Exploring China’s Investments and Development Assistance in Myanmar

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ian Holliday</td>
<td>Preface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chenyang</td>
<td>The Adjustment of Obama Administration’s Policies towards Myanmar: Promoting Democracy in Myanmar or Containing China?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashley South</td>
<td>Governance and Legitimacy in the Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Jolliffe</td>
<td>The Role of People’s Security in Peace Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Allan</td>
<td>Business and Peace in Myanmar: Thoughts on Sector Risks, Related to Peace and Social License to Operate Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Holliday</td>
<td>Thinking about Myanmar’s Citizenship Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew J. Walton</td>
<td>Burmese Politics and the Pathology of Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khin Khin Lwin</td>
<td>The Displaced in Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bray</td>
<td>Risk Assessment, International Investment and Responsible Business Practice in Myanmar: What Has Changed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu Li</td>
<td>Politicization of China’s Economic Investment in Myanmar: Cause and Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu Xianghui</td>
<td>Myanmar’s Oil and Gas Sector since 2011: Progress and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Simpson</td>
<td>From ‘Outside’ to ‘Inside’: The Transformation of Activism over Energy Projects in Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Zichang</td>
<td>Amending Constitution: Focal Point of Myanmar’s Political Development in 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi Shihong</td>
<td>Cooperation and Competition between U.S. and Japan’s Policy towards Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Baoyun</td>
<td>The European Union and Future Development of Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavin Chachavalpongpun</td>
<td>Human Security in Myanmar: Critical Hurdles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lei Zhuning</td>
<td>Development of Transport Connectivity in Myanmar and the Prospect for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Xuecheng</td>
<td>Myanmar’s Political Transformation and New Development of China-Myanmar Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aung Aung  China-Myanmar Relations (2011-2013): Promoting China’s Image in Myanmar
Lu Guangsheng  China’s Investment in Myanmar under Its Political and Economic Reform
Nora Schlenzig  State Transformation and the Geography of State Power: Exploring Cross-border Development between China and Myanmar
Diane Tang Lee  China’s Investments and Development Assistance in Myanmar
Khin Maung Nyo  Challenges Facing Myanmar’s Migrant Workers
Kerstin Duell  Exile or Return? The Diaspora’s Role in Myanmar’s Political Transition
Mung Don  Transitional Justice in Myanmar: Assessing the Alternatives
Jacqueline Menager  Cultural Elite: Situating Hip Hop in the Transition
Renaud Egreteau  Soldiers as Lawmakers: In Search for a Legislative Role for the Tatmadaw
Wooyeal Paik  Authoritarian Survival Strategies in Comparative Perspective: Myanmar, China and North Korea
Joakim Kreutz  Myanmar’s Economic Potential: Peace Making or Peace Breaking?
Andrew Selth  Obstacles to Police Reform in Myanmar/Burma
Song Qingrun  The Prospects of Myanmar’s Economic Reform and Development
Preface

Ian Holliday

On 17-19 June 2013, the University of Hong Kong hosted its seventh annual symposium on politics and government in Myanmar. Previous symposia were held in Bangkok (2007), Xiamen (2008), Kunming (2009), and Hong Kong (2010-12). For all seven events, the Singapore office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung was a collaborating partner providing welcome financial support alongside funding also provided by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. For all five events from Kunming forwards, Yunnan University was a collaborating partner bringing a full delegation of scholars from Mainland China to the symposium.

At the 2013 symposium, forty scholars and practitioners made fifteen-minute presentations to audiences of up to one hundred people. Soon after the conclusion of the symposium, thirty presenters submitted brief summaries of their talks in English. All thirty were then translated into the Myanmar language. This collection brings together the thirty summaries in both languages, with the English versions grouped together first and the Myanmar versions following.

Grateful thanks for excellent administrative support are due to Florence Luk, Harold Tsang and Nikki Wong in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. For translation from English into the Myanmar language, thanks go to Phyo Win Latt.
The Adjustment of Obama Administration’s Policies towards Myanmar:

Promoting Democracy in Myanmar or Containing China?

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The Aim of Rebalance Strategy in Asia-Pacific Region of Obama Administration: Containing China or Not?

Maintaining hegemony and dominance in Asia-Pacific region is the key aim of Obama Administration’s rebalance strategy. USA will contain any major powers which can challenge its hegemony in this region, not only China.

After three-decade rapid development, China is rising. Maybe the U.S. government hasn’t issued the containing China strategy yet, but has taken many actions, particularly since 2009. Professor ZHENG Yongnian, the Director of EAI, NUS, pointed out that, Obama administration’s policy towards China is the engagement under the containment. Professor HUANG Jin at NUS, a former research fellow at Brookings Institution, also thinks USA’s containing action upon China is very clear, as the U.S. made use of Taiwan issue before 2008, and now its interferences China’s Tibet and Xinjiang affairs. Meanwhile, USA also instigates China’s neighboring countries against China. We can’t ignore USA’s destructive role in the tension in South China Sea and East China Sea.

Due to the China-US structural contradiction and the growing of Chinese strength, the Obama Administration’s policies towards China is no longer to pull China into the US-dominated international system and achieve China’s peaceful evolution but to fully contain China’s rise, mainly by non-military measures. USA makes full use of its domination of international regulations and political values to damage China’s international image and limit China’s international spaces through the interpretation of those regulations as well as the reports of Western media. By making use of its democracy advantages, Myanmar’s nationalist sentiments and concepts of CSR, EIA and SIA, the U.S has successfully made China’s aids and investments in Myanmar serious obstacles for China-Myanmar relations. Many evidences indicate that some NGOs from USA were involved in the movement against Myitsone dam, and the strong interests of USA in the coordination and negotiation of the conflict in Kachin State is also a good example of USA’s containing action upon China.

China also needs to realize the diplomatic faux pas in its relations with Myanmar during the past two decades. China did not paid enough attention to Myanmar ordinary people and only developed the relations with Myanmar military government; the economic cooperation mostly focused on natural resources exploring with less social responsibilities and not enough help to the improving of local livelihood. These shortcomings were optimized by USA. Therefore, China needs to adjust its policies and improve the behaviors of Chinese companies and citizens in Myanmar.
Is Promoting Democracy in Myanmar the Fundamental Goal of the Adjustment of Obama Administration’s Policies towards Myanmar?

Although most American people respect democracy and human rights, promoting democratic value and political system is one of the three main foreign strategic objectives of the U.S. After the ending of apartheid in South Africa, USA’s democracy exporting is not merely for interfering in other countries’ internal affairs, with democracy exporting as an important object as well. That’s to meet the need of domestic politics and foreign relations of USA. But U.S. government will undoubtedly give up democracy and human rights protection for national interest if promoting democracy collides with the seeking of national interest.

Thailand and Pakistan also have long-time military rule, and even a military coup occurred in Thailand in 2006, but the U.S. didn’t impose sanctions upon Pakistan and its military cooperation with Thailand has never stopped. So some scholars are wondering why the U.S can’t lift its sanctions upon Myanmar. The U.S. never condemns Mubarak, the former Egyptian President who was in power for more than 30 years and tried to make his son as his successor. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Brunei are absolute monarchy nations, but the U.S. government never forces those leaders to carry out democratizations only because they are vital for USA’s national interest.

Democracy is the best political system for human, but it’s not omnipotent and can’t resolve all complicated problems in a short time in any countries. The Philippines is an allied country of the U.S. in SEA, but it does not have good governance after independence, and now is reaching the verge of failed state. As a responsible big country, the U.S. not only has to boost democratization, but also needs to help Philippines and Myanmar to improve administrative capacity and develop economics. The scholars don’t think the U.S. has done good jobs in this section. Although the efficiency of USA’s policy adjustment must be assessed by Myanmar people, an academic assessment can be given.

After the Obama Administration took office in 2009, it adjusted its main objective in Myanmar to hinder China-Myanmar cooperation in order to contain China’s rise. Its declaration that the development of US-Myanmar relations is not aiming at China is unbelievable for Chinese people.

The logical relation of the policies of Obama Administration towards Myanmar: As China did not keep good relations with Myanmar people since 1988, and the democratic regime must respect the people’s willing, so many cooperation projects between China and Myanmar cannot be implemented smoothly after the democratization happened in Myanmar. Myitsone dam, Latpadaung copper mine and China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline are the targets of USA’s action.

The Response of Myanmar to USA’s Policy Adjustment

Myanmar society has different response to USA’s policy adjustment.

Some Myanmar people hope USA can pay more attention to Myanmar. For example, Zaw Htay, a Myanmar government official, published an article titled “Myanmar and Washington’s New Strategic Choice in Southeast Asia” in the Washington Post on November 15, 2011. The paper said that “What the West must realize is that in today’s geopolitical situation, particularly given the rise of China, it needs Myanmar. Washington and others must help facilitate Myanmar’s connection to the outside world at this critical juncture. My president’s suspension of the Beijing-backed Myitsone Dam signaled to the world what he stands for. If the United States neglects this opportunity, Washington will part ways with the new order in the Indochina region”.

But some Myanmar people complain USA. For example, some Myanmar elites said, Myanmar has
done so much and USA responses less. Myanmar has done better job than Afghanistan, but USA can provide about several billions US dollars assistance to Afghanistan every year with no money but sanction to Myanmar, so they are unsatisfied with the USA’s action and response. Another official based in Naypyidaw pointed out, for Myanmar foreign relations, India and China are the most important partner. He hopes USA will not cause Myanmar any trouble.

According to the CSIS Myanmar Trip Report in September 2012, some Myanmar elites tried to balance between China and USA. The report said: “The widespread belief that the Myanmar government’s concern about excessive dependence on China was a primary motivator in prompting military leaders to pursue reform appears to be overstated. In fact, the group’s interlocutors stressed China’s role as a traditional neighbor and encouraged the United States to avoid zero-sum policies toward China. Given China’s long near-monopoly on political ties, military sales, and trade with Myanmar during the decades of military rule, the country’s rapidly warming ties with the United States are being greeted with suspicion in China and are stoking fears about imagined U.S. containment efforts. A proactive policy of consultation with China on the U.S. approach toward Myanmar could help mitigate concerns in Beijing about the United States using Myanmar to contain China”

The Attitude of China on the Development of Myanmar-USA Relations: Perspective from a Chinese Scholar

All nations must respect Myanmar’s right to develop relations with other countries. Chinese scholars fully realize the recognition from USA Myanmar’s political transition and its economic assistance will be of great significance for the modernization process of Myanmar. The U.S. also has the right to keep good relations with Myanmar, and China always supports that. In June 2007, China hosted a secret meeting between Myanmar ministers and U.S. officials in Beijing. After the 2008 Nargis Cyclone, China coordinated Myanmar military government and USA to ensure U.S military aeroplane to transport disaster relief materials to Yangon airport.

But China’s national interest must be respected by USA and Myanmar. The stability and development of China-Myanmar border areas and Chinese investment in Myanmar all are China’s national interests, which are not allowed to be damaged. Unfortunately, they are affected by USA’s activities in Myanmar.

Conclusion

China and USA have the competitions in Myanmar, but both have to respect the sovereignty and the legal rights of Myanmar. No one can force Myanmar people to do anything against their willing. It’s the right time for the U.S. to remove all the sanctions upon Myanmar now.

China needs a stable and harmonious environment for the modernization process. As USA is not a reliable partner, China needs to pay more attentions to the neighboring nations in Asia, and must develop the relations with neighboring countries independently. Anyhow, we hope USA will not play zero-sum game with China in Myanmar or other regions.
Governance and Legitimacy in the Peace Process

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Opportunities and Risks

• The peace process which emerged in Myanmar in late 2011 is the best opportunity in many decades to address political, social, economic and cultural issues which have driven armed conflict since independence.

• The recent halt to fighting between the government and Kachin Independence Organisation means that for the first time all major non-state armed groups have agreed preliminary ceasefires with the government.

• However, a number of serious issues remain unresolved. The peace process is unlikely to succeed unless these are addressed. This will be difficult, given the long history of mistrust among key stakeholders.

Ceasefires

• People living in conflict-affected areas benefit from ceasefires between the government and non-state armed groups (NSAGs): reduced fear, improved livelihood options, better opportunities for travel.
• The primary concern of conflict-affected communities is physical security.
• Many ethnic nationality communities continue to experience high levels of militarization. If the Myanmar Army and NSAGs could withdraw from some non-strategic positions, perceived as threatening by communities, this would provide a boost in confidence to ethnic stakeholders.

• Preliminary ceasefires need to be consolidated, with concrete agreements regarding troop positions and behavior of armed elements (ceasefire ‘Code of Conduct’).

• Need for ceasefire monitoring.

• Serious concerns regarding ongoing major clashes (e.g. Shan State). Questions regarding whether Myanmar Army is following government’s peace agenda - or is this a case of ‘good cop, bad cop’?
Peace Process

• There is a need to move from the agreement of preliminary ceasefires, to discuss long-standing political issues which have structured armed and state-society conflicts in Myanmar. Government has agreed in principle to political negotiations, but these have yet to start. The clock is ticking - 2015 elections.

• Ethnic stakeholders (NSAGs, political parties, civil society) need to ensure policy and tactical coherence, in order to represent their communities effectively in political talks.

• Need to ensure participation of key stakeholders, including conflict-affected communities, civil society groups and political parties. This will be a logistical challenge, reflected in the complexity of the ‘Framework Agreement’ (ethnic peace plan) presented to the government.

Outstanding Issues - incursion of unregulated business activities into conflict-affected areas; land-grabbing; mega-projects

• Most new business activities in conflict-affected areas are extractive (logging, mining etc), and often connected to local or national powerholders (e.g. Myanmar Army, NSAGs). Business activities in newly accessible conflict-affected areas are often associated with land-grabbing (e.g. for plantation agriculture).

• As well as the negative social and environmental impacts, such activities can undermine trust and confidence in the peace process.

• Negative impacts of the 2012 Farmland Act, and 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Wasteland Act.

• Concerns about major infrastructure projects (e.g. hydroelectric dams).

Outstanding Issues – local autonomy and politics of governance

• Government has committed in principle to negotiations regarding decentralisation in ethnic nationality-populated areas. However, in the absence of substantial political talks, no progress has yet been made.

• Ceasefire process has seen the government pushing to expand its authority into previously contested, conflict-affected areas. This is not necessarily (or entirely) a conspiracy: it is what governments do - apply governance to subjects.

• Expansion of government services into previously inaccessible, conflict-affected communities can be positive for vulnerable populations (e.g. improved access to health and education services, provision of ID cards) – but can also be seen as threatening by local communities, who continue to regard the state as threatening, and the Myanmar Army as violent and predatory.
• Efforts to expand Myanmar government authority and service-delivery systems should therefore be undertaken in close consultations with the non-state armed groups and affected communities, and relevant civil society groups.

• In many conflict-affected areas, local organisations (working cross-border, and from ‘inside’ Myanmar) have for years been the only agencies providing assistance to conflict-affected communities. Many NSAGs, and CBOs working in partnership with them, have developed long-established, if chronically under-resourced, structures in the fields of education, health and local administration.

• For many displaced and other communities in the conflict zones, NSAG and related civil society structures and personnel are perceived as more legitimate and effective than those of the state. It is essential that such individuals and networks enjoy a sense of ownership in the peace process.

• There is a risk that international and state agencies entering these areas can undermine and/or overwhelm existing local capacities, damaging confidence in the peace process.

• International actors should not undermine trust and confidence in the peace process, by supporting an expansion of government authority into previously contested areas, without consultation (‘do no harm’).

**Political Cultures**

• Despite commitment to the peace process, government and Myanmar Army leaders still seem to regard ethnic communities as ‘children’, whose lives must be developed/improved by the government (with international assistance) – rather than seeing ethnic communities (and NSAGs?) as primary actors in their own stories.

• As noted, in practice, this is often experienced by conflict-affected communities as the penetration of top-down state services and governance structures into previously inaccessible, conflict-affected areas - which can undermine trust in the peace process.

• There is considerable risk that peace and political actors will avoid difficult challenges, preferring self-congratulation to addressing the many difficult problems still affecting ethnic communities and state-society relations - in which case opportunities to build a better Myanmar may be lost.

**Convergence, and ‘Federalism from Below’**

• There is a risk that elite-level political talks will be drawn-out, top-down and blueprint-driven. Negotiations could get trapped in legalistic discussions (e.g. around constitutional reform), with key actors adopting ‘zero-sum’ approaches - especially in the run-up to 2015 elections.

• Ethnic political actors should identify issues for priority, ‘fast-track’ negotiations with the government. Government needs to make some symbolic and practical concessions/gestures,
in order to demonstrate good faith and awareness of ethnic grievances (e.g. in relation to language use, land rights).

- Support local activities which help to address urgent concerns and needs of ethnic communities. Concrete and sustainable attempts to build peace ‘on the ground’ are particularly important, given the likelihood that political negotiations will not produce a deliverable settlement until late 2014 (if we are lucky - and there remains the outstanding question of whether any such agreement will be acceptable to Myanmar Army or other key stakeholders).

- Government and donors should undertake peacebuilding needs assessments in partnership with NSAGs, civil society and conflict-affected communities - in order to build common understandings of needs, and a joint agenda for addressing these.

- Promote activities which help to build trust and confidence on the part of key stakeholders, testing the peace process. Seek out and support good practice (‘appreciative enquiry’ approach) - e.g. in fields of education, livelihoods.

- Support ‘convergence’ between state and non-state governance regimes and service delivery systems, in ways which empower and build on local practice. Importance of demonstrating to communities (and NSAGs, civil society) that the peace process can create spaces to support local agency.

**Key Questions**

- Will the current round of ceasefires see NSAGs continue to control autonomous ‘liberated zones’ (like the ceasefires of the 1990s) - in which case, what will be the status of these areas, and how/will such issues be addressed as part of political negotiations?

- The peace process has seen NSAGs enter a (no doubt, long and contested) transformation from insurgent groups, towards – what? State and international actors mostly assume that, if a political settlement can be negotiated that is acceptable to key stakeholders, NSAGs will disarm. Some NSAGs may eventually lay down arms, and become political parties; others may prefer to retain their weapons - perhaps as part of a transformed Myanmar Army.

- NSAGs have been illegal (according to the Myanmar government, which itself has been regarded as illegitimate; also, lack of recognition for NSAGs under international states system). The President has promised to rescind laws criminalizing contact with NSAGs. What is the status of NSAGs, for the Myanmar government and Army, and international actors (diplomats, donors, aid agencies)? How should non-state governance and service delivery regimes relate to (be integrated with?) state structures?

- Does government understand ethnic grievances and aspirations? Are Myanmar government - and Army - willing to address ethnic concerns substantively in political negotiations?
• Will government and international partners be willing to ensure that activities to build peace and bring development to conflict-affected areas are undertaken jointly, in partnership with key stakeholders?

• The status of NSAGs as political representatives of ethnic groups is problematic - BUT they do have (varying amounts of, often contested) legitimacy among minority communities. The peace process has brought NSAGs into partnerships with government and international actors, and provided opportunities for NSAGs to organize among previously inaccessible communities (e.g. in government-controlled areas). Where does this leave other ethnic political actors (e.g. political parties which contested the 2010 elections)?

The Peace Process, and the ‘Anti-politics Machine’


• Is the same thing happening to ethnic grievances and political agendas, as part of the peace process?

• If ethnic concerns are addressed through political negotiations, it might be appropriate to transfer some issues from the political agenda, onto the development agenda (e.g. language and land rights).

• Otherwise, international assistance to the peace process may serve to re-frame ethnic communities and leaders’ concerns and struggles, as technical problems to be ‘fixed’ by the delivery of aid and economic development.
The Role of People’s Security in Peace Building

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The Role of People in Peace Building

Peace building is essentially the process of consolidating ceasefires signed between armed political actors by strengthening institutional capacities and rebuilding conflict-affected societies to foster an environment for lasting and inclusive peace.

It is a liberal intervention, usually from the West, and thus peace itself - normatively understood as the absence of fighting - is not the only goal. Many totalitarian states for example have achieved that through brutal suppression and decisive military victories. Liberal ‘peace building’ initiatives can easily become broader state-building projects, aimed at producing a certain type of peace, one that goes hand-in-hand with the fostering of democracy, law and order, development, human rights and free market capitalism all with an emphasis on state centralisation and global integration.

There is a prevalent understanding that civil conflict arises where there are divides along ethnic or other lines and real or perceived disparities between those closest to the state and others. Therefore, peace building theory posits that the state must reach out to conflict-affected populations, providing them with a tangible benefit from the peace, known as a ‘peace dividend’, to get them behind the process and to alleviate grievances and tensions.

Focusing mostly on the peace process between the Myanmar Government and Karen National Union (KNU), this paper will argue that such a focus on the needs of populations is particularly important in Myanmar, where for decades the state and competing ethnic armed actors have essentially been fighting over people. However, while the nature of conflict in Myanmar appears to have been misunderstood, a number of ‘peace building’ projects linked to the state’s broader pseudo-liberal economic state-building project appear to be in fact threatening the endeavour for lasting peace.

People’s War. People’s Peace?

People are the primary object that armed actors in Myanmar’s decades-long conflicts have been fighting over. Therefore, at the heart of a programme for peace, must be a peaceful consensus on how, and by whom, people should be governed.

The Tatmadaw’s People’s War Doctrine developed in the 1960s in essence renders people a mobilisable resource that needs to be managed in order for leaders to achieve their political aims. The doctrine was developed to make the entire citizenry exploitable for military goals, especially in the event of a foreign invasion. Though this has never happened, the doctrine has arguably shaped successive regimes’ approaches to governance significantly and has certainly impacted
counterinsurgency strategy.

People are central, too, to the motivations and pursuits of the country’s myriad ethnic armed groups (EAGs), the majority of which claim to be fighting for the self-determination and other interests of their people. As a result, in many cases far better services have been provided to people by EAGs than the Government. In these areas traditional hierarchies based largely on respect for elders, patrons, protectors and providers have translated into dedicated support by ethnic populations for their respective EAGs.

In turn, since the 1960s the Tatmadaw has responded with population-centric military strategies most popularly characterised by their ‘four-cuts strategy’, which aimed to cut off all relations between ethnic populations and EAGs to starve the latter of sanctuary, funds, intelligence, recruits and other provisions, and turn the populations on them. Beginning as a multi-faceted popular support campaign, the strategy has manifest most vividly over the decades in mass displacement operations, centering on the total decimation of entire communities and forcible relocation of millions of people, out of EAG territories and into Government controlled pacified areas. To varying degrees, such operations have come hand-in-hand with a wide range of intimidation methods including burning of villages; destruction of food stores; laying of landmines in residential areas, fields and pathways; extrajudicial killing; arbitrary arrest and torture; as well as sexual and other forms of physical abuse.

**Empowering People for Peace**

Three reasons a focus on people is crucial to lasting peace in Myanmar:

1. Akin to the broader struggle for democratisation in Myanmar, an evolution away from dependence on armed actors will take years and depends primarily on the emergence of a capable and empowered citizenry, with an established educated middle class, to open up new spheres of influence from below. Capacity building at a grassroots level is key, with the civilian population as the primary focus.

2. At present, large swathes of ethnic populations are trapped in a vicious cycle of marginalisation, whereby state oppression and abuse has kept them withdrawn - or in extreme cases, on the run - from the state, strengthening their dependence on and allegiance to EAGs. As a result, such populations are then persecuted further by the state, subject to population-centric military strategies described above and the abuse by soldiers acting with near impunity. I refer not just to those who have at times lost their homes and gone on the run, but to millions of people who have never had a real home, such as over-60s I have interviewed that have been on the run since they were toddlers.

3. Finally, judging by research I conducted in 2012 on the involvement of under-18s in Karen EAGs and Tatmadaw Border Guard Forces, for many young males passively enduring such hardship and subjugation is not an option. While Government initiatives over the years pacified or even coopted EAG leaderships, desire for direct military action at a local level - not to mention widespread dependence on anti-personnel explosives to protect schools, clinics and other local service structures - have remained central to survival. No matter what gains are made today between political elites at the negotiation table, these highly militarised areas, fraught with insecure and hopeless populations
will not see peace until people are able to envision a future where peace means promotion of their everyday existence and ability to determine their own futures.

**Aspirations for Development**

Assumptions are often made about what a ‘peace dividend’ would look like in a given war-torn community. Typically, international actors work alongside or back the state to target key development indicators, thus building the society’s confidence in the peace building process. In Myanmar’s case, as well as the provision of basic supplies to IDPs, government-linked and NGO initiatives have begun probing a number of issues, including demining and economic development, both of which remain extremely contentious issues with EAGs and associated civil society networks. Other projects receiving overseas development backing, many loosely in the name of peace, have focused on broader centralisation efforts such as building roads and government schools, particularly in areas where EAGs have lost leverage as a result of the ceasefires. Meanwhile, the state itself, has to date seemingly dedicated negligible government funding to such initiatives, while it continues to spend over USD 2 billion per year on the military.

In the case of the Government’s ceasefire with the KNU, research I conducted in April - June 2013 found that inchoate peace projects have done little to outbalance the perceived greater insecurity stemming from the Tatmadaw’s relentless growth and ever-aggressive posture, and in some cases have in fact heightened such fears significantly. While the numbers of Tatmadaw outposts are increasing and bamboo fortifications are replaced with concrete, the burgeoning Myanmar Air Force is repositioning machine-gun mounted combat helicopters and test dropping bombs from its jets, all within clear sight of local communities.

Through initial consultations with locals and ground troops of the Karen National Liberation Army, I have found that, for example, while the Norway-backed Myanmar Peace Support Initiative’s pilot projects have been well received, their limited scope thus far has allowed only minor confidence building among locals. The positive influence had by such projects is also in competition with that of vigorous advances into the region by extractive and industrial agricultural business ventures, and overseas development projects focused on the building of roads and other infrastructure conducive to state centralisation. Roads in such areas have direct strategic consequences at a time there are no guarantees ceasefires will hold and while villagers are seeing the Tatmadaw gain unfettered access to all villages for comprehensive reconnaissance operations. Further, even non-military related development projects introduced in coordination with state mechanisms with limited acknowledgement of existing governance structures (particularly schools) have been treated with great skepticism, as either part of a broader Bamanisation agenda or as subversive to local societal structures. Indeed, such schemes are clearly a direct effort to undermine structures tied to alternative power structures and boost the state’s influence, while attempting to win the hearts and minds of EAG-linked populations.

While stating such fears, consulted locals stressed that their societies’ own development aspirations had been obstructed only by the persistent decimation of their villages, farms and transport routes, by the military they see growing around them unhindered. As one man said, ‘if we had not had to rebuild every house in every village so many times in our lives, we would have developed very far.’
is often heard, another explained, ‘we have no plans to build strong homes yet, because they will just burn them down within 2 or 3 years... their development is just for their power.’ In essence, to feel the benefits of peace, people don’t need token development projects, they need security assurances, so they can start developing for themselves. The failure of numerous initiatives to build projects around this indicates a greater emphasis on building a centralised economy than on fostering an environment conducive to lasting peace. In the process, such endeavours risk severely undermining efforts made to this end and strengthen state plans to eliminate popular forms of opposition through force and coercion.
Business and Peace in Myanmar:

Thoughts on Sector Risks, Related to Peace and Social License to Operate Issues

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Myanmar is embarking on “a triple transition from an authoritarian military system to democratic governance; from a centrally-directed economy to market-oriented reforms; and from 60 years of conflict to peace in the border areas.”1 While the courageous reforms being undertaken in “clean government and good governance” areas deserve the international acclaim they are getting, many difficult and intractable issues remain. Setbacks in any and all of the transition areas affect the others. Without real focus on embedding reforms, changes will remain as a surface veneer and many of the issues that have in part led to decades of civil war and conflict will continue. The context remains an extremely fragile one. The expectations for real results and quality of life improvements to be delivered to impoverished are clear, yet currently largely unseen.

A Plethora of Difficulties

President Thein Sein characterized some of the difficulties in his speech of 10 Jan 2013. “Regardless of … reforms, the country has experienced a plethora of difficulties and challenges during the transition period. Drawing on lessons learned from the experience in dealing with the problems associated with the Letpadaung Taung project, land rights, riots in Rakhine State and the breakdown of peace in Kachin state, the Government will continue to try to improve its management skills in the future.” A breakdown shows that many of the factors behind the problems have business links: Letpadaung Taung (mine) – compensation issues, use of force, land loss, community rights, pollution; land rights – land grabbing, uplands, inappropriate laws, cadastre issues, competing uses; Rakhine State riots – general absence of rights for groups, continued lack of development dividend; Kachin State peace/war – lack of autonomy, no resource benefit sharing, centrally decided projects. Business and investment are currently more linked to conflict than they are to peace. John Ruggie, who led the process for development of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, highlighted that in Myanmar, “heightened due diligence is going to be required.”2 The “Protect, Respect, Remedy” framework, or the State Duty to Protect Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights and the need for greater Access to Remedy for victims of business-related abuse, will help.

Key Public Concerns about Projects

Various seminars and analyses come up with similar lists of concerns about impacts for projects in

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1 World Bank, Myanmar Strategy 2012.
Myanmar. Fifteen key public concerns brainstormed by a mix of government, industry and public interest groups: poor consultation processes; no support for future livelihood; lack of proactive engagement by corporate culture; lack of responsibility to communities (safety, environment); operating standards are poor and need raising; cultural heritage impacts not considered; projects impact way of life; no budget for reasonable compensation; human rights – no proper enforcement; lack of community input (what are community needs?); loss of land – cultural and economic aspects; lack of ability for tripartite consultation – government, business and communities; no continuous monitoring; ethical and cultural change and rise of crime; health and safety impacts and environmental pollution. This list is remarkably similar to the list of concerns published regarding the Letpadaung Taung project.³ The similarity of problems in projects shows a degree of “foreseeability”. This highlights the importance of risk assessment and industry sector risk profiles.

**Rapid Risk Assessment on Business and Peace Issues**

A rapid risk snapshot on business and peace related factors by industry class was prepared. Ten sectors and a total of sixty four business activity types were assessed from the perspective of effect on the development direction and peace processes and how risk is perceived in these sectors. Basic energy, infrastructure, agriculture and food production, consumer goods, light industry, education and services were considered to have lower risk and be more likely help development. Some examples of the 64 sub-sectors considered are village based renewable energy, vocational training, healthcare, community based tourism, communications, community forestry activities.

Extractives sectors and heavy industry were considered higher risk and more likely to hinder development. Little work has been done in Myanmar on the differences between sectors and industries, with “business” often tending to be considered as homogenous from a risk perspective. This work is introductory and ideally it should be backed up with a large scale perception study or rigorous risk practice assessment. Such work should prompt interest in the sectors with lower risk. Investors taking higher risks to achieve higher rewards are externalizing the impact at the cost of communities. Forseeability of risks seems critical, and as a result of the elevated risks in some sectors, additional complications in the peace process can be expected.

**Examples of More Detailed Sector Studies: Mining**

Recent global research by Franks and Davis looked at 50 cases of mining company/community conflict.⁴ The research showed that the main costs of conflict to a company were found to be management and staff time, fines, compensation, design modification costs and production loss issues, with 50 percent of the issues dealing with problems in the areas of: pollution; distribution of benefits; access or competition over resources; consultation and communication; community health and safety; vulnerable and marginalized groups; culture and customs; consent issues; population and demographic change issues. The International Council for Mining and Metals analyzed company/community conflict issues resulting in reports of human rights abuse in the mining and minerals sector with similar conclusions.

⁴ Davis, Rachel and Franks, Daniel M., The costs of conflict with local communities in the extractive industry, 2011.
Seven Joint Recommendations for Positive Development in Extractive Industries

Seminars on CSR, Social Impact and Business and Human Rights, developed the following seven principles for improving practice in the extractive sector in Myanmar to address foreseeable risk.\(^5\) (1) A tripartite dialogue improvement between government, business and the public offers improved communication, understanding and many opportunities to facilitate further national development. The seminar focused on CSR and human rights issues shows a possible route forward in improved understanding between groups on these issues. (2) Community participation and consent in the processes of decision making would overcome many of the issues currently resulting from the operation of extractives projects (Free Prior and Informed Consent or FPIC). (3) Attention to land, livelihood, environmental, gender, cultural heritage, benefit sharing, safety, community harm and community protection issues are considered particularly important. (4) The “Protect, Respect, Remedy” Business and Human Rights Framework offers input towards improving government, business and community relations. (5) Best Practice Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and specifically a focus on Respect for all human rights under the Ruggie Framework, will greatly reduce the negative impacts. (6) Positive social license to operate will be gained by business respecting and following the various standards and codes relevant to various industry sectors. (7) Ongoing monitoring and improved legal and non-judicial mechanisms for remedy through valid grievance mechanisms and compensation offer many avenues in helping resolve issues. While prepared for the extractive industries these principles are considered applicable to many industry sectors.

Summary and Conclusions

Projects and overall risk levels are assessed from the perspective of whether they are likely to help or hinder peace and development. Different sectors have a different risk and benefit profile and while some sectors have higher risk, there are many sectors of business providing services that communities are likely to welcome without similar risks. These sectors are more likely to have a positive effect on the overall development direction and peace processes. Land issues, transparency over land use and community consent over land use issues are critical for managing social license to operate. Benefit sharing and high quality resource management are key issues to ethnic groups.

Recommendations for improving of extractive and other sectors in line with Guiding Principles are available. To help peace, more work on agreement between all parties of the priority of sectors for development and sectors to avoid, delay or take special precautions for is recommended. Community led development project approaches are more likely to have lower conflict. Many business tools are available to help in quality projects.

Considering business and human rights will help show how investment may help or hinder peace. Ideally investors and planners can then focus on lower risk options, improve risk mitigation and involve the public more.

Closing Thoughts on Community Voice

During government, industry and public seminars some highlighted the concept of community right\(^5\) Spectrum Seminar, “Sharing on Corporate Social Responsibility”, 7-8 October 2012.
of choice, or citizen led development with comments like: “Good standards are followed by companies like ------------. Yet only ###### companies come in here. Shouldn’t we have the right to invite the best practice companies like --------- to come in and work in Myanmar? We don’t want the bottom quality companies coming here! We would like to invite the best companies to come.” If citizens are in a position to choose, a more harmonious basis for business and peace would result.
Thinking about Myanmar’s Citizenship Crisis

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Citizenship comprises a bundle of civic rights and duties that together generate a civic persona or identity. In 1949, T. H. Marshall classically argued that civic rights have three main elements. The civil component comprises “the rights necessary for individual freedom”. The political component comprises “the right to participate in the exercise of political power”. The social component comprises “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society”. More recently, scholars have added a fourth element to capture the considerable racial and ethnic diversity of many contemporary societies. The cultural component comprises the right to assert and cultivate one’s cultural heritage. Today, then, while practice differs considerably across distinct societies, it is nevertheless common to hold that citizenship rights are multifaceted, spanning the civil, political, social and cultural domains. They are balanced by civic duties captured in the obligation of allegiance to a state, and any additional duties flowing from that. When these many elements are pulled together, the result is a civic persona or identity. One key issue facing any state is the extent of uniformity or diversity to be fed into civic identity.

In Myanmar, there is currently a citizenship crisis with four main dimensions. In a general sense, there is a broad curtailment of citizenship generated by provisions in the 2008 Constitution and additional legislation. Civil rights are not wholly secure, political rights are circumscribed by direct military appointments to elected assemblies at the national and provincial levels, social rights are often close to non-existent, and cultural rights are highly variable. Within this context, the crisis has three more specific aspects. One is a targeted denial of citizenship focused on the Rohingya population in Rakhine State and increasingly having implications for other Muslim groups in other parts of the country. Another is a targeted restriction of citizenship affecting all official national minorities notably through limitations on rights to cultural expression. Still another is somewhat different in nature. This is a broad arrogation or appropriation of citizenship undertaken by the dominant Bamar majority within the country, and shown by Matthew J. Walton to be similar in many core respects to white privilege in the United States and other western societies.

When examining Myanmar’s citizenship crisis, it is possible to look inwards through an historical approach highlighting unique features of national history, or to look outwards through a comparative approach that searches for commonalities with other national experiences. Looking inwards in this case tends to generate a focus on imperialism and authoritarianism. Ethnic markers were solidified during the colonial period, and borders were opened to inward migration of South Asian people often seen as uniquely alien. An extreme, dogmatic chauvinism was a feature of the authoritarian interlude that opened in 1962 and only formally drew to a close in 2011. From this perspective, citizenship issues appear to be uniquely difficult in Myanmar. By contrast, looking outwards in the
Myanmar case draws attention to the common macro challenge faced by many modern states in piloting a shift from racial or ethnic hierarchy to democratic citizenship. In this sense, although Myanmar of course has many specific and contingent features, it is by no means unique or alone in the issues it currently faces, and can certainly learn from comparative experience. At a time when many Asian states are only just starting to grapple with issues of intercultural dialogue, and with linked questions of recognition and accommodation for minority groups, such experience tends to be most extensive in developed western states. It is English-speaking settler states such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, and European states with highly diverse populations such as Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and Scandinavian countries, that have traveled farthest down this road. Together, they have helped to set international standards that are monitored by the United Nations and other key bodies. While this disconnect from Asian settings necessitates greater sensitivity in undertaking comparative analysis, it does not render it impossible.

Broadly, many western states have moved in recent decades through successive stages of civil rights equality, multiculturalism, and civic integration. For civil rights equality, leadership came above all from the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. For multiculturalism, Australia and Canada were notably important from the 1970s onwards. For civic integration, a wide range of developed states have made key contributions. Today, multiculturalism is the most controversial among these broad initiatives, with significant popular backlashes witnessed in many western nations since the turn of the millennium. In 2010-11, German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed multiculturalism had “utterly failed”, French President Nicolas Sarkozy pronounced it “dead”, and British Prime Minister David Cameron made similar remarks. However, in 2010 the Multiculturalism Policy Index reported modest extensions of multiculturalism in most major nations, and registered only one major backlash in the Netherlands. In the same year, the Migrant Integration Policy Index released similar results. Thus, though undeniably controversial, the attempt to accommodate diversity and build safeguards for minorities that is core to multiculturalism remains a key feature of public policy in many states. Moreover, while civic integration has been promoted as an alternative, triggering more assimilationist attempts to facilitate adaptation to the majority culture, it retains many features in common with multiculturalism.

Underlying these policy initiatives is a tripartite categorization of minority groups that is widely accepted in western states. Again, this may not be directly transferable to Asian contexts, but it can help to order and perhaps stimulate thinking. The three groups are immigrant minorities with only a limited history inside the borders of the state, indigenous peoples in settler states that have histories stretching back into the mists of time, and national minorities with a claim to some element of suppressed nationhood. As Myanmar is not a settler state, the second of these three categories is unlikely to be directly applicable. By contrast, the other two categories appear to have considerable relevance to its current circumstances.

The Multiculturalism Policy Index tracks eight policies linked to immigrant minorities: political affirmation; revision of school curricula; media sensitivity; dress code and other exemptions; dual citizenship; funding for cultural activities; funding for language training; affirmative action. It tracks six policies focused on national minorities: federalism; official language status; political representation; funding for language training; political affirmation; international visibility. All of this material is readily accessible on the Internet, and available for broad debate and analysis. Examining
Myanmar in this context, it is clear that much could be learned. The country does not yet have basic civil rights equality. It has very few of the policies implemented by other states with a diverse racial, ethnic or cultural mix. Thus far, it has made little attempt to develop a diverse national identity. However, the political reforms presently taking place generate an opportunity to do that as a means of building democratic citizenship.

Thinking about ways to address Myanmar’s citizenship crisis remains difficult. Zero tolerance for racism would seem to be a prerequisite, though it will need to secure visible public support from the entire political spectrum, including not just democratic elements but also religious and military leaders. In parallel, it is necessary to institute civil and political equality for all citizens. Linked to this could be full political affirmation of intercultural diversity. Moving beyond this core agenda would be still more problematic, as it would require constructive policy change in key areas such as education, the media, and culture. Nevertheless, initiatives have been taken in many different global settings, and are available for analysis by Myanmar policymakers. There is nothing to be lost, and potentially much to be gained, by taking a look.

Most of the work in addressing Myanmar’s citizenship crisis will need to be undertaken domestically. It is from inside the country, at both elite and grassroots levels, that leadership on racism, rights and a more diverse national identity will have to come. At the same time, however, the international community can support domestic efforts by signaling robust ongoing support for diversity, and by helping to fund policy initiatives in the spheres of education reform, media training, cultural renewal, and global engagement. Unless committed attempts are made to move from vertical forms of racial and ethnic hierarchy to horizontal forms of democratic citizenship built on intercultural diversity, it is hard to see how progress with the wider transition can successfully advance.
Burmesse Politics and the Pathology of Unity

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Myanmar is reaching a point in its current political transition where people inside and outside of the country have begun to express fears about reforms moving too quickly. These fears are often directed at demands for recognition (if not increased political autonomy) from various marginalized groups; most commonly in Myanmar these are the ethnic minorities that have been seeking political recognition of their disadvantaged position in Burmese society for decades.

The common response from many (mostly Burman) political leaders (and more than a few foreign observers) is that expressing these types of grievances too loudly during this fragile transition could jeopardize the entire process by damaging national unity at a critical moment. Thus, these grievances should be deferred until a point where the country is more politically and economically stable. Whereas General Aung San hoped for “unity in diversity,” I would argue that in Myanmar the discourse has been more akin to “unity through hegemony” and this construction of unity will continue to ignore and alienate non-dominant groups in the country.

Unity has been a consistent theme among Burmese political figures, from the colonial period, through military rule, to the present period of transition. Of course, some calls for unity have been for strategic or psychological reasons but in this paper I am interested in the way the Burmese Buddhist conception of unity functions an indicator of correct moral practice or orientation. I argue that this conception of unity is actually an anti-democratic impulse that inhibits the incorporation of diverse voices and perspectives into the Burmese political sphere and is an impediment to national reconciliation. Furthermore, it isn’t merely a disciplining tool of former military governments, it’s also been effectively used by members of opposition parties and groups supposedly committed to justice, equality, and democratic development.

As a moral concept, unity represents devotion to a common purpose and loyalty to a group or community; it requires subsuming one’s own interests for the benefit of the whole, something that encapsulates the Buddhist practice of rejecting the self-centered ego. In a late 19th century treatise of advice for a king, the minister U Hpo Hlaing clearly explained the moral dimension of unity, drawn from the Buddha’s advice to a group of princes. He claimed that, in an effort to achieve unanimity on an important matter, the discussion must leave out individual preferences. Disunity, then, is the result of a group of individuals committed only to their own benefit; it is a result of moral failure.

Later in the text, he warned about the four agatis (biases). The failure of a political body to act in a unified way would indicate that some or all of its members are under the influence of these biases and, as a result, acting according to their own narrow interests. A unified assembly, on the other hand, has overcome divisions precisely because its members had developed their moral practice to
overcome the agatis and act according to the ideal of selflessness. Unity then depends on individual moral development and the ability to move beyond self-interest in making political decisions.

Contemporary uses of the idea of unity also stress its nature as a moral concept. In an article in an underground journal circulated in Myanmar in the months prior to the 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” a monk connected unity to correct moral practice and control of one’s actions. “In a united people we can see that the conduct of their body and mind is honest, their moral conduct is good, and the strength of their mental qualities is great.” He went on to state that, “unity needs control/restraint through proper moral conduct and an even mind.” Note the implication that if a country is not unified it is because its people are morally deficient, unable to control their self-centered impulses.

The military conception of disciplined democracy arises from the fear of political disorder, which intensified during the parliamentary period and provided members of the military with their view of themselves as the only institution capable of holding the country together. The potential divisiveness of democracy must be mediated by a group capable of transcending potential disunity (the military) that can also impose discipline on the citizenry.

The military’s narrative of how to develop a lasting democracy is also consistent with the general Burmese perspective on popular political participation that is skeptical of the ability of the average person (pu htu zin) to participate in politics and wary of the results when it occurs. That is, most citizens do not yet have the moral grounding to move beyond their own selfish interests and participate in a potentially divisive democratic process in a unified way that would benefit the country as a whole.

A 2008 editorial from the government run New Light of Myanmar warned readers of the dangers of not practicing democracy “correctly.” The failures of the parliamentary period were “not because of democracy, but because of those who implemented democracy, and those who were desperate to come to power with egotism, attachment to the party concerned, and selfishness.” Another editorial reinforced the idea that only the military was morally capable of rising above this egotism and working for the benefit of the country. The importance of “disciplined” participation implies that most citizens were not and are still not morally equipped to take part in the correct manner without continued guidance. The strongest indicator of this moral immaturity from the military’s perspective was continued political opposition to the state.

In a 2005 speech, former Senior General Than Shwe stated that “Under a democratic system, only high education standards can ensure discipline and a clear perception of right from wrong.” He also warned of the dangers of a return to the disorder and chaos that characterized the parliamentary period and then drew on the four agatis (biases) that U Hpo Hlaing used to argue for collective decision-making and that Aung San Suu Kyi also used to criticize military rule. “Genuine democracy can flourish only when each and every citizen possesses reasoning power and is able to vote for delegates without [the] four forms of partiality.” The military instituted “disciplined democracy” as a form of moral and political guardianship and military leaders’ claims regarding the legitimacy of their guardian role refer to the purity of their intentions (non-disintegration of the Union, as opposed to personal gain) and position themselves as the only group capable of making selfless decisions with the interest of the entire nation in mind.
This skepticism is also not just limited to past political figures or the military. In an interview just after his release, the 88 Generation activist Min Ko Naing stated “It is very important to have discipline and unity. We have to show that we deserve democracy.” This conception of unity reinforces an anti-democratic discourse that questions the ability of individual citizens to (ever) have the moral capacity (ability to think beyond their own interests) to effectively participate in self-governance.

There has also been a persistent concern for the collective political action of the party system. The proliferation of political parties and events like the 1958 split in the ruling AFPFL was seen as evidence of disunity and of the moral deterioration of the government and the citizens. Seeing political parties as evidence of factionalism continued throughout the period of military rule, especially after the ill-fated 1990 elections. A 1998 article in the New Light of Myanmar stated, “As to freedom of organizational activity and expression, it can be a big danger, as long as there are political parties that still cannot renounce the way of confrontation, defiance of authority and anarchy, so there will be only such freedom within the bounds of rules and regulations.” Here, “the way of confrontation” implies that any disagreement is unacceptable and is just a first step toward fragmentation and the dissolution of the country. Whereas the phrase “defiance of authority” implies that the authorities know what’s best; they are the (only) ones (capable of) working for the benefit of all, while any opposition could only be selfish and misguided.

Finally, a discussion of unity as a moral concept cannot ignore the ways in which groups across the political spectrum have used the rhetoric of unity to quash dissent within their own organizations. In this way, the unity discourse has functioned as a disciplining tool, deployed in order to win an internal argument or move a group past a contentious disagreement. Multiple scholars have noted instances where “moralized” concepts like unity have been used to repress dissenting or minority views, by implicitly or explicitly questioning the moral conduct of those who disagreed with their policies.

While I would argue that the Burman-dominated discourse on national unity presents the greatest impediment to national reconciliation, a concern with unity has stifled difference and generated conflict within non-Burman and other minority groups in the country as well. For example, even though Christians are not the majority among Karens, Christians have dominated the leadership of the KNU and Karen ethnic oppositional identity is broadly conceived as Christian. This has resulted in discrimination against Buddhists and lack of recognition of Buddhist Karen within the movement. The split between the DKBA and the KNU is an example of the destructive effects that an over-riding and homogenizing concern for unity can have on a diverse political community.

This brief examination of unity as a moral notion also demonstrates the ways in which political concepts acquire additional dimensions of significance when interpreted within a Burmese Buddhist worldview. In this narrative, unity is an indicator of correct moral practice, of the ability of individuals in a group to overcome the natural human inclination towards self-interest; it functions as an evaluative moral concept. Those who threaten unity do so because they are enslaved to selfish and individualistic desires and unable to see or work for the benefit of the community. Those who control the discourse on unity position themselves as morally superior; they see themselves as capable of overcoming their desires, even sacrificing individual interests, to realize a goal that will benefit all.
The Displaced in Reform

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The reformists are leading Myanmar’s political reform during this transition period. However, the situation in border areas and conflict/post-conflict zones remains highly volatile and insecure. Illegal trade, the grab for natural resources, economic inequity, highly contested development projects fuel conflict, threaten communities and the country’s potential for transformation. Military officers begin to participate in peace talks, but security sector reform is at a stand-still and demilitarisation, a sensitive issue. Equitable distribution of power across the political spectrum, the peace processes, and constitutional reform remain essential to driving the reform process forward. Underneath the façade of seeming progress is a well of deep injustices. Significant new freedoms have been attained but health, education and other basic services remain severely limited, and mistrust, violence and abuse prevail, especially for the most marginalised and vulnerable. In the midst of rapid changes and exciting opportunities, there is unease within communities affect by the conflict in Kachin and northern Shan States. What happens to ordinary people in transition? What does an elder feel about being displaced? What are the real battles facing youth? Who do the children fear? What is a mother’s burning question? I would like to take this opportunity to raise their voices and to make them present to us.

There are approximately 60,000 displaced persons in KIO or non-State areas and 40,000 in State-controlled areas. These villagers fled their homes due to direct attacks or due to fear of violence resulting from military. Initially the people remained close to their villages, or hid in the jungle, to monitor the situation, feed their livestock and take care of their plantations. When it became evident that the fighting would continue, the people began to move into church compounds, monasteries and places designated as “internally displaced camps.” For weeks, I sat with individuals or groups of survivors listening to their fears, feelings of uncertainty, pain, frustration, and struggles. These individuals object to being labelled as “displaced persons” and “victims.” Their bitterness is evident: “We are neither displaced nor victims; this is our land, our ancestral land: we have lived here for generations. How can we be the displaced? We are not rich or educated like you are in the city, but we own our land. We worked our own land for our livelihood; we lived in dignity. We were forced into this situation.” These feelings are prevalent in all those who are living in camps.

The past, present and future of these individuals speak of loss, deprivation and anxiety. In the past, they have faced the loss of their life’s work and investments; in the present they contend with deprivation of needs, comforts and opportunities; in the future they will face issues related to security, loss of land, rebuilding lives and relationships. Villages remain abandoned either voluntarily or due to pressure from one or all of the many State and non-State armed groups in the area. In some areas, only those of Kachin ethnicity and tribal ties are forced to move out, whereas the rest are allowed to remain, creating suspicion and divisions among neighbours and communities. In some
others, the local population is taxed and coerced by two or more of these armed groups, straining their resources, and their physical and psychosocial well-being. For these communities, even the most insignificant things in life, would never be the same. Families are torn apart: one member fighting for the State army, another for a non-State armed group or militia; decision-making powers play out in relationships with devastating consequences; every family is obligated to provide one, two, three, sometimes all sons for the frontlines, and the daughters for health, education or social services – with the exception of the few with enough connections or influence to send their children far away from the conflict.

The shelters at the camps are basic: long structures on bamboo stilts, built mainly with zinc sheets and 9-ply wood, partitioned into roughly 10-by-15-feet sections all held together by wire and bamboo scaffolding. In some camps blue tarps are used instead of zinc sheets. For almost three months, I lived in the land of Loss. During the past years, the communities in camps and in conflict areas have gradually learnt to live with loss: personal items, house and land, livelihood, crops and animals, education opportunities, health services, dignity. At the camps, it is a daily struggle of learning to live with less: less space, less solidarity among families, less relationships and contact, less food, less movement, less work, less will-power, less hope, and less certainty in what the future holds.

In a number of camps, firewood is scarce, as are fresh meat and fresh vegetables. Some camps are miles away from where firewood can be collected, which means walking for miles – most of the time on an empty stomach; markets open once every five days, but very few can afford to purchase food; the majority of families cook two meals a day in the camps: the morning meal at around eight and the evening meal at around four thirty. Meals consist mainly of vegetables, roots, and on a market day, eggs, or a few fish; fresh meat is beyond our budget, although, from time to time, there would be a piece of dried meat or salted fish grounded into the roots and chillies.

As in every other resource-rich state, these areas in conflict have been plundered by every top dog that has passed by. Even now, whoever wins the war will battle amongst themselves to sell the state out to the highest bidder and divide the spoils of peace. While the locals have been forced to flee the fighting, their homes have been looted by hungry and deprived victors – their animals killed and eaten, their plantations and forests cut down by over-zealous patrols from different armed groups, their land simply taken over by locals or outsiders with powerful connections. The majority of elders, who have experienced armed conflict and broken promises from both the state and the KIA, believe that it is more dignified to die fighting rather than starving in peace times; the younger generation, fight their own battles of drug addiction, sexual abuse, intimidation, conscription, prostitution and HIV while dreaming of family, friends, success, and being “hip and fresh;” children – the most adaptable group of the general population – play, sing, dance under the proud but worried eyes of their elders, without inhibition as only they know how, but with a sense of caution and wariness.

It has been extremely painful to be separated from their communities, land and the comfort of their home. Equally humiliating to these proud people is the need to accept “hand-outs” and to live in often squalid and unhygienic conditions that lack privacy, facilities and security, the discrimination and bullying by local residents due to tension over resources, the inability to provide for their families or to live up to traditional, expected roles in the community such as organizing important rituals and celebrations, to ensure their children’s education opportunities, to seek life-sustaining support and to access services due to lack of income. The elderly express feelings of uselessness,
depression, sadness, deprived of their life’s work and investments – an irreparable loss with no hope of ever being restored in their lifetime.

Families in the camps commit or face violence and abuse due to the over-consumption of alcohol and lack of easy access to drugs, inadequate and unsafe shelter arrangements, risky situations, in which young boys and girls are placed, domestic violence, and unwanted pregnancies. It is extremely difficult for the displaced to generate any income while living in the camps, with consequences on various aspects of people’s lives: access to appropriate medical services, education, general sense of security, and negatively impacts their sense of self-reliance and psychological health. Where there are casual labour opportunities too these vulnerable communities are exploited and paid low wages. They are pushed into adopting risky coping strategies such as working illegally across the border, or selling self, community or family members to human traffickers. Movement in and out of camps is strictly regulated by camp committees enforcing curfew hours and systems to record individual travelling out of camp for specific periods of time. This is said to have reduced opportunities for human trafficking, military recruitment and prostitution.

When the war began, no one expected it to continue for long. As the conflict enters its second year, uncertainties as to when the conflict would end and what would happen should the crisis last longer raises fears. This awareness is very strong among the displaced population, further adding to the already uncertain projections of their future, straining their capacity for resilience and their will to survive. How do they cope? Women quite often express and voice out their frustrations, pray individually or in groups, share feelings with friends and neighbours. Men consider their participation to be a unified and collective act of defending the national cause, often making reference to their sacrifice for a worthy cause, while others cope by employing negative strategies such as drinking, drugs, abuse and violence.

What do the displaced expect from the peace talks?

- Safe, dignified, voluntary return and resettlement
- Participation in informed decision-making processes
- Fulfilment of basic needs
- Access to land and livelihood opportunities

Rebuilding lives, restoring relationships, and community assets

The right to determine their own and their children’s and grandchildren’s future
Risk Assessment, International Investment and Responsible Business Practice in Myanmar:

What Has Changed?

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In late 2012, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by the international anti-corruption NGO Transparency International (TI) gave Myanmar a score of 15 points out of 100.6 In the CPI, 100 stands for the highest standards of transparency, and Denmark received the highest score of 90 out 100. By contrast, Myanmar is near the bottom of the table, only just above Sudan. Looking at the CPI, one is tempted to believe that nothing in Myanmar has changed.

A reading of the international business press suggests the opposite conclusion. For example, a Wall Street Journal article published on 2 June begins by stating “Interest in Myanmar’s investment potential has reached feverish levels over the past year”.7 If one looks no further than the first sentence, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that everything has changed. However, reading further, one quickly learns that foreign investment in Myanmar in 2012 was only $1.4bn, roughly the same figure as in Laos, which has only a tenth of Myanmar’s population. Furthermore, weak governance – including perceived high levels of corruption – is among the deterrents to would-be investors. Some things have changed, but not everything.

International Perspectives

Control Risks recently commissioned the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) to conduct a survey of International Business Attitudes to Corruption.8 The survey covered senior legal officers and management professionals in 316 companies worldwide. It did not focus on Myanmar specifically but many of its findings carry lessons for the country as it presses ahead with its reform process.

In the first question, we asked respondents to select their two greatest concerns from a list of five potential areas of corruption risk. The results were as follow: 58% of respondents chose ‘risks associated with ensuring the smooth running of the business, e.g. demands for bribes from customs, police officers or tax inspectors responsibility for anti-corruption’; 52% chose ‘risks associated with your company’s relationship with third parties, e.g. commercial agents, consultants’; 29% chose ‘risks associated with winning business, e.g. demands for bribes to secure contract’; 25% chose ‘risks associated with doing business in particular countries’; and 12% chose ‘risks associated with business partners, e.g. joint venture partners, politically exposed persons’.

At first sight, it is surprising that risks associated with running of the business should rank so high in

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6 See TI's website, www.transparency.org, for a full report on the CPI, including an explanation of its methodology.
8 For the full text of the survey, see www.controlrisks.com.
respondents’ concerns. The reason is that demands for bribes from – for example – tax officials or customs officers - often come across as a form of extortion. The amounts of money exchanged may be relatively small – often less than USD 100 - but demands typically carry a threat: ‘If you don’t pay, your business will suffer’, whether as the result of expensive delays in customs processing or license applications, or in the form of unjustified tax requisitions. International companies are reluctant to pay because US, UK and other Western law enforcement agencies are cracking down on commercial bribes whether they are paid at home or internationally, including in countries such as Myanmar.

The emphasis on ‘operational bribes’ does not mean that other risks are unimportant. To gain a more nuanced view of how companies view them, we offered respondents a series of scenarios and asked them to comment on whether the risks were ‘insignificant’, ‘routine’ or ‘major’- or whether they amounted to a ‘deal-breaker’ meaning that the company could not go ahead with the project under those circumstances.

In one of the scenarios, we invited respondents to consider a situation where ‘judges deciding commercial disputes are notoriously corrupt’ Hardly anyone thought that the risks were ‘insignificant’ and nearly a fifth of respondents thought that this situation amounted to a ‘deal-breaker’. Nevertheless, it was striking that more than 40% thought that the risks were ‘routine’. This does not necessarily mean that they would bribe the judges where necessary. Instead, companies may manage such risks by specifying in contracts that commercial disputes would be decided outside the country concerned. Alternatively, they may decide that in the event of a dispute they will have to accept a negotiated settlement on terms that they consider unjust rather than risk going to court. The possibility that this might happen is not an absolute deterrent to investment but it is one among several factors that they will need to take into account.

In a second scenario, we asked respondents to consider a situation where a potential joint venture partner was a ‘cousin of the Prime Minister’ (the same kinds of issue would apply to relatives of any senior government official). The range of responses was striking. Nearly a quarter (23%) thought that the risks amounted to a ‘deal-breaker’, but almost as many (20%) – including a large proportion of Western companies - thought that the risks were ‘insignificant’.

In Control Risks’ view, it would be wrong to be complacent. In certain circumstances there may well be legitimate commercial reasons to work with the relative of a senior politician. Equally, there are key questions that need to be asked: what exactly is the nature of the relative’s contribution to the joint venture, and how exactly are they rewarded? To take a cynical view – which will, after all, be the view taken by regulators and investigative journalists – is there a possibility that they are being paid for minimal services as a kind of proxy bribe to the official? And what happens if the government changes?

**Implications for Myanmar**

The survey results point to a wide range of approaches to risks associated with high levels of corruption: not all companies will regard such risks as a deterrent to investment. However, a significant minority of companies will decide that they would prefer to put their money in other countries that present fewer problems. This is all the more damaging because these are the likely to
be the companies that operate according to higher commercial, technical and corporate responsibility standards.

In Control Risks’ recent experience, international companies frequently ask questions about the legal situation in Myanmar as well as the wider operating environment when deciding whether or not to invest. So far, the answers are not entirely satisfactory, and this is one of the reasons why international investment has been slower than might be expected.

Companies’ concerns are not so much to do with the letter of the law, but rather with competence of officials at every level, and especially the judiciary. Myanmar has recently signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. This is a step forward because it means that in future it may be possible to resort to international arbitration to resolve commercial disputes. However, Myanmar’s parliament will still need to implement the provisions of the Convention in domestic legislation, and the long-term objective of ensuring that Myanmar judges are properly trained in commercial law remains as important as ever.

Partnership risk is a second major concern that often comes up in Control Risks’ discussions with would-be investors. At a minimum, they want to know whether their prospective joint venture partners are included on a US sanctions list. More than that, they want to be able to assess their personal connections and reputations for integrity.

To return to the question posed by the title of this article, the issue is not so much whether Myanmar is changing but how fast, and in what direction. President Thein Sein has recognised the need to raise governance standards and take concrete steps to tackle corruption. Rapid progress is an urgent requirement if both domestic and international companies are to flourish in the new Myanmar.
Politicization of China’s Economic Investment in Myanmar: Cause and Impact

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The Present Situation of Sino-Myanmar Economic Cooperation

Due to geopolitical reasons, Sino-Myanmar economic cooperation has a long history.

In 2005, the volume of trade between China and Myanmar was $1.2 billion, while the bilateral trade volume rose to $6.97 billion in 2012. Since 2005, the China’s investment in Myanmar has increased considerably, surging from $110 million to $8.75 billion in recent 5 years. Most of China’s investment projects focus on the resources industries, such as energy, mineral industry and so on.

On May 27, 2011, The Chinese President Hu Jingtao met with the Myanmar President Thein Sein in Beijing, both sides issued a joint statement of building the comprehensive strategic partnership, through which they try to enhance bilateral cooperation.

Up to August, 2012, the total investment of China in Myanmar has reached $14.14 billion, and to Myanmar, China has become the biggest investment country compared with other foreign countries.

The Politicization of Myanmar Economy: Two Typical Cases about China

Myitsone Dam

Myitsone Dam is controversial for at least six reasons: non-transparency, minimal electricity supply to the domestic market, forcible displacement of residents, predominant use of Chinese labors, adverse environmental impacts, and disrespect of local cultural heritage.

Some analysis points out, the transition of democratic reform in Myanmar and the prejudice hold by Western countries on Chinese enterprises’ investment in hydropower project of Myanmar lead to the suspension of the dam construction.

The sudden suspension of construction of Myitsone Dam highlights the political risk of China’s investment in Myanmar. Since that time, “China’s investment in Myanmar” has entered in the most difficult time, some other projects mired in controversy and there were no more new investment projects of China since then.

Latpadaung copper mine

In November 2012, a mass protest against the injustice of demolition compensation and the
environmental pollution broke out in Latpadaung copper mine, the protesters occupied the camp of Wanbao Company near the mine, causing that the construction of the project was forced to halt.

On December 1, Myanmar government set up a commission of inquiry. On March 12, 2013, the final report of the commission manifested that, the project should continue to implement, however, it requires of necessary improvement measures. The problem of transparency is put forward many times in this report. According to the report, due to the low transparency, local people knew little about the project, which leads to misunderstanding.

**The Politicization of Myanmar Economy: Cause**

(1) To Resolve a Variety of Internal Contradictions

First, Myanmar government need to balance the domestic political interests and improve the government image. During the transition period, the most important thing for Thein Sein government is to shape a new image of government and to convert the people’s conceptions of the new government, enhancing the public’s trust. Therefore, the voices of the common people’s (or just in the name of it) has become the focus of Thein Sein government and it hope to take the opportunity to get the public’s trust. China is the biggest investor in Myanmar, so its large construction projects must attracted great attention.

Second, to accelerate the National Reconciliation and Reduce the Conflicts of Interests in the Minority Areas.

Third, mediate the conflicts between the old and new Interests. China’s investment projects in Myanmar are always under attack, the deep reason is the conflicts between the old and new interests.

(2) To Balance Myanmar’s Relations with Other Countries

First, Need to Weaken China’s Influence. China’s influence in Myanmar is growing, which deepens the anxiety of Myanmar government and the foreign powers. It is generally believe that China’s strategic intent includes two aspects: to strengthen energy security; to open a new channel into the India Ocean, becoming a real sense of the “Two Ocean” country.

Second, To Balance International Relations and Interests. In the process of balancing international relations, many countries—the United States, Japan—gradually perceived the pressure from China, so they began to enhance the diplomatic interactions with Myanmar. Especially after the United States implemented the “Return to Asia-Pacific” strategy, Myanmar has become a new hot spot of the interests game between China and the United States. The balance strategy of diplomacy in Myanmar aims to stimulate the competition between the great powers and maximize its own interests. Western countries have canceled economic sanctions to Myanmar gradually.

(3) The Problems of Chinese Enterprises

We need to reflection on China’s overseas investment patterns. Most of China’s oversea investment projects are implemented by the state-owned enterprises that is used to dealing with governments.
They tend to build a good relation with governments, while ignore the social public, leading to the opaque of the projects and the unfair distribution of the profits.

Many Chinese state-owned enterprises is lack of corporate social responsibility.

**Impacts on the Politicized Tendency of Chinese Economic Investment in Myanmar**

To Transform the Sino- Myanmar Relations from Bilateral to Multilateral

The advancement of democratization process in Myanmar changed the Sino-Myanmar relations that is an important part of Myanmar’s foreign relations, but not all. What the Myanmar government need is not only the bilateral relationship with China, but also the multilateral international relations that includes China, it is impossible for the Sino-Myanmar relations to go back to the previous state of unipolar. However, China is one of the most important neighbor of Myanmar, and China will exert positive effect on the development of Myanmar. Therefore, both of them need to adjust their mentality and promote the regional prosperity jointly on the basis of the existing good cooperation.

The Pain of the Transition of Myanmar Government: the Cost of the Democratization

In the process of democratization in Myanmar, the government also faced severe economic challenges. Foreign enterprises are cautious about the investment in Myanmar, hindering the economic development of Myanmar. Under the condition of giving priority to the political reform, the development of economy in Myanmar will be affected largely.

Transformation of the Ways of Dealing with the Disputes

As we can see, from the event of Myitsone Dam to the case of Latpadaung copper mine, the way of Thein Sein government in dealing with complicated international issues has become increasingly mature.

Shift China’s overseas investment patterns and Its Focus on the Project of People’s Livelihood

Cooperation is the balance of interests, rather than imposing the unilateral interests on the other side, the same is to the cooperation of China and Myanmar.

**Conclusion**

The politicization of China’s investment in Myanmar is the inevitable outcome of Myanmar’s political transition. First of all, China is the main investor of Myanmar; Secondly, many Chinese investment projects came into being during the period of military rule, which has become a sensitive political problem in the process of democratization in Myanmar; Thirdly, Myanmar need to rebalance the international relations and interests, improving its international status. The politicized tendency—including Myanmar’s domestic democratization, national reconciliation, external relations and other problems—will pose great effect on Sino-Myanmar economic cooperation. In the meantime, it will, to some extent, evolve into a hot spot in the multi-stakeholder game.
Myanmar’s Oil and Gas Sector since 2011: Progress and Challenges

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Since the inauguration of the new government in 2011, it has pushed forward the reform with poverty eradication and improving people’s livelihood as its mantra. Thus, Myanmar’s oil and gas sector is facing a new period of strategic development. The country is using a variety of technical and economic means to adjust the domestic investment, to ensure the domestic energy security, to make more rational distribution of resources into the exploration, exploitation, production and other areas in the oil and gas industry. A close study of the oil and gas sector reveals that the unique geographical location and rich of oil and gas resources give Myanmar an important position in the regional oil and gas industry. Meanwhile, the weak infrastructure, lack of technology and capital also bring about great challenges for its future development.

An Overview of Myanmar’s Oil and Gas Industry

Myanmar used to be an important oil exporting country in the Southeast Asia. Although its oil and gas industry declined slowly after World War II, Myanmar’s oil and gas production together with the position of its oil and gas industry gradually recovered since its opening-up in 1988. According to the BP statistic, the country has a natural gas reserve of 7.8 trillion cubic feet and accounts for 0.1% of the world’s total reserves. But the data from EIA (US) reveals that the reserves of Myanmar’s oil and gas are 10 trillion cubic feet. Ministry of Energy of Myanmar (MOE) claims that the country owns 0.58 billion barrels of oil deposit and 22.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. From a global perspective, Myanmar does not have particularly notable oil and gas reserves. It’s ranked fortieth for proved reserves of natural gas and seventy-seventh for proved reserves of oil. However, from a regional perspective Myanmar’s reserves are significant. Currently, Myanmar exports the largest volume of natural gas by pipeline and the fourth largest volume of natural gas overall in the Asia-Pacific region. Myanmar’s oil and gas production areas can be divided into two types: onshore production areas and offshore production areas. It is reported that Myanmar has a daily average production of 7500 barrels of oil on shore and 65 million cubic feet of gas.

Myanmar exports the largest volume of natural gas by pipeline and the fourth largest volume of natural gas overall in the Asia-Pacific region. Myanmar’s oil and gas production areas can be divided into two types: onshore production areas and offshore production areas. Myanmar’s onshore oil reserve is 0.5 billion barrels and natural gas reserve is 970 billion cubic feet. There are 14 onshore oil and gas basins in Myanmar. Myanmar has an offshore oil reserve of 8.1 billion barrels and an offshore natural gas reserve of 10 trillion cubic feet. Myanmar authority divides those into 3 areas and 25 blocks. The three zones are Rakhine Offshore area, Moattama Offshore area and Tanintharyi Offshore area.
Exploration and Excavation

So far, exploration and development are only carried out in the Central Myanmar Basin, the Pyay Embayment Basin and the Ayeyarwady Delta Basin. There are a little or even no exploitation in the other 11 basins. It's possible to discover new oil and gas reserves in many other places in Myanmar. Therefore, Myanmar has great potential for oil and gas exploitation. Compared to onshore oil and gas resources, Myanmar has a greater potential in offshore oil and gas exploitation. Currently, the daily productions of Myanmar’s offshore fields are 12 thousand crude oil and 1.05 billion cubic feet natural gas. With the new discovery of gas in Myanmar’s coastal areas, its offshore gas reserve is large as well. The Yadana oil and gas field in the block M-5 and the Yetagun oil and gas field in the blocks M-12 and M-13 have the highest yield in Myanmar’s offshore oil fields. The discoveries at the block A-1 and block M-9 increased Myanmar’s share of proved natural gas reserves in the Asia-Pacific region from 2.6% to 4.14%, to become the seventh largest in the region.

Natural Gas Transport

Myanmar has built more than 2000 miles onshore natural gas pipeline, the diameter of which is mostly 6-20 inch. Compressed natural gas (CNG) is generally used in industry and daily life. From 1986 to 2004, 5 CNG filling stations were constructed, of which 2 are located in Yangon, 2 seats in Yenangyaung and 1 in Chauk. Besides, Myanmar has converted 587 oil buses into natural gas vehicles. Myanmar’s CNG developed rapidly from 2004 to 2011. As of June 2011, Myanmar has 27472 natural gas buses and 45 CNG filling stations, 40 in Yangon, 2 in Mandalay, 2 in Yenangyaung and 1 in Chauk. The goal of Myanmar natural gas market is to build reasonable number of CNG filling stations along the gas pipeline.

Export of Natural Gas

In 1998, Myanmar became a gas exporting country. Two years later in 2000, it exported the largest volume of natural gas by pipeline in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, it’s the fourth largest natural gas exporting country in the region. According to the British Petroleum Organization, Myanmar became the eleventh largest country exporting natural gas by pipeline in 2006. Currently, natural gas is one of Myanmar’s main export products. Increasing gas exports helps Myanmar gain a rising status in the regional oil and gas exploration area. As the per capita use of natural gas is growing in Myanmar, natural gas is to be allocated for domestic consumption as priority. According to the Ministry of Energy, Myanmar has earned 16 billion US dollars in 2007-2012 fiscal years. It is estimated that the total export of gas set a record of 3.5 billion US dollars during 2011-2012 fiscal year.

Governance and Transparency

Since the inauguration of U Thein Sein government, Myanmar Government expresses its intention to reform its energy sector, and to facilitate the extractives transparency. Myanmar is preparing to implement Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), which will provide a platform for conversations though its multi-stakeholder group. On 14 December, President Thein Sein has appointed U Soe Thein, Minister of the President’s Office, to lead EITI implementation in Myanmar, and established the EITI Leading Authority. On May 20, 2013 Minister of Energy U Than Htay and Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Carlos Pascual released a Joint
Statement on Good Governance and Transparency in the Energy Sector. Through the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative (EGCI), the United States intends to support technical capacity-building to facilitate long-term sector management, financial accountability and safety. On 6th June, 2013, the 22th World Economic Forum on East Asia was held in Naypyidaw, a report titled New Energy Architecture: Myanmar was released calling for new strategy and planning on Myanmar’s oil and gas industry.

**Foreign Investment in Oil and Gas Sector**

Foreign investment in Myanmar’s oil and gas industry has increased since its opening-up in 1989 and other preferential policies. Especially after 2000, foreign companies’ involvement in Myanmar’s oil and gas exploitation increased significantly. Projects, which foreign companies involved in, are mostly concentrated in coastal areas. Countries investing in Myanmar include ASEAN members like Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as non-ASEAN states like China, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, and Russia and so on. Among them, companies from China and India are most active. Besides, Thailand is one of Myanmar’s largest investment sources in oil and gas industry. Since 2012 PTTEP has drawn bold plans to expand its fuel station and retail network in Myanmar. With Myanmar’s reform and opening up and the lifting of western sanctions, oil giants like Total, Chevron, Shell intend to participate in the development of Myanmar’s oil and gas sector. The Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline is scheduled to operate on May 2013, and crude oil pipeline to operate on September 2013.

Generally MOGE cooperates with foreign companies in approach of PSC. There are altogether 101 blocks for business cooperation with foreign oil companies: 53 onshore and 48 offshore. By January 2012, there are 8 foreign oil companies working in 10 onshore blocks, 12 in 27 offshore blocks. In January 2013, India has won PSC-1 onshore block bid and on 28 May signed PSC contract with MOGE as holder of 77.5% shares. On April 10, 2013, Myanmar government initiated bidding for 30 offshore blocks, By May 2013, there are 59 pre-qualified international companies that have been enlisted on the onshore blocks bidding. Competition between foreign companies brings advantages for Myanmar in pitting China, India with ASEAN member’s demand for energy to require those countries provide reasonable economic interests to Myanmar.

**Advantages and Challenges**

The Oil and Gas sector has made great strides during last two decades. Yet insufficient terminals, defunct port system and underdeveloped transportation have undermined its potential for progress.

**Vast Potentials in Newly Explored Blocks**

Myanmar’s proved oil and gas reserves have doubled in the past decade. The revelation of block A-1 and block M-9 increased Myanmar’s share of proved natural gas reserves in the Asia-Pacific region from 2.6% to 4.14%, to become the seventh largest in the region. Block A-1 locates in Rakhine coastal area, near Sittwe Port. Currently, there is no accurate figure of the natural gas reserves in block A-1. The conservative estimate of its natural gas reserves is 10 trillion cubic feet, with about 4-6 trillion cubic feet in Shwe gas field and 5 trillion cubic feet in the Shwe Phyu gas field. In addition to block A-1, Mya natural gas field (block A-3) was also found in Rakhine coastal area, whose estimated
natural gas reserve is 2 trillion cubic feet. The gas reserves in M-9 block are estimated to be 8 trillion cubic feet. These findings further improved Myanmar’s position in the international energy market.

Insufficient Oil for Domestic Demand

Compared with natural gas, Myanmar is not so rich in crude oil reserves. Myanmar’s oil and gas production has increased since 1988. The production of crude oil has increased from 4.83 million barrels in 1988 to 7.62 million barrels in 2007, with an increasing rate of 67%. At the same time, Myanmar’s oil demand is also growing. The demand of gasoline, diesel and other fuel oil has increased by four fold during nearly two decades. Diesel import accounts for more than half of the domestic consumption and the Myanmar government has to pay for the subsidies caused by the different prices in the international and domestic markets. Thus, Myanmar is still incapable of providing self-sufficient crude oil and its import of petroleum products has been on increase.

Deficiencies in Oil and Gas Market

The segmentation and monopoly is serious in Myanmar’s oil and gas market, resulting in market mechanism malfunction, business inefficiency and underdevelopment of oil and gas market. Moreover, there are administrative monopoly and market access restriction in Myanmar’s oil and gas industry. The state-running oil marketing terminals have the priority to gain petroleum products. During the privatization of state assets in recent three years, some fuel stations were sold to private enterprises, and since February 2012 private enterprises have been entitled to importation and exportation, storage and sale of oil and gas products, but more is to be reformed to break the monopoly and promote the effective circulation of products and service.

Refineries to be Constructed

Currently, Myanmar has set up only three refineries, namely, Thanlyin Refinery, Chauk Refinery and Thanbayakan Refinery, all of them locates in Yangon region’s Thanlyin town and Magway division. The oldest one was built in 1954, and can’t operate at full capacity due to the long period. The combined capacity of the three refineries is 51 thousand barrels per day, which can’t meet the domestic need. In the coastal area of lower Myanmar, natural gas power generation plays an important role. Myanmar government is eager to build new refinery. In the meeting on May 27 2013, President U Thein Sein urged China National Petroleum Corporation’s new president Liao Yong Yuan to construct refinery plants in Myanmar. It is proposed in the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines project that a refinery plant in Mandalay, with a capacity of 56 thousand barrels per day, is to be constructed in order to refine the annual 2 million tons crude oil downloaded from China-Myanmar pipeline. It can process crude oil produced in Myanmar or from Middle East. Oil products can be transported to destination by the pipeline after processing. The oil products of the refinery also can be put into local market. Therefore, building refinery in Myanmar can meet its domestic demand and greatly reduce the cost and risk of international transportation.

Gas Grid to be Developed

Although Myanmar is rich in natural gas resources, its domestic gas usage rate is growing too. Thus, it needs to expand gas transportation grid. It needs to improve cross-border gas transportation grid to
strengthen exporting capacity, and with the development of Myanmar’s economy, residents must also have more gas demand. It implicates the existing 2000 kilometers gas pipeline be expanded for secondary supply network. When conditions permitted, natural gas pipeline can be reach to some households in large cities.

Oil and Gas Legislation to Be Promulgated

Myanmar needs develop specific regulations for energy, and its legal system for oil and gas exploitation needs to be improved. Currently, foreign investment in Myanmar’s energy industry has to comply with several laws and regulations. Although Myanmar has developed some policies relating to oil and gas exploitation and consumption, the energy sector can’t fully achieve the objectives due to lack of specific energy laws and regulations.
From ‘Outside’ to ‘Inside’: The Transformation of Activism over Energy Projects in Myanmar

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The search for energy security and the establishment of reliable transnational energy markets is one of the key factors re-shaping politics and governance throughout Asia. With the energy needs of China and India in particular rapidly increasing, Myanmar, sandwiched between the two, has taken on greater significance both as a source and a transit route for energy. With the development of these regional energy markets there is a pressing need for effective environmental governance of transnational energy projects that have the potential to inflict serious and widespread social and environmental impacts. Until recently most forms of state-led governance in Myanmar were authoritarian and haphazard. With the political reforms currently underway, however, the new government is attempting to establish more democratic, rigorous and transparent forms of governance. Non-state actors, and particularly environmental activists, can make an important contribution to this transition. Historically, most activism has been transnational in nature, as it has been undertaken by exiled activists based in Thailand or otherwise beyond the reach of the Myanmar state. As the opportunities for political contribution and dissent in Myanmar increase more activism is taking place inside Myanmar, as exiled activists return and domestic activists emerge. This paper explores this unfolding transformation of activism from an exiled ‘activist diaspora’ to domestic activism, particularly in relation to campaigns against the gas and oil pipelines being built across Myanmar to provide energy for south-west China.

During military rule the displaced and rebellious borderland communities were the most fertile spaces for the development of environment movements against transnational energy projects based in Myanmar. Despite the dangers these activists often re-entered Myanmar incognito to undertake research for NGOs that were based outside Myanmar’s borders. These activists developed networks between displaced communities inside Myanmar and the exiles across the border (South 2004). The indeterminate nature of the zones of operation that environmental activists inhabited led them to undertake a broad range of activities. No border-based environmental groups were simply lobby groups but their activities included lobbying international actors, writing reports, undertaking covert field research and providing clandestine education and training in Myanmar.

This exodus from authoritarian-ruled Myanmar to engage in activism in its borderlands and neighbouring countries resulted in what can be described as an ‘activist diaspora’, which has provided activist environmental governance of policies and projects in Myanmar (Simpson 2013a). The inclusive domain of the term ‘diaspora’ has, at times, been stretched to render it almost meaningless, with academic literature on, for example, liberal or queer diaspora leading Brubaker to argue that ‘[i]f everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so’ (2005: 3). Myanmar’s expatriate
activists, however, fulfil not only traditional aspects of the term based on dislocation or ‘the dispersal of a people from [their] original homeland’ (Butler 2001: 189), but also what Sökefeld argues are ‘imagined transnational communities’ with a ‘transnationally dispersed collectivity that distinguishes itself by clear self-imaginations as community’ (2006: 267). His focus on social movement theory and forms of mobilisation dovetails with the concept of an activist diasporic community. This concept, deriving as it does from a largely progressive and democratic activist community also avoids the pitfalls that afflict some diasporic communities, such as a lack of trans-ethnic solidarity and gender awareness (Anthias 1998). Despite friction existing between some ethnic communities of Myanmar, which may be replicated in exile, this friction is largely absent in the environmental activist communities examined here who have made significant attempts to develop multi-ethnic collaboration for both strategic and ideological reasons. An additional stimulus to cooperation has been the geographic reach of both the Shwe Gas Pipeline and the Salween Dams, which cross several ethnic states and regions, precipitating a high level of cross-ethnic cooperation in the development of the campaigns. This unprecedented collaboration is the first defining characteristic of an activist diaspora.

The second characteristic of an activist diaspora is that it actively establishes linkages and provides specialist knowledge and otherwise unavailable expertise to broader campaign networks or coalitions in foreign or ‘outsider’ communities, which contrasts with the often isolationist approach of other members of diasporic communities. The importance of exiled activists to the outside groups lies in their specific linguistic and cultural knowledge together with a local political understanding, often sharpened by intense personal experiences, which outsiders, in this case from the North or Thailand, are unlikely ever to acquire or fully comprehend. This ‘insider’ knowledge of Myanmar exiles allows them to undertake covert research back in Myanmar proper that would otherwise be unachievable and to provide the expertise to outside or transnational civil society groups that is inaccessible to other activists. In this way the activist diaspora can publicise and highlight issues of particular concern to their communities, drawing the attention of outsiders to their campaigns.

The third aspect of an activist diaspora is that contributing expertise to broader campaigns and engaging with activists outside its community plays an important role in bolstering the confidence and skills, including English language proficiency, of exiles who may otherwise feel isolated in a foreign country. The delicate balance of emotions that exists in exile communities between ‘hope [and] resistance’ on the one hand and ‘helplessness, suffering and apathy’ on the other suggests that those who establish strong links both to their own diasporic community and the outsider community are those most likely to adapt successfully to their new lives (Mavroudi 2008: 70). The networks within Myanmar’s activist diaspora have facilitated linkages and communication with other transnational activists, based predominantly in Thailand, that have successfully conveyed their campaigns, on both cross-border energy projects and democratisation in Myanmar, to a more spatially dispersed transnational audience (Simpson 2013b).

**Activism over the Shwe Gas Pipeline**

Until recently most activism over the Shwe Gas Pipeline Project, which is to transport gas from Rakhine State to Yunnan Province in China, was undertaken by outside activists, led by the Shwe Gas Movement (SGM) and Arakan Oil Watch (AOW) in Chiang Mai. As under most authoritarian regimes,
political activism in Myanmar took unconventional forms so, while there were no domestic NGOs established to challenge the Shwe Project directly, concerned youth channelled their energy through alternative organisational structures. In 2004 Thu Rein, a student at Sittwe University in the state capital, set up the Association of University Stipends and Social Affairs Rakhine, a student body nominally established to represent student interests. As the details of the Shwe Project gradually emerged the Association became a focal point for related debate and discussion. As well as holding covert gatherings on the topic they contacted exiled organisations, such as AOW and SGM in Thailand, to gather more information. Their activities were eventually discovered by military intelligence and in 2009 eleven Association student members were arrested, receiving sentences of up to six years in prison with three years each for two illegal activities: ‘contacting unlawful [e.g. exiled] associations’ and ‘illegal border crossings’, into Thailand or India. These young students were taken to prisons in other states and regions – some as far away as Kachin State at the other end of the country – which made it difficult for old or poor relatives to visit. Although the easing of security tensions under the new government meant that most of the group were released in a January 2012 amnesty, four remained in jail. Thu Rein managed to evade arrest and fled to Thailand in 2010, eventually becoming the Campaign Coordinator of AOW.

Restrictions on these domestic political activities began to lift in late 2011. In October 2011 Energy Minister U Than Htay confirmed in a parliamentary speech that 80 per cent of the Shwe gas was to be exported to China with much of the rest to be used by factories in central Myanmar owned by companies that were known to be close to the military. In response to this statement and the easing of political restrictions the local campaign became more open and visible. One component of the campaign was the writing of letters to the provincial governments of both Rakhine and Shan states – the two ethnic states that the pipeline traversed – making what could be considered procedural complaints about the pipeline construction such as infringing on farmers’ land, lack of compensation and destruction of roads. A more confrontational, substantive and dissenting argument in the campaign, which was informed by concepts of natural resource rights, was the demand that the gas be used to provide 24-hour electricity to Rakhine State before any gas was exported. Rakhine State was one of Myanmar’s poorest, with the lowest per capita electricity usage in the country according to the state-run media. The emerging permissive political atmosphere convinced local activists that it was possible to make this sort of demand openly for the first time. Across the state t-shirts, posters, stickers and calendars appeared bearing the message ‘24 Hours of Electricity Now. We Have the Right to Use Our Gas’ (Mizzima 2012).

The demand for 24-hour electricity resonated with the more formalised ethnic political parties in Rakhine State, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), which participated in the 2010 elections and had parliamentarians in the national parliament, and the ALD, which boycotted the 2010 elections but agreed to register as a party in late 2011 along with the NLD. Both parties

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9 Thu Rein, interview with author, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 11 February 2012.
10 Phyo Phyo (pseudonym), interview with author, Yangon, Myanmar, 18 February 2012.
11 Patrick (pseudonym), interview with author, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 13 February 2012.
12 Soon after the ALD decided to participate in the elections the plainclothes security personnel who had been posted outside the
adopted a less confrontational approach than activists, however, and saw potential developmental benefits from the pipeline projects, with the Secretary of the RNDP, Oo Hla Saw, noting that they were much less socially and environmentally damaging than the Myitsone Dam in Kachin State. Indeed he ‘welcomed’ foreign direct investment in Rakhine State although preferring US/EU over Chinese investment due to ‘greater transparency and respect for international norms’. While Oo Hla Saw felt that they were unable to stop the project anyway the RNDP argued in parliament that the 20 per cent of gas allocated to Myanmar should be used for development in Rakhine State, setting up a ‘24-hour Electricity Committee’ to pursue this objective. The ALD Secretary, Aye Tha Aung, voiced similar opinions from outside the parliamentary system, but argued that more public participation was necessary in the decision making process and that Rakhine State ‘received nothing’ under the existing contracts. All technical labour was brought in from China and many of the manual labourers were brought in from central Myanmar. Local campaigner were now very openly arguing for overt politicisation of the gas in favour of Rakhine State, with activists arguing for it all to be kept in the state rather than being sold to China in international energy markets.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s activist diaspora has skills and international networks that could be used effectively to bolster the growth and efficacy of domestic ‘inside’ activism. Rapid changes in the domestic political and economic environment, however, poses challenges for activists based ‘outside’ to keep up with developments and remain relevant. As well as the Shwe Pipeline coming into commercial operation in the second half of 2013 there is likely to be an explosion of energy and natural resource projects over the next few years that have the potential to cause significant social and environmental displacement throughout Myanmar. Civil society can contribute to the environmental governance of these projects not only by bringing an important alternative viewpoint but, in the case of Myanmar, inside activists and those with international experience can also provide skills and expertise that are in desperately short supply in the Myanmar government and its civil service.

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Amending Constitution: Focal Point of Myanmar’s Political Development in 2013

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On Political Development

Here the political developments means that, first, public sources are distributed fairer than before, and second, powers are obtained and operated according rules more than before; the second criteria must be obedient to the first criteria; One country’s political developments are the results of the interactions among the relative political powers.

Why should we study Myanmar’s political development?

It can provide us a framework to comprehend, judge and forecast Myanmar’s situation

How to analyze Myanmar’s political development?

It need us focus on the interactions among the various political powers instead of just one political leader’s aspiration and action.

Focal Points of Myanmar’s Political Development in 2013

First, amending the 2008 constitution for Aung San Suu Kyi’s presidential dream

In the period of one or two years afterwards, amending the 2008 constitution’s request for presidential qualification will be a focal point in the Myanmar’s political development. This because that Aung San Suu Kyi want to race for the Myanmar’s president in 2015. According Myanmar’s 2008 constitution, Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be elected as Myanmar’s president because she married an Englishman, and her two sons are English. But Aung San Suu Kyi has expressed her aspiration several times that she want to race for Myanmar’s president in 2015. If she wants to realize her presidential dream, she must mobilize enough support to amend the 2008 constitution.

According the present observation, AungSan Suu Kyi can get enough votes if she was admitted to race for the 2015 presidential election. In the long past period, Aung San suu kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) that she led struggled arduously and persistently with the junta for Myanmar’s democracy. This wined Aung San Suu Kyi a coin of Myanmar’s democracy and common people’s support. They support her to race Myanmar’s next president to lead Myanmar after 2015.

15 Chapter III, Article 59 (f), of the Constitution states: “He himself [the president or vice president], one of his parents, his spouse, one of his legitimate children or their spouses shall not owe allegiance to a foreign power, nor be the subject of a foreign power or the citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign country.”
Here it should point that though NLD support Aung San Suu Kyi’s aspiration to be president, they didn’t take the actions that they used to, such parade on the street. Instead, they take legal actions to show their support, such as to participate in the committee of amending constitution of parliament, to take part in the international symposium on amending constitution. At same time, Aung San Suu Kyi also seeking the military’s support by expressing clearly her points about armed forces in the future political structure.

About amending constitution, the latest expression of Aung San Suu Kyi is that she will first lead the NLD participate the parliamentary election, if NLD won the majority, then she and NLD promote to amend the constitution so that she can be elected as the next president by parliament.

To the request of amending constitution of Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD, the ruling party leaders responded differently. Aung Min responded positively. He said he support ASSK and NLD demand. Htay Oo, a vice chairman of USDP, responded negatively. He said that there is not plan now to amend the constitution. Thein Sein, the president responded mildly, he said it will be determined by people and by the parliament. From their interaction, it can be judged that the constitution cannot be amended this year.

Second, amending the 2008 constitution to satisfy the minority peoples’ demand

According the law, the central government want incorporate the local armed forces of minority (LAFM) into the Board Guard forces. The LAFM felt that the treatment stipulated by the law were not satisfactory and refused the requirement of central government. Then the central government attacked them.

This time the central government takes the “carrot and stick” strategy. At the same time the attack was fighting, the central government also established two committees----Union Peace Making Committee and the Union Peace Working Committee--- to seek end the conflicts peacefully. In 2012, the central government has signed peace agreement with six LAFMs. The one that is still fighting with the central government is Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The reason of continuing conflicts is that the two sides cannot agree on the preconditions to cease fire.

The leaders of KIO point that the main reason of the present conflicts is the central government betrayed the 1947 Panglong agreements. They put forward that it should first resolve the problems of status and rights of the minority peoples in the federalist government and then negotiate the peace agreement. The central government insists that it should cease fire first and then negotiate the plans of political settlement.

It can be concludes from the interactions between the central government and LAFMs that the focal points of the conflicts are the distribution of the rights. The KIO want the high autonomy that stipulated by the 1947 Panglong agreements. Otherwise, the central government did not empower the autonomy the minority wanted. The sustained conflicts showed us once again that the criteria of fair distribution of rights must be emphasized in the political developments of one country. The criteria of normalization gaining and operation of power must be obedient to the former criteria. Otherwise, the results may be armed conflicts in larger scale and more efficient slaughters.
Seemed understanding this, the central government unilaterally announced that it will stop attack and seek to negotiate the cease fire in January 2013. 28 may the two sides will hold peace talk in Magweal Hall in Myitkyina Township with the participation of representatives of China and the UN.

Though the interactions between the central government and KIO have not promoted the normalization of the power operation—promoting fair distribution by the present constitution and parliament, the struggle of KIO for fair right distribution is still one very important part of Myanmar’s political development.

The key to resolve this problem is the honesty and measures of the central government. That is whether the central government want amend the 2008 constitution according the 1947 Panglong agreements to meet the autonomy of the Kachin and other minority peoples.
Cooperation and Competition between U.S. and Japan’s Policy towards Myanmar

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After the first general election in 20 years held in January 2010, an elected government took place of the military junta in March. On April 1, 2012, Myanmar opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won the by-elections and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi was elected Member of Parliament with an overwhelming majority of votes. A series of changes of Myanmar political situation brought hopes for this country’s stability and development, broadened space for Myanmar diplomacy and provided opportunities for U.S. and Japan to improve their relations with Myanmar. U.S. and Japanese dignitaries visited Myanmar continuously, launching the efficient and pragmatic dialogue and cooperation with Myanmar’s new government. Cooperation and competition between U.S. and Japan’s policy towards Myanmar will undoubtedly affect Myanmar’s domestic and foreign affairs in many aspects. Reviewing U.S. and Japan’s policies towards Myanmar, this paper will discuss cooperation and competition between U.S. and Japan, and its influences on China as well.

Since the Obama administration took office, the government emphasized Southeast Asia as its strategic priority, declaring “Return to Southeast Asia”, enhancing cooperation with ASEAN countries, proposing a new mechanism of “Lower Mekong Initiative” (LMI), and taking adjustment of its policy towards Myanmar into account. U.S. proactive flexible engagement policy towards Myanmar in certain sense is an inevitable result of the adjustment of U.S. global strategy, even an inevitable choice of U.S. “Return to Southeast Asia” strategy. From a micro view, U.S. proactive flexible engagement policy towards Myanmar was based on U.S. reflection on inefficient “sanction and isolation” policy and its judgment of Myanmar’s internal and external situation. Since 2009, U.S. policy towards Myanmar has shifted from the long-term “sanction and isolation” to the two-way “pragmatic engagement” which means simultaneous diplomatic engagement and sanction, and U.S. continuously showed its willingness to improve its relation with Myanmar, then put it into practice. During Hilary’s visit to Myanmar in early December, 2011, Hilary particularly invited Myanmar to join LMI cooperation mechanism as a diplomatic observer. Hilary’s visit to Myanmar opened a new page for U.S.-Myanmar relations, and it was an important part of “return to Southeast Asia” strategy. In November 19th 2012, Obama, the first U.S. president who visited Myanmar, met Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon, and declared that U.S. would provide $170 million financial aid to Myanmar. The significance of Obama’s six-hour visit to Myanmar was more symbolic than practical, and was regarded as recognition for the abolition of military governance and encouragement for the future.

U.S. needed Myanmar as its strategic pivot of “Return to Southeast Asia” by which U.S. wanted to impair China’s increasing influences in Southeast Asia. The Obama administration attempted to grasp the chance that Myanmar was undertaking a comprehensive reform and trying to get out of the international isolation, hoping to catalyze peaceful evolution of authoritarian regimes in East Asia by Myanmar’s comprehensive reform and the influence of “Arab Spring”.

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Japan was greatly aware of Myanmar’s fertility, the potential huge market and business opportunities of more than 50 million people. For Japan, the sea routes in Southeast Asia were the lifeline through which Japan could enter into the Pacific. From the long-term strategic point of view, Japan’s competing dominance over Myanmar’s diplomacy and its abundant resources with China is very important to maintain its maritime lifeline. In order to maintain its influences in Southeast Asian especially in Myanmar and prevent the infiltration of China’s influences, Japanese government continues to spread the “theory of Chinese threat to the south”, therefore, Myanmar is increasing fears and concerns that China will force to the south someday.

Japan’s policies towards Myanmar were the following: taking financial aid as a bait to impel dialogues between Myanmar’s government and opposition parties and reconciliation of ethnic minorities; helping Myanmar’s transition towards market economy system; keeping the coordination with European countries and U.S.; paying continuous attention to the situation of human rights in Myanmar. When the people in Myanmar had enough food and clothing, they would ask the military junta to take reform and transfer more power to them. When it became true, Myanmar could be a democratic country as Japan had expected. Japan always implemented “constructive interference” policy towards Myanmar and played a very important role in guiding Myanmar’s road to market-oriented economy. Japan kept a certain distance with European countries and the States, had the close ties with Myanmar government, and induced Myanmar to keep a certain distance with China by “the carrot rather than the big stick” policy. Japan attempted to affect Myanmar’s process of democratization and direction of economic reform by the means of economic and technical assistance, the exchange of policies and dialogues, human resource development, trade cooperation and direct investment and so on.

Affected by the Obama administration’s “Return to Southeast Asia” and “proactive flexible engagement”, Japanese government included Southeast Asia into “value-oriented diplomacy” system, trying to enlarge the camp of containing China and taking frequent diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia. Japan wanted to develop further relations with Myanmar via the transition from the military junta to the elected government, realizing the promise made by the previous Japanese leaders, paying attention to the abundant human resources and markets to seek the joint development of mineral resources such as natural gas and rare earth. As for economic cooperation with Myanmar, Japan played a more active role, trying to support the construction of democratization in Myanmar via the enhanced economic relation and contain China’s influences in Myanmar by signing and implementing the investment agreements to strengthen financial assistance for Myanmar.

Both U.S. and Japan consider Myanmar’s geopolitics location is of great importance. Myanmar is located in the central area of the contiguous plates of East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia, and it is the most convenient channel through which China advances south into the Indian Ocean, so U.S. and Japan naturally compete with China for their influences in Myanmar. Myanmar’s political elites also think the strategic location of Myanmar between China and India is more important than its abundant natural resources. Both U.S. and Japan realize that it is necessary to further improve their relations with Myanmar to balance the continuously developed bilateral relation between China and Myanmar. Though it will be a long period for U.S. to lift its sanctions on Myanmar completely, U.S. will finally do this to further enhance its influences in Myanmar and even the whole Asian-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Japan coordinates closely with U.S. “return to Southeast Asia” strategy when
improving its relations with Myanmar. Thus, when considering the development of their relations with Myanmar, U.S. and Japan pay great attention to policy coordination and close cooperation between them in order to promote the political and economic reform in Myanmar.

Japan always remains close interactions with U.S. in its important diplomatic activities because U.S.-Japan Alliance is the foot stone of Japan’s diplomacy, but it is obvious that U.S. can’t fully understand Myanmar’s importance to Japan. In order to maintain the special Japan-Myanmar relations and Japan’s interests in Myanmar, Japan not only put pressure on Myanmar but also kept close relations during the military junta. As for sanctions on Myanmar, Japan showed a different and even double-faced stand from U.S., which indicated Japan’s opportunism and pragmatism.

For Japan, it did not prepare enough for U.S. “return to Southeast Asia”, LMI and the rapidly-developed U.S.-Myanmar closer relations, and felt nervous because this situation was not the same as it had expected-to contain China by strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s elaboration of its policy towards Myanmar was a little inferior to U.S. “return to Southeast Asia” strategy, and Japan-Myanmar cooperation space was extruded by U.S. In recent years, U.S. paid more attention to Myanmar, so Japan worried about its influences on Myanmar and enhanced its cooperation with Myanmar to ensure its leading position in this region.

In other words, U.S. mighty interference would weaken Japan’s influences on Myanmar and the Southeast Asia, and the leading position in Southeast Asia pursued by U.S. and Japan were contradictory. Both U.S. “proactive flexible engagement” and Japan’s “constructive interference” aimed at enlarging their influences on Myanmar, which would cause more competition between these two countries. In recent years, with the different strategic consideration, the strategic interests of U.S. and Japan in this region were overlapped and the competition and cooperation between these two countries occurred repeatedly. Both U.S. comeback and Japan’s increased stake to gain superiority were to enhance its influences on Myanmar. U.S. and Japan would keep close cooperation to improve their relations with Myanmar and the competition for their influences on Myanmar would be inevitable, which would objectively enlarge Myanmar’s diplomatic space and improve Myanmar’s relations with western countries.

In conclusion, Myanmar is very important for China in geopolitics, border security and energy security and China also has much financial interests in Myanmar. In recent years, Myanmar implemented “multi-faceted diplomacy” and “the balance of power”, developing relations with neighboring countries such as China and India as well as improving relations with the western countries including U.S. and Japan. China hopes to see a stable and prosperous Myanmar, so there would be a certain space for China, Japan and U.S. to cooperate diplomatically with some common interests in issues related Myanmar. Facing U.S. and Japan’s recent activities, China should remain conscious and vigilant. “Return to Southeast Asia” and “proactive flexible engagement” of the Obama administration and Japan’s “value-oriented diplomacy” in Southeast Asia region and close economic relation with Myanmar aim at China clearly, planning to contain China’s influences in strategic aspect. Besides, U.S. and Japan took some other measures in politics, diplomacy, and economy, military and social culture to contain China. U.S. and Japan’s improved relations with Myanmar will not only inevitably play a role in containing China but also interfere with China’s strategic layout in Southeast Asia.
The European Union and Future Development of Myanmar

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Due to historical factors and actual demands, some European powers pay an extra attention to Myanmar. With the deepening of the European integration process, the European Union (EU) applies also a more unified policy towards Myanmar focused on “Values diplomacy” which is the basis of the EU policy on this country. With the reform of Myanmar’s new government, EU has also adjusted its policy. At same time, Myanmar’s government needs the help and aids from EU. A benign interaction between European Union and Myanmar has preliminary established, and this new relationship will exert some influences in the future development of Myanmar.

The EU Policy to Myanmar’s Military Junta

During the Myanmar’s military junta period, issues such as human rights and freedom were the EU’s most important obstacles in the relations with this country. Responding to the Burmese junta’s repression of pro-democracy activists, the EU governments agreed to impose even tougher sanctions against Rangoon. The decision extended the existing the EU ban on granting visas to more than 200 people, including not just members of the government but also “those who profit from it.” The EU freeze on assets of Myanmar’s nationals was also extended to cover more people, including generals, ministers, and people working in the tourism industry and in state enterprises. It suspended preferential trade concessions for the country several years ago. At same time, the EU banned the sale of arms to Myanmar.

In the process to impose the values diplomacy on Myanmar, the EU has on the one hand applied sanctions on Myanmar for express its dissatisfaction with the human rights situation in the country; on the other hand, promoted its values in Myanmar by a variety of channels, including the establishment of the non-governmental organizations and funding the local NGO existed.

The EU’s policy vis-à-vis to Myanmar has given the Myanmar’s military government a great deal of pressure.

At this period, the relation between EU and Myanmar even had a great effect on the relations EU-ASEAN. After Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN on 1997, and in the process of institutional development of Asia-Europe meeting where ASEAN and the European Union are the main problem of Myanmar even became one of the issues in the relationship between two sides. Since then, the ASEAN-EU bi-regional dialogue went into a process of atrophy.

Adjustment of the EU Policy towards Myanmar

Since the elections in Myanmar, the new Government introduced quickly the political and social
reforms and carried out an opening policy; the European Union has watched and supported the remarkable process of reform in Myanmar; welcome the developments towards democracy, a strong Parliament, freedom of expression, and the government’s efforts against corruption, as well as the efforts towards the release of remaining political prisoners.

As the EU is conscious that there are still significant challenges to be addressed in its relations with Myanmar, it set up the political conditions: First is to consolidate the democratic achievements so far and to move further towards full transition; second to unconditionally release the remaining political prisoners, while noting with satisfaction the creation of a review mechanism and looking forward to the early completion of its work; third to strengthen human rights and the rule of law including through enhanced cooperation with the UN, in particular to ensure the protection of all minorities; fourth to deal with inter-communal violence; fifth to achieve sustainable peace in Myanmar by addressing long-standing differences in an inclusive way, and in particular calling for an end of hostilities in Kachin State; sixth to adopt urgent action to deal with humanitarian risks for all displaced people in the Rakhine State.

The economic conditions have been set up as following: First is to promote inclusive and sustainable growth, as well as good governance to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in line with the government’s plans; second to ensure that reforms are translated to economic benefits for ordinary people; third to encourage responsible trade and investment while promoting transparency and environmental protection.

In the international affairs there are also the principles to be respected: Myanmar has to be an active and respected member of the international community, by adhering to international agreements, including in relation to human rights, land mines, non-proliferation and disarmament, etc.

With adjustment of its policy towards Myanmar, the EU stands ready to cooperate with Naypyidaw. The EU is willing to open a new chapter in its relations with Myanmar building a lasting partnership and to promote closer engagement with the country as a whole. The Council invites the High Representative/Vice President to discuss and propose a comprehensive framework with priorities for the EU’s policy and support to the ongoing reforms for the next three years to prepare election of 2015 and encourages relevant authorities in Member States and the EU institutions to proceed without delay to joint programming of development aid for Myanmar while respecting the existing harmonization efforts.

The EU plans to strengthen relations with Myanmar’s parliament by studying the possibility of assisting the reform of the police service in Myanmar, in partnership with all appropriate stakeholders, in particular with the country’s Parliament.

The EU is ready to cooperate with Myanmar for democratization and human rights by sharing the recent experience on political transition and democratization in some of its Member States and exploring ways to promote a regular human rights dialogue with Naypyidaw.

For economic cooperation the EU will maintain increased levels of development assistance, in coordination with other donors and explore the feasibility of a bilateral investment agreement. But the EU will still keep the embargo on arms. In response to the changes that have taken place and in
the expectation that they will continue, the Council has decided to lift all sanctions with the exception of the embargo on arms which will remain in place.

The main factors improving EU’s policy change is the reform of Myanmar are following: First, the achievements of social and political reforms and carried out an opening policy to the world adopted by new Government of Myanmar introduced EU to adjust its policy towards Myanmar to promote father reform in this country. Secondly, the EU realize the unavailability of sanctions policy. In fact, for over 14 years EU sanctions have achieved little to nothing in terms of forcing Myanmar’s military dictatorship to open up, as an example, Piero Fassino, EU Special Envoy for Myanmar, has been unable for long time to get permission to visit the country since his appointment in late 2007. Third, for reasons of economic interests. The EU is facing many challenges, such as the European debt crisis and weak economic development, and its economic power has declined. Myanmar is an important market for EU. Some big companies of the EU member countries keep an eye on potential future developments in Myanmar, hoping to gain an interest in this market.

However, there are also some different voices on the adjustment of policy towards Myanmar. For example the European Burma Network, a collective of advocacy and human rights groups has released a joint statement urging the European Union to delay lifting remaining sanctions on Myanmar ahead of a review on April 22, 2013. “We are concerned that the premature lifting of EU sanctions will undermine the reform process in Myanmar, and could even encourage further serious human rights abuses,” said the statement issued by Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, on March 26, 2013. Some other criticized that the EU Foreign Ministers have decided to trust Thein Sein, and throw everything they have behind him. There are no caveats or reservations—instead it’s a wholehearted endorsement of a man whom the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar twice named for personally ordering human rights abuses.

The Myanmar Government’s Response

Myanmar’s government shows welcome attitude to the new policy of EU. It’s president Thein Sein had visited EU and requested that the remaining EU sanctions be lifted during his European visit. He pointed out: “What we lack is capital and modern technologies ... all these are because of the economic sanctions for the last 20 years”.

Myanmar has shown clearly that Myanmar has high expectations of EU’s aids. In 2012 the European Commission allocated €18.5 million to address the basic humanitarian needs of over one million vulnerable people in Myanmar affected by conflict, natural disasters or ethnic tensions, particularly along the eastern border with Thailand, in Kachin, Chin and in Rakhine State. ECHO has provided €5 million of humanitarian aid to Kachin state, and €8 million to Rakhine state in 2012. EU’s aids eased the burden of Myanmar’s government to a certain extent.

In order to respond to the demands of release of political prisoners, Myanmar’s president has pardoned 93 prisoners, including at least 59 political detainees, a day after the European Union lifted sanctions. “Amnesties almost always coincide with international events. Today’s amnesty coincides with the lifting of EU sanctions,” said Ko Ko Gyi, who was released from jail in 2012.

Taking conscience of role of European big companies on the EU’s policy vis-à-vis to Myanmar, the
government of Naypyidaw will pay high attention to them in future, and increase its relationship with the big European enterprises, in particular the links with some transnational holding companies to obtain more investment and assistance from EU.

**Conclusion**

The European Union had taken the new policy characterized by the links between the values and economic assistance in Myanmar, to encourage the government of this country to continue to reform and opening up, and at the same time, the EU tries use economic interests to prevent the turn back of Myanmar’s reform.

The European Union and Myanmar has established a preliminary benign interaction

It can be expected, as long as the Myanmar government continues to implement the reform and opening up policy, the EU will continue to make a positive response, so that bilateral relations in different fields, such as political, social, economic, cultural and other will maintain a stable development.
Domestic Discourse of “Security”

Human security has been a relatively alien concept due to the overwhelming concentration on the security of nation-state. The making of the “security” discourse in Myanmar is arbitrary. It is arbitrary because it has been shaped and reshaped according to the changing power interests of the Myanmar elite. The state becomes equivalent to the nation. Hence, the security of the nation is equal the regime security. Brendan Howe and Suyoun Jang explain this through the actor-centric security paradigm.16 In this paradigm, security is an essential component of absolute sovereignty and the cornerstone of national interest. It places the security of the nation-state at the centre of analysis. From this viewpoint, state is forever preoccupied with the need to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity from foreign and domestic enemies, at the same time as it defends itself from all kinds of threats to its interest. Externally, wars are unavoidable. Internally, political stability and social order is imperative. The priority has been to ensure security with the military being assigned a primary role in the safeguarding of the nation-state.

In Myanmar’s case, a number of factors are responsible for the existence of state-centric of security. From the bitter memory of being colonised by the British, the civil war throughout the Cold War, to the unending ethnic insurgencies, the security discourse nominated the state as the most important institution capable of defending the country. This explains why the military rule in Myanmar had endured, effectively because the junta claimed to protect national security; yet, what exactly they protected remained obscured.17

Western Advocacy: Self-serving?

Maung Zarni crafts a useful framework in exploring the relationship between human security in Myanmar and Western advocacy. He argues that there are three discourses of “security” adopted by

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the West. These are: national security, global security and human security.\(^{18}\) Whereas the first two discourses have gained much attention from Western governments primarily because of their interests involved, the last has often been ignored even when they promoted the awareness of human rights in Myanmar. Western advocacy on security in Myanmar has heavily focused on the outside interests in the endurance of the regime and the way in which such regime has engendered the impact on global security. Zarni emphasises, “The third—human—or people-centred—security trails as a distant third in Western policy making. This reality is opposed to public discussions, where the omnipresent rhetoric of human rights masks its diminished status”.\(^{19}\)

As the Cold War came to an end, what also came was the shift of the West’s advocacy policy toward political situation in Myanmar. The brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in August 1988 and the rejection of the election result in 1990 which saw the triumph of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) partly influenced the change in the West’s position toward Myanmar’s human rights situation. Yet, the change was merely cosmetic. The emergence of Suu Kyi as a democratic icon fighting for democracy and the protection of human rights perfectly served as the reference point in the new advocacy policy of the West. But in reality, the West invested tremendously in safeguarding its core interests in the Middle East and North Africa. Strategically, the United States was willing to enter into wars in the Middle East so as to protect those interests, be they political or economic. Meanwhile, in 2005, the United States referred to Burma/Myanmar as “outpost of tyranny”. Despite being labelled as enemy of democracy, Myanmar has never been perceived as the United States’ core interest.

As part of readjusting its position, the American government implemented a liberal Western advocacy to protest against the appalling human security situation in Myanmar. This liberal Western advocacy was made possible because Myanmar was one of the places where the West felt it could afford to live out its liberal values, as it was pursuing its core interests elsewhere. In other words, advocacy of human security was allowed to dominate Myanmar policy discussions and media coverage because other Western interests in Myanmar were not deemed very important.\(^{20}\) In the words of Michael Backman, “Burma is not strategically important to the United States, so it is a ‘free kick’ politically to take a high-handed approach to the issue. It makes for good headlines and helps to pacify the US domestic human rights lobby, regardless of whether the approach is effective or not”.\(^{21}\) The West then imposed sanctions against the Myanmar regime, realising that the shut-down of channels of communication with Myanmar would not affect its overall global strategic interests. Indeed, sanctions became the hallmark of the West’s Myanmar policy, initially endorsed by Suu Kyi herself. Sanctions were also justified not only because of the persistent military rule in Myanmar, but also the terrible human security situation.\(^{22}\) In response, the military regime intensified its


\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.


repressive policy vis-à-vis its own people, creating an even more devastating human insecurity situation. For a long time, Western sanctions had proven to be futile.

The US Shift of Myanmar Policy

The changes inside Myanmar, at the same time, coincided with US President Barack Obama’s innovative policy toward Asia—the so-called “Asia Pivot”. Once again, the new political landscape in the region forced the United States to readjust its focus on Myanmar’s regime, rather than the dire human rights situation inside the country. The new concept of US policy toward Myanmar is now a pragmatic concept—engaging the regime and encouraging its democratisation with lucrative investments from the United States supposedly to facilitate the economic opening up after long years of the country’s economic hardship.  

The engagement with the Thien Sien government is now a product of the United States’ Asia Pivot in relation to Myanmar. The United States no longer needs Myanmar dissidents and exile leaders to legitimise the substance of its policy toward Myanmar. Together with Suu Kyi, the Obama administration has reinvented Myanmar whose old image as an outpost of tyranny was replaced by a new friendly business partner image. In responding to the opening up process of Myanmar, Washington has sought to create a comfort zone for the leaders in Naypyidaw primarily to do business together and at the same time to veer the country away from the Chinese influence. Lifting sanctions, engaging with the Myanmar elite, paying more attention to Myanmar’s political reconciliation and promoting human rights are now parts of the new policy package designed to welcome Myanmar’s political transition and to ensure the US interests in such process.

Apparently, the US admiration of Myanmar’s democratisation and of course its defence of human rights in the country neatly unveils an ethical standpoint of the Obama administration. But the real gist of the new upgraded Myanmar policy of the United States has been security-commerce centric—being wary of the threats from the old military elite and in the meantime needing to engage economically with the new regime for the United States’ own benefits. This view of the realpolitik, or in a more diplomatic term—pragmatism, is indeed dominating the West in terms of its new approach in dealing with developments in Myanmar. However, pragmatism poses a dilemma for the West. It needs to be pragmatic to grasp any opportunities which emerge in the process of transition. But in so doing, its promotion of human rights and the support for human security could be compromised. Like in the past, the security-centric view of the West eclipsed its seriousness to tackle human insecurity issues. Today, while the West finds it is important to remain pragmatic in managing its relations with Myanmar, its concerns over the lack of human security are belittled. The fact that the atrocious human security situation still persists today in Myanmar is a testament of the ineffectiveness of the new approach by the West.


Development of Transport Connectivity in Myanmar and the Prospect for Regional Cooperation

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Myanmar stands at the conjunction of Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Asia. Due to its strategic location, Myanmar plays an irreplaceable role in bridging separate and landlocked countries and regions together. Hence, regional transport connectivity in a large part hinges on Myanmar’s progress in this regard.

Confronted by many difficulties such as limited financial resources and technology capabilities, Myanmar’s transport infrastructure construction since 1988 has been mostly inward-looking. In order to fully utilize Myanmar’s comparative advantages and generate economic benefits for Myanmar and the region at large, it is necessary to deepen multi-lateral cooperation and make concerted efforts to promote regional transport connectivity centered on Myanmar.

Improvement of Transport Connectivity in Myanmar

Myanmar has made much progress in the area of transport infrastructure construction since 1988. However, as constrained by limited resources and economic sanctions, there is still much work to be done on domestic front and the progress on improving regional connectivity is limited.

1. Progress on Transport Infrastructure Construction

Great achievement has been seen in road construction since 1988. Previously, before 1988, there were only 13,635 miles of roads maintained by Public Works of the Ministry of Construction. By the end of 2011, Public Works has extended the road to over 24,000 miles in the entire nation. Particular effort has been given to the Yangon-Mandalay expressway and road construction on the western bank of the Ayeyawady River, which has lagged behind the eastern side in development due to poor transport conditions.

As to railway, Myanmar has made tremendous progress in railway construction in last two decades. Before 1988, there were 1,976 miles of railroads in the country, of which 1,924.75 miles were built before 1948, and only 51.6 miles were built from 1948 to 1988. Since 1988, construction of railway has been expedited. By April 2011, 1,048.95 miles more railway had been added to the existing railway system and the total length of railway has exceeded 3,000 miles. The government plans to further extend the railway system by a rate of building 250 miles railroads annually.

From Myanmar government’s point of view, in terms of importance in socio-economic development, Yangon-Mandalay railroad stands first, Mandalay-Myitkyina railroad comes second.
Yangon-Mawlamyine-Ye is third and Yangon-Pyay is fourth\textsuperscript{27}. In the meantime, mush focus has been put on construction of railroads to areas formerly not linked with the central part of Myanmar. The aim is to promote economic development in a regionally balanced way, so as to promote equitable development of all parts of the country.

Myanmar has also made great progress in the area of air and water transportation since 1988, although the achievements might not be as conspicuous as those achieved in road and railway construction.

2. A Similar Pattern Observed on both Road and Railway Construction

Despite of the above-mentioned achievements, the overall progress on transport connectivity is slow and Myanmar still has a long way to connect itself with its neighbors.

Although Asia Highways, ASEAN\textsuperscript{28} Highways and GMS\textsuperscript{29} Economic Corridor projects have been stated as government priorities, in reality, road construction is inward-looking and little progress has been made on outbound projects. For instance, nearly two third of the Asian Highway routes in Myanmar are Class III road and nearly one third are still below Class III roads. A similar pattern could be observed on railway construction, with emphases having been put on domestic front, and little progress having been made to bridge the missing links with neighboring countries. Major missing links of TAR\textsuperscript{30} still exist in Myanmar as it was ten years ago.

Opportunities and Challenges

Deepening regional cooperation on transport connectivity will bring Myanmar and neighboring countries many benefits.

1. Market Access and Economic Cooperation

Improvement on regional connectivity will provide the countries in the region with easier market access to the vast regional market. Myanmar’s neighbors--China, India, Bangladesh and other ASEAN member countries, constitutes a huge market with a total population of over 3 billion.

Regional integration is gaining momentum with the establishment of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and the coming ASEAN Economic Community. Other regional cooperation mechanisms such as GMS, SAARC\textsuperscript{31}, BIMSTEC\textsuperscript{32} are also coming along. As a result, regional FDI\textsuperscript{33} and technology transfer will increase, together with more job opportunities. As export-oriented labor-intensive industries are phasing out of the coastal areas of China, Myanmar could become a major production center of Asia considering its competitive labor costs and advantageous location. Moreover, improvement on transport connectivity will greatly promote the development of logistics and tourism in the region, and create more jobs in the service sector.

\textsuperscript{27} New Light of Myanmar, March 15, 2011 p.8
\textsuperscript{28} ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
\textsuperscript{29} GMS: Greater Mekong Sub-region
\textsuperscript{30} TAR: Trans-Asian Railway.
\textsuperscript{31} SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
\textsuperscript{32} BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
\textsuperscript{33} FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
2. Challenges and Difficulties Confronting the Regional Routes thru Myanmar

Financing and technical constraints have become the two most prominent and recurring problems hampering the construction of regional routes. Besides, each route has its own particular problems. Taking reference from the GMS transportation and logistics cooperation, exorbitant and unpredictable transit charges, complex cross-border procedures and poor condition of transport infrastructures are usually cited as major obstacles. Problems usually amass at border areas and security problems constitute a big challenge in and around Myanmar. Lack of mechanisms for sharing the benefit and cost fairly among the stakeholders is also a problem. In addition, there could be externalities brought about by improved regional connectivity such as trafficking of people, drugs and protected wildlife coming with improved transport facilities.

The Way Forward

To promote regional connectivity, it is necessary for stakeholders in the region to deepen multilateral cooperation and assist Myanmar in transport infrastructure construction.

1. To Strengthen Multi-lateral Cooperation

In the new era since the democratic government sworn in, Myanmar is returning to its long-cherished tradition of neutrality, and it is in Myanmar’s best interests to maintain a delicate balance of powers. It is critically important for Myanmar to utilize its geographical advantage to foster regional cooperation, channel all the international and regional resources to domestic constructive purposes while carefully avoiding becoming a battle ground for cut-throat geopolitical struggle and missing the golden opportunity for long overdue development.

For China, a stable, prosperous and open Myanmar is in China’s interests, especially for its landlocked and underdeveloped Southwest areas. That’s why it is China who first provided platform for Myanmar-U.S. dialogue a few years ago. It is also in the interests of other neighboring countries of Myanmar to see its promising economic potential being full realized.

To improve regional connectivity centered on Myanmar is of great importance for regional cooperation. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a regional multilateral cooperation mechanism centered on Myanmar. The mechanism, in the initial stage, should involve all the immediate stakeholders in the region, particularly Myanmar, India, Bangladesh, Thailand and China, and should follow the principle of inclusiveness, open to regional and global stakeholders in the long run.

Some efforts have been made in this regard. In May 2013, India and China jointly proposed the BCIM\textsuperscript{34} Economic Corridor initiative following a successful car rally from Kolkata to Kunming via Bangladesh and Myanmar in February and March 2013. Meanwhile, the U.S.A. is floating the idea of developing an India-Pacific Economic Corridor through Bangladesh and Myanmar. Japan is making plans to construct high speed trains for Myanmar while China, in cooperation of Korea, is considering setting up factory for producing locomotives for the high speed train. In the future, more concerted

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\textsuperscript{34}The BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum involves Bangladesh, China (Yunnan), India (NER and West Bengal) and Myanmar, which was started with the Kunming Initiative in 1999, with the aim to “strengthen regional economic cooperation and cultural exchanges and to make the BCIM area the real ‘Suvanabhumi’ (golden land) as they figure in ancient legends.”
efforts are needed to provide more assistance in order to further improve regional connectivity.

2. A New Master Plan on Regional Connectivity is in Need

It is necessary to consider the overall situation of regional connectivity, taking into account all the existing routes and planned or proposed routes. A new master plan for regional cooperation on transport connectivity should be drawn up with flagship and pilot projects being identified.

3. To Establish Mechanisms for Better Sharing of Benefits and Costs

Transport routes and economic corridors in Myanmar can be regarded as “club goods” for the region around Myanmar. Improvement of the transport conditions in Myanmar will benefit all the regional stakeholders. Therefore, a set of benefits and costs sharing mechanisms should be established, and measures should be taken to remedy the hidden costs in social and environmental areas.

4. To Reduce Non-Physical Barriers and Enhance Interoperability

Taking reference from the experience of GMS Cross-border Transport Agreement (CBTA), it is also recommended that a similar multilateral agreement be reached among Myanmar and its neighbors to facilitate customs clearance procedures and reduce transport time and costs in the region.

Through implementation of these measures, it is hoped that a seamless regional logistics network be established eventually, so as to fully realize the potential of infrastructure interconnectivity in the region, and the benefits of regional cooperation can be reaped and shared among all the countries in the region.
Myanmar’s Political Transformation and New Development of China-Myanmar Relations

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China and Myanmar are friendly neighbors, sharing the profound “pauk-phaw” (fraternity) friendship with cross-border ethnic peoples living together. They are the first Asian countries that advocated the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the code of conduct for the state-to-state relationship. Myanmar has adhered to the “One-China” policy and supported China’s core interests. China has supported Myanmar’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Myanmar and China have constructed the strategic corridor of energy and commerce connecting the landlocked Southwest China to the Indian Ocean. They are the two key stakeholders in the proposed Four-State Economic Corridor among China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India. They are the cooperative partners of the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation and the four-state Joint Patrolling against organized crimes over the Mekong River, greatly contributing to the shipping safety on the river. China is Myanmar’s largest investor with an investment totaling $12.32 billion in 2010. In 2011, the bilateral trade volume reached $6.5 billion, seeing an annual increase of 46.3 percent. China’s non-financial direct investment in Myanmar that year was $460 million, increasing 41.4 percent over that in 2010, making China Myanmar’s second-largest trading partner behind Thailand. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (CAFTA) was realized on 1 January 2010 as over 90 per cent of products classified by ASEAN-6 and China have been eliminated. The CLMV countries, including Myanmar, will fully implement the CAFTA on 1 January 2015.

China is happy to see Myanmar emerging from decades of the military rule and diplomatic isolation, shaking off the Western sanctions by conducting political and economic reforms, and cultivating diplomatic space of national reconstruction. Under the new civilian government, China-Myanmar relations have opened a new page of their traditional friendly relationship. President U Thein Sein visited China immediately after assuming the presidency in May 2011. The joint statement on establishing the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership was signed between China and Myanmar. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with U Wunna Maung Lwin, his counterpart from Myanmar, at the sidelines of ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting and related meetings held in Brunei in July 2013. Wang described their bilateral relations by quoting two famous Chinese sayings “time reveals a person’s heart” and “a friend in need is a friend indeed.” Wang reaffirmed that China will, as always, adhere to a friendly policy towards Myanmar and support Myanmar to pursue a path of development that conforms to its conditions and that, such a traditional friendly relationship should rather be strengthened, not weakened under the new situation. Myanmar’s Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin said that Myanmar cherished the traditional friendship with China and thanked China for having long offered valuable support and assistance. He reaffirmed that “Myanmar is in a
period of reform and transition, but we will never change our good-neighborly and friendly cooperative relations with China.”

**China Supports Myanmar’s Political Transformation**

Since the new civilian government was established in March 2011, Myanmar’s political transformation has experienced the two phases. The first phase could be defined as the one of political rectification; and it has now ushered in the second phase of political democratization.

With the seven-step roadmap toward democracy, the new constitution adopted in 2008 came into force. The elections conducted in November 2010 officially ended the Junta’s rule in Myanmar. The civilian government was sworn-in in March 2011. China has strongly supported the Junta’s roadmap toward democracy, the democratic election in 2010 and the new Government. Chinese official statements and media reports held positive and supportive positions on political development in Myanmar. The smooth elections provided an opportunity for the international community to encourage the new civilian government to move in the direction of greater openness and reform and commit it to national reconciliation and economic development.

President Thein Sein-Aung San Suu Kyi meeting on 19 August 2011 was “the first step toward national reconciliation.” President Thein Sein announced in 2011 that his government would allow exiles to return home when their offences would be considered leniently. Since then, the new government has released hundreds of prisoners, including political prisoners. Myanmar government has formed a National Human Rights Commission to investigate reported abuses in the country. The 15-member commission of retired civil servants will safeguard citizens’ fundamental rights as specified in the 2008 constitution. The election law and Party registration bill have been revised to pave the way for opposition parties to register as legal political parties, including the National League for Democracy. The New Government has lifted the censorship of the media and the private newspapers and magazines and the television stations have been published and operated.

The government has started peace talks with armed ethnic groups. The government has also formed a national peace committee to deal with groups seeking peace talks. The new government has signed ceasefire agreements with 11 leading ethnic armed groups. The talks with the KIA for a ceasefire agreement are under way with the support of the international community. Although there have been conflicts and clashes between the Myanmar military and some armed ethnic groups, the government has started the process of negotiations with several armed ethnic groups and at least temporarily shelved the BGF plan.

The second phase is characterized by preparations for the 2015 elections. Suu Kyi and Shwe Mann have announced the presidential bid, and 11 ethnic parties have decided to create one party under the name of Federal Union Party, eyeing the 2015 elections. These new political developments have lifted the certain of political democratization. The key issue is constitutional amendment: Whether Suu Kyi is qualified to run for the presidency and How to share power and interests between the Federal government, the local minority authorities within the federal context, and how to deal with sectarian conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims and other minority communal groups. The
international community is watching the interplay of the internal and external political forces released by the political transformation in Myanmar.

**New Development of China-Myanmar Relations**

After the new government was established, Myanmar’s president U Thain Sein visited China and the two governments signed the joint statement on establishing the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership between China and Myanmar. In June 2013, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited Myanmar and Called on President U Thein Sein. During his visit, both governments signed the agreement on implementing the Action Plan of Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership and further pushing forward the process of neighborly and friendly cooperation.

With the development of political and social diversity in Myanmar in the process of democratization, China has adjusted its policy to Myanmar with emphasis of public diplomacy. Some geo-strategists, security experts, and policy analysts have distorted this diplomatic move as a China’s effort to colonize Myanmar or encircle other neighbors, or dominate in the Indian Ocean. I would like to explain the current dynamic China-Myanmar relations from a Chinese perspective. Although China’s approach may differ from others’ approaches, its general goals are similar. The goals China has pursued:

China has appointed its capable ambassador Yang Houlan to Myanmar and an experienced senior diplomat Wang Yingfan as special envoy to Asian affairs, first concentrating on dealing with developing China-Myanmar relations.

China has seen Myanmar as a good neighbor, a cooperative partner, and a close friend. Myanmar is also seen as a land bridge that gives access to the Indian Ocean and enables China to bypass the Malacca Straits from the geostrategic perspective.

China has support Myanmar’s national reconciliation and domestic unity through constructive dialogue with the opposition and through negotiating peace agreements with armed ethnic groups. China has been a biggest investor and improved its infra-structure by the connectivity projects. Chinese government and Chinese companies have paid attention to the social obligations and environmental issues related to their investments.

China has supported Myanmar’s chairmanship of the ASEAN in 2014-2015 and supported this nation’s efforts to participate in regional cooperation, particularly participating in the course of the ASEAN community building. In developing their bilateral relations, China has adhered to the principles of sovereign equality, friendly consultation on an equal footing, and mutual benefits and win-win cooperation.

China has strengthened its efforts to engage with opposition parties and social groups as well as consolidated its official government-to-government relations. Chinese government has invited the ruling USDP delegation to visit China. China has also invited the NLD delegations and leading minority ethnic parties or groups to visit China, strengthening people-to-people contacts and consolidating
the social base of China-Myanmar friendship and cooperation.

**Conclusion**

The whole nation is shifting to an agenda of political and economic liberalization, a process remarkably initiated by positive interactions between President U Thein Sein and Daw Aung Shan Suu Kyi. However, a number of challenges is facing the new government and these are “serious, deep-seated and long-standing” problems. The Myanmar people expect that this political process will be conducive to political reconciliation, social stability, and economic development. Minority ethnic groups hope that peace will be achieved by negotiating new peace agreements with the civilian government. The 2008 constitution excluded most of the ceasefire groups’ demands for ethnic self-determination. It should decentralize authority, particularly in the fields of development and social welfare, to the new state-level administrations. The fate of the ceasefires lies with the new government. The international community has significant interests in “stabilizing” Myanmar.

The international community is expecting the new process of national reconciliation and economic development sustainable and irreversible. The new government needs to cope with the five “balancing” issues:

1. Balancing of political democratization agenda and economic development agenda. Any political reform agenda without people-centered and development-oriented agenda are doomed to fail when people do not benefit from them.

2. Balancing of release of “political prisoners” and return of the internally displaced refugees. Previous and ongoing armed conflicts have forced over half-a-million people to flee their homes, with 150,000 refugees and some 2 million migrant workers crossing the border to seek refuge and livelihood in the neighboring countries.

3. Balancing political reconciliation between the opposition and the government and the peace agreements between the armed ethnic groups and the federal governments.

4. Balancing the relations with the dominant Buddhist population and with the minority communal groups in terms of social and economic policy making.

5. Balancing relations with all key stakeholders or major players in the region and the world.

We are happy to see that the new government has been making active efforts to maintain the positive momentum of conducting domestic reforms and pursuing friendly relationships with all countries, particularly neighboring countries.
China-Myanmar Relations (2011-2013): Promoting China’s Image in Myanmar

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With the recent democratization in Myanmar, the society of Myanmar is heavily influenced by Western value systems such as democracy, human rights, freedom, and good governance. More international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are coming into Myanmar to encourage civil society and to strengthen nascent democratization process. From that sense, in the increasingly active Myanmar’s civil society, you may not survive if you are not talking about human rights.

Currently, international relations and Myanmar are widely being discussed within news journals in Myanmar including China-Myanmar relations. Many writers write about the relations between China and Myanmar from different point of views. Some write that Myanmar should be closer to the US. Some write Myanmar should be closer to European countries. Some write Myanmar should maintain relations with China as Myanmar cannot choose its neighbors. Among the critics, one common thing is that all stakeholders in politics of Myanmar do recognize the importance of China in the future of Myanmar. Many experts also agree that current image of China in Myanmar is severely damaged as China supported ex-military regimes in Myanmar neglecting the voice of the people of Myanmar under suppression.

People in Myanmar generally feel that China exploited Myanmar during its hard times meaning that China supported the military mechanism of Myanmar ignoring democracy, human rights and good governance. In turn, China purchased natural resources of Myanmar with cheap prices. As a result, Myanmar had become poorer more and more relying on China for everything. In this paper, how China can promote its image among Myanmar people will be discussed.

It is important for China to understand Myanmar and to conduct strategic public relations diplomacy. In doing so, the role of Chinese embassy in Myanmar is important as the embassy serves as the image of China in Myanmar. Before writing the paper, I met around 20 people from the class of Peace, Democracy & Development (MDRI-CSIS) in Yangon and also met with taxi drivers and some people on the streets. Based on the information obtained, in the presentation, there are recommendations for China to promote China’s image in Myanmar.

In the past, China worked with the Government of Myanmar as the Government was the only main stakeholder in the politics of Myanmar. However, today’s Myanmar is changing meaning there are more than one stakeholder such as civil society, political parties and the media. In order to implement a powerful public diplomacy in Myanmar, China should establish an effective public relations department at the Embassy of China in Yangon. Local political officers and media officers should be hired at the department in order to garner updated information and to keep abreast with the changes. Unlike the US embassy, British Embassy and Japanese Embassy in Myanmar, people
have little information about what the Chinese embassy is doing in Myanmar. China should also build Chinese Centers in Myanmar to provide cultural exchange programs (like Confucius Centers). In Yangon, the American Centre and British Council are very popular among the Youth in Myanmar to learn English and Western culture, but no people go to the Embassy of China in Yangon to learn Chinese culture. In order to raise the awareness of Myanmar people on China, China can also advertise its achievement and values through private media in Myanmar.

In Chinese project areas, long-term development projects for local people should be considered. China can do it through local NGOs or can set up a new NGO that can implement the values and interests of China. Chinese projects in Myanmar are also under critics for not creating enough job positions for Myanmar’s work forces meaning that China brings their own workers from China. Most senior positions are occupied by those who speak Chinese so Chinese projects are just for China. China should also send medical teams and other humanitarian teams to support vulnerable people in Myanmar. Meeting closely with local people will be one of the best tools to win minds and souls of Myanmar people. Myanmar is now in the process of democratization so it is important for China to understand on Myanmar meaning that the politics of Myanmar is more and more complex. So, China should regularly invite independent scholars/researchers to China and discuss about the politics of Myanmar. Students in Myanmar have little information about scholarships from China, so people think that Chinese scholarships are just for Chinese meaning that if you do not speak Chinese, you will not win Chinese scholarships. In order to promote human resource development, China can receive more Myanmar students allocating the quota for them.

In the views of Myanmar people, Myanmar girls are often persuaded to China through human-trafficking and are forced to marry to Chinese disabled men or those who have mental problems. People think that China does not take enough actions against those crimes so China can take more action on it and should also let people know how China is combating on it through private media. If Chinese leaders visit Myanmar, they should go and talk to university students and civil organizations. For example, Western leaders visited Myanmar and met with civil societies. Japanese leaders also visited Myanmar and met with civil organizations and even they played with children meaning that within minutes, Japan won the hearts of Myanmar people. In order to strengthen people-to-people relations, China can also send its movie stars or singers to Myanmar to meet with local people as ambassadors. Like the US and EU, China should allow Myanmar a special trade opportunity and can write off some debts. In order to encourage the growth of manufacturing and create more job opportunities in Myanmar side, China should take some measures to increase imports from Myanmar, so that the trade imbalance between the two countries can be relieved. China also should examine previous contracts with Myanmar during military regimes as some Myanmar people think that the Military regime in Myanmar sold out all resources to China before they quitted the power. Finally, China should work more closely with NLD and should invite Aung San Suu Kyi to China to discuss current China-Myanmar relations. China can take this opportunity letting Aung San Suu Kyi know what China like or dislike.
China’s Investment in Myanmar under Its Political and Economic Reform

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By 2012, China has invested more than $ 14 billion in Myanmar, accounting for about 50% of Myanmar’s total foreign investment, which makes China the largest investor of Myanmar. Myanmar’s political and economic reform brings both new opportunities and challenges to Chinese investment. Myanmar’s new Foreign Investment Law and its efforts to open monopoly industries to the private sector are attractive for foreign investors, including China. However, the suspension of Myitsone dam and the protest against Latpadantaung Cooper makes Chinese investors suffers a lot. Facing the new situation, both the Chinese government and enterprises have adjusted their policy for investing in Myanmar.

What Has China’s Investment in Myanmar Changed since 2010?

Chinese investment in Myanmar declined. By August 2012, China has invested a total of $ 14.11 billion in Myanmar, ranking the first. The investment is mainly in oil and gas, electricity, mining and manufacturing. However, it’s reported that no new Chinese investment went to Myanmar after the Myitsone Dam was suspended in 2011. The effect of the reform carried out by the new government has yet to be observed. Some Chinese enterprises have stopped to invest in the Northern Myanmar on in recent two years. Some even plan to withdraw from Myanmar to Laos.

The Chinese government has adjusted its Myanmar policy to come up with the new situation of China-Myanmar economic cooperation. A senior diplomat Wang Yingfan was appointed as the representatives of Asian affairs at the beginning of 2013, in charge of Myanmar affairs. Yang Houlan, the new Chinese ambassador to Myanmar, is actively contact with all parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of Generation 88. Chinese embassy in Myanmar registered in the Face Book, viewing it a channel to communicate with Myanmar public. Meanwhile, the Chinese government upgraded the environmental standards for going-out Chinese enterprises. In February 2013, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environment jointly issued the Guidelines on Environmental Protection in Overseas Investment and Cooperation, which is the first of its kind in China. The guideline makes it clear that the going-out Chinese enterprises should abide by the laws and regulations of the host countries and fulfill the responsibility of environmental protection. Chinese enterprises have to get a recommendation from the provincial (municipal) commercial department before invest in Myanmar after March 2013.

Facing the complicated situation in Myanmar, some Chinese enterprises introspected on their past behavior, and took some actions. They pay more attention and invest more to fulfill social responsibility, promote transparency, engage with local media actively and try to “do more and talk less”. China Power Investment Corporation, the contractor of the Myitsone Dam, makes great efforts
to try to change Myanmar’s view on the dam, including investing Myanmar media to China to enhance communication and dialogue with the local community. In addition to pay attention to environmental protection, the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline contractor has invested roughly $20 million to improve the infrastructure along the pipeline. It constructed 45 schools, 2 kindergartens, 3 hospitals and 21 medical stations and Maday reservoir and some electric transmission line in Rakhine State. Wanbao Minng plans to build new school and library around the Latpadantaung Copper and rebuild the road.

Prospect of China’s Investment in Myanmar

Myanmar will be more pragmatic towards foreign investment. The investigation report on protest against Latpadantaung Copper points out that the copper project is an officially signed bilateral project, unilateral suspension will damage Myanmar’s reputation, investors’ confidence, bilateral relations and the public’s long-term interest. It shows that despite of some unfriendly behavior against foreign investment, the Myanmar government and the public will take a more pragmatic and impartial attitude towards foreign investment for the interest of the country and its people.

Western countries’ return to Myanmar will affect but can’t replace Chinese investors. The U.S. announced the suspension of economic sanction on Myanmar in May 2012 and President Obama made a historic visit to Myanmar in the November. The EU officially removed all sanctions against Myanmar except for arms embargo in April 2013. A month later, Japan announced to provide Myanmar with 91 billion yen ODA and exempted 200 billion yen debt. However, Myanmar is not ready for large investment at present due to its backward infrastructure is backward and unsolved ethnic and religious crisis. In addition, the U.S. hasn’t completely abolished its sanction and not fully recovered from the global economic crisis. EU is in the debt crisis. Thus, it’s unreality for Myanmar to count Western countries on large-scale investment and assistance in the near future.

Generally speaking, there are three main features of China’s investment in Myanmar: holding the bottom line, waiting and seeing, and gradually improving. Holding the bottom line is to avoid another Myitsone Dam Event and prevent the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline from huge impact. And China won’t stop the effort to get the Myitsone Dam re-start. The on-going Chinese projects are long-term with huge investment, which will be carried out continually unless there is any accident. Waiting and seeing means China will continue to observe the progress and result of Myanmar’s political and economic reform, as well as its impact on Chinese investment. This feature may last until the 2015 election has been held or even longer. The trend of slow increasing of China’s investment in Myanmar won’t be changed as long as the issues mentioned above haven’t been solved or Myanmar’s situation is still unclear. Gradual improving includes two aspects. One is that the Chinese government will enhance its guidance for Chinese enterprise in operation, environmental protection and public relation maintain. The other is that Chinese enterprises will pay more attention to operation strategy, environmental protection and social responsibility, as well as political, economic and social risks during the operation.

Conclusion

China is the largest investor of Myanmar. Great changes have taken place in Myanmar’s internal
affairs and diplomacy since the new government took office in 2011. Although there is uncertainty in Myanmar economy, the overall prospect is optimistic. In the recent two years, the new government introduced several economic laws and regulations. It will continue to attach importance on economic development and attracting foreign investment. Myanmar market will be more mature, and its investment environment will be more open and in line with international practice. The current Myanmar market is just starting rising, with both risk and opportunities. Facing such challenges and opportunities, Chinese enterprises should be more calm, positive and objective.
State Transformation and the Geography of State Power:

Exploring Cross-border Development between China and Myanmar

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Owing to China’s conservative rhetoric on state sovereignty but also because many countries feel uneasy with China’s growing influence, literature on China’s foreign policy remains dominated by conventional International Relations theories that adopt a specific understanding of the state. In this conceptualization, the state incorporates the core features of some form of central government with exclusive authority over a territory and a defined population. The model moreover implies fairly neat distinctions between dynamics inside and outside a state’s geographical boundaries and between the public sphere of politics and the private sphere of society and economics.

Being an ideal type it does not directly portray the ‘real world’. Yet, in recent years many scholars pointed out that deviations from this standard model are key in understanding today’s cross-border relations and they take issue with the dichotomies it creates. A more nuanced understanding of how state type and cross-border relations relate thus seems necessary to understand China’s growing involvement with its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Dynamics that matter in this context are relations between central and local authorities in China’s two border provinces Yunnan and Guangxi. And while many theoretical debates on state transformation also discuss increasingly blurred lines between state and non-state actors more generally, an issue that deserves special attention in this case is the entanglement of illicit and legal domains. This refers to criminal activities like drug trafficking and corruption but it can also include institutions and practices outside the legal framework that take on more constructive functions in society.

Including different geographical layers of government and actors outside conventional state administrative bodies into the analysis of China’s relations with its neighbours has the potential to challenge the image of China as a unitary actor following clear-cut strategies in its neighbouring countries for expanding geopolitical influence, following an image campaign or a scramble for resources. Understanding the many players with different levels of power and goals involved in this process is key for adjusting and improving engagement strategies for Myanmar.

The various interests and layers of conflict involved can be traced both in discourse and practice with regard to cross-border relations. I will try to substantiate these claims by exploring official rhetoric regarding Yunnan’s new ‘bridgehead strategy’ towards its neighbours, followed by some remarks on evolving state market relations in China and its impact on China Myanmar relations.

On a visit to the province in 2009, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced that Yunnan...
would become a ‘bridgehead’ for China’s opening towards the southwest. Formally introduced as part of the 12th 5 Year Plan in 2011, the declared aims of this strategy are to further China’s economic ties and promote regional cooperation with its neighbours. It also includes the components of border stability and developing a strategic connection to the Indian Ocean.

This security concern even seems to find expression in the name for the strategy, as ‘bridgehead’ is originally a military term usually employed to describe a position from which troops defend a bridge near an enemy. This military connotation can also be found in Chinese dictionaries although Baidu claims it to be an economic term. Another explanation linguists offer with regard to contemporary Chinese language is that it still employs revolutionary vocabulary to bridge the gap between economic transition and socialist ideals that used to once justify one party rule. As it has also been referred to as the ‘gateway strategy’ in other publications however, it might only be an unfortunate translation.

Yet, looking at a number of publications regarding the aims of the program reveals that there exist different readings of what the campaign should entail. The term bridgehead starts appearing in most publications between 2009 and 2011. So around the same time as it is announced as a national strategy. These texts usually highlight the official aims outlined above or emphasize domestic efforts designed to close development gaps between China’s coastal and inland provinces.

However, there is a publication that places the same term in a much earlier context: a development report published by the economics department of the Yunnan Academy of Social Science on the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area indicates that the original idea behind it was probably initiated on the local level. Here, the focus seems to be more foreign policy oriented and economic in nature. Thus, one can speculate whether meaning and aims of the strategy were only later appropriated and adjusted by central authorities.

An article in the China Daily in 2011 even calls on Yunnan province to stop treating neighbouring countries as export markets only to make the relationship more beneficial for both sides. While unclear whether this reflects an honest appeal of central authorities to improve the local implementation of national policies or this can be read as a case of shifting blame to lower levels of government, it definitely suggests that there exist some tensions in centre-periphery relations.

The very same article also urges the border prefecture Dehong to make use of its strategic position and broaden investment into Myanmar. However, a visit to the prefecture’s city Ruili - a major border crossing to Myanmar also referred to as the ‘big toe’ of the bridgehead strategy – casts doubts on which role the immediate border areas can play in the program. Once a lifeline to isolated Myanmar, new unrests in Kachin state and Myanmar’s process of opening up to the rest of the world seem to put a damper on border trade. Dominating the city’s current image are large posters by the People’s Liberation Army cautioning the importance of military education and in Jiegao cameras are pointed at the heavily guarded border crossing.

To address the second issue of state – market relations in China requires looking at both formal regulatory development, reform of the financial sector, ownership forms and the changing bases of legitimacy of the Communist Party (CCP).
In terms of CCP legitimacy, economic growth increasingly builds one of pillars of support for the party. Also, the CCP is trying to embrace private businesses in different ways. A key question remains however whether the private sector will be serving as an agent of change inside the party or whether the party is ‘co-opting’ private entrepreneurs and consolidating its power by sending party members into business.

Generally, when government officials become private entrepreneurs it can cut both ways. It could strengthen the private sector in terms of human capital but it can also accelerate crony capitalism. While the number of private entrepreneurs joining the CCP in Yunnan seems to be growing, overall they make up for only a small share of the provincial party members.

Another positive development in this context appears to be that market logics begin to infiltrate the state itself. For example, SOE executive bonuses are increasingly tied to financial performance, and provincial economic success matters for resource allocations and promotion within the party.

When looking at Yunnan and Myanmar’s case more specifically however, the key problem remains that most of the provinces industries and the vast majority of investments into Myanmar are in sectors that remain heavily dominated by SOE’s such as tobacco production, oil and gas exploitation or water supplies. For local growth at least in the direct border regions this means that the argument of complementarity does not really hold. Also, the most dynamic part of China’s economy – the private sector - only plays a marginal role in cross-border business.

When trying to research private sector involvement in China Myanmar relations in more detail, an issue that complicates things are the sometimes rather confusing categories in Chinese statistics. There are a number of different terms lumped together or used inconsistently for the private sector. Among them, one of the least transparent terms is also the one used most frequently in the statistical yearbooks of Yunnan. With regard to outward engagement one can only find international trade numbers without further specifying the recipient countries.

In general, private Chinese businesses have gained a bad reputation of relying on illegal practices in context of the opium replacement strategy and contract farming in Myanmar. Yet again, the problems involved are too complex to justify finger pointing at private business owners only.

Cross-border activities are in fact often overregulated which creates high administrative hurdles and nuisances.

Another issue that remains problematic for the private sector is the banking system in China. Most businesses have to rely on the country’s shadow lending system that involves higher risks and interests rates because official banks do not provide them with loans.

The issue of Renminbi convertibility creates further problems. Despite recent attempts by the Chinese government to further internationalize the currency, only one bank in Laos and Thailand have so far signed swap agreements in the Greater Mekong Area. The almost non-existent banking system in Myanmar in combination with a lack of regulated financing of cross-border investment on the Chinese side thus creates rather unfavourable circumstances for the sector.
While the current overall picture does not seem very favorable, understanding the different players and interests involved in cross-border dynamics also provides some potential for China Myanmar relations. Considering the true lines of conflict and competition is not only necessary to design appropriate strategies but might also create new space to improve China Myanmar relations in the future.
China’s Investments and Development Assistance in Myanmar

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Introduction

My PhD thesis will examine interactions between China and Myanmar civil society in China’s foreign aid and investments. I recently conducted a pilot study trip in Myanmar, and would appreciate your comments on my preliminary observations. I broadly categorize China’s aid into economic, social and political aspects. The economic aspect is the infrastructure projects such as dams and bridges. These are usually thought of as business investments but it is worthy to note that there is sometimes an economic assistance element in them. The social aspect of China’s aid is the initiatives that help improve livelihood, mainly the building of schools and hospitals for people in the areas affected by the infrastructure projects. These are mainly done as part of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives of the Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). The political aspect is the facilitation of peace talks ethnic armed groups and the military.

All of these aspects are connected, but in this presentation I will narrow down to the economic aspect. China financed many economic projects; those that are supported with grants, interest-free loans, or concessional loans could be classified as aid. There are a host of aid projects in the transportation, manufacturing and agricultural sectors that have been overshadowed by the unpopular mega infrastructures.

It is clear that under the new political environment, Myanmar civil society is demanding more public participation in the decision-making of China’s aid and other investments, while Chinese state media and embassy in Myanmar have also called for increased public engagement. Some efforts can already be seen, but I will draw from the current state of environmental governance in China to show how it will be a challenge for Chinese government and SOE officials, as they are not experienced in public participation in environmental governance.

Economic Aspect of China’s Aid

China financed many economic projects with grants, interest-free loans, or concessional loans, which would classify them as aid. Apart from mega infrastructures like the Myitsone Dam, there are a host of other projects that have been overshadowed by the unpopular mega infrastructures. Just to cite some examples, these projects include the Yangon-Thanlyin Bridge for which China provided an interest-free loan of at least 50 million yuan in 1980s, and other interest-free loans have been provided to the power-generation, manufacturing and agricultural sectors.

As with China’s aid to other developing countries, many of the projects are linked with business and trade. China’s aid is managed by the Ministry of Commerce and the China Export Import Bank, the
mandate of both is to build China’s domestic economy. This contrasts with the arrangement of many western countries, for example the US Agency for International Development is housed under the State Department. This institutional structure reflects that China uses aid for its own economic development as well as the recipient country’s, which is made explicit in its constant emphasis that development assistance is more of a “mutually beneficial cooperation”.

China’s provision of business-linked aid is coherent with its foreign policy grounded on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” – equality, mutual benefit, and respect for sovereignty of the host country, which Premier Zhou Enlai introduced in 1954. The Chinese leaders to this day assert that aid is a partnership and not a one-way transfer of charity nor a tool for hegemonic aggression. In fact many developing countries such as Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, governments view it as a successful model and an amenable alternative than that preached by Western donors with burdensome conditionalities. Aside from arguments that China is protecting these countries against international criticism and reprisals, there are a lot of doubts especially in Myanmar whether the benefits are equally mutual or actually tilted towards China, and also, whether the local populations can enjoy the benefits, as the recent protests show. As these investments are geared by Chinese SOEs who are driven not only by diplomatic but also business interests, how do they ensure their business practices do not infringe on these principles of equality and mutual benefit? How, and to what extent, China adheres to these principles will be explored in the rest of my research.

It is worthy to note here that China’s aid is very different from western, liberal democratic notions of aid, whose aid or peacebuilding programmes encompass security sector reforms, rule of law programming, transitional justice mechanism, election monitoring and so forth.

China’s heavy focus in economic aid is underpinned by the belief that “development is of overriding importance” which ex-President Deng famously said in 1970s about China’s reform and opening. It also reflects developmentalist notions that economic development is the primary means of establishing political legitimacy. In foreign policy, officials also prioritize economic growth above other issues such as political reform and social justice.

This state-centric approach to development has extended to its foreign interventions and brought accusations that China will support incumbent regimes regardless of their nature, and because it usually cooperates exclusively with the host government, its interventions may be conducive to statebuilding but are arguably not an inclusive peacebuilding that involves strengthening of civil society.

However, I would argue that while state-centric approach describes China’s assistance in broad strokes, the local conditions and the host government’s priorities are the fine lines that shape China’s engagement. In Myanmar, China’s engagement has no doubt focused on support to the government, but because the Myanmar government sees the urgent need to manage the ceasefires and peace process with its ethnic minorities, China plays along and supports the peace talks in cooperation with the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups.

The recent priority of Myanmar government on political opening resulting in more space for local civil society to protest is also why China needs to respond to local resistance against its investments
by engaging with local populations and advocacy groups. China does have its own stake in border and energy security that motivates it to support peace talk and appease grievances, but the point here is that when local conditions, influenced by the prevailing priorities of the host government, call for an approach that is less straight-forward than the state-centric, government-to-government method, China adjusts accordingly and pragmatically. It adjusts its aid approach to be more i) comprehensive in terms of dimensions (i.e. encompassing the social and political aspects stated in the beginning), and ii) inclusive in terms of the range of actors/stakeholders involved by China.

**China Responds to Resistance – Engaging with Myanmar Civil Society**

These adjustments are a response to the mounting resistance from Myanmar civil society. From my observations in the pilot study, there is a strong network amongst Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Yangon, who are actively engaged in various environmental, social, and cultural issues. The cohesiveness of the CSOs enabled them to cooperate together along with painters, cartoonists, poets, and photographers to raise awareness throughout the country. At the same time, Yangon-based CSOs have good connections with ethnic political party leaders and ethnic activists. Their priorities of demands might be different – while Yangon-based CSOs stress on transparency and accountability of investments, ethnic leaders have an added demand for increased autonomy. Nonetheless, there is a sense of unity among them that was galvanized during the anti-Myitsone Dam campaign, overriding other differences of interests and ethnicity.

China sees the need to respond to the resistance against its investments. After the dam suspension, there have been increased efforts from the China side to engage with civil society to build dialogue or for consultation. In 2012, Chinese Embassy had a discussion about Myanmar-China relationship that participants thought was very open. An official from Ministry of Commerce carried an assessment visit to Kachin to speak to local villagers and church leaders to understand their concerns.

Although engagement initiated by state officials were largely considered satisfactory, it is not the case with the Chinese SOEs. Myanmar-China Pipeline Watch Committee (MCPWC) made recommendations to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) concerning the pipeline project, including improving transparency and the safety of nearby communities. MCPWC expresses its frustrations towards the denials from CNPC. Another informant from an ethnic party also says that CNPC denied all the facts to the newspapers. What is heard repeatedly with several activists and ethnic leaders is they feel cheated by the “so-called” consultations and compensations, where photos of the ceremonies would be published as proof that the company has fulfilled its responsibilities, but affected populations find unsatisfactory.

State-civil society dialogues have only begun recently, and Chinese SOEs are not familiar with public consultations. Myanmar civil society is pushing the Chinese state and SOEs on a learning curve of engaging the public. What is the current state of public participation in environmental governance within China? How comfortable is the Chinese government (national, provincial levels and SOEs) to interact with civil society directly, and how experienced is it to respond to public demands?

The Chinese government is not unfamiliar with environmental activism. President Thein Sein’s call to suspend the Myitsone Dam construction because of public outcry is in many ways reminiscent of
Premier Wan Jiabao’s call to suspend the Nu River Dam, also known as the Salween River, in 2004 because of a nation-wide campaign in China against it.

The characteristics of these activisms and the space they are allowed to operate in however, are presumably very different between China and Myanmar. In China, although the government has enacted Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and public disclosure regulations in the early 2000s, government officials are not accustomed to engaging civil society on public decision-making and there are various restraints that limit genuine participation of Chinese NGOs. Moreover, environmental activism in China is cooperative rather than antagonistic with the national government, as ENGOs tend to have formal or informal ties with the party-state.

Although I have not explored in great detail the nature of environmentalism in Myanmar and its relationship with the state, the CSOs I’ve interacted with certainly have no formal or informal ties with the state. Therefore, Chinese officials are likely to be inexperienced about dealing directly with the kind of civil society in Myanmar which, unlike in China, is more independent of its own state and not subject to the same conditions/restraints that China’s environmental activists face, not least because of the opening up of the political space in Myanmar.

Conclusion

China’s foreign investments are undergoing an image crisis in Myanmar. Chinese state officials have recognized it and began to adjust its engagement to become more comprehensive and inclusive in terms of the range of actors involved by China. One of my future research aims will be to find out how the Chinese state (national, provincial levels and SOEs) interacts with civil society and non-state actors in Myanmar in its investments and aid, and what challenges lie ahead.
Challenges Facing Myanmar’s Migrant Workers

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According to the Economist magazine published on 30th May, in 2009 the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimated that 10% of Myanmar’s population were living abroad. Another study suggests that there are between 2m and 4m Burmese workers in Thailand, perhaps another half-million in Malaysia, more than 100,000 in Singapore, a few thousand in Japan and South Korea, and then a totally unknown number in India and China. However, last year only $566m (or 1.1% of GDP) worth of remittances ended up in the coffers of the Central Bank of Myanmar.

As IMF observed on 22nd May, 2013, Myanmar’s ambitious reform program is bearing fruit, with macroeconomic stability and high investor interest. Growth in fiscal year (FY) 2012/13 (year ending March) is estimated at around 6½ percent and is expected to accelerate slightly to 6¾ percent in FY 2013/14.

At the World Economic Forum for East Asia, Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi mentioned that “I want our country to be a sanctuary any of our people can return to and bring their talents back.” It indicates partly that Myanmar migrant workers are not enjoy working abroad under difficult, dirty and dangerous working conditions. However, she cannot guarantee when her wish will be fulfilled and in what way.

Myanmar Ministry of Labor has recently adopted a strategy to address employment and migration. It has opened 77 employment centers across the country to assist the youth and unemployed access both domestic and oversea job markets. In particular, it has taken a historic change to register the migrant workers in neighboring Thailand – a phenomenon previously regarded as an illegal activity subject to heavy punishment by law. (Framework for economic and social reforms) It has already issued half a million passports and identity cards to migrant workers while cooperating with the Royal Government of Thailand in reaching out to around 2 million migrant workers in Thailand. Official attempts to acknowledge and register reduced the cost of migration and impact on poverty. Remittances of migrant workers could be channeled through proper banking system.

Myanmar government, which pays little if any attention to migrant workers, adopted policy very recently which could be interpreted some concerns for migrant workers. Migration policy of Myanmar new government includes to migrate via formal channel, basic rights for migrant workers to be protected, to reduce the costs for migration, to focus on socio economic development of migrant workers and families and gaining experience, skill and knowledge from migration. Moreover, migration should be integrated into the National Development Strategy. Furthermore, policy recommended data collection, visits and research to be conducted, integration with international organizations, international and local civil society. And finally, to endeavor for the development of
In Malaysia, seven cases of incidents on 30th May to 4th June killed more than 4 Myanmar workers and a thousand arrested for interrogation. It is related with group clash and not related with Malaysians (Myanmar Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs). Even some Malaysia businessmen demand for protection of Myanmar workers in Malaysia. Most of Myanmar workers in Malaysia planning to return home because of attacks in Malaysia and concern by their families in Myanmar but limited by Contract terms and lack of document. Even though those who already worked for agreed term facing difficult to leave as their passports are controlled by the employees.

According to Deputy Minister for Information ,inexperienced and low capacity of Myanmar embassy officials in Malaysia make unable to issue Certificate of Identity to remaining illegal Myanmar migrant workers . According to one estimation, it amounted to 300,000 legal migrant workers and 30,000 illegal workers in Malaysia. Myanmar government could employ very limited officials and coordination with other ministries is still needed, said Deputy Minister for Labor. As of June 19, 10,000 Myanmar migrant workers already hold Certificate of Identity, according to Minister for Labor. Other Myanmar migrants who are working in different parts of Malaysia demand for the presence of Myanmar Counsellor in their regions as it is risky to visit Myanmar embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

Myanmar employment Agencies are restricted by Ministry of labor to bring workers to Malaysia during June 2013. One delegation of employment agencies visited Malaysia and reported that conflicts in Malaysia is not related with discrimination of race or religion but based on personal affairs.

There are some lucky groups of Myanmar migrant workers are still waiting to get registered with UNHCR as refugee. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Myanmar nationals with refugee cards issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were illegally doing business which suffer local businessmen. Local people criticized UNHCR’s repeated defence of refugees, who were caught abusing their refugee status by conducting illegal businesses. Some of the Myanmar refugees, who total about 9,000, according to UNHCR data, had refused to leave Malaysia after establishing themselves in the country (New Strait Times, 24th June, 2013).

Myanmar business community and civil society actively participated to bring back workers in Malaysia. On 28th June, 12 workers are employed in Naypyidaw and another 43 workers in Yangon totally 55 out of around 1000 returnee from Malaysia (New Light of Myanmar 29th June). In general, their skill and experience might not fit into the needs of local market. However, on the other hand, Myanmar migrant workers are still leaving to Malaysia through official channel.

Problems in Thailand are different from Malaysia. In Thailand, Reliability and credibility of the Myanmar Agents in question related with wages and working conditions. Myanmar government in collaboration with Thai government already issued temporary passport to 1.4 million Myanmar workers in Thailand. But as 2 million still remain, the process extended again from May 11 to Aug 11, 2013. The cost of temporary passport amounted to 3700 Bahts per worker and 675 Bahts for dependents and children. However, they still suffer higher cost of temporary passport through agents at the cost of 15000 Bahts). The causes for registration through agents might be illiteracy, lack of
information and understanding of the process, and low income level. Children of the migrant workers have very few access to education even though 74 schools for Myanmar migrant workers established in Thailand.

Illegal Myanmar migrant workers are deported by Thai officials frequently as Thai police force trying to suppress increasing cases of human trafficking. On 21st June, Myanmar labor officials approved that around 150 Myanmar migrant workers are deported through Myawaddy. Around 200 workers who already contracted with Thai companies but could not get permission from the Ministry of Labor protest in Myawaddy for delaying their migration on 28th June, 2013.

Factors affecting returnees might be: economic development in Myanmar, wage differential, unemployment which increased from 4.01 to 8-10 percent (Minister for Labor, 31st May, 2013), under-employment and low development of businesses, development of peace especially in remote and ethnic areas and willingness of migrant workers among others. Other related issues include defining what is home country-Thailand or Myanmar, new and unfamiliar social and physical environment in Myanmar, adaptability of Myanmar kids born in Thailand with Myanmar environment, continuous training and education for Myanmar kids born in Thailand.

There are some area of development including government policy (Myanmar citizens all over the world need to be protected by the government), easier transfer of remittance via formal channel, establishing Industrial zones near border areas but developed slowly because of constraints in financing infrastructure, Complaint Mechanism for local and international labor issues which is established on 27th June.
Exile or Return? The Diaspora’s Role in Myanmar’s Political Transition

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Introduction

Myanmar’s tumultuous post-colonial history has been characterised by decades of direct and indirect military rule and corresponding political mobilisations ranging from armed ethnic and ideological insurgencies to mass protests, student movements, and non-violent pro-democracy uprisings. The nationalisation and mismanagement of the economy, the militarisation of the state, political surveillance and oppression, and the closure of universities triggered the flight of millions of Burmese. Several main waves of exit can be distinguished following (1) the 1962 military coup, (2) the onset of the ‘Burma Socialist Programme Party’s direct rule and the U Thant uprising in the mid-1970s, (3) the 1988 mass uprisings, and (4) the 2007 uprisings respectively. The largest exodus occurred between late 1988 and after the 1990 elections when the military government indefinitely delayed the transfer of power to the elected opposition. Thus, the Burmese diaspora was primarily conflict-generated but also comprised individuals who left for educational and professional purposes. Political exiles as a subset of this diverse diaspora lead a transnational pro-democracy movement that maintained sustained challenges against the powerful military regime for over 20 years.

Although activism was only one among multiple factors that induced top-down political reform beginning in 2011, the political diaspora can be credited with influencing international relations with their homeland and, to a lesser extent, domestic politics. The unexpected government-driven reform initiative combined with invitations - but no safety guarantees or amnesty - to the diaspora at large to return home, only attracted a few political exiles back. They currently contribute to the politico-economic development, including as advisors to the present government. However, while there is general agreement over the important areas where the skills and experience of the returning diaspora could benefit the country’s development, political exiles also meet with distrust from their countrymen. Disagreement among activists who remained in the country prevails when assessing the role and motivation of exiles in Myanmar’s reforms. Conflicts persist among dissident groups of a movement that was split between home and exile over 20 years ago and that attempts to reconcile different experiences into one combined effort for Myanmar’s transformation.

Attitudes of Activists who Remained in the Country towards Exiles

Many activists in Myanmar are acutely aware of their lack of formal education, theoretical knowledge, international exposure and organisational capacity as a result of censorship, the undermining of the education system, and the lack of internet access and ICT. They also lament the fact that nobody in the country ever experienced the democratic freedoms and practices envisioned
for Myanmar’s future. Representatives of youth organisations therefore stressed that the primary contribution of returning exiles consisted in bringing know-how, international experience and organisational skills to the movement and to the country’s development at large.

Another important area of exile experience is the interaction with people from other ethnic groups and hence a different understanding of ethnic relations. In exile, Burmans were in regular contact with ethnic movement organisations as well as with the armed groups. Not least, key exile groups such as the NCGUB, DAB and NCUB were founded in the previous Karen National Union headquarters at the inception of the pro-democracy movement between 1988-1990. During the exodus into territories controlled by the respective rebel armies the latter provided vital help for the activists’ survival in the jungle and eventual crossing to neighbouring countries. Although Burman-ethnic relations were far from smooth, identifying common goals as well as exposure to international perspectives on ethnic rights increased mutual acceptance in the early years.

Beyond politics, many fields could benefit from the foreign-educated Burmese’ valuable expertise and skills. For instance, exile media organisations could become catalysts for media development by training young journalists, setting standards of journalism ethics, connecting local and international media and in short, put Myanmar indigenous media outlets on the global news network map. While the government appears to favour returning exile media, they still need to struggle with cronies who oppose this new competition and who attempt to outbid or undermine exile journalists.

In-country movement leaders are proud of their years of sacrifices to maintain, at great personal risk, underground networks across the country and contacts with the grassroots. A common criticism is that exiles remain close to their peers from the 88 Group and political prisoners but not the grassroots; accordingly, exiles work with the political leaders and main stakeholders but hardly with the broader civil society that does not focus on strictly political issues. There is thus a notion that exiles fail to approach and to understand the general population’s needs and aspirations. Yet, considering the nature of the previous clandestine work, it comes at no surprise that the mutual exposure between exiles and the grassroots has been limited at best. However, such criticism contradicts the claims of the exile organisations like ABSDF, DPNS and FTUB to have worked extensively at the grassroots during the years of dictatorship. Whatever the case, returning exiles need to intensify their approach to the grassroots in order to work efficiently with the population and use funds wisely.

Incongruent expectations pose another point of contention between locals and exiles. Local activists are well aware that decades of pent-up frustration and grievances fuel people’s extremely high expectations to see immediate improvements in matters of daily survival such as food, housing, electricity, transport, land issues and others. Exiles seem to hold equally unrealistic expectations but in terms of fundamental institutional changes rather than daily hardship. With an education and experience often acquired in established democracies and industrial countries, exiles tend to

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37 Interview with youth activists. Yangon 2013.
38 Interview with youth activists, Yangon 2012.
40 Interview with Ko Ko Gyi, Yangon 2013.
measure Myanmar against the political freedoms in their host countries. On the one hand, such comparisons imply how removed from current conditions some exiles may have become. On the other hand, the vision of a full-fledged federal democracy will be the key to drive the country’s reform ahead and prevent it from stagnating at an early stage.

Residual resentments after a 20-year history continue to impact on relations within the home and exile movement. Activists in Myanmar have always perceived themselves as the real martyrs and crucial players, while portraying exiles to a varying degree as hypocrites leading lives in security and material comfort. Beyond real dedication to the country’s political progress the question of power lies at the core of the matter. In 2007 for instance, some former political prisoners from the 88 Generation stressed their unwillingness to grant political positions to returning exiles in the event of transition. In 2012, insiders still question whether returnees are driven by concern for their country or by personal gain. As a member of the Myanmar Youth Union explained ‘we need to call the exiles back to see their attitudes – whether they return for their own interests or to really help the country.’ Others on the contrary believe the returnees to be very committed to a broad-based reform and therefore actively be working with many different groups and parties.

Conflicts also exist over past exile activities – on the exact nature and effectiveness of programmes and the use of funds allocated to exiles. It is somewhat ironic that the competition for funding that exacerbated some of the internal problems of the movement in exile now causes friction between exiles and activists at home.

**Changing Donor Agendas in the Current Period and Their Implications**

The reform process substantially altered ramifications for donors. The flow of people, capital and information into Myanmar drastically increased. The suspension of most international sanctions paved the way for formal bilateral and multilateral engagement with the new administration. International non-governmental organisations, some of which have a long history of supporting Burmese refugees, IDPs, and migrant workers in the region as well as political exiles, are entering the country to carry out their programmes. Several trends among donors of political organisations can be observed.

First, the traditional donors of the exile movement shifted their focus to support projects in the country, which are run by newly established organisations or returning exiles.

Second, a different set of donors, international and multilateral agencies supporting political parties, parliaments and multi-party platforms are setting up or expanding their specific Myanmar programmes and staff.

Third, funds to exile and cross-border projects are drying up. The major donors of the movement in exile for 20 years – the National Endowment for Democracy, Soros and the International Republican Institute – continue to support some initiatives but grants will be phased out before 2015. Donors

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41 Interview with peace movement organiser, Yangon 2012.
42 Interviews with former political prisoners, Yangon 2007.
43 Interview with Myanmar Youth Union, Yangon 2012.
44 Interview with Generation Wave, Yangon 2012.
45 Interview with NLD Youth, Yangon 2012.
may also feel compelled by their respective governments to rush into Myanmar. Yet, this quick shift and ‘donor fatigue’ have detrimental effects on humanitarian assistance to IDPs and refugees in border areas and neighbouring countries where the return of these communities remains unclear.

Fourth and related, exile organisations need to re-invent themselves to stay relevant. On the one side, the ongoing political opening undermines arguments to ‘stay behind’ in exile. In fact, the exiled government NCGUB dissolved in September 2012 after 21 years. With Aung San Suu Kyi in parliament and other progress, the NCGUB had not more ‘raison d’être’, besides the group’s budget was reduced to a quarter of what it was five years ago. On the other side, human rights groups continue to publicise violations, restrictions of freedoms and Myanmar’s many unchanged problems. Perhaps the last role for exile organisations would be in the mid-term to keep a check on whether progress is being made towards true democratisation, rule of law and respect for human rights.

Outcome

The country’s underdevelopment, humanitarian and political crises engendered a ‘gold rush’ not only of investors, development assistance and humanitarian aid but also of donors of political programmes.

Power asymmetries between donors and recipients, between exiles and insiders and between local well-established and newcomer organisations created a difficult web of relationships and dependencies. In addition, the sudden availability of resources also triggered the mushrooming of Burmese political organisations. This is mainly due to the fact that activists feel they are finally able to do more and more openly, especially since everyone is preparing for the next general elections in 2015. Genuine efforts notwithstanding, some organisations also appear to be hastily set up to siphon off some funds without actually offering useful programmes.

The few returned exiles focus so far on building capacities of the main political actors in the country – the government and parliaments, leaders of political parties and groups associated with the movement. As a result, well-known dissidents are represented in presidential advisory boards, in the MDRI think tank as well as in special commissions, for instance to investigate the Buddhist-Muslim communal violence or the security forces’ treatment of the protestors at the Letpadaung copper mine. However know-how transfer appears to be seen as a one-sided process. Missing in this discussion are the areas where the returning diaspora could learn from people in the country.

The lack of a systematic, transparent and nation-wide policy applicable to the entire diaspora, including political exiles, remains a key issue to be resolved. Since President Thein Sein’s verbal invitations have not translated into legal assurances, most exiles wishing to return hesitate. The government needs to demonstrate its political will with an amnesty for exiled activists in order for the country to fully benefit from its diaspora’s skills and expertise.

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Transitional Justice in Myanmar: Assessing the Alternatives

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A transitional justice is usually taken place after a political transition from authoritarian or military regimes to democratic government to address the gross human rights violations of the past oppressive regimes. Several measures such as retributive justice, reparation, truth commission, memorialization, affirmative action, institutional reform (vetting process) and other measures are executed to achieve justice, accountability, national reconciliation, peace and political stability. The transitional justice measures are envisaged by several human rights activists, local and international human rights organizations and victims of the gross human rights violations in Myanmar. Several literatures on transitional justice of Myanmar discussed a variety of approaches to address human rights violations of the past two decades.

The International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School studied the human rights violations of the armed conflict between several non-state armed groups and Tatmadaw in the eastern part of Myanmar. The study concluded there were war crimes, crimes against humanity and other gross human rights violations.47 Recently, Tomas Ojea Quintana, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has reported to the UN Human Rights Council suggesting transitional justice measures to seek justice, truth and accountability of the past gravest violations in the political transitional period. Executing under his mandate, he encouraged the residing parliamentarians to initiate legislation addressing the past human rights grievances.48 Ian Holliday briefly discussed a national measure of transitional justice in his ‘Burma Redux’ and suggested a regional or State level approach to addressing the past violations in his presentation of the 2012 Myanmar Conference.

Post 2010 Election

The human rights activists and organizations in abroad and domestic have campaigned for several years calling for the establishment of a commission of inquiry of Myanmar. Since the United States has started engagement policy with the new elected nominal civilian government, the support and pressure of the international community for the transitional justice was significantly decreased. The US and some of the European States have extended their political engagement to deeper military relationship and business investments. The possibility of bringing the perpetrators of gross human rights violations to the International Criminal Court and other ad hoc international criminal tribunals is extremely low at present political settings. Some democratic opposition parties are concerned of

prosecution of the military perpetrators will result in negative impacts on the reform process initiated by the highly military influenced government.

The USDP and military representatives, over 80% of the representatives, is unlikely to initiate any legislations to address the past human rights violations or amend the Section 445 of the 2008 Constitution which guarantees amnesty to all the actions taken by the military regimes of the past two decades. The military, the most powerful and influential institution in Myanmar politics, will prevent any measures to prosecute the senior military leaders. The full-scale national transitional justice of any measures seems impossible.

Alternative Measures

Jon Elster suggested the motivation for retributive justice becomes lower with the fading memory of the past. In his research on the trials of Germany after the WWII, the number of prosecution was dropped in the later years. The gap between the conflict (violations) and the measure of a transitional justice determines what measures have to be taken. The lack of political will of the international and national stakeholders raises the question of when the transitional justice will be initiated in political transition of Myanmar. Currently, the regional or State level measures of addressing the past human rights violations seems promising while the international and national transitional justice are constrained by numerous challenges.

The amnesty provision of the Constitution, the Section 445, does not prevent the prosecution of human rights violations committed by the military after 2010. Under the constitution certain human rights are guaranteed from violation and the perpetrators are liable under the domestic jurisdiction. Regardless of challenges such as the Supreme Court, the highest court of the State, has no jurisdiction over military affairs and the Commander-in-Chief has final judicial authority over the Courts-martial. The current domestic legal system maintains the immunity of the military institution from the prosecution of the past human rights violations.

Recent human rights abuses in Kachin State and northern Shan State were violations of the constitutional rights of Myanmar citizen and existing domestic laws. The litigation of those violations in either civilian or military courts does not interfere with the constitutional immunity clause and it will have impact on fighting against the impunity enjoyed by the military. This ambitious legal task requires a flexible strategy to avoid negative consequences on the victims. Such litigations were already conducted for the unlawfully detained persons in the armed conflicts by the military intelligence in Kachin State. The detainees were saved from torture in unknown detention centers and they were brought to the township and district courts. The impunity poses serious threats to the rule of law and democratic society and it undermines the political reform process. The judicial mechanisms are still strongly influenced by the military and executive body. However, the litigation has revealed the need of institutional reform of the legal system and mechanism of check and balance.

The next advantage of focusing on recent abuses is that most of the human rights violations were well reported, published, documented and recorded in video and audio, and the international

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community was well informed about the atrocities of the conflicts. Some of the victims, relatives and family members of the victims, witness and the perpetrators are still alive and the evidence can be accessible rather easily. The 2008 constitutional provision of immunity covers the human rights violations in Karen State, Shan State and eastern parts of Myanmar because those violations were committed before the new government was installed and the 2008 constitution came into effect. The regional measure of Kachin State is very unique and timely approach to transitional justice.

The current reform taken by the government, the investment interests and political attention of the international community are supposed to be favorable ground for initiation of small but timely regional measures of transitional justice. The scope and mandate of the alternative measures are limited but it is a catalyst for national measure of transitional justice and it exposes the necessity to end the cycle of conflicts. Based on the precedent cases, the alternative measures might not be effective or have incredible impact on the institutional reform or political transition like the retributive justice conducted by the International Criminal Court, ad hoc criminal tribunals or hybrid courts. However, it is an initiative for broader and forward-looking national transitional justice, and preliminary measure to lobby the Union government and State government for rehabilitation and reparation of the victims of violations and armed conflicts.

Such moderate alternative measure is supposed to avoid provoking the security concerns of retired Generals and the litigation should focus on the prosecution of physically committed or directly complicit military personnel. The retired military Generals are not liable as they are no longer in the position of formal military structure. The most likely to be prosecuted under this legal approach are low ranking officers such as major, lieutenant and private. The highest possible responsible position might be ‘Bureau of Special Operation’ and the approach opens an escape route for senior military officials through the flow of command system. The Commander-in-Chief or other higher officials is assumed not to order to commit rape, murder or torture, but non-recognition of the violations and lack of accountability create collective guilt of the military institution. The legal justice is an important step to national reconciliation because it individualizes the crimes and help the Kachin community change the perception of collective crimes of the Burman. The president and General Myint Soe, from Bureau of Special Operation and in charge of military operation in Kachin State and northern Shan State, stated that the military personnel are liable for any commission of violations under domestic civilian laws and military laws in recent interview.\(^{50}\)

The regional measure cannot fully address the legacy of past violations but it can achieve the government’s recognition of those violations. The initiative will raise transitional justice as an issue in 2015 election. The fact-findings, documentation and investigation by the regional measure are preparatory step for wider national measures. On the other hand, the rehabilitation and reparation measures can acquire the necessary data from the fact-findings and other local NGOs can initiate the approach to rebuild the livelihood of the victims. The victims will not be left behind, but equipped with skills and education to join the competing open market and workforce in the transition. The development of people from war-torn areas will surely reduce the burden on the State and strengthen the democratization process. All in all, the regional measure is a compulsory initiative for truth commission or other transitional justice measure and national reconciliation.

Cultural Elite: Situating Hip Hop in the Transition

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A preoccupation since the 2010 elections has been the question of ‘why now’? Over the past two days we have heard various facets of this transition and I would like to add another - that of generational change. Young people have grown up in a country with a basic standard of living and considerably fewer opportunities than the countries where many of them travel for university studies and vacations. The role of young people in the current transition cannot be overlooked: as both a force for change and as the leaders of the future. It is not only an economic and political transition but a social one; young people have begun to expect more from their country.

The concept of elite is a linking factor and a justification for studying culture in Myanmar. While we have discussed notions of political elite and the economic transition in Myanmar, I think it is necessary to link these actors and their actions to wider society. Here culture and specifically music provides one such link. Hip hop musicians influence what is considered desirable and this both supports and drives the current shift from a militarily dominated country to a more cosmopolitan outwardly looking population.

Hip hop is quickly becoming the most popular music in Myanmar. While rock bands, most prominently Iron Cross and R Zarni, have dominated the past, the future looks to be preoccupied by hip hop. Popular music and the cultural sphere of Myanmar is an important driver and measure of the transition. Not only does music offer an ideal medium for the expression of social realities and values, it also has the potential to challenge the status quo. Here I am not referring only to politically oriented music, but more importantly to music which challenges certain moral and social mores which are outdated and repressive to many, primarily the youth of today.

When appraising the hip hop scene in Myanmar, three distinct categories of musicians can be identified. Firstly, there are the children of wealthy families who want to be famous. Their families bankroll their questionable talent, with auto-tuned songs written and produced by talented musicians, excessive advertising displaying their expensive photo shoots and the funds to put on elaborate shows in prime locations. The second group are artists who are talented, but not as wealthy, and have persevered with music, negotiating with censors, competing for sponsorship and networking for features on the wealthy artists tracks and spots in their shows. And finally, the third group are artists who are classified as ‘underground’. This final group is the focus of this paper.

Here the concept of underground needs to be unpacked. An underground artist in Myanmar is someone who has never released an official album, that is, they have never applied to the Press Scrutiny and Registration Board. Instead, they have relied on the internet to distribute their music, uploading to Youtube, Facebook and other file sharing sites to circulate their music. Also, live
performances were a crucial ground for increasing their fan base.

Underground artists in Yangon did not apply to the censorship board for several reasons. Firstly, many have tattoos, which were banned on posters, advertising, TV and film clips until November 2012. Secondly, their lyrics, while not always directly political were more confrontational than the censor board would approve, most often discussing how hard life is in Myanmar. While these lyrics would not always directly indict the government nor be directly political, but rather conform to a typical hip hop practice of talking about hustling and life on the streets, the artists predicted the censorship board would not have approved and therefore did not apply.

If they were to apply and their songs didn’t pass, they couldn’t upload them to Youtube or Facebook or perform them live, as that would have had serious repercussions being a direct disregard to the censorship decision. Whereas if censorship was never sought, artists could simply remain under the radar and have more grounds for contestation if they were ever confronted for their music. Interestingly, while this approach of skirting the censorship board seems risky, I have not heard of any of the underground artists being punished for such defiance. Indeed, a video clip for one song shows the artists in a physical conflict with actors, dressed as Yangon police. This was considered by the artists as considerably dangerous, however even this went seemingly unnoticed by the authorities.

Following the end of censorship in late 2012, these underground artists are currently working to release their first official albums this year. While the albums due to be released throughout this year do not have to go through any censorship process, the artists are still taking a risk releasing official albums. The artists do not know what the results of their official releases will be, especially considering some of their songs are openly confrontational, discussing the 1988 uprisings, political prisoners and refugees on the Thai-Burma border for example. As with most facets of the newly forming country, the true extent of musical freedom will be tested over the next few years, through the release of increasingly controversial songs.

Certainly, a free music scene is important in and of itself, however, it indicates broader changes also. Presenting a model for youth with less traditional morals, it offers an alternative to what was previously a more conservative culture, which emulated military force as the key marker of elitism and power. Now the cultural cache, which can be garnered from being conspicuously ‘cool’, is joining previous methods of gaining power, predominately wealth and military connections. This change affects many facets of Burmese society, including gender inequalities for example.

The hip hop industry in Myanmar is a predominately male domain. This comes from the difficulty of women entering the industry due to restrictions on their movements from parents, husbands, boyfriends and the stigma attached if they do so. Females in the public sphere, including models, actresses and singers, who dressed provocatively by Burmese standards, who went out at night and acted independently from their male custodians were virtually considered prostitutes, with outraged comments towards photos, videos or news articles about them. This obviously stopped many from even considering or pursuing the occupations. This is beginning to change, with some female hip hop artists becoming popular, including Bobby Soxer and Sandy Myint Lwin.
This leads to another important aspect of Myanmar’s hip hop culture, that of image. Popular music internationally is entering a new period of music distribution and how artists make money. While previously relying on profits from album sales, now with the proliferation of free downloading of albums, artists are earning money from alternative means including sponsorships and touring. Myanmar’s underground hip hop artists have long relied on sponsors, appearing in promotional material for clothing and accessories, state promotional material and movie soundtracks. This includes promotional material for private clothing, watches, jewelry, makeup, mobile phone launches and retail stores, as well as government campaigns - for example several major hip hop artists have been commissioned to write songs and film video clips for the South East Asian Games being held by Myanmar in December this year. And thus, more than the music quality necessarily, hip hop artists’ reputations and image are becoming increasingly more important.

As hip hop becomes more popular and profitable, so an increase in a formalization of the management of artists can be seen. Producers, studio owners, sponsors and event managers are increasing becoming viable businesses, and as such the industry is becoming more formalized and somewhat depersonalized. The four most popular hip hop artists in Yangon currently are Sai Sai, Snare, Bunny Phyo and Hlwain Paing. These artists perform almost always together and almost exclusively for the event organizer BoBo Entertainment. Sponsors for these events have recently begun to include Coca Cola and Tiger Music.

An integral quality of hip hop are group affiliations. Both from groups of rappers who perform as one entity, including PBD Hood, Cyclone and Snare, but also of associations of musicians, the most prominent of which is the Myanmar Hip Hop Association or MHA. Members of MHA bear large tattoos of the acronym and often perform together in shows and on albums. A side effect of such group affiliations are competition and rivalry, which is currently intensifying in the Yangon scene. With the perception that the industry is about to take off with increasing foreign investment and disposable income, everyone wants to be at the head of the pack as sponsors begin to invest more and the possibility of international record companies entering the market increases.

Ultimately, all these changes indicate hip hop in Myanmar is driving many social, political and economic changes, including the traditional discrimination against tattoos, gender inequality, military elitism, censorship of freedom of speech and foreign involvement and perception. As such, the interplay between culture and politics requires further analysis and a greater appreciation in Myanmar Studies.
Soldiers as Lawmakers: In Search for a Legislative Role for the Tatmadaw

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Under authoritarian rules, parliaments are frequently construed as “rubber stamp” legislatures. They are expected to act according to the wishes of the powerful executive. In transitional periods though, the significance of newly-formed legislatures increases considerably. Newly-elected parliaments can indeed either act as obstructionist bodies defending the interests of the old ruling class, or, on the contrary, foster democratization. In post-junta regimes, the military commonly seeks a constitutionally-sanctioned presence in these parliaments – but not always as the case of the post-1986 civil-military transition in the Philippines illustrate. The legislative participation of the military is usually secured through reserved seats in national and/or local assemblies. Through this presence in lawmaking bodies, praetorian armies intend to keep an eye on the legislative process and safeguarding their own interests, beside other channels of influence they have captured in the state bureaucracy and transitional executive and other policymaking structures. Indonesia has long offered a case model with General Suharto’s New Order (1965-1998). The Indonesian military indeed managed to institutionalize its participation in governance and lawmaking. Active generals and colonels have long populated Indonesia’s embassies, ministries and parliaments. It was only in the early 1990s that the mandated presence of the armed forces in the national parliament in Jakarta began to be seriously debated. Military parliamentarians were eventually withdrawn from national and local legislatures in 2004.

In Myanmar, the 2008 Constitution provided a significant opportunity for the Tatmadaw to follow this model. Burmese army delegates represent roughly one fourth of each local and national assemblies formed after the 2010 elections. They can therefore boast 110 seats in Pyithu Hluttaw (article 109b of the Constitution), 56 seats in Amyotha Hluttaw (article 141b), and a total of 222 seats in the fourteen state and region legislatures (article161d). All military appointees are nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw. It was one of the last decisions taken by Senior-General Than Shwe on January 20, 2011, before his retirement. Out of 388 first-time delegates appointed by Than Shwe in 2011, there were only three army colonels in Pyithu Hluttaw, two in Amyotha Hluttaw, whilst one army colonel lead each military delegation in the fourteen decentralized local assemblies, safe the Kayin State where a Brigadier-General has been posted (he would thereafter be nominated Chief Minister). All other military appointees were of lower ranks – majors, captains, and navy lieutenant-commanders. For many observers, their core objective in the parliament was to ensure the army a non-negotiable “veto” on any potential constitutional reform; indeed 75 per cent of the legislators are required to pass any amendment on the Constitution.

But if the presence of the military in the post-SPDC national and local assemblies seems secured, Tatmadaw’s legislative power appears not as unlimited and unchecked as often claimed by pro-democracy activists. Initially, many an observer thought the military appointees would just have
to resist potential amendments to the Constitution prepared by leading opposition MPs, secure the nomination of the President and one of the two Vice-presidents (both with substantial military background), and deal with military-related affairs. But the political significance of the army representatives in the national parliament (far more than in the local legislatures) has gradually evolved, in line with the enduring political salience of the *Tatmadaw*. During the first post-2010 elections parliamentarian sessions, newly appointed army delegates tended to keep low profile in all assemblies. But once the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy entered both houses after the by-elections held in April 2012, the parliament’s prestige emerged redeemed. Already, the assertion of Thura Shwe Mann’s political authority as Speaker of *Pyithu Hluttaw* has since 2011 strengthened its importance. This was all the more highlighted by rumours on his emerging political rivalry with the executive power and President Thein Sein.

Above all, military representatives have progressively showed skills at participating in parliamentarian debates, discussing law propositions and arranging for shuttles of bills between the two houses of *Pyidaungsu Hluttaw*. Special trainings have been provided to them and political science teachings are compulsory at the Defence Services Academy (DSA). When in early 2013 I conducted interviews in Naypyidaw and Yangon with parliamentarians, some have recalled how they have attempted to establish some sort of friendly dialogue with their military colleagues, especially the mid-rank officers. Discussions within the premises of the national assemblies in Naypyidaw appeared far more forthcoming than initially expected. After all, legislative mechanisms were also quite unfamiliar to civilian MPs, who took for the first time a parliamentarian position in 2011.

Furthermore, three weeks after the historical election of Aung San Suu Kyi in April 2012, the substitution of 59 majors and captains with as many Brigadier-generals and colonels as new military appointees in *Pyidaungsu Hluttaw* underscored an evident policy change from the armed forces. From then on, higher ranking military officers were to get thoroughly involved in legislative debates. This indicated the increasing importance the *Tatmadaw* – and more particularly its C-in-C Min Aung Hlaing – gives to a legislative branch. This is also in line with the *Tatmadaw*’s rhetoric on the image of responsibility, accountability and dedication to the public interest that every senior army officer should project, including in non-military bodies and institutions.

Besides, military appointees have increasingly proved ready not to vote systematically against propositions prepared by opposition MPs (far from it). On some issues once considered as “national security” and reserved to the sole military hierarchy during the SLORC-SPDC era, military delegates have proved willing to listen and, sometimes, align with the opposition. When the support for a general amnesty for prisoners was proposed in August 2011, military appointees acquiesced. According to civilian parliamentarian themselves, the new legislature – although far from perfect – therefore in no way resembles the tightly controlled National Convention which drafted the Constitution between 2004 and 2007.

If the post-SPDC national and local parliaments can prove they are no rubber-stamping legislature, in which military delegates act cooperatively with the dominant party as well as the opposition, the prospects for a consolidation of the post-SPDC transition through parliamentarian activism would therefore appear brighter. Encouragingly, the military delegates have not opposed the formulation of the most significant reform-minded laws since 2011 – especially at the Union level. The critical
role, behind closed doors, of the charismatic Thura Shwe Mann might explain. A further positive sign would be that the military moves beyond its primordial veto function sanctioned by the Constitution to actively participate in lawmaking and reform planning. This is however where the transition appears to remain extremely fragile, and expectations too idealistic. Tensions might loom soon. Opposition members and particularly Aung San Suu Kyi have repeatedly claimed that the presence of men in uniform in post-SPDC assemblies was an anomaly that has to be corrected. They push for a constitutional amendment before 2015. As in Indonesia in the 1990s, how the issue is dealt with will prove critical to the consolidation (or not) of a peaceful relationship between the civilians and the still dominant military, and this beyond the premises of the parliament.
Authoritarian Survival Strategies in Comparative Perspective:

Myanmar, China and North Korea

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Three authoritarian regimes in (South and North) East Asia—Myanmar, China and North Korea—have been experiencing substantial challenges and changes in recent years, but have responded differently. Myanmar made a transition to market economy with recent significant political reform; China has made a transition to market economy without fundamental political reform; North Korea has not made a transition to market economy without any political reform. These three authoritarian regimes’ different paths for their own regime survival help us to understand authoritarian regimes in East Asia. More specifically, comparing the three East Asian authoritarian regimes would show their resilience, survival strategies, and economic and political reform and transition.

In this vein, this paper focuses on the following four questions: (1) How have the three authoritarian regimes—China, Myanmar, and North Korea—in East Asia been surviving?; (2) Why did some authoritarian regimes make economic and/or political transition and the others not?; (3) What are the roles of semi-competitive election, authoritarian regime type, and clientele structure in making such distinctions with the similar result (regime survival)?; (4) What are other critical factors beyond these three domestic factors?

To answer this set of questions, this paper uses comparative political study with qualitative methods of case study of three regimes and quantitative methods for large pictures in East Asia and other regions (large-N study). To use these methods for this research, there are some concerns such as the “kitchen sink” method (i.e. including every possible variable in the equation); the “endogeneity” (i.e. the causal relation runs in both directions) problem; and the “multicollinearity” (i.e. two or more predictor variables in a multiple regression model are highly correlated) problem

Main arguments of this paper are as follows. Authoritarian regimes in East Asia have been transforming themselves into different types of hybrid regime for its own survival. The following three theoretical frameworks are helpful to analyze their authoritarian resilience: (1) Institutional arrangement (electoral institution); (2) Authoritarian regime type (single-party, military, personalistic, and hybrid); and (3) Their engendered similar but distinct patron-clientele structures (at the elite as well as mass levels). These theoretical frameworks, the further study will be incorporated to the context of economic and political reform(or transition).

Case I. The Tatmadaw Regime in Myanmar

Its institutional arrangement (electoral mechanism) has been based upon semi-competitive national and local elections with increasingly more competitiveness (esp. since 2012) with the ordinary
citizens’ significant electoral experiences and opposition party and charismatic leaders such as Aung San Suu Ki. Its authoritarian regime type is still military type, which is conventionally the most unstable and short-lived, but not for Myanmar and similar with the previous South Korea 1960s~1980s. Its patron-clientele structure is composed of two sectors: at the elite level, it revolving around the military armed force (tatmadaw) and connected entrepreneurs and at the mass level, the ordinary citizens are largely excluded, but are somehow connected into the military-based clientelism for their own survival.

**Case 2. Chinese Communist Party Regime in China**

Its institutional arrangement (electoral mechanism) has no meaningful election above the village committee election with neither opposition parties and leaders nor substantial electoral experiences. This regime promotes “Socialist Democracy with Chinese Characteristics”, which is not very clear. Its authoritarian regime type can be categorized as single-party (Chinese Communist Party), which is very stable with collective leadership at the top (established succession mechanism) and more than 82 million party members. The patron-client structure of this single-party regime has that of revolving around political and economic resources at the elite level and that of not revolving around elections and largely between local governments/cadres and newly emerged entrepreneurs excluding most ordinary citizens at the mass level.

**Case 3. The Kim Family Regime in North Korea**

Its institutional arrangement (electoral mechanism) has no meaningful election without any opposition parties and leaders and electoral experience of ordinary citizens. Its ruling coalition is the smallest among three cases. Its authoritarian regime type is a so-called triple-threat (a hybrid of Single-party, Military, and Personalistic) and relatively stable with succession issue. Its patron-client structure is composed of the Kim Family and its military and party cronies at the elite level and local cadres and illegal businessmen at the mass level. It seems that there is no patron for ordinary citizens who barely survive in everyday life.

**Conclusion**

Based upon the preliminary research, more specific mechanisms related to economic and political reform/transition in each case will be investigated. To be sure, some other factors for regime survival will be state repression (Its proportional change with political openness?), predatory state vs. developmental state, international factors (Nuclear Weapons, China/US...), and ideology (The Revival of Great Chinese People, National Unity, We Kim Ilsung People...). Also, these three authoritarian regimes will be compared with other authoritarian regimes from previous and current as well as in East Asia and other regions for general patterns for prediction.
Myanmar’s Economic Potential: Peace Making or Peace Breaking?

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The Myanmar reform process starting with the 2008 Constitution have so far been accompanied by an increase in political violence- particularly near economically important areas. Widespread public protests have taken place against planned dams and pipelines, and natural resources rich areas have been affected by clashes between the government and non-state armed groups in Kachin and northern Shan state. Indeed, statements by representatives for non-state armed groups repeatedly assess that the current fighting occur because the government wants to capture these natural resources. But this behavior flies in the face of established theories on rational political decision-making: why engage in costly fighting in exactly the locations where the peace dividend from the end of conflict will be the greatest?

In what follows, I suggest an explanation that focuses on the dynamic nature of strategy employed by belligerents during civil strife. Thereby, I move away from a common assumption in scholarly work on internal war warring party behaviour is determined solely by their interaction with each other. In this short research note, I focus explicitly on one factor – parties expected duration of the conflict – and one effect – whether parties choose to engage in battle near or far from important economic resources. Following a presentation of the theoretical argument, I explore whether this can be observed in Myanmar. The empirics build on the shift in government behavior in northern Myanmar (Kachin and Shan States) as a consequence of the reform process, and I conclude with a discussion on the implications this may have for the possibility of ending civil war in the country.

The Aims of Rebels and Governments in Conflict

While there can be many reasons for why civil strife erupts somewhere, the choice of action by governments and rebels in the initial stages are strikingly similar across different countries. The first rebel offensives focuses on the achieving the goal of getting increased access to power. In the first years of post-colonial Burma, several rebellious movements were almost able to succeed with this but the early ABSDF government managed to defend itself. Fighting was extremely intense as both sides committed all their available resources towards the military campaign in the expectation that the conflict soon would be over. Most of the fighting was located at the most economically and symbolically important resources, such as cities, trading posts and transport routes, as capturing them could provide important resources for post-conflict reconstruction.

However, unless one side succeeds in defeating the other in these early clashes, belligerents have to reconsider their strategy. Knowing that they are unable to comprehensively win the conflict and achieve their ultimate goals, they have to focus on secondary goals such as survival and to strengthen militarily over time. In order to do this, governments will claim control over as much
territory as possible to be perceived as strong and legitimate. Rebels, on the other side, need to ensure that they control some territory for recruitment purposes and are able to set up bases for military training, political education, and the development of a political wing. Both sides also need to be more cautious with their existing resources. Thus, even though the competition still centers on control over territory, belligerents are less willing to commit resources for this and clashes will not be near economically important areas. It is rational for them to avoid fighting near economically important areas since that could disrupt their income from the ongoing trade with natural resources. To maximize income from these areas for the warring sides, they will instead establish arrangements to ensure that they receive a share of the income from the trade without having to risk losing soldiers or income. In Myanmar, such arrangements have consisted of for example taxation of companies involved in logging and mining, as well as road-blocks or protection pacts seeking revenue from transporting the goods towards the Thai and Chinese borders.

If negotiations begin and the parties see these as credibly offering a way to settle the conflict, they will again reconsider their expectation of the duration of conflict and subsequently shift from temporary to ultimate goals. In order to improve their bargaining position as well as secure important resources in the post-conflict society, the strategic aim of the parties will shift back towards economically important areas. At the same time, they will also be more willing to commit the resources at their disposal to secure these areas in what is perceived as the end-game of the conflict. This is of course a risky choice, an intensification of violence runs counter to attempts to build trust between belligerents and may lead to a breakdown of the talks and a return to protracted conflict.


Ever since independence, the government has shown little ambition to engage with or incorporate northern Kachin and Shan states into the state formation of Burma/Myanmar. Most areas have not been under direct government control, and there have been few attempts to establish state presence. Instead, these areas have been ruled through more or less formalized networks where local saophas, religious actors, and local strongmen who have been trusted with controlling the political and economic local life. This approach persisted even during the SLORC/SPDC “ceasefire” period. Despite an opportunity of almost two decades of reduced violence in these areas and where many local leaders explicitly requested government support for schools and healthcare, little interest was shown by Yangon/Naypyidaw. Tellingly, there were not even much interest from Myanmar businessmen to access the income from natural resources in these areas, with almost all investments only involving foreign companies from, in particular, China and Thailand. The military government, and particularly local commanders, continued to tax the trade in these areas which suggest that they remained focused on the short-term goal of preparing for fighting rather than seeking to consolidate their long-term power.

**The Government Approach to Ethnic Minority Areas in Northern Myanmar 2008-**

In my research, I have found that the prevailing view is that there was a visible change of government strategy following the new constitution 2008. Since then, the government has with increasing assertiveness focused their troop deployments and political efforts towards securing control over
economically important areas. The first sign of this followed the acceptance of some non-state forces to transform into border guard forces (BGF). While much of the opposition of the BGF scheme from non-state armed groups focused on their unwillingness to serve under a Myanmar army commander, this aspect has not been the cause of as much fraction as originally expected. However, when a new BGF has been formed, this has usually been accompanied by a deployment of Myanmar army units at economically important areas nearby. The second sign that the government is paying more attention to natural resources are the events that led to the resumption of the Kachin conflict in 2011. Although tension had been lingering between the government and the KIO for some time, the spark that started the fighting was the intrusion of government soldiers into an area that the 1994 ceasefire terms stipulated as controlled by KIO. This should not have necessitated an escalation of violence that now has lasted several years, but the government forces refused to withdraw while the KIO were similarly reluctant to concede this economically important territory. Finally, many ethnic minority representatives also claim that the governments’ priorities in the ongoing peace talks have been to focus first on achieving a ceasefire with those groups that controlled the most economically important areas. As the peace process has persisted and widened, it is not possible in 2013 to suggest that the government only is interested in ceasefires only where there are natural resources. However, the content and uneven progress of the talks indicate that both the government and the non-state armed groups are fully aware of the importance of controlling future economic growth: some groups have explicitly demanded that they are granted at least partial control over areas that are considered as having economic potential. In some cases, this has even included areas that currently are not under rebel control.

This study yields three implications that can be useful for understanding the contemporary situation in Myanmar. First, there is a rationale behind the escalation of violence in some parts of the country during the early stages of the peace process as competing actors are vying for power in a future Myanmar. Second, while this may explain the violence in Kachin and northern Shan state, we should not underestimate the risk that this may delay or reverse the peace process. Increased violence is a threat to any attempt of settling or implementing a settlement and there is a risk that all the Myanmar army and the non-state armed groups move back into a mode where they expect fighting to persist of another generation or so. This would likely increase human rights abuse and challenge the development that is necessary in the country to safeguard both the peace process and the political reforms. Third, it is also necessary to be observant on how this competition to control natural resources and economic centers is manifested. An consequence of the contentious relations between government and non-state armed group is that whichever actor ends up in control may also be protective against any other community or political organization in this territory. If all economically promising areas are controlled by a unique actor who rejects the possibility of non-violent actors co-existing in the same space, then Myanmar’s road towards both democracy and economic growth will be substantively longer.
Obstacles to Police Reform in Myanmar/Burma

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Despite all the publicity that Myanmar (Burma) has received since the inauguration of a hybrid military-civilian parliament in 2011, and the launch of an ambitious reform program by President U Thein Sein, there are some important issues which seem to have escaped serious study. The reform of the national police force, for example, has not been specifically covered in any of the president’s speeches about the need for the ‘rule of law’. However, it has become clear that the government wishes not only to reinvigorate existing plans to expand and remodel the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), but also to give it a more distinctive civilian style and ethos, and see it take greater responsibility for some key aspects of the country’s internal security. Indeed, such steps will be essential if Myanmar is to strengthen the rule of law and make an orderly transition to a genuine and sustainable democracy.

The armed forces (Tatmadaw) will remain responsible for external defence and for major security operations such as counter-insurgency campaigns against armed ethnic groups. However, it seems to be envisaged that, as part of the broad democratisation process, the MPF will assume a greater role in terms of law enforcement and the maintenance of internal order. Already, there are more blue uniforms than green uniforms on the streets of Myanmar’s population centres, protecting VIPs, standing static guard outside government offices and diplomatic missions. In rural districts they are manning road blocks and protecting important infrastructure sites such as bridges. The police can also be expected to play a larger part in quelling outbreaks of civil unrest, with the army only called upon to provide aid to the ‘civil’ power during emergencies, as occurred in Arakan (Rakhine) State in 2012 and central Myanmar in 2013.

To this end, the MPF is being expanded, restructured and modernised. It is already larger and more powerful than it has been since the colonial era, but the goal is a force of over 100,000 men and women, with 34 ‘security’ battalions. As seen on the MPF’s comprehensive new Myanmar language website, recruitment standards and officer level entry requirements have been raised. At the same time, the MPF’s doctrine and training programs are being changed to give greater emphasis to ‘community-based policing’ by unarmed officers working in close cooperation with the civil population. This approach may not be completely new to Myanmar but, if fully and successfully adopted, it will be in stark contrast to the tough paramilitary style of policing that has characterised the force since General Ne Win’s 1962 coup d’etat.

As the former military regime found before 2011, however, and as post-authoritarian governments in other countries — such as Indonesia — have also experienced, the reform of a national police force presents enormous challenges. Such transitions are never quick or easy. There are a number of areas where the government and police force are likely to encounter challenges during the reform process.
Inevitably, given the rapid expansion of the MPF, there will be structural and resource pressures. In addition, Myanmar’s armed forces remain very powerful. There will be some areas, such as intelligence collection and internal security operations, where the interests of the MPF and Tatmadaw will overlap. The respective roles, responsibilities and associated benefits of the two institutions may be sorted out — probably in the Tatmadaw’s favour — but there could still be friction. Also, there are cultural issues in the police force which will take a long time to resolve. Corruption and the abuse of power, for example, are deeply-rooted problems that will be difficult to eradicate. Until they are, the force’s relations with the civil population will remain problematical.

In addition, such reform measures cannot be implemented in isolation from other institutions of state. As the president has said, the benchmark for public bodies must be the rule of law, administered fairly and impartially. There can be no tolerance of a system which constantly alludes to the rule of law, but enables practices that contradict it. For decades, the ‘rule of law’ was conflated with ‘law and order’, as defined by the military government. There were honourable exceptions, of course, but all too often the police acted as if they were not subject to the laws they were charged to uphold. If officials cannot change and embrace the new paradigm, or are seen to be irretrievably linked to the old regime, then they will need to be replaced. A more modern and effective police force will be rendered impotent, for example, if prosecutors, judges, and prison governors fail in their responsibilities. There needs to be a clear break with the past.

Since 2011, several foreign governments, international institutions and private foundations have approached Naypyidaw with offers of help in this area. While most cite the president’s speeches and refer to broad ‘rule of law’ issues, a number seem to envisage direct assistance to the MPF. The ability of foreigners to reform Myanmar’s police force, however, is limited. They can provide specialised instruction, technical assistance and modern equipment. They can advise on concepts like rights-based and community policing. This should lift the MPF’s ability to perform its basic functions, enhance its capacity to control crime and disorder, and develop democratic policing models. However, fundamental reform of the MPF will depend on sustained support from Naypyidaw, a paradigm shift in the force’s professional culture and the development of a relationship of trust with the community. These are matters which can only be dealt with by the Burmese themselves.

Over the past decade, a broad consensus has developed at the international level on what democratic policing looks like. Analysts have identified seven basic principles: that the police force operates in accordance with the law, is regulated by a professional code of conduct, protects life by minimising the use of force, is accountable to the public, protects life and property through pro-active crime prevention, safeguards human rights and dignity, and acts in non discriminatory manner. These seven principles can be condensed to just three: the police force must adhere to international standards of human rights, it must maintain effective internal and external accountability, and develop a partnership with local communities to achieve public safety. Measured against all these benchmarks, Myanmar has made some progress since the late 1990s, and perhaps even since the advent of a new government in 2011, but it still has a long way to go.

Should the MPF be able to reinvent itself, however, it has the potential to make a major contribution to President Thein Sein’s reform program and the development of a more democratic, prosperous and humane society in Myanmar. Also, as an important civilian body answerable to the public
through an ‘elected’ government, its behaviour — and treatment by the government — will be important indicators of progress in current attempts to implement the rule of law in Myanmar and make the security forces more accountable for their actions. These are all matters which will be watched closely, both by the international community and by the Burmese people themselves.
The Imperative of Myanmar’s New Round of Economic Reform

Long period of extreme poorness of the country and people is the main driving force to push the new government to undertake new round of economic reform. Myanmar is country full of natural resources. But, it has been one of the poorest countries since 1987.

The urgency of the new round of economic reforms. The Thein Sein government put the political reform as its priority, especially during the first year of the new government, it paid not much attention to the economic reform and development. Later, the top official realized that lagging economic reform would damage the political reform.

The turmoil situation in Arab world in the past two years has shocked the Myanmar authority and pressed them to accelerate the economic reform, because the main reason of the so called Arab Spring is the high rate of unemployment of the young people.

The Measures of Myanmar’s New Government Economic Reform since 2011

After more than one year of political reform, the Thein Sein government pushed the second phase of reform-economic reform.

First, the government set the scientific plan and ambitious aim of the economic reform for the following years, which will guide and drive the reform process. President Thein Sein said that, one of Myanmar’s economic objectives “Development of agriculture as the base and all-round development of other sectors of the economy as well” has been replaced with “Building of modern industrialized nation through the agricultural development, and all-round development of other sectors of the economy.”

Second, quite different from the former junta government, one of the fundamental goals of the Thein Sein government’s economic reform is to improve the common people’s wellbeing, and it pays much attention to the rural development and poverty alleviation.

Third, the parliament and government has amended some out-dated economic laws or promulgates a series of new laws, which has helped the country to improve the invest environment and boost the economic development. The new laws have facilitate the investment and take more preferential measures the investors to attract investment.

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Fourth, Myanmar has reshuffled several economic governing organizations, set up several new service organizations, eliminate the conservative officials, and put the reformer to the important positions. All the above mentioned measures have consolidated the reformers’ status in the government, unified and strengthened the all the government officials’ thoughts about reform, then to improve the officials’ consciousness and efficiency of serving for the investors. For example, in January, 2013, Myanmar government has formed a central committee for further development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), pivotal for national economy and promotion of social-economic status of the people. The 27-member central committee for SME development is chaired by President U Thein Sein, also involving two Vice Presidents Dr. Sai Mauk Kham and U Nyan Tun and 20 ministers.52

Fifth, the government strongly pushes the privation of the state owned enterprises, loosen the state control towards the sectors of the telecommunication, energy, finance and other fields, and then let the private capital and foreign capital to operate in the above-mentioned fields. Some state-owned enterprises will be changed into corporation and some into private sector with the aim of boosting the private sector, the government wants to create a suitable environment for the private sector in the reform process, then to put more dynamic into the economy.

Sixth, the government takes the full advantage of the wisdom of the domestic and international experts or institutions. On April 11, 2011, President Thein Sein set up the Economic Advisory Unit lead by Dr. U Myint, and the advisors can directly submit the economic reform advice to President Thein Sein. Myanmar has held several big workshops concerning the Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation, the reform of bank and capital market, and it has held the Myanmar Investment Summit every year. The Myanmar government has invited many international scholars, experts and investors to attend the workshops and Summit, and it has even employed several U.S. and EU experts to help push the economic reform. With the help of the IMF experts, on April 1, 2012, Myanmar ended the parallel market currency exchange rate system which had lasted for more then 20 years, and Myanmar’s central bank set a reference exchange rate of 818 kyat per dollar (basically according to the black market range of 800 to 820 kyat per dollar, which is already used for most transactions in the country) used for most everyday transactions. Besides these measures, the Myanmar banks has joined Visa ATM network, and they begun to introduce the electronic transaction such as ATM and E-commerce, then they has begun to conduct international credit cards transactions.

Seventh, President Thein Sein has undertaken economic and political reforms that have persuaded Western countries to suspend even get rid of most of the sanctions. And the Myanmar government makes great efforts to attract the FDI from the ASEAN, U.S., EU, Japan, China, India, South Korea and other countries. Myanmar is seriously short of capital and techniques to develop the economy, because it has large amount of debt and was given heavy economic sanctions for more than 20 years.

The Prospects of Myanmar’s Economic Reform: Asia’s Next Rising Star?

On August 20, 2012, the Asian Development Bank released a study report, *Myanmar in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges*. The reported pointed out that, Myanmar could follow Asia’s fast

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52“SMEs lie at the core of national economic growth in developing countries and some developed countries: President U Thein Sein,” *The New Light of Myanmar*, January 12, 2013.
Myanmar's economy has the several advantages to take off in the future.

First, the country is on the track of quick reform and development, and it has great potential in the economic development, because almost every sector of the agriculture and industry need development and investment, and Myanmar has more than 60 million people and it has potential consumption ability.

Second, Myanmar's economic reform and development gets a lot of support from the international society. The informally-named Paris Club, a group representing 19 major world economies, has forgiven $6 billion of Myanmar's debt in January, 2013, then in May, Japan wrote off nearly Myanmar’s $2 billion debt and extending new aid of 51.05 billion yen ($504 million). Myanmar has also get a lot of loans and aids from the international society.

Third, Myanmar is in a good position connecting the business and the interflow of goods and materials between Southeast Asia and South Asia, and Myanmar is building the several economic zones will help Myanmar to become a center of products and logistics in the region, such as Dawei in Myanmar-Thailand border area, Kyauk Phyu near the coast of India Ocean, and Thilawa near Yangon Port off the Andaman Sea. These special economic zones will better bring the geographical advantages into play and boost its development. And there are rich natural resources in Myanmar.

The future of Myanmar’s economic reform and development seems bright. But, its reform and developing process will be an arduous one full of challenges.

First, until now, many international investors suspect the future of new round of reform. According to the Corruption index 2012 from Transparency International, Myanmar was a still one of the most corrupted countries in the world, which was a big obstacle to the economic reform and development. The Wall Street Journal's article pointed out that, Myanmar has only just cracked open to Western investors after a junta government stepped down in 2011, and the private-equity firms are divided over whether Myanmar will be a source of huge profits, or just another place to endure losses.

Second, the outdated economic, especially financial system issue will be the big obstacles for the economic reform.

Third, the dilapidated infrastructure including hard and soft ware in the whole country is another big and long-term barrier to the economic reform and development.

Fourth, short of sufficient domestic and foreign investment restricts the reform and development.

Fifth, in the economic reform process, whether Myanmar’s national industry will become stronger or defeated by foreign companies? Most of Myanmar’s local companies are middle and small sized ones, even there are several big enterprises, and their technology, management, and operation lag far behind the international level. Facing more and more powerful international companies, what’s the destiny of Myanmar’s national companies? How to make the local and international companies to compete or cooperate harmoniously? Then to make them develop simultaneously?

Internationally, the western investors don’t have enough capital to invest in Myanmar, and the western market consumption capacity is relatively low. This bad situation means that the western investment and market can’t play great contributing role in Myanmar’s economic development.

Short Conclusion

Myanmar’s economic reform will boost the country’s development and improve the mass people’s well-being. The country’s development has great advantages and bright future. But, Myanmar also should notice the challenges and carefully overcome the difficulties ahead.
The Obama Administration's Myanmar Policies Adjustment: Promoting Democracy in Myanmar or Containing China?

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အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈမ်ားကိုမည္သည့္အခါမွ်တိုးတက္ေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္ရန္ျမန္မာစစ္အစိုးရႏွင့္ဆက္ဆံေရးကိုသာစြန္႔လြတ္မည္မွာျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၏တ႐ုတ္သည္ခဲ့ေပ။အမ်ားအားျဖင့္အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့ျခင္းမရွိသလိုအားနည္းခဲ့သည္။ခုႏွစ္ကစစ္တပ္သိဋေသာ္အမ်ဳိးသားအက်ဳိးစီးပြားရွာေဖြျခင္းႏွင့္ရာဆက္ဆံေရးခၽြတ္ေခ်ာ္မႈမ်ားကိုလည္းအေမရိကန္ႏိုင္ငံျခားဆက္ဆံေရး၏ေမးခြန္းထုတ္ၾကသည္။တစ္ခုေလာဒီမိုကေရစီျမႇင့္တင္ေရးသည္ကိုက်င္ျပည္နယ္ရွိပါ၀င္ပတ္သက္ခဲ့သည္ကိုလြန္ခဲ့သည့္အားေကာင္းေသာစိတ္၀င္စားမႈမ်ားသည္လည္းအေရးႀကီးသည့္အျခားႏုိင္ငံမ်ား၏အသားေရာင္ခြဲျခားမႈဖိအားမေပးခဲ့သလိုအဆိုပါေခါင္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ားကိုယင္းသို႔ေသာလုပ္ခဲ့သည္။ပါကစၥတန္ႏုိင္ငံတို႔တြင္လည္းကိုသာမန္ျပည္သူမ်ားအေပၚလံုေလာက္ေသာအာ႐ံုစုိက္ခဲ့ေသာစီးပြားေရးပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈတြင္ယံုမွားသံသယရွိဖြယ္ရည္မွန္းခ်က္တစ္ရပ္ျမႇင့္တင္ျခင္းသည္ပဋိပကၡညႇိႏႈိင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္းႏွင့္ျပည္တြင္းေရးတြင္ေဒသခံမ်ား၏သည္ယင္းတို႔သည္လစ္ဟာမႈမ်ားေၾကာင့္အေမရိကန္သည္ေဆာ္ဒီအာေရဘီးယား၊လိုအပ္သည္။ဒီမိုကေရစီျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံေပၚခ်ိန္ညႇိရန္အသက္ေမြး၀မ္းေက်ာင္းတိုးတက္ရန္ရွိခဲ့သည္။ေသာသက္ေသအေထာက္အထားမ်ားကအေမရိကန္၏ျမန္မာဆက္ဆံေရးတြင္အေမရိကန္၏မ႐ႈတ္ခ်ခဲ့သည့္အျပင္၀င္ေရာက္စြပ္ဖက္ရန္မွ်သာမဟုတ္ေတာ့ဘဲရာအေၾကာင္းမျမင္ေပ။ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈျပဳလုပ္ရန္ႏွင့္ႏွစ္ေပါင္းလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးကိုမ႐ုပ္သိမ္းႏုိင္ရသနည္းဟုကာလၾကာရွည္ထားရွိသည့္ဒီမုိကေရစီတင္ပို႔ျခင္းသည္အိုဘားမားအစိုးရ၏ျဖစ္ေသာ္လည္းမိမိတို႔၏ရန္ျဖစ္သည္။ေလးစားၾကသျဖင့္ဘ႐ူႏုိင္းတို႔သည္အာဏာရယူထားသည့္အေမရိကန္သည္သဘာ၀အရင္းအျမစ္သည္ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚခ်မွတ္ထားသည့္သံတမန္ေရးပြတ္တိုက္မႈျဖစ္လွ်င္လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးကာကြယ္ျခင္းကိုျပသခဲ့ၾကသည္။အာဖရိကတြင္ျပည္တြင္းႏုိင္ငံတြင္ဒီမိုကေရစီအေပၚပညာရွင္မ်ားကအခါကမွ်သူ၏ေနရာကိုအီဂ်စ္သမၼတေဟာင္းကူညီေပးျခင္းမရွိတ႐ုတ္သည္အျပဳအမႈမ်ားကိုတန္ဖိုးမ်ားႏွင့္ထို႔ေၾကာင့္ဆက္ခံရန္
ယခုလက္အပါအဝင္ လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas ExperIeCJJ; တွင် လူမျိုးတို့၏ အနီးစီးစွာ အောင်မြင်ရေးအား အသက်ရွှင်စီး ဖြစ်ရ Sas Expe
မြန်မာစစ်အစိုးရနှင့်ကပ်ဗျာပံ့ေရးပစ်ည္းမ်ား မြန်မာနိင္ငံအသံုးပေးသည္ဆိုေသာင္ပူပ္မႈမ်ား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့်အက်ဳိးဖစ္ထြန္းလိမ့္မည္ကို ယင္းအေပၚ မြန်မာအခ်ဳပ္႕ေသာ ၀န္ရံပိတ္ဆို႔ေရးအားထုတ္မႈမ်ားအပၚ ရွာင္ရွာေစလိုၾကသည္။ တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္ပတ္သက္ေသာအေပါင္းသံုည ၂၀၁၂ နာဂစ္ဆိုက္အရာရွိတစ္ဦးက တ႐ုတ္တိနသည္ တ႐ုတ္တြင္သံသယ၀င္စရာမ်ား စစ္လက္နက္ပစ်ည္းမ်ားေရာင္းခ်မႈလုပ္ေဆာင္မႈႏွင့္ အေမရိကန္ျပည္ေထာင္စု တ႐ုတ္ကအားလွုးနီးပါး မန္မာအထက္တန္းလႊာမ်ားက မန္မာစစ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားက သူအျဖစ္စက္တင္ဘာတြင္ အေမရိကန္အမ်ဳိးသားအက်ဳိးစီးပြားကိုလည္း မန္မာ၀န္ႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္႐ႈေထာင့္တံု႔ျပန္မႈမ်ားကမူ ကာင္းမြန္ေသာအေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈမ်ားသာ တုံ႔ျပန္မႈမ်ားကို အထက္တန္းလႊာမ်ားက ဆက္ဆံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးတုိးတက္မႈအေပၚ ယင္းကို ထုတ္ျပန္ခဲ့သည့္ CSIS စစ္အစိုးရခ်မွတ္ခဲ့သည့္ အေမရိကန္က ၂၀၀၈နာဂစ္ဆိုက္ကလုန္းမုန္တိုင္းၿပီးအေနက္က႑ကို ျပီး ထုတ္သည့္ စစ္အရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔ရန္မန္မာႏုိင္ငံအား တ႐ုတ္ကလည္း တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္အေမရိကန္ၾကားနည္းေသးသည္ အေမရိကန္ မိတ္ဖက္မ်ားျဖစ္ၾကသည္ဟု ခ်ည္းကပ္မႈႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ အေမရိကန္ထံမွ ေၾကာက္ရြံ႕စိုးထိပ္မႈမ်ား႐ုတ္တရတ္ရလဒ္ထြက္ျပီး မူရာျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚမူ အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့သည့္အတြက္ အာဖဂန္ႏုိင္ငံသိန့မူအၿမဲတမ္းအေထာက္အပံ့ျပဳခဲ့သည္။

ယင္းတို႔က လ်င္ျမန္စြာျဖစ္စဥ္အတြက္ မြန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၏ဟူ၍ျဖစ္သည္။ မြန္မာႏုိင္ငံသည္ ထိန္းသိမ္းထားရန္ ဆယ္စုႏွစ္မ်ားညႇိႏႈိင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေပးခဲ့သည္။ အျပည့္အ၀နားလည္သေဘာေပါက္ၾက ဆက္ဆံေရးအေပၚတြင္ အသိအမွတ္ျပဳျခင္းႏွင့္ တ႐ုတ္၏သေဘာထားမီွခိုေနရျခင္းကို အိမ္နီးခ်င္းႏုိင္ငံအျဖစ္သာ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတို႔ကေ လးစားရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အခြင့္အေရးကို လ်ဳိ႕၀ွက္အစည္းအေ၀းတစ္ခုကို လ်ဳိ႕ေထြးလာေသာ အေထာက္အကူျဖစ္ေစသည္။ အေမရိကန္ျပည္ေထာင္စုအား ျမန္မာျကားအေျခစိုက္ ျပီးတို႔ကြား ဆက္လက္ထားရွိသည္။ အေမရိကန္ဆက္ဆံေရးတို႔သည္ ၎၏စီးပြားေရးတ ကာလၾကာအခ်ဳပ္႕ေသာ အာဖဂန္ႏုိင္ငံထက္မည္ အုပ္စု၏ 107
ယင်းနေ့ကြားတွင် နေ့စဉ်ရေးထိုးထားသော အပေါ်မီးမခံရသည် တည်းဖြတ်ခြင်းအားလွှင့်ပြီး မိတ်ဆွေသော အက္ခရာစီမံခိုးများဖြစ်ကြသည်။

နိဂ္ဂိုလ်သို့မဟုတ် အေမရိကန်တို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် နေရာမားသော အခုိက္ခေါင်းဆောင်များရှိ၍ စိတ်မာရန် လိုအပ်သည်။

အေမာ်ရော်မှားသော နောက်ဆုံးရှိ ဒေသအနီးအနားများကို ကျောင်းသားများကို ဖွံ့ဖြိုးဦးစားရာ အခြေခံပါသည်။

အေမာ်ရော်မှားသောကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် သာသနာအချိန် အခြင်းအရာများကို ဥပဒေစားရာ လိုအပ်သည်။

အေမာ်ရော်မှားသောနေ့စဉ် အေမာ်ရာမောင် အေမာ်ရာမောင်ဆိုင်ရာ ပေးထားသော အချိန်များကို ဖယ်ရာများကို နောက်ဆုံးရှိသည်။

အေမာ်ရော်မှားသောနေ့စဉ် ဒေသအနီးအနားများကို ကျောင်းသားများကို ဖွံ့ဖြိုးဦးစားရာ အခြေခံပါသည်။

နိဂ္ဂိုလ်အား အေမာ်ရော်မှားသောနေ့စဉ် အေမာ်ရာမောင်များကို တိုက်ခိုက်ဦးစားရာ အခြေခံပါသည်။

အေမာ်ရော်မှားသောနေ့စဉ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် များသော အချိန်များကို ဥပဒေစားရာ လိုအပ်သည်။
Governance and Legitimacy in the Peace Process

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The insurgent network's co-optation and accommodation

- The peace process has been severely undermined by the continued presence of armed groups in the peace talks. The process is often characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability, with the insurgents frequently using the talks as a platform to further their own interests. This has led to a lack of trust and confidence among the parties involved, as well as among the public.

- The KIO (Karen Independence Organization) has been particularly active in this regard, using the peace process as an opportunity to strengthen its position and gain recognition as a legitimate political entity. This has led to further polarisation and instability in the region.

- The peace process has also been characterized by a lack of accountability and transparency, with the insurgents often operating outside the law and with little oversight or accountability. This has led to a lack of trust and confidence among the public, and has undermined the legitimacy of the peace process.

- To address these issues, it is necessary to strengthen the peace process by promoting transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. This will involve ensuring that the peace negotiations are conducted in a fair and balanced manner, and that the parties involved are held accountable for their actions.

- Ultimately, the success of the peace process will depend on the willingness of the parties involved to make the necessary concessions and to engage in meaningful dialogue. This will require a commitment to the rule of law and a willingness to negotiate in good faith.

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• စစ္တပ္တစ္ေယာက္တစ္မ်ိးျဖစ္ေနသေလာဆုိသည္ႏွင့္ပက္သက္သည့္ သေဘာတူ သေဘာတူညီခ်က္မွ ေပၚထြန္းခဲ့သည္။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္အတုိင္း ႏွင့္ပက္သက္လတ္တေလာျဖစ္ပြားေနသည့္ အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စလာရပ္စဲေရး ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္ျဖစ္ပြားေနေသာ သယံဇာတကနဦး ေထာက္ပံ့ပုိ႔ေဆာင္ေရးဆုိင္ရာ အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲေရးကိစၥရပ္မ်ား အ၀င္လယ္ယာေျမဥပေဒႏွင့္ အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲေရးမ်ားသည္ ေသာရန္-ပဋိပကၡအက်ဳိးဆက္ခံစားရေသာ လုိအပ္သည္။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရး မႈတစ္ရပ္ရွိလိမ့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အသိုင္းအ၀ုိင္းမ်ားကို တပ္ေနရာခ်ထားျခင္းႏွင့္ ႏွင့္ သတၱဳတူျဖစ္ျခင္း ျမီးူးျပီးစသည့္ အစိုးရက ျမန္မာသည့္ စီမံကိန္းမ်ား-မရွိေသးေပ။

၀င္ေရာက္လုပ္ကိုင္ျခင္း၊ ဥပမာလုိအပ္သည္။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားျဖစ္ၾကသည္။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးစစ္တပ္၊ မ်ဥ္းျဖင့္ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းမရွိေသာ ေမးခြန္းမ်ား။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးနဲ႔ ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးစစ္တပ္၊ မ်ဥ္းျဖင့္ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းမရွိေသာ ေမးခြန္းမ်ား။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးနဲ႔ ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးစစ္တပ္၊ မ်ဥ္းျဖင့္ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းမရွိေသာ ေမးခြန္းမ်ား။

• ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးနဲ႔ ဗိုင်းလွန်းခ်မ္းခ်မ္းေရးစစ္တပ္၊ မ်ဥ္းျဖင့္ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းမရွိေသာ ေမးခြန္းမ်ား။
ထူးျခားသည့္ •

မရွိမျဖစ္အေရးပါသည္။

မႈမ်ားကိုအကန္႕အသတ္မ်ားၾကားမွလုပ္ေဆာင္ေနရသည့္တိုင္ ယင္းေဒသ၏ ၿခိမ္း ခုိင္မာသည့္ႏုိင္ငံေရးေဆြးေႏြးပြဲမ်ားမရွိသည့္ အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲေရး ယူဆ ျခင္းသည္ ယခင္က တြန္းအားေပးမႈတစ္ခုသာ ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ ျမန္မာအစိုးရ မ်ားေပးသည့္ လုပ္ကိုင္ျခင္းႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ပဋိပကၡအက်ဳိးဆက္ခံစားရေ ချမ်ားကိုကာလအတန္ၾကာကပင္ျဖည့္ဆည္ေပးႏိုင္ခဲ့ပါသည္။

မ်ားစြာေသာ အနီးကပ္ မ်ားႏွင့္ တုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ားေနထုိင္ၾကေသာ ပူပန္မႈမ်ား။

အဓိက်ေသာ သက္ ရွိေနေသာ ဥပမာ ေျခာက္မႈအျဖစ္ -

ေနရာေဒသမ်ားသုိ႔ ႏႈိင္းမႈမ်ားကို ထိခုိက္လြယ္သည့္ ေဒသႏၱရရပ္ရြာမ်ားလက္နက္ကိုင္အုပ္စုမ်ား၊ အေျခခံအေဆာက္အအုံအရပ္ မ်ားစြာေသာ စိတ္ခ်မႈကို စြမ္းရည္မ်ားကုိ ဘက္အဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားႏွင့္ ပညာေရး၀န္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ားရရွိမႈ ျဖစ္ပုံရသည္။

ေႏွာင့္ယွက္ဖ်က္ဆီးျခင္းႏွင့္ ျဖစ္စဥ္ ပ်က္စီးမူအရ န္ေျခာက္မႈအျဖစ္လည္း မွတ္ယူၾကသည္။

ပိုမုိသည္ဟု ေႏွာင့္ယွက္ဖ်က္ဆီးျခင္းႏွင့္ NSAG ပ်က္စီးမူအရ ေရအားလွ်ပ္စစ္စနစ္မ်ားတုိးခ်ဲ႕ရန္ ျဖစ္စဥ္ ပ်က္သက္ေသာ အစိုးရ 111
• ဆုံခ်က္ (အပြည့်အစုံ) များ၊ မြန်ကောလိမ်းခွင့်ရသူနှင့် အကျိုးချောက်များ အထွေထွေ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ ကြည့်ရှုလျှင် နောက်ဆုံးချက်များ သတ်မှတ်ချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

ဦးထောက် သုံးစွဲ

• ဆုံးဖော်စေချင်သူများ ပြင်ဦးသော အင်္ဂါးတွေနှင့် အားလုံးပြင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရသူများ လေးတွေ့မှတ်ချက်များ အထွေထွေ ထုတ်ပြန်ပေးချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

• ဆောင်ရွက်ဦးသော အင်္ဂါးတွေနှင့် အားလုံးပြင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရသူများ လေးတွေ့မှတ်ချက်များ အထွေထွေ ထုတ်ပြန်ပေးချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

ဦးထောက် သုံးစွဲ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်များ

• ဆောင်ရွက်ဦးသော အင်္ဂါးတွေနှင့် အားလုံးပြင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရသူများ လေးတွေ့မှတ်ချက်များ အထွေထွေ ထုတ်ပြန်ပေးချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

• ဆောင်ရွက်ဦးသော အင်္ဂါးတွေနှင့် အားလုံးပြင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရသူများ လေးတွေ့မှတ်ချက်များ အထွေထွေ ထုတ်ပြန်ပေးချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

• ဆောင်ရွက်ဦးသော အင်္ဂါးတွေနှင့် အားလုံးပြင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရသူများ လေးတွေ့မှတ်ချက်များ အထွေထွေ ထုတ်ပြန်ပေးချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

• ဆောင်ရွက်ဦးသော အင်္ဂါးတွေနှင့် အားလုံးပြင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရသူများ လေးတွေ့မှတ်ချက်များ အထွေထွေ ထုတ်ပြန်ပေးချက်များ အကြောင်းဖော်ပြချက်ရရှိသည်။

112
ဤစာလူးများသည် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း အများအားဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲထားပါသည် (၁၇) ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ အားလုံးဖြင့် အများအားလုံးကို ပြောင်းလဲမှုအား စိတ်ချီးမျှေးစွာ လျှောက်လှုပ်ရာတွင် ဤစာလူးများကို ထိန်းသိမ်းထားသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားများအား လွှဲပြောင်း၍ အားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲထားပါသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အခြားပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံများ၏ အင်ဒိုနီးရှားများအားလုံးအားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲထားပါသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲမှုအား စိတ်ချီးမျှေးစွာ လျှောက်လှုပ်ရာတွင် ဤစာလူးများကို ထိန်းသိမ်းထားသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားများကို လွှဲပြောင်း၍ အားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲထားပါသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အခြားပြည်ထောင်စုနိုင်ငံများ၏ အင်ဒိုနီးရှားများအားလုံးအားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲထားပါသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲမှုအား စိတ်ချီးမျှေးစွာ လျှောက်လှုပ်ရာတွင် ဤစာလူးများကို ထိန်းသိမ်းထားသည်။

ဤစာလူးများသည် အင်ဒိုနီးရှားများကို လွှဲပြောင်း၍ အားလုံးဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲထားပါသည်။
အစိုးရမဟုတ်သည် အုပ်ခ်ပ္မႈႏွင့္ ၀န္ေဆာင္မႈေပးသည့္ အုပ်ခ်ပ္ေရးသည် မည္သုိ႔ျဖစ္သင့္သနည္း။
• တုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ား၏ နစ္နာမႈမ်ားႏွင့္ ရည္မွန္းခ်က္မ်ားကို အစုိးရက နားလည္သလား။
• ျမန္မာအစိုးရႏွင့္ စစ္တပ္ သည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရး ေစ့စပ္ညွိႏႈိင္းမႈမ်ားတြင္ တုိင္းရင္းသားတုိ႔၏ ပူပန္မႈမ်ားကို ျပည့္ျပည့္၀၀ ေျဖရွင္းေပးလုိသလား။
• ပဋိပကၡအက်ဳိးဆက္ကိုခံစားရသည့္ ေနရာေဒသမ်ား ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးရန္ႏွင့္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးတည္ေဆာက္ရန္လုပ္ငန္ေစရန္ အစုိးရႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံတကာမိတ္ဖက္မ်ားသည္ ေသာ့ခ်က်က်ေသာ သက္ဆုိင္သူမ်ားႏွင့္ မိတ္ဖက္ျပဳကာ ပူတြဲေဆာင္ရြက္လုိစိတ္ရွိမလား။
• တုိင္းရင္းသားအုပ္စုမ်ား၏ ႏုိင္ငံေရးကိုယ္စားျပဳမႈအျဖစ္ NSAG မ်ား၏ အဆင့္အတန္းသည္ ျပႆနာျဖစ္သည္။
• အျခားေသာ တုိင္းရင္းသား ႏိုင္ငံေရးသမားမ်ား (ဥပမာ - ၂၀၁၀ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲမ်ားတြင္ ၀င္ေရာက္ယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္ခဲ့သည့္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးပါတီမ်ား) အတြက္ ဘယ္ေနရာ ရွိသလဲ။

NSAG မ်ားအတြက္ အမှုဆောင်ရွက်သော အလုပ်များကို စုစည္းေဆာင္ရြက္ရန္ NSAG မ်ားအတြက္ အခြင့္အလမ္းမ်ားရရွိခဲ့သည္။
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန်းစာများနှင့် ဆိုင်းစိုက်ခံရစ်သော မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းကို စာကြောင်းကြားခြင်းနှင့် အစိုးရအထိမ်းအမှတ်မ်ား ကို ဖော်ပြထားသည်။ ယောက်ျပာ့ခ်က်များဖြင့် အစိုးရအထိမ်းအမှတ်များကို ကိုယ်စားလှယ်တို့အနီး ပြောင်းလည်းကောင်း ရရှိသည်။ အရေးကြီးများအားလုံးတွင် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းကို ဖော်ပြထားသည်။ မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းကို ဖော်ပြထားသည့် အထူးအချက်များနှင့် အားလုံးတွင် ဆိုင်းစိုက်ခံရစ်မှုများ ဖော်ပြထားသည်။
မီးေအာက္တြင္ရွိေသာ စစ္မဲ့ေဒသမ်ားသို႔ ပို႔ေဆာင္ျခင္းမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့သည္။ ယင္းသို႔ေသာ အဓမၼေနရာေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းျခင္းအေပၚ ဗဟိုျပဳကာ အသိုက္အ၀န္းတစ္ခုလံုး အလံုးစံုျပဳန္းတီးသြားေရးႏွင့္ လူသန္းေပါင္းမ်ားစြာကို ဆယ္စုႏွစ္မ်ားႏွင့္ခ်ီ၍ အစုလိုက္အၿပံဳ လိုက္ေနရာေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းျခင္းမ်ား ျပဳလုပ္ရမည္ဟု ဆိုၿပီး အေထာက္အပံ့မ်ားျပတ္ေတာက္သြားေစရန္ရည္ရြယ္ၿပီး ျပည္သူမ်ားဘက္လွည့္သြားခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

ရန္ပံုေငြမ်ား၊ ေထာက္လွမ္းေရး၊ တပ္သားစုေဆာင္းျခင္းႏွင့္ အျခားမ်ားကိုလည္း အသံုးျပဳခဲ့သည္။
ျပည္သူမ်ားသည္ သူတုိ႔၏ ေန႔စဥ္ဘ၀ျဖစ္တည္မႈႏွင့္ မိမိတုိ႔အနာဂတ္မ်ားကို ဆုံးျဖတ္ႏိုင္စြမ္းကို ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ား ႏွင့္ပင္ ပူးတြဲေဆာင္ရြက္ေနေသာေစ့စပ္ညႇိႏိႈင္းေရးစားပြဲ၀ိုင္းတြင္ အသက္(၁၈)ႏွစ္ေအာက္မ်ား ပါ၀င္ ပတ္သက္မႈအေပၚ ၂၀၁၂ခုႏွစ္တြင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့သည့္ ၃.

ေလးဘက္သြားအရြယ္ကတည္းက ထြက္ေျပးခဲ့ရသည့္သူမ်ားကဲ့သို႔ျဖစ္သည္။

d) စစ္ေဘးဒဏ္ခံခဲ့ရသည့္ရပ္ရြာတစ္ခုတြင္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရး၏ ဖြံ

၁။ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးႀကီးသည္။

ျပည္သူမ်ားအေပၚ ဦးတည္ရမည့္ အေၾကာင္းသံုးရပ္သည္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးတည္ၿမဲရန္ ῿ငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးအတြက္ ျပည္သူမ်ားကို အားေပးအားေျမႇာက္ျပဳျခင္း ယင္းသို႔ေသာလူမ်ားသည္ ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္၏ အျပစ္ေပးမႈကို ထပ္မံခံရၿပီး အထက္တြင္ ေဖာ္ျပထားခဲ့သည့္ EAG ဆုတ္ခြာျခင္း(သို႔)အလြန္အကၽြံျဖစ္ေသာ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အတြင္းမွ ထြက္ေျပးျခင္းမ်ားျဖစ္ေပၚၿပီး ေဘးထုတ္ဖယ္ၾကဥ္ခံရသည့္အဆိုးေက်ာ့ သံသရာ ထဲတြင္ ပိတ္မိေနၾကသည္။ ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ဖိႏွိပ္မႈႏွင့္ ၂။

ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ဒီမိုကေရစီ အသြင္းကူးေျပာင္းေရးအတြ က္ က်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာ ႀကိဳးစား႐ုန္းကန္မႈႏွင့္ လတ္တေလာတြင္ေျမာက္ျမားလွစြာေသာ တိုင္းရင္းသားမ်ားသည္ EAG လူလတ္တန္းစားတစ္ရပ္ႏွင့္အတူ လုပ္ႏိုင္စြမ္းရွိၿပီး စစ္ေဘးဒဏ္ခံခဲ့ရသည့္အဆိုးေက်ာ့ သံသရာ ထဲတြင္ ပိတ္မိေနၾကသည္။
ဗဟုိခ်ဳပ္ကိုင္မႈကို ပိုမုိအားျပဳျခင္းအေပၚအာ႐ုံစိုက္သည္။

ထုိစဥ္အခ်ိန္တြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ကိုယ္တုိင္ကမူ စစ္ေရးအသုံးစရိတ္ကို တစ္ႏွစ္လွ်င္ အေမရိကန္ေဒၚလာသန္း၂၀၀၀ ေက်ာ္ ဆက္လက္သုံးစြဲေနၿပီး ယင္းသို႔ေသာလုပ္ငန္းမ်ဳိးမ်ားကို အစုိးရ၏ အသုံးစရိတ္ေပးျခင္းကို လ်စ္လ်ဴ႐ႈထားပုံရသည္။
Business and Peace in Myanmar:  
Thoughts on Sector Risks, Related to Peace and Social License to Operate Issues

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World Bank, Myanmar Strategy 2012.
စီးပြားလုပ်ငန်းဆီလို သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် သည် အရေးပါ စာသားရင်းသားလေ့ကျင်ပါသည်။

စီးပြားလုပ်ငန်းရေးစံချောင်းများအား သက်ရောက်မှုမြောက်ပြုလုပ်မှုပေးသော အရေးပါသည်။

စီးပြားလုပ်ငန်းရေးစံချောင်းများကို သက်ရောက်မှုမြောက်ပြုလုပ်မှုပေးသော အရေးပါသည်။


120
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် အလွန်အေရးကျသည် သယံဇာတတူးေဖာ္ေရးလုပ်ငန်းများတွင်လည်း ယင့်ကိစ်ရပ်များပေါ်ဖြံ႕ဖဖဳိးစြန္႔စားရႏုိင္ေျခနိမ့္ေသာ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္ အားသြန္ခြန္စုိက္လုပ္ေဆာင္မႈတစ္ျဖင့္ကေပးဆပ္ရသည့္ စီမံကိန္းမ်ားလည္ပတ္ရာမွ တုိးတက္ေအာင္ေဆာင္ရြက္ရန္ အက်ိဴးအျမတ္ခြဲေ၀ျခင္း၊


ရပ္ရြာက်န္းမာေရးႏွင့္ လူမႈေရးသက္ေရာက္မႈ၊ ပိုင္း ရွိခဲ့သည္။

ရပ္ရြာက်န္းမာေရးႏွင့္ လူမႈေရာက္မႈ နားလည္မႈတုိးတက္ရန္ေရွ႕ဆက္ရမည့္ သို႔မဟုတ္ ျပဳိင္ဆုိင္ျခင္း၊ The International Council for Mining and Metals စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းႏွင့္ ပဋိပကၡ၏အဓိကအက်ဳိးဆက္မွာ စြန္႔စားမႈျမင့္ျမင့္မားမားလုပ္သည့္ စြန္႔စားရႏီုင္ေျခမ်ားကို ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ႏုိင္သည္။

လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးကိစၥရပ္မ်ားကို ေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့သည္။


လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးကိစၥရပ္မ်ားကို ေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့သည္။

စီမံခန္႔ခြဲမႈႏွင့္ ကုမၸဏီ/စြန္႔စားရႏိုင္ ရွာေဖြေတြ႕ ယူဆၿပီး ၇ရပ္ရြာ ရပ္ 121
အထူးသတ်မှတ်မှုများကို သိရှိပါသည်။ လမ်းညာခံမူမ်ားနှင့်အညီ လုပ်ငန်းလည်ပတ်ရန် ရရှိပါလိမ့်ပါလေး လူမို့လုံခါစင်ကို ရပ်ရွာဆက်ဆံုးတက္မႈဆီသုိး တရားရေရာဆုိင်ရာမဟုတ်ေသာ ကုစားရန်အတွက် အရာမ်ားစြာကို တည်ခ်က္တစုခ်ခ်ချင်းသည် လူ႔အခြင့္အေရး ႀကီးဆုိၾကဖြယ္ရွိသည်။ ယင္းအေျခခံမူမ်ားသည္ ရပ်ရွာအသံအေပၚ အာ႐ုံစုိက္ျခင္းကို အထူးအေရးႀကီးစြန္႔စားရႏိုင္ေျခမ်ားႏွင့္ ကုမၸဏီေတြကို ပုိမုိလုပ္ေဆာင္ရန္ အေထာက္အကူျဖစ္ေစသည္။ ေကာင္းမ်ားစြာေသာ ႏိုင္စြမ္းပိုရွိေသာ (အမ်ဳိးမ်ဳိးေသာလုပ္ငန္းက႑မ်ားႏွင့္) အစီအစဥ္ေရးဆြဲသူမ်ားသည္ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းနည္းနာမ်ားလည္း နိဂုံးမ်ား လုိက္နာပါတယ္ စံခ်ိန္စံညႊန္းေတြကို ျပည္သူမ်ား စံချျပဳရႏိုင္ေျခအလုံးစုံကို အႀကံျပဳပါသည္။ ေနာက္ဆုံးပိတ္အေတြးစမ်ား ျပည္သူလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးမ်ားကို အက်ဳိးျဖစ္ေစသည္။ အက်ဳိးအျမတ္မ်ားရွိေနၿပီးပြင့္လင္းျမင္သာမႈႏွင့္ အက်ဳိးအျမတ္မ်ားျဖစ္ေစသည္ကို ျပသလွ်က္ရွိသည္။ သို႔မဟုတ္ ပိုမုိပါ၀င္မႈအေပၚ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းသည္ အေထာက္အကူျဖစ္ေစရန္ ေဆြးေႏြးပဲြမ်ားအတြင္းမည္သို႔အဆီးအတာျဖစ္ေစသည္ကို ျပသလွ်က္ရွိသည္။ ေစာင့္ၾကည့္ ေလးစားျခင္း၊ သယံဇာတတူေဖာ္ေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားအတြက္မ်ားသည္ လုပ္ငန္းတစုးအျဖစ္ အရည္အေသြးျပည္႔၀ေသာ 7 ယင္းသည္ တုိင္းရင္းသားအုပ္စုမ်ားတြင္ ၀န္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ားကို ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းႏွင့္ ထည့္သြင္းစဥ္းစားျခင္းသည္ ေျမယာအသုံျပဳမႈကိစၥရပ္မ်ားအခ်ဳိ႕က႑မ်ားတြင္ ရရွိႏုိင္ ေျဖရွင္းရာတြင္ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားကို မီးေမာင္းထုိးျပခဲ့သည္
ဒီကိုလာတာကို ကၽြန္ေတာ္တုိ႔ မလုိလားဘူး။ အေကာင္းဆုံးကုမၸဏီေတြဒီကိုလာဖုိ႔ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တုိ႔ ဖိတ္ေခၚလုိပါတယ္
စသည့္ မွတ္ခ်က္မ်ားျပဳခဲ့ၾကသည္။ အကယ္၍ ႏိုင္ငံသားတစ္ေယာက္သည္ ေရြးခ်ယ္ႏိုင္သည့္အေနအထားတြင္ရွိခဲ့လွ်င္ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းႏွင့္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးအတြက္ ပိုၿပီးဟန္ခ်က္ညီေသာအေျခခံတစ္ခုထြက္ေပၚလာမည္ျဖစ္သည္။
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မြန်မာ့လူမျိုးတို့၏အက်ပွားအတည်သည်းရာတွင်လူမျိုးတို့၏ထိခိုက်မှုကိုရရှိသည့်အာဏာရွင်းလင်းအေပးအသုံးပြုချက်အပေါ်များအတွက်အားလုံးပြောပြင်သည်။

ဗားသားမှားစွာသိရှိသောအရာအတွက်လူမျိုးတို့၏အားလုံးပြောပြင်သည်။

၁၉၆၂ခုနှစ်တွင်ကိုင်လာခဲ့သည်။

သို့မဟုတ်တုိင်းရင်းသားများသည်မှားစွာသိရှိသောအရာအတွက်လူမျိုးတို့၏အားလုံးပြောပြင်သည်။

အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံ၏အာန်နားများသည်သို့မဟုတ်လူမျိုးတို့၏ကြိုက်သောအဖြဲ႕အစည္းများထဲမှားစွာသိရှိသည်။

ယံဗုဒ္ဓုိက်ဗုဒ္ဓုိက်ကြီးအားလုံးပြောပြင်သည်။

စိုင်မူဆိုရာတွင်မူရှိသောအရာအတွက်လူမျိုးတို့၏ကြိုက်သောအဖြဲ႕အစည္းများထဲမှားစွာသိရှိသည်။

ယံဗုဒ္ဓုိက်ဗုဒ္ဓုိက်ကြီးမှားစွာသိရှိသောအရာအတွက်လူမျိုးတို့၏ကြိုက်သောအဖြဲ႕အစည္းများထဲမှားစွာသိရှိသည်။
ဆန္႔က်င္ဘက္အားျဖင့္ အမ်ဳိးအစားသုံးခုတြင္ မ်ဳိးစုံ၀ါဒအတြက္မူ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈမ်ဳိးစုံ၀ါဒကို တုိင္လူနည္းစုမ်ားအတြက္မူ မ်ဳိးစုံကြဲျပားမႈကိုေဖာ္ေဆာင္ရန္ႏွင့္ အကာအကြယ္မ်ားကိုတည္ေဆာင္ရန္ ကိန္းကလည္းအလားတူ ၿဗိတိသွ်၀န္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ ၂၀၁၀ က အေရးပါခဲ့သည္။ ျပန္႔ေရာက္ရွိသြားခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္သည္။ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈမ်ဳိးစုံ၀ါဒႏွင့္ ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းအေျခခ်လူနည္းစုမ်ား၊ ႏိုင္ဖြယ္ရွိသည္။ ျမွင့္တင္ခဲ့စဥ္အလုိက္သင့္ေနလုိသူမ်ားကလူမ်ားစုယဥ္ေက်းမႈကိုလက္ခံေရးကို လကၡဏာတစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္ရွိေနေသးသည္။ အန္ဂလာမာကယ္က ဦးေဆာင္ဦးရြက္ျပဳခဲ့သူမ်ားၾကား ခ်က္က်ေသာေနရာမွ ႏွစ္မ်ားတြင္အေမရိကန္ျပည္ေထာင္စုမွအထက္မွလာေသာ ထုိပုံစံမ်ဳိးသည္ က လႊဲေျပာင္း ယင္းမူ၀ါဒမ်ားစတင္ကုိင္စြဲျခင္းသည္ ယင္းသည္ပင္ သြားသည္႔အေျခအေနမ်ဳိးရွိခဲ့သည္။ ထုိ႔ႏွစ္မွာပြင့္ သြားသည္႔အေျခအေနမ်ဳိးရွိခဲ့သည္။ ထုိ႔ႏွစ္မွာ ၀ါဒသည္ တြင္ယဥ္ေက်းမႈမ်ဳိးစုံ ၀ါဒမူ၀ါဒအညႊန္းကိန္းအရအမ်ားစုေသာ ေစာင့္-၁၁ အေတာ္အသင့္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ခဲသည္ကိုေတြ႕ရၿပီး ၾကည့္ကြပ္ကဲႏုိင္မည့္ ႏိုင္ဖြယ္မရွိေသာ္လည္း ခုႏွစ္တြင္ အေနာက္ႏုိင္ငံမ်ားသည္ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈမ်ဳိးစုံ၀ါဒတြင္ အမ်ဳိးအစားသုံးခုခြဲျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ အခ်ဳိ႕ ႏို္ငံသားေပါင္းစည္းမႈအတြက္ ကိုင္တြယ္ရန္လုိၿပီး မ႑ဳိင္ျပဳရန္မွာ ႏုိငံသားဆုိင္ရာေပါင္းစည္းမႈမ်ား၏ ေသာ ယင္း၏ အစိတ္အပိုင္းမ်ားအျဖစ္ ျပင္သစ္သမၼတ လက္ရွိ စံခ်ိန္စံညြန္းမ်ားခ်မွတ္ရာတြင္ ႏုိငံသားအခြင့္အေရးတူညီမႈအတြက္ အျငင္းပြားဖြယ္ရာအျဖစ္ဆုံးျဖစ္ေနၿပီး အေျခခ်ေနထုိင္သည့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တစ္ခုမၾကာေသာ ယေန႔ကာလတြင္ ေယဘုယ်ျဖစ္ေသာ ျဖစ္ႏိုင္ဖြယ္ရာမရွိျခင္းမဟုတ္ေပ။
မိုးမိုးစားစဥ္းစားခြင်းများကြောင့် သဘာဝတွင်းလေ့လာရန် ဗိုင်းရှင်များသည် အသက်ရှင်တစ်ဖက် ဖျင်စင်ရန် အပြင်ပြောင်းလဲသင်္ဆောက်ရန် အဖွှံ့သွင်းမှုများကို စိတ်စီးစီးမှု အောက်ပါအတွက် အပြီးတိုးခဲ့သည်။ ယင်းများသည် သရဖ်များကို ရွေးချယ်ရန် အထိမ်းအမှတ်လာနိုင်သည်။

ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များပေးကြသည်ကို ကြည့်ရှုပါ။ အားလုံးတွင် အိုးပောက်သော အခြေခံဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို သိရှိနိုင်သည်။ ယင်းနှင့်များလာသော အားလုံးသည် သဘာဝလျောက်လွန်သည်။

ယင်းအချက်အလက်များကို အင်္ဂလိပ်အပေါ် အခြေခံဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို သိရှိနိုင်သည်။ ယင်းနှင့်များလာသော အားလုံးသည် သဘာဝလျောက်လွန်သည်။

ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကို ကြည့်ရှုပါ။ အားလုံးတွင် အိုးပောက်သော အခြေခံဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို သိရှိနိုင်သည်။ ယင်းနှင့်များလာသော အားလုံးသည် သဘာဝလျောက်လွန်သည်။

ယင်းအချက်အလက်များကို အင်္ဂလိပ်အပေါ် အခြေခံဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို သိရှိနိုင်သည်။ ယင်းနှင့်များလာသော အားလုံးသည် သဘာဝလျောက်လွန်သည်။
ဗုဒ္ဓဟူး တစ်သက်တာပေးပြီး ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးသော်လည်း အောက်ပါအရေးကို ပြပေးမည်။ ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးတစ်ယောက်ထက်ပိုင်းအဆင့်တွင် ပါဝင်သော မီဒီယာသင်တန်းပေးခင်းတို့ မ်ိးစုံကြဲျပားမႈအတွက် လက်ရှိလည်းကောင်း၊ ပညာပေးလျပေးလျခဲ့ပေမျှ၊ မီဒီယာသင်တန်းပေးခင်း၊ ယာယာမႈဆုိင်ရာပုံစံအတွက် ကမာလုံးဆုိင်ရာ ထိေတြ႔ဆက္ဆံျခင္းတို႔၏ နယ္ပယ္မ်ားတြင္ မူ၀ါဒဆုိင်ရာေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားကို ဘွေငြေထာက္ပံ့ရန္ ညီျခင္ျဖင့္လည္း ေကာင္းျပည္တြင္းအားထုတ္မႈမ်ားကိုအေထာက္အပံ့ေပးႏိုင္သည္။

ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးမ်ိဳးစုံကြဲျပားမႈကို လူမ်ဳိးေရးတွင္ တုိင္းရင္းသားထက္ပုံစံ၏ ေထာင္လုိက္ပုံစံမ်ားမွ ယာယာမႈျခင္းကူးလူးဆက္ႏွင့္ မူ၀ါဒဆုိင်ရာေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားကို အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ျခင္းမျပဳလွ်င္ က်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈကို ေအာင္ျမင္စြာအေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ၿပီး တုိးတက္မႈျဖစ္ထြန္းမႈကို ေတြ႕ျမင္ႏိုင္ရန္ ခဲယဥ္းသြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။
Burmese Politics and the Pathology of Unity

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ႏုိင်ငံေရး ျမဳပ္ႏွံျခင္းႏွင့္ ကိုယ္က်င့္သီလဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးကာ ေဆာင္ႏိုင္စြမ္းအေပၚမူတည္ေနသည္။ ေကာင္းျခင္း၊ တစ္ပါးကဆုိသည္။ မွန္ကန္ေသာကိုယ္က်င့္သီလႏွင့္ သေဘာ ေ၀ခဲ့သည့္ ဒီမုိကေရစီတည္ျမဲေရးကို ကို ယင္းတုိ႔၏ တြင္ ဆုိင္ရာကို မင္းသာဦးအားဗုဒၶေဟာၾကားခဲ့သည့္တရာ္ထဲမွထုတ္ႏုတ္ၿပီးစည္းလုံးညီညြတ္မႈ၏ စစ္တပ္၏ မည့္ပံုရွိေနသည္။ ရလဒ္ကို အားထုတ္ရာတြင္ ကိုက္ညီေန ပုဂၢဳိတစ္ဦးခ်င္း၏ ေရွ႕ဆက္လွမ္းရန္ ညီလာခံသည္ ျပဳလုပ္ႏိုင္သည့္ သာမန္လူပုဂၢဳိလ္မ်ား (လမ္းတစ္ခုျဖင့္လုပ္ေဆာင္ရာတြင္ အက်ဳိးစီး သတိထားရမည္ဟူေသာ စည္းကမ္းျပည့္၀ေသာ ရွင္းလင္းစြာ ေျမေအာက္ဂ်ာနယ္တစ္ခုတြင္ပါရွိသည္ ကုိယ္က်င့္သီလ ႏုိင္ငံတစ္ႏိုင္ငံ အုပ္စုတစ္ခု ယင္းတုိ႔ ထုတ္ႏုတ္ခ်က္ပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ တစ္ဦးခ်င္းအႀကဳိက္ေဘးဖယ္ထားရမည္ဟု ကိုယ္က်င့္သီလဆုိင္ရာအေျခခံတစ္ခုကိုေရာက္ရွိႏိုင္ျခင္းမရွိေသးဘဲ အုပ္စုတစ္ခုကသာျပဳလုပ္ႏိုင္ၿပီး ညီညြတ္သူတုိ႔မွာ ဗဟိုျပဳသည္ေစ့ေစာ္မႈမ်ားကုိ ရွင္းျပခဲ့သည္။ ၏အဖြဲ႕မ်ားသည္ ေၾကာက္ရြံ႕မႈမွ မည္သုိ႔မည္ပုံအေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရမည္ဆုိသည့္ အလားအလားမ်ားသည္အလားအလာရွိေသာစည္းလုံးညီညြတ္မႈျပဳကြဲမႈ ပုတုဇဥ္ တစ္ခုတည္းေသာ ပ်က္ယြင္းျခင္း၏ ကိုယ္က်င့္သီလမ်ားကို ၂၀၀၇ တစ္ဦးတစ္ေယာက္၏လႈပ္ရွား မႈကို တရားတုိ႔ျဖင့္ ႏိုငံသားအမ်ားစုသည္ မ်ား၏ အသိုင္းအ၀ုိင္းတစ္ခုကို ေရႊ၀ါေရာင္ေတာ္လွန္ေရး အေရးႀကီးေသာ ကိုယ္၊ ျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ားခ်မွတ္ရာတြင္ ၁၉ ျပည္သူမ်ား စိတ္အမူအရာတုိ႔ ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းတုိ႔လုိအပ္မည္ ရန္လုိအပ္ၿပီး ရာစုေႏွာင္းပိုင္းတြင္ ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ရန္မတတ္ႏိုင္ေသာေၾကာင့္ဟု ကိစၥရပ္တစ္ခုတြင္ စစ္တပ္ကသာ စည္းလုံးညီညြတ္မႈဆုိသည္မွာ သူက အျခားတစ္ဖက္တြင္ မိမိကိုယ္ကိုဗဟုိျပဳသည္အတၱကို ရလဒ္အားျဖင့္ ႐ုိးေျဖာင့္မႈရွိျခင္း၊ မတုိင္မီလမ်ားက သတိေပးခဲ့သည္။ ကိုယ္ကုိယ္စီးပြားထက္ေက်ာ္လြန္ၿပီးလုပ္ ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ဟု ေယာအတြင္း၀န္ဦးဖုိးလႈိင္က စည္းလုံးညီညြတ္မႈဆုိသည္မွာ တုိင္းျပည္ကိုတစ္စည္းတစ္လုံးျဖစ္ ညီညီညြတ္ညြတ္ေအာင္ျမင္ရန္ မိမိတုိ႔ကုိယ္ပိုင္က်ဥ္းေျမာင္း ထုိ႔ျပင္ အတၱကင္းမႈ၏ အခ်ဳိ႕သူမ်ား စည္းလုံးညီညြတ္ေသာ စည္းကမ္းမ်ားျပဌာန္းလာ ၁၃၀
အခုေစာင္ပျဖစ္ေသာခ်ိန္မွာထြန္းကားႏုိင္တယ္အာေဘာ္ထားသည္။

ေဖာ္ေဆာင္သူတစ္ႏုိင္ငံလုံးအက်ိးစီးပြားကိုအတၱစြဲမ်ားေၾကာင့္ျဖစ္သည္ဟုသည္ကိုစစ္တပ္သည္သာယင္းအတၱစြဲကိုေက်ာ္လႊားႏိုင္စြမ္းရွိညာမ်းတုိင္းျပည္အက်ိးသယ္ပိုးႏိုင္သည့္ဆုိႏိုင္ဒီယာတရား၀င္ျဖစ္စုအျဖစ္(“ေတြ႕ဆုံေမးျမန္းမႈတစ္ခုေျဖၾကားရာတြင္ပါလီမန္ေခတ္ကဲ့သို႔လႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားလြတ္လပ္စည္းကမ္းရွိစြာပါ၀င္ေရး၏ဒီမုိကေရစီကိုမွန္ကန္စြာမက်င့္သုံးျခင္း၏အႏၱရာယ္မ်ားကိုစစ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားကျပသေနျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

ဒီမုိကေရစီနဲ႔ထုိက္တန္ေၾကာင္းမိမိကုိယ္မိမိအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္မႈတြင္အတိတ္ကႏိုင္ငံေရးေခါင္းေဆာင္မင္းကိုႏိုင္သည္တြင္။စစ္တပ္ကေဖာ္ေဆာင္သည့္စည္းကမ္းျပည့္၀ေသာဒီမုိကေရစီဆုိသည္မွာ၁၉၉၈ကိုယ္က်ဳိးစီး႐ႈျမင္ခဲ့ၾကၿပီးေဆာင္က်ဥ္းေရးသားထား၈၈မ်ဳိးဆက္ေက်ာင္းသားေခါင္းေဆာင္မင္းကိုႏိုင္သည္တြင္။

ဆုိညာမ်းတုိင္းျပည္အက်ိးသယ္ပိုးႏိုင္သည့္ဆုိေသာအုိငहဒီယာ၏ေတြ႕ဆုံေမးျမန္းမႈတစ္ခုေျဖၾကားရာတြင္ပါလီမန္ေခတ္ကဲ့သို႔လႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားလြတ္လပ္စည္းကမ္းရွိစြာပါ၀င္ေရး၏ဒီမုိကေရစီနဲ႔ထုိက္တန္ေၾကာင္းမိမိကုိယ္မိမိအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္မႈတြင္အတိတ္ကႏိုင္ငံေရးေခါင္းေဆာင္မင္းကိုႏိုင္သည္တြင္။
သူ့ကုိယ်က်င့်တရားလုိက်နာက်င့်သုံးမ်က္ႏွာစာအားလုံးအတြက္အက်ဳိးရွိမည့်သည်။

ထိပ္တုိက္ရင္ဆုိင္ေရးစည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္ဴ႐ႈရန္မျဖစ္ႏိုင္ေပ။

ကၽြန္ေတာ္ကဆုိခ်ိန္တြင္ညီညြတ္မႈကဲ့သို႔သေဘာတရားသည်လမ္းေၾကာင္းကုိယ္က်င့်တရားလုိက်နာက်င့်သုံးမ်က္ႏွာစာအားလုံးအတြက္အက်ဳိးရွိမည့်သည်ခြဲ 132
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးကြီးချုံးအဖွဲ့ဝင်များ စာရင်းအတွက် လှုံးရောက်သော  [-]: အိမ်နှစ်ခန့်အထောင်စုသည် မေရးကာလတွင် မိမိနှင့် စိတ်ကူးတို့ကို ကာလစဉ်တွင် နားထောင်ခဲ့သည်။ အဲဒီလူပုဂူလ်တစ်ဦးချင်းစီကုိ နေထိုင် စုစုိးထောင်မှုကို ကြေညာမှု မကူးစွာေတာ့သော်လည်း နေရာမရှိမှသာ အခြေခံစားမှုကို နေရာမှနေသော် နေက်ငယ် တိရစ္ဆာန်များကို စားဖြင့်သူတို့စုစုိက်ခင်းကို စောင့်ရှောက်ဖြင့် လူအဗျာသူတို့က သူတို့နေရာေးလွန် မရှိပါတယ်။ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးေဆြးေႏြးပြဲများမှ စစ္တပ္အရာရွိများစတင်ပါးေဆာင်လာ အကောင်းချက်ရှိသော်လည်း ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးကေပါက်တံ့မှုများအား မီးထုံးေပး၍ ရပ်ရှာများနှင့် တိုင်းပြည်ရဲ့ အသောက်ပေးမှုအားလုံးလာကို ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္လွ်က္ရွိ ထုတ္ယူမှု၊ စီးပြားများနှင့် ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးစီမံကိန္းများအတြက္ အျပင္းအထန္ယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္ေနများဟာ ပဋိကေတာ့ မတည္ၿငိမ္မှုနှင့် မလုံၿခဳံမှားမားပါပဲ။ တရားမွ်ကုန္သြယ္မှု၊ သဘာ၀သယံဇာတ်ကို ခ်င္လာေရးအဖြဲ႕(ကၽြန္မတို႔က သူတို႔ကိုယ္စားေပာျပသြားပါရေစွာ) ဘာလဲ။ ကေလးသူငယ္ေတြ ေၾကာက္ရြံ႕ထိတ္လန္႔ေအာင္ ဘယ္သူေတြ လုပ္တာလဲ။ မိခင္ေတြရဲ႕ ေခါင္းထဲအျပင္ပန္းသ႑ာန္ရလာက်မှားလာရာတွင္ တရားမွ်တမႈမရွိျခင္းက နက္႐ႈိင္းစြာရွိေနပါတယ္။ သိသားပါျပင္ေျပာင္းေလာမားမှုဟာ ေရွ႕မတုိးေနာက္မဆုတ္ႏွင့္ စစ္ဘက္ဆုိင္ရာလႈပ္ရွားမှုကင္းပျခင္းတို႔နှင့် ကိုင္ျပင္ေျပာင္းေလာမားမှုမဟုတ္ အစုိးရမှုမေလာက္မထိန္းခ်ဳပ္တဲ့ေဒသားများမွာ ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းခံရသူ ၆၀၀၀၀၀၁၃၃
ဒီလိုကောင်းသောအချက်များအားလုံးကို ယူဆနိုင်ပါတယ်။ သင့်၏ အလုပ်အကူအဝေးကို လေ့လာပါ။ မိသားစုအပေါ် ထိုအကြောင်းအရာများအားလုံးကို သင်္ချို့ျခင်းတွင် ကြည့်ရှုပါ။ သင့်၏ အကြောင်းအရာများအားလုံးကို ရေးသားပါ။ သင့်၏ အလုပ်အကူအဝေးကို လေ့လာပါ။ မိသားစုအပေါ် ထိုအကြောင်းအရာများအားလုံးကို သင်္ချို့ျခင်းတွင် ကြည့်ရှုပါ။ သင့်၏ အကြောင်းအရာများအားလုံးကို ရေးသားပါ။ သင့်၏ အလုပ်အကူအဝေးကို လေ့လာပါ။
အဓိကအားဖင့် အသီးအရှေ့ သစ္ျမစ္သစ္ဥေတြဖစ္ၿပီး ေစ်းေန႔မွာဆုိရင္ေတာ့ ဘဲဥ၊ ၾကက္ဥ ဒါမွ မဟုတ္ သြားရတယ္။ ေစ်းေတြကလည္း ငါးရ က္တစ္ေစ်းပဲဖြင့္ေပမယ့္ လူနည္းစုပဲ အစားအေသာက္၀ယ္ႏိုင္ပါ တယ္။ ῶငိမ္းခ်မ္းတဲ့ကာလေတြမွာ ငတ္မြတ္ေနတာထက္စာရင္ တုိက္ပြဲ၀င္ရင္းေသသြားတာက ပုိၿပီး ဂုဏ္အုိးအိမ္ေတြကုိေတာ့ ဆာေလာင္ၿပီး မ၀ေရစာျဖစ္ေနတဲ့ ေအာင္ႏုိင္သူေတြက သိမ္း၊ အမ်ဳိးမ်ဳိး ေသာ ေကာင္းေစတာကေတာ့ ေပးစာကမ္းစာကိုလက္ခံရတာ၊ စုတ္ျပတ္ၿပီး တစ္ကိုယ္ရည္သန္႔ရွင္းမႈလည္းမရွိဘဲ အလြန္ပဲနာၾကင္ခံစားခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ ဂုဏ္ယူစြာနဲ႔ေနထုိင္လာခဲ့တဲ့ ဒီလူေတြအတြက္တစ္ေျပးညီ ရွက္စရာ သူတုိ႔ရပ္ရြာေတြ၊ ေျမယာေတြနဲ႔ သက္ေသာင့္သက္သာရွိလွတဲ့ သူတုိ႔ရဲ႕အိမ္ေတြကေန ခဲြခြာေနရာတာဟာ မေတြရဲ႕မ်က္စိေအာက္မွာ သူတုိ႔သဘာ၀အတုိင္း အခ်ဳပ္အျခယ္မရွိဘဲ ကစားျခင္း၊ ေတးဆုိျခင္း၊ ကခုန္ျခင္းကုိယ္ပုိင္ဘ၀၊ ပစၥည္းပစၥယနဲ႔ လုံၿခဳံေရး မရွိတဲ့ေနရာမ်ဳိးေတြမွာ ေနရေလ့ရွိတာ၊ ရင္းျမစ္ေတြနဲ႔ပက္သက္ၿပီး သူတုိ႔သက္တမ္းမွာ ေမ်ာ္လင့္လုိ႔မရေတာ့ဘဲ ျပန္မရ ႏုိင္ေတာ့တဲ့ ဆုံး႐ႈံးမႈတစ္ရပ္ပါပဲ။ ၀န္ေဆာင္မႈေတြရဖုိ႔ပဲျဖစ္ပါတ ယ္။ လူႀကီးသူမေတြကေတာ့ အသုံးမ၀င္ျဖစ္မႈ၊ စိတ္က်မႈ၊ ၀မ္းနည္းမႈ၊ သူတုိ႔ဘ၀ ပညာေရးအခြင့္အလမ္း ေရရာဖုိ႔၊ ဘ၀တစ္ေလွ်ာက္အေထာက္အပံ့ျဖစ္ရာကို ရွာေဖြဖုိ႔နဲ႔ ၀င္ေငြမရွိတာေၾကာင့္ ဆုးဆုးရြားရြားျပဳမူခံရျခင္း၊ ῶခိမ္းေျခာက္ခံရျခင္း၊ အဓမၼစစ္သားစုေဆာင္းခံရျခင္း၊ ျပည့္တန္ဆာအျဖစ္ သြတ္ စခန္းေတြမွာရွိတဲ့ မိသားစုေတြဟာ အရက္အလြန္အကၽြံေသာက္တာ၊ မူးယစ္ေဆြ၀ါးအလြယ္မရႏိုင္တာ၊ စတဲ့ သူတုိ႔ရဲ႕ ကိုယ္ပုိင္တုိက္ပြဲကို ဆင္ႏႊဲေနၾကပါတယ္။ အားလုံးထဲမွာ အသားက်
အရွယ်မှာတော်လှန်စွာ အလေးအလျင်သွားတာ ပြောပြင်ပြောပြင်စွာ ဆုံးဖြင့် အဖြစ်လျင် သတ်မှတ်ထားတာ အမှန်တကယ် ပြောပြပါသည်။ အပြင်ပြင်ပြောပြောစွာ အခြေခံထားတာကို ကြယ်လာတာ ဒါမှာ ရင်ဆိုင်ရာတွေရှိပါတယ်။

ယင်းသော အချက်အလက်များကို နေထုံးသူများက နေထုံးတာကို အလွန်ချင်းစိတ်တာ စုကောင်စုကောင် သင်ဘာကာ ဦးဆောင်တာမ်ား များစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်တာတွေကို အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။ အနည်းဆုံး အကောင်အထည်တွေကို နေထုံးသူများက နေထုံးတာကို အလွန်ချင်းစိတ်တာ စုကောင်စုကောင် သင်ဘာကာ ဦးဆောင်တာမ်ား များစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်တာတွေကို အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။ ဒါကို အကောင်အထည်တွေကို နေထုံးသူများက နေထုံးတာကို အနေနောက် အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။

စီစဉ်ပေးထားတာကို နေထုံးသူများက နေထုံးတာကို အနေနောက် အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။ ယင်းသည် ဦးဆောင်တာမ်ား များစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်တာတွေကို အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။

ယင်းသည် ဦးဆောင်တာမ်ား များစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်တာတွေကို အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။ ယင်းသည် ဦးဆောင်တာမ်ား များစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်တာတွေကို အရေအတွက် ပြောပြပါတယ်။

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Risk Assessment, International Investment and Responsible Business Practice in Myanmar: What Has Changed?

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Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) o ကမ္ပဏီပေးသော စီးပြားဌာန Control Risks အား တိုက်ရိုက် အသိပေးခဲ့သော ကြိုဆိုချင်သော အချက်အလက်များကို ပြသခဲ့သည်။

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6 Transparency International (TI) o ကမ္ပဏီပေးသော Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) အား သို့မဟုတ် CPI အနေဖြင့် အချက်အလက်များကို ပြသခဲ့သည်။


8 အားလုံးဝေါဟာရကို www.controlrisks.com website မှ ပြသခဲ့သည်။
တစ်ခုအနေဖြင့်ဆုံးဖြယ့္ရာရွိသည့္ပမာဏဖြစ်သောအေမရိကန္ေဒၚလာ ၁၀၀ ေတာင္းခံမႈမ်ဳိးသည္ ပုံစံတစ္မ်ဳိးျဖင့္လာေလ့ရွိသည္။ ေပးရသည့္ ေငြေၾကးပမာဏသည္ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းပက္သက္ေသာ စြန္႔စားရႏိုင္ေျခမ်ားကုိ၂၅ရာခုိင္ႏႈန္းက ေရြးခ်ယ္ခဲ့သည္။ ဥပမာ လုပ္ငန္းပူးတြဲလုပ္ကိုင္ ဖက္၊ ႏိုင္ေျခမ်ားကို ၂၉ ရာခုိင္ႏႈန္းက ေရြးခ်ယ္ခဲ့သည္။ ႏုိင္ငံတစ္ခုခုတြင္ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းလုပ္ကိုင္ရသည္ႏွင့္ စစ္တမ္းတြင္ ကမၻာတစ္၀န္းရွိ ကုမၸဏီ ယင္းတုိ႔အေလးထားရဆုံးႏွစ္မ်ဳိးကုိ ေျဖဆုိသူမ်ားအား ေမးျမန္းခဲ့သည္။ ရလဒ္မွာေအာက္ပါအတုိင္းျဖစ္သည္။ စစ္တမ္း ေတြရွိခ်က္မ်ားစြာမွာ ေရွ႕တြင္ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈျဖစ္စဥ္မ်ားကိုရင္ဆုိင္ရာေတာ့မည့္ႏိုင္ငံတစ္ငံ ႏိုင္ငံတကာကုမၸဏီမ်ားက ေပးရန္လက္တြန္႔ၾကသည္။ ႏိုင္တကာတြင္ျဖစ္ေစ ကူးသန္းေရာင္း၀ယ္ေရးဆုိင္ရာ လာဘ္ေပးမႈမ်ားကုိ ႏွိမ္နင္းေနေသာေၾကာင့္မည့္ဆုိးျဖင့္ေက်ာ္ၾကားလွေသာ အဂတိလုုိက္စားမႈတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္ေန သည္ဟု ဆုံးျဖတ္ေသာ အခင္းအက်င္းတစ္ခုတြင္ "မင္းမေပးရင္မင္းလုပ္ငန္းထိခုိက္သြားမယ္လုပ္ငန္းလည္ပတ္မႈဆုိင္ရာ လာဘ္ေပးမႈမ်ား သိသာထင္ရွာျခင္းမရွိ လုပ္႐ုိးလုပ္စဥ္ ှကားပြဲစားကို ေငြေၾကးပမာဏတစ္ခုေပး ရမည္ဆုိလွ်င္ ယင္းသို႔ေသာ အေျခ၃၁၆ ခုမွ ဥပေဒေရးရာႏွင့္ စီမံခန္႔ခြဲေရး အဆင့္မင့္အရာရွိမ်ားကို "သို႔မဟုတ္"အဓိက်သည္ "ကို မွတ္ခ်က္ေပးရန္ ေမးျမန္းအေျခအေနတစ္ဟု မည္သူ
ပုံမှန်သော လုပ်ငန်းလည်ပတ်မႈ ပတ်၀န္းက်င္အေျခအေနလည္းပါးင္သည္။ ယခုအခ်ိန္အထိ အေျဖမ်ားကုမၸဏီမ်ားျဖစ္ဖြယ္ရွိေသာေၾကာင့္ အဖက္ဖက္တြင္ အဆုံးအ႐ႈံးပိုမ်ားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ လုပ္ငန္းဆုိင္ရာ၊ နည္းပညာဆုိင္ရာႏွင့္ ေကာ္ပုိရိတ္ တာ၀န္၀တၱရား စံခ်ိန္စံညႊန္းမ်ားအရ လည္ပတ္မည့္ အဆီးအတားတစ္ခုအျဖစ္ ကုမၸဏီအားလုံးက ယူဆလိမ့္မဟုတ္ေပ။ သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း အနည္းစုေလး ျမန္မာ ရႏိုင္ေျခထက္တရားမွ်တမႈမရွိဟုယူဆေသာ္လည္ ညွိႏႈိင္ေျပလည္သည့္နည္းကို လက္ခံၾကလိမ့္မည္ျပင္ပတြင္ ဆုံးျဖတ္မည္ျဖစ္ရာ ယင္းသုိ႔ေသာ စြန္႔စားရမႈမ်ားကို ကုမၸဏီမ်ားက ကိုင္ တြယ္သြယ္ရွိသည္။ လာဘ္ေပး ရမည္ဟု ေသခ်ာေပါက္ဆုိလုိျခင္းမဟုတ္ေပ။ ထုိသို႔ျပဳလုပ္မည့္အစား ကန္ထ ႐ုိက္စာခ်ဳပ္မ်ားတြင္ ရာခုိင္ႏႈန္းေက်ာ္ကထင္ျမင္ၾကသည္။ မလြဲမေရွာင္သာ ႀကဳံရသည္အခါ သူတုိ႔သည္ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားကို မ်ဳိးေတာ္စပ္သည္ဟုလည္း စဥ္း စားရမည္) ဟု စဥ္းစားရန္ ေျဖၾကားသူမ်ားအား ေမးျမန္းခဲ့သည္။ တုံ႔ျပန္မႈ ဒုတိယအခင္းအက်င္းတြင္ အလားအလာရွိသည္ လုပ္ငန္းပူးတြဲလုပ္ကိုင္မည့္ မိတ္ဖက္သည္ ၀န္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ႏွင့္ အစိုးရအဖြဲ႕ အေျပာင္းအလဲျဖစ္လွ်င္ ဘာျဖစ္မည္နည္းဆုိသည့္ ေမးခြန္းမ်ားရွိသည္။ မည္သုိ႔ျဖစ္မည္နည္း။ စည္းကမ္းထိန္းသိမ္းေရးသမားမ်ားႏွင့္ စုံစမ္းေဖာ္ထုတ္ေရးသားသည့္ သတင္းစာ ဘာ၀ကို အတိအက်ဆုိရလွ်င္ ဘာျဖစ္မည္နည္း။ သူတို႔ရရွိမည့္ ဆုလာဘ္သည္ အတိအက်အားျဖင့္ အျမင္တြင္ ေက်နပ္ေလာက္သည့္အေျဖရရန္မွာ မွားယြင္းဖြယ္ရွိသည္။ တစ္စုံတရာေသာ သိသာထင္ရွားမႈမရွိ Control Risks ကုမၸဏီမ်ားျဖစ္ဖြယ္ရွိေသာေၾကာင့္ အဖက္ဖက္တြင္ အဆုံးအ႐ႈံးပိုမ်ားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ Control Risks ကုမၸဏီမ်ားျဖစ္ဖြယ္ရွိေသာေၾကာင့္ အဖက္ဖက္တြင္ အဆုံးအ႐ႈံးပိုမ်ားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။
ကုမၸဏီမ်ားသည် ဥပဒါပါအခ်က်မ်ားအတုိင်းလုပ်ဆာင်ရမည့်မှားစွာမပူပန့်ဘဲ အဆင့်တုိင်းရွိ အရာရွိမ်ား၏ အရည်အေသြးကို ပိုမုိအေလး ထားသည်။ အထူးသော်လည်း တရားစီရင်ရေးတိုင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ဗြိတိသျှနိုင်ငံသည် New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ကိုများစေသည်။ ယင်းသို့လက်များကြည့်ရှုခြင်းသည် ျဖစ္ၿပီး အနာဂတ်တို့ ဖြစ်သူ ပြန်လားသူများတို့ လုပ်ငန်းလုပ်ကိုင်ဖျစ်ရာ အျငင္းပြားမ်ားကို အျပည္ျပည္ဆုိင်ရာ ခုံသမာဓိသုိ႔တင္မည့္အလားအလာရွိသြားသည့္သေဘာျဖစ္သည္။ တိုက်ရိုက် လူ့ဒီးယားမှ အခြေခံလုပ်ငန်းလုပ်ကိုင်မ်ားသည် အေမရိကန္ အေရးယူပိတ္ဆုိ႔သည့္စာရင္းတို့ပါမပါ သိလုိၾကသည္။ ထုိထက္ပိုၿပီး သိလုိၾကသည္မွာ ဂုဏ္သိကၡာအတြက္ ယင်းတို႔၏ ပုဂၢဳိလ္ေရးအဆက္အသြယ္မ်ားႏွင့္ နာမည္ဂုဏ္သတင္းမ်ားကို လက္လွမ္းမီလုိၾကသည္။

ယခုစာတမ်းတွင် ေခါင္းစဥ္တပ္ထားသည့် ေမးခြန္းကို ျပန္သြားရလွ်င္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသည္ ေျပာင္းလဲနိုင်သလား၊ မေျပာင္းလဲဘဲေနသလားအေပၚမ်ားစြာအျငင္းပြားေနသည္မဟုတ္ဘဲ ဘယ္ေလာက္ျမန္သလဲႏွင့္ ဘယ္ကို သြားေနသလဲဆိုသည္ကုိ ေမးခြန္းထုတ္လုိျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ အုပ္ခ်က္မႈ စံခ်ိန္စံညႊန္းမ်ားကို ျမွင့္တင္ရန္ႏွင့္ အဂတိလုိက္စားမႈတုိက္ဖ်က္ေရးအဆင့္မ်ားကို ခုိင္မာေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္ရမည္ကို သမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္က အသိ အမွတ္ျပဳခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္သည္။  ေျခလွမ္းသစ္မ်ားေလွ်ာက္လွမ္း ေနေသည်အတုိင်း ရန္းပျစ္ပြားေနသည့္ အခုိင္မာေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္ရန္ အေရးတႀကီးလုိ အပ္ခ်က္တစ္ခုျဖစ္သည္။
Politicalization of China’s Economic Investment in Myanmar: Cause and Impact

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ျမန္မာ့စီပြားေရးကိုႏုိင္ငံေရးဇာတ္သြင္းျခင္း - အေၾကာင္းတရား အေၾကာင္းတရား

ျမန္မာတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ စီးပြားေရးရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈမ်ားကုိ ႏုိင္ငံေရးဇာတ္သြင္းျခင္း - အေၾကာင္းတရား အေၾကာင္းတရား

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လက်ပံုတာင်းေတာင် ေၾကးနီသတင်းစီမံကိန်းထည့်သြင်းထားသည်။ အစီရင် ခံစာအရ ပြင့်လင်းျမင့္သာမႈနည္းပါးသျဖင့္ စီမံကိန်း ႏွင့္ပက္သက္ၿပီး ေဒသခံ ဒီဇင္ဘာ ၁ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ျမန္မာအစုိးရ ကလက္ပံုတာင်းေတာင် စုံစမ္းစစ္ေဆးေရး ေကာ္မရွင္ကို တြင္ျဖစ္ခဲ့ၿပီး ဆႏၵျပသူမ်ားက သတင်းအနီးရွိ ျမန္မာမႈႏွင့္ တရားမွ် တမႈမရွိေသာ နစ္နာေၾကးကို မေက်နပ္သည့္ ေဒသခံမ်ားဆႏၵျပမႈႀကီးတစ္ရပ္ ၂၀၁၂ ႏို၀င္ဘာလက္ပံုတာင်းေတာင် ေၾကာင့္ ျဖစ္ေပၚလာသည့္ သဘာ၀ပတ္၀န္းက်င္ညစ္ညမ္းတ႐ုတ္လုပ္ငန္းမ်ား၏ ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈအေပၚ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံမ်ားကထားရွိေသာ အာဃာတမ်ားေၾကာင့္ ဆည္းေဆာက္ေရးရပ္တန္႔သြားရျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ဟု ေလ့လာသုံးသပ္သူအခ်ဳိ႕က ေထာက္ျပၾကသည္။

ျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈ ျမန္မာ့စီးပြားေရးကို ႏိုင္ငံေရးဇာတ္သြင္းျခင္းအေၾကာင္းအက်ဳိးစီးပြား အသစ္မ်ားႏွင့္ အေဟာင္းမ်ားၾကား ပဋိပကၡျဖစ္သည္။

သည္။ တ႐ုတ္သည္ ျမန္မာတြင္ ပမာဏအႀကီးမားဆုံးရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံသူျဖစ္ေသာေၾကာင့္ ေကာ့ပါးလီမိတက္ ျပည္တြင္း၀ိေရာဓိမ်ဳိးစုံကို ေျဖရွင္းရန္ သည္ အခက္ခဲဆုံးကာလတစ္ခုျဖစ္လာခဲ့ၿပီး အျခားစီမံကိန္းအခ်ဳိ႕လည္း အျငင္းပြားဖြယ္ရာထဲတြင္ ဝမ္ေပါင္ ေကာ့ပါးလီမိတက္

(၁) ျပည္တြင္း၀ိေရာဓိမ်ဳိးစုံကို ေျဖရွင္းရန္
(၂) အျခားႏိုင္ငံမ်ားႏွင့္ ျမန္မာ့ဆ က္ဆံေရးကို ခ်ိန္ညွိရန္ ပထမဆုံးအေနျဖင့္ တ႐ုတ္လႊမ္းမုိးမႈ အားေလ်ာ့သြားရန္လုိအပ္သည္။ ျမန္မာတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ ၾသဇာလြမ္းမုိးမႈ သည္ႀကီးမားေနသျဖင့္ ျမန္မာအစိုးရႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံျခားပါမ်ား စုိးရိမ္ပူပန္မႈကို နက္နက္႐ႈိင္း႐ႈိင္းျဖစ္ေပၚေစခဲ့ သည္။

ျမန္မာ၏ မဟာဗ်ဴေျမာက္ရည္ရြယ္မႈ တြင္ စြမ္းအင္လုံၿခဳံေရးကို ခုိင္မာအားေကာင္းေစရန္ႏွင့္ ႏုိင္ငံ တစ္ႏုိင္ငံ၊ သမုဒၵရာႏွစ္ခု ဆိုေသာအခ်က္ကို တကယ္ျဖစ္လာေစရန္ အိႏၵိယသမုဒၵရာသို႔ လမ္းေၾကာင္းသစ္ တရပ္ပြင့္ရန္ဆုိသည့္ မ်က္ႏွာစာႏွစ္ရပ္ရွိသည္ကုိ ေယဘုယ်အားျဖင့္ ယုံၾကည္ၾကသည္။

(၃) တ႐ုတ္လုပ္ငန္းမ်ား ၏ ျပႆနာမ်ား တ႐ုတ္၏ ႏိုင္ငံရပ္ျခား ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမူ ပုံစံမ်ားကို ျပန္လည္ဆန္းစစ္ရန္ လုိအပ္သည္။ တ႐ုတ္၏ ႏိုင္ငံရပ္ျခား ႏိုင္ငံျခားဆက္ဆံေရးေကာင္းတစ္ခု တည္ေဆာက္ရန္သာ ယင္းတ႐ုတ္အခ်က္အျခာေနရာသစ္တစ္ခု ျဖစ္လာခဲ့သည္။ ျမန္မာ၏ သံတမန္ေရးရာခ်ိန္ညွိေရးမဟာဗ်ဴဟာသည္ မဟာပါ၀ါႀကီးမ်ားၾကား ၿပဳိင္ဆုိင္မႈကို ႏႈိင္ဆြရန္ႏွင့္ မိမိကိုယ္ပိုင္အက်ဳိးစီးပြားကို အမ်ားဆုံးခ်ဲ႕ထြင္ရန္ ရည္ရြယ္သည္။
ျမန္မာအစိုးရ၏ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းေရး နာက်င္မႈ

danpy

- ဒီမုိကေရစီအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းေရးအတြက္ ေပးဆပ္ရသည္

န္ဖုိး

- ျမန္မာ ဒီမုိကေရစီအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈ ျဖစ္စဥ္တြင္ အစုိးရသည္လည္း ျပင္းထန္လွေသာ စီးပြားေရးစိန္ေခၚမႈမ်ားျဖင့္ ရင္ဆုိင္ခဲ့ရသည္။ ႏုိင္ငံျခားလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားက ျမန္မာတြင္ ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈႏွ ၿင့္ပက္သက္ၿပီး သတိႏွင့္လုပ္ေဆာင္ေနၾကသျဖင့္ ျမန္မာစီးပြားေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈအတြက္ အဆီးအတာျဖစ္ခဲ့ရသည္။ ႏိုင္ငံေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈကို ဦးစားေပးထားရသည့္ အေျခအေနေအာက္က ျမန္မာစီးပြားေရး ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈကို ႀကီးႀကီးမားမားသက္ေရာက္မႈရွိမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

အျငင္းပြားမႈမ်ားကို

- ကိုင္တြယ္ေျဖရွင္းျခင္းနည္းလမ္းမ်ား အသြင္ေျပာင္းျခင္း

ကၽြန္ေတာ္တုိ႔ ေတြ႕ျမင္ခဲ့ရသည့္အတုိင္း ျမစ္ဆုံဆည္အျဖစ္အပ်က္မွ လက္ပံေတာင္းေတာင္ ေၾကာင္းရွိေတာ္တုိ႔ ေတြ႕ျမင္ခဲ့ရသည့္ အတုိင္း ႏိုင္ငံတကာအေရးကိစၥမ်ားကို ကိုင္တြယ္ရာတြင္ ဦးသိန္းစိန္အစုိးရ၏ နည္းလမ္းသည္ ပုိမုိရင့္က်က္လာခဲ့သည္။

don

- တ႐ုတ္၏ ႏိုင္ငံရပ္ျခားရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈကို ေရႊ႕ျခင္းႏွင့္ ျပည္သူမ်ား၏ အသက္ေမြး၀မ္းေၾကာင္းအေပၚ စီမံကိန္းကို ဦးတည္ျခင္း ေကာ္ပုိေရးရွင္းသည္ အျခားတစ္ဖက္အေပၚ တစ္ဘက္သတ္အက်ဳိးစီးပြားခ်မွတ္ျခင္းထြက္ အက်ဳိးစီးပြား ထိန္းညွိျခင္းကို ျပဳလုပ္ရသည္။ တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္ ျမန္မာ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈသည္ ထုိသုိ႔ပင္ျပဳလုပ္ရမည္။

- နိဂုံး ျမန္မာတြင္ တ႐ုတ္ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈကို ႏိုင္ငံေရးဇာတ္သြင္းျခင္းသည္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေရး အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈ၏ မလြဲမေရွာင္သာေသာ ရလဒ္ျဖစ္သည္။ ပထမဆုံးအခ်က္မွာ တ႐ုတ္သည္ ျမန္မာ ၏ အဓိက ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံသူျဖစ္သည္။ ဒုတိယအခ်က္မွာ မ်ားစြာေသာ တ႐ုတ္ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမႈစီမံကိန္းမ်ားသည္ စစ္အစိုးရအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္သည့္ကာလအတြင္း ေရာက္လာခဲ့ၾကသည့္အတြက္ ျမန္မာ့ ဒီမုိကေရစီအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈျဖစ္စဥ္တြင္ အထိမခံေသာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးျပႆနာတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္လာခဲ့သည္။ တတိယအခ်က္မွာ ျမန္မာသည္ ႏိုင္ငံတကာအဆင့္အတန္းကို ျမွင့္တင္ရင္း ႏိုင္ငံတကာဆက္ဆံေရးႏွင့္ အက်ဳိးစီးပြားမ်ားကို ျပန္လည္ခ်ိန္ညွိရန္လုိအပ္သည္။ ျမန္မာ့ ျပည္တြင္း ဒီမုိကေရစီအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈ၊ အမ်ဳိးသား ျပည္လည္စည္းလုံးညီညြတ္ေရး၊ ျပင္ပဆက္ဆံေရးႏွင့္ အျခားေသာ ျပႆနာမ်ားအပါအ၀င္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးဇာတ္သြင္းလုိမႈသည္ တ႐ုတ္
Myanmar's Oil and Gas Sector Since 2011: Progress and Challenges

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Since 2011, the government has started to implement various policies and measures to promote the growth of the oil and gas sector, with the approval of the people. These policies have contributed to the increase of the sector share in the economy.

The oil and gas sector has been a significant contributor to the country's economy, providing jobs and contributing to the country's GDP. However, challenges still exist in the sector, including infrastructure development, regulatory frameworks, and environmental concerns.

In the future, the government should continue to focus on improving the sector's infrastructure, developing new fields, and promoting the development of the downstream industry. This will help to further increase the sector's contribution to the economy and create more jobs for the people.
လက်ရာအချင်း အာရွပစိဖိတ်တစ်ခု၌ ပိုက်လုံးဖြင့် ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းပေးမာပေးမှာ အများဆုံးျဖစ်သည်။ သဘာ၀ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းပေးမှာ စတုတၢြာက်အများဆုံးျဖစ္သည်။ မြန်မာ့နှင့် ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းထုတ်လုပ်ချင်းနယ်ပယ်ႏွစ္ပိုင်းခြဲျခင်း ကုန်းတောင်းထုတ်လုပ်ချင်းနယ်ပယ်ႏွင့်ကမ္းလြန်ထုတ်လုပ်ချင်းနယ်ပယ်ဟူၾကသည်။ မြန်မာ့ကုန်းတောင်းနေရန်အရန်ပမာဏမှာ စည်းပြောင်း ၀ ဒသမ ၅ဘီလီယံအတွက် သဘာ၀ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းပမာဏကုဗေပ ၉၇၀ ဘီလီယံရှိသည်။

ေရန်နေရာ ၁၄ခုရွိသည်။ မြန်မာ့နှင့် မုတ္မိမုတ္နေရာႏွင့် ကမ္းလြန်အရန်နေရန်ပမာဏစည်းပြောင်း ၈ ဒသမ ၁ဘီလီယံအတွက် ကမ္းလြန်သဘာ၀ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းပမာဏကုဗေပ ၁၀ ထရီလ်ံရှိသည်။ ယင်းတို႔ကို မြန်မာအာဏာပိုင်းမ်ားက နယ်ေျမသံုးခုႏွင့်လုပ်ကြက်ပြောင်း (၂၅) ခုပြောင်းျခားထားသည်။

ျမန်းနာ့က်ေဖြေစက် စမ္းသပ္ရွာေဖြေစက် ယေနႌအချင်းထိ စမ္းသပ္ရွာေဖြေစက် မ်ားကို မြန်မာ့နှင့် ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းသိုက်အသစ္မ်ားျဖစ္သည့် ျပည်ေရန်ေျမ်ားျဖစ္သည့် ဧရာ၀တီျမစ္၀ကၽြန္ေရန်းမ်ားတြင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္လ်က္ရွိသည်။

ေရန်ေျမ်ား ၁၁ခုတြင္ အနည္းငယ္လာေရာက္ မတူးေဖာ္သည့်အည်အောက်တွင္ ရွိေနသည်။

မြန်မာ့အာဏာ အချင်းျဖစ္သည့် အေျခအေျခားထားသည်။ ထို႔ေၾကာင့္ မြန်မာ့အနေဖြဲ အေရန်ေျမတြင္း ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းသိုက်အသစ္မ်ားျဖစ္သည်။

ေလာင္စာဆီအသံုးျပဳသည် ဘတ္ေစ္ကား(၅၈၇)စင္းကို သဘာ၀ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းသံုးယာဥ္မ်ားျဖစ္လဲခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာ့ သဘာ၀ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းသည် ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွာစ္တြင္ အလ်င္အျမန္ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးလာခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၁၁ခုႏွစ္ ဇြန္လတြင္ မြန်မာ့အေရန်းချင်း ဓာတ်ငြိမ်းအေရာင္းဆိုင္ေပါင္း (၄၅) ဆိုင္ရွိခဲ့ကာ ရန္ကုန္တြင္ဆုိင္(၄၀)၊ မႏၱေလးတြင္ ၁၄၇

ဗာေးင်ငါးခုေဖြေစက်ပါးချင်းကို CNG အေရာင္းဆိုင္ေပါင္းသည်။
မဟာဗ်ဴဟာသစ္ကုိ ရွာ ေဖြေနသည္ဟု ထုတ္ျပန္ခဲ့သည္။ ၂၀၁၃ ခုႏွစ္ဇြန္လေျခာက္ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ေနျပည္ေတာ္၌က်င္းပခဲ့ သည့္ ၂၂ႀကိမ္ေျမာက္ စြမ္းအင္က႑တြင္ ေကာင္းမြန္ေသာ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္မႈႏ ွင့္ ပြင့္လင္းျမင္သာမႈ ဦးေဆာင္အာဏာပိုင္အဖြဲ႕ကို ထူေထာင္ခဲ့ သည္။ ၂၀၁၃ ခုႏွစ္ ေမလ(၂၀)ရက္ေန႔တြင္ စြမ္းအင္၀န္ႀကီး (၂)ဆိုင္၊ ေရနံေခ်ာင္းတြင္ (၂)ဆိုင္၊ ေခ်ာက္တြင္ (၁) ဆိုင္ရွိသည္။ ျမန္မာ့သဘာ၀ဓာတ္ေငြ႕ေစ်းကြက္၏ Initiatives (EITI) ၁၆ ဘီလီယံရရွိခဲ့သည္။ ၂၀၁၁ တိုးပြားလာစဥ္တြင္ သဘာ၀ ဓာတ္ေငြ႕ကို ျပည္တြင္းစားသံုးမႈအတြက္ ဦးစားေပးအျဖစ္ ထားရွိလာသည္။ အဆင့္အတန္း ျမင့္လာ ေစခဲ့သည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ လူတစ္ဦးခ်င္းအလိုက္ သဘာ၀ဓာတ္ေငြအသံုးျပဳမႈ ဓာတ္ေငြ႕တင္ပို႔မႈ တိုးျမႇင့္လာမႈေၾကာင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသည္ ေရနံႏွင့္ သဘာ၀ဓာတ္ေငြ႕ရွာေဖြမႈနယ္ပယ္တြင္ ၁၁ႏုိင္ငံေျမာက္ အႀကီးဆံုးႏုိင္ငံျဖစ္လာခဲ့သည္။ ေလာေလာဆယ္တြင္ သဘာ၀ဓာတ္ေငြ႕သည္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၏ ၂၀၀၀ျပည့္ႏွစ္တြင္ အာရွ ပစိဖိတ္ေဒသမွ ပိုက္လိုင္းျဖင့္ သဘာ၀ဓာတ္ေငြ႕အမ်ားဆံုးတင္ပို႔ခဲ့သည္။ ပန္းတိုင္မွာ ဓာတ္ေငြ႕ပိုက္လိုင္းသစ္ေၾကာင့္ ေၾကာင္းတစ္ခုရရွိလိမ့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ဒီဇင္ဘာ ၁၄ ရက္ေန႔ကို သမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္က သမၼတ႐ံုး၀န္ႀကီး ၎၏ ပါ၀င္ပတ္သက္ေနသူအမ်ားအျပားရွိသည့္ အုပ္စုက ထိန္းသိမ္းေရးအတြက္ လမ္း-၂၀၁၂ ဘ႑ာေရးႏွစ္တြင္ ဓာတ္ေငြ႕တင္ပို႔မႈ စုစုေပါင္း
၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ်တွင် စတင်တံခါးဖြင့်ခဲ့ပြီး အာဦများမသာပြီးကတည်းက မြန်မာ ရန်းသို့ ဓာတ်ငြင်လုပ်ငန်းတွင် မိုင်းဆိုင်းရင်းသို့ အေးမြဲဖြစ်သည်။ အထောက် ၂၀၀၀ ပြည်နှစ်တွင် ပိုင်းတွင် မြန်မာ ရန်းသို့ ဓာတ်ငြင် တူညီထားရာတွင် မိုင်းဆိုင်းရင်းသို့ အေးမြဲဖြစ်သည်။ အျဖိုင်းကုမ္ပဏီများပါဝင်ပြီး သက်သာစောင်းမြင်ပေးသည်။ အျဖိုင်းကုမ္ပဏီပါဝင်ပြီး သက်သာစောင်းမြင်ပေးပြီး မိုင်းသားတန်းတိုးတက်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ရင်းသို့မှုးပြီးရင်းသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အာရှးဆုံးရင်းသို့မှုးခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၁၂ခုနှစ်တွင် PTTEP သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ စက်သံုးဆီအေရာင္းဆိုင္မ်ား၊ လက်လီကြန့်ရက္မ်ား တိုးချင်ရန်ႀကီးမားသည့်အစီအစဥ္တစ်ရပ္ ေရးဆြဲခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဗုံးလဲေရးခြင်းတို့ ရိုးသူက်ပေးနေသည်။ ဗုံးလဲေရးခြင်းတို့၏အလားအလာေကာင္းမ်ား ပ်က္စီးခဲ့ရသည်။ အာရွပစိဖိတ်သမိုင်းတဲ့ကားရွေးချယ်မှုများ များက်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာ အလားအလာမ်ား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ရွေးချယ်နိုင်ရာတွင် လြန်ခဲ့သည် ဆယ္စုတွင် ဗုဒ္ဓပေးရွေးမွာ ၁ ဒသမ ၁၄၉

ဗုံးလဲေရးခြင်းတို့၏အလားအလာေကာင္းမ်ား ပ်က္စီးခဲ့ရသည်။ လုပ္ကြက္ A-1 နှင့် လုပ္ကြက္ M-9 ကျေန့်အောင်သွယ်ထားသည်။
ပိုမိုလုပ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည်။ ထုတ်ကုန်များနှင့် ၀န်ဆောင်မွှေးများ ထောက်ခံလို့ ပေးထားရွက်ရန် ပေးပြီးဖော်ပြပါ။ ပေးထားချက်များကို တရားဝင်လုပ်ခဲ့သောအခါ လက်ရှိအုပ်ချုပ်များရရှိပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ဗုဒ္ဓိဘာသာအုပ်ချုပ်များ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ဗုဒ္ဓိနိုင်ငံတွင် လုံးဝင် ဗုဒ္ဓိနိုင်ငံတကာဋစ်ကြက်ရေးသားသူများ ဗုဒ္ဓိးဗုဒ္ဓိးကြက်ကား လုပ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ဓာတိစာအုပ်၊ ဒီဇယဘာသာစာအုပ်များကို လေးစုစုစာရင်းအတွင်း ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းမှ ကြားပြုခြင်းများပြုပြင်သည်။

ဗုဒ္ဓိနိုင်ငံအား အစိုးရက

ဗုဒ္ဓိနိုင်ငံတွင် နောက်ပြည်သူပျော်ရွှေ့ရွှေ့ရွှေ့ခြင်းများကို အတွက် နောက်ပျော်ရွှေ့ခြင်းများ လုံးဝေးရွှေ့ခြင်းများကို ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ မှန်ကန်၍ လူကြီးမှူးခံများအတွက် နောက်ပျော်ရွှေ့ရွှေ့ခြင်းများ ပေးရွှေ့ခြင်းများကို သိရှိခဲ့သည်။ ပြည်သူ၏ ရှေးဟောင်းအချက်များကို ရွေးချယ်ခြင်းများဖော်ပြပါ။

အချိန်များ, သဘာဝနှင့် အသက်များ

1988ခုနှစ်တွင် စိုးငွေးကြေး ၄ ဒသမ ၈၃ သန်းရွိခဲ့ရာမှ 2007ခုနှစ်၌ ၇ ဒသမ ၆၂ သန်းသို့တိုးတက်ခဲ့သည်။ သဘာဝဓာတိုက်လုပ်နေသည်။ ဗုဒ္ဓိနိုင်ငံမှာ ဗုဒ္ဓိစာမျက်နှာထားရှိသည်။ လုပ်ငန်းနှင့် ဓာတိုက်လုပ်နေသည်။
သယ္ယူပို႔ေဆာင္ေရး၏ ကုန္က်စရိတ္ႏွင့္စြန္႔စားရႏုိင္သည္မ်ားကုိ ႀကီးႀကီးမားမားေလ်ာ့ခ်ႏိုင္မည္ျ ဖစ္သည္။

ေရနံခ်က္စက္႐ံုတည္ေဆာက္ျခင္းသည္ ျပည္တြင္းလိုအပ္ခ်က္ကို ျဖည့္ဆည္းႏုိင္သည့္ ႏိုင္ငံတကာ ေရနံထြက္ကုန္မ်ားကိုလည္း ထုတ္လုပ္ၿပီးေနာက္ ပိုက္လုိင္းေရာက္ရွိရာ ေနရာ - ေရနံခ်က္စက္႐ံုတည္ေဆာက္ရန္ပါေင္သည့္ ယင္းစက္႐ံုမွ တစ္ေန႔လွ်င္ ေရနံစည္ ေပါင္းစည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္းမ်ားကို လိုက္နာေနရသည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသည္ ေရနံႏွင့္ ဓာတ္ေငြ႕တူးေဖာ္ထုတ္လုပ္ေရးႏွင့္ ဓာတ္ေငြတူးေဖာ္ေရးအတြက္ ၎၏ တရားေရးစနစ္ကို တိုးတက္ေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္ရန္ လိုအပ္သည္။

တုိက္တြန္းခဲ့သည္။ အဆိုျပဳထားသည့္ ျမန္မာတိက်ေသာစြမ္းအင္ဥပေဒမ်ား၊ စည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္းမ်ားမရွိေသာေၾကာင့္ စြမ္းအင္က႑သည္ ရည္မွန္းခ်က္ကို ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသည္ စြမ္းအင္အတြက္ တိက်ေ သာ စည္းကမ္းမ်ား၊ အခြန္ေဆာင္ရန္လိုအပ္သည့္ ေရနံႏွင့္ ဓာတ္ေငြမ်ားပိုမိုလိုအပ္လာမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အရန္ပို႔ေဆာင္ေရးကြန္ရက္အတြက္ လက္ရွိကီလိုမီတာ ၂၀၀၀ လိုအပ္သည္။ ျမန္မာ့စီးပြားေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးလာမႈႏွင့္အတူ ႏိုင္ငံတြင္ေနထုိင္ ၾကသူမ်ားကလည္း တည္ေဆာက္ရမည့္ ဓာတ္ေငြပိုက္လိုင္း

သဘာ၀ဓာတ္ေငြ႕ ဓာတ္အားေပးစက္႐ံုသည္ အေရးႀကီးေသာ အခန္ေဆာင္တစ္ခုတြင္ ပါ၀င္သည္။

ခ်က္လုပ္ႏုိင္မႈပမာဏမွာ တစ္ႏွစ္လွ်င္ ေရနံစည္ေပါင္း (၅၁၀၀၀)ရွိၿပီး ယင္းပမာဏသည္ သက္တမ္းအရွည္ဆံုး ေရနံခ်က္စက္႐ံုတစ္ခုကို ၁၉၅၄ ခုႏွစ္တြင္တည္ေဆာက္ခဲ့ၿပီး ႏွစ္ကာ ဥကၠ႒အသစ္ အားျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ေရနံခ်က္စက္႐ံုမ်ားတည္ေဆာက္ရန္ တ႐ုတ္ေရနံႏွင့္ ဓာတ္ေငြ ႕ပိုက္လုိင္းစီမံကိန္းတြင္ မႏၱေလး၌ ျမန္မာပိုက္လုိင္းမွ 151
"From 'Outside' to 'Inside': The Transformation of Activism over Energy Projects in Myanmar

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မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာမိုးကို ကိုယ်စားလွယ်စေသောအဆိုပါ လုပ်ဆောင်မှုများရှိသည်။ လူမျိုးလူမျိုးဆိုင်ရာ စိုက်ပျိုးရေးဦးစီးချီးမှု သယ်ယှဉ်လျှင် ပြောပြချက် အား ထိန်းချုပ်နိုင်သည်။ ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာမိုးများသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် သိမ်းပိုးထားပြီး ထိန်းချုပ်နိုင်သည်။

**Simpon (1998)**

Simpon (1998) ကို ရွေးရွေးတွင် ပေါက်လာသော အလုပ်လုပ် စုစုပေါင်းကို ရွေးချယ်ချက်ရန် အခိုးများ ဆိုင်ရာ ချက်ချင်းများ ရှိသည်။
မရွိဘဲသက္ဆုိင္ေသာ လူငယ္မ်ားက မိမိတုိ႔စြမ္းအားကို အျခားေသာ အဖြဲ႕အစည္းဆုိင္ရာ အေဆာက္အအုံ ရေနံ့စာင့္ၾကည့္ေရးအေျခစိုက္တည္ရွိခဲ့သလုိပင္ အျခားေသာ ႏိုင္င္ႏိုင္ျဖတ္ေက်ာ္ တက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ားႏွင့္ အခ်ိတ္အဆက္၊ ႏုိင္ငံေရာက္ ျမန္မာတက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ား ၾကား ကြန္ရက္မ်ားသည္ ထုိင္းႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ယခင္ကတည္းက အထီးတည္ျဖစ္မႈကို ခံစားရဖြယ္ရွိသည္ ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားတြင္ အဂၤလိပ္ဘာသာစကားကၽြမ္းက်င္မႈအပါအ၀င္ သိေအာင္လုပ္ျခင္းႏွင့္ မီးေမာင္းထုိစိုးမ်ားျပျခင္းမ်ားျပဳလုပ္လာႏုိင္ၿပီး ယင္းတုိ႔၏ လႈပ္ရွား မႈမ်ားအား ျပင္ပလူမ်ား ၏ လူ႔အဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားေထာက္ပံ့ေပးခဲ့သည္။ ထုိနည္ျဖင့္ ျပည္ပႏိုင္ငံေရာက္ တက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွား သူမ်ားသည္ ေၾကာင့္ ပိုမုိထိေရာက္ခဲ့သည္။ ျမန္မာျပည္ေျပးမ်ား၏ ရရွိႏုိင္ဖြယ္မရွိေသာ သို႔မဟုတ္ အျပည္အ၀နားမလည္ႏိုင္ေသာ ခုိင္မႈႏွင့္ ပုဂၢလိကအေတြ႕အႀကဳံမ်ား ယင္းတုိ႔၏ သီးျခားဘာသာစကားႏွင့္ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈဆုိင္ရာ အသိပညာမ်ားေပၚတြင္မူတည္ေနသည္။ ျပည္ေျပးတက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ား၏ အေရးပါမႈမွာ ယင္းတုိ႔၏ ျပည္တြင္းႏိုင္ငံေရးကိုနားလည္ျခင္းႏွင့္အတူတက္ၾကြစြာတည္ေဆာက္ျခင္းႏွင့္ အထူးျပဳအသိပညာမ်ားေထာက္ပံျခင္းအျပင္ ျပည္ပႏိုင္ငံေရာက္ အသုိက္ေကာင္းေသာ အခ်ိန္အဆက္ႏွစ္ကို ထူေထာင္ျခင္းျဖင့္ ထုိသူတုိ႔သည္ မိမိတုိ႔၏ ဘ၀သစ္မ်ားတြင္ ေအာင္ႏုိင္မႈအားနည္းျခင္းကို မိမိတုိ႔၏ ျပည္ပႏိုင္ငံေရာ က္ အသိုက္အ၀န္းႏွင့္ ျပင္ပအသိုက္အ၀န္းၾကား အား ၁၅၄
သူရိန္ႏွင့္ေတြ႕ဆံုေမးျမန္းျခင္း၊ ခ်င္းမိုင္ ထိုင္းႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၂ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီ ၂၀၁၂။

က်ဴးေက်ာ္ျခင္း၊ နစ္နာေၾကာ္ရန္ ပ်က္ကြက္ျခင္းႏွင့္ လမ္ားပ်က္ဆီးျခင္းတုိ႔ကဲ့သို႔ေသာ ပုိက္လုိင္း တည္မႈမ်ား ေျဖေလ်ာ့ျခင္းတုိ႔ေၾကာင္း ျပည္တြင္းလႈပ္ရွားမႈသည္ ပုိမုိပြင့္လင္းၿပီး ျမင္သာလာခဲ့သည္။ လႈပ္ရွားမႈေတာ္မိန္႔ခြန္းတြင္ အတည္ျပဳခဲ့သည္။ အဆုိပါအတည္ျပဳခ်က္ကို တုံ႔ျပန္ျခင္းႏွင့္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးဆုိင္ရာ ကန္႔သတ္အမ်ားစုကို ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံအလယ္ပုိင္းရွိ စစ္တပ္ႏွင့္နီးစပ္သည္ဟု ေက်ာ္ၾကားေသာ ကုမၸဏီမ်ားပုိင္စစ္ဓာတ္အားအသုံျပဳမႈ အနိမ့္ဆုံးျဖစ္သည္ဟု ႏိုင္ငံပိုင္သတင္းစာအရသိရွိရသည္။ အသစ္ျဖစ္ထြန္းလာ သည့္လက္ထက္တြင္ လုံၿခဳံေရးအရေျဖေလွ်ာ့မႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ၿပီး အဖြဲ႕၀င္အမ်ားစုကို ၂၀၁၂ ဇန္န၀ါရ၀ါရီတြင္ လြတ္မတရားသင္း (ဥပမာ စစ္ေထာက္လွမ္းေရးမ်ားက ေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့ၿပီး ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ အဖြဲ႕၀င္ေက်ာင္းသား ၉ ဦးဖမ္းဆီးခံခဲ့ရကာ ျပဳလုပ္ေသာ စုေ၀းေဆြးေႏြးမႈမ်ားလုပ္သလုိ သတင္းအခ်က္အလက္မ်ားပိုမုိရရွိရန္ ထုိင္းႏိုင္ငံရွိေရႊစီမံကိန္း၏အေသးစိတ္အခ်က္အလက္မ်ားတျဖည္းျဖည္းထြက္ေပၚလာခ်ိန္တြင္ အသင္းသည္ သက္ဆုိင္တစ္ခု ျဖစ္သည့္ တကၠသိုလ္ပညာသင္စရိတ္ေထာက္ပံ့ေရးႏွင့္ ရခုိင္လႈမႈေရးအသင္းကို ထူေထာင္ခဲ့သည္။

(အမည္ရင္းမဟုတ္) ႏွင့္ေတြ႕ဆံုေမးျမန္းျခင္း၊ ရန္ကုန္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၈ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီ ၂၀၁၂။

(အမည္ရင္းမဟုတ္) ႏွင့္ေတြ႕ဆံုေမးျမန္းျခင္း၊ ခ်င္းမိုင္ ထိုင္းႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၃

6 Patrick (ဆိုင္း) ေရက်ရွိမ်ားက ေရးသော် အေနခ်ား ပျော် စိုး၊ ဖြင့် ၁၃

7 တစ္ခါ (ဆိုင္း) ငွေ့်ပြုမ်ားက ေရးသော် အေနခ်ား ပျော် စိုး၊ ဖြင့် ၁၃

8 Patrick (ဆိုင္း) ေရက်ရွိမ်ားက ေရးသော် အေနခ်ား ပျော် စိုး၊ ဖြင့် ၁၃
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးမွေးဖွားချိန်မှစ၍ နိုင်ငံရေးနိုင်ငံတကာအကြောင်းအထက်မှ ဆိုင်ရာအချက်အလက်များမှ အားလုံးပေးသော နိုင်ငံတကာလူများရဲ့ ကြိုးပြောင်မှုများကို လေ့လာခဲ့သည်။ ရွေးသူများက ေတာင်းဆုိတည်း။

တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးနေသော ဓာတ်ငွေကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနီးတွင် ဓာတ်ငွေအားလုံးကို နယ်ပယ်တွင်သွင်းထားရန် တက်ကလေသည်။

နိုင်ငံတကာ ဝေါ်သူများကို အဆက်အပြောင်မှုအားဖြင့် ကြည့်ရှုမည်။ ဟူ၍ နိုင်ငံတကာလူများသည် အနေဖြင့် အလားအလာများရှိသည် စီမံခန့်အင်္ဂါနှင်းနိုင်သည်။

NLD အမ်ဳိးသားဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးရေးပါတီ ပြဲတွင်ပါဝင်ယှဉ်ၿပီး အမ်ဳိးသားလြတ္ေတာ္အတြင္း လႊတ္ေတာ္ကုိယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားရွိသည့္ ရခုိင္

ဦးေအာင္ကလည္း လႊတ္ေတာ္ျပင္ပမွ အလားတူထင္ျမင္ခ်က္မ်ဳိး ထုတ္ေဖာ္ေျပာဆုိ ခဲ့ေသာ္လည္း သည္ဟု ဦးဦးလွေစာက လႊတ္ေတာ္တြင္ တင္ျပခဲ့ၿပီး ယင္းရည္မွန္းခ်က္ကို အေကာင္အထည္ ေဖာ္ရန္

ပ်က္စီးမႈမ်ားစြာနည္းပါးသည္ဟု

နယ်ပယ်တွင် တည္ေဆာက္သည့္ ျမစ္ဆုံဆည္ထက္ လူမႈဘ၀ေရးရာႏွင့္ သဘာ၀ပတ္၀န္းက်င္ဆုိင္ရာ

ပိုက္လုိင္းစီမံကိန္းမွ အလားအလာရွိေသာ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိး

ႏွင့္အတူ ပါတီတစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္မွတ္ပုံတင္ခဲ့ေသာ ရခိုင္ဒီမိုကေရစီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္

12 နိုင်ငံရေးနိုင်ငံတကာအကြောင်းအထက်မှ ဆိုင်ရာအချက်အလက်များမှ အားလုံးပေးသော နိုင်ငံတကာလူများရဲ့ ကြိုးပြောင်မှုများကို လေ့လာခဲ့သည်။ ရွေးသူများက ေတာင်းဆုိတည်း။ တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးနေသော ဓာတ်ငွေကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနီးတွင် ဓာတ်ငွေအားလုံးကို နယ်ပယ်တွင်သွင်းထားရန် တက်ကလေသည်။

13 နိုင်ငံရေးနိုင်ငံတကာအကြောင်းအထက်မှ ဆိုင်ရာအချက်အလက်များမှ အားလုံးပေးသော နိုင်ငံတကာလူများရဲ့ ကြိုးပြောင်မှုများကို လေ့လာခဲ့သည်။ ရွေးသူများက ေတာင်းဆုိတည်း။ တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးနေသော ဓာတ်ငွေကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနီးတွင် ဓာတ်ငွေအားလုံးကို နယ်ပယ်တွင်သွင်းထားရန် တက်ကလေသည်။

14 နိုင်ငံရေးနိုင်ငံတကာအကြောင်းအထက်မှ ဆိုင်ရာအချက်အလက်များမှ အားလုံးပေးသော နိုင်ငံတကာလူများရဲ့ ကြိုးပြောင်မှုများကို လေ့လာခဲ့သည်။ ရွေးသူများက ေတာင်းဆုိတည်း။ တိုက်ရိုက်ပေးနေသော ဓာတ်ငွေကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရာ အနီးတွင် ဓာတ်ငွေအားလုံးကို နယ်ပယ်တွင်သွင်းထားရန် တက်ကလေသည်။

156


မြန်မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈကို ကၽြႏု္ပ္တုိ ဘာအေၾကာင္းေၾကာင့္ ေလ့လာသင့္သနည္း။
ကၽြႏု္ပ္တုိ႔အား ျပည့္စုံေသာ ေကာက္ခ်က္ခ်ရန္ႏွင့္ ျမန္မာအေျခအေနမ်ားကို ခန္႔မွန္းရန္ မူေဘာင္တစ္ခုကို ေပးႏိုင္ေသာေၾကာင့္ျဖစ္သည္။

၂၀၁၃ တြင္ ျမန္မာ့ႏို္ငံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈ၏ ဆုံခ်က္ပြဳိင့္

မြန်မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရးေခါင္းေဆာင္တစ္ေယာက္၏ ျပင္းျပေသာဆႏၵႏွင့္ လုပ္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ားကို သာ မ်ားစြာေသာ ႏုိင္ငံေရးအာဏာရွိသူမ်ားအၾကား အျပန္အလွန္ဆက္ဆံေရးမ်ားကို ကၽြႏု္ပ္တုိ႔ ဦးတည္ရန္ လုိအပ္သည္။

၂၀၁၃ တြင္ ျမန္မာ့ႏို္ငံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈ၏ ဆုံခ်က္ပြဳိင့္
သမၼတအျဖစ္ လႊတ္ေတာ္က ေရြးခ်ယ္ႏိုင္ရန္ သူမႏွင့္ သမၼတျဖစ္ေရးအိပ္မက္ကို သူမ အမွန္တကယ္အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္လုိလွ်င္ ၂၀၀၈ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပုံ ႏုိင္မည့္မဟုတ္ေပ။ သုိ႔ေသာ္ ၂၀၁၅ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ သမၼတျဖစ္ေရးအတြက္ မိမိေရြးေကာက္ပြဲယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္လုိ ေၾကာင္း အတိုင္း ျပဌန္း ပုဒ္မ တြင္ေအာက္ပါ ၂၀၁၅ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ သမၼတျဖစ္ေရးအတြက္ မိမိေရြးေကာက္ပြဲယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္လုိ ေၾကာင္း အတိုင္း ျပဌန္း ပုဒ္မ တြင္ေအာက္ပါ

15 နိုင္ငံေတာ္သမၼတနွင့္ ဒုတိယသမၼတမ်ား(၃) နိုင္ငံေတာ္သမၼတနွင့္ ဒုတိယသမၼတမ်ား၊ NLD အိုးမိုးစ္စားတဲ့ အခြင်းမွာ ယင္းတုိ႔ တုိ႔၏ ေတာင္းဆုိမႈကို ပုဒ္မ တြင္ေအာက္ပါ ၂၀၁၅ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ သမၼတျဖစ္ေရးအတြက္ မိမိေရြးေကာက္ပြဲယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္လုိ ေၾကာင္း အတိုင္း ျပဌန္း ပုဒ္မ တြင္ေအာက္ပါ ၂၀၁၅ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ သမၼတျဖစ္ေရးအတြက္ မိမိေရြးေကာက္ပြဲယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္လုိ ေၾကာင္း အတိုင္း ျပဌန္း ပုဒ္မ တြင္ေအာက္ပါ ၂၀၁၅ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ သမၼတျဖစ္ေရးအတြက္ မိမိေရြးေကာက္ပြဲယွဥ္ၿပဳိင္လုိ ေၾကာင္း အတိုင္း ျပဌန္း ပုဒ္မ တြင္ေအာက္ပါ ၂၀၁၅ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ သမnetinetပြီးပြီး ချီးမြစ်စားမှုနီးချီးမြစ်စားမှုရင့္မှားကျနားခဲ့သည်။ ပြီးချီးမြစ်စားမှုအားလုံးအားလုံးကို မလုပ္ခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္
စိတ္ေက်နပ္ေလာက္ဖြယ္မရွိဟု BGF ဥပေဒအရ လူနည္းစုတုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ား၏ ေဒသခံလက္နက္ကိုင္တပ္ဖြဲ႕ပုံအေျခခံဥပေဒကို ျပင္ဆင္ေရးဒုတိယအခ်က္ေေနျဖင့္ လူနည္းစုတုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ား၏ ေတာင္းဆုိမႈကို ျဖည့္ဆည္းရန္ ၂၀၀၈ ဖြဲ႕စည္း
ယခ်ိန္တြင္ ဗဟုိအစိုးရသည္ ထုိ႔ေနာက္ ဗဟိုအစိုးရက ယင္းတုိ႔အား တုိက္ခုိက္ခဲ့သည္။

မ်ားျဖစ္ပြားေနခ်ိန္မွာပင္ ပဋိပကၡကို ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းစြာ အဆုံးသတ္ရန္ ဗဟုိအစိုးရက Committee အစိတ္အပုိင္းတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္ေနဆဲျဖစ္သည္။

အေရးမွ်တစြာခြဲေ၀ျခင္းအတြက္ ေသာ ခြဲေ၀မႈကိုတုိးျမွင့္ေရးကဲ့သုိ႔ အာဏာက်င့္သုံးမႈ၏ မူလူအေျခအေနကို တုိးျမွင့္ႏုိင္ျခင္းမရွိခဲ့ဘဲ အခြင့္ ဗဟုိအစိုးရ ႏွင့္ ဆက္လက္တုိက္ခုိက္ေနေသာ အဖြဲ႕တစ္ခုမွာ ကခ်င္လြတ္ေျမာက္ေရးအဖြဲ႕ ဗဟုိအစိုးရႏွင့္ ပါ၀င္ၿပီး ျမစ္ႀကီးနားရွိ က တစ္ဖက္သတ္ေၾကညာခဲ့သည္။ ေမလ ၂၈ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္ ကုလသမဂၢကိုယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားတုိက္ခုိက္မႈမ်ားကို ရပ္ၿပီး အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲေရးေဆြးေႏြးမႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္သြားမည္ဟု ၂၀၁၃ တြင္ ဗဟုိအစိုးရပုိမုိျပင္းထန္ေသာ သတ္ျဖတ္မႈမ်ားဆီ ေရာက္ရွိသြားဖြယ္ရွိသည္။

မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ထုိ႔ေနာက္လွ်င္ရလဒ္သည္ ပမာဏႀကီးမားေသာ လက္နက္ကိုင္ ပဋိပကၡျဖ စ္သြားဖြယ္ရွိ ၿပီး မူလအေျခအေနကို ျပန္သြားျခင္းႏွင့္ အာဏာကုိက်င့္သုံးျခင္း စံႏႈန္းသည္ ယခင္စံႏႈန္းမ်ားကို လုိက္နာရခ်ဳပ္ခြင့္ကို မေပးလုိ�ပ။ ကာလရွည္ ပဋိပကၡမ်ားကိုၾကည့္လွ်င္ ႏုိင္ငံတစ္ႏိုင္ငံ၏ ႏိုင္ငံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈတြင္ ခ်ဳပ္ခြင့္ကို အေရးမ်ားခြဲေ၀ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ဟု ေကာက္ခ်က္ခ်ႏိုင္သည္။ ၁၉၄၇ ပင္လုံစာခ်ဳပ္ပါ အျမင့္ဆုံးကိုယ္ပိုင္အုပ္ ဗဟိုအစိုးရႏွင့္ ညွိႏႈိင္းမည္ဟု တစ္စိုက္မတ္မတ္ေျပာဆုိခဲ့သည္။

ဗဟိုအစိုးရကမူ လူနည္းစုတုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ားလုိလား ေသာ ကိုယ္ပိုင္အုပ္ KIO ကိုယ္ပိုင္အုပ္တြင္ က လုိခ်င္သည္။ ဗဟိုအစိုးရက လူနည္းစုတုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ားကုိယူဆၿပီး ဗဟိုအစိုးရ၏ လုိအပ္ခ်က္မ်ားကုိ ျင င္းဆုိခဲ့သည္။
ဗဟုိအစုိးရ အဓိကေသာ့ခ်က္မွာ ဗဟုိအစိုးရ၏ ႐ုိးေျဖာင့္မႈႏွင့္ လုပ္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ားပင္ျဖစ္သည္။

ကခ်င္ႏွင့္ အျခား တုိင္းရင္းသားလူနည္းစုမ်ား၏ ကိုယ္ပုိင္အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ခြင့္ရရန္ ၁၉၄၇ ခုႏွစ္ ပင္လုံသေဘာတူ ညီခ်က္မ်ားအရ ၂၀၀၈ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပုံအေျခခြင့္ရုပ္ပေါင့္ ဗဟုိအစုိးရက ျပင္ဆင္လုိသေလာဆုိသည္ပင္ျဖစ္သည္။
Cooperation and Competition between U.S. and Japan’s Policy towards Myanmar

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In 2009 in July, during the US-ASEAN summit in Okinawa, a "Lower Mekong Initiative" (LMI) was launched, which included Myanmar. However, the Myanmar government has limited cooperation with it. In 2009, the military junta was replaced, and the new government of Myanmar began to seek closer ties with the US-ASEAN. In 2010, the US-ASEAN summit was held in Okinawa, which Myanmar attended. During the meeting, the US-ASEAN Mekong countries decided to set up a "Lower Mekong Initiative" to promote cooperation among Mekong countries. The Myanmar government has been actively involved in this initiative, and has taken the lead in promoting cooperation among Mekong countries.
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကို ပြန်လည်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အရာအားလုံးအတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ရာ အခြေခံအပေါ်တွင် အိမ်ချင်း အလွန် အရေးကြီးသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်က အိမ်ချင်း အိမ်ချင်းအတွက် တိုးတက်အုပ်စုကို အုပ်စုဆောင်ရွက်သည်။ အိမ်ချင်းများသည် မိုးမိုးစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းရသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သည် မိုးမိုးစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းရသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သည် အိမ်ချင်းများသည် မိုးမိုးစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းရသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။ အိမ်ချင်းများသည် မိုးမိုးစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းရသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သည် မိုးမိုးစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းရသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သည် မိုးမိုးစွာ ဆောင်ရွက်ပြောင်းလောင်းရသော အချက်အလက်များ ပုံမှန်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။

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ဂ်ပန္မဟာမိတ္ျဖစ္ေသာေၾကာင့္ ၎၏အေရးႀကီးေသာ သံတမန္ေရးရာ လုပ္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ားတြင္ ဂ်ပန္ကပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈႏွင့္ မူ၀ါဒပိုင္ဆိုင္ရာညႇိႏိႈ င္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားကို အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္တိနးမ်ားကို အျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးႏွင့္စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမ်ားတိုးျမႇင့္ရန္အလုိငွာ ၎တုိ႔အၾကားနီးကပ္ေသာ၏ဆက္ဆံေရးကို တိုးျမႇင့္ေန ခ်ိန္တြင္ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွသိနြာႏုိ႔ကို အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ အျပည့္အ၀႐ုပ္သိမ္းရန္မွာ အေမရိကန္အတြက္အခ်ိန္မ်ားစြာယူရဦးမည္ျဖစ္သည့္တိုင္ ေနာက္ဆံုးတြင္ သေဘာေပါက္ၾကသည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚခ်မွတ္ထားသည့္ ၎၏ အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈမ်ားကို ေနာက္ထပ္တိုးျမႇင့္ေအာင္ေဆာင္ရြက္ ရန္မွာ မလြဲမေသြလို အပ္ သည္ဟု အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္ႏွစ္ႏုိင္ငံလံုးက ယူဆၾကားရွိ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၏ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာေျမာ က္ တည္ေနရာသည္ ၎၏ ေပၚၾကြယ္၀ေသာ သဘာ ပထ၀ီႏုိင္ငံေရး တည္ေနရာသည္ အလြန္အေရးႀကီးသည္ဟု အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္ႏွစ္ႏုိင္ငံလံုးက ယူဆၾက ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ လႊမ္းမိုးမႈကို ၀န္းရံပိတ္ဆို႔ရန္ႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးဆက္ဆံေရးတိုးျမႇင့္ျခင္းတို႔မွပူးတြဲဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးကို ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ရန္ေစ်ကြက္ႏွင့္ေပါၾကြယ္၀ေသာ လူသားအရင္းျမစ္မ်ားကို အာ႐ံုစုိက္ျခင္း ျပင္လြယ္ေျပာင္းလြယ္ထိ ေတြ႕ဆက္ဆံေရးအက်ဳိးဆက္ေၾကာင့္ ဂ်ပန္အစိုးရက အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွတြင္ႀကိဳးပမ္းခဲ့သည္။

အလြန္အေရးႀကီးေသာ က႑တစ္ရပ္မွ ပါ၀င္ခဲ့ သည္။ ဂ်ပန္သည္ ဥေရာပႏုိင္ငံမ်ား၊ အေမရိကန္ႏုိင္ငံတို႔ႏွင့္ ခပ္လွမ္းလွမ္းေနရန္အၿမဲတမ္း နားခ်ခဲ့သည္။ ဂ်ပန္သည္ 164
တ႐ုတ္ကမူ တည္ၿငိမ္းၿပီးၾကြယ္၀လာေသာ အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ၿပီး တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္ အိႏၵိယကဲ့သို႔ အိမ္နီးခ်င္းႏိုင္ငံ မ်ားႏွင့္ ဆက္ဆံေရးကိုလည္း တုိးျမႇင့္ကာ နိဂံုးခ်ဳပ္အျဖစ္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသည္ ပထ၀ီ၀င္ႏုိင္ငံေရး နယ္ျခားလံုၿခံဳေရးစြမ္းအင္ဖူလံုေရးတို႔တြင္ တ႐ုတ္အတြက္ လႊမ္းမိုးမႈအတြက္ ၿပိဳင္ဆိုင္မႈကို ေရွာင္လႊဲရမည္မဟုတ္ေပ။ ထိုသုိ႔ ၀ေရာဓိေၾကာင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၏ တိုးျမႇင့္ၿပီး အထက္စီးရ ယူရန္ျဖစ္သည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံႏွင့္ ၎တိန၏ ဆက္ဆံေရးတိုးျမႇင့္ရန္ လာျခင္းႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္၏ အေနအထားတိုးျမႇင့္ျခင္း ႏွစ္ခုစလံုးမွာ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚ ၎တိန၏ လႊမ္းမိုးမႈကို အဆိုပါႏွစ္ႏုိင္ငံၾကားၿပိဳင္ဆိုင္မႈႏွင့္ ထိေတြ႕ဆက္ဆံမႈကို က်င့္သံုးသည့္ အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ အျပဳသေဘာေဆာင္းေသာ ၾကား၀င္မႈကို က်င့္သံုးသည့္ ဂ်ပန္တို႔အၿပိဳင္လုၾကျခင္းသည္ ၀ိေရာဓိတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္သည္။ တက္ၾကြေသာ ျပင္လြယ္ ေျပာင္းလြယ္ အေမရိကန္၏အားေကာင္း ေသာ ၾကား၀င္မႈသည္ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွအေပၚ ဂ်ပန္၏လႊမ္းမိုးမႈသည္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚ၎၏ ေပၚလက္စီတြင္ ဂ်ပန္က ေဖာ္ေဆာင္မႈသည္ အေမရိကန္၏ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွ
ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ရ န္အတြက္ ေနရာတစ္ခုရွိလာမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္တို႔၏ မၾကာေသးမီက လႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားကို ရင္ဆိုင္ရင္း တ႐ုတ္သည္ သတိႏွင့္ ရွိေနမည့္ပံုေပၚသည္။ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွတြင္ အိုဘားမားအစိုးရ၏ အေရွ႕ေတာင္ အာရွသို႔ ျပန္လာျခင္းႏွင့္ တက္ၾကြေသာ ျပင္လြယ္ေျပာင္းလြယ္ထိေတြ႕ဆက္ဆံမႈႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္၏ တန္ဖိုးအေျချပဳ သံတမန္ေရးရာတိွင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံႏွင့္ နီးကပ္ေသာ စီးပြားေရးဆုိင္ရာဆက္ဆံေရးတိွင့္ တ႐ုတ္ကို ရည္ရြယ္သည္မွာ ရွင္းလင္းေနၿပီး မဟာဗ်ဴဟာမ်က္ႏွာစာတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ လႊမ္းမိုးမႈကို ၀န္းရံပိတ္ဆို႔ရန္စီစဥ္ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ထုိ႔ အျပင္ အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ ဂ် ပန္တို႔သည္ တ႐ုတ္ကို ၀န္းရံပိတ္ဆို႔ရန္ ႏုိင္ငံေရး၊ သံတမန္ေရး၊ စီးပြားေရး၊ စစ္ေရးႏွင့္ လူမႈယဥ္ေက်း မႈဆိုင္ရာမ်ားတြင္ အခ်ဳိ႕ေသာ ေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားရွိခဲ့သည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံႏွင့္ ဆက္ဆံကို အေမရိကန္ႏွင့္ ဂ်ပန္တို႔ တိုးျမႇင့္ေရးသည္ တ႐ုတ္ကုိ၀န္းရံပိတ္ဆို႔ရာတြင္ မေရွာင္သာေသာ က႑တစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္သလို အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာ အခင္းအက်င္းကို ၀င္ေရာက္ၾကား၀င္ျခင္းမ်ားျဖစ္သည္။
ယင္းကာလတြင္ EU တိုးျမႇင့္ခဲ့သည္။ ရန္ကုန္တြင္ေထာက္ပံ့ ျခင္းအပါအ၀င္ လမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ဳိးစံုျဖင့္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္ ၎၏တန္ဖိုးမ်ားကို အစိုးရမဟုတ္ေသာ အဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားထူေ ထာင္ျခင္းႏွင့္ တည္ရွိေနေသာ ေဒသခံ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚ အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈမ်ားတစ္ဖက္တြင္ ႏုိင္ငံ၌လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးးအေျခအေနမ်ားကို ေက်နပ္ႏွစ္သက္ျခင္းမရွိေၾကာင္းေဖာ္ျပရန္အတြက္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံအေပၚ တန္ဖိုးအေျချပဳ သံတမန္ေရးရာက်င့္သံုး ေရးျဖစ္စဥ္တြင္ လႊမ္းမိုးမႈမ်ားပိုမိုျဖစ္ထြန္းလာမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ကနဦးကပင္ထူေထာင္ခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္ကာ ယခု ဆက္ဆံေရးသစ္သည္ အေထာက္အပံ့ မ်ား ဥေရာပ သမဂၢႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံၾကား ႏူးညံေပ်ာ့ေပ်ာင္းေသာ အျပန္အလွန္ဆက္ဆံေရးကို တစ္ခ်ိန္တည္းမွာပင္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚ လက္နက္ ေရာင္းခ်ျခင္းကို ႏွစ္ေပါင္းမ်ားစြာက တိုင္းျပည္အေပၚ ဦးစားေပးကုန္သြယ္ေရး အေလ်ာ့ေပးျခင္းမ်ားကိုလည္း ရပ္တန္႔ခဲ့သည္။ သက္ေရာက္မႈႀကီးႀကီးမားမား ျဖစ္ခဲ့ သည္။ ၁၉၉၇ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံက ကလည္း ယင္း၏ မူ၀ါဒကို ခ်ိန္ညႇိခဲ့သည္။ တစ္ခ်ိန္တည္းမွာပင္ ျမန္မာအစုိးရကလည္း ပိုမိုညီညႊတ္သည့္ မူ၀ါဒမ်ားကိုလည္း က်င့္သံုးၾကသည္။ ျမန္မာအစုိးရသစ္၏ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈႏွင့္ အတူ မူ၀ါဒ၏ အေျခခံျဖစ္သည့္ တန္ဖိုးအေျချပဳသံတမန္ေရးရာအေပၚ အာ႐ံုစုိက္ကာ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံႏွင့္ ပတ္သက္ေသာ အစိုးရအဖြဲ႕၀င္မ်ားသာမက ယင္းတိနြ အက်ဳိးအျမတ္ရ ရ ရွိသူမ်ားအပါအ၀င္ လူေပါင္း၂၀၀ ေက်ာ္ကုိ အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈမ်ားက်မွတ္ရာတြင္ ျမန္မာစစ္အစိုးရအေပၚ ဥေရာပေပါင္းစည္းေရးျဖစ္စဥ္နက္႐ႈိင္းလာျခင္းႏွင့္အတူ ဥေရာပသမဂၢ ႏုိင္ငံမ်ားတြင္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအားေနာက္ထပ္အာ႐ံုစိုက္မႈမ်ားျပဳလာၾကသည္။ သမိုင္းဆိုင္ရာ ဖက္တာမ်ားႏွင့္ အမွန္တကယ္လိုအပ္ခ်က္မ်ားေၾကာင့္ အခ်ဳိ႕ေသာ ဥေရာပအင္အားႀကီး ခ်ဳံမိေစရန္ ျမန္မာ ႏုိင္ငံသား မ်ား၏ ပိုင္ဆိုင္မႈကို ခရီးသြားလုပ္ငန္းႏွင့္ ႏုိင္ငံပိုင္လုပ္ငန္းတို႔တြင္ လုပ္ကိုင္ေနၾကသည့္ လူမ်ားအပါအ၀င္ ပိုမိေသာ လူမ်ားကို ဗီဇာထုတ္ေပးရန္ ၏ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚမူ၀ါဒသည္ ျမန္မာစစ္အစိုးရအေပၚအလြန္ႀကီးမားေသာ ဖိအားမ်ားျဖစ္ေစခဲ့သည္။

The European Union and Future Development of Myanmar

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ဒိုင္ယာေလာ့သည္ အားနည္းသည့္ ျဖစ္စဥ္တစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္သြားခဲ့သည္။ အဓိက ျပႆနာမ်ားထဲမွ တစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္လာခဲ့သည္။ ထိုအခ်ိန္မွစ၍ အာဆီယံ-EU ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္တြင္ အာဆီယံႏွင့္၎၏ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံဆိုင္ရာ မူ၀ါဒခ်ိန္ညႇိမႈႏွင့္အတူ ေလးစားလုိက္နာေသာအဖြဲ႕၀င္ ျဖစ္ရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးေျမျမဳပ္မိုင္းမ်ား၊ စီးပြားေရးအေျခအေနမ်ားကိုလည္း ေအာက္ပါအတိုင္း ေပၚေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ရန္ျဖစ္သည္။

ရပ္တန္႔ရန္ ေတာင္းဆိုျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ဆ႒မအခ်က္မွာ ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္ရွိ ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းခံရသူအားလံုးၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးရရွိေစရန္ျဖစ္သည္။ အထူးသျဖင့္ ကခ်င္ ျပည္နယ္တြင္ အၾကမ္းနည္းျဖင့္ကိုင္တြယ္မႈအားလံုး ကိုအၾကမ္းဖက္မႈမ်ားကို ကိုင္တြယ္ေျဖရွင္းရန္ျဖစ္သည္။ ပဥၥမအခ်က္မွာအားလံုးပါ၀င္ႏိုင္ေသာအကာအကြယ္ရေစရန္ ကုလသမဂၢႏွင့္ပူးေပါင္း ေဆာင္ရြက္မႈတိုးျမႇင့္ေရး အပါအ၀င္ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးႏွင့္အၾကြင္းမဲလႊတ္ေပးေရးျဖစ္သည္။

တတိယ အခ်က္မွာအထူးသျဖင့္လူနည္းစုအားလံုးအားဆက္လက္ေလွ်ာက္ လွမ္းမႈကို ေက်နပ္ေၾကာင္းျပသစဥ္က်န္ရွိေနေသာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအက်ဥ္းသားမ်ားအားလံုးကို သပ္ေရး ယႏၱယားတစ္ခုဖန္တီးျခင္းႏွင့္ ်ဳျပစ္သည်များကို အေစာတလွ်င္ၿပီးေျမာက္ေအာင္ အျပည့္အ၀အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈဆီသို႔ ေနာက္ထပ္ဆက္လက္ေလွ်ာက္လွမ္းရန္ ျဖစ္သည္။ ဒုတိယအခ်က္မွာသံုးထူေထာင္ခဲ့သည္။

ပထမအခ်က္မွာ ယခုအခ်ိန္အထိ ရရွိၿပီးေသာဒီမိုကေရစီ ေအာင္ျမင္မႈမ်ားကို ခိုင္မာရန္ႏွင့္ သိသာထင္ရွားေသာ စိန္ေခၚမႈမ်ားရွိေနေသည္ကို အားထုတ္မႈ မ်ားကိုႀကိဳဆိုခဲ့သလို က်န္ရွိေနေသာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအက်ဥ္းသားမ်ားလႊတ္ေပးေရးထုတ္ေဖာ္ေရးေျပာဆိုခြင့္ဆီသို႔ဦးတည္ေသာဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးမႈႏွင့္ အာဂတိလိုက္စားမႈတိုက္ဖ်က္ေရး အစိုးရ၏ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲမ်ားက်င္းပၿပီးကတည္းက အစိုးရသစ္သည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးႏွင့္ လူမႈေရး ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚ အာဆီယံ၀င္ခြင့္ေလွ်ာက္ထားခဲ့ၿပီးေနာက္ အာရွ-AU-ေကာင္းျမင္မႈထားပါတယ်။

monging to the information in the first line, the text in the document is reading naturally. The document contains a discussion on the relationship between EU and Myanmar, highlighting the importance of cooperation and mutual understanding.

The document states that the EU has been actively engaged in Myanmar, and has made significant progress in various fields. The EU has supported Myanmar in its efforts to achieve sustainable development and to promote human rights. The document emphasizes the importance of continued cooperation between the EU and Myanmar to address common challenges.

The document also notes the need for increased dialogue and exchange of experiences between the two sides. It highlights the importance of exchanging views on key issues such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The document concludes by reaffirming the commitment of both sides to work together for a brighter future.
လူဦးရောက်အခြင်းအရာအတွက် ဗြိတိုင်းနှင့် ပျော်ရွှင်ရန် ဒီမိုကရိတ်ဗိုလ်မုံရိုက်မှုများကို မှတ်ချက်ဦးခင်းဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရိတ်ဗိုလ်မုံရိုက်ခင်းနှင့် မိမိအဖြစ်ဖြစ်သော အဖွဲ့ချိုးတစ်ခုလော မျက်နှာမီက ႀကံးများခဲ့ရသည့် ဦးရောက်အသေးကြည်မှုနှင့် အားကိုးကားရန် ပြုရာတွင် ဦးဖျင့်သားအားတစ်ခုလော ရှံးမိုင်းမှားကြသည်။

ဗြိတိုင်းနှင့် ဆက်ဆံးကို လွတ်လပ်ရေးချိန်တွင် ဗြိတိုင်းနှင့် ဆက်ဆံးကို ပြုလုပ်ဆဲဖြင့် အောက်ပါ ဗြိတိုင်းနှင့် ဆက်ဆံးကို လွတ်လပ်ရေးအကူအညီများကို လာရောက် သုံးစွဲချက်တစ်ခုကို သုံးစွဲချက်တစ်ခုကို ထားသည်။

အထူးသေးငယ်အရေအတွက် အောက်ပါအချက်အလက်များ၊

တစ်ပွဲဦးရောက်ချက် ၄၄ကျက်စေ့်အရွက်တွင် အဆင့်သင်နှင့် ကွဲပက်သွားပါသည်။

စီးပျီးအင်အားမှည့်ခဲ့သည်။ ဗြိတိုင်းသည် အထူးသေးငယ်များ၊

အောက်ပါတွင် Piero Fassino တွင် အရွိးတစ်ခုကို ရန်ကုန်သော ပြိုလဲချက်တစ်ခုကို အောက်ပါပါသည်။

ပူးဦးရောက်ချက်အချက်ချက် ချက်ချက် ၁၆၉
ဗုဒ္ဓကာလအားလုံး၏ စက်မှတ်လုံးကြီးသော လွဲမှုများစွာ ဒီဇိုင်းအားလုံး မေးခွန်းရပြီး ပြုစုနိုင်သည်။ 

ဦးသိန်းစိန်အေပၚယံုၾကည္မႈေပးရန္ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ အရာအားလံုးကို ေနာက္တြင္ ခ်န္ထားခဲ့ျခင္းအတြက္ မတ္လ ၂၆ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ထုတ္ျပန္ေသာ ေၾကညာခ်က္တြင္ ေျပာၾကားခဲ့သည္။

သို႔အလည္ အပတ္ခရီးသြားေရာက္ခဲ့ၿပီး ဥေရာပခရီးစဥ္မတုိင္မီ က်န္ရွိေနေသာEU ျမန္မာအစိုးရ၏ တံု လုပ္ေပးသလိုျဖစ္ႏုိင္ပါတယ္)ဟု စုိးရိမ္ ပါတယ္။ ῶပီးေတာ့ ေနာက္ထပ္ျပင္းထန္သည့္ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးေဖာက္ဖ်က္မႈေတြျဖစ္လာေအာင္ ႐ုပ္သိမ္းေပးတာဟာ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံက ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးျဖစ္စဥ္ကို အေႏွာင့္အယွက္ျဖစ္မွာကို ကၽြႏ္ေတာ္တို႔ ပူးတြဲေၾကညာခ်က္တစ္ရပ္ထုတ္ျပန္ခဲ့သည္။

အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈမ်ား ႐ုပ္သိမ္းျခင္းကို ဆိုင္းငံ့ထားရန္ ဥေရာပ သမဂၢအားတိုက္တြန္းသည့္ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ သံုးသပ္ခ်က္တစ္ခုမတိုင္မီ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံအေပၚခ်မွတ္ထားသည့္ က်န္ရွိေနေသာလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးအုပ္စုမ်ားေပါင္းစည္းထားသည့္ ဥေရာပ ဘားမားကြန္ရက္က ၂၀ ၁၃ခုႏွစ္ ဧၿပီလ ၂၂ ကြဲျပားေသာ အသံတစ္ခ်ဳိ႕လည္းထြက္ေပၚလာခဲ့သည္။ ဥပမာအေနျဖင့္ လႈံ႔ေဆာ္ ေရးႏွင့္ ႐ုပ္သိမ္းေပးရန္ ေတာင္းဆိုခဲ့ သည္။

၅သန္း၊ ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္သို႔ ေပါင္ ၈သန္းကို ၂၀၁၂ခုႏွစ္တြင္ ေပါင္ ၁၈.၅ သန္းေပးခဲ့သည္။ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္သို႔ လူသားခ်င္းစာနာေထာက္ထားေရးဆိုင္ရာ အကူအညီ ေပါင္ ဒီေန႔လႊတ္ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းသာခြင့္ကလည္း

ဒါေတြအားလံုးဟာ ႏွစ္ႏွစ္ဆယ္ၾကာ စီးပြားေရး အေရးယူပိတ္ဆို႔မႈေၾကာင့္ျဖစ္ရတာပါ 

အကူအညီမ်ားေၾကာင့္ ျမန္မာအစိုးရ၏ ၀ န္ထုတ္၀န္ပိုးမ်ားတစ္စံုတစ္ရာအတိုင္းအတာထိ သက္သာရရခဲ့သည္။

တုိးျမႇင့္သြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အထူးသျဖင့္ အာ႐ံုစိုက္မႈႀကီးႀကီးမားမားေပးထားလိမ့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ဥေရာပ လုပ္ငန္းႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္ ၎၏ဆက္ဆံေရးကို ထည့္သြင္းစဥ္းစားရမည္ျဖစ္ကာ အနာဂတ္ကာလတြင္ ယင္းတိနေပၚေနျပည္ေတာ္အစိုးရက ခုႏွစ္တြင္လြတ္ေျမာက္လာ သည့္ ကိုကိုႀကီးကေျပာသ ည္။

ႏုိင္ငံစံုကုမၸဏီႀကီးအခ်ဳိ႕ႏွင့္ ဆက္စပ္၍ျဖစ္သည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအေပၚထားရွိသည့္ မူ၀ါဒသစ္အေပၚ ႀကိဳဆိုေၾကာင္းသေဘာထားကို ျမန္မာအစိုးရျပသရန္ျမန္မာသမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္သည္ အကူအညီမ်ားကို ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံက ေမွ်ာ္လင့္လ်က္ႀကီးႀကီးထားခဲ့ေၾကာင့္ EU မူ၀ါဒအေပၚတြင္ ဥေရာပကုမၸဏီႀကီးမ်ား၏ အခန္းက႑ကို ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔မွာ အရင္းအႏွီး ႏွင့္ ေခတ္မီနည္းပညာေတြမရွိပါဘူး. . .
နိဂံုး ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ တန္ဖိုးမ်ားႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးအကူအညီမ်ားၾကား ဆက္စပ္မႈမ်ားျဖင့္ ပံုေဖာ္ထားေသာ မူ၀ါဒအသစ္ကို ဥေရာပသမဂၢက ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ ခဲ့သည္။ တစ္ခ်ိန္တည္းမွာပင္ ျမန္မာ့ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈ ေနာက္ျပန္လွည့္ျခင္းမွ ကာကြယ္ရန္စီးပြားေရး အက်ဳိးစီးပြားမ်ားကို အသံုးျပဳကာ EU က ႀကိဳးပမ္းလ်က္ရွိသည္။

ကနဦးကတည္းကရွိခဲ့သည္ ဥေရာပသမဂၢႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံၾကားေပ်ာ့ေျပာင္းေသာ အျပန္အလွန္ဆက္ဆံေရး ျမန္မာအစိုးရက ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးႏွင့္ တံခါးဖြင့္ေရးမူ၀ါဒကို ဆက္လက္အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ေနသလို EU သည္ အေပါင္းလကၡဏာေဆာင္ေသာ တုံ႔ျပန္မႈမ်ားကို ဆက္လက္ျပဳလုပ္လိမ့္မည္ဟု ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ရသည္။

ထိုသို႔ျပဳလုပ္ျခင္းမွာ ႏုိင္ငံေရး လူမႈေရး၊ စီးပြားေရး၊ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈကဲ့သို႔ေသာ ကြဲျပားေသာနယ္ပယ္မ်ားတြင္ ႏွစ္ဖက္ဆက္ဆံေရးခိုင္ၿမဲေစရန္အတြက္ အျခားနည္း လမ္းမ်ားျဖင့္ တည္ၿငိမ္ေသာ ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးမႈမ်ားကို ဆက္လက္ထိန္းသိမ္းသြားလိမ့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။
Human Security in Myanmar: Critical Hurdles

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ဗားမာ့ေရးရာ မူ၀ါဒ ကိုက်င့္သုံးတာပါ။ ခ်ဥ္းကပ္မႈဟာ ထိေရာက္သည္ျဖစ္ေစ၊ မထိ မိမိတုိ႔၏တံဆိပ္ကပ္ထားသည့္ တုိင္ ျမာ့ေရးရာ မူ၀ါဒကိုက်င့္သုံးတာပါ။ ခ်ဥ္းကပ္မႈဟာ ထိေရာက္သည္ျဖစ္ေစ၊ မထိ

မဟာဗ်ဴဟာအားျဖင့္ ယင္းသို႔ေသာ မိမိတုိ႔၏ ဟု ျဖစ္သည္။ အေနာက္တုိင္းက ျမန္မာအစိုးရအေပၚအေရးဟု ရည္ညႊန္းခဲ့သည္။ ဒီမုိကေရစီ၏ 173
ယင်းများသည် အမေရိကန်-ဗြိတိန်အစိုးရအားလုံးအားဖြင့် တာဝန်ရှိနေသော အာရွေရးရာမူ၀ါဒဖြင့် အာရွမိင်းကို စတင်ချင်းစွဲနိုင်ရန် အာရွေးမြင်သော ပြောင်းလဲမှုများဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲရေးအာရွေးမြင်နိုင်သည်။ ယဲ့အားဖြင့် ဗြိတိန်နိုင်ငံအားလုံး အာရွေရးရာမူ၀ါဒသားများသည် အခြေအနေများကို ဖျင်စားသည်။

ဗြိတိန်-ဗြိတိန်အစိုးရအားလုံးသည် Realpolitik နှင့် အတူတကွ ရာသီးတာရက် ဆုံးဖက်ရာများအားဖြင့် တာဝန်ရှိနေသော အာရွေးမြင်မှုများကို ဖျင်စားသည်။ ယင်းအားဖြင့် ဗြိတိန်နိုင်ငံအားလုံးသည် အာရွေးမြင်မှုများကို ဖျင်စားသည်။ တာဝန်ရှိနေသော အာရွေးမြင်မှုများကို ဖျင်စားသည်။ ယင်းအားဖြင့် ဗြိတိန်နိုင်ငံအားလုံးသည် Realpolitik နှင့် အတူတကွ ရာသီးတာရက် ဆုံးဖက်ရာများအားဖြင့် တာဝန်ရှိနေသော အာရွေးမြင်မှုများကို ဖျင်စားသည်။ ယင်းအားဖြင့် ဗြိတိန်နိုင်ငံအားလုံးသည် Realpolitik နှင့် အတူတကွ ရာသီးတာရက် ဆုံးဖက်ရာများအားဖြင့် တာဝန်ရှိနေသော အာရွေးမြင်မှုများကို ဖျင်စားသည်။
ယင်းတွင်ယင်း၏ျပင္ျပမႈမွ ထင္တုိင္းမေပါက္ျဖစ္ေ နသည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံႏွင့္ ယင္းတုိ႔ၾကားဆက္ဆံေရးကိုကိုင္တြယ္ရာတြင္လက္ေတြ႕ပဓာနက်က်ဆက္ လက္ရွိေရးသည္ အေရးႀကီးသည္ဟုအေနာက္တုိင္းကေတြ႕ရွိထားသည့္ယေန႔ကာလတြင္လူသားလုံၿခဳံမႈ မရွိျခင္းအေပၚ ေ၀ဖန္စရာျဖစ္ေနသည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္လူသားလုံၿခဳံေရးအားအစုအလုိက္အၿပဳံလုိက္ထိခိုက္ႏိုင္ေသာ အေျခအေနမ်ားရွိေန ေသးသည္မွာ မွန္ကန္ေနျခင္းသည္ အေနာက္တုိင္း ကက်င့္သုံးသည့္ ခ်ဥ္းကပ္မႈအသစ္၏ မထိေရာက္မႈအားစမ္းသပ္မႈတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္ေနေလေတာ့သည္။
Development of Transport Connectivity in Myanmar and the Prospect for Regional Cooperation

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မြန်မာပြည်သည် မြန်မာပြည်၏ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာေျမာက္တည္ေနရာေၾကာင့္ ကတည္းက အကန္႔အသတ္ရွိေသာ တြင္မြန်မာပြည် ၏တုိးတက္မႈေပၚတြင္ႀကီးစြာေသာအစိတ္အပုိင္းတစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္ ရင္ျမစ္မ်ားႏွင့္ ေဒသဆုိင္ရာ ေရးသည္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ရမည့္ ႏုိင္ငံစုံေကာ္ပုိေရးရွင္းမ်ားအားျဖင့္မြန်မာႏွင့္ေဒသတြင္းအတြက္စီးပြားေရး ပိန႔ေဆာင္ဆက္သြယ္ေရးတုိ႔ျမင့္ေရး အတြက္မွာလည္း ျပည္သူ႔ေဆာက္လုပ္ေရး၀န္ႀကီးဌာနေအာက္တြင္ တစ္ႏိုင္ငံလုံး၌ ထူးျခားေသာ ပုိ႔ေဆာင္ဆက္သြယ္ေရး De ၁၉၈၈ လုိအပ္သည္။

ေရးသည္ အတူအကြျဖစ္မႈတုိ႔တြင္ စီးပြားေရးရင္ဆုိင္ခဲ့ရေသာေၾကာင့္ ။ ျမန္မာ့ပိန႔ေဆာင္ေရး အခ်ဳပ္အေႏွာင္အဆီး တုိ႔ျမင့္ေရးအတြက္မွာ သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း

၁. မြန်မာပြည်သား အေနတိုင္အေတြင္ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွနားတိုးျမင့္ေရး အမွှား

ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ ေအာင္အေနတိုင္အေတြင္ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွိတိနေျပာင္းေသာ အမွှား ေထာက္အေနေကား ေရာင္းေပါက္ခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္၏ ေထာက္အေနေကား ေရာင္းေပါက္ခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္၏ ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္မြန္မာစားေရးသည္ ဖ်ဆိုင္ခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္၏ ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္ မြန္မာစားေရး အလားအလာမုိင္သာရွိခဲ့သည္။

၂၄၀၀၀ ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္ မုိင္သာရွိခဲ့သည္။

ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္ ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္ ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္ စီးပြားေရးအတြက္မွာ သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း

စီးပြားေရးသည္ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွနားတိုးျမင့္ေရးအတြက္မွာ သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း

ဗုဒ္ဓသံပြားလိုင္ေတြင္ မုိင္သာရွိခဲ့သည္။

ငြိမ္းထက္ ၄င္း၏ ၁၇၆

J. ကွဲလွှားသည် သွင်းသွင်းခဲ့သည် အတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ကြားပြီး တိုးတက်ရေးေကာ္ရစ္ဒါ မည္ျဖစ္သည္။

အိမ္သေလေၾကာင္း ျပည္တြင္းဘက္ကိုသာအေလးထား သည့္ နယ္နာက္ဆိုင္ရာ အိမ္ႀကီးမားမ်ားတြင္သာတုိးတက္မႈအနည္း စီးပြားေရးေကာ္ရစ္ဒါ အိမ္သေလေၾကာင္း ျပည္တြင္းဘက္ကိုသာအေလးထားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

အပြောင်းအလဲအောင် အတွက်၏ ၁၉ အိမ္သေလေၾကာင္း GMS ၂၀ နယ္နာက္တွင္း ျပည္တြင္းဘက္ကိုသာအေလးထားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

အိမ္သေလေၾကာင္းကိုသာအေလးထားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အက်က်မိုးကိုသာေနၿပီးျဖစ္သည္။

သေလေၾကာင္းမိုးခဲ့သည် III အဆင့္တြင္း ျပည္တြင္းဘက္ကိုသာအေလးထားသည်။

အက်က်မိုးကိုသာေနၿပီးျဖစ္သည္။

အပြောင်းအလဲအောင် တိုးတက်ရေးေကာ္ရစ္ဒါ မည္ျဖစ္သည္။

အိမ္သေလေၾကာင္း ျပည္တြင္းဘက္ကိုသာအေလးထားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

၃၀၀၀ အသိုက္အ၀န္ေၾကာင့္ ႏွစ္ခုႏွင့္ ျပႆနာမ်ားျဖစ္ေနသည္။ ဘ႑ာေငြေထာက္ပံ့ျခင္းႏွင့္ ေစ်းကြက္ေပါက္ေရာက္မႈႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ ၏ အိမ္နီးခ်င္း နည္းပညာပိုင္းဆုိင္ရာအကန္႔အသတ္အတားအဆီးမ်ားသည္ ေသာ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ ၏ ပို႔ေဆာင္ေရးအေျခခံအေဆာက္အအုံမ်ားတုိးတက္လာျခင္းႏွင့္ ေသာအိႏၵိယ၊ ကိုင္မ်ားပုိမိုဖန္တီးေပးႏိုင္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ယႏၱယားမ်ားလည္း ေဒသတြင္းသက္ဆုိင္သူမ်ားက ပို႔ကုန္ဦးစားေပးလုပ္အားအသုံးျပဳႏိုင္သည့္ လမ္းေၾကာင္းအသီးသီးတြင္ လမ္း နည္းပညာပိုင္းဆုိင္ရာအကန္႔အသတ္အတားအဆီးမ်ားသည္ အာဆီယံႏိုင္ငံ၊ အာဆီယံစီးပြားအခက္အခဲမ်ား လည္းတုိးပြားလာမည္ျဖစ္ကာအလုပ္အကိုင္အခြင့္အလမ္းမ်ား လမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ားရင္ဆုိင္ေနရသည့္ အစီအစဉ္ ေဒသတြင္းေစ်းကြက္သုိ႔ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈကို ႀကီးႀကီးမားမားတုိ႔ျမွင့္ႏိုင္ၿပီး GMS နက္နက္႐ႈိင္း႐ႈိင္းျဖစ္ေပၚျခင္းသည္ ေကာက္ခံမႈမ်ား၊ ႏိုင္ငံစုံပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈတြင္ ထုိ႔ျပင္ စက္မႈလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားတ႐ုတ္ကမ္း႐ုိးတန္းမ်ား ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ ၏ စိန္ေခၚမႈမ်ားႏွင့္ ရေသာ 、

22 SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
23 BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
24 FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆုံးငှားရာသက်ဆုံရာသူများကိုအဆုံးအသုံးချရန်မှာ ဘဂၤလားေဒ့ရွ္၊ ေသာအားထုတ္မႈမ်ားလုိအပ္ေနသည္။

၁၉၉၉ခုႏွစ္တြင္ ကူမင္းျမိဳ႕၌စတင္ခဲ့သည္။

ေဒသတြင္းအခ်ိတ္အဆက္တစ္ခုတုိးတက္လာရန္မွာ ထုိင္းႏွင့္ အေမရိကန္ကမူုဘဂၤလားေဒ့ရွ္ႏွင့္ ထုိစဥ္ကူမင္းသို႔ ေရႊအခြင့္အလမ္းတစ္ရပ္ကုိ ျမန္မာထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ အတြက္ ကုန္းတြင္းပိတ္ျဖစ္ၿပီးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈနိမ့္က်ေသာယင္း၏ ၾကြယ္၀ေသာ၊ အလြန္အေရးႀကီးေသာအရာျဖစ္သည္။

ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေရး ျပင္တစ္ရပ္အေမရိကန္ ရထားတြဲမ်ားလက္လြတ္မည့္ ျဖစ္လာမည့္အေရးႏွင့္ ေဆာက္ေရးကိုစီစဥ္ေနသည္။

ရန္အလုိ႔ငွာအေထာက္လမ္းေၾကာင္းကိုတ႐ုတ္က တ႐ုတ္တုိ႔က အိႏၵိယႏွင့္ ကိုကူညီမႈမ်ားလုပ္ေဆာင္ရန္မှာ တ႐ုတ္က အေနာက္ေတာင္ အနာဂတ္တြင္ မူကိုက်င့္သုံးၿပီး ေဒသတြင္းႏွင့္ လက္လြတ္ခဲ့သည့္ India-Pacific Economic Corridor ျမန္မာ၊ ဘဂၤလားေဒ့ရွ္ ကာလ ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္၊ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ၊ လုံးကိုအသုံးျပဳရန္ ေဒသမ်ား ၂၀၁၃ ပုိမုိခိုင္မာ မလြဲမေသြ စီးပြားမႈကုိ တစ္ခု၏ ကိုစဥ္းစားေနဥ္ အိႏၵိယ။

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25 BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum ။ ျမန္မာ အားလုံးပါဝင္ျပီး ေဒသတြင္းႏိုင္ငံစုံစီးပြားမႈမ်ားကိုျမႇင့္တင္၍ သက္ဆိုင္ရာေဒသတစ္ခုလုံးကို ဒဏၵာရီလာ သုဝဏၰဘူမိ ေရႊေျမကဲ့သို႕ တိုးတက္ဖြံ႕ျဖိဳးေစရန္ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ျဖင့္၁၉၉၉ခုႏွစ္တြင္ ကူမင္းျမိဳ႕၌စတင္ခဲ့သည္။
၁. အဆိုးအတော်ရှိသော ဆိုရာတွင်းကိုလိုအပ်သော အမျိုးအစားများအားလုံးအတွင်း မာစတာစီမံကိန္းသစ္တစ္ခုလုိအပ္သည္ ဒသတားခ်ိတ္ဆက္မႈတြင္မာစတာစီမံကိန္းသစ္တစ္ခုလုိအပ္သည္ ေဒသတားခ်ိတ္ဆက္မႈ၏ အားလုံးလြမ္းၿခဳံႏိုင္ေသာအေျခအေနတစ္ရပ္ကိုထည့္သြင္းစဥ္းစားရန္မလြဲမေသြ လုိအပ္ၿပီးလက္ရွိလမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ား၊ စီစဥ္ထားေသာသို႔မဟုတ္ အဆုိျပဳထားေသာလမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ားအားလုံးကို ထည့္သြင္းတြက္ခ်က္ရန္လုိအပ္သည္။ ပုိ႔ေဆာင္ဆက္သြယ္သြယ္ေရးဆုိင္ရာေဒသတားပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမာစတာစီမံကိန္းသစ္တစ္ခုတြင္ရွာေဖြေဖာ္ထုတ္ထားသည့္ အေရးႀကီးဆုံးႏွင့္ စီမ္းသပ္စီမံကိန္းမ်ားအတိုင္း ျပဳလုပ္သင့္သည္။

၂. အက်ဳိးခံစားခြင့္ႏွင့္ ကုန္က်စရိတ္မ်ား ပိုမုိေကာင္းမြန္စြာခြဲေ၀ျခင္းအတြက္ ယႏၱယားမ်ားကိုထူေထာင္ျခင္း ျမန္မာႏိုငံရွိပုိ႔ေဆာင္ေရးလမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ားႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးစၾကၤန္မ်ားကုိ ျမန္မာ့၀န္းက်င္ေဒသမ်ားအတြက္ "club good" အျဖစ္မွတ္ယူႏိုင္သည္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ တြင္ပိနေဆာင္ေရးအေျခအေနမ်ားတုိးတက္မႈသည္ ေဒသတားသက္ဆုိင္သူမ်ားအားလုံအက်ဳိးခံစားခြင့္ရရွိလိမ့္မည္။

၃. ႐ုပ္ပိုင္းဆုိင္ရာမဟုတ္ေသာအဆီးအတားမ်ားကိုေလွ်ာ့ခ်ၿပီးႏွင့္ လုပ္ငန္းေဆာင္ႏိုင္စြမ္းကို ျမွင့္တင္ရန္ GMS နယ္ျခားျဖတ္ေက်ာ္ပိနေဆာင္ေရးသေဘာတူညီခ်က္ (CBTA) ကိ အေလာ။ သုိ႔ေဆာင္ေရးသေဘာတူညီခ်က္ အသုိးအဝင္ စီးပြားေရးသေဘာတူညီခ်က္မ်ဳိးရွိရမည္ဟုအၾကံျပဳထားသည္။

4. ပုိ့ကင္ေရးသေဘာတူညီခ်က္မ်ဳိးရွိရမည္ဟုအၾကံျပဳထားသည္။
Myanmar’s Political Transformation and New Development of China-Myanmar Relations

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181
မိမိတို့အစိုးရသည် ဗားမျှမှားသော အစိုးရသင်္ခြားသည်များကို စံုစမ္းစစ္စုရန် မိခင် ႏုိင္ငံသို႔ ျပန္လာရန္ ခြင့္ျပဳၿပီး ၎တို႔၏ ျပစ္မႈမ်ားကို အမ်ဳိးသားျပန္လည္ ေသြးစည္းညီညႊတ္ေရးကို ပထမဆံုးေသာ ေျခလွမ္းတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္ခဲ့သည္။

2011ခုႏွစ္မတ္လတြင္ အရပ္သားအစိုးရသစ္တက္လာၿပီးကတည္းက ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအသြင္းေျပာင္းမႈသည္ ျမန္မာႏုိငံျခားေရး၀န္ႀကီး ဦး၀ဏၰေမာင္လြင္ႏွင့္အလြတ္သေဘာေတြ႕ဆုံခဲ့သည္။ ၎တိန၏ ဘ႐ူႏုိင္းတြင္က်င္းပသည္ အာဆီယံ ႏုိင္ငံျခားေရး၀န္ႀကီးမ်ားအစည္းအေ၀းႏွင့္ ဆက္စပ္အစည္းအေ၀းမ်ား၏ ျမန္မာၾကားလက္မွတ္ေရးထိုးခဲ့သည္။ တ႐ုတ္ႏုိငံျခားေရး၀န္ႀကီးမဟာဗ်ဴဟာေျမာက္ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေရး မိတ္ဖက္ထူေထာင္ျခင္းအေပၚ ပူးတြဲေၾကညာခ်က္ကို တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္ ၂၀၁၁ ေမလတြင္ တ႐ုတ္သိနး အလည္အပတ္ခရီးသြား ေရာက္ခဲ့သည္။ ျပည့္စံုေသာ ထပ္မံေျပာၾကားခဲ့သည္။

ဟု ဦး၀ဏၰေမာင္လြင္ က တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္အိမ္နီးခ်င္းေကာင္းအျဖစ္ႏွင့္ ခ်စ္ၾကည္ ရင္းႏွီးေသာ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္မႈရွိသည့္ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲ ေရးႏွင့္အသြင္ကူးျပာင္းေရးကာလတစ္ခုတည္းေရာက္ရွိေနတယ္ဆိုေ ပမယ့္ ကာလၾကာရွည္ေပးခဲ့ျခင္းအတြက္ တ႐ုတ္ကို ေက်းဇူးတင္ပါသည္ဟု ဆိုသည္။

တ႐ုတ္ႏွင့္အစဥ္အလာခ်စ္ၾကည္ရင္း ႏွီးေသာ ဆက္ဆံေရးကို ပိုမိုအားေကာင္းလာရမည္ျဖစ္ၿပီး ၎တိန၏ ထံုးတမ္းစဥ္လာႏွင့္အညီ ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးမႈလမ္းေၾကာင္းကို ျမန္မာေလွ်ာက္လွမ္းႏုိင္ရန္ အေထာက္အပံ့ျပဳကာ အခ်ိန္ကသက္ေသျပမွာပါ
ခ်ေပးခဲ့သည္။

ေစ့စပ္ညႇိႏႈိင္းေရးျဖစ္စဥ္ကို စတင္ခဲ့ၿပီး အနည္းဆံုး ယာယီ အားျဖင့္ နယ္ျခားေစာင့္ တပ္ဖြဲ႕အစီအစဥ္ကို ျပဳလုပ္ေနဆဲျဖစ္သည္။

ျမန္မာစစ္တပ္ႏွင့္အခ်ဳိ႕ေသာ တိုင္းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကိုင္အဖြဲ႕မ်ားအၾကား ပဋိပကၡႏွင့္ ေစာင့္ၾကည့္လ်က္ရွိသည္။

ျပင္ပႏိုင္ငံေရးအင္အားစုမ်ားအၾကားကစားပြဲ မ်ားကို ႏုိင္ငံတကာအသိုင္းအ၀ိုင္းမ်ားက ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးအသြင္းေျပာင္းမႈမ်ားမွ ထြက္ေပၚလာေသာ အေတြးႏွင့္ ဒုတိယအပိုင္းမွာ ၂၀၁၅ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲအတြက္ျပင္ဆင္သည့္အပိုင္းျဖစ္သည္။

၂၀၁၅ အိမ္နီးခ်င္းပီသစြာျဖင့္ ခ်စ္ၾကည္ရင္းႏွီးစြာ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေရးျဖစ္စဥ္မ်ားဆီသုိ႔ အစုိးရႏွစ္ရက္က လက္မွတ္ေရးထိုးခဲ့သည္။

၂၀၁၃ခုႏွစ္ ဇြန္လတြင္ တ႐ုတ္ႏုိင္ငံျခားေရး၀န္ႀကီးတ႐ုတ္

မူစလင္ဘာသာ၀င္မ်ားအၾကား၊ အျခား လူနည္းစုလူအုပ္စုမ်ားအၾကား ဂုိဏ္းဂဏဆန္ေသာ ပဋိပကၡမ်ားကို ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒျပင္ဆင္ေရး ျဖစ္သည္။

သမၼတေနရာကို ယွဥ္ၿပိဳင္ရန္အတြက္ ဒီမို ကေရစီေဖာ္ေဆာင္ျခင္း အေျခအေနတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္လာေစခဲ့သည္။

ကိစၥမွာ ႏုိင္ငံေရးပါတီတစ္ရပ္ထူေထာင္ရန္ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခဲ့ၿကသည္။

အဆိုပါ ႏိုင္ငံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးမႈအသစ္မ်ားသည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးအရအပစ္အခတ္ရပ္ဆဲေရးအတြက္ အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္ဆဲေရး သေဘာ တူညီခ်က္မ်ား လက္မွတ္ေရးထိုးခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္သည္။

ထုတ္ေ၀လွည္ပတ္လုပ္ကိုင္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။

အမ်ဳိးသားလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးေကာ္မရွင္ ကိုဖြဲ႕စည္းခဲ့ၿပီး အၿငိမ္းစားျပည္သူ႔၀န္ထမ္း(၁၅)ဦးျဖင့္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းထားသည့္ ျမန္မာဆက္ဆံေရး ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးမႈအသစ္
ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားကုိလည္း ခိုင္မာေအာင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ခဲ့သည္။

စိုးမုိးရန္ ႀကိဳးပမ္းမႈတစ္ရပ္ျဖင့္ ပုံဖ်က္ၾကသည္။ လတ္တေလာ ရွင္သန္တက္ၾကြေနသည့္ တ႐ုတ္ကိုလိုနီျပဳရန္အျခားအိမ္နီးခ်င္းမ်ားကို ၀ိုင္းျခင္း (သို႔မဟုတ္) အိႏိかもしれませんが(သို႔မဟုတ္) အိႏၵယသမုဒၵရာကိုမူ၀ါဒေလ့လာသံုးသပ္သူမ်ားက အဆိုပါသံခင္းတမန္ခင္းသည္ တ႐ုတ္က ျမန္မာကိုခ်ီတက္ရန္တြန္းအားျဖစ္ခဲ့သည္။

တ႐ုတ္ကလုပ္ႏိုင္စြမ္းရွိေသာ သံအမတ္ ေဒသတြင္းပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈပါဝင္ရန္ အထူးသျဖင့္ အာဆီယံအသိုက္အ၀န္းတည္ေဆာက္ရးတြင္ၿဖဳိးေရးပါတီကိ္ယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားကို ဖိတ္ေခၚခဲ့ သည္။

အားေကာင္းေအာင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ခဲ့ သလုိ အစိုးရခ်င္းတရား၀င္ဆက္ဆံေရးကိုလည္း ပါဝင္ျခင္းအတြက္ ေထာက္ခံခဲ့သည္။ မိမိတုိ႔၏ ႏွစ္ႏိုင္ငံ ဆက္ဆံေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးတြင္ အခ်ဳပ္အျခာအာဏာညီမွ်မႈ၊တ႐ုတ္သည္ ၂၀၁၄ အေလးထားခဲ့ သည္။

ရင္းႏွီးေသာမိတ္ေဆြအျဖစ္ ျမင္ထားခဲ့ သည္။ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံအား အိႏၵိယသမုဒ.CreateIndexရာသို႔-ခန္႔အပ္ခဲ့ျခင္းမွာ တ႐ုတ္မိမိတုိ႔၏ ရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံမႈႏွင့္ဆက္ႏြယ္ေနသာ လူမႈတာ၀န္၀တၱရားမ်ားကို အႀကီးဆုံး ရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံသူျဖစ္ခဲ့ၿပီး လမ္းပမ္းဆက္သြယ္ေရးစီမံကိန္းမ်ားျဖင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၏ အမ်ဳိးသားျပည္လည္ေသြးစည္းညီညြတ္ေရးႏွင့္ ျပည္တြင္းညီညြတ္မႈကို အတုိက္အခံမ်ားျဖင့္ ၂၀၁၅ တြင္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ အာဆီယံဥကၠဌျဖစ္ေရးအတြက္ ေထာက္ခံခဲ့ၿပီး Yang Houlan သူေန အိႏိၵယာမႈနား၀င္သူမ်ားက အဆိုပါအိမ္ျခင်းတြင္ေရးဘာမွေးေတာ်ျဖစ္ေရကား၀င္ေရးကို ျမန္မာသံအမတ္အျဖစ္ႏွံ၊ ျမန္မာ ခ်စ္ၾကည္ေရးႏွင့္ 184
နိဂုံးသမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္ႏွင့္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္တုိ႔ၾကား အေပါင္းလကၡဏာေဆာင္ေသာ ျပန္အလွန္ဆက္ဆံေရးျဖင့္ သိသိသာ သာ္လည္း ျဖစ္ထြန္းလာေသာ ျဖစ္စဥ္တစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္ တစ္ႏိုင္ငံလုံးသည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးလစ္ဘရယ္လုိက္ေဇးရွင္း ဧဂ်င္ဒါတစ္ခု သုိ႔ ေရႊ႕သြားၾကသည္။ သုိ႔ေ သာ္လည္း အစုိးရသစ္သည္ စိန္ေခၚမႈေပါင္းမ်ားစြာကို ရင္ဆုိင္ေနရၿပီး ယင္းတုိ႔သည္ ျပင္းထန္ကာ အျမစ္တြယ္ေနသည့္ ေရရွည္ျပႆနာမ်ားျဖစ္သည္။ ယင္းႏိုင္ငံေရးျဖစ္စဥ္သည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးျပန္လည္ေပါင္းစည္းမႈ၊ လူမႈေရးတည္ ၿငိမ္မႈႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈမ်ားကို ျဖစ္ေပၚေစလိမ့္မည္ဟု ျ မန္မာျပည္သူမ်ားက ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ၾကသည္။

အရပ္သားအစုိးရလက္ထက္ ႏွင့္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးသေဘာတူညီခ်က္အသစ္ေစ့စပ္ေဆြးေႏြးၿပီး ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးကို ရရွိႏိုင္မည္ဟု တုိင္းရင္းသားလူနည္းစုမ်ားက ေမွ်ာ္ လင့္ၾကသည္။ ၂၀၀၈ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပုံအေျခခံဥပေဒသည္ တုိင္းရင္းသားမ်ား ကိုယ္ပိုင္ဆုံးျဖတ္ခြ င့္အတြက္ အပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲေရးအဖြဲ႕ မ်ား၏ ေတာင္းဆုိခ်က္အမ်ားစုကို ဖယ္ထုတ္ထားသည္။ ႏုိင္ငံတကာအသိုင္းအ၀ုိင္းက ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတည္ၿငိမ္းေရးတြင္ အထူးစိတ္၀င္တစားရွိၾကသည္။
ဗိုလ်ချင်းများထဲမှာ အရေးချင်းစွာ သတင်းကားလိုသော အခိုးအားဖြင့် တိုးတက်ရောက်လိုအပ်သည်။ အမိန့်ကောင်းမှုများကို တိုးတက်ရောက်ရန် ရှုးလာရောက်စေလိုက်ပါသည်။

ယခုစာတမ်းတွင် ဗိုလ်ချင်းများအကြား မိမိ၏ပုံရိပ္ကို တ႐ုတ္မည္ သို႔တုိးျမွင့္ႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း ေဆြးေႏြးသြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

ဗိုလ်ချင်းများထဲမှာ အရေးချင်းစွာ သတင်းကားလိုသော အခိုးအားဖြင့် တိုးတက်ရောက်လိုအပ်သည်။ အမိန့်ကောင်းမှုများကို တိုးတက်ရောက်ရန် ရှုးလာရောက်စေလိုက်ပါသည်။

မိမိ၏ပုံရိပ္ကို တ႐ုတ္မည္ သို႔တုိးျမွင့္ႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း ေဆြးေႏြးသြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

ပြုလုပ်သော သတင်းအခ်က္အလက္မ်ားကို အေျခခံၿပီး ေဆြးေႏြးတင္ျပမႈတြင္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ ပုံ ရိပ္တုိးျမွင့္ရန္ တ႐ုတ္အတြက္ အၾကံျပဳခ်က္မ်ားထည့္သြင္းေဆြးေႏြးသြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

ယခုစာတမ်းမေရးသားမီတြင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္သည္ ရန္ကုန္ရွိ Peace, Democracy & Development (MDRI-CSIS) အတန္း၏ ေက်ာင္းသား ၂၀ ခန္ႏွင့္ေတြ႕ဆုံခဲ့ ၿပီး အငွားယာဥ္ေမာင္းမ်ားႏွင့္ အခ်ဳိ႔သူမ်ားကိုလည္း လမ္းေပၚတြ င္ေတြ႕ဆုံခဲ့သည္။ ရရွိခဲ့ေသာ သတင္းအခ်က္အလက္မ်ားကို အေျခခံၿပီး ေဆြးေႏြးတင္ျပမႈတြင္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏ ပုံ ရိပ္တုိးျမွင့္ရန္ တ႐ုတ္အတြက္ အၾကံျပဳခ်က္မ်ားထည့္သြင္းေဆြးေႏြးသြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။

186
သတင်းအချက်အလက်များရရန် ဗိုလ်ချုပ် အောက်ခံအလဲများ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ဆိုင်ရာတွင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သို့မဟုတ် ရန်ကုန်ရှိ တွေ့ရသည် ရန်ကုန်ရှိ တွေ့ရသည် အောက်ခံအတွက် အောက်ခံမှ အောက်ခံမှ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အဖြေအလဲများ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အဖြောင်ပြားလျက် ပိုမိုးရပြီး အရပ်လူအဖွဲ့အစည်းများဗိုလ်ချုပ်အဖြေအလဲများအဖြောင်ပြားလျက် မီဒီယာများကဲ့သို့ မွတ်ဆွေးနွဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာအစိုးရဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကို ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များ သည် အတိတ်ကာတိုင်း တွေ့ရသည် မြန်မာႏိုင်ငံတွင် အဓကထြက်သူသည် အစိုးရသို့မဟုတ် တွေ့ရသည် ရေးရာမိုးသော် သို့မဟုတ် တွေ့ရသည် အပေါ်မှသားဖြစ်သည်။ တွေ့ရသည် အလိုအလျောက် အားလုံးအားများကို သင်ယူလုံးယူ လူငယ်များအပေါ် အလျောက် လည်း ထူးထွက် သင့်သည်။ ရန်ကုန်တွင် အမိရိကန်စင်တာတွင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သို့မဟုတ် မီဒီယာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများဗိုလ်ချုပ်အဖြေအလဲများကို (ကြန်းရွပ်စင်တာ ကဲ့သို့) သင်ယူရန် မြန်မာသို့မဟုတ် အဆုံးတွင် တွေ့ရသည် မီဒီယာကဲ့သို့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကို သင်ယူသည်။ ရန်ကုန်တွင် အမိရိကန်သို့မဟုတ် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်သို့မဟုတ် ဂ်ပန်သို့မဟုတ် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များတို့လုံးတို့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကို (ကြန်းရွပ်စင်တာ ကဲ့သို့) သင်ယူရန် မြန်မာသို့မဟုတ် အဆုံးတွင် တွေ့ရသည် မီဒီယာကဲ့သို့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များကို သင်ယူသည်။ မြန်မာသို့မဟုတ် အဆုံးတွင် တွေ့ရသည် အေရးႀကီး သည်။ ထိပ်ပိုင်းသို့မဟုတ် ရယ်ထားသဖြင့် တွေ့ရသည် အတြက် မီဒီယာများမှထည့်ကာ တွေ့ရသည် စိတ်ဥပာဥုံများကို သင်ယူသည်။ တွေ့ရသည် မီဒီယာချင်းများသည် တွေ့ရသည် မီဒီယာချင်းများအရ တွေ့ရသည် မီဒီယာချင်းများမှာ တွေ့ရသည် အေရးႀကီး သည်။ တွေ့ရသည် အဆုံးတွင် တွေ့ရသည် မီဒီယာများကို (ကြန်းရွပ်စင်တာ ကဲ့သို့) သင်ယူသည်။
အေရးယူမႈမ်ားမျပဳလုပ္ဟု ျပည္သူမ်ားကထင္ျမင္ေနၾကသျဖင့္ တ႐ုတ္သည္ အဆုိပါရာဇ၀တ္မႈမ်ားကို အေရးယူမႈမ်ားပုိမုိျပဳလုပ္ၿပီး တ႐ုတ္က အဆုိပါရာဇ၀တ္မႈမ်ားကို မည္သို႔တိုက္ဖ်က္ေနေၾကာင္းပုဂၢလိကမီဒီယာမ်ားမွတဆင့္ျပည္သူမ်ားကို အသိေပးရမည္။ တ႐ုတ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ား ျမန္မာျပည္သုိ႔ သြားေရာက္လည္ပတ္လွ်င္လည္း တကၠသုိလ္ေက်ာင္း သားမ်ားႏွင့္ အရပ္ဘက္လူမႈအဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားထံ သြားေရာက္ၿပီး စကားေျပာသင့္သည္။ ဥပမာ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသုိ႔ သြားေရာက္လည္ပတ္ခဲ့ၿပီးအရပ္ဘက္အဖြဲ႕ အစည္းမ်ားႏွင့္ေတြ႕ဆုံခဲ့သည္။ ဂ်ပန္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားလည္း ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ သုိ႔သြား ေရာက္လည္ပတ္ခဲ့ၿပီး အရပ္ဘက္လူမႈအဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားႏွင့္ေတြ႕ဆုံခဲ့ကာ ကေလးငယ္မ်ားႏွင့္ ကစားခဲ့သျဖင့္ ထုိမိနစ္ ပိုင္းေၾကာင့္ ဂ်ပန္သည္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံအား ရယူႏိုင္ခဲ့သည္။ ျပည္သူခ်င္း ဆက္ဆံေရး အားေကာင္းေစရန္ တ႐ုတ္သည္ မိမိ၏ နာမည္ေက်ာ္သ႐ုပ္ေဆာင္မ်ား သို႔မဟုတ္ အဆုိေက်ာ္မ်ားကို ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံသို႔ေစလႊတ္ၿပီး သံတမန္အျဖစ္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ေတြ႕ဆုံ ေစႏိုင္သည္။ အာဏာမလႊဲ ေျပာင္းမီ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံတြင္ စစ္အစိုးရသည္ သယံဇာတအားလုံးကို တ႐ုတ္သို႔ေရာင္းခ်သြားခဲ့သည္ဟု ျမန္မာျပည္သူအခ်ဳိ႕က ယူဆျဖင့္ စစ္အစုိးရလက္ထက္အတြင္း ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံႏွင့္ခ်ဳပ္ဆုိထားခဲ့ေသာ ယခင္ကန္ထ႐ုိက္စာ ခ်ဳပ္မ်ား ကိုလည္း တ႐ုတ္က သုံးသင့္သည္။
ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရးႏွင့္စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးကာလအတြင္း ျမန္မာတြင္ တ႐ုတ္ရင္းႏွီးျမဳပ္ႏွံမႈ

China's Investment in Myanmar under 1st Political and Economic Reform

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ဗားများအလားအလာ တစ်ခါ ကြည့်နေရာတွင်စီရန်လိုသည်။ သိမ်းချင်းမရှိသော စီးပြားအက်ပါအတိုင်းများကိုလည်း အစပြုစီးခြင်းမရှိ

မျှော်လင့် အချင်းအရာများကို ထုတ်လုပ်ရန် လမ်းများလည်း ကြည့်ရှုလုပ်ရန် စီစဉ်သည်။

သူများမှာ နောက်တစ်လအကြာတွင် ဂုဏ္ဂျင်က မျှော်လင့်စီးပြားအက်ပါအတိုင်းများကို ကြည့်ရှုခြင်းမရှိသည်။

ဗားများအတွက် အသေးများသိသော စီးပြားအက်ပါအတိုင်းများအားကို အစပြုစီးခြင်းမရှိ ရင်းမြစ်နေသည်။

ဗားများကို နောက်ထပ်ရေးနေရာတွင် ပါဝင်လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းမရှိပေးခြင်းမရှိသည်။ သူများသည် ၂၀၁၂ ပြည့်နှစ်နွေ့၌ ပါဝင်ခြင်းသည် အက်ဋအားရှိလိမ့်မည်ဟု ဖော်ပြခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

ဗားများအား ထိခိုက်စေရန် လိမ့်ပါသည်။ နောက်ထပ်များစွာကို ရှေးယူပိုတ်ဆုံးသည်။

နောက်ထပ်ရေးနေရာတွင် ပါဝင်ရေးနေရာများကို အစပြုစီးခြင်းမရှိပေးခြင်းမရှိသည်။

ဗားများကို ဆုံးဖြတ်ရန် လိမ့်ပါသည်။ နောက်ထပ်ရေးနေရာများစွာကို ရှေးယူပိုတ်ဆုံးသည်။

ဗားများအား ထိခိုက်စေရန် လိမ့်ပါသည်။ နောက်ထပ်များစွာကို ရှေးယူပိုတ်ဆုံးသည်။
ဗုဒ္ဓလေးဆိုးဖြင့် မြန်မာ့လူမျိုးများသည် ဗုဒ္ဓလေးဆိုးမှာ မျှော်လင့်သည့် အနောက်တိုင်းနိုင်ငံများထံမှ ပေါင်းမှုများထွက်ရာ ရင်းဗုဒ္ဓလေးစာများကို မွေးမှုသည်းမှုကို လျှပ်စစ်ရာများကို လျှပ်စစ်စွာဖြင့် မှတ်တမ်းသည်းမှုကို ဖြစ်သည်။

ဗုဒ္ဓလေးဆိုးဖြင့် မြန်မာ့လူမျိုးများသည် ရင်းဗုဒ္ဓလေးစာများ၏ အဓကသြင်္ဆွေးလာခြင်းကို မှန်ကန်ကားကို စီးဆင်းကာ တိုက်ရိုက်လိုက်ရှိလိုက်သည်။

ရင်းဗုဒ္ဓလေးစာများ၏ အောက်ဆျပ်လျင်မှုကို သားဖော်ကြည့်၊ စီးတော်ထွက်ရာများကို စက်ကွယ်ရှိလိုက်သည်။

ဗုဒ္ဓလေးဆိုးဖြင့် မြန်မာ့လူမျိုးများသည် ရင်းဗုဒ္ဓလေးစာများ၏ အောက်ဆျပ်လျင်မှုကို သားဖော်ကြည့်၊ စီးတော်ထွက်ရာများကို စက်ကွယ်ရှိလိုက်သည်။

191
State Transformation and the Geography of State Power:
Exploring Cross-border Development between China and Myanmar

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မိုင်းမီးေျမာက္ခ်ိတ္ဆက္မႈတစ္ခု ေဖာ္ျပခဲ့သည္။ ယင္းရည္မွန္းခ်က္မ်ားတြင္ နယ္ျခားေဒသတည္ၿငိမ္ေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားႏွင့္ အိႏၵိယ သမုဒၵရာသို႔ ေဒသတြင္းပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈကိုတုိးျမႇင့္ရန္မွာ ယင္းမဟာဗ်ဴဟာ၏ ေၾကညာခဲ့သား ရည္မွန္းခ်က္မ်ား ေတာင္ကေျပာၾကားခဲ့သည္။ ပံုမွန္အားျဖင့္ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွင့္ ၁၂ ႀကိမ္ေျမာက္ ၅ ႏွစ္စီမံကိန္း၏ အစိတ္အပုိင္း တစ္ မည္ဟု၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္တြင္ယင္းျပည္နယ္သို႔သြားေရာက္ေသာခရီးစဥ္၌ပါတီအေထြေထြအတြင္းေရးမွဴး ဟူက်င္ ယူနန္သည္အေနာက္ေတာင္ဘက္ဆီဆုိ တ႐ုတ္၏လမ္းပြင့္ရန္အတြက္ ႀကဳိးပမ္းျပသသြားမည္ျဖစ္သည္။
ယူနန္ျပည္နယ္တြင္ ပုဂၢလိကစြန္႔ဦးလုပ္ငန္းရွင္မ်ားတြင္ “Bridgehead” ေစာင့္ ၾကည့္လွ်က္ရွိသည္။ ယူနန္ျပည္နယ္ရွိ မၿငိမ္သက္မႈမ်ားႏွင့္ ကမၻာသို႔တံခါးဖြင့္ေနသည့္ ျမန္မာ့၏လုပ္ငန္းစဥ္မ်ားေၾကာင့္ တစ္ခ်ိန္ ကထားသည္။

၆၇၀၄ဗိုလ်မီးအရ ႏုိင္ငံျခားေရးမူ၀ါဒအသားေပးႏွင့္ စီးပြားေရးပိုဆန္ပုံရ သည္။

ဝါစားျခင္းဟင်္ခ်က္ကိုတားပါမည္။ ယင္းတုိက္တြန္းခ်က္သည္ကိုရပ္တန္႔ရန္လိုျပီးႏွစ္ဖက္စလုံးအတြက္ အက်ဳိးအမ်ဳိးပိုမုိ႕ရာ။

CCP အတွက္မွာ ဗိုလ်မီးအရ ပါတီတြင္းအေျပာင္းအလဲ ဓားလုိ႕ဖြစ္သြားႏိုင္သည္။

ဗိုလ်မီးအရ ပါတီတြင္းအေျပာင္းအလဲ ဓားလုိ႕ဖြစ္သြားႏိုင္သည္။
ရင်းျမစ္ခြဲေ၀မႈႏွင့္ရာထူးတုိးျ ခင္းအတြက္ ျပည္နယ္ဆုိင္ရာ စီးပြား ေရးေအာင္ျမင္မႈမ်ားျဖစ္ေပၚလာျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

ေစ်းကြက္သေဘာတရား မ်ား စိမ့္၀င္သြားမည့္အျဖစ္မ်ဳိးပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ ဥပမာအားျဖင့္ ႏိုင္ငံပိုင္လုပ္ငန္းမ်ားရွိ ဘ႑ာေရးစည္းမ်ဥ္းမရွိမႈႏွင့္အတူ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္လည္း ထို႔အတြက္ဘဏ္စနစ္တစ္ခုမရွိေသးေသာေၾကာင့္ သေဘာတူညီခ်က္မ်ားကို လက္မွတ္ေရးထုိးထားသည္။ တ႐ုတ္ဘက္တြင္ နယ္ျခားျဖတ္ေက်ာ္ရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံမႈ၏ ယြမ္(...

နောက်ထပ္ကိစၥတစ္ရပ္မွာ တ႐ုတ္ရွိ ဘဏ္စနစ္အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးပိုင္းဆုိင္ရာ အတားအဆီးမ်ားႏွင့္ အေႏွာင့္အယွက္မ်ားျမင့္မားေစသည္။

ဟာႏွင့္ကန္ထ႐ုိက္လယ္ယာေျမလုပ္ကိုင္ျခင္းတြင္တရားမ၀င္လုပ္ရပ္မ်ားအေပၚမွီခုိထားျခင္းေၾကာင့္မပါရွိေပ။ အတူေရာေနျခင္းသို႔မဟုတ္ေရွ႕ေနာက္မညီအသုံျပဳ ထားျခင္းမ်ား အေတာ္မ်ားမ်ားရွိေနျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ယင္းတုိ႔လုပ္ရန္ ႀကဳိးပမ္းရာ တြင္ ေရာေထြးေနသည့္အရာမ်ားသည္ တစ္ခါတစ္ရံတြင္ တ႐ုတ္၏စာရင္းအင္းမ်ားတြင္ထုတ္လုပ္ေရး၊ ေရနံႏွင့္ ဓာတ္ေငြ႕တူးေဖာ္ေရး ႏွင့္ ေရအရင္းအျမစ္ကဲ့သုိ႔ေသာ ႏိုင္ငံပိုင္လုပ္ငန္းမ်ားႀကီးစုိးထားျပႆနာမွာ ျပည္နယ္ လုပ္ငန္းအမ်ားစုႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္းသို႔၀င္ေရာက္ ျမႇဳပ္ႏွံမႈအမ်ားစု ေဆး ရြက္ႀကီး ယင္းအေနအထားတြင္ ေနာက္ထပ္အေပါင္းလကၡဏာေဆာင္ေ သာဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈမွာ ႏုိင္ငံအတြင္းသို႔ပြားေရး၏ အားအေကာင္းဆုံးအပုိင္းျဖစ္ေသာ ပုဂၢလိကလုပ္ငန္းက႑သည္လည္း နယ္ျခားေဒသ စီးပြားေရး
အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ ပေါင်းစည်းသောအချက်အလက်များမှစ၍ အကူအညီများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ လက်တွေ့ရှိခြင်းအားလုံးကို အနေဖြင့် အလွန်ဖော်ပြသည့်အောက်တွင်ရှိရောက်သည်။ အပေါ်များနှင့် အခြေခံများစွာ ပေလွောင်းရေးသားစရာများအားလုံးကို ထည့်သွင်းစားသည့် သင်္ကောတစ်ခုဦးဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင်လည်း အနာဂတ်ကာလတွင်လည်း ဖော်ပြသည်။
Exploring China's Investments and Development Assistance in Myanmar

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အောင်မြင်တွေ့ဖျင်သည်။

အိမ်ရွင်းဟားဌာန၏ အကူအညီမ်ားသည် လစ်ဘရယ်ဒီမုိက ၊ ရက်နည်းမ်ားက်င့်သုံးသည့် အေနာက်ႏိုင်ငံမ်ားကေပးသည့်
အစီအစဥ္မ်ား၊ တရားဥပဒ်စိုးမုိးေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ား၊ အသြင္ကူးေရးလုပ္ငန္းကာလတရားမွ်တမႈ ယႏၱယားမ်ား၊
လုံၿခဳံေရးက႑ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမ်ားကတစ္ဆင့္ေပးေသာ အကူအညီ သို႔မဟုတ္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးတည္ေဆာက္
ၾကမည္နည္း။

စီးပြားေရးစီမံကိန္းမ်ားကုိ အေထာက္အပံ့မ်ား၊ အတုိးမဲ့ေခ်းေငြမ်ား၊ ႏွစ္ရွည္ေခ်းေငြမ်ား
အေနာက်ကမၻာအလွဴ ရွင္မ်ား၏ ၀န္ထုတ္၀န္ပုိးျဖစ္ေစမည့္ ျခြင္းခ်က္မ်ားျဖင့္ေပးေသာ အကူအညီမ်ားထက္
ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးဆဲႏိုင္ငံ မ်ားစြာတြင္ ယင္းနည္းလမ္းကို ေအာင္ျမင္သည့္ မုိဒယ္တစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္ အစုိးရမ်ားက႐ႈျမင္ၿပီး
အသုံျပဳ ျခင္းမဟုတ္ဟု ႐ႈျမင္ၾကသည္။

ယေန႔ကာလ တ႐ုတ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားကလည္း အကူအညီေပးျခင္းကို
ရွိၾကသည္မွာ အက်ဳိးအျမတ္သည္ ႏွစ္ ဖက္ညီမွ်၏ေလာ၊
တ႐ုတ္သာ အက်ဳိးပိုျဖစ္ထြန္းသေလာဆုိျခင္း
ႏိုင္ငံတကာ ေ၀ဖန္မႈႏွင့္ လက္တုံ႔ ျပန္ျခင္းတုိ႔မွ အကာအကြယ္ေပးလွ်က္ရွိသျဖင့္ အေတာ္မ်ားမ်ား
သံသယ ျဖစ္ထြန္းေရးမူႀကီးမ်ားမွ
ၾကသေလာဆုိသည္ပင္ျဖစ္သည္။

အဆုိပါ ရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံမ်ားမ်ား သံတမန္ေရးအားျဖင့္သာမက စီးပြားေရးအက်ဳိး
လုပ္ငန္းႏွင့္ ကုန္သြယ္မႈတို႔ျ ဖင့္ ဆက္စပ္ေနသည္။

စီးပြားေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈအတြက္လည္း အသုံျပဳသည္ကို ျပသေနုျခင္းျဖစ္ သည္။

ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ ယင္း၏
အရ တ႐ုတ္သည္ မိမိ၏စီးပြားေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈအတြက္ အကူ အညီမ်ားကို အသုံျပဳသလုိ အိမ္ရွင္ႏုိင္ငံမ်ား၏
ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရး၀န္ႀကီးဌာန၏ လက္ေအာက္တြင္ရွိ သည္။

(ဗုိလ္က်စုိးမုိးေရး肟႔ေကြည့်ရှုးပြုသူဥေးမွာ)
ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးအတြက္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ဗဟုိျပဳခ်ဥ္းကပ္မႈကို တ႐ုတ္၏ ႏိုင္ငံတကာ၀င္မႈမ်ားတြင္တြင္ပါက်င့္သုံးခဲ့ၿ ပီးတ႐ုတ္၏ တုံ႔ျပန္မႈမွာျမန္မာ့အ ရပ္ဘက္လူ႔အဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားႏွင့္ ထိေတြ႕ျခင္း၊ ခ်ိန္ညႇိမႈမ်ား လုပ္ေဆာင္ရုံးပါ၀င္သည္ အားလုံးပါ၀င္မႈတုိ႔ျဖစ္သည္။

သည္႕လမ္းအတုိင္း တည့္မသြားေတာ့ဘဲ လုိအပ္ခ်က္အရေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း၊ လက္ေတြ႕အက်ဳိးစီးပြားအရ ၏ ဦးစားေပးကိစၥရပ္မ်ား၏ လႊမ္းမုိးမႈရွိၿပီး ယင္းခ်ဥ္းကပ္မႈတြင္ ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ဗဟိုျပဳၿပီး အစိုးရခ်င္းေဆာင္ရြက္ၾက အေၾကာင္းတရားမ်ားရွိေသာ္လည္း ေဒသခံ အေျခအေနမ်ားေၾကာင့္ ထုိသို႔ျပဳလုပ္ရခ်ိန္တြင္ပင္ အိမ္ရွင္အစိုးရမၾကာေသးမီက ႏိုင္ငံေရးပြင့္လင္းမႈအေပၚ ျမန္မာအစိုးရက ဦးစားေပးလာခဲ့သည့္ ရ လဒ္အျဖစ္ေဒသခံမ်ားႏွင့္ မိမိတုိ႔ၾကားအပစ္အခတ္ရပ္စဲေရးႏွင့္ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္မ်ားကို အေရးေပၚကိုင္တြယ္ရန္လုိအပ္ေန ျဖစ္သည္မွာသံယသျဖစ္ဖြယ္ရာမရွိေသာ္လည္း ထုိသို႔ျပဳလုပ္ရသည့္အေၾကာင္းမွာ တုိင္းရင္းသားလူနည္းစုသုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း ႏုိင္ငံျခားစီးပြားေရးအကူအညီတြင္ တ႐ုတ္အလြန္အမင္းဦးတည္သည္မွာ တ႐ုတ္ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးႏွင့္ တံခါးဖြင့္CSO)
ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးတိုင်းရင်းသားမူရာများစွာ တွင်းတွင်း CSO ဖြစ်သူ အရိုးကြီးမှာ ကျက်စိုက် နေသော အထွေထွေ ရှိကြောင်း CT အသေးသား နေအိုင်းထောင်းစိုးမှု သိရှိသကဲ့သို့ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ CSO ဖြစ်သူ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ တွင်းတွင်း မေးမားသူ တစ်ဦးကို တွင်းတွင်းကျွန်ုပ်တို့ လိုအပ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။

မေးမားကြောင့် CSO ဖြစ်သူ ထိန်းသိမ်းမှု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ အခြေအနေများကို မေးမားသူ တွင်းတွင်းအား တွင်းတွင်းကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ အများအပြားမှာ အချို့အချို့သို့ ရွှေ့ပြောင်းလျှင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ကို သယ်ရောက်မှု့ပေးနိုင်ကြသည်။

မေးမားကြောင့် CSO ဖြစ်သူ ထိန်းသိမ်းမှု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ အခြေအနေများကို မေးမားသူ တွင်းတွင်းအား တွင်းတွင်းကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ အများအပြားမှာ အချို့အချို့သို့ ရွှေ့ပြောင်းလျှင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ကို သယ်ရောက်မှု့ပေးနိုင်ကြသည်။

CSO (MCPWC)
CNPC

200
ထုိ႔ျပင့္ တ႐ုတ္ႏိုင္ငံ၌သဘာ၀ ပတ္၀န္းက်င္ေရးရာ တက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားသည္ အစိုးႏွင့္စင္ၿပဳိင္ေဖာ္ေဆာင္မႈ(သံလြင္ျမစ္) တည္ေဆာက္ေရး ကို ၀န္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္၀န္က်ား ေပါင္ကဆုိင္းငံ့ရန္ဆုံးျဖတ္လုိက္ျခင္းအား ျပန္လည္ သေဘာထားစည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္းမ်ားကိုေဖာ္ေဆာင္ခဲ့သည့္တုိင္ အစိုးရအရာရွိမ်ားသည္ ျပည္သူမ်ားပါ၀င္ သို႔ေသာ္လည္း အဆုိပါတက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ား၏ စ႐ုိက္လကၡဏာႏွင့္ ၄င္းတုိ႔ရရွိထားသည့္ေနရာတုိ႔တြင္ အမွတ္ရေစသည္။

ရသည့္ အေတြ႕အႀကဳံမ်ဳိး တ႐ုတ္အရာရွိမ်ားတြင္ မရွိၾကပုံေပၚသည္။ အနည္းဆုံးအားျဖင့္ တ႐ုတ္ႏိုင္ငံ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံရွိသဘာ၀ပတ္၀န္းက်င္ေရးရာတက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ား၏သဘာ၀ႏွင့္ယင္းတုိ႔ႏွင့္ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ၾကား သည္မွာအေသအခ်ာပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ ျပည္နယ္အဆင့္မ်ား၊ ႏိုင္ငံပုိင္လုပ္ငန္းမ်ား) သည္မိမိ၏တရား၀င္ျဖစ္မႈတုိ႔တက္ရန္ မိမိ၏ အကူအညီလုပ္ထုံး သည္။ အနာဂတ္တြင္ကၽြန္ေတာ္ျပဳလုပ္မည့္ သုေတသန၏ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္တစ္ခုမွာတ႐ုတ္ႏိုင္ငံ (ႏိုင္ငံအဆင့္၊ ျခင္းရွိသည့္ အက္တာမ်ား/သက္ဆုိင္သူမ်ား အဆင့္ဆင့္ပါ၀င္သည္ အားလုံးပါ၀င္မႈတုိ႔ ပုိမုိျဖစ္လာေစရန္ျဖစ္ ေရး

CSO ႏွင့္ တ႐ုတ္အရာရွိမ်ားက NGO မ်ား အမွန္တကယ္ပါ၀င္ႏိုင္ေရးတြင္ မ်ားစြာေသာ အကန္႔အသတ္မ်ားရွိေနသည္။

ခုိင္မာျပည့္စုံေရး၊ ယင္း၏ ခ်ဥ္းကပ္မႈကို ၂၀၂၀

Challenges Facing Myanmar’s Migrant Workers

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The Economist has highlighted that in March 2009, in 10 out of 18 countries, Myanmar’s migrant workers amounted to over a million people. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has noted that there are significant differences in their living and working conditions in different countries. In Thailand, there are 2 to 4 million workers, in Malaysia there are 5 million, in Singapore there are 1 million, and in Japan there are numbers that are not published, according to a research conducted by the Economist Magazine.

A total of 1.1 million Myanmar workers work abroad, according to the Economist. Myanmar workers are bound to work in other countries, while the government remains silent. This has been highlighted by the IMF in a report in February of 2013.

In 2012/13 (at the end of the fiscal year), the number of workers was 6 million, but it increased to 7.5 million in 2013/14. In the 2013/14 fiscal year, Myanmar workers were employed in a variety of jobs in other countries. At the same time, the government has not taken any action to improve the situation of Myanmar workers.
ကိုယ်ရေးကိုယ်တာံပျနားပြဲကျောင်းရသည်ဟု ဆုံသည်။ လူမှားသော ဝါသားခွဲခြားများနှင့် ဆက်စပ်ၿပီးျဖစ္ ျပီးသည်မဟုတ်ဘဲ ျမန္မာဌာနက ၂၀၁၃ ဇန္လတြင္ တားမစ္ခဲ့သည်။ မေလးရွားသို႔သွားသည့် မေလးရွားသို႔ အလုပ္သမားမ်ား ပို႔ေဆာင္ျခင္းမျပဳရန္ ျမန္မာအလုပ္အကိုင္ရွာေဖြေရာအဂ်င္စီအားမ်ား နယ္ေျမအသီးသီးတြင္ လုပ္ကိုင္ေနသာ အျခားျမန္မာလုပ္သားမ်ားက ေတာင္းဆုိခဲ့သည်။

အလုပ္သမား၀န္ႀကီးက ေျပာဆုိသည်။ ကြာလာလမ္ပူရွိ ျမန္မာသံ႐ုံးသို႔သွားေရာက္ရန္မွာ ရက္ေန႔ တြင္ ျမန္မာေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သား ၁၀၀၀၀၀ သည် အသိအမွတ္အျပဳလက္မွတ္မ်ား ရရွိၿပီးျဖစ္သည်ဟု ညႇိႏႈိင္းေဆာင္ရလက္ရန္ လိုအပ္ေနသည်ဟု အလုပ္သမား၀န္ႀကီးကဆုိသည်။ ဇြန္လ ၁၉ ျမန္မာအစိုးရသည် ၀န္ထမ္းမ်ားကို အကန္႔အသတ္ျဖင့္သာခန္႔ထားႏိုင္ၿပီး အျခား၀န္ႀကီးဌာနမ်ား ႏွင့္လည္း တရား၀င္ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သား ၃၀၀၀၀၀ နှင့္ တရားမ၀င္လုပ္သား ၃၀၀၀ ရွိသည်ဟု သိရသည်။

မေလးရွားရွိ သူတုိ႔၏ ႏိုင္ငံကူးလက္မွတ္မ်ားကို ထိန္းသိမ္းထားသျဖင့္ ျပန္ထြက္ရန္ အခက္အခဲ ႏွင့္ ရင္ဆုိင္ေနရသည္။ သေဘာတူထားသည့္ ကာလအတုိင္း အျပည့္အ၀လုပ္ကိုင္ခဲ့ၿပီး သည့္လုပ္သားမ်ားပင္လွ်င္ အလုပ္ရွင္မ်ားကမိခင္ႏိုင္ငံသို႔ျပန္ရန္စီစဥ္ၾကေသာ္လည္း စာခ်ဳပ္ပါ ကန္႔သတ္ခ်က္ႏွင့္ စာရြက္စာတမ္းမျပည့္စုံမႈမ်ားရွိေနသည္။

ခုိက္ခံရမႈႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံရွိယင္းတုိ႔၏ မိသားစုမ်ား၏ ပူပန္မႈေၾကာင့္ေၾကာင့္ အကာအကြယ္ေပးရန္ ေတာင္းဆုိခဲ့ၿပီး မေလးရွားသို႔ျပန္ရန္စီစဥ္ၾကေသာ္လည္း စားရိတ္မ်ားေလွ်ာ့ခ်ရန္ႏွင့္ ပုံမွန္လမ္းေၾကာင္းမွတစ္ဆင့္ထြက္ခြာသည္႕ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းသူမ်ားပါ ၀င္ၿပီး ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သား မားအတြက္ သက္သာရာရေစမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ျမန္မာအစိုးရ၏ ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းေနထုိင္ျခင္းမူ၀ါဒတြင္ အနည္းငယ္သာ အာ႐ုံစိုက္ခဲ့ လွ်င္ ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ားအတြက္ အခ်ဳိ႕ေသာ ပူပန္မႈမ်ားကို ျမန္မာအစိုးရ၏ မ်ားမၾကမီက ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ခဲ့သည့္ မူ၀ါဒမ်ဳိးကို ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ားအတြက္ သင့္ေလ်ာ္ေသာ ဘဏ္စနစ္မွတစ္ဆင့္ ေရာက္ရွိႏိုင္ေတာ့မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ကိုယ္စရာမ်ားကို ေလွ်ာ့ခ်ႏိုင္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ား၏ ျပန္ပုိ႔ေငြသည္လည္း အားထုတ္ႀကဳိးပမ္းရန္ျဖစ္သည္။
ခုႏွစ္ ဇြန္လတြင္ ျမ၀တီ၌ ဆႏၵျပခဲ့ၾက သည္။ ေျပာင္းေရႊ႕သြား ေ ရာက္ျခင္းကို ေႏွာင့္ေႏွးေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္သည္ဆုိကာ ျမန္မာအလုပ္သမား ၂၀၀ က ၂၀၁၃ ျမန္မာအလုပ္သမားေရးရာအရာရွိမ်ားက အတည္ျပဳခဲ့သည္။ ထုိင္းကုမၸဏီ မ်ားႏွင့္ ထုိင္းရဲတပ္ဖြဲ႕က လူေမွာင္ခုိကုန္ကူးျခင္းအျဖစ္ အမႈႀကီးေအာင္လုပ္ျခင္းလည္းခံရသည္။ ဇြန္လ ၂၁ ရက္ေန႔တြ င္ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ား၏ ကေလးငယ္မ်ားသည္ ပညာေရးကို အလြန္နည္းပါးသည့္ပမာဏကသာ ရရွိသည္။ လုပ္ငန္းစဥ္ကိုနားလည္ျခင္းမရွိသူမ်ားႏွင့္ ၀င္ေငြနိမ့္သူမ်ားျဖစ္ႏိုင္သည္။ ထုိင္းႏိုင္ငံတြင္ ပြဲစားမ်ားမွတစ္ဆင့္ ယာယီႏိုင္ငံကူးလက္မွတ္ျပဳ လုပ္သည့္ကုန္က်စရိတ္မွာ ဘတ္ ၁၅၀၀၀ ရက္ေန႔အထိ ထပ္မံသက္တမ္းတုိးထားသည္။ ယာယီႏိုင္ငံကူးလက္မွတ္ကုန္က်စရိတ္မွာ အလုပ္သမားတစ္ဦးသန္းအတြက္ ယာယီႏိုင္ငံကူးလက္မွတ္မ်ားထုတ္ေပးၿပီးျဖစ္သည္။ သုိ႔ ေသာ္ ၂ သန္းမွာ က်န္ရွိေနဆဲျဖစ္ၿပီး ယုံၾကည္ကုိးစားရမႈကုိ ေမးခြန္းထုတ္ရသည္မွာ လုပ္ခလစာႏွင့္ လုပ္ငန္းခြင္အေျခအေနပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ ေၾကာင္းမ်ားမွတစ္ဆင့္ မေလးရွားသို႔ ဆက္လက္ထြက္ခြာေနၾကသည္။

အံ၀င္မည္မဟုတ္ေပ။ သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း အျခားတစ္ဖက္တြင္ ျမန္မာေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ားသည္ တရား၀င္လမ္း ၀န္းက်င္အနက္ ဇြန္လ ၂၈ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ေနျပည္ေတာ္၌ အလုပ္သမား ၁၂ ေယာက္၊ ရန္ကုန္၌ အလုပ္သမားမေလးရွားရွိ လုပ္သားမ်ားကို ျပန္လည္ေခၚေဆာင္ရန္ ျမန္မာစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းအသိုင္းအ၀ိုင္းႏွင့္ ကိန္းဂဏန္းမ်ားအရ လူဦးေရ ၉၀၀၀ ခန္႔ရွိေသာ ျမန္မာေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ား၏ ကံေကာင္းေသာအခ်ဳိ႕အုပ္စုမ်ားကမူ ဒုကၡသည္အျဖစ္ UNHCR ကို ေဒသခံမ်ားက ေ၀ဖန္ၾကသည္။ (New Strait Times, 24th June 2013)
ျပန္လာၾကသူမ်ား ႀကဳံေတြ႕ရဖြယ္ရွိသည့္ ဖက္တာမ်ားမွာ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၏ စီးပြားေရးဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈ၊ လုပ္ခလစာကြာျခားမႈ၊ အလုပ္လက္မဲ့ ႏႈန္း ၄ ဒသမ ၀၁ ရာခုိင္ႏ ႈန္းမွသည္ ၈ ရာခုိင္ႏႈန္းမွ ၁၀ ႏႈန္းတုိးျမင့္လာမႈ (အလုပ္သမား၀န္ႀကီးဌာန၊ ၂၀၁၃ ၊ ေမ ၃၁) အလုပ္အကိုင္ရွားပါးမႈႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈနိမ့္ေသာ စီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ား၊ အထူးသျဖင့္ နယ္စြန္နယ္ဖ်ားႏွင့္ တုိင္းရင္းသားေဒသမ်ားတြင္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရး ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈႏွင့္ အျခားသူမ်ားၾကား ေရႊ႕ေျပာင္းလုပ္သားမ်ားကို ခန္႔အပ္လုိမႈတုိ႔ျဖစ္သည္။ အျခားစပ္ဆက္ေနသာ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားမွာ မိခင္ႏိုင္သည္ ထုိင္းႏိုင္ငံေလာ၊ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေလာ၊ အသစ္ျဖစ္ၿပီး မရင္းႏွီးေသာ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံရွိ လူမႈေရးႏွင့္ ႐ုပ္ပိုင္း ဆုိင္ရာဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈ၊ ထုိင္းႏိုင္ငံတြင္ေမြးဖြားသည္ ကေလးငယ္မ်ား ျမန္မာပတ္၀န္းက်င္ႏွင့္ အသားက်မႈ၊ ထုိင္းႏိုင္ငံတြင္ ေမြးဖြားေသာ ျမန္မာကေလးငယ္မ်ားအတြက္ စဥ္ဆက္မျပတ္သင္တန္းမ်ားႏွင့္ ပညာေရးတုိ႔ျဖစ္သည္။

အစိုးရမူ၀ါဒ (ကမၻာတစ္၀န္းရွိ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံသားအားလုံးကို အကာအကြယ္ေပးရန္ လိုအပ္သည္) ျပန္ပုိ႔ေငြကို ပုံမွန္လမ္းေၾကာင္း မွ ပိုမုိလြယ္ကူစြာလႊဲေျပာင္းျခင္း၊ နယ္ျခားေဒသမ်ားအနီးတြင္ စက္မႈဇုန္မ်ားထူေထာင္ျခင္း (အေျခခံအေဆာက္အအုံမ်ားသို႔ ဘ႑ာေရးေထာက္ပံ့မႈအကန္႔အသတ္ေၾကာင�္ ေႏွးေကြးစြာ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးျခင္း)၊ ဇြန္လ၂၇ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ထူေထာင္ခဲ့သည့္ ျပည္တြင္းႏွင့္ ႏုိင္ငံတကာအလုပ္သမားအေရးမ်ားတုိင္ၾကားမႈယႏၱယားတုိ႔အပါအ၀င္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈျဖစ္ေပၚလာသည့္ နယ္ပယ္အခ်ဳိ႕ရွိသည္။
Exile or Return? The Diaspora’s Role in Myanmar’s Political Transition

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Myanmar Program Manager, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation Singapore
ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးအပီးများ အဖို့ျခင္းတုိ႔ကိုဆက္လက္ထိန္းထားလုိသည္။ ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားသည္ သူတုိ႔ႏွင့္ေခတ္တူ ၈၈ မ်ဳိးဆက္လုပ္ကိုင္ခဲၾကသည္။ ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားသည္ သာမန္ျပည္ သူလူထု၏ လုိအပ္ခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္ စိတ္ဆႏၵမ်ားကိုအေျပာင္း အလဲကိုအေထာက္အကူေပးသူမ်ား ျဖစ္လာ ႏုိင္ၾကသည္။ ျပည္ေတာ္ျပန္လာေသာ ျပည္ေျပးမီဒီယာမ်ားကို ကိုကမၻာလုံးဆုိင္ရာ သတင္းကြန္ရက္ေျမပုံေပၚတင္ေပးျခင္းတုိ႔အတြက္ ျပည္ေျပးမီဒီယာအဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားသည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးနယ္ပယ္ကိုေက်ာ္လြန္ၿပီး ႏုိင္ငံျခားပညာတတ္ဗမာမ်ား၏ တန္ဖုိးရွိေသာ ပညာရပ္ဆုိင္ရာကၽြမ္းက်င္မႈ ႏွင့္တုိးျမင့္ခဲ့သည္။

သြားေရာက္ရာတြင္ပင္အေထာက္အကူျဖစ္ေစခဲ့သည္။ ဗမာႏွင့္တုိင္းရင္းသားဆက္ဆံေရးသည္ အဆင္ေျပေခ်ာေမြ႕ရန္စိစစ္ေရး၊ ပညာေရးစနစ္ပ်က္စီးမႈ၊ အင္တာနက္သုံးစြဲမႈႏွင့္စုေပါင္းအားထုတ္မႈတစ္ခုအတြင္းသုိ႔ မတူညီေသာ အေတြ႕အႀကဳံမ်ားေပါင္းစည္းရန္ ႀကဳိးပမ္းခဲ့သည္။ ႏိုင္ငံတကာအေတြ႕အႀကဳံႏွင့္ အဖြဲ႕အစည္းဆိုင္ရာ ကၽြမ္းက်င္မႈမ်ားေဆာင္က်ဥ္းလာသည့္ ျပည္ေတာ္ျပန္ျပည္ေျပးသူတုိ႔ပူပန္ၾကသည္။ ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ တုိင္းျပည္ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးႏွင့္ လႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားအတြက္ တတ္သိမႈမ်ား၊ ပုံမွန္အဆက္အသြယ္ရွိသလုိ လက္နက္ကိုင္တပ္ဖြဲ႕မ်ားႏွင့္လည္း အဆက္အသြယ္ရွိသည္။ အဖြဲ႕မ်ားမွ လူပုဂၢိလ္မ်ားႏွင့္ အျပန္အလွန္ဆက္ဆံေရးျဖစ္သည္။ ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ တုိင္းရင္းသားဆက္ဆံေရးတြင္မရွိျခင္းကို ျမန္မာတက္ၾကြ လႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ားစြာက ေကာင္းစြာသတိျပဳခဲ့ၾကသည္။ ျမန္မာ့အနာဂတ္ကုိေဖာ္ေဆာင္ရာတြင္ ေက်ာင္းပညာေရး၊ သီအုိရီဆုိင္ရာဗဟုသုတ၊ ႏိုင္ငံတကာအေတြ႕အႀကဳံႏွင့္ အဖြဲ႕အစည္းဆုိင္ရာစြမ္းရည္မ်ား (KNU) NCGUB DAB နှင့္ NCUB ကြည့်ရှုရာမ်ားကို သူတုိ႔၀ိုင့်းဆက္၀ြင့်ၾကရာမ်ားတို႔ေဆာင္က်ဥ္းလာသည့္ ျပည္ေတာ္ျပန္ျပည္ေျပးသူတုိ႔ပူပန္ၾကသည္။
ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားသည္ လုံၿခဳံမႈႏွင့္ အသုံးအေဆာင္ေကာင္းမ်ားတြင္ ေနလိုသည့္အေခ်ာင္သမားအျဖစ္ ဒီဂရီအမ်ဳိးမ်ဳိးျဖင့္ မိမိတုိ႔ကုိယ္ကုိ တကယ့္ အာဇာနည္မ်ားႏွင့္ အလြန္အေရးပါသည့္ပေလယာမ်ားအျဖစ္ အျမဲမွတ္ယူထားၾကၿပီး အကာအကြယ္ေပး  ထားသည္။

ကိုေမာင္းႏွင့္မည္ေသာ့ခ်က္တစ္ခုျဖစ္ၿပီး အေစာပိုင္းအဆင့္တြင္ပင္ပ်က္သုန္းသြားမည့္အေျခအေနမွာ အလုံးစုံျပည့္၀ေသာ ဒီမုိကေရစီေမွ်ာ္မွန္းခ်က္သည္ တုိင္းျပည္၏ အနာဂတ္တြင္ျပဳလုပ္မည့္ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမ်ား အျခားတစ္ဖက္တြင္ ယင္းသို႔ေသာ ႏႈိင္းယွဥ္မႈမ်ားေၾကာင့္ အခ်ဳိ႕ ေသာ ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားသည္ ျပည္တြင္တက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ားက ေကာင္းစြာသတိျပဳမိၾကသည္။ ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားတြင္လည္း ယင္းသို႔ တမဟုတ္ခ်င္းတုိးတက္သည္ကိုျမင္ေတြ႕လုိ႔သည့္ အလြန္တရာျမႇဳပ္ႏွံၿပီး အမွန္တကယ္ေက်းဇူးရွိျခင္းထက္ေက်ာ္လြန္ၿပီး အကန္႔အသတ္ရွိခဲ့သည္မွာ အံ့ၾသစရာမရွိေပ။ သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္း အာဏာရွင္လက္ေအာက္တြင္ရွိခဲ့သည့္ ယခုအခါတြင္ ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားႏွင့္ ျပည္တြင္းၾကြလႈပ္ရွားသူမ်ားၾကား အုပ္စုမ်ားကြဲထြက္ေနျခင္းမွာလည္း ျပည္ေျပးလႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ား၏ အတြင္းေရးျပႆနာအခ်ဳိ႕မွာ ရန္ပုံေငြအတြက္ ၿပဳိင္ဆုိင္ၾကရာမွာႀကီးထြားလာျခင္းျဖစ္ၿပီး သေဘာသဘာ၀ ႏွင့္ ထိေရာက္မႈမ်ား၊ ျပည္ေျပးမ်ားကိုေပးသည့္ ရန္ပုံေငြမ်ားအသုံးျပဳမႈႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ ျဖစ္သည္။

အတိတ္ကာလျပည္ေျပးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားႏွင့္ပက္သက္ေသာ ပဋိပကၡမ်ားလည္းရွိေနၾကသည္။ ပ႐ုိဂရမ္မ်ား၏ တက္တက္ၾကြၾကြလုပ္ကိုင္ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ ဟူ၍ ယင္းအျမင္ႏွင့္မတူေသာယုံၾကည္မႈမ်ားလည္းရွိသည္။

ျပန္လာၾကျခင္း ျဖစ္သည္၊ ထုိ႔ေၾကာင့္ မတူညီေသာ အုပ္စုမ်ားႏွင့္ ပါတီမ်ားစြာႏွင့္ ရွင္း ျပခဲ့သည္။ ျပန္လာၾကသူမ်ားသည္ က်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမ်ားကိုျပဳလုပ္ရန္ အလြန္တရာျမႇဳပ္ႏွံၿပီး အတြက္ ျပည္ေျပးေတြကုိ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တုိ႔ ျပန္ေခၚဖုိ႔လုိအပ္ပါတယ္

ABSDF ၊ DPNS တုိ႔ကဲ့သုိ႔ေသာ အဖြဲ႕အစည္းမ်ားသည္ ေအာက္ေျခလူထုႏွင့္ ႏွင့္ သူတုိ႔အက်ဳိးစီးပြားအတြက္ 208
လူငယ်ဦးစွာ အလုပ်လုပ်ရာ အာဏာသို့မဟုတ် အတွင်းရေး သို့မဟုတ် အရေးရှိ အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဤအစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် ဦးစားနိုင်သည့် အနုပညာအတွက် အခြွေအလွှာများကို လေ့လာရာတွင် အောက်ပါတို့သည် ကျွန်တော်ကြားခံသော အရေးယူမှုများကို စီမံကိန်းများကို ရရှိခဲ့သည်။ အခြေခံကြောင့် အိန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများ၊ ဥပဒေအရေးအရာများကို လေ့လာခြင်းကြောင့်လည်း အောက်ပါတို့ကို လေ့လာရန်သည်။

အတွင်းရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် နောက်ဆုံးအချက်ကို ပြုလုပ်ပေးသော အခြွေအလွှာများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရသည်။ ယခုအခါမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ နောက်ဆုံး အချက်ကို မျှမှတ်နိုင်ရန် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများဟူသော အိပ်မူမှုများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရသည်။

အိန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများ၊ ဥပဒေအရေးအရာများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရန်အတွက် အိသိမ်းပေးရန် အမှန်နှင့် အိန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရန်အတွက် လေ့လာလိုက်ရသည်။

အထူးသဖြင့် အန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများ၊ အိန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရန်အတွက် အိသိမ်းပေးရန် အမှန်နှင့် အိန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရန်အတွက် လေ့လာလိုက်ရသည်။

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အထူးသဖြင့် အန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများ၊ အိန်းသောစာမျက်နှာများကို လေ့လာလိုက်ရန်အတွက် လေ့လာလိုက်ရသည်။
စိုးရိုးသည်

ယင်းချင်းများကို ဖြည့်စွက်ထားသည်။ ၎င်းများအကြောင်းများကို အဆင့်အတွက် ပြပြီး စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုများကို အသုံးပြုလိုမည်။ MDRI ပညာရောအဖျက် တစ်ချက်တစ်ချက် တပ်ဆင်ထားသည်။ ဒီမိုကရေစီကြည့်ရှုမှုများနှင့် အလိုအလျင် မိမိတို့၏ ရေးသားမှုကို ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။
Transitional Justice in Myanmar: Assessing the Alternatives

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The current transitional justice process in Myanmar is characterized by several challenges and advancements. The process, initiated in 2010, has faced numerous obstacles including legal, procedural, and institutional hurdles. Despite these challenges, the country has made progress in addressing past atrocities.

The process faces several critical issues, including the need for comprehensive legal frameworks, effective implementation, and judicial independence. Additionally, there is a need for international support to ensure accountability and justice for victims.

The Myanmar government has taken steps towards reconciliation and peace, including the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015. However, the process remains slow and faces significant resistance from certain factions.

The transitional justice process in Myanmar is critical for the country’s path towards democracy and peace. It is imperative that the government and international stakeholders continue to support and monitor the process to ensure that justice is achieved for victims.

In conclusion, the transitional justice process in Myanmar is a complex and ongoing challenge. Continued efforts are needed to ensure that the process leads to genuine reconciliation and justice for all.

Tomas Ojea Quintana

211
အိမ်ပျိုးရောင်းခွင့်ပေးမှုအားလုံး အရ စီမံခန့်ခွအား လုပ်ဆောင်သော စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးချက်များသည် အိမ်ပျိုးမှုအား လုပ်ဆောင်ရာ အားလုံးအချိန်မှာ အဖြစ်ပေးဖော်ပေးသည်။ ကိုယ်စားလွယ်ရာခိုင်ႏိုင်း(၈၀)ကျော်စား ရာခိုင်ႏိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ အာဏိပိုင်း တိုင်းပြည်သူ့အားလုံးက အားလုံးအရ စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးမှုအား လုပ်ဆောင်ရာ အားလုံးကို အဖြစ်ပေး မှုများကို အနေဖြင့် ရိုက်ထည်ပေးသည်ဟု ဗိသုကာလ်ားက်ခဲ့သည်။ အားလုံးအရ စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးမှုအား လုပ်ဆောင်သော စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးချက်များကို ဗိသုကာလ်ားက်ခဲ့သည်။

ဗိသုကာလ်ားက်ခဲ့သည်။

နောက်စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးချက်များကို စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးချက်များပေးသည်။ သူများကို တိုင်းပြည်သူ့အားလုံးကို အားလုံးအရ စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးမှုအား လုပ်ဆောင်ရာ အားလုံးကို အဖြစ်ပေး မှုများကို အနေဖြင့် ရိုက်ထည်ပေးသည်ဟု ဗိသုကာလ်ားက်ခဲ့သည်။ အားလုံးအရ စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးမှုအား လုပ်ဆောင်သော စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးချက်များကို ဗိသုကာလ်ားက်ခဲ့သည်။

အားလုံးအရ စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးမှုအား လုပ်ဆောင်သော စီမံခန့်ခွေ့ပေးချက်များကို ဗိသုကာလ်ားက်ခဲ့သည်။
တရား႐ံုးမ်ားသို႔ ေခၚေဆာင္ခဲ့ရသည္။ ကင္းလြတ္ခြင့္သည္ တ႐ားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးႏွင့္ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္တြင္ စစ္ေထာက္လွမ္းေရးက လက္နက္ကိုင္ပဋိပကၡတြင္ ဥပေဒမဲ့ သက္ေရာက္လိမ့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ထုိသို႔ ရည္မွန္းခ်က္ႀကီး ေသာတရားေရးဆုိင္ရာလုပ္ငန္းသည္ အရပ္ဘက္တရား႐ံုး(သို႔)စစ္ဘက္တရား႐ံုးက ၀င္ေရာက္စြက္ဖက္ခြင့္ခ်ဳိးေဖာက္မႈမ်ားကို တရားစြဲဆိုျခင္းသည္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒတြင္ကင္းလြတ္ခြင့္ျပဳထား ေသာအပိုဒ္ႏွင့္ အခြင့္အေရးႏွင့္ တည္ဆဲျပည္တြင္းဥပေဒမ်ားကို ခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ ျခင္းမ်ားျဖစ္ၾကသည္။ ယင္းသို႔ေသာ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္ႏွင့္ ရွမ္းျပည္နယ္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းတို႔တြင္ မၾကာေသးမီက ျဖစ္ပြားခဲ့သည့္ သက္ေသအေထာက္အထားမ်ားကို အလြယ္ တကူပင္ ရွာေဖြႏုိင္သည္။ ၂၀၀၈ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒကို မိသားစု၀င္မ်ား၊ သက္ေသမ်ားႏွင့္ က်ဴးလြန္ၾကသူမ်ားမွာ အသက္ရွင္လ်က္ရွိေနၾကျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ႏိုင္ငံတကာ အသိုင္းအ၀ိုင္းသည္ ပဋိပကၡ၏အစုအလုိက္အၿပံဳလိုက္သတ္ ျဖစ္ပြားခဲ့သည့္ လူ႔အခြင့္ အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ခံရမႈမ်ားကို ဦးတည္ ျခင္း၏ေနာက္ထပ္အားသာခ်က္မွာ ျဖစ္သည္။ သို႔ေသာ္လည္း တရားေရးစနစ္၏ အဖြဲ႕အစည္းဆိုင္ရာျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး လိုအပ္ခ်က္ႏွင့္ ရွိႏုိင္မည္။ သို႔ေသာ္လည္းယင္းသို႔ေသာေဆာင္ရြက္မႈတစ္ခုသည္ ပိုမိုက်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာ ႏုိင္ငံလံုးအဆင့္အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈ အေပၚသက္ေရာက္မႈရွိေကာင္းမွ ရွိႏုိင္မည္ျဖစ္သလို(သို႔မဟုတ္)သိသာေသာအက်ဳိးဆက္ရွိေကာင္းမွ ေသာနည္းလမ္း၏နယ္ပယ္ႏွင့္ လုပ္ပိုင္ခြင့္တို႔သည္ အကန္႔အသတ္ရွိေသာ္လည္း အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈကာလ ေဆာင္းတိုင္းတိုင္းေဆာင္မႈမ်ား စလင္း၏စုးပံုအကာရုပ္ အေပၚသက္ေရာက္မႈမ်ား တရားေရးအတြက္ ဗုဒ္ဓမဟုတ္။
ဗုဒ္ဓဓမ္မာဘာသာစကားနှင့် တရားမွ်တမႈ ဆိုင္ရာ ဦးတည္ေနသည္။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုအစိုးရႏွင့္ ျပည္နယ္အစိုးရမ်ား အား ကနဦးေဆာ္ၾသစည္ောင္မည့္လုပ္ငန္ေဆာင့္မ်ားႏွင့္ လက္နက္ကိုင္ပဋိပကၡမ်ားကို ခံစားခဲ့ရသူမ်ား၏ ျပန္လည္ထူေထာင္ေရးႏွင့္ အစားေလွ်ာ္ေပးျခင္းအတြက္ျဖစ္သည္။
စီးပွားရေးပြုလုပ်မှုအားလုံးကို အောက်ပါ စာလုံးရေးနှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများဖြင့် လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်း၏ ၎င်းတို့ကို ပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၏ ၎င်းတို့ကို ထည့်သွင်းစဥးစားရန်လုံးဝေါ်လုပ်ဆောင်သည်။ စစ်အုပ်ခ်ပ္မႈရွိခဲ့သည့္ လုပ္ဆိုင်ခ်က္မ်ားသည် ပုိမုိက်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာ လူအဖြဲ႕အစည္းတစ္ရပ္ႏွင့္ခ်ိတ္ဆက္မႈရွိ မလြဲမေသြရွိေနသည္ဟုကၽြန္မေရးအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈဆုိင္ရာ သေဘာတရားမ်ားကို ဒုတိယအမ်ဳိးအစားမွာ ပါရမီရွိေသာ အႏုပညာရွင္မ်ားျဖစ္ေသာ္လည္း ေငြေၾကားမၾကြယ္၀သူမ်ားျဖစ္ၾကသည္။ သူတုိ႔၏ မ်ားျဖင့္ ဗုန္ေပါလေအာေၾကာ္ျငာၿပီးေခတ္မမီေတာ့သည့္ တစ္စုံတစ္ ရာေသာ ကိုယ္က်င့္သီလမ်ားႏွင့္ လူမႈေရးအေလ့အထမ်ားကို ႏုိင္ငံေရးဂီတမ်ားအေၾကာင္းကိုသာ ေျပာဆုိသြား မည္မဟုတ္ဘဲ လူအမ်ားေပၚ အဓိကအားျဖင့္ ယေန႔ေခတ္လူငယ္မ်ား ျဖစ္သည္သာမက ပိုေနျမဲက်ားေနျမဲအေန အထားကို စိန္ေခၚမည့္ အလားအလာလည္းရွိသည္။ ယခုစာတမ္းတြင္ ယင္းတုိ႔သည္ အေထာက္အပံ့ႏွင့္ ေမာင္းႏွင္အားမ်ားျဖစ္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။

ယုံကြည်သောအခွင့်အရေးများလည္း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အနီးစားဖော်ရွေးနေသောအခွင့်အရေးကို အတွက် အားလုံးလိုက်ားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အနီးစားဖော်ရွေးနေသောအခွင့်အရေးကို အတွက် အားလုံးလိုက်ားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာဘာသာဖော်ပြထားသော တစ်ခုချင်းစားချက်တစ်ခုရှိသော အလှားကိုလည်း ညွန်ကျင်မှုတစ်ခုကို တစ်ခုချင်းစားပါ။ အစားအလာများကို လေ့လာမှုသည် လူငယ်များအတွင်း ဂီတကို တစ်စုံတရာအတွင်းများသည် စမ္းသပ္ခံသွားမှုကို ရှိပါသည်။

အသစ်ပုံဖော်နေသော အိုရီအေနအေဖွင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် Youtube နှင့် Facebook ကို မိတ်ဆက်နိုင်သည်။ အိုရီအေနအေဖွင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် Youtube နှင့် Facebook ကို မိတ်ဆက်နိုင်သည်။

Underground သည် အိုရီအေနအေဖွင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် Youtube နှင့် Facebook ကို မိတ်ဆက်နိုင်သည်။

ယခုစာဖြင့် Underground သည် အိုရီအေနအေဖွင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် အေဖြင့်အေဖြင့် Youtube နှင့် Facebook ကို မိတ်ဆက်နိုင်သည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အမွေအစိတ်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားသော ဟစ်အေဟာ့များသည် အရေးကြီးချင်းစ်များကို အဆင့်မြင့်ခံရာ မိဘများနှင့် မောင်းကြည်ချက်များထိုးထား၍ ဗိသုကာဝါးကျင်းက်၏ အေဖြးတည်ဆောက်ခြင်းပြုလုပ်ကြသည်။

မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ကြည့်စုံတွင် ပြီးမှုအစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်သော မြို့တော် ရန်ကုန်မြို့၏ လူဦးရေးကြီးများသည် အေဖြး၀င်ရှွန်းခဲ့သည်။

ထို့ကြောင့် ကြည့်စုံတွင် ပြီးမှုအစိတ်အပိုင်းတစ်ခုဖြစ်သော မြို့တော် ရန်ကုန်မြို့၏ လူဦးရေးကြီးများသည် အေဖြး၀င်ရှွန်းခဲ့သည်။

ယခုအခါ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈဆုိင္ရာ လက်နက္ပုန္းသည် ယခင္က ပါ၀ါရယူခဲ့သည့္ လမ္းစဥ္မ်ား၊ အစဥ္အဆက္ခ်မ္းသာသူ နည္းလမ္းမ်ားကို ေပးကာ စစ္တပ္သည္ လူ႔မလုိင္၀ါဒႏွင့္ အာဏာကို အဓိကဖန္တီးသူအျဖစ္ ပုံေဖာ္ထားၾကသည္။

ယဲန္ကမူအေခြေရာင္းသည့္အေပၚကရသည့္ အဓိကဟစ္ေဟာ့အတြက္ အေရာင္းျမႇင့္တင္ျခင္းမ်ားပါ၀င္သလုိ ယခင္ႏွစ္ဒီဇင္ဘာလတြင္ ျမန္မာႏိုင်ငံ၌က်င္းပမည့္ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အထည္မ်ား၊ နာရီမ်ား၊ လက္၀တ္ရတနာမ်ား၊ မိတ္ကပ္၊ မုိဘုိင္းလ္ဖုန္းမိတ္ဆက္ျခင္းႏွင့္ လက္လ�အေရာင္းဆုိင္မ်ားႏုိင္ငံေတာ္၀ါဒျဖန္႔ ခ်ိေရးပစၥည္းမ်ားႏွင့္႐ုပ္ရွင္သီခ်င္းမ်ားကိုသာ အားထားခဲ့ရသည္။ 

ယင္းတုိ႔တြင္ပုဂၢလိက အ၀တ္ေတာ္မ်ား သည္ စပြန္ဆာမ်ား၊ အ၀တ္အထည္မ်ားႏွင့္ လူ႔အသုံးအေဆာင္မ်ားအတြက္ အေရာင္းျမႇင့္တင္ျခင္းမ်ား၊ သစ္တစ္ခုသို႔ ၀င္ေရာက္လွ်က္ရွိသည္။
ယခုလုပ်ငန်းသို့ချက်ချက်များပြောပြပါရွှေရွှေဟုသောအောက်ျဖင့် စပြန်ဆာများကရင်မှားခြင်းများပိုမိုစတင်လာခြင်းကိုလာခြင်းမှားပါမှာ။ ယင်းျပာင်းလဲမႈအားလုံးသည် ဗီယာရွိဟစ္ေဟာ့ကို ခြဲျခားသည့္အေလ့အထ၊ က်ားမတန္းတူညီမႈ၊ စစ္တပ္လူ႔မလုိင္၀ါဒ၊ လြတ္လပ္စြာေျပာဆုိခြင့္၊ ဗီယာျခားပါ၀င္ပက္သက္ျခင္းႏွင့္ သေဘာတရား တု့ိကိုစိစစ္ကန္႔သတ္ျခင္းတုိ႔အပါအ၀င္မ်ားစြာေသာလူမႈေရး၊ ဗီယာေရးႏွင့္စီးပြားေရးအေျပာင္းအလဲကိုေမာင္ေနသည္မွာ အေသ အခ်ာပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ ယင်းသုိ႔ ဗီယာေရးႏွင့္ ယဥ္ေက်းမႈၾကားအျပန္အလွန္သက္ေရာက္ေနျခင္းကုိ ေနာင္ထပ္ေလ့လာသုံးသပ္ မႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ရန္လုိအပ္ၿပီး ဗီယာအေရးေလ့လာမႈတြင္ ဗားဗားမားမားေနရာေပးရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။
Soldiers as Lawmakers: In Search for a Legislative Role of the Tatmadaw

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The Tatmadaw, the military-dominated parliament of Myanmar, is an anomaly in the world of democracy and governance. Despite its occasional representation of the military in politics, the Tatmadaw has faced challenges in its legislative role, particularly in relation to the transition from military rule to civilian governance. This paper explores the historical context and the current status of the Tatmadaw in the legislative process, highlighting the complexities and controversies surrounding its role.

The Tatmadaw's legislative role has been a topic of much debate and scrutiny, with questions raised about its ability to effectively represent the interests of the military and the country as a whole. This paper aims to provide insights into the legislative activities of the Tatmadaw, examining the challenges and opportunities it faces in fulfilling its role as a legislative body.

The paper discusses the historical background of the Tatmadaw, its establishment in 1962, and the evolution of its legislative functions. It also examines the Tatmadaw's current role in the legislative process, including its participation in drafting laws and its influence on policy-making.

The paper concludes with an analysis of the Tatmadaw's future prospects, highlighting the need for reforms to ensure its legislative role is strengthened and its contribution to the democratic process is maximized. It calls for a more inclusive approach to governance, where the Tatmadaw plays a critical role in promoting national interests and ensuring the sustainability of democratic principles.

The paper is a valuable resource for those interested in understanding the complexities of governance in Myanmar and the challenges faced by the Tatmadaw in its legislative role.
စီစဥုံႏိုင္ငံေရးသိပန္းဘာသာအမ်ားကအဓိကထားျပာဆုိၾကသည္မွာသူရဦးေရႊမန္း၏ႏုိင္ငံေရးအာဏာ၏ခုိင္မာမႈမွာလည္းခုႏွစ္ကတည္း၂၀၁၃တပ္မေတာ္၏အေျခခံဥပေဒကိုျပင္မည္ဆုိလွ်င္ျပည္နယ္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္အျဖစ္လ်ာထားျခင္းခံရသည္လႊတ္ေတာ္အရပ္ရပ္တြင္ပထမဆုံးအႀကိမ္ခ်ရန္မွာမ်ားစြာဖြဲ႕စည္းပုံအေျခခံဥပေဒျပင္ဆင္ေရးအလာအလာတစ္ခုခုကုိဗုိလ္မွဴး၊SPDCေလာင္းႏွစ္ဦးအနက္တစ္ေနရာဥပေဒျပဳေရးအာဏာသည္တုိင္းျပဳျပည္ျပဳလႊတ္ေတာ္ႏွင့္ေဒသဆုိင္ရာလႊတ္ေတာ္မ်ားတြင္ျပည္သူ႔လႊတ္ေတာ္ဥကၠဌအျဖစ္တာ၀န္ယူခဲ့သည့္အဓိကရည္မွန္းခ်က္ျဖစ္ေသာေၾကာင့္တပ္မေတာ္သားကိုယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားသည္ဗုိလ္ႀကီးႏွင့္ဗုိလ္မွဴးႏွင့္အကန္႔ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားကိုတပ္မေတာ္ထံမွာေနျပည္ေတာ္ႏွင့္ေဒသဆုိင္ရာလႊတ္ေတာ္မ်ား(စားလွယ္မ်ား၏ထုိအရာမ်ားအျပင္စစ္တပ္ေနာက္ခံအျပည့္ရွိရမည္အသစ္ခန္႔အပ္ခံရသည့္အသတ္မဲ့ၿပီးတုိးတက္ျပသခဲ့ၾကသည္။ကိုယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားယူဆသည္။သူသည္ကိုင္တြယ္ရန္ျဖစ္မည္ဟုေလ့လာသူအမ်ားစုကျောင်းမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့ရာဆောင်းခံချင်းစိတ်မီးမရွိဟုဆုိရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။အနည္းငယ္ေျပာင္းလာခဲ့ၾကားဥပေဒမ်ားအတြက္(DSA)မူ၀ါဒအေျပာင္းအလဲသက္ေသတစ္ခုကိုရန္ကုန္၌ျပည္ဆုိစုၾကည္。အေျခခြင်းျပဳခ်ယာျခင်းမွာထိညာမရွိဟုဆုိရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။အျခားေသာသမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္ႏိုင္ငံေရးအလတ္တန္းအရာရွိမ်ားႏွင့္တြင္ျပန္ေျပာင္းေျပာဆုိၾကသည္။အခ်ဳိ႕ကတြင္ဥပေဒျပဳေရးယႏၱယားျဖတ္ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲၿပီးေနာက္အထူးသင္တန္းမ်ားေပးၿပီးလွယ္မ်ားကသည္။တစ္ျဖည္းျဖည္းတုိးလားၿပီးတပ္မေတာ္၏ေနရာသည္ျပန္ေျပာင္းေျပာဆုိၾကသည္။ပထမ၂၀၁၀ရရွိရန္ႏွင့္ျဖစ္သည္။တပ္မေတာ္ထားရွိျခင္းသုံးပတ္အၾကာတြင္တပ္မေတာ္၏မားသည္ကနဦးထင္ျမင္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။တြင္ထားရွိျခင္းပင္ျဖစ္သည္။လႊတ္ေတာ္တြင္ထားရွိျခင္းသုံးပတ္အၾကာတြင္မ်ားႏွင့္ေထာက္ခံ၂၀၁၁ဗီတုိျဖင့္ပယ္၂၂၀
သီးသန္႔ထားသည္ဟု တပ္မေတာ္သားကိုယ္စားလွယ္သည္ သေဘာညီေနသည္ကို ဖြဲ႕စည္းပုံအေျခခံဥပေဒျပင္ဆင္ေရး (မင္းေအာင္လႈိင္ ထုိ႔ျပင္ စစ္တပ္မဟုတ္ေသာ တပ္မေတာ္ထိပ္တန္းအရာရွိတုိင္းသည္လည္း တပ္မေတာ္သည္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေသာ အတုိက္အခံမ်ားအထူးသျဖင့္ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္း ျပည့္ျပည့္၀၀ပါ၀င္လာခဲ့ၾကသည္။ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးအေျချပဳဥပေဒမ်ားေဖာ္ေဆာင္မႈကို SPDC ပါလီမန္တက္ၾကြလႈပ္ရွားမ႑ဳိင္ကို လက္ေတာက္ပလာမည္ဟု အမ်ဳိးသားညီလာခံကို ယင္းကိစၥသည္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပုံအေျခခံဥပေဒကေပးထားေသာ ပ်က္လြယ္သည့္အေနအထားတြင္ရွိေနၿပီး စီစဥ္ျခင္းတုိ႔တြင္ တက္တက္ၾကြၾကြပါ၀င္လာျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုအဆင့္တြင္ျဖစ္သည္။ မ်ားတြင္း၌ယူနီေဖာင္း တင္းမာ (သီးသန္႔ ထားသည္) တွင္ထုိ႔ျပင္ တပ္မေတာ္သားကိုယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားသည္ မႈမ်ားကမၾကာမီ ဆက္ဆံေရးတစ္ရပ္ လႊတ္ေတာ္ဥပစာကို ေက်ာ္လြန္သည္။ သည္ တာ၀န္ယူမႈ၊ ေဖာ္ထုတ္ရမည္။ ေတြ႕ရသည္။ ၀တ္မ်ားရွိေနျခင္းသည္ ဥပေဒျပဳေရးမ႑ဳိင္ကို တာ၀န္ခံမႈႏွင့္ က်င္ရာတြင္ ဆန္႔ ခံဥပေဒ ကို ဖုံးကြယ္ေနသည့္ ၾသဇာႀကီးေသာ ခုိင�မာရန္ နားေထာင္လုိစိတ္ ရွိေၾကာင္းျပသခဲ့ၿပီး ၂၀၁၁ ထားသည့္ ေခတ္အတြင္း မူၾကမ္းေရးဆြဲခဲ့သည့္ လက္၀ယ္ရွိသည့္ ၂၀၁၁ ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ခ်က္မ်ားမွာလည္း ေထာက္ခံခ်ိန္တြင္ လမ္းမရွိ အရပ္သားကိုယ္စားလွယ္မ်ားကုိယ္တုိင္ကလည္း အေရးထားမႈပိုမုိတုိး (စုၾကည္က ျပင္ဆင္ရမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း သို႔မဟုတ္ တြန္းေန ခုႏွစ္ကတည္းကစတင္ခဲ့သည့္ ခုိင�မာအားေကာင္းေရးအတြက္ စနစ္တက်စီမံထားျခင္းမဟုတ္ေသာ ၾသဂုတ္လ ေသးေခ်။ ေကာင္းေသာလကၡ သိသာထင္ရွားေသာ “ (က်င္သမႈမျပဳခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ဆန္႔ အထူးသျဖင့္ ထပ္တလဲလဲေျပာၾကားခဲ့သည္။ လာႏိုင္သည္။ ၾကသည္။ မခုိင္မာရန္ သိသာလည္း ဥပေဒျပဳျခင္းႏွင့္ တပ္မေတာ္သား တြင္ တင္းတင္းၾကပ္ၾကပ္ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္ထားေသာ လာေၾကာင္း တင္ျပသည့္ အက်ဥ္းသားမ်ားအတြက္ ၁၉၉၀ သက္ေသျပလိမ့္မည္နည္း ကာကြယ္ေရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္ အလြန္တရာ သူရ ရည္မွန္စရာမ်ားထားရွိၾကသည္။ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈသည္ ႏွင့္ ၁၉၉၁ ၂၀၀၄ စိတ္ကူးဆန္ေနသးသည္။}
Authoritarian Survival Strategies in Comparative Perspective: Myanmar, China and North Korea

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ARGE-N Study)

222
ပညာရေး (၃)- မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ တပ်မော်အစိုးရ

အင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက် (ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်) အားအင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်(ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်) အင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်(ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်) အင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်(ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်) အင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်(ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်) အင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်(ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်) အင်္ချင်းစစ်က်မှုရွေးချယ်ရာ စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်(ဥပဒေပြု ပြောက်)
ယခုတွင်ရှိသည့် အခြေခံ အာဏာရွင်အစုံရမ်းသည် ပြုလုပ်ပြီးပြီးပြီး အခြေခံအားလုံး အသေးစိတ်များနှင့်အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အာဏာရွင်များသည် အစားထိုးပါတော့မည်ဖြစ်သည်။

မရှန်းယွဥ်ပြီးပြီးပြီး အခြေခံအားလုံးနှင့်အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အာဏာရွင်များသည် အစားထိုးပါတော့မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
Myanmar’s Economic Potential: Peace Making or Peace Breaking?

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The economic potential of Myanmar includes a significant flow of foreign investment and trade, especially with neighboring countries. However, the political instability and armed conflicts have hindered economic growth and development. Therefore, peace making is crucial for the economic potential of Myanmar.

Peace making can be achieved through various means such as dialogue between the government and ethnic armed organizations, peace talks, and international mediation. These efforts can help to create a stable environment for economic growth and development.

In conclusion, peace making is essential for the economic potential of Myanmar. It is important to address the root causes of conflict and work towards a sustainable peace.

References:

ယင်းကျမ်းစီမံခွန်ခိုးအတွက် အစိုးရသို့မဟုတ် ပြည်သူများ ကျင်းမာရေးမှုအရေအတွက် အခြေခံအချက်အလက်များပါဝင်စေရန် မိမိတို့၏ လက်ရှိရောင်းမွှေးမ်ားကို ပြောင်းလဲစေရန် လိုအပ်သည်။

သို့မဟုတ်တိုင်းတာ၏အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွက် မိမိတို့၏ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို မပေါ်စေရန် အသိပေးရန် လိုအပ်သည်။

ယင်းကျမ်းစီမံခွန်ခိုးအတွက် အခြေခံအချက်အလက်များပါဝင်စေရန် မိမိတို့၏ လက်ရှိရောင်းမွှေးမ်ားကို ပြောင်းလဲစေရန် လိုအပ်သည်။

ယင်းကျမ်းစီမံခွန်ခိုးအတွက် အခြေခံအချက်အလက်များပါဝင်စေရန် မိမိတို့၏ လက်ရှိရောင်းမွှေးမ်ားကို ပြောင်းလဲစေရန် လိုအပ်သည်။
တည်ချင်းထားနေဆဲျဖစ္သည်ဟု ယူဆရသည်။ ငယ်သာပေသခဲ့သည်။ ပြောရမည်ဆုိလွဲင်မြန်မာစီးပြားရေးသမားမ်ားပင်လွဲအဆုံပါတွေ့ရှင်ရန်မိုးျဖစ္ပြောနေသည်။ အဆုံပါတွေ့ရှင်ရွာအောင် အပေါင်းစီးသည်။ အဆုံပါတွေ့ရှင်ရွာသည် တိုက်ခိုက်များမျော့တက်လာချင်း၏ ပြန်ကြယ်တွင်ရှိသည် ဆင်းခင်ပုံတစ်ခုျဖစ္သည်။ ဒောသင့် ထိန်းချုပ်ထားချင်းမရွိသည် နယ်ျမခမ်ားပင်ပါရှိနေသည်။ ျဖစ္ပြောနေသော ပြောက်ခိုက်များမျော့တက်လာသင့်လည်း အစိုးရ၏ ဦးစားပေးကြေညာကြော်လည်း ရွိခဲ့သည်လည်း အစိုးရတပ်မ်ားက ဆုတောင်းခြားရန်ဆုိချင်းသလုိ ထိန်းချုပ်ထားချင်းမျော့သို႔ အစိုးရတပ်ဖြဲ႕မ်ား နယ်ကလုံသြားျခင်းျဖစ္ရျခင်းျဖစ္သည်။ ကာလမ်ားစြာသည့် ရင်ဆုိင်တိုင် ပြောက်ပြောက်ပြောက်သော ျဖစ္ပြောနေသည် ၁၉၉၄ ခုနှစ်အပေါင်းရပ်စဲရှိသည်ကြောင်း ျမန်မာစစ်တပ်တပ်ရင်းမ်ားကလည်း ထားရွိထားၿပီးျဖစ္သည်။ ဒောကြား လက်ခံြဳးခ်မြုးျဖစ္ပြောနေသည် ၂၀၀၈ BGF အျဖစ္လက်ခံခဲ့ ျခင်းျဖစ္သည်။ ျမန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ ကျပ်ကျင်းမ်ားတြင် တာ၀န္ထမ္းျဖစ္လုိား (BGF) အပေါင်းရပ်စဲရှိသည်။
တစ်ခုမှာ ကချင်နယ် ၏ ရွမ်းနယ်ဗုဒ္ဓပုံတွင်အပြန်သည် တိုက်ချက်များကို ယခုလာမှုရှိသည် သိရင်းငါးချက်လုပ်ငန်းစဥ်၏ အစွာမှုများ သို့မဟုတ် ချိန်လွှပထားများကို ကာကွယ်တိုက်သင် ဗုဒ္ဓလားကျစ်သည်။ တိုင်ပြားလာသည့် တိုက်ချက်များသည် အောက်မှုမှုတစ်ခုအတွက် အောက်မှုစွာ သို့မဟုတ် အထည်ဖော်ကျသင်းမှုချက်တစ်ခုခုအတွက် အရေရာတစ်ခုျဖစ္ပြီး ဗားရွေးချယ်များကို အုပ်ဆိုင်းနိုင်သည်။ ဗားရွေးချယ်သည့် အရေရာရာမှု လာရေးအဖြေများ ဗားရွေးချယ်များသည် အားလုံး လာရေးစုံစွားဆက်ဆံများ၏ အက်ဦအဆက်တစ်ခုသည် မည်သူကျင်းတစ်ခုကို ထိန်းချုပ်သို့သားသည်ျဖစ္စေသည်။ ထိရိယာအတွင်းရွိ အချိန်အေရာက်များသို့မဟုတ် အစိုးရအဖြဲ့အစည်းတစ်ခုခုအတွက် အကာအကြယ်ျဖစ္သည်။ အကယ်၍ လွာချားအလားအလားသည် နယ်ဗုဒ္ဓလားဗုဒ္ဓာတ်အဖြစ် အများအပြားထိန်းချုပ်ထားပြီး ယင်းနေရာတွင်ပါရှိသည် အက္ခရာမဖက်အက္ခရာများ၏ အလာအလာများကို ပယ်ဖျင့်ခဲ့လွှားသည်။ ဗားရွေးချယ်များနှင့် စီးပြားလွှားသုံးအပါအဝင် ဗားရွေးချယ်များမှာ တစ်ရပ်စီးသည် ပါဝင်သည်။
Obstacles to Police Reform in Myanmar/Burma

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၂၀၁၂တွင် စစ္ဘက်နယ်ပယ်မ်ားကိုရွိသည်။ ဥပမာအားဖင့် တိုင်းရွေးလဲရေးသည်အစီအစဥ်တစ်ရပ်ကိုစတင်ခဲ့သည့် တိုင်းအေလးအနက်လားခင်းမွကင်လျတ်နေခဲ့သည်းမှုကို ကတည်ကပြုထားခဲ့သည့် တင်းမာသည့် ဗားသူများဖြစ်သည်မှာဆန်က်င်ဘက်အနီအထားသိပ်း၀ဝ်နိုးပြောင်ကြားပြီး ၁၉၆၂ခုနှစ်တွင် ဗုိလ်ခ်ွပ်မိုးေနားအာဏာသိမ်းပီးလည်း ဗားသူများဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းခ်ဥ္းကပ္မီးသည် ဗီးယားနှင့်လိုအပ်သော်လည်း လမ်းလည်းေကာင်း အစိမ်းကြူးမွဲထားသည်။

အေရးေပးအေျခအေနအတွင်းအရပ်ဘက်အာဏာကိုအေထာက်အကူျပဳရန်အသင့်အေနအထားသာရွိေနမည်ဟုစစ္တပ်ကမူ၂၀၁၂ခုနှစ်တွင်ရခြင်းဖြင့်ပြောင်ခဲ့သည်။၂၀၁၃ခုနှစ်တွင်ဗီးယားနှင့်လိုအပ်သော်လည်းေကာင်းအစိမ်းကြူးလုပ်ဆောင်မွဲသည်။ျပည္တိုးေရးများကိုကုိင်တယံရာတွင်ရဲတပ်ဖြဲ႕ပုိမုိႀကီးမားသောအစိတ္အပုိင်းတစ်ရပ်တွင်ပါဝင်ပီးအေစာင့်များတွင်လည်းေကာင်းအစိမ်းေရာင္ယူနီးစားမ်ားပိုမုိရွိနေးပီးစြွဲျဖစ္သည်။

အကာအကြယ်ေပးရာတွင်လည်းေကာင်း၊အစုိးရဖျင့်သံတမ့်ရွင်းမ်ားအျပင္ဘက်တွင်ရပ္ေနေသာလုံခြုံေရးယခုတွင်လည်း ဗီးယားနှင့်လိုအပ်သော်လည်းေကာင်း၊အေရးႀကီးပုဂဢဲိမ်ားကိုသည့်ျပည့္စုံေသာ၀ဝ်ျပီးလုံခြုံေရးရင္း ၃၄ရင္းရွိသည့်တပ်ဖြဲ႕တစ်ခုျဖစ္ရန္ျဖစ္သည္။ဗီးယားဘာသာဖြင့်ကိုလုိနီေခတ္ကတည္းကပြုမုိႀကီးမားပီးလည်း ပန္းတုိင်မွာအမ်ဳိးသား၊အမ်ဳိးသမီးတပ်ဖြဲ႕အားျဖင့္အရေးမ်ားက အရပ္သားမ်ားႏွင့်အနီးကပ္ပူးတြဲေဆာင္ျခင္းျဖင့္ရပ္ရြာအေျချပဳရဲတပ်ဖြဲ႕လုပ္ငန္းမ်ားများချင့်႔ျပန္႔ေသာဒီမုိကေရစီစနစ္သို႔အစီအစဥ္တက်အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းရန္ျဖစ္သည္။

သုိ႔ေသာ္လည္းတပ်မေတာ္သည်ျပင္ပကာကြယ္ေရးႏွင့်တိုင်းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကိုင္တပ်ဖြဲ႕မ်ားႏွင့်ရင္ဆုိင္မည့္ဆူပူမႈႏွိမ္နင္းေရးျဖစ္သည်။ဗီးယားတိုးေရးတည္တံ့က်င့္မ်ားေပးရန္ႏွင့်တိုင်းျပည္၏ျပည္တျံုစံ၏ေသာအခ်ဳိ႕မ်က္ႏွာစာမ်ားကိုပိုမုိတာလက္ရွိအစီအစဥ္မ်ားကိုအသစ္ျပန္လည္အားျဖည့္ရန္သည္သာမကအရပ္ဘက်ပုိဆန္ေသာဟန္ပန္ႏွင့္စိုးမုိးေရးဒီမုိကေရစီစနစ္သို႔အစီအစဥ္တက်အသြင္ကူးသည်။
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်အားလုံးက ဣစိုးပေးချက်နှင့်အတူ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်၏ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမုိးေရးမှာ အလွန်အမျိုးသားကို အနေဖြင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်များသည် အာဏာရွင်း အစိုးရ များသည် နောက်ဆုံးတွင်း လေးထောင်းများစွာခဲ့ရသည်။

ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်အားလုံးက ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်၏ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမုိးေရးမှာ အလွန်အမျိုးသားကို အနေဖြင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်များသည် အာဏာရွင်း အစိုးရ များသည် နောက်ဆုံးတွင်း လေးထောင်းများစွာခဲ့ရသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်များသည် နောက်ဆုံးတွင်း လေးထောင်းများစွာခဲ့ရသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်သည် နောက်ဆုံးတွင်း လေးထောင်းများစွာခဲ့ရသည်။ 

မြန်မာလူများ၏ အာဏာရွင်းများအားလုံးက ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်များသည် နောက်ဆုံးတွင်း လေးထောင်းများစွာခဲ့ရသည်။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်သည် နောက်ဆုံးတွင်း လေးထောင်းများစွာခဲ့ရသည်။
အဆင့်ကိုးကားသောအချက်များအပေါ် ထိခိုက်ရာတွင်မှာ အဆင့်ကိုးကား တောင်းဆိုသွားသော အချက်များကိုတင်ယူခဲ့သည်ဆယ်စုရာစုပေါင်းရောက်ရွိခဲ့ပါသည်။ အောက်ဖော်သော ၇ ရပ်ကိုရောက်လာသုံးသပ်သူများကရောက်လာသုံးသပ်မွတ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ယင်းတို့မှာ ရဲတပ်ဖြဲ႕သည် အာရှ၊ ပေရာဖက်ရွင္နယ်ကိုးကျွန်းစွာသတ်မွတ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ အာရှအသုံးခဲ့ဝင်ငွေကိုအနည်းဆုံးအသုံးပြုခဲ့စေပြီး လူ႔ဘူမိုးများကိုကာကြယ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ရဲတပ်ဖြဲ႕သည် အျပည္ျပည္ဆုိင္ရာလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးစံႀကိုဆိုင္ရာလုိက်နာေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္း၊ အဖြဲ႕စည္းအတြင္းႏွင့္ ျပင္ပတြင္ ထိေရာက္ေသာတာ၀န္ခံမႈကုိ ထိန္းသိမ္းျခင္းႏွင့္ ျပည္သူ႔ဘူမိုးများကို ကာကြယ္ထိန္းသိမ္းေစာင့္ေရွာက္ျခင္းစသည့္ မူသုံးရပ္သို႔အက်ဥ္းခ်ဳပ္ႏုိင္သည္။ ယင္းစံသတ္မွတ္ခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္တုိင္းတာၾကည့္လွ်င္ ျမန္မာႏိုငံ သည္ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ေႏွာင္းပိုင္းကတည္းကစၾကည့္လွ်င္ တိုးတက္မႈအခ်ဳိ႕ရွိခဲ့ၿပီး ၂၀၁၁ တြင္ အစုိးရသစ္တက္ၿပီးေနာက္ သိသာခဲ့ဖြယ္ရွိေသာ္လည္း ေရွ႕ဆက္ေလွ်ာက္လွမ္းရမည့္ မ်ားစြာရွိေနေသးသည္။

MPF သည္မိမိကိုယ္တုိင္လည္ပုံေဖာ္ႏုိင္သင့္ၿပီး ထုိသုိ႔ဆုိလွ်င္ ျမန္မာႏိုငံတြင္သမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္၏ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးအစီအစဥ္ႏွင့္ ပုိၿပီးဒီမုိကေရစီဆန္ကာေပါၾကြယ္၀ၿပီး လူသားဆန္ေသာလူ႔အဖြဲ႕အစည္းတစ္ရပ္ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးကိုအဓိက်ကေသာထည့္၀င္မႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ႏိုင္မည့္အလားအလာျဖစ္သည္။ အေရးႀကီးေသာ အရပ္ဘက္အဖြဲ႕အစည္းတစ္ရပ္အေနျဖင့္ ေရြးေကာက္ခံအစိုးရ၊ မိမိတုိ႔၏ အျပဳအမူအေရးႀကီးေသာ ညႊန္းကိန္းတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္ေပလိမ့္မည္။ ယင္းကိစၥအားလုံးတို႔ကို အားလုံးတိုင္ကေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း ႏွစ္ဖက္စလုံးက အနီးကပ္ေစာင့္ၾကည့္ရလိမ့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။
မြန်မာစီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမႈအလားအလာမ်ားတိုင္းျပည္ႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးမႈအလားအလာမ်ားတို႔သည္ အစိုးရသစ္အား စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈအသစ္၏ အလြန္အေရးပါေသာအရာမ်ားတိုင္းျပည္မ်ား ကာလၾကာျမင့္စြာ အလြန္အမင္းဆင္းရဲခဲ့ျခင္းတို႔သည္ အစိုးရသစ္အား စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈအသစ္ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ရန္ တြန္းအားေပးသည့္ အဓိကေမာင္းႏွင္အားျဖစ္သည္။

ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံသည္ သယံဇာတေပါ၀သည္ တိုင္းျပည္ျဖစ္သည္။

ေနာက္ပိုင္းတြင္ စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈေနာက်က်ျခင္းသည္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈကို ပ်က္စီးေစမည္ဟု ထိပ္တန္းအရာရွိမ်ားက သေဘာ ေပါက္ခဲ့သည္။

လြန္ခဲ့သည့္ႏွစ္ႏွစ္၌ အာရပ္ကမၻာတြင္ျဖစ္ပြားခဲ့သည့္ ၀႐ုန္းသုန္းကား အေျခအေနေၾကာင့္ ျမန္မာအာဏာပိုင္မ်ား ေသြးပ်က္ ထိတ္လန္႔ခဲ့ရၿပီး စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈကို အရွိန္ျမႇင့္ရန္ ၎တိနေပၚ ဖိအား ျဖစ္ေစခဲ့သည္။

အဘယ္ေၾကာင့္ဆိုေသာ္ အာရပ္ေႏြဦးဟု ေခၚဆိုသည့္ အျဖစ္အပ်က္၏ အဓိကအေၾကာင္းအရင္းမွာ လူငယ္မ်ား အလုပ္အကိုင္ မရွိသည့္ႏႈန္း ျမင့္မားလာျခင္းေၾကာင့္ျဖစ္သည္။

၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္မွစ၍ ျမန္မာအစိုးရသစ္၏ စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈ လုပ္ေဆာင္မႈမ်ား ႏုိင္ငံေရး ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈမ်ား တစ္ႏွစ္ေက်ာ္ၾကာ ျပဳလုပ္ၿပီးေနာက္ သမၼတဦးသိန္းစိန္အစိုးရသည္ စီးပြားေရး ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈ၏ ဒုတိယအပိုင္းကို ျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့သည္။
ဗိုလ်ချင်းစိုက်ခ်င်းများကို ပြောင်းလဲထားရာ စီးပြားရေးအတွက် အသုံးပြုခြင်းနှင့် စီးပြားအလုပ်များကို မှားလားပါ။ စီးပြားရေး အဖြေအစိုးရကို အကြံပေးသုံးပြီး လျှပ်စစ်များကို အများအားလုံး ရှာဖွေပြီး စီးပြားရေးအားလုံး အဖြေအစိုးရကို အကြံပေးပါသည်။

ဗိုလ်ချင်းစိုက်ခ်င်းများကို ဖြည့်စွက်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။ ဗိုလ်ချင်းစိုက်ခ်င်းများကို ဖြည့်စွက်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။

အမျိုးသား အဖြေအစိုးရကို ဖြည့်စွက်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။ ဗိုလ်ချင်းစိုက်ခ်င်းများကို ဖြည့်စွက်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။

အဖြေအစိုးရကို ဖြည့်စွက်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။ ဗိုလ်ချင်းစိုက်ခ်င်းများကို ဖြည့်စွက်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏ အသုံးပြုခြင်း။
ျမန္မာ့စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးအနာဂတ္သည္ ေတာက္ပေနပုံရသည္။ သို႔ေသာ္ ယင္း၏ျပဳျပာင္း ႀကီးထြားတုိးတက္မႈျမန္ဆန္ေသာ စီးပြားေရးမ်ားေနာက္ကို လုိက္ႏုိင္ၿပီး တစ္ႏွစ္အတြင္ ၇ ရာခုိင္ႏႈန္းမွ ၈ ရာခုိင္ႏႈန္းသို တုိးတက္ကာ၀င္ေငြအလယ္အလတ္ရွိေသာ ႏိုင္ငံတစ္ခုျဖစ္လာကာ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈကို အရွိန္အဟုန္ျဖင့္ေနာက္ထပ္ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးစိန္ေခၚမႈမ်ားကို ေက်ာ္လႊားႏိုင္လွ်င္ ၂၀၃၀ တြင္ ႏုိင္ငံသားတစ္ဦးခ်င္း၀င္ေငြသည္ သုံးဆျဖစ္လာမည္ဟု အစီရင္ခန္႔စာက ဆုိသည္။

ျမန္မာ ႏုိင္ငံဟာ အာရွရဲ႕ေနာက္ထပ္ထြန္းသစ္စၾကယ္တစ္ပြင့္ျဖစ္လာႏိုင္တယ္ဆုိေပမယ့္ ဒီလုိျဖစ္လာဖုိ႔ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈကို ခုိင္ခုိင္ျမဲျမဲနဲ႔ မဆုတ္မနစ္ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ဖုိ႔လုိအပ္ပါတယ္ ဟု အေရွ႕အာရွ၊ အေရွ႕ေတာင္အာရွႏွင့္ ပစိဖိတ္ဆုိင္ရာ ADB ဒုတိယဥကၠဌ Stephen Groff က ေျပာဆုိခဲ့သည္။
လဲမႈ ႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္မ်ားသည္ စိန္ေခၚမႈအျပည့္ျဖင့္ ခက္ခဲၾကမ္းတမ္းသည့္လမ္းတစ္ခုလည္း ျဖစ္ေပလိမ့္မည္။

ပထမအခ်က္မွာ မ်ားစြာေသာ ႏိုင္ငံတကာရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံသူမ်ားသည္ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးအေက်ာ့သစ္၏ အနာဂတ္ကို သံသ ယရွိၾကသည္။

Transparency International ကထုတ္ျပန္သည့္ ၂၀၁၂ အက်င့္ပ်က္ျခစားမႈညႊန္းကိန္းအရ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ သည္ ကမၻာေပၚတြင္ ျခစားမႈအမ်ားဆုံးႏိုင္ငံတစ္ခုျဖစ္ကာ ယင္းသည္ စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးေရးတုိ႔၏ ႀကီးမားေသာ အတားအဆီးျဖစ္သည္။

ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံသည္ ၂၀၁၁ တြင္ စစ္အစိုးရဆင္းသြားၿပီးေနာက္ အေနာက္ႏိုင္ငံ ရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံသူမ်ားအတြက္ ပြင့္ကာစသာျဖစ္ေနၿပီး ပုဂၢလိကလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားအေနျဖင့္ ျမန္မာႏိုငံသည္ အျမတ္ႀကီးႀကီးမားမား ရႏိုင္သည္ေနရာေလာ၊ အျခားေနရာသည္ အဆုံး႐ႈံးနည္းမည္ေလာကို ေ၀ခြဲမရျဖစ္ေနသည္။

ဒုတိယအခ်က္မွာ ေခတ္ေနာက္က်ေနသာ စီးပြားေရးျဖစ္ၿပီး အထူးသျဖင့္ ဘ႑ာေရးစနစ္ကိစၥသည္ စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈအတြက္  ႀကီးမားေသာ အတားအဆီးျဖစ္သည္။

တတိယအခ်က္မွာ တစ္ႏုိင္ငံလုံးရွိ အၾကမ္းထည္ႏွင့္အႏုထည္မ်ားအပါအ၀င္ ယုိယြင္းပ်က္စီးေနသာ အေဆာက္ အအုံမ်ားျဖစ္ၿပီး ယင္းသည္လည္း စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖဳိးမႈျဖစ္ၫ၀မီးေသာလုပ္ငန္းအမ်ားအျပားရွိသည့္တုိင္ ၄င္းတုိ႔၏ နည္းပညာ၊ စီမံခန္႔ခြဲမႈ ႏွင့္ လုပ္ငန္းလည္ပတ္မႈတုိ႔မွာ ႏုိင္ငံတကာအဆင့္ေနာက္တြင္က်န္ေနသည္။

ပဥၥမအခ်က္မွာ စီးပြားေရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲရုပ္ငန္းစဥ္တြင္ ျမန္မာအမ်ဳိးသားလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားသည္ ပိုအားေကာင္းလာမလား သို႔မဟုတ္ ႏိုင္ငံျခားကုမၸဏီမ်ားေၾကာင့္ က်႐ႈံးသြားမလားဆုိသည္ပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ ျမန္မာ့ကုမၸဏီအမ်ားစုမွာ အေသးစား ႏွင့္ အလယ္အလတ္လုပ္ငန္းမ်ားျဖစ္ၾကၿပီး ႀကီးမားေသာလုပ္ငန္းအမ်ားအျပားရွိသည့္တုိင္ ၄င္းတုိ႔၏ နည္းပညာ၊ စီမံခန္႔ခြဲမႈ ႏွင့္ လုပ္ငန္းလည္ပတ္မႈတုိ႔မွာ ႏုိင္ငံတကာအားျဖင့္လည္း အေနာက္တုိင္းရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံသူမ်ားတြင္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၌ရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံရန္ အရင္းအႏွီးအလုံအေလာက္ မရွိေခ်။ အေနာက္တုိင္းေစ်းကြက္စားသုံးမႈမွာလည္းနိမ့္က်သည္။