and immigrant supporting entities. These former groups depend on public aid to a greater extent than the latter, making their discourse more critical, albeit mitigated by their status as implementers of assistance programmes. Immigrant entities that represent more discriminated groups speak in terms more closely approaching the defence of positions favourable to positive discrimination, because their members suffer more intensely from the consequences of racism and xenophobia. They are the ones who embrace most vigorously the discourse of interculturality because it is in their everyday practices, while support entities are the ones who best know the theory supporting such claims.

Quantitative data show how the hegemonic picture that linked immigration to the need for manual laborers has collapsed in Spain. Academic literature shows that the perception of Spaniards has changed and that the positive side of the presence of foreigners is linked to cultural wealth. To this, we must add the emergence of identity policies challenging the serious redistributive crisis that is having an impact on social equity. This means that the debates on diversity management must be considered as core debates. In the absence of ‘means’ to implement policies, resulting from the failure to redistribute wealth, ‘symbolic’ policies emerge. The best example of this is discourse as a policy itself.

4. Conclusions

Discourses are a prelude to policies; they precede and predict future actions. Restrictions start by being verbalised and subsequently solidified. A good example of this was the exclusion from access to public health of immigrants in an irregular administrative situation that was made on the grounds of austerity policies and which took place under the conservative government of Partido Popular in 2012. Prior to this, there had been declarations defending different rights for immigration in a regular situation and foreigners in an irregular administrative situation (Royal Decree-Act 16/2012, 2012).

Just as austerity cut this social right from some of the most vulnerable foreigners, the logic of universal rights, access standardization, the fight for public health access and, finally, an organised and sensitised group of social actors was able to reverse this situation in 2015. The conservative government was pressured to reinstate foreigner’s access in an irregular administrative situation to the primary health system. This may be the best demonstration of the existence of an egalitarian force in the vision of foreign integration.

At the cultural level, it is worth noting that differences are hard to accept in Spain, so talking about a shared identity is not easy given the considerable internal plurality of the Spanish state. Applying this ongoing debate to the arrival of immigrants allows for a certain de facto diversity, but it does not support it, at least on a national scale. Interculturality only takes a centre role when we talk about educational programs or when we consider immigrant communities that are culturally distant, such as Moroccans; where intercultural mediation does seem necessary to mediate. In this sense, much remains to be done if we wish to develop the kind of approach that is respectful of difference that forms the basis of any social cohesion project.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.
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