Understanding the Drivers of Poverty in Zimbabwe: Emerging Lessons from the Protracted Relief Program
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- The study was coordinated by a team from the PRP Harare Office including Kerina Zvobgo, Erica Keogh and Killian Mutiro.
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Understanding the Drivers of Poverty in Zimbabwe: Emerging Lessons from the Protracted Relief Program
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAM</td>
<td>Basic Education Assistance Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Conservation Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKN</td>
<td>Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESPA</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPL</td>
<td>Food Poverty Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOZ</td>
<td>Government of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ha</td>
<td>Hectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immune Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICES</td>
<td>Income Consumption Expenditure Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIME</td>
<td>Longitudinal approaches to Impact Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIMS</td>
<td>Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPI</td>
<td>Multidimensional Poverty Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt</td>
<td>Metric Tonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MZF</td>
<td>Moving Zimbabwe Forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEETS</td>
<td>Not in education, employment or training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASS</td>
<td>Poverty Assessment Study Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Protracted Relief Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDCO</td>
<td>Small Enterprise Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Small Scale Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>tonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCPL</td>
<td>Total Consumption Poverty Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMSTAT</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMVAC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Introduction

The contemporary rebound and recovery\(^1\) of the Zimbabwe economy comes on the back of more than a decade of economic decline and an increase in levels of poverty. Since the late 1990s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita had peaked at US$574 in 1998 and by the time the inclusive government was formed in 2009 this had nearly halved and was estimated to be about US$284. Reasons for the decline are many and varied but in the main relate to the cumulative effects of economic and political governance challenges prevailing in the country at the time.\(^2\) The catastrophic decline in GDP per capita triggered a rise in income poverty that eroded many of the post-independence welfare gains. This paper analyses the drivers of poverty in rural and urban Zimbabwe. It draws its evidence principally from the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP)-LIME Surveys but also analyses evidence from other major poverty surveys and reports. Based on this analysis the paper draws out some key lessons learnt and the implications for future poverty reduction interventions\(^3\).

Emerging Lessons after Eight Years of PRP

The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) was launched by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in 2004. Phase I (2004-08) reached 1.5 million people. Phase II (2008-2010) helped to increase coverage to at least 2 million people in both urban and rural areas. The second phase was a multi-donor funded programme, financed by Australian Aid (AusAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union (EU), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands (EKN), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank. The PRP aimed to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and, through various programming interventions, sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions. The balance, in terms of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and development, has changed in

\(^1\) Real GDP growth rate for 2011 estimated at just above 6 per cent while in 2009 and 2010 it had grown by 5.7 and 8.1 per cent respectively


\(^3\) Appendix 1 gives a detailed description of the scope of this work, the questions and methodology used.
response to the evolving context in Zimbabwe. In the current extension phase of the PRP II (2011-2012) the interventions are now more developmental, building the sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in Zimbabwe. From analysis of the combined experiences, the following key areas of learning for the future have been identified:

**Many Groups in Poverty**

The PRP evidence shows a multiplicity of groups living in poverty. There are more rural than urban poor but within each of these there are internal variations. In both rural and urban areas the poorest are often the groups with health (chronically ill or disabled), age (orphans and grandparents), gender (female) social determinants.

**Multiple Drivers of Poverty**

Evidence from the 23 PRP-LIME sites shows that the programme was dealing with multiple drivers of poverty. For the rural sites the socio-economic drivers included lack of access to, and capability to use, productive assets, limited opportunities for off farm employment, social exclusion and spatial disadvantage. These combined to make livelihood pursuits limited, unsustainable or simply inaccessible. For the urban programme, the main drivers related to lack of quality employment and opportunities to make a living through self-employment. A large number were driven into poverty through non-developmental politics and loss of livelihoods.

**Productivity Growth and Conservation Agriculture**

The PRP has demonstrated very clearly that productivity growth is key to raising rural incomes and providing pathways out of poverty. The biggest problem for smallholder agriculture has been low productivity. What the PRP has demonstrated is that by facilitating input support households gain an ability to use their land to better themselves. Conservation agriculture is an example of where PRP interventions have increased productivity for smallholder farmers. In years with normal rainfall, many of the households that had never produced a surplus have managed to, are food secure and are looking to participate in markets. For urban areas, the PRP experience clearly shows that access to quality employment or opportunities to trade can make a difference.

**Institution Building**

During the economic crisis provision of public goods and services was weakened as the state capacity to provide these declined due to budget constraints. The PRP has shown the importance of building stronger local level institutions and capacity to co-ordinate and ‘do development’ with the co-operation rather than direction of the state. It is a way to reach people when state institutions at the centre do not work well or are paralysed by lack of resources. That way development does not stop but continues through local level non-state actors. Examples of PRP initiatives that attempted to fill the vacuum in these services are the
volunteer–led Farmer Field Schools that filled a void left by under resourced extension services and the ‘para vets’ who provided services to livestock farmers. Similarly, many of the home based care groups emerged to provide much needed local level support for the chronically ill. The process of building these community level institutions has created a new crop of trained development actors actively making a difference in their communities.

Embracing the Mosaic of Livelihoods

PRP recognized and followed the 23 Livelihood Zones which have been developed by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) in its programming. Evidence from the PRP LIME data suggests that such an approach allowed PRP to embrace difference and develop interventions that suited the different settings to the finer distinction between household types at a local level. The PRP allowed sufficient flexibility for the development of a mosaic of locally defined projects within the programme. It allowed experimentation and embraced difference and learning across the project areas while retaining overall focus. This was a major strength.

Asset Building Matters when Incomes are Slow to Recover

For many rural communities poverty is defined through access to and ownership of productive assets. Developing an asset building dimension to PRP programming has allowed households to not only work on stabilising their livelihoods but also begin the process of welfare enhancing wealth creation. There is evidence from PRP that the transfer of wealth creating assets, such as small livestock, gives beneficiaries the confidence and security to begin investing and experiment with other livelihood options. As the food situation has begun to stabilise some of the PRP beneficiaries are using the ‘liquid’ assets (goats, chickens) to generate cash income rather than for food. Similarly, one of the most popular PRP initiatives has been ‘Mukando’ (village based/community micro savings and lending groups), which has begun to spur the growth of micro enterprises and a necessary diversification out of agriculture. Mukando has also provided PRP with a local community driven exit strategy that is filling a funding gap likely to emerge after PRP.

Apart from these wealth creating assets, PRP has also had a focus on human capital development. Many individuals have gained essential skills through education and training driven by local needs not from colleges. The emergence of a new cadre of well trained development para-practitioners often working voluntarily is a residual but positive effect. This is a form of asset building for poverty reduction that empowers individuals and communities to, within limits, deal with development challenges as they emerge rather than
wait for the state or other external actors.

**Social Protection and the Vulnerable Groups**

PRP and other actors experimented and piloted a new generation of social protection and in so doing initiated evidence based policy dialogue that led to the new framework for social protection being adopted by the state. It was effective in experimenting and demonstrating the effectiveness of social transfers in enhancing welfare outcomes. This is a policy innovation that plays both a redistributive and protective function. There is evidence from PRP LIME data that the cash transfers have contributed significantly to household incomes helping to stabilise consumption and meeting some of the cash needs especially in rural areas. Positive welfare outcomes of social transfers are clear in all PRP areas with school attendance in households getting cash transfers and assistance under BEAM being a third higher than households without.

**Re-thinking and Reimagining Urban Programming**

There is evidence from PRP LIME data that urban programming was highly effective while it lasted.

Its ‘palliative’ dimension was effective in saving lives especially in post 2004 when the economic collapse affected employment and food markets. Once a semblance of stability was restored through the formation of the inclusive government there is no evidence that urban programming in PRP remained as focused in ensuring a soft landing for the poor as they made the transition from ‘crisis’ to ‘stability’. If anything can be learnt perhaps it is that there is need to rethink new strategies for dealing with small but ‘very deep’ pockets of urban poverty in an urban economy that is not generating quality formal employment. More specifically there is need for innovative thinking on the forms of social protection that can work in urban Zimbabwe where there are small concentrations of deep poverty located in an environment where fees and rents are often tenfold those of the rural environments.
1 Scope and Structure of the Paper

What are the Drivers of Poverty and What have We Learnt?

This paper analyses the drivers of poverty in rural and urban Zimbabwe. It draws its evidence principally from the Protracted Relief Programme-LIME Surveys but also analyses evidence from other poverty surveys and reports that include: Income Consumption and Expenditure Surveys (ICES) of 1990/1 and 1995/6; the Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) of 1995 and 2003; ZIMVAC Reports (2001-2011); Multiple Indicator Monitoring Surveys (MIMS) of 2009, the Moving Forward in Zimbabwe Poverty Survey of 2011 and the Demographic Health Surveys (1988, 1994, 1999, 2005-6 and 2010-2011). Based on this analysis the paper draws out some key lessons learnt so far and the implications for future poverty reduction interventions. The paper divides into six main sections. Section one gives an overview of the contemporary poverty discourses and establishes a local understanding of poverty. This is followed by a discussion of what we know about poverty patterns (in space and time) in Zimbabwe. Section three looks at the covariate drivers of poverty while section four analyses the idiosyncratic drivers. Section five draws out the key lessons learnt while section six looks at the implications of the key lessons for poverty reduction policy and practice in Zimbabwe and beyond.

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4 Longitudinal Approaches to Impact Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (LIME) is the main means for collecting data for monitoring and evaluation in PRP. This is done through a robust quasi-experimental design monitoring 28 project sites.
5 Appendix 1 gives a detailed description of the scope of this work, the questions and methodology used.
2 Understanding Poverty in Zimbabwe

Unlike many development concepts that lack equivalence in African vernacular languages, the term poverty has a very direct local expression. Many of the local languages in Zimbabwe have terms that locate it socially and relate to it. The Shona word ‘Urombo’ or ‘Nhamo’ and the Ndebele word ‘Ubuyanga’ capture its essence. Both main vernacular languages do recognise the time duration and depth dimensions of poverty. Analytically many in Zimbabwe relate poverty to assets which are often seen as indicators of wealth or an ability to avoid poverty. In many rural areas it is land and livestock particularly cattle that define a households wealth status.

The 1981 Riddell Commission of Inquiry into Incomes and Pricing was probably the first systematic attempt to understand issues of deprivation and welfare in Zimbabwe. Prior to this, much of the work was ad hoc and consisted mostly of academic studies focusing on the impacts of resource alienation, especially land, on the ability of Africans to make a living. Much of the poverty discourses prior to independence were therefore subsumed under the broader theme of the effects of settler colonial policies on the welfare of the African population. A clear illustration of this is Roder (1964); Arrighi (1970); Palmer (1976); Riddell (1976) and Whitsun Foundation (1976). All relate the poverty and deprivation in the then tribal trust lands to a combination of land and market alienation and a lack of knowledge and skills. Although the 1981 Riddell Commission called for systematic collection of data on poverty, it was not until 1990 that systematic poverty measurement started with the ICES of 1990/91. Until then, most of the work done internally within government was based on the Central Statistical Office setting the poverty datum line upon which minimum wage negotiations were based. A tradition of using the money metric poverty measures has therefore always had a very narrow remit with a bias toward wage employment rather than being used to set broad based strategies to fight poverty. This position pushed by the bureaucratic elites meant that as long as poverty was framed this way, it remained an incomes issue that could be settled in wage negotiations. There was an underlying rationale to this. The Riddell Commission Report had highlighted the plight of the ‘working poor’ and

6 In Shona the concept of chronic poverty is captured in phrases like nhamo yemadzinza (poverty passed down across generations) or nhamo inokandira mazai (poverty that lays eggs)

7 The PRP-LIME reports on rural wealth ranking are a good example of how locals try to analyse and understand poverty and progress out of poverty.

8 See GoZ(1981)
incomes inequality as major issues that needed to be resolved.

Sitting alongside this ‘money metric’ conceptualisation of poverty, a more widely held narrative (especially among lay citizens and political elites) is an asset based view. Until 2000 the view expressed in almost all official development plans has been that poverty in Zimbabwe is a direct result of land alienation. This, it was argued, was at the core of the poverty question in Zimbabwe and could only be solved through redistribution of land.\(^9\) In the post-2000 period a more plural discourse has emerged that sees poverty as a function of idiosyncratic and covariate factors. This chimes more with the global discourses that identify structural and personal traits that keep people in poverty.\(^{10}\)

\(^9\) See for example the Growth with Equity Documents; Transitional Development Plan; The first Five Year Plan and the Second Five Year Plan; ESAP and ZIMPREST

\(^{10}\) The Chronic Poverty Research Centre identifies five traps that keep people in poverty namely: insecurity, limited citizenship, spatial disadvantage, social discrimination and poor work opportunities.

“In many rural areas of Zimbabwe it is land and livestock particularly cattle that define a household’s wealth status”
3 Measuring Poverty in Zimbabwe

Officially four nationally representative surveys have been completed since 1980. A fifth living standards survey is currently under way. Data from Income Consumption and Expenditure Surveys (ICES) of 1990 and 1995 respectively and from the Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) of 1995 and 2003 form the basis of much of what we know about poverty in Zimbabwe. Both the ICES and PASS are not directly comparable due to methodological differences. Apart from these surveys, specialist data bases like the Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey (MIMS), ZIMVAC and PRP-LIME also provide scope for exploring poverty in Zimbabwe. The only panel data set tracking welfare in rural Zimbabwe has been running since 1982. The Moving Forward in Zimbabwe project at the University of Zimbabwe working with ZIMSTAT also completed a poverty study in 2011 that sheds light on contemporary poverty trends.

In official discourses, there is an acceptance that poverty is multidimensional although much of the evidence upon which decisions are made still derives from money metric measures. While the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) has shown a willingness to broaden its understanding of poverty, their main instrument for decision making however still remains the poverty lines. In fact the 2003 Poverty Assessment Study Survey illustrated this willingness to broaden the understanding of poverty to beyond income and consumption. However the headline figures remained dominated by the money metric measures and there is little evidence that the multidimensional elements captured influenced decision making.

ZIMSTAT draws a distinction between the Food Poverty Line (FPL) which captures food poverty and the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL). The FPL is defined as a lack or inability of individuals or households to meet a standard consumption level considered necessary to acquire minimum nutritional level pegged at 2070 kilo calories per person per day but often rounded up to 2100 (PASS, 2006; and WHO). This nutritional requirement can be obtained from a number of food items which vary greatly across the country. These food items form a national food basket whose value is then determined using

11 The two PASS surveys used different food items compromising comparability of the data. The 1995 PASS survey used two baskets - urban and rural - with 16 food items but the 2003 PASS used a basket consisting of 30 food items drawn from the 1995 ICES. Recalculation of the 1995 food basket has allowed some level of comparability between the two surveys.

12 Bill Kinsey has been conducting a panel study of resettled households in Zimbabwe and has built a knowledge hub that allows analysis of poverty dynamics
the prevailing market prices to come up with a money-metric Food Poverty Line (FPL). When the value of non-food items is added a total consumption poverty line (TCPL) is obtained. Consumption of food with a monetary value below the FPL means the individual or the household is food poor. On the other hand if total consumption of food and non-food items is below food poverty line the individual or household is considered to be ‘very poor’ while total consumption above FPL but below TCPL then one is considered ‘poor’ and above TCPL then one becomes ‘non-poor’.

Apart from this official endorsement of the money metric measures and tacit acceptance of multidimensional understanding of poverty, non-state actors especially donor agencies and NGOs have embraced and have adopted multi-dimensional concept of poverty. The UNDP’s multidimensional poverty index (MPI) is a good example of this as it incorporates education, health and living standards. It goes beyond income and consumption and looks at welfare outcomes drawing a distinction between severe poverty and vulnerability.

Similarly, the PRP-LIME data on which this paper draws did not use the official poverty lines but instead went beyond the income and consumption analysis to embrace participatory assessments of welfare conditions. The PRP uses multiple indicators that allow it to identify poverty on thresholds as follows:

- The most deprived households are deemed to be under the Survival Threshold, which is when its members consume less than 2,100 kcal per person per day plus survival non food items (cost of preparing food, cost of lighting, milling fees, and cost of water for human consumption). This is similar to (but not necessarily the same as) the ZIMSTAT Total Consumption Poverty Line.
- The next threshold is the Livelihood Protection Threshold where survival costs plus costs associated with access to services (health, education), costs of maintaining productive activities and costs of supporting a locally acceptable standard of living are met.
- The Livelihood Promotion Threshold is a developmental target based on the wealth profile and corresponding food and income levels of households that maintain their productive expenditure in the face of long term hazards/shocks.

Embedded within this understanding is the notion that households can graduate or regress from one threshold to another. Looked at historically, this means much of what PRP did was mainly to enable households to make this transition across the thresholds. In the next section we look at the patterns of poverty in PRP areas and also draw inferences from other national surveys.
By the time the inclusive government was formed in 2009, there was no doubt that a majority of Zimbabweans were not only living in poverty but had endured it for close to a decade (Chimhowu et al 2010). Evidence from PRP-LIME data backs this up. Table 1 is a summary table showing results of wealth ranking done in the PRP districts between July 2009 and June 2010. The wealth ranking tables suggest that 60 per cent of the households are classified as very poor or poor and only 20 per cent could be classified as better off.\(^{13}\)

**Table 1  Wealth Ranking Outcomes in PRP Project Districts 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Site</th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Better Off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binga</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulima</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimanimani</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitungwiza*</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chivi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gokwe</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gweru*</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insiza</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariba</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makonde</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Matabele</td>
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<td>Mazoe</td>
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<td>Masvingo*</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>Mutare*</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Mutambara</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Zvishavane</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: PRP-LIME District Baseline Reports 2009/2010

*urban districts

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\(^{13}\) This is based on a review of 23 reports on wealth ranking done in the PRP districts. It is not intended to present this as statistically representative of national poverty (since PRP districts were not randomly selected) but as indicative of what is generally accepted as the general pattern.
Definitions of who is very poor, poor or better off in PRP districts are locally defined during the wealth ranking process and therefore can vary across the districts. In general however, in rural districts, wealth ranking exercise privileged ownership of productive assets especially land, livestock (cattle) and farm equipment. In the urban districts access to regular paid employment, property ownership, access to capital for income-generating activities, and ownership of the machinery needed for income generating activities distinguished the poor from the non-poor households (PRP Report Number 4 2009). The most deprived households (very poor) are those that have no access to labour, such as those with elderly, disabled, chronically ill and child headed households. The poor households are those with access to sufficient land and labour to gain food security through cereal production and/or improved garden or livestock production but with serious cash constraints. The third group consists of the better off farmers that have labour and land but no access to credit. These self supporting farmers have the potential to enter into market linkage arrangements with the private sector and produce surplus. In a majority of the districts, the wealth ranking identified a fourth group that is neither poor nor better off. This group could be called a group in transition either from being better off to being poor or from being poor to being better off.

On this basis, only six of the 23 districts reviewed had 50 per cent or more of their households classified as being ‘middle’ (neither rich nor poor) or better off (non poor). This is expected given that the PRP specifically targeted these areas because of their vulnerability. There is however evidence to suggest this pattern observed in PRP districts had become the general trend across the country. Some recent survey work shows that as much as 70 per cent of urban households are below the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) and a significant 15 per cent are below the Food Poverty Line (FPL). Data from ICES 1990 and 1995; PASS 1995 and 2003 confirm however that a majority of people living below the poverty threshold continued to be in rural areas. About 8.2 million of the projected 12.7 million people in Zimbabwe live on about 1.321 million small farms that now occupy nearly 79 per cent of all agricultural land. Nearly a million of these farms are located on communal lands where plot size range from as little as 0.2 to as much as 10 ha. Evidence from PASS 1995 and 2003 shows a high concentration of poverty in the rural areas as Table 2 shows.

14 See MZF(2011); ZIMVAC 2010; PASS 2006
15 ZIMVAC, 2011
It is clear from Table 2 that even before the 2000-2009 economic crises a majority of households living in communal and resettlement areas were already living in poverty, although many could still feed themselves. The 2003 survey data suggest a worsening of the welfare conditions as many of the communal households did not earn or grow enough to feed themselves. Table 3 presents more recent data from the MZF survey completed in 2011. It is a summary of the findings based on a representative sample of 16 districts.

The MZF survey shows that poverty levels are quite high and, alarmingly so for the rural areas. Overall 81.6 per cent of population in the 16 surveyed districts lived below the total poverty line in 2011(MZF, 2011). We return to a discussion of the drivers of poverty in the next section suffice it to say the dramatic rise suggested by the MZF data can be attributed to the devastating effects of the protracted socio-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use Area</th>
<th>Total Consumption Poverty</th>
<th>Food Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement Area</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Scale Commercial</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large scale commercial</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Areas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoZ 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Consumption Poverty</th>
<th>Food Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Incidence (%)</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Depth (%)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Severity (%)</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>3,448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MZF Survey
economic and political crisis experienced between 2000 and 2009. Extrapolations
from these survey data would suggest as much as seven million out of the 8.2 million
people in rural areas live below the total consumption line while as many as 5.5
million live in severe poverty and are food insecure. We can estimate that 40 per
cent (2.2 million) of those in severe poverty are chronically poor\textsuperscript{16}. They have lived in
poverty for most of their lives.

\textsuperscript{16} There has not been an official analysis of the number of people in long term poverty in Zimbabwe ie
those that were poor between either the ICES or the PASSes and it is beyond the scope of this paper
to do so here. We draw out this indicative figure of 2.2million based on CPRC analysis of patterns in
sub Saharan Africa. This is within range of UNDP’s MPI data for Zimbabwe of 14.8% severe poverty
rate- equivalent to about 1.9million people.
5 Poverty, Agro-ecological and Livelihood Zones

Although done nearly 43 years ago and adjusted incrementally ever since the Vincent and Thomas agro-ecological zoning system still influences the official discourses on agricultural potential. Some state and non-state actors have begun to work with livelihood zones that privilege food security.\(^{17}\) Many people still prefer the Vincent and Thomas zoning for its simplicity in spite of the fact that it is agro-centric and fails to take into account the many ways that people actually make a living.

Irrespective of which zoning system is used, there is no doubt that opportunities to make a living in Zimbabwe vary quite significantly according to location. For rural livelihoods, the Vincent and Thomas Agro-ecological Zoning system shows that more than fifty per cent of the country lies in regions classified as being generally unsuitable for dry land farming without additional investment in water technology.\(^{18}\) According to this, Regions IV and V are deemed too dry for crop production without irrigation or appropriate moisture management practices. Small grains, particularly millet and sorghum, can be produced in some parts of this region although seasonal and periodic droughts are a common feature afflicting most farm-based livelihoods. With changing production practices and innovations, regions IV and V have since the early 1980s seen increased production of high value tourism products based on wildlife farming. Only 38 per cent of the country is deemed to have ‘natural’ farming potential that is often punctuated by periodic droughts once every four to five years.

With up to 74 per cent of all communal lands located in the drier regions IV and V it is not too difficult to see why this marginality when combined with remoteness and relatively basic production technologies compromises the ability of families in the marginal lands to make a living and stay out of poverty. Evidence suggests that many of the people that cannot make a decent living off the land are based in the drier agro-ecological regions where lack of investment in better adapted production methods and water infrastructure has made agriculture a more perilous activity. Indeed, PRP is implemented primarily in Natural Regions IV and V. Table 3 confirms that there are many more people living in poverty in the drier agro-ecological regions compared to the better rainfall regions. It suggests that with limited investment in water infrastructure agriculture does not generate enough income for a household to live on.

\(^{17}\) PRP has worked with both the Vincent and Thomas Zones and the ZIMVAC derived livelihood zones that divides the country into 24 livelihood zones.

\(^{18}\) See Vincent and Thomas 1969
Table 4: Poverty by Natural Region in Rural Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>Prevalence (%) of Poverty</th>
<th>Extreme Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Central Statistical Office 1998)

Much of the present spatiality of poverty can be explained by past policies of land alienation. Part of the argument for land reform was to correct this imbalance in access to productive land and decongest the communal areas that had room for only 325 000 farm units but by 1980 already carried 675 000 19. The extent to which land reform has decongested the communal areas is not known but evidence from the 23 PRP districts where LIME data are available still suggests that the ability to use land it is still a major determinant of exit from poverty. In almost all the rural districts, households in the lowest wealth groups had access to similar amount of land to other wealth groups. It is the proportion cultivated that is very different for different wealth groups. The very poor households will cultivate a much smaller proportion compared to other wealth groups. The LIME data suggest that land utilization is constrained by lack of capabilities specifically draft power, seed, and labour.

Some (see for example Arrighi 1970) argue that communal areas were designed as labour reservoirs for the mines, large scale farms, and the urban industries and were never meant to be viable entities. It could be argued that the communal areas have by default continued to play this role even after independence. Indeed the PRP reports consistently show on one hand that labour migration affects rural production especially in labour constrained poor households. On the other hand evidence from PRP suggests that labour migration is a well established livelihood strategy benefiting the better off households especially those in livelihood zones like South Western (Matopo), Western Kalahari Sandveld (Bulilima), Mwenezi-Chivi-Central and South Midlands (Zvishavane) and Beitbridge and, South Western Lowveld Communal (Matobo) (Zvarevashe 2010; Mutiro 2010).

19 Jordan (1979:9)
Which Social Groups are Poor?

We saw earlier how for a smallholder farmer, being located in a marginal agro-ecological zone often implies a life of poverty if they lack an ability to make investments in land. Apart from this spatially determined poverty, there are some socio-culturally determined factors that can trap a household into poverty. Evidence from PRP (see for example Hobane, Kageler and Zimbizi: 2006) shows that there are age, health status, marital status and family size defined social groups among the poor households. Table 5 is a summary of these.

Table 5: Social Groups Living in Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Determinant</th>
<th>Who is Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Chronically ill, Disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Child headed, Grandparent headed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female headed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Single, Divorced, Widowed, Polygamous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family size</td>
<td>Those with orphans, High dependency ratio (5 or more dependents)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from Table 5 that there is a core group of households predisposed to poverty simply because their social make up makes it harder to either make a living or attract adequate public policy attention and support. PRP has had a specific focus on these households and indeed in all programme districts the social protection packages have had a deliberate focus on these.

The health status of a household has a bearing on its ability to make a living. Indeed evidence from PRP wealth ranking suggests in 18 of the 23 districts reviewed the households found in the very poor category have a chronically ill member of the household and will often have an orphan. In fact, many of the households that have remained within their wealth group even after PRP derive from this household type. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has left a legacy of child and grandparent headed households. GoZ (2011:5) estimates that there are at least 989 009 orphans in Zimbabwe. Although many of these live off surviving relatives about a tenth (100 000) live on their own often headed by a sibling below the age of 18 years. Such households are more likely to be poor compared

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20 This point emerges from the PRP district reports but was confirmed during ground truthing exercise in Musana and Mufakose. When asked to outline the characteristics of households that lived in poverty in the past and are still in poverty it was clear that this is the very particular type of household that has failed to respond to interventions.

21 GoZ (2011)
to a household headed by a male of working age. Evidence from ZIMVAC 2011 shows child headed households incomes are half the average earnings of an adult male headed household. Such households are likely to be labour constrained and hence struggle to be productive. They are also socially excluded and do not benefit directly from participation in some livelihood activities.

Insights from both ICES and PASS show that more female headed households live in poverty compared to the male-headed households. In fact, from ZIMVAC 2011 there is evidence that a female-headed household has an income that is only 50 per cent of what a male headed household has access to. In a patriarchy that Zimbabwe is, this is not surprising. Although generally equal in law, some customary practices still mean that women can only access productive resources through the patriarchy (Horrell and Krishnan 2006). This tends to affect their ability to make a living once the male household head dies. Makura (2010) and Moyo and Kawewe (2009) have shown how many of the widows of HIV/AIDS victims often live a life of poverty when the male heir decides to limit their access to productive resources. ZIMVAC (2011) shows that nearly 70 per cent of all female-headed households are always food insecure and need food aid in any given year. Female managed households tend to fare better although delayed production related decision-making is seen as a major constraint on productivity. This is particularly so if the husband works outside Zimbabwe and continues to make decisions about how productive assets are utilised on a periodic basis.

In a rain fed agricultural environment where a delay in decision making at the start of the season by just a few days can reduce yields by up to 30 per cent, it is clear that female managed households can easily fall into poverty.

Another social group likely to be found among those living in poverty includes the labour constrained households. From the PRP LIME data these include households facing chronic illnesses, grand-parent headed, child headed and households with disability. It is estimated that about two per cent of the population (about 254 000 people) in Zimbabwe live with a form of disability that potentially affects their ability to make a living (Land and Charowa 2007: 15). About a fifth of these (57 000) are children. There is evidence that households with a disability have low mean incomes and are more likely to be poor than those without disability (ibid).

Family size is another social parameter that features prominently in the PRP data. These data suggest that it is not just the number of individuals in a household that matters
but the dependency ratio. For example in Mutare both the very poor and better off households have seven household members and yet they have very different outcomes because of the dependency ratio and of course other personal circumstances (Makoni et al 2010). Many of the households in the very poor category in rural areas have high dependency ratios. Where the dependency ratio is low, larger households fare better as they are able to deploy them in livelihood pursuits (LIME Baseline Report 14: 2011).
Capturing poverty trends or change over time requires panel data sets designed with this in mind. Indeed PRP LIME uses a quasi-experimental design that will allow an assessment of how poverty has changed over time when it is evaluated. Literature reviewed based on data from the 1990/1 and 1995-6 ICES suggests that those living in income poverty rose from 52.8 per cent in 1990-91 to 75.6 per cent in 1995-96\(^\text{23}\). In fact real household consumption declined by 24 per cent between the two surveys (Elwang, 2002: 11). Although not directly comparable, a new set of surveys, the Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) also confirmed that income poverty continued to rise from 1995 to 2003-04 suggesting that the proportion of households living under the poverty line increased from 42 per cent in 1995 to 63 per cent in 2003-04 (GoZ, 2006).

Apart from the periodic ZIMVAC and MIMS there is no poverty survey data for the period 2004 till 2011 although there is a general consensus in the literature reviewed suggesting that poverty levels peaked in the late 2000s. If we use the data on food insecure households we can make a general conclusion that since 2003 poverty levels rose dramatically, peaked in 2008 and have begun to tail off since the formation of the inclusive government in 2009. Similarly a consideration of UNDP development rankings sheds light on decline in welfare conditions in Zimbabwe. The fact that Zimbabwe’s 2011 HDI value has been below the regional (sub-Saharan Africa) average since 2000 suggests (in comparative terms) a lack of progress in improving welfare conditions in Zimbabwe over time.

In the next section we look at the drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe.

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\(^{23}\) These data are not directly comparable due to methodological issues but are indicative of a general upward trend in poverty levels in Zimbabwe

“\text{There is a general consensus from literature that poverty levels (in Zimbabwe) peaked in the late 2000s}”
Drivers of Poverty in Zimbabwe

The CPRC (2010) identify five traps that drive and keep households in poverty. These are: livelihood insecurity; limited citizenship, spatial disadvantage, social discrimination and poor work opportunities. Many of these drivers are common in Zimbabwe and indeed PRP analysis\textsuperscript{24} shows that in rural districts the main drivers of poverty are ‘drought, lack of agricultural inputs as well as unaffordability (where available)’ Similarly in the former large scale commercial farming areas (Makonde, Mazowe) the communities ascribed their poverty to government macro policies that cost them jobs. They also perceive themselves as discriminated against as they did not gain access to land and other public entitlements. Urban dwellers had a slightly different take instead ascribing their poverty to ‘hyper inflation and unemployment which have caused the cost of living to be unaffordable’\textsuperscript{25} In addition they also attest to the effects of government policy especially the infamous Operation Murambatsvina which ‘closed or limited main means of livelihoods for most poor and average families in the suburb’. Further analysis of PRP LIME data returns three main clusters of districts reflected in Table 6.

\textit{“In rural districts, the main drivers of poverty are drought, lack of agriculture inputs as well as unaffordability (where the inputs are available)”}

\textit{“Urban dwellers ascribe their poverty to hyperinflation and unemployment which have caused the cost of living to be unaffordable”}

\textsuperscript{24} See Hobane, Kageler and Zimbizi (2006) 15-16

\textsuperscript{25} Hobane, Kageler and Zimbizi (2006) 15-16
Table 6  Clustering of Districts according to Drivers of Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>PRP District</th>
<th>Main Drivers of Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Cluster 1| Binga Bulima Chimanimani Chivi Insiza Kariba Mutambara Nkayi Nyanga Tsholotsho UMP Gokwe Zaka Zvishavane | • Marginality presents production challenges for resource constrained farmers  
• Climatic challenges  
• Labour constraints due to migration of able bodied  
• Remoteness- being away from line of rail limits integration to markets and increases production costs; also poor market and technology information  
• Constrained access to land and, capacity to use land  
• Limited and poor quality of off farm employment  
• Moral hazard |
| Cluster 2| Gweru Harare Chitungwiza Mutare Bulawayo Matobo Masvingo | • Mainly urban line of rail districts fully integrated into national economic infrastructure hard hit by economic collapse  
• Poor quality employment, casualisation of labour  
• Limited trading opportunities –lack of public policy support for small and micro enterprises  
• Barriers to entry into employment and retail markets  
• Adverse effects of public policy |
| Cluster 3| Mazowe Makonde | • Former farm workers with constrained access to productive assets  
• Constrained ability to use land  
• Poor quality employment, seasonal, poor pay, labour tenancy  
• Adverse effects of public policy |

Cluster 1 districts are the predominantly rural, mainly communal areas that suffer from what the CPRC (2010) call a spatial disadvantage. They are located in marginal environments and endure weather and climate induced hardships that constrain livelihood pursuits. The districts are mainly located off the main ‘line of rail’ (Bulawayo-Harare-Mutare trunk route) and are therefore away from the core centres of the formal economy. A combination of marginality and remoteness presents this spatial disadvantage that limits the viability of and livelihood opportunities.

Cluster 2 districts are mainly urban and located within the main ‘line of rail’ trunk route. The main driver of poverty in this cluster is the collapse of the formal economy during the crisis. This has affected the quantity and quality of jobs available a factor compounded by what CPRC (2010) has termed limited citizenship. A lack of voice and
effective representation often sees policies that work against them and compromises their ability to make a living\textsuperscript{26}.

Cluster 3 districts are located in areas of comparatively better agro-ecological potential (Makonde and Mazowe are part of the bread basket districts in Zimbabwe). Poverty in these locations is driven by insecurity, poor work opportunities, social discrimination and limited citizenship\textsuperscript{27}. These PRP locations occupied mostly by displaced former farm workers record some of the highest levels of poverty of any of the PRP sites. They have constrained access to land and where they have land often lack the ability and capacity to use the land to make a living. They have access to limited (often casual and seasonal) employment that pays little.\textsuperscript{28} Many are in labour tenancy arrangements that are as insecure as they are exploitative.

Within these specific drivers of poverty in the districts we can distil two types of drivers that cut across the clusters. Co-variant drivers are structural in nature, are generalised and affect all households. Their widespread nature means they often require long term national level policy programming responses at scale. Covariant drivers are often seen as being more lethal because their generalised nature often implies that individuals and communities cannot help each other in meaningful ways to climb out of poverty. On the other hand idiosyncratic drivers target specific individuals, households, social groups, communities or defined spatialities. They hurt individual entities but there is scope for localised interventions through project or sector specific programme responses. In the next section we explore these in some detail referring to both the general Zimbabwe situation and to PRP.

\textsuperscript{26} For example operation Murambatsvina that displaced nearly 700 000 people mainly along this line of rail.

\textsuperscript{27} see Mafuratidze (2011) on Makonde

\textsuperscript{28} In the case of Mazowe as little at US$15 in three months (see Tavugara-Mpofu and Honye 2010).
9  Covariant Drivers of Poverty in Zimbabwe

The Economic Drivers of Poverty: Low Productivity and Anaemic Growth

Much of the poverty experienced by Zimbabweans today can be explained by the cumulative effects of poor economic growth since the late 1990s. For over ten years Zimbabwe went through a period of sustained economic decline that saw gross domestic product per capita which had peaked at US$574 in 1998 decline by nearly 50 per cent to US$284 by 2008. Among other factors, this decline in GDP per capita triggered a rise in income poverty that also led to significant asset attrition. Hyper-inflation that reached 231 million per cent in July 2008\(^{29}\) is an indicator of the unstable economy which was also characterised by poor performance in manufacturing, agriculture and mining whose growth has historically been associated with poverty decline. When Zimbabwe’s average GDP growth rates per decade are computed we find a story of three decades of a progressive slide into poverty. The first decade of independence can be described as one of growth while the second was one of stagnation followed by decline in the post-2000 period. Figure 1 illustrates growth trends in GDP, manufacturing, and agriculture between 1980 and 2005. It shows positive but fluctuating growth for nearly two decades till the late 1990s when the economy went into an extended recession.

Figure 1: GDP Growth, Manufacturing and Agriculture

Source: Chimhowu et al 2010

\(^{29}\) Official figure issued by the CSO in July 2008 before formation of the GNU. Estimates suggest that the figure for November of that year was much higher.
Loss of jobs during the economic decline reduced household earnings, a factor that saw many households descend into poverty. Chimhowu et al. (2010) argue that although the economic decline accelerated during the 2000s the economy shed jobs during the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and was already in decline by the time the full blown crisis emerged in 2000. Figure 2 illustrates this and shows that from 1997 there was no growth in formal sector employment largely due to poor performance from the productive sectors of the economy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to look at the reason for the poor performance in the productive sectors but elsewhere this has been put down to the failure of ESAP to meet its targets due to a variety of reasons that included a major drought and declining commodity prices (see Elwang et al. 2002).

Figure 2: Employment Growth in Post Independence Zimbabwe

By the time the crisis abated in 2009 the economy had shed nearly half the formal sector jobs and created a new generation of poor households. From a peak of 1,329,000 formal sector workers only 766,391 jobs remained at the end of 2010. Non-agricultural employment declined from 896,400 in 1998 to 763,164 in 2010 so in the main, it was the loss of about 150,000 agriculture related rural employment that has reduced rural incomes for a specific sub group of farm workers. The demise of large scale commercial farming also significantly reduced the income and consumption smoothing possibilities for rural households in communal areas adjacent to commercial farms (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008). Many sank deeper into

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30 Figures from ZIMSTAT 2011
poverty with loss of formal sector employment and reliance on household based employment. Much of the rural and urban poverty today can be explained by this decline in quality employment.

Jobless Growth: Sector Contributions and Low Poverty Reduction Elasticity

Although the socio-economic crisis has ended and the economy has stabilised and begun to grow, what then explains the fact that the poverty figures have remained high three years on? Reasons for this are varied but the literature points to one main structural factor. A look at the sectoral contribution to growth shows that much of the economic growth is led by sectors with low poverty reduction elasticity. Mining which has rebounded by nearly 44 per cent 31 has been credited with boosting the overall growth rate and yet a look at Table 7 shows a decline in formal sector jobs being created.

Table 7: Formal Sector Employment in Zimbabwe 1995; 2009 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Sector</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>334 000</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>5 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>59 000</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>49 891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>185 900</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>171 007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water</td>
<td>9 500</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>16 763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>71 800</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>39 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution, Restaurants and Hotels</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>103 812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication</td>
<td>50 900</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>38 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Insurance</td>
<td>21 000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>84 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>77 000</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>91 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>115 600</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>122 424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>26 000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>50 685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Domestic</td>
<td>102 100</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>102 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>86 100</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>59 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 239 600</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>934 738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Mining led growth by its very nature does not generate the type of employment that is often seen as poverty reducing (Loayza and Raddatz 2009; Khan 1999). Lack of growth or high enough growth in those sectors with higher poverty reduction

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31 (GoZ 2011:31)

32 Agriculture plummeted from 315 000 in 1998 to 193 000 by Dec 2002 loss of 150 000 jobs.
elasticity like agriculture and manufacturing has meant that employment growth has remained weak.

Decline in Agricultural Production and Productivity Growth

Earlier it was argued that since a majority of the people living in poverty are based in the rural areas and make a living off the land, poverty will only abate when their incomes begin to rise either through increases in agricultural productivity or through quality rural employment opportunities. What happens to their incomes will likely determine outcomes of current poverty reduction efforts. For the moment, their livelihoods are tied to agriculture significantly and it is clear that making this work will be the main pathway out of poverty for them and for the urban poor as well given that manufacturing growth has always depended on agriculture doing well. We saw from Figures 1 and 2 how agriculture productivity growth affects overall economic growth. When agriculture does well, the economy has grown and employment growth has been observed as manufacturing also tends to do well (up to 60 per cent of raw materials for manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe are derived from agriculture). We also know that historically when rural incomes rise, effective domestic demand for manufactured goods and services also rises, which can provide a market for increased output. Although agriculture in Zimbabwe has often been afflicted by a drought once every four to five years, during good rainfall seasons poverty levels decline and droughts always drag some vulnerable households deeper into poverty. While much of the urban poverty and some of the rural poverty can be explained by loss of income earning abilities due to loss of, and lack of quality employment, much of the rural poverty can be explained by the collapse of agricultural production during the crises and persistently low productivity over time.

If we take a closer look at the output growth the official data show moderate growth in the value of agricultural output produced in both commercial (including Small Scale Commercial Farming) and communal (including resettlement) areas over the 1982-97 period in contrast to the 2 years before that period. From 1999 production slumped to below levels of the mid 1980s, with major fluctuations in production according to weather conditions. Official figures, though, show that between 1982-4 and 1996 the real value of production in communal areas grew by 40 per cent, whilst between 1983-4 and 1996 the real value of production in commercial areas grew by 35 per cent. During the crisis period there was a distinct reversal of this trend and real value of production fell by 33 per cent (CSO, 2006). It is clear that the crisis caused a severe decline in Zimbabwean agriculture and the rural economy in general in the process driving many into poverty. The crisis affected agriculture in very specific ways that
had a bearing on people’s ability to make a living off the land. We highlight the key ones below.

- **Collapse in Agricultural Commodity Marketing and Pricing**
  The hyper-inflation environment (231 million per cent) gravely affected returns on agriculture. This meant that most people that used to produce for the formal market were reluctant to do so as the delays in processing payments meant that by the time they were paid the money was worth nothing. Households that used to produce for the markets stopped and produced mostly food crops for sustenance.

- **Asset Attrition**
  The protracted decline in the economy since 2000 also resulted in asset attrition as households sold off assets as a consumption smoothing strategy. This often meant selling off liquid assets also necessary for agricultural production. A decline in cattle numbers was particularly obvious in some areas although in other areas the crisis saw an increase (Scoones, 2011). A lack of cattle undermines availability of draught power and also compromises the income and consumption smoothing strategies of rural households.

- **Labour Shortage**
  There is a basic assumption of labour abundance in rural Zimbabwe owing to displacement of former commercial farm workers. Available evidence from the PRP LIME suggests that apart from migration of the able bodied, an inability to hire labour by the smallholder farmers means that labour shortage is a limiting factor on productivity. Most able bodied young adults that provided family labour either left rural Zimbabwe for other countries in the region or have opted for non-farm rural activities like artisanal mining. This has created labour constraints on production on the family farm. Further, skill has become a limiting factor. As experienced and trained smallholder farmers have been dying off due to old age and HIV/AIDS the agricultural skills base has been undermined significantly.

- **Declining Soil Fertility**
  Initial productivity increases in communal lands after the war could be accounted for by the virgin land effect. Once soil fertility declined due to use over time the high external inputs model of production (hybrid seeds and fertiliser) that was introduced became too expensive to maintain especially given declining profitability due to poor pricing structure and lack of state support (due to ESAP). Once input supply and output marketing chains collapsed due to the crisis, participation in the formal commodity markets became perilous and indeed there are cases of rural producers that sank deeper into poverty because they were never paid for the output they delivered through the official
marketing channels especially for the controlled commodities like maize.

- **Dying out of Private Finance for Agriculture**
  Once the state stopped supporting the smallholder farmers with subsidised inputs, many farmers became indebted and failed to secure private finance needed for inputs. It is quite clear that during the years following the 1992 drought when some free inputs were made available there was a productivity spike especially in food crops like maize. In the post-2000 period the demise of commercial farming that used to provide bridging income for inputs among resettled farmers has worsened the situation. Before the demise of large scale commercial farming some smallholder farmers could seek temporary employment on farms and used this to purchase inputs. Others relied on urban formal employment to generate the inputs. Once the large scale farms were taken over during the post-2000 invasions and the formal sector jobs began to decline due to the deteriorating economy this income smoothing strategy was no longer available.

- **Insecure Tenure**
  Even if private financing was still available, one of the key limiting factors is the terms under which land is accessed. It is clear that apart from the state and agricultural commodity brokers, financial institutions did and still will not extend credit facilities to the resettled and communal farmers due to lack of tenure security. Financial institutions reduced the amount of loan finance available to support agriculture after the Fast Track Land Reform.

A combination of the factors above no doubt contributed to the productivity decline in agriculture that affected the ability of many to make a living off the land. There is no doubt that poverty was already increasing by the time of the farm invasions in 2000 but it is also clear that poverty rates continued to grow during the crisis and by all measures a majority of Zimbabweans were desperately poor by the time the crisis abated in 2009. Many that grew enough to feed themselves became food insecure while those that always produced a surplus were affected by the market collapse. Since the 2008/9 season when the crisis abated agriculture has begun to rebound but not recovered. Table 8 below shows the production trends of major food and cash crops over the last three growing seasons.
Table 8: Area planted and production of major crops 2008/2009 to 2010/2011 season

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>Production (Mt)</td>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1 500 000</td>
<td>1 242 586</td>
<td>1 803 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>389 333</td>
<td>181 448</td>
<td>386 585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl Millet</td>
<td>153 545</td>
<td>50 938</td>
<td>189 644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Millet</td>
<td>101 189</td>
<td>37 162</td>
<td>54 372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>47 691</td>
<td>58 570</td>
<td>67 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>337 671</td>
<td>207 000</td>
<td>338 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>85 227</td>
<td>115 817</td>
<td>48 010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarbeans</td>
<td>52 265</td>
<td>37 321</td>
<td>30 715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>354 636</td>
<td>216 619</td>
<td>424 532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>39 000</td>
<td>3 100 000</td>
<td>36 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>900</td>
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Source: ZIMSTAT 2011

Productivity levels are still low and the peak yields of the 1980s are yet to be matched. Contemporary maize yields of 0.7 t/ha are still well below the 1-1.4t/ha reached during the mid 1990s (GoZ 2011: 104) and farmers still cannot produce enough grain to feed the nation. In the next section we look at how the breakdown in entitlement from the state has also contributed to an increase in the numbers living in poverty.
Declining State Capacity and Breakdown in Claims and Entitlement

One of the key roles of the state in a democracy is to ensure adequate provisioning of essential goods and services either directly through its programmes or by ensuring that conditions allow for markets or other non-state actors to fill any gaps in provisioning. When the citizens feel unable to make public service claims against their government there is a breakdown in trust that often leads individuals to turn to alternative providers or do without. The post-colonial Zimbabwe state was always populist. It sought to ensure universal access to health and education. Over nearly two decades it had built what by regional standards was seen as a very able and competent bureaucracy that ensured the core functions of, and public service claims by citizens against the state were met (Agere 1998). Markets for some essential public goods were also allowed to provide for particular groups especially the middle classes while other non-state actors were given space within government programmes to assist. A majority of Zimbabweans still relied on state provisioning of these core services.

However when the budget deficit began to grow and the socio-economic crises deepened in the
2000s the capacity of the state to deliver public goods and services to its citizens was very severely curtailed at a time when citizen’s dependence on state provisioning of these core public services was growing. For a start a severe brain drain owing to growing political uncertainty and poor salaries\(^\text{33}\) affected the capacity of the state to deliver its programmes while crippling inflation simply made day to day programming unfeasible. Similarly, education and health expenditure began to decline. In fact education per capita grants shrunk to less than one US cent per child in 2008 compared to US$6.26 in 1990/91. This explains why schools were unable to purchase textbooks and other teaching/learning materials. The health budget in real terms also began to shrink and by 2007 the per capita allocation of health in the budget had declined to less than US$0.19 per year.

It therefore was no surprise that after initial improvements during the 1980s many of the health and education indicators began to worsen. For example crude death rate dropped from 10.8 in 1982 to 6.1 in 1987 then rose to 9.49 in 1992 before nearly doubling to 17.2/1000 population by 2007. Similarly infant mortality that had declined to 53 per 1000 live birth had risen to 68 per 1000 by 2008.

Similarly, in education, the very impressive enrolment rates began to falter and by 2011, evidence suggests that up to 18 per cent of 5-17 year olds who should be in school are not in school\(^\text{34}\). The major reason cited by nearly 52 per cent of households is the issue of user fees and other informal rents citizens are having to pay to access their entitlements\(^\text{35}\). More directly, this breakdown in entitlement to essential public goods and services can drive households into poverty. Many of the people that need the state to work and provide the goods and services are the vulnerable. Without access to health and education essential to fully participate in social, political and economic development many of these children not in education, employment or training (NEETS) will find it difficult to make a living. They will have few opportunities to earn an income in a quality job. In a way we could say that the decline in state’s capacity to provide for basic social services and infrastructure affects quality human capital formation and overall productivity and in the long term affects growth prospects. In the next section we consider some idiosyncratic drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe.

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\(^{33}\) By the time the inclusive government was formed in 2009 civil servants staff salaries were a paltry 12.3 per cent of the average salary in 1990 in US$ terms and vacancy rates in some departments were as much as 80 per cent.

\(^{34}\) ZIMVAC 2011

\(^{35}\) Many of the fees and rents are discretionary and therefore remain hidden from the official costs of accessing public goods and services.
Idiosyncratic Drivers of Poverty

Ability to use Land

Many of the idiosyncratic drivers emerge from looking at the profiles of the poor and reviewing their life stories in the PRP-LIME data. For many rural households the lack of ability and capacity to use land is a major driver. With the land redistribution process all but done, at least for now, it is clear that households that fail to produce more on the land they currently have will likely fail to raise their incomes through agriculture and will have to diversify out of agriculture. In fact there is already evidence of this happening. ZIMVAC (2011) shows 41 per cent of households reported casual labour as the main source of income followed by remittances (28 per cent) and vegetable sales (23 per cent). Crop sales feature a distant fifth after livestock sales with just 11 per cent of the households indicating this as a main source of income. What the PRP-LIME data however show clearly is that when the poor and very poor households with access to land are helped to use more of their land they can increase production and become food secure while in some cases they can even produce a surplus for the market\(^\text{36}\). When a household’s ability to use the land is enhanced through programming interventions such households can become food secure and begin to climb their way out of poverty\(^\text{37}\).

Natural and Policy Shocks and Stresses

For some households, the occurrence of shock and stress to their lives or livelihoods can be the core driver into poverty. Adverse life cycle events like death of a breadwinner, divorce, and or prolonged illness are known to be triggers of a descent into poverty. Apart from reducing productivity due to the time lost tending to these issues some life cycle events can lead to asset attrition through involuntary or distress sales. Many of the HIV/AIDS deaths for example are often seen as poverty inducing because of the prolonged nature of the illness and the costs incurred up to the time of death. This often means there is no impartible inheritance for the surviving family members who often have to rebuild their assets. In fact from PRP we learn that many of the households in the ‘very poor’ category have landed there through personal misfortunes like chronic illness, bereavement or divorce\(^\text{38}\).

\(^{36}\) See for example Chifamba et al(2010) in Matobo

\(^{37}\) Mushipe \textit{et al} (2011) show for example how households classified as poor in Gokwe increased area under cultivation by more than 60 per cent once programming effort increased their ability to use the land.

\(^{38}\) This point relates to the earlier discussion on the social groups likely to be living in poverty in PRP areas.
Natural weather cycles in Zimbabwe can also be poverty inducing. In general, a drought is expected once every four to five years. Once every ten years a major drought occurs. While households can cope with low or late rains, available evidence suggests that it is the major droughts that families often fail to recover from. Kinsey (2010)’s longitudinal study has shown how some households that became poor during the 1992/2 drought have never fully recovered from the effects of this drought.

In some cases state policies can drive individuals or groups of people deeper into poverty. From PRP reports we learn that many of the urban poor today can specifically trace their impoverishment to the retrenchments that followed the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s. Similarly, a majority of the very poor and poor in urban and peri-urban locations in Zimbabwe will point to the 2005 state sponsored programme ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ as a trigger of their decent into poverty. Some who lost their homes and livelihoods have never recovered from the effects in spite of remedial programmes by both state and non-state actors.

It is clear from this discussion so far that the covariant and idiosyncratic drivers combine to produce the landscape of poverty that was discussed in section 3. Three key points are worth highlighting based on this discussion so far. Firstly, is the fact that although the two co-produce each other, by far the greatest drivers of poverty are those that affect economic growth on a much wider scale. That means getting the politics right is as important as getting the economics of growth right. Secondly, while growth is important, it should be borne in mind that it is not any growth that will do for poverty reduction. It is growth that is driven by sectors with a high poverty reduction elasticity that will have the most impact in reducing poverty. For rural areas evidence from PRP shows that a focus on building the capacity to produce food often allows households to begin to climb out of poverty. Thirdly, for the urban we more broadly see employment growth as the most direct way to reduce poverty. In the next section we look at the experiences of PRP and others to draw out some lessons on what works for poverty reduction and wealth creation. The focus here is on both the substance of interventions and the programming operations.
The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) was launched in Zimbabwe by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in 2004. This first phase lasted until 2008, when the second phase (2008-12) was commissioned. The second phase has evolved to be a multi-donor funded programme, financed by Australian Aid (AusAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union (EU), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands (EKN), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank. Funding for the current phase amounts to over USD 130 million. It has reached over two million vulnerable people throughout Zimbabwe. In its last 12 months the programme is being implemented by 23 international and local national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) plus six Innovation Fund partners. GRM International, a consultant company, is responsible for management and coordination.

The PRP aimed to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and through various programming interventions sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions. The balance, in terms of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and development, has been changing with the evolving context in Zimbabwe. In the current phase the interventions are now more developmental, building the sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in Zimbabwe. Phase I reached 1.5 million people. Phase II helped to increase coverage to at least 2 million in both urban and rural areas. So what lessons can we learn from the combined experiences of all the actors? Based on an analysis of the very detailed report we distil six key areas of learning for the future. We discuss these below and start with lessons learnt from rural programming.

Productivity Growth and Conservation Agriculture

The PRP has demonstrated very clearly that productivity growth is key to raising rural incomes and providing pathways out of poverty. The biggest problem for smallholder agriculture has been low productivity. What the PRP has demonstrated is that by providing sustained input support households gain an ability to use their land to better themselves. In particular it is the introduction of a new generation of production technologies that has been the greatest success especially for grain production. Conservation agriculture has managed to strike a very delicate balance between high external input agriculture (that does not work in an environment where input markets are constrained) and low
external input agriculture (that is not realistic in dry land farming). By innovating and experimenting with a ‘third way’ PRP may have emerged with a way forward for African agriculture. The PRP LIME data shows the rapid productivity gains especially among the very poor and poor households (Mutiro et al Keogh 2011). Many of the households that had never produced a surplus for nearly a decade have managed to and are looking to participate in markets.

There are some emerging drawbacks affecting labour constrained households but there is evidence that PRP has allowed CA to evolve into the next generation that recognise this by supporting introduction of mechanised CA. It is still early days for this innovation but initial results suggest a breakthrough and a definite need for further research and propagation beyond the PRP activity. Further, while there is no doubt that conservation agriculture has enhanced productivity growth, this very success could be what undermines it if this productivity growth is undermined by lack of access to markets especially for those already producing surplus. There is evidence in some areas that selling locally is no longer an option as most households are increasingly becoming food secure. It is clear that this is an area where coordinating with private sector players could begin to help connect the farmers to markets.

39 A household visited in Musami increased productivity from 0.3t/ha to 3.5t/ha after introducing CA.

40 In some places local communities have organised themselves resulting in the emergence of reciprocal labour pools to cope with the labour demand.
Until the crisis, Zimbabwe had a very efficient and effective bureaucracy that liked to build institutions and policy from above (Agere 1998). Such an approach only works in situations where development is being done in a ‘normal’ setting (there is no governance crisis, markets work and the economy is sound). A question that emerges however is what happens when the ‘centre’ is weakened and suspends normal programming and markets cannot provide the public goods and services? What the PRP has shown is the importance of building local level agency and capacity to co-ordinate and ‘do development’ with the co-operation rather than direction of the state. Doing so restores entitlements and claim making from below and enhances demand side accountability. It is a way to reach people when state institutions at the centre do not work well or are paralysed by lack of resources. That way development does not stop but continues through local agency. Of course the assumption here is that there is sufficient space for local actors to innovate and implement things without being hindered. This works well in situations of state failure and
perhaps this is an important lesson governments need to know. From PRP experiences, it was clear that in the limited access of health, education and extension services it was the local ‘first responders’ that filled this vacuum. Volunteer –led Farmer Field Schools filled a void left by under resourced extension services while ‘para vets’ began to provide services to livestock farmers. Similarly many of the Community Home Based Care/WASH groups have morphed into community based savings groups (Mukando). Many of the institutions formed are assuming a life of their own without PRP41. A key challenge however for policy making from below is the lack of coherence across sectors and across the geographical space. In the absence of a plan (as a point of reference for the disparate group) policy making from below can create a lack of spatial coherence that can easily undermine the ability of poor people to make a living. Perhaps the question this raises is whether this model only works when the centre cannot hold things together.

Embracing the Mosaic of Livelihoods

Zimbabwe is divided into 23 relatively homogeneous zones, developed by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) defined according to a livelihoods framework. Livelihood zone profiles have also been developed which describe the major characteristics of each zone, including a brief differentiation of the food security status of different wealth groups. The aim of the profiles is to present sufficient information to allow a rounded and balanced view of livelihoods nationally. PRP is informed by the profiles and follows the Livelihood Zones in its programming. The Livelihood Zones assist the PRP in selecting the most vulnerable communities and targeting the most needy.

Evidence from the PRP LIME data suggests that it embraced difference and did not seek to prescribe standard livelihoods models. By embracing difference within a uniform framework of understanding it has allowed the development of a mosaic of livelihood portfolios better suited to the different settings in which it operated. Many of the different settings have developed different combinations of livelihood activities that spread the risk of impoverishment. In particular it is the introduction of non-farm agriculture, such as income generating related activities that has provided some scope for income smoothing among the beneficiaries.

Asset Building Matters when Incomes are Slow to Recover

For many rural communities poverty is defined through access to and ownership of productive assets. This
has been one of the key areas of learning from PRP and beyond. Building an asset dimension to PRP programming has allowed households to work on raising their incomes but also begin the process of wealth creation. Asset building is crucial for taking the current generation out of poverty but also in stopping the intergenerational transfer of poverty (impartible inheritance). There is evidence from PRP that the transfer of wealth creating assets gives beneficiaries the confidence and security to begin investing and experimenting with other livelihood options. What is however also clearly evident especially in the case of small ruminants transfers is that this allows individuals to begin to accumulate cattle over time. The LIME data suggest the use of small ruminants for income rather than consumption smoothing. They are used as ladders of wealth accumulation by households and there is clear evidence that some households helped onto this ‘productive assets’ ladder by PRP are moving onto larger stock and more productive assets.\textsuperscript{42}

Similarly, one of the most popular PRP initiatives has been ‘Mukando’ (community savings and lending scheme). In an environment like contemporary Zimbabwe where financial capital markets are constrained and underdeveloped, ‘mukando’ or ‘kutusha mani’ has emerged to fill this gap. In the process it has provided PRP an exit strategy while quite evidently improving women’s self worth both within the community and in the household. However the question that still needs to be asked is: does Mukando as currently conceptualised have the capacity to create local social differentiation by excluding the chronically poor? Further, will this create a generation of beneficiaries caught in a debt trap? Since Mukando is still very much locally driven and not run by an external agency, the possibility of this happening seems quite low but there is need to continue to monitor how they evolve. What is clear is that Mukando is providing the finance needed for local micro enterprise development. It is providing a service that no other public or private sector organisation is providing in the rural areas since the demise of SEDCO.

Apart from these wealth creating assets, PRP has also had a focus on human capital formation. Many individuals have gained essential skills through education and training driven by local needs not from colleges. Examples were given earlier on of ‘volunteer farmer trainers’, Paravets (charging a small fee), community home based care givers; and WASH groups. This is a form of human capital formation that not only promotes local agency but empowers individuals so that they feel able to deal with problems locally as they emerge. There is evidence of individuals gaining enough confidence to begin to participate in local

\textsuperscript{42} See Chifamba (2012)
governance issues through these asset building programmes.

**PRP and Social Protection for the Vulnerable**

Social protection has emerged as another area of policy making from below. For the poor and vulnerable groups (orphans, disabled, female headed households) their ability to participate in activities to build a livelihood may be limited by their circumstances. Different forms of social protection can make the difference between rebuilding their lives and falling into chronic poverty. PRP was very effective in ‘importing’, adapting and experimenting with forms of social transfer, including food and cash that have been adopted and packaged into a coherent policy for implementation by the state, in the form of the Harmonised Cash Transfer Scheme. This is a policy innovation that plays both a redistributive and protective function. There is evidence from PRP LIME data that the cash transfers have contributed significantly to household incomes helping to stabilise consumption and meeting some of the cash needs. Some of the welfare outcomes are already clear. A look at the PRP LIME sites shows for example that cash transfers can be as much as 30 per cent of household incomes especially in rural areas. Similarly, school enrolment improves by up to 50 per cent in areas where BEAM operates.
Through LIME, the PRP has learned that cash transfers, as currently designed, have less impact in the urban areas, where there is a cash economy and households have to pay for access to services such as electricity and water and in some cases rent. PRP LIME results show the need for a different design for urban areas – more towards facilitating productive expenditure and investments by households.

**Re-thinking and Reimagining Urban Programming**

Most of the PRP has had a very logical and deliberate focus on rural poverty. This is where three quarters of all poor people in Zimbabwe still live. As urbanisation of poverty accelerated especially after *Operation Murambatsvina*, PRP began to expand its activities to cover urban areas. There is evidence from PRP LIME data that urban programming was highly effective while it lasted. Its ‘palliative’ dimension was effective in saving lives especially in post 2004 when the economic collapse affected employment and food markets. Once a semblance of stability was restored through the formation of the inclusive government there is no evidence that urban programming in PRP remained as focused in ensuring a soft landing for the poor as they made the transition from ‘crisis’ to ‘stability’. If anything can be learnt perhaps it is that there is need to rethink new strategies for dealing with small but ‘very deep’ pockets of urban poverty in an urban economy that is not generating quality formal employment. More specifically there is need for innovative thinking on the forms of social protection that can work in urban Zimbabwe where there are small concentrations of deep poverty located in an environment where fees and rents are often tenfold those of the rural environments.

**Adaptive Management and Process Approach**

One of the lessons emerging from the PRP is the importance of adaptive management and process approach to programme planning. PRP was a multi-faceted programme that was aiming to hit a moving target. It therefore required flexibility of programming and a rapid process of learning and changing course. It also had room for experimentation and for cross programme learning that allowed it to share knowledge and experience of what works in which settings. Having a robust monitoring and evaluation framework worked well as it allowed lessons learnt to be shared among partners. It also appears that donors gave PRP the ‘room for manoeuvre’ that allowed innovative programming to thrive. It also allowed sufficient interface with state institutions to allow them to learn and adopt practices and programmes that the state felt would work. This provided good scope for an exit strategy for PRP.

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43 In 2005 an estimated 700 000 mainly urban dwellers were left homeless and destitute after their ‘irregularly’ built homes were destroyed by the state.
12 Conclusions and Recommendations

Poverty in Zimbabwe is widespread and levels are deep, particularly in the rural areas. There are two types of drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe, namely covariant or structural drivers which affect all households, and idiosyncratic which target specific individuals, households, social groups or communities. The widespread nature of covariant drivers means that they often require long term national level policy programming responses at scale. Covariant drivers, such as economic crisis and jobless growth, breakdown in claims and entitlement, and inadequate markets are often seen as being more lethal because their generalised nature often implies that individuals and communities cannot help each other in meaningful ways to climb out of poverty. On the other hand idiosyncratic drivers, such as access to assets, shocks and stresses such as illness and crop failures, hurt individual entities but there is scope for localised interventions through specific programme responses.

In an effort to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe the PRP through various programming interventions sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions which reached about 2 million people in both rural and urban areas. The balance, in terms of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and development, changed with the evolving context in Zimbabwe, with the current interventions being more developmental, building the sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in Zimbabwe.

A number of lessons have been learnt from the PRP and other actors’ experiences together with the various studies and surveys on poverty, to help inform a strategy for further poverty reduction and wealth creation. A number of factors are important that can work to reduce poverty, namely productivity growth and promotion of smallholder farming; institution building and policy making from below; social protection, which can play both a redistributive and protective function; encouraging diverse livelihoods; and asset building which is crucial for taking the current generation out of poverty. Furthermore, another key lesson emerging from the PRP is the importance of adaptive management and process approach to programme planning. PRP was a multi-faceted programme that had the flexibility of programming and a rapid process of learning and changing course, enabling it to hit the moving targets in a very dynamic situation. It also had room for experimentation and for cross programme learning that allowed it to
share knowledge and experience of what works in which settings. The rigorous monitoring and evaluation framework was effective as it allowed lessons learnt to be shared among partners. The programme design was sufficiently flexible to allow innovative programming to thrive, and as well as providing an interface with state institutions to allow them to learn and adopt practices and programmes that the state felt would work, thereby providing the PRP with good scope for an exit strategy.

**Recommendations**

In light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are suggested:

**For Government**

Engage in policy dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, so as to ensure the implementation of sound, harmonised pro-poor policies and practices, based on national priorities, scientific evidence and practical experiences.

Engage in partnerships with NGOs, donors and the private sector in the implementation of pro-poor policies and strategies.

**For Donors**

Have a mechanism that allows for sharing of information and experiences, techniques and technologies that work, thereby maintaining synergies between donors and other stakeholders, including government, to harmonise delivery, and prevent overlaps and gaps.

Developmental assistance which is flexible and which embraces the mosaics of livelihoods will give people and communities opportunities to raise their incomes so that they can have a stronger asset base, have more opportunities and capabilities, and be less vulnerable and more resilient to shocks.

Promote smallholder farmers to be more productive with: inputs, equipment, irrigation, improved markets and market linkages, adding value, and diversification.

Engage and collaborate with key stakeholders on the design of appropriate urban programming that address the small but deep pockets of urban poverty.

**For the Private Sector**

Engage with the government, donors and civil society so that Corporate Social Responsibility efforts and initiatives are targeted towards poverty reduction, and resilience, and are informed by identified priorities and practices.

Engage in Private Public Partnerships (PPP) so as to be a key player in the provision of services in the delivery of development and livelihood programs.

**For Research Institutions**

Carry out research on knowledge gaps, in-depth case studies and collection of poverty narratives to understand the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, what drives poverty and how individual cycles can be broken.
Undertake longitudinal research and panel surveys to understand the dynamic nature of poverty and how people move into and out of poverty.

Conduct follow up research to determine longer term impacts and knock-on effects of assistance interventions and development programmes to establish what works and has impact in the long term. This will assist future interventions to be designed to have greater impact and be more sustainable.
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55 **Roder, W.:** The division of land resources in Southern Rhodesia. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 54, 41-58


65 ZIMVAC (2011) Rural Livelihood Assessment 2011, Harare


Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency. Harare
Appendix 1: Scope of this Work

Although the key focus of this work is to understand the drivers of chronic poverty (understood as long duration poverty) in Zimbabwe, doing such analysis necessarily means attention has to be paid to other forms of poverty. Much of this work will be based on an analysis of what we can learn from the programming work done through the PRP.

The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) was launched in Zimbabwe by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in 2004. This first phase lasted until 2008, when the second phase (2008-12) was commissioned. The second phase has evolved to be a multi-donor funded programme, financed by Australian Aid (AusAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union (EU), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands (EKN), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank. Funding for the current phase amounts to over USD 130 million. It has reached over two million vulnerable people throughout Zimbabwe. In its last 12 months the programme is being implemented by 23 International and local national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) plus six Innovation Fund partners. GRM International, a consultant company, is responsible for management and coordination.

The PRP aimed to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and through various programming interventions sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions. The balance, in terms of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and development, has been changing with the evolving context in Zimbabwe. In the current phase the interventions are now more developmental, building the sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in Zimbabwe. Phase I reached 1.5 million people. Phase II helped to increase coverage to at least 2 million in both urban and rural areas.

Aims and objectives

This consultancy entitled “Drivers of chronic poverty in Zimbabwe: What have we learned?” aims to identify and document PRP experiences with the changing poverty landscape in Zimbabwe. It incorporates a review of the lessons that PRP and its Partners have learnt about the drivers of poverty and responses to such in Zimbabwe.
## Mapping of Objectives, Questions and Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Sources of Data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify and Analyse the nature, extent, patterns and dynamics of poverty in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>- What do the data tell us about poverty in Rural and Urban Zimbabwe</td>
<td>PRP LIME data and Reports</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- How has poverty changed over time in rural and urban areas?</td>
<td>ZimVac</td>
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<td>- What are the local definitions of poverty in rural and urban areas?</td>
<td>Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS)</td>
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<td>ICES</td>
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<td>MZF 2011 Data</td>
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<td>Primary Ground Truthing</td>
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<td>MDGs Monitoring Reports</td>
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<td>Mercy Corps</td>
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<td>Analyse the drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe and how these have shaped humanitarian and Government of Zimbabwe policy responses</td>
<td>- What are the localised drivers of poverty in rural and urban areas?</td>
<td>PRP LIME</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- What are the common drivers of poverty across all geographical and social sectors?</td>
<td>ZimVac</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- How have policy responses over time been shaped drivers of poverty?</td>
<td>Poverty Assessment Study Surveys MZF 2011 Data</td>
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<td>Primary Ground Truthing</td>
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<td>MDGs Monitoring Reports</td>
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<td>Kinsey Data Base</td>
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<td>Identify and analyse strategies that have been successfully employed to create wealth opportunities for the poor</td>
<td>- What are the local wealth creation opportunities in rural and urban areas?</td>
<td>PRP LIME</td>
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<td>- What wealth creation strategies can be promoted to counteract the effects of the identified poverty drivers</td>
<td>ZimVac</td>
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<td>MDGs Monitoring Reports</td>
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<td>Government Policy</td>
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<td>Documents</td>
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<td>Primary Ground Truthing</td>
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<td>Structured Interviews with stakeholders</td>
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<td>Review of International Experiences in Developing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify the programming and policy implications of the emerging poverty trends in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>- What are the programming and policy implications for future planning towards poverty reduction in rural and urban areas?</td>
<td>Structured Interviews with stakeholders- Government,</td>
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<td>Beneficiaries; Donors</td>
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<td>Ground Truthing</td>
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Methodology

This was essentially a desk study that sought to comprehensively analyse the lessons from the PRP while situating this experience within the knowledge pool of what else we know (from other data sources and literature) about the drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe. The work drew mainly from the PRP- LIME data and where possible complemented this with analysis of other available data (like DHS; MZF; PASS; ICES). The analysis of the data and documents was be complemented by some semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. Some limited ground truthing consisting mainly of two focus group sessions – one rural and one urban especially covering some of the beneficiaries was also done.

The work proceeded through three key phases as follows

**Phase 1**

**Review of LIME Data and Reports**

This involved an analysis of data and documents such as monitoring & evaluation reports. This phase used mostly valorised data although in some instances use was made of raw data from the MZF survey and ZIMVAC. This was done to generate exemplars necessary to illustrate key points of argument. The review provided important background information to the research as well as a deeper understanding of the Household Economy Approach and its impact. This form of analysis provided the report with headline figures that underpin the core arguments made.

**Phase 2**

**Situating the LIME Data within context of What is known and What has been Learnt**

The aim was to situate the LIME evidence within the broader poverty knowledge pool. It reviewed evidence from the PRP and other published data and reports and analysed patterns emerging from research and programme interventions in Zimbabwe. During this phase we also reviewed official policy and programming efforts by the different stakeholders and drew conclusions on how these have influenced the poverty reduction landscape.

**Phase 3**

**Interviews and Ground Truthing.**

Apart from reviewing secondary data some interviews and consultative meetings with key stakeholders were conducted. The main objective was to gather data on programming efforts and emerging consensus on outcomes. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 17 key informants. Some limited ground truthing was also carried out in Musana and Mufakose. This consisted mainly of two focus group sessions – one rural and one urban especially covering some of the beneficiaries of PRP. In much of the poverty analysis work, ground truthing is a standard way of checking that findings of a desk study chime with the reality on the ground. Talking to and checking facts with beneficiaries helped to strengthen the confidence with which firm conclusions could be drawn. Methodologically it also balanced out the views of the elite (from semi-structured interviews) with those of the ordinary beneficiaries.
Phase 4
Final Write Up and Review
During this phase a draft report was written and put out to review. Feedback received was taken into account in preparing the final report.
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