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Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 711-738

Published by: [International Phenomenological Society](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653791>

Accessed: 03/02/2012 07:06

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Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense

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What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the *cogito*-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker's arguments are directed against two models of ordinary perception, the "object perception model" and the "broad perceptual model". I argue that the core theses that Shoemaker associated with them are either dubious in their own right or applicable to certain cases of self-knowledge. Overall the aim is to show that there is such a variety of patterns in each case that simple analogies or disanalogies are unhelpful.

What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? Is it in any way like observation or perception? If so, how like? In this paper I hope to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are authoritative with respect to knowledge of the contents of their own intentional states, are enough like perception to qualify as cases of quasi-observation, and so to justify the claim that authoritative self-knowledge is a form of inner observation. In doing this I am going against the current trend in philosophical literature, which is decidedly hostile to observational models of self-knowledge (Shoemaker 1994, McDowell 1994, Peacocke 1996, 1998, Wright 1998). However, I think that much of this hostility is voiced against the background of assumptions concerning the so-called observation model itself, and specifically, assumptions about what ordinary perception involves, which themselves are questionable. If the perceptual model upon which the analogy with self-knowledge is based is itself a faulty paradigm for ordinary perception, the fact that cases of self-knowledge do not conform to it is neither here nor there. One cannot establish that self-knowledge is not a form of inner observation or perception on the basis of a paradigm that is too crude or inaccurate to fit perception itself.

My strategy for making plausible the claim that certain cases of self-knowledge are, broadly speaking, observational, is to focus on various models of ordinary perception and argue that the ones that cause trouble for an observational account of self-knowledge are either unsatisfactory paradigms for ordinary perception, or, where they are not, are applicable to certain cases of self-knowledge. I shall proceed by examining two models that Sydney Shoemaker (1994) discusses extensively, the “object perception model” and the “broad perceptual model”, and the reasons he advances for thinking that introspective self-knowledge does not conform to either of these. In the case of the first, I shall argue that the core theses that Shoemaker associates with the paradigm are either dubious in their own right with regard to ordinary perception, or applicable also to certain cases of self-knowledge. In the case of the second, I shall argue that Shoemaker’s claim that first-order and second-order intentional states do not, whereas perceptual states and their objects do, meet the condition of existing, or being capable of existing, *independently of one another*, is false. Certain cases of self-knowledge, viz. the so-called *cogito*-type ones, I argue, can be construed as meeting the independence condition. My overall aim is to show that there is such a variety of patterns in each case that *simple* analogies or disanalogies are unhelpful. If this is right, then the contrast between perception and introspection distorts both modes of awareness.

Before embarking on this enterprise, I should make clear what the point of the exercise is and why it is significant. The class of intentional states with which I am concerned is, in the first instance at least, a very restricted but important one. I am interested in what Tyler Burge (1985, 1988, 1996) has referred to as the *cogito*-type states; states in which one is currently consciously thinking about a thought (with a given propositional content *p*) *while* thinking that thought. Such cases of self-knowledge are thought by many to be ones where the subject is authoritative with regard to the nature and contents of the first-order thought. Suppose, for example, that it is true that I am currently, consciously thinking that I am thinking that water is transparent, and that this reflective thought constitutes knowledge. This knowledge seems to be peculiarly *immediate* or *direct* (Burge 1985, 1988, 1996, Heil 1988). Descartes (1969) thought that the special status of such knowledge that derives from this immediate relation between subject and thought, or thinker and thought reviewed, makes for a kind of *transparency* of thought reviewed to the reviewing subject. He thought that it is this difference between a subject’s access to the contents of her own intentional states and others’ access to those contents that confers an epistemic advantage on the subject in the sense of better placing her to know what the contents of those states are, and so in giving her *authority* over others with regard to knowledge of such contents (see Burge 1985).

Many have understood this relation of epistemic directness as being non-evidence-based, which in turn encourages the view that the *cogito*-type cases are like cases of observation in certain relevant respects.¹ Specifically, the thought is that, in so far as authoritative self-knowledge depends upon epistemic immediacy, where this is non-evidence-based, a perceptual model might serve as a basis for explaining the authoritative nature of certain cases of self-knowledge.

I think that this thought is correct for the *cogito*-type cases, and elsewhere (Macdonald 1995, 1998) I have argued that there are two features of epistemic directness, of being non-evidence-based, that apply to awareness of both observable properties (primary and secondary) and sensation and intentional properties in *cogito*-type cases.² The first is that awareness of such properties is *epistemically basic* in the sense that it is the fundamental or favoured means by which objects that instance these properties are initially typically known.³ The second is that such properties *are in general as they appear to be* when instances of them are presented to normal perceivers in normal circumstances. What makes for the peculiarly *authoritative* nature of self-knowledge is that subjects are the *only* ones to whom instances of such properties appear in the epistemically favoured way. Thus, the argument is as follows:

1. A subject S typically thinks about her own intentional states *as* states of particular contentful types and awareness of such contents is epistemically basic to S.
2. S's intentional states are of the contentful types that they appear to be (i.e., such contents are knowable by S in an epistemically direct way).

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¹ See Heil (1988, 1992), Burge (1985, 1988), Davidson (1984, 1987, 1988), Wright (1989), and Alston (1971). Some, like Wright, emphasize the non-evidence-based character of such knowledge, whereas others, like Heil, emphasize its non-empirically evidence-based character. Alston gives an illuminating account of the different senses that might attach to the notion of direct access. He argues that the notion of directness that is relevant to self-knowledge is epistemic, not causal, and is explicable in terms of being non-evidence-based, where this is distinct from being non-inferential. Heil (1992) endorses this view.

² I take certain properties to be observable if whether objects are instances of them can be determined just by unaided observation of those objects. Whatever 'unaided' means here, it does not mean 'unconceptualized': it may be that I cannot know *which* observable property is being manifested to me through its instance simply by being presented with an instance of it, since I must be capable of recognizing another instance of that property as of that property when presented with it. For recent discussion of observable properties and observational predicates, see Wright (1987). See also Christopher Peacocke (1983) for discussion of conditions necessary and sufficient for a concept to be observational. Peacocke further elaborates the sense in which the two features I take here to be central to a property's being observable are features of observational concepts.

³ That is to say, typically, in getting to know what an object is, these are the first of its properties which one gets to know that it has.

3. No one *other* than S can be the subject of S's intentional states, so that when S thinks about her own intentional states as states of particular intentional types, S is the only one to whom those contentful types appear in this way.

Therefore, in general (i.e., barring special cognitive failures)

4. S is authoritative with regard to the contents of her own intentional states.⁴

If the argument is correct, self-knowledge in *cogito*-type cases is like observation or perception in being epistemically direct. Where it departs from the model of ordinary perception is in its account of what makes for *authority*. Perception, unlike certain kinds of self-knowledge, is not authoritative.⁵ But the observation model is applicable to cases of authoritative self-knowledge,

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⁴ This version of the argument differs from that presented in Macdonald (1995) and replicates the one presented in Macdonald (1998). What appears here as premise 2 appears there as a conclusion derived from 1 and 3. The reason for the reformulation is that to see 2 as being entailed by 1 and 3 is to encourage the view that authoritative self-knowledge arises from the fact that in reflection a subject's attitude toward her first-order contentful types or properties *determines* their extensions, and so makes them the states that they are. However, unlike Wright (1988, 1992), who maintains that one's authority with respect to one's own intentional states consists in the fact that one's best opinion concerning those states' contentful types fix the extensions of those types, I maintain that one's authority consists in the fact that one cannot in reflection misidentify the object of one's reflection, and this is so because the nature of the thought reflected upon determines the nature of the reflecting thought. Reflection is, in at least one respect, an appropriate characterization of the special relation subjects' second-order thoughts bear to their first-order ones. In physical reflection, say, in a mirror, under certain ideal conditions, the object cannot be misrepresented. So the object is as it appears to be. But the reflection does not determine the object to be what it is. Similarly, in mental reflection, the nature of the thought reflected upon determines the nature of the reflection. If so, then 2 should appear as an independent premise in the argument.

⁵ So, although perception meets the conditions specified in premises 1 and 2 of the argument for authoritative self-knowledge, it does not meet the condition specified in premise 3. That premise says that first-order intentional properties are such that, when grasped in the epistemically direct way, are grasped only by their subject. But observable properties of objects, both primary and secondary, are not such that, when grasped in the epistemically direct way, are grasped only by one subject. This may make it look as though it is a contingent matter whether there is authoritative self-knowledge; a matter of who happens to be around (which in turn robs the authoritative status of such knowledge of any real epistemic interest). But I do not think that this is so. I think it plausible to maintain that it is in the *nature* of intentional properties in *cogito*-type cases to be graspable by only one subject. So, if such properties have the essential features of observable ones in these cases and thereby qualify as observable, they form a *special* kind of observable property. For it is in the nature of primary and secondary observable qualities of objects of perception that they be graspable by any number of subjects. This difference between intentional (and other mental) properties and (other) observable properties of objects makes the authoritative status of certain cases of self-knowledge a substantial matter.

despite the difference in authoritative status, because in both cases the knowledge is distinctively direct or immediate in nature.

So I believe that the central features characteristic of observation properties in the case of perception also apply to sensation and intentional ones in *cogito*-type cases. However, Shoemaker does not. His arguments present the most formidable challenge in current literature to observational accounts of self-knowledge. So let us examine them.

1. Shoemaker and the “Object Perception” Model.

In a series of influential articles, Sydney Shoemaker (1994) attacks the claim that introspective knowledge of one’s states—both sensation and intentional—is a form of “inner sense” analogous to perception or observation. He does this in two stages. In the first he sets out a narrow model or stereotype of ordinary perception, the “object perception model”, which he argues fails to fit introspective knowledge of one’s sensation and intentional states, even minimally. In the second he considers a sub-class of theses constitutive of the object perception model, which he dubs the “broad perceptual model”, whose two theses do not, he claims, apply to sensation and intentional states. Let us consider his claims with regard to the object perception model first.

Shoemaker characterizes the object perception model in terms of eight theses, four of which he considers to be essential to it. These theses are:

- (1) Sense perception involves the operation of an organ of perception whose disposition is to some extent under the voluntary control of the subject. Acquiring perceptual knowledge involves getting the appropriate organs into an appropriate relation to the object of perception.
- (2) Sense perception involves the occurrence of sense-experiences, or sense-impressions, that are distinct from the object of perception, and also distinct from the perceptual belief (if any) that is formed. The occurrence of these constitutes the subject’s being “appeared to” in some way—a way that may or may not correspond to the way the object actually is.
- (3) While sense perception provides one with awareness of facts, i.e., awareness *that* so and so is the case, it does this by means of awareness of objects. One’s awareness of the facts is explained by one’s awareness of the objects involved in these facts. So, for example, I am aware (I perceive) that there is a book before me *by* perceiving the book—here the book is the (non-factual) object. In such a case there is always the potentiality of a factual awareness whose propositional content involves *demonstrative* reference to the object

or objects of which one is perceptually aware—e.g., that *this* book is to the right of *that* one.

(4) Sense perception affords “identification information” about the object of perception. When one perceives one is able to pick out one object from others, distinguishing it from the others by information, provided by the perception, about both its relational and its non-relational properties. The provision of such information is involved in the “tracking” of the object over time, and its reidentification from one time to another.

(5) The perception of objects standardly involves perception of their intrinsic, nonrelational properties. We can perceive relations between things we perceive; but we wouldn’t perceive these things at all, and so couldn’t perceive relations between them, if they didn’t present themselves as having intrinsic, nonrelational properties. To perceive that this book is to the right of that one I must perceive, or at least seem to perceive, intrinsic properties of the two books, e.g., their colours and shapes.

(6) Objects of perception are potential objects of attention. Without changing what one perceives, one can shift one’s attention from one perceived object to another, thereby enhancing one’s ability to gain information about it.

(7) Perceptual beliefs are causally produced by the objects or states of affairs perceived, via a causal mechanism that normally produces beliefs that are true. Given (2) above, this process involves the production of sense-experiences, which together with background beliefs give rise to the perceptual beliefs. Given (1), the specification of the causal mechanism makes reference to the organ of perception, and the reliability of the mechanism consists in there being a correspondence between the contents of the beliefs and what the sense-organs are directed towards.

(8) The objects and states of affairs which the perception is of, and which it provides knowledge about, exist independently of the perceiving of them, and, with certain exceptions, independently of there being things with the capacity for perceiving them or being aware of them. Thus trees, mountains, etc. can exist without there being creatures with the capacity to perceive them, and it is in principle possible for houses, automobiles and human bodies to exist in this way. (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 252–54)

Shoemaker argues that introspective knowledge fails to conform to all eight of these theses. Since, however, he thinks that only four of them, 3—6, are essential to the model, and two of the others, 7 and 8, characterize the broad perceptual model to be discussed in section 2 below, I shall not dwell on his claims with regard to 1 and 2 except to make a couple of comments. First, in (1) Shoemaker summarily dismisses the suggestion that there might be an organ of “inner sense”, but I do not see why we must take this view. Suppose that we did in fact discover that some region of the brain was strongly linked to awareness of sensations or occurrent thinkings, and perhaps had other similarities to outer sense organs (for instance, distortions due to manipulation of that region). Then might it not be tempting to think of it as an organ of inner sense? If so, then it seems that the possibility cannot be dismissed on *a priori* grounds: all that follows from Shoemaker’s point is that we *do* not see any comparable organ to eyes and ears, and that is neither here nor there.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we were unable to discover any such organ of inner sense. Would this show that inner sense was not a form of perception? Not necessarily. For often in perception itself there is not a fixed use of a single organ. Suppose that I am listening to a quartet and I want to hear the viola separately from the other instruments. What I do is look at the viola player’s left hand and pick up the speed of the vibrato, and suddenly her sound emerges from the overall blend. In this case ears and eyes are cooperating in a way I cannot separate, and it seems wrong to view such perception as the operation of a simple transducer.⁶ The point seems clearer still for kinesthesia and cases of proprioception, where there appears to be no transducer at all.⁷

Second, in (2) Shoemaker states that sense perception involves the occurrence of sense experiences by virtue of which perceived external objects appear to a subject, which are distinct both from objects perceived and from

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⁶ I am indebted here to Andrew Woodfield and to Adam Morton, who provided the example.

⁷ In kinesthesia, one is sensorily aware of one’s own bodily movements, but not through any fixed use of any organ that might plausibly be seen as a transducer akin to the eye or ear. In proprioception one’s motor system has information about the mechanical state of play of one’s limbs, which one uses in order to move one’s body about, but again there is nothing akin to an organ that might be seen as a transducer for such information:

The regular muscle fibers in a muscle responsible for producing force are called *extrafusal fibers*. Parallel to the extrafusal fibers are the *intrafusal fibers*, also called *muscle spindles*, which serve to measure muscle length and motion. Extrafusal fibers are innervated by *alpha motor neurons* in the spinal cord; intrafusal fibers are separately innervated by *gamma motor neurons*. They are sensory endings on the muscle spindles that send feedback about the length and motion of the spindles to the spinal cord over the *la afferent fibers*. The muscle spindles, joint receptors, and Golgi tendon organs are called *proprioceptors*, because they give information about the mechanical state of the limb. (Hollerbach, 1990, p. 176.)

beliefs that those experiences ground. On this basis he rejects the view that sensations and intentional states might “appear to” subjects in some way. I find the assumption upon which this rejection is based problematic. There are models of perception, such as John McDowell’s (1994), that explicitly reject such intermediaries, unconceptualized sense experiences, between objects of perception and beliefs to which those experiences give rise. For McDowell, there are objects of perception and thought, and there are the states to which those objects give rise. Sense experiences are, like states of belief and judgement, conceptualized. So it does not seem to be essential to all perceptual paradigms that there be a third item, an unconceptualized sensory experience that acts as intermediary.

This leaves us with theses 3–6. What are we to make of Shoemaker’s claims with regard to these? My view is that, with regard to all four theses, what is true of perception is also true of certain cases of self-knowledge, and what is not true of those cases of self-knowledge is not true of all cases of perception either. If this is right, then Shoemaker’s arguments against the claim that introspective self-knowledge is not a form of inner observation, in as much as they depend on the object perceptual model, do not succeed.

So let us examine thesis 3. Shoemaker claims that in perception one’s awareness of facts is mediate or in some other way derivative on one’s awareness of objects that constitute them, but not vice versa. But why should we think that this is true of perception? The thesis does not simply concern a fact/object dichotomy between perceiving objects, on the one hand, and perceiving facts, on the other. It concerns a much more complex and dubious distinction between priorities in perception; about whether, when we perceive, we perceive facts via perceiving objects or we perceive objects by perceiving facts. And here I do not see why we must be forced to choose: it may be that sometimes we do it one way and sometimes we do it another. A stronger point may be true here, namely that one cannot do one *without* doing the other, i.e., that perceiving an object *o* is, in fact, perceiving *o*’s being *F* (or *o*’s being *G*, or...).⁸ It also seems possible to perceive the *F*-ness of *o* without thereby perceiving *o*.⁹

What about thesis 4? Shoemaker thinks that 4 follows from 2, which I have already briefly commented upon above. However, let us examine more carefully his reasons for thinking that it is inapplicable to self-knowledge. Shoemaker’s main reason for thinking that thesis 4 is inapplicable turns on the assumption that the object of such knowledge—of introspective awareness—is the *self*. In fact this assumption also pervades his discussion of theses 3, 5, and 6. His claim is that in perception, awareness of the object

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⁸ Davidson makes a similar point in Davidson (1980).

⁹ See, for example, Locke’s discussion of ‘partial consideration’ in Locke (1975). I am indebted here to an anonymous referee for this journal.

enters into awareness of a fact about that object by perceiving the object, its properties and relations to other things, and *identifying* the object *as* the object it is. In introspective self-knowledge, however, there is neither room for such identification nor need for information upon which to base such identification. There is no room for such identification because in general

...there is no possibility here of a *misidentification*; if I have my usual access to my hunger, there is no room for the thought "Someone is hungry all right, but is it me?" (Shoemaker 1994, p. 258).

And even when there is room for identification, it will always presuppose possession of other first-person information. Suppose, for example, that I am uncertain whether the person in the mirror is me, and I move about, trying to see whether the movements of this person match mine. In order to determine whether that person is me, I need to know that *I myself* am moving in certain ways. On pain of infinite regress, then, in general, identification-based introspective self-knowledge must presuppose self-knowledge which is not so based: a non-identification-based awareness of oneself.

Shoemaker recognizes that these claims, even if true, do not obviously rule out the possibility of a perception-based model of introspective self-knowledge which does not take the so-called 'object' of such knowledge to be a self. In particular, it does not rule out the possibility that the objects of introspective awareness are sensational and intentional *states*. However, he addresses these types of case also, and his main objection to the applicability of the perceptual paradigm here focuses, not on the infinite regress problem, but on the claim that there is no possibility of *misidentification*. Here his argument relies exclusively on the point that, unlike perception, knowledge of one's own intentional states (say, knowledge that one believes that Boris Yeltsin is President of Russia) is such that one *cannot misidentify* either the state (say, that it is a belief rather than a wish) or its content.

Now, I agree that, at least with respect to a small class of cases of self-knowledge (the *cogito*-type ones, in fact) one cannot go wrong in this way. But this is itself a controversial point which requires defense. Furthermore, what defense it needs may be (and I think is) consistent with a perceptual model of self-knowledge. More importantly, however, I think it highly implausible to suppose that all mental states are incapable of misidentification in the way that Shoemaker suggests. On the contrary, even in the case of sensation states, where this might seem most clearly to be true, one needs to distinguish those immediate, fragmentary stabs of sensation and those longer term, complex, non-fragmentary states, such as having a migraine. The latter are not only complex, but seem to display a regular pattern of development which may, and often does, serve as a kind of 'check' on one's assessment of the state but also serves as a source of prediction.

This makes such states like states of perception in having both causal and predictive elements.

In the case of intentional states the suggestion is much less plausible. Here one must distinguish one's currently, consciously entertained thoughts from beliefs which one has but hardly ever—if ever—entertains consciously. There are desires whose 'objects' may not be easily identified by the subject, and with regard to which a subject may be deluded. And there are assumptions at work in behaviour that may only be known indirectly and fallibly, if at all, by their subjects. In short, not all cases of sensation and intentional states are plausibly understood to be incapable of misidentification. Most such states appear, on the contrary, to be quite capable of misidentification: think, for example, of cases of memory where one misremembers. Like misperception, where one perceives but mistakes one thing for another, in misremembering one remembers but mistakes one thing for another. So, for example, in the case of memory of one's own sensation and intentional states, one might misremember an experience of anguish as one of embarrassment; or a perception of an Oxford college building as a perception of a church. Further, of those concerning which we might wish to claim that we are authoritative, it is controversial whether a subject's knowledge of them is either incorrigible or infallible. This is paralleled in perception. In some cases the relation between subject and object may be so simple, so immediate, that perhaps one cannot go wrong, or, if one can, one is nevertheless authoritative with regard to knowledge about them. This may be true, for example, for cases of perception of secondary qualities such as colour. In other cases it is not like this.

So I do not think that Shoemaker's claims with regard to the possibility of misidentification establishes the required asymmetry between perception and self-knowledge. Before moving on, however, I should like to add one further point. Even if Shoemaker were right that we cannot misidentify first-person conscious thoughts, it would not without further argument follow that we cannot perceive first-person thoughts. For consider an analogous case: the actual world. Everybody agrees that we cannot misidentify the actual world with some other world. And notice that this point holds irrespective of whether we are modal realists or ersatzers of some sort. For if ersatzism of any sort is true, then there is only the actual world to perceive, and even if modal realism is true, then people at the actual world perceive only the actual world. But it is also true that we all agree that we perceive the actual world. The consequence is that we cannot misidentify the actual world, but we can perceive the actual world.¹⁰

Let us turn, then, to thesis 5. Shoemaker claims that it is an essential feature of the object perception model of ordinary perception that in perception one acquires information about the objects of perception by perceiving

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¹⁰ I am indebted here to Chris Daly.

the *intrinsic, nonrelational* rather than *extrinsic* properties of the objects of perception. However, because intentional states are characterized by their contents, and intentional content is *extrinsic* rather than *intrinsic* to such states, thesis 5 is inapplicable to them. Thus, he argues,

...recent discussion of mental content seems to have established that a person's having a state with a certain content consists in part in "external" facts about the person's environment—in the person's standing, or having stood, in perceptual relations to external objects of certain kinds, in his belonging to a linguistic community in which certain practices exist, and so on. I have in mind the arguments of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. So having a state with a certain intentional content is not an intrinsic feature of a person, and having a certain content will not be an intrinsic feature of a belief or desire. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 259)

But I think that Shoemaker's argument here is problematic. It depends on an assumption concerning the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction that is dubious. Shoemaker seems to think that one cannot know one's intentional states in the perceptual way because such knowledge would either require knowledge of the extrinsic factors that determine intentional content to be what it is, or it would require the subject to "reach out into the world" in order to grasp the contents of one's states. Both requirements strike him as ones that inner sense could not meet. But I want to ask why the *extrinsic* nature of content-determination requires access to features outside the head. The assumption that seems to be lurking here is that a property is extrinsic if and only if it is *constituted* by relations to objects, etc., other than that or those which possess it in the sense of being its subject. But this strikes me as conflating *relational individuation* with *being a relation*. Think, for example, of colours. Perhaps it is true that they are such that their natures are not independent of their effects on normal perceivers in normal circumstances. Does it follow that colours are not *in* the objects of perception? Plainly not. In general, it does not follow from the fact that the individuation of an item requires reference to items to which it bears relations, that it is *constituted* in any way by those items. Consider, for instance, functional expressions, such as 'the son of x' which, when combined with a name, serve to map fathers on to their male offspring. The fact that these expressions individuate sons by their relations to their fathers in no way shows that sons are in some way *constituted* by their fathers. If this is so for items like colours and sons, there is no reason to think it is not so for others. Thus, it does not follow from the fact that one may individuate a property, such as that of being a son, by means of an expression which relates that property to another, such as that of being a father, that being a son is in some way constituted by being a father. Similarly, it does not follow from the fact that intentional contents are relationally individuated that they are constituted by those beyond-the-head items that serve to help individuate them. Nor for that reason does it follow that intentional contents, when thought, are not 'wholly in the head'.

This leaves us with thesis 6. Shoemaker claims that in perception objects of awareness are ones to which one can not only *attend*, but that one is able to *shift* one's attention from one object to another, and that it is natural to suppose that the role of attention in introspective self-knowledge of one's own sensory states such as sensations might seem to be the same. However, he argues that the analogy with perception in fact breaks down, and that it is pretty much non-existent with regard to intentional states such as beliefs. Since my interest here is in the *cogito*-type cases of introspective self-knowledge, I shall put Shoemaker's claims concerning sensory states to one side. The question at issue, then, is why intentional states are not objects of attention.

Shoemaker's answer is that there really is no analogue here of *shifting* one's attention from one intentional state to another. If it makes sense to talk of shifting one's attention from one intentional state to another, it simply amounts to talk of one's shifting from thinking about one thought with a given content to thinking about another thought with a different content. But this is not the role that attention plays in perception, or even in sensation. Here the role played by attention is to put the subject in a better position to 'view' the object, or to get information about it.

But why is this not also true for certain cases of introspective self-knowledge? Most of the time we, as subjects of intentional states, are currently, consciously thinking thoughts about the world around us, even if we are not then reflecting upon them. One clear role that reflection plays is to enable us to attend to certain of these thoughts. Suppose that I am in the library, struggling to write a paper on authoritative self-knowledge. I am troubled by a line of argument, and I am trying to figure out why I am dissatisfied with it. I ask myself, what exactly is my objection here, what exactly am I thinking? Here the role of attention seems just to be to put me in a better position to grasp the contents of my first-order thoughts. I do not see why such a role should be seen to be so foreign to introspective knowledge of one's intentional states, or why it is not genuinely information-seeking. Similarly for cases of memory.¹¹

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¹¹ I am thinking here not only of cases of memory, where one can be said to 'redeploy' (Peacocke, 1996) contents of an earlier experience, but also of the kinds of cases mentioned by Moran (1994), where an intentional state is consciously present and one reflects upon it (as one does in wondering what one is presently thinking). Moran distinguishes between theoretical-descriptive and prescriptive bases for psychological ascriptions. He invites us to consider a person who, in the process of wondering about her current intentional states, asks herself the question 'What do I think about X?'. This question can be interpreted in two ways: (a) as a theoretical-*cum*-descriptive one about an attitude antecedently held, and (b) as a prescriptive one about what the subject *ought* to believe about X. Normally, these two ways of interpreting such a question interact with one another. However, Moran argues that they are distinct and that it may be possible to detach one from the other. His point is that reflective thinking is not always exclusively of the prescriptive form, where the question of rational interpretation, of having reasons by

If this is right, then all four of the theses that Shoemaker singles out as essential to the object perception model are problematic, either because they are not uncontroversially true of perception itself or because, although true of perception, they are also true for certain cases of introspective self-knowledge. It remains to consider theses 7 and 8, which together constitute what Shoemaker calls the “broad perceptual model”.

2. The Broad Perceptual Model.

Shoemaker’s characterization of the broad perceptual model identifies two claims as essential to it. These are:

7. Perceptual beliefs are causally produced by the objects or states of affairs perceived, via a causal mechanism that normally produces beliefs that are true. [Given (2) above,] this process involves the production of sense-experiences, which together with background beliefs give rise to the perceptual beliefs. [Given (1),] the specification of the causal mechanism makes reference to the organs of perception, and the reliability of the mechanism consists in there being a correspondence between the contents of the beliefs and what the sense-organs are directed towards.

8. The objects and states of affairs which the perception is of, and which it provides knowledge about, exist independently of the perceiving of them, and, with certain exceptions, independently of there being things with the capacity for perceiving them or being aware of them. Thus trees, mountains, etc. can exist without there being creatures with the capacity to perceive them, and it is in principle possible for houses, automobiles and human bodies to exist in this way. (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 253–54.)

Shoemaker dubs the conditions expressed in these claims the *causal condition* and the *independence condition*, respectively, and argues that neither condition is met in cases of introspective self-knowledge. Again, I think that to the extent that they are met in perception, they are also met in at least certain cases of self-knowledge; and that, where they are not met in cases of self-knowledge, they fail to be met in certain cases of perception. So let us examine his reasons for rejecting the analogy between perception and introspective self-knowledge, beginning with the first condition.

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which to criticize, evaluate, and amend one’s thoughts or beliefs, enters into the very process of first-order belief formation. There are descriptive elements in such reasoning, even where there are also prescriptive ones. Daydreaming may be a case of this kind. It is this descriptive element in reflective thinking that I wish to emphasize here.

Those who wish to make use of the broad perceptual model to make intelligible cases of introspective self-knowledge must suppose that such cases are like perceptual beliefs about objects in at least this way: that just as our perceptions of objects in the environment are caused, via reliable perception-producing mechanisms, by those objects, our beliefs about our mental states are caused, via reliable belief-producing mechanisms, by those states. Shoemaker claims that he does not hold this view. Instead of addressing it directly, however, he undermines it by arguing that the second, independence, condition cannot be met. His claim is that the relation between certain sorts of mental states (namely, sensations and propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires) and introspective awareness of them is *constitutive, or conceptual, and 'self-intimating', or 'self-presenting'* (but not in the Cartesian sense of being transparent to the subject).¹² This being so, the independence condition between first-order and second-order mental states in these cases cannot, as it can in the case of perception, be met.

Later I will suggest that not all models of perception that recognize causal connections between perceptual states or beliefs and their objects, and so recognize items whose existence is independent of one another, construe such connections as prohibiting content-connections and so broadly logical, or conceptual connections between such items. But I want now to focus on Shoemaker's arguments for thinking that the independence condition cannot be satisfied in the case of introspective self-knowledge, since it is this that undermines both of the theses constitutive of the broad perceptual model.

Shoemaker's case turns on a kind of thought experiment which he calls "self-blindness", a condition rather like "blindsight". In blindsight a person is blind to certain facts about her mental states which she would be aware of if she were functioning normally. So, for example, a person might insist that she cannot see something that is present in her visual field, but when she is forced to 'guess', she will get it right far more often than chance could explain. Shoemaker invites us to consider a person who, like the blindsighted one, is blind to certain facts about her mental states which she would be

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¹² Thus, he says,

The view I support holds that there is a conceptual, constitutive, connection between the existence of certain sorts of mental entities and their introspective accessibility, while denying the transparency of the mental. It is a version of the view that certain mental facts are "self-intimating" or "self-presenting", but in a much weaker version than the transparency thesis. (Shoemaker, 1994, p. 272.)

Shoemaker associates transparency with Cartesianism, whose model of self-knowledge he interprets as a kind of 'inner eye' model of introspection, whereby one's own first-order mental states serve as objects of inner perception. Such objects are evidently 'open to view' in a way that is incorrigible and/or infallible. Shoemaker's own view is that although one cannot in general misidentify one's own sensations and intentional states, it is not because they are inner objects to which one bears some special epistemic relation akin to a perceptual one. See Shoemaker, 1994, pp. 271–72.

aware of if she were functioning normally, but on another level. Here her own first-order mental states are present, but she is functioning abnormally introspectively rather than perceptually. Whereas the blindsighted person sees things that she is unaware of seeing and so is having perceptual experiences of which she is introspectively unaware, in self-blindness a person is in mental states that she is undergoing but to which she is introspectively blind.

Crucial to both sorts of cases is the possibility that the subject should be able to *conceive* of those facts or phenomena to which she is blind, so that she is capable of learning of those facts or phenomena by means other than perception or introspection. What matters is that she is incapable of learning about them *perceptually*, through her perceptual experiences, in the visual case, and *introspectively*, through her awareness of her first-order mental states, in the case of self-knowledge.

Shoemaker claims that from an evolutionary point of view, this is not a real possibility. However, the independence condition suggests that self-blindness should be at least logically possible, just as in perception blindsight is possible. Of course, this is compatible with the presence, in general, of a reliable connection between being in certain mental states and being introspectively aware of them, just as there is in perception. But it suggests that this connection is *contingent*. And Shoemaker argues that in the case of self-knowledge it is not.

First, consider introspective awareness of sensations. Here the argument is that it is impossible that one should be in a sensation state, say, a state of pain, without being capable of being introspectively aware of it. Note that the point here is not, as Shoemaker emphasizes, that since it is of the essence of pain that it be *felt*, one cannot be in pain without feeling it. Self-blindness with regard to one's sensations is not about being in a certain sensation state, say, a state of pain, and not feeling it:

It must not be supposed that these creatures do not *feel* their pains. Pain is a feeling, and what they are self-blind to are, precisely, their feelings of pain. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 274)

So the point is one concerning the independence of the sensation state, *with* its phenomenological feel, from one's introspective awareness of it. Shoemaker's claim is that it is impossible for it to be true, in general, that one should be in such a state and fail to be introspectively aware of it. The reason is that, in order to make sense of self-blindness with regard to one's sensation, one must suppose that one is self-blind to a whole host of other mental states, ones which would make intelligible pain behaviour, such as that one finds the sensation unpleasant, and so has a desire *for this reason* to be rid of the pain. But then it seems that a state of pain that played only the causal role that pain plays with regard to behaviour without playing the total causal role usually associated with pain, namely, the role it plays in causing beliefs

and desires which in turn cause and make intelligible pain behaviour, simply would not be pain. As Shoemaker puts the point,

...let's try to suppose that when a pain is occurring in one of these creatures, the creature actively dislikes it and wishes that it would end. It is just that the creature is unaware of this active disliking and wishing. Does the disliking and wishing have any of its normal consequences? Let's try to suppose that it does. When in pain the creature heads for the medicine cabinet, or calls the doctor's office for an appointment. But what does the creature itself make of this behaviour? It now appears that its self-blindness has expanded to cover much more than just its pain—it must be blind to its finding the pain unpleasant, to its wishing that it would end, and to the reasons for its behaviour. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 274)

But why this last claim? Why must it be blind to the *reasons for its behaviour*? These concern the subject's beliefs and desires, and Shoemaker has made it a condition on the possibility of self-blindness that the subject should be capable of forming beliefs and desires about its sensations and other mental states in ways other than introspective ones. So why is such a subject unable to make intelligible, by rationalizing, its pain behaviour?

Shoemaker's answer is this:

...at least some kinds of "pain behaviour"—taking aspirin and calling the doctor are good examples—are intelligible *as* pain behaviour only on the assumption that the subject is aware of pain; for to see them as pain behaviour *is* to see them as motivated by such states of the creature as the belief that it is in pain, the desire to be rid of the pain, and the belief that such and such a course of behaviour will achieve that result. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 274)

Now, as he has constructed the case of self-blindness, it must be possible for a creature to acquire the concept of pain and learn of its pain through means other than introspective ones, notably through its own and others' behaviour. It must also be possible for a creature to acquire beliefs and other intentional states about its pains on the basis of these other sources. But then why is it not possible that a creature should be capable of interpreting or making intelligible its behaviour *as* pain behaviour other than on an introspective basis if, *ex hypothesi*, that creature is capable of acquiring the *concept* of pain through means other than introspective ones? Shoemaker's response here simply seems to beg the question against one who thinks that the case of self-blindness is like that of blindsightedness. For he simply asserts that a person who is self-blind to at least certain of its sensations, namely pains, would not be capable of having the belief that it is in pain, the desire to be rid of the pain, and the belief that such and such a course of behaviour will achieve that result. However, if the conditions for self-blindness are as Shoemaker specifies them, why should we think that a creature should not be capable of acquiring such beliefs through means other than introspective ones?

Suppose that there were creatures that were incapable of recognizing colours on the basis that normally applies to humans, namely on the basis of experiences with a certain phenomenological character, say, something's

looking yellow or looking green, but rather, were able to recognize them by learning how to discriminate between certain wave reflectance frequencies from surfaces of objects in their environment and by learning how to correlate these with certain colour terms. These creatures would not experience colours as normal humans experience them, nor would their colour concepts and their perceptual beliefs concerning the colours of objects be acquired on the basis of the phenomenological character of their visual experiences. Does it follow that they would not have beliefs about colours, or colour concepts? I think not. The case seems to me to be analogous to that of self-blindness. A creature who does not know of her pains, or acquire the concept of pain, on the basis of introspective awareness of her pains will certainly know of her pains *differently* from one who does. But it does not follow from this that she does not have the concept of pain, or know of her pains. One can imagine such a creature being patiently instructed that certain movements count as pain behaviour, that it counts as pain behaviour because it causes certain sensations, that these sensations are unpleasant, that most people behave this way, not only because they have beliefs and desires that make intelligible this behaviour, but because those beliefs and desires are caused by introspective awareness of the sensations, and that because *this* creature lacks the normal means of knowing of her sensations, she must believe that she is in pain on grounds other than these.¹³

Further, any reason that one might have for thinking that this possibility is not a real one in the case of self-knowledge seems also to cast doubt on its possibility in the case of perception. Suppose, for example, that one were to respond to the perceptual case by arguing that the creatures in question would not have *our* colour concepts, or the same kinds of *beliefs about colours* that normal human beings have, simply because they would not be acquired on the same basis as they are acquired by normal humans. Then equally, the same can be said for creatures that are self-blind to their sensations. Either way, the analogy holds: either what is not possible in the case of self-knowledge is equally impossible in the case of perception, or what is possible in the case of perception is also possible in the case of self-knowledge.

So I do not see that Shoemaker has a case against the broad perceptual model *vis-à-vis* sensations. But as I have said, my main target is not the claim that a perceptual model is inapplicable to sensations, but the claim that it is inapplicable to intentional states. What is the case against the applicability of a broad perceptual model to these?

Shoemaker's claim is that self-blindness with regard to one's own intentional states is also impossible. The reason is that, in being in such states,

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¹³ Given Shoemaker's functionalist view of the nature of mental states, he cannot deny this possibility.

and in having normal intelligence, conceptual capacity, and rationality, one *automatically* has second-order beliefs:

...if one has an available first-order belief, *and* has a certain degree of rationality, intelligence and conceptual capacity (here including having the concept of belief and the concept of one-self), then automatically one has the corresponding second-order belief. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 288)¹⁴

A rational agent, that is to say, an agent who has normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity, will behave in ways that give the best possible evidence that she is self-aware, and so not self-blind. Such a person will be self-aware in that she has *normal awareness* of her own intentional states, where this sometimes involves, but *does not require*, reasoning sequentially from one premise to another by a series of steps.

...in order to explain the behaviour we take as showing that people have certain higher order beliefs, beliefs about their first-order beliefs, we do not need to attribute to them anything beyond what is needed in order to give them first order beliefs plus normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity. ...in supposing that a creature is rational, what one is supposing is that it is such that its being in certain states tends to result in effects, behaviour or other internal states, that are rationalized by those states. Sometimes this requires actually going through a process of reasoning in which one gets from one proposition to another by a series of steps, and where special reasoning skills are involved. But usually it does not require this. I see an apple and I reach for it. It is rational for me to do so, and this can be shown by presenting an argument, a bit of practical reasoning that is available to me, in terms of my desires and my beliefs about the nutritional and other properties of apples. But I needn't actually go through any process of sequential reasoning in order for the beliefs and desires in question to explain and make rational my reaching for the apple. And no more does the rational agent need to go through a process of sequential reasoning in order for her first order belief that P, plus her other first order beliefs and desires, to explain and rationalize the behaviour that manifests the second order belief that she believes that P. (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 284–85)

As this passage makes clear, a subject's being self-aware requires no more than being in states of belief and desire that tend to cause and rationalize other intentional states and behaviour.

But what kind of self-awareness is this? Shoemaker's self-aware person is one whose beliefs and desires rationalize her behaviour, but not necessarily from her own perspective. Her second-order beliefs simply 'come for free':

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¹⁴ This quotation (and others to follow) suggests a view that is ambiguous between two claims. The first is that first-order intentional states are not an agent's *reasons for* (but only causes of) her second-order states. The second is that first-order intentional states cannot in general exist independently of (and so are not merely contingently related to) second-order ones. Shoemaker's view is in fact a combination of the two: an endorsement of (causal-role) functionalism as a theory of the nature of mental states, and (consequently) a rejection of a reason-based account of self-knowledge. What follows in the text is an argument, first, for the claim that first-order intentional states can be reasons for second-order ones, and second, for the claim that this does not prohibit certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the *cogito*-type cases, from meeting the independence condition.

they will automatically be present given the presence of an appropriate system of first-order beliefs.¹⁵ It is true that she is typically *capable* of reasoning sequentially and so of rationalizing her behaviour from her own point of view, but such reasoning, and rationalizing is not required for self-awareness. So self-awareness is something subjects can possess, not by virtue of exercising a first-person perspective on their own states, but simply by behaving in a rational way, i.e., in a way which can be rationalized.

But then I think that Shoemaker's use of the term '*self-aware*' to mean '*introspectively self-aware*' here is a misnomer: subjects whose rationalizing behaviour does not count as such from their own perspective do *not* provide the best possible evidence for being introspectively aware of their own beliefs and desires. Conscious, yes, but introspectively conscious, no. Further, any conception of self-awareness stronger than this, say, in requiring sequential reasoning, would require reflecting on one's reasons *as reasons*, and so require a more robust account of introspective self-knowledge than Shoemaker is prepared to give.

So even if Shoemaker is right in his claim that one's ability to be in first-order intentional states is not independent of the capacity to be self-aware in the minimal sense of being capable of acting in ways that are rational, i.e., can be rationalized, it would not follow that one cannot be in first-order intentional states independently of the capacity to be self-aware in the much stronger sense associated with the ability to subject one's first-order states to critical reflective reasoning *as reasons*. Further, it does not seem impossible that there should be creatures that are self-blind in the stronger sense of failing to be introspectively self-aware and yet are rational in the sense that their behaviour might be capable of being rationalized from their own perspectives, since they might be capable of finding out in ways other than by introspective self-awareness that they are in first-order states of a given kind. Consider, for example, simple cases of self-deception. Suppose that I am in love with someone and I go out of my way to ignore and avoid him. Being self-deceived, I cannot be brought to see that I am in love with him by any act of 'inner awareness'. But others, seeing easily enough that my behaviour is the behaviour of one who is in love, might be capable of getting me to see this in other ways. Similarly for repressed mental states. A man may know that his wife is having an affair but be unable to confront the reality of the situation. He goes about his daily business giving no behavioural signs of his knowledge. But others, in whose presence he has been exposed to evidence which incriminates his wife, and who discern alterations in behaviour, such

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¹⁵ I owe this way of putting the point to an anonymous referee for this journal.

as 'going off' a favourite restaurant in an area in which his wife has been seen with her lover, might be capable of getting him to acknowledge his state.¹⁶

Shoemaker's argument here is effectively that one's first-order states do not in general provide *reasons* for one's having second-order beliefs. As he puts it,

...believing that one believes that P can be just believing that P plus having a certain level of rationality, intelligence and so on... (Shoemaker 1994, p. 289)

This view, which Peacocke (1996) calls the 'no reasons' view, is often contrasted with a view of self-knowledge which takes such knowledge to be based on a kind of inner observation. Shoemaker's argument is that self-blindness in the case of intentional states is impossible, but not, as in the case of sensations, because it is impossible that a subject should be in first-order intentional states and have beliefs about such states based on grounds *other* than introspective ones (say, behaviour, or the subject's awareness of her own neurophysiological states). Rather, it is impossible because self-knowledge of one's own intentional states *is not based on reasons of any kind*, since there are not two independently existing states involved in such knowledge. So the reason why self-blindness is impossible in this case is that the connection between the having of first-order beliefs and the ability to self-ascribe them is *direct*, too direct for there to be either some kind of inner awareness of, or 'blindness' to, one's first-order states. Such knowledge is *baseless*.

Because Shoemaker's arguments against the applicability of the broad perceptual model to self-knowledge of one's own intentional states takes such a different form from those against the applicability of that model to self-knowledge of one's sensations, it is perhaps inappropriate to point out, as I have above, that one might know of one's own first-order intentional states, not by means of introspection, but by other means such as behaviour and/or awareness of one's neurophysiological states. If such knowledge is not

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¹⁶ My point here is directed against Shoemaker's claim that such cases of self-blindness are impossible. It might be thought that it does not tell against the weaker suggestion that cases like these are possible, but only against a normal background of beliefs, ones which manifest rationality in Shoemaker's weaker sense, and that this is all that Shoemaker needs to establish to show that self-blindness to one's intentional states is impossible. However, the case of self-blindness, like the case of blindsightedness, requires that only certain of a subject's mental states are ones to which the subject is self-blind. Thus, in blindsight, a person is blind to certain facts about her mental states which she would be aware of if she were functioning normally. The blindsighted person sees things of which she is introspectively unaware. But she is otherwise cognitively normal, and this is crucial to the case. For she is capable of conceiving of those facts or phenomena to which she is blind, so that she is capable of learning of those facts or phenomena by means other than visually. She is seeing abnormally, but she is not otherwise cognitively abnormal. Similarly for the self-blind subject. For the analogy to work, here too the subject must be seen to be functioning abnormally in a quite specific way, yet be functioning otherwise cognitively normally. My claim is that this is just what happens in cases of self-deception and repression.

acquired on the basis of *any* reasons, then this kind of response is irrelevant. But I want to ask why we should think that all cases of self-knowledge are of this kind, and so why there cannot be cases of self-knowledge which are based on states of which one is, but can sometimes (as in cases of self-deception) fail to be, introspectively self-aware. And I think that Shoemaker's reasons for thinking that they are turn out, on examination, to trade on an ambiguity in the term 'rationality' and its near cousin, 'self-aware'.

It has been said that it is essential to belief possession, and to the concept of belief, that beliefs are subject to rationalistic constraints. Thus to have a belief that *p*, for some propositional content *p*, is (amongst other things) to be disposed to assert that *p*, to engage in reasonings using the content that *p*, and to be prepared to revise the belief that *p* in the light of conflicting evidence.

In one, very minimal, sense of the term 'self-aware', to be self-aware is simply to employ one's beliefs in rational behaviour, to have one's first-order beliefs cause one's other intentional states and behaviour in ways that can be rationalized (Davidson 1970, 1974, McGinn 1982, Shoemaker 1988, 1991). It is in this sense that one can attribute to children, who may not yet be capable of critically evaluating their reasonings to see whether, for example, they conform to *modus ponens*, self-awareness of their own states. It seems clear that this is the sense of self-awareness that Shoemaker has in mind when he claims that a subject who is self-aware is rational. Suppose that he is right in thinking that engaging in a process of sequential reasoning by which subjects rationalize their own behaviour is not required for rationality and self-awareness in his sense. Still, it does not establish what Shoemaker thinks it does with regard to the broad perceptual model, for two reasons.

First, the applicability of a perceptual model to self-knowledge does not require that it fit every case of such knowledge, nor is it plausible to think that it does. My concern is with a certain class of intentional states, namely ones that one is currently, consciously, thinking about *while* thinking them. It is these states concerning which the perceptual model seems most appropriate. But these are not the states with which Shoemaker is primarily concerned, if at all. So even if his claims regarding self-awareness and rationality are correct with regard to beliefs about one's beliefs in cases where one is not currently, consciously undergoing those beliefs while considering them, nothing of interest would follow about the applicability of the broad perceptual model in cases where one *is* currently, consciously undergoing such states while considering them.

But second, and more importantly, it may be that one can only be capable of engaging in *reflective reasoning*, *reasoning about one's reasoning*, if one is capable of thinking certain kinds of thoughts, thoughts of the form, *I am thinking that I am thinking that p*, and so of being self-aware in a much stronger sense than Shoemaker is prepared to countenance. The reason is that

in order to reason reflectively, one needs to be able to *examine* ones reasons, and to consider them *as reasons*, for behaving one way or another, or for accepting or rejecting or revising one's attitudes. To do this evidently requires being able to view them *as objects* of reflection or deliberation. As Tyler Burge puts the point,

To be capable of critical reasoning, and to be subject to certain rational norms necessarily associated with such reasoning, some mental acts and states must be *knowledgeably* reviewable. (Burge 1996, p. 8)

Critical reasoning is reasoning that involves an ability to recognize and effectively employ reasonable criticism or support for reasons and reasoning. It is reasoning guided by an appreciation, use, and assessment of reasons and reasoning as such. (Burge 1996, p. 8)

Burge considers it to be essential to the ability to reason critically that one be capable of thinking *cogito*-type thoughts, and he associates this ability with being rational in some sense of 'rational'. This sense of 'rational' is clearly stronger than what Shoemaker has in mind. And I think that being rational in Shoemaker's sense requires being rational in this stronger sense.

It may be that one can be rational in Shoemaker's sense without actually engaging in critical reasoning. But it does not seem possible for one to be rational without being *capable* of reasoning critically. Nor does Shoemaker actually claim that it does. But if so, then one cannot be rational in Shoemaker's sense without being rational in the stronger sense associated with the ability to reason critically (as Burge construes it). Since this latter ability requires the ability to think *cogito*-type thoughts, thoughts about what one is currently consciously thinking, where one is both thinking and thinking *about* a propositional content, the ability to be rational in Shoemaker's sense requires the ability to think *cogito*-type thoughts, and not all self-knowledge can be construed in the way Shoemaker construes it.

Shoemaker in fact recognizes this, but points out that his conception is the one that is in fact met by most people most of the time, and the notion of rationality that involves engaging in critical reasoning, is an ideal that most of us regularly fail to meet (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 286–87). But my point here is that the *capacity* to engage in critical reasoning, not the exercising of it, is constitutive of rationality, and that that capacity requires the ability to think *cogito*-type thoughts. So even if Shoemaker has shown that the independence condition is not met in certain cases of self-knowledge, ones where one is rational in the weaker sense, he has not shown that this is true for all such cases. Specifically, he has not shown that it is not met in the case of *cogito*-type thoughts. The question, then, is whether *cogito*-type thoughts themselves 'come for free': whether they too fail to meet the independence condition. And this depends on how one construes such thoughts.

The independence condition served as the main target of Shoemaker's attack against the broad perceptual model precisely because, if it could be shown that first-order and second-order intentional states are not independent of one another, if the relation between the two was *constitutive* rather than contingent, then a crucial feature of the perceptual model would thereby be shown to be inapplicable to self-knowledge. Both Shoemaker and Burge consider the relation between first and second-order intentional states to be conceptual (although for different reasons).¹⁷ And this seems to be true for the *cogito*-type cases, where the contents of the thought reviewed must match the contents of the reflective thought about it. Must the relation between first and second-order thoughts in the *cogito*-type cases then be non-contingent?

I do not think so. We have already considered Shoemaker's reasons for thinking that the relation between first and second-order intentional states is non-contingent. But let us briefly consider Burge's, since they are instructive.

Burge views the *cogito*-type cases as ones in which subjects' first-order thoughts are literally contained within, or are constituents of, their second-order thoughts, which are contextually self-verifying for the reason that in thinking the reflective thought, one *makes* that thought true. One makes it true because, in thinking reflectively, one brings into being the first-order thought on which one is reflecting. The relation between first- and second-order thought is non-contingent because there are not here two separate acts of thinking: there simply is no first-order thought, considered as a state distinct from the second-order, reflective one, to stand in such a contingent relation.

If one understands *cogito*-type cases in this way, then it may be inappropriate to view them as explicable along the lines of the observational model. But it does not follow that the observational model is inapplicable to all cases of authoritative self-knowledge. For one thing, Burge himself (1996) thinks that his *cogito*-type cases form a very small class of cases of self-knowledge which he intends his account of epistemic entitlement to cover, and this class will almost certainly contain cases where it is appropriate to view a subject's first- and second-order states to be distinct and causally related. I am thinking here not only of cases of memory, where one can be said to 'redeploy' (Peacocke 1996) contents of an earlier experience, but also of cases where an intentional state is consciously present and one reflects

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¹⁷ So my argument here is not that Shoemaker's account cannot accommodate *cogito*-type thoughts consistently with his view that such thoughts fail to meet the independence condition. Shoemaker can allow Burge-style *cogito*-type thoughts, where these are construed, not as a second-order thought distinct from a first-order one, but as a self-conscious, or reflective way of thinking a thought. My argument is that Burge's way of construing such thoughts is not the only, nor the most plausible, way of construing them: that there is a plausible alternative way of construing such thoughts according to which they do meet the independence condition, and that this opens up conceptual space for a quasi-perceptual account of them.

upon it, as one does in wondering what one is presently thinking. Here one brings into view a state antecedently present, and does so by *attending* to it.

So, even if the broad perceptual model is inapplicable to *cogito*-type cases as Burge construes them, this does not in itself invalidate it for all cases of self-knowledge where the question of a subject's authority with regard to a first-order intentional state may arise. It is a moot point whether at least some of these cases are *cogito*-type ones. But there is a further question here as to whether Burge's own construal of the *cogito*-type cases is the only, or the best, way of construing them. His explanation of the contextually self-verifying nature of such thoughts is that in them one's first-order thought is literally a constituent of one's second-order one. However, this feature of such thoughts could be explained differently. It may be that a necessary condition of thinking a *cogito*-type reflective thought with a given content is that that content refers to a first-order thought content, and that a necessary condition for this is that the contents of the two thoughts match. If so, then although it would be true that thinking such a second-order thought suffices for its being true, and that thinking it makes it true, this would not be because there is no first-order thought distinct from the reflective one to which it is contingently related.

So there does seem to be a case for supposing that first-order and second-order thoughts in even the *cogito*-type examples are distinct and capable of being contingently related to one another. This opens up conceptual space for an account of introspective self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, the *cogito*-type ones, which is broadly perceptual. This should be of interest to anyone whose concern with self-knowledge is, as mine is, a concern with *authoritative* self-knowledge. The *cogito*-type cases are central, not peripheral, to the issues here precisely because they count as paradigmatic ones of authoritative self-knowledge. And the broad perceptual model is of use in helping to make intelligible these cases of self-knowledge precisely because it promises to deliver an explanation of the special epistemic right, or entitlement, that subjects have with regard to knowledge of certain of their own intentional states in just these cases. Nor should the fact that such thoughts are *conceptually* or rationally related present serious obstacles to the applicability of a broadly perceptual model. Why? Because there are models of perception, such as McDowell's (1994), which construe perception as relating items both contingently and causally, and rationally, or conceptually. McDowell's model takes the relation between perceptual belief or judgement and what grounds it to be both contingent and causal, and conceptual or rational in that such grounds are both causes of and reasons for the perceptual beliefs they ground.

Briefly, according to McDowell, a satisfactory naturalistic theory of mind can only succeed if the 'space' of reasons extends outward, into perception itself, so that there is no epistemic 'gap', so to speak, between mind and

world. For McDowell, there is reality, and there are states of mind which, in perceptual experience of the world, deploy concepts that act both as passive receptors of information from the world and as active in playing a role in judgement, and more generally, in critical reasoning. The passive and active aspects of such states are inseparable, even notionally: in order for the faculty of sensibility to carry out the role of grounding the spontaneity characteristic of belief and judgement, it must be a passive faculty. But it must also be fully conceptualized, since it must constrain belief and judgement.

McDowell is concerned to establish that perceptual experiences can yield not merely reasons, but good reasons, for beliefs formed on the basis of them. He has complained (1994) that Peacocke's defense of states of non-conceptual content falls short of what is needed, since the defense appeals to reasons *for which* a subject forms a belief, whereas what is needed is a *subject's* reasons. Reasons for which a subject forms a belief may exist even when the subject has no reasons.¹⁸

In being agent-centred, and also in showing how perceptual states can serve as justifications (and not merely "exculpations"), McDowell's account of perceptual states as reasons differs markedly from Shoemaker's. One's first-order perceptual states serve not only as causes of, but as reasons for, one's judgements about them. And they are reasons from the subject's point of view: they are the subject's reasons.

The perceptual model with which McDowell's view works, in rejecting states of non-conceptual experiential content that mediate between objects of perception and beliefs or judgments which those experiences ground, is structurally similar to the model of self-knowledge, which recognizes only two items, first-order sensation or intentional state, and second-order, reflective state. Might this model provide a basis for an account of authoritative self-knowledge that deploys the features of direct epistemic access, features central to the quasi-perceptual model of authoritative self-knowledge set forth at the outset of this paper?

McDowell has claimed that his view has no need for a notion such as that of direct epistemic access.¹⁹ This is because rational connections hold, not only between intentional and other states of mind, but between them and the world itself, and this because

...There is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or think, and the sort of thing that is the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks *is* the case, ...so there is no gap between thought and the world. (1994, p. 27)

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¹⁸ McDowell gives the example of the bodily adjustments a skilled cyclist makes when going around a curve. Part of the point of his example is that reasons are goal-oriented, and they need to be so oriented from the perspective of the subject herself.

¹⁹ In discussion at a conference on Self-Knowledge held at the University of St Andrews, August, 1995.

However, the fact (if it is one) that there is no ontological gap between thought and world does not by itself show that there is no need for the kind of observational model envisaged at the outset of this paper, no explanatory work for the features associated with direct epistemic access to do. For deployment of these features is intended to serve a quite specific explanatory function, namely to make intelligible how a subject's access to her own first order sensation and intentional states better places her to know what the contents of those states are. Thus, suppose that McDowell's account of the relation between thought and world is correct. Still, one wants to know why a subject is sometimes authoritative with regard to knowledge of her own sensation and intentional states. Nothing in McDowell's account explains this asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. On the contrary: McDowell's emphasis on the distinction between *reasons for which* a subject makes a judgement and the *subject's* reasons, calls out for explanation. And the features associated with direct epistemic access are meant to do just that.

3. Conclusion

I have argued that Shoemaker's argument for the claim that the independence condition cannot be met in self-knowledge is not decisive against all cases of such knowledge. Shoemaker's case against the applicability of a broad perceptual model to introspective self-knowledge thus fails for the same reason as it fails with respect to the object perception model. That he takes theses 3—6 to be constitutive of the object perception model is problematic because it neglects models of perception in which at least some of these conditions fail to apply. But this is not the only reason why his attack on the thesis that introspective self-knowledge is a form of inner perception fails to succeed. It is unsuccessful also because it neglects arguably the most important and central cases of self-knowledge, ones where subjects have a special epistemic entitlement or right to such knowledge, namely the *cogito*-type cases.²⁰

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²⁰ I would like to thank Tom Baldwin, Graham Bird, Jessica Brown, Chris Daly, Graham Macdonald, Marie McGinn, Adam Morton, Julia Tanney, Andrew Woodfield, and two anonymous referees for this journal for very helpful comments.

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