Electronic identifier: 27321

Date of electronic submission: 21/03/2019

Thesis format: Traditional

The University of Manchester makes unrestricted examined electronic theses and dissertations freely available for download and reading online via Manchester eScholar at http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar.

This print version of my thesis/dissertation is a TRUE and ACCURATE REPRESENTATION of the electronic version submitted to the University of Manchester's institutional repository, Manchester eScholar.
Pleasure Three Ways: Phenomenological, Attitudinal, Representational

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2019

Lucy A Tomlinson

School of Social Sciences
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright Statement</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0. Introduction: Problems of Pleasure and Contemporary Theories of Pleasure</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 What we talk about when we talk about pleasure</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1.1 First desideratum</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1.2 Second desideratum</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1.3 Third desideratum</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2 Introducing the three theories of pleasure</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2.1 Phenomenological theories of pleasure</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2.2 Attitudinal theories of pleasure</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2.3 Attitudinal vs. phenomenological theories of pleasure</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2.4 Representational theories of pleasure</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2.5 Representational vs. attitudinal and phenomenological theories of pleasure</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis plan/summary of desiderata</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. The Heterogeneity Problem</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Raindrops on roses, or, the infinite varieties of pleasure</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The Heterogeneity Argument</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Introspective disagreement</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 The Heterogeneity Argument and introspection</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 What is introspection?</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 General worries about introspection</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.3 Stories we tell ourselves: inference and confabulation</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Preserving introspection</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Chapter summary</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Pleasure as a Distinctive Feeling**

2.1 Separating the phenomenological theories  
2.1.1 Distinctive Feeling theory  
2.2 Answering the Heterogeneity problem  
2.2.1 Causal or compound?  
2.2.2 Bramble's Distinctive Feeling theory  
2.3 Criticisms of Distinctive Feeling theory  
2.3.1 Sensation or feeling?  
2.3.2 Independence from target sensation  
2.3.3 Opposition to pain  
2.3.4 Connection to motivation (Findlay's problem)  
2.4 Chapter summary

3. **Hedonic Tone Theories of Pleasure**

3.1 Overview of Hedonic Tone theories  
3.2 Answering the Heterogeneity Argument  
3.2.1 What is the determinable-determinate relation?  
3.2.2 Applying the determinable-determinate relation  
3.2.3 The determinable-determinate relation for pleasure  
3.2.4 Objections to using the determinable-determinate relation for pleasure to answer the Heterogeneity Argument  
3.3 Chapter summary

4. **Attitude Theories of Pleasure**

4.1 Desire-based attitude theories  
4.2 Problems for desired-based attitude theories  
4.2.1 The strangeness of desire  
4.2.2 The Euthyphro problem  
4.2.3 Heathwood's sense/reference solution to Euthyphro  
4.2.4 Brady's component response to the Euthyphro dilemma
7.2.2 The emotional self 244
7.2.3 The boundaries between selves 247
7.3 Which attitude? Attention and pleasure 248
  7.3.1 Affective experience and attention 258
  7.3.2 Attention and the heterogeneity problem 262
7.4 Another look at the desiderata 266
7.5 Chapter summary 276

8 Concluding remarks 277

Bibliography 283

Word count: 72997
Declaration

I declare that no portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Copyright Statement

The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the "Copyright") and he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time.

The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “intellectual property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in the thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/policies/intellectual-property.pdf), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University's policy on presentation of Theses.
Abstract

This thesis proposes that the only satisfactory theory of pleasure is an evaluativist theory where pleasurable experiences represent their objects as instantiating the property ‘good for me’. It elaborates on the theory by noting that the relationship between subject as self and the object of experience is crucial when defining the ‘good for me’ property and is essential to understanding how pleasure works. Other evaluativist treatments do not consider this factor but this thesis demonstrates it is the final puzzle piece in giving a complete theory of pleasure.

Traditionally, philosophical theories of pleasure are divided between the phenomenological and attitudinal approaches. This division is motivated by the Heterogeneity Argument, which says that there is no common phenomenological factor that unites instances of pleasure. By undermining the Heterogeneity Argument, the two approaches can be combined, taking the best from both. This is achieved by adopting a representationalist approach to pleasurable experiences.

This thesis also looks at pleasures connection to its assumed opposite, pain, and its place in the larger landscape of the emotion. It argues that instead of emotions being accompanied by feelings of pleasure, positive emotions such as joy or pride are determinates of pleasure. Finally it concludes that pleasure and pain are opposites but shows an important asymmetry with respect to attention.
Acknowledgements

Writing a thesis is a struggle – the difficulty lies not only in taking on the work of others possessed of keener pen and more powerful brain than your own but in mastering one’s own fears and insecurities. I’m not sure I managed that entirely but the defeat has been less painful thanks to some wonderful support and great friendship.

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of Peter Goldie, who started me off on this path. He was not only a great philosopher but also a person who knew how to live well. I still have a card he gave me stuck on my wall to remind to appreciate the joys of this life and it makes me smile to see it.

Endless thanks are owed to my supervisors Joel Smith and Sean Crawford for their support through hard times both intellectual and emotional, honesty and insight. Sean has been the soul of kindness, while every die-hard procrastinator ought to go through the Joel Smith Finishing School and come out the other side a more humble and hopefully more enlightened person.

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester is a warm and welcoming place and I’ve benefitted immensely from the privilege of being able to study here. Especial thanks go to Graham Stevens for helping me out a few years ago. Without him I would not have carried on in philosophy (so you can blame him for this thesis). Tim Bayne, Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd have all given help and support over the years that has been much appreciated.

Clare Mac Cumhaill has been a fantastic mentor and patient listener. Beccy Simpson, Moritz Mueller, Olle Blomberg, Alba Montes and Hichem Naar have all provided fun and conversation, both of the philosophical and less philosophical variety. The meetings of the Glasgow Pain group have also been a great inspiration to me, and, despite the name, a source of pleasure. Gwyneth Archer, Jessica Wills and Hazel Madoc-Sutton have given me the balm of friendship when it was needed most. Captain Tom Stevens has been a true friend and made me laugh at the most unexpected moments. Thanks to all of you.

My family have been there for me through it all and I owe them the world. My mum and dad have been my strongest supporters in everything and my brother and sister have helped me through so much. I can’t thank them enough.

Finally, this thesis is dedicated to Tom and Bill, together they form the source of all love and the centre of my universe.

The last year has been the most difficult time I could have imagined and I am awed by and grateful for the wonderful people who surround me. They bring me more pleasure than they could ever know.

This thesis has been possible due to financial support from the AHRC.
0. **Introduction: Problems of Pleasure and Contemporary Theories of Pleasure**

The concept of pleasure is woven throughout the history of philosophy. The Stoics condemned it. Epicurus made it the centre of his moral philosophy. Bentham and Mill thought we ought to be maximising it, for ourselves and for others. Spinoza said that, “The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof” (Spinoza, 2012, p. 195). Pleasure then, has made a great impact on moral and ethical philosophy, on questions of how we ought to live. What has been less explored is the question of exactly what kind of thing pleasure is. It is usually assumed that pleasure is self-evident. You know it when you see it. But do we always see it when it is there, and do we always correctly identify it when we do? Surely before we seek to maximise or desensitise ourselves to something, we ought to know what that thing is. A related and intermingled question is why do humans feel pleasure? What purpose does pleasure serve in regards to our adaptation and survival as a species? The aim of this thesis is to try and find out.

This thesis will present three apparently competing theories of pleasure, attitudinal, phenomenological and representational, that currently make up the field in the contemporary pleasure debate. I will demonstrate that, although attitudinal and phenomenological theories are posited as being in competition with other, as they are set up as opposing responses to the same problem (that of the heterogeneity of pleasure), in fact if only their positive agendas are taken into account there no reason to think of them as competing accounts of pleasure.
This task forms the first half of the thesis. The second half moves on to consider a rather different breed of theories of pleasure: the representationalists. Representational accounts, deriving as they do from different debates within the philosophy of mind, do not acknowledge the problem of heterogeneity at all. They therefore take a completely different tack to the other two accounts and need to find their own place within the conceptual space, rather than merely being a sub-division of attitudinal accounts. Though representational accounts have more work to do in establishing themselves, this thesis will demonstrate that once they do, they harness all the advantages of both attitudinal and phenomenological theories. I then go on to endorse a particular form of representationalism: evaluativism, while showing the current formulations of this theory need further refining, particularly in what they take to be the intentional content of a pleasurable experience to represent.

A brief summary of my thesis goes something like this. The only way to successfully conceptualise an experience of pleasure is to use the representationalist model of experience. The best version of that model so far is the evaluativist model but the intentional content provided by evaluativists – that pleasure experiences represent their objects as ‘good for me’ - is not developed enough to account for certain issues. Instead I propose that we follow an impure representationalist strategy where the content ‘good for me’ determines phenomenal content along with a specific intentional mode – the mode in question being attention. When we consider the content ‘good for me’ we begin to understand the importance of the role of the self in determining what a pleasure experience will be like. In fact I go further and posit that there
are multiple ‘selves’ that can be the candidate for the ‘me’ part of ‘good for me’. These multiple selves account for the groupings or hierarchies of pleasure that we often see in both scientific and folk parlance: sensory, aesthetic, intellectual, emotional etc, and allow us to see how more complex cases, such as masochistic pleasures, can come about.

The ‘good for me’ property is also useful as it anchors the intentional double structure of affective states. The experience is both directed towards the object but is also reflexive. Pleasure experience is self-disclosing in a way that non-affective sensory experience is not and the intentional structure of the evaluativist theory I espouse accounts for that. The fact that the intentional mode of pleasure experiences is attention means that we can see when our attention shifts from the object of pleasure to the self, and back again, we get strange effects in the ability to introspect pleasure, which sets pleasure phenomenology apart from other types of phenomenology which do not have this double structure.

**0.1 What we talk about when we talk about pleasure**

‘Pleasure’ can serve to conceal a constellation of concepts, in which it is not always clear how the individual terms are linked together or differentiated. Some worthwhile work on defining pleasure can be done by exploring how pleasure and say, happiness, are different, and in doing so further define each concept. The so-called *Naïve View* is of pleasure as a sensation or feeling which stands in causal connection but is nevertheless ontologically independent from its cause.
This view of pleasure, espoused by Kant (see below), treats pleasure as a product of certain experiences and one that, like money, has a certain fungibility. The notion of pleasure has important connections to other concepts: those of desire (or fulfilment of desire), the opposition to pain, pleasure as a motivational force, and its connection to the judgments we make about our affective experiences. Any theory of pleasure will touch on all of these points and even if it does not encompass every single facet, will at least nod to why all these points seem inter-related.

The term ‘pleasure’ can often be used as a noun, for example people might say – “a finely cooked meal is a pleasure”, or, “my pleasure is a good glass of whiskey” – which of course means that eating the meal or drinking the whiskey is a pleasurable experience. Often the term ‘sensory pleasure’ is used in a similar was – to mean an object of a sensory nature that is reliably associated with pleasant experience. I want to draw a very clear contrast between using the word ‘pleasure’ as a kind of shorthand to describe pleasurable experience and ‘pleasure’ as referring to the product of these activities. Under this usage, drinking whiskey is the cause of pleasure but not pleasure itself. Pleasure as an abstract noun is rather a mental episode or feature of a mental episode. Whether that mental episode be a sensation, feeling, connation, cognition or attitude depends upon the theory of pleasure at hand. There is therefore the risk of confusion between the concept of a sensory pleasure as a mental episode as caused by sensation, and the theory that pleasure (in all instances) is a kind of sensation.
Furthermore, there is sometimes a confusion between how pleasure instantiates itself. In order to capture this I shall use the terms ‘pleasingness’ and ‘pleasantness’. Pleasingness is an extrinsic property of an object insofar as it is the cause of a pleasurable experience or the object of a pleasurable experience. A tasty sandwich is pleasing and also pleasant. Pleasantness is used in much the same way in everyday discourse, but to here I shall use it to mean the putative property of a mental episode that makes it pleasure.

*Pleasure*: the mental episode, feature or property which unifies all experiences we recognise as pleasurable. Example - eating a peach gives me great pleasure, or, on another, less fluent reading, the experience of eating a peach exemplifies an episode of pleasure.

*A pleasure*: an object or an activity which is the cause (or reliably the cause) of pleasure. The eating of peaches is a pleasure.

*Pleasing* (adjective), *pleasingness* (noun): the extrinsic property of a bearer (ie activity, object) by which that bearer causes pleasure, for example, this peach is pleasing to me.

*Pleasant* (adjective), *pleasantness* (noun): the intrinsic property of an experience by which that experience is an example of pleasure. Example – eating the peach is a pleasant experience.

*Pleasurable*: neutral terminology which indicates we have recognised and designated something (activity, object, experience) as in some way associated with the concept of pleasure.

How does this terminology help clear up confusions? Firstly, it can help us see
that seemingly contradictory statements are not so. Imagine the jaded sybarite who can no longer take pleasure in food, but still labels it one of life's pleasures because it has reliably caused pleasure in the past. He might say something along the lines of 'this pleasure no longer gives me pleasure' meaning 'this activity no longer causes or is the object of [a sensation or experience of] pleasure for me'. Similarly the ascetic who says 'the pleasures of the flesh give me no pleasure' means that what are commonly taken to be pleasant activities by the majority are not in fact pleasant experiences for him. More seriously for theorists of pleasure, confusion between sensory pleasures (i.e. activities of a sensory nature that are often pleasurable) and sensory pleasure (in the abstract noun sense where the episode of pleasure is itself a sensation) means relevant different entailments of such claims might be obscured.

The lay concept of pleasure is an important one to consider; although it may well be that our philosophical and scientific definitions in the end differ from it. Dube and Le Bel considered it necessary to map the psychological terrain and to that end produced five studies of how people used the concept 'pleasure':

Results further revealed that... laypeople represented pleasure as a hierarchical concept in which differentiated pleasure types (i.e. intellectual, emotional, social and physical) were subsumed under a higher level unitary form of pleasure. In this structure, unitary and differentiated pleasures shared a set of common affective qualities but were also distinguishable by unique and distinctive affective characteristics (Study 5) (Dube & Le Bel, 2003)

The first thing to note about the above-quoted study is that it is not claiming to show what kind of thing pleasure is, but how ordinary people conceptualise it. Dube and Le Bel's proposal that pleasure is a hierarchical concept with a general
unitary form of pleasure at the highest level with differentiated forms of pleasure at the level underneath seems to be a way of expressing both pleasure’s simple power and experiential richness. However, in examining the lay concept of pleasure we begin to see the shape of the philosophical problem. How do these differentiated forms of pleasure, with their distinctive objects and very different experiential qualities, come to be subsumed under one grand, unitary concept of ‘pleasure’? Below I shall show how this forms the first of three desiderata for a theory of pleasure.

0.1.1 First desideratum

It is proper that the apparent heterogeneity of pleasure is the first desideratum to be considered. Underlying the task of constructing a theory of pleasure is the assumption that there is such a thing as pleasure to be explained. More specifically, that pleasure is a natural kind, most likely a mental object or state, or property of such, and the class of those things which we call ‘pleasures’ can be unified in some way. Though of course a theorist of pleasure has to be optimistic that such a thing is possible, it may turn out that the class of pleasures is not unified and that what we think of as a class is not a class at all. The construction of a theory of pleasure is a search for this unifying feature, and it may be a search that fails. Still, the basic primary motivation exists for the theorist of pleasure in that we seem to be able to put things in this class, imaginary or not, and recognise the sense in other peoples’ ability to use the terminology. Two alternative views of pleasure are often defended throughout philosophy, affective science and economics:
1) Pleasure is a unitary phenomenon

or

2) Pleasure is a diverse phenomenon

The first view is exemplified by Kant, who said:

Just as to the man who wants money to spend, it is all the same whether the gold was
dug out of the mountain or washed out of the sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at
the same value, so the man who only cares for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether
the ideas (which he enjoys) are of the understanding or of the senses, but only how much
or how great the pleasure will be and for how much time. (Kant, 2004 (1788))

Kant’s position, which I have termed the product view, casts pleasure as a unitary
phenomenon, that is that pleasure itself is always the same thing, regardless of
source or object. This chimes well with much of current behavioural economics,
which cast pleasure as utility, that is the ultimate currency by which we make
our decisions and compare outcomes. Kant’s description suggests that pleasure,
like money, is ultimately fungible, separable from its causes, an independent (at
least in principle) phenomenon. As a unitary phenomenon, it can be counted in
units and added up and taken away from a grand total and because of this
different pleasurable experiences can be compared and one can be found to be
more or less pleasurable than the other. This is in opposition to the other
commonly held position throughout philosophy and the sciences; the view that
pleasure is an inseparable part of experience and that different pleasant
experiences cannot be weighed or compared against one another in the manner
Kant suggests. The opposite view to Kant’s was given by Karl Duncker:
A product like gold emancipates itself from, and exist independently from, its source. Is the pleasure separable from the flavour in this sense? Clearly not. The experience of pleasure remains dependent on the experience of the flavour (or whatever source it may have). (Duncker, 1941, p. 399)

The potential evidence for pleasure’s diversity is manifold and happily for the human race, pleasurable experiences are legion. Human beings typically take pleasure in good food, good wine, good conversation, in the giving of gifts, in the receiving of gifts, in pretty pictures and scary movies, in playing a game, in winning a game, in the first snowfall of winter or the last rays of the evening sun. In scratching itches, solving a crossword, sipping tea, hearing a symphony, learning a new language, building a tree house, throwing out unwanted junk, travelling, coming home. The list is seemingly endless. Some pleasures, such as sweet foods, hot baths, and the giving and receiving of affection are common to practically all, while others, such as masochistic sex or collecting certain memorabilia are much rarer (though still not uncommon).

This multitude gives us the first, and arguably most influential, desideratum when it comes to formulating a theory of pleasure: accounting for the number and variety of pleasurable experiences which do not seem to have all that much in common. This is known in the pleasure literature as the *Heterogeneity Problem*, and is main source of much of the debate about pleasure.¹ That there are different kinds of pleasant experiences is not contested. What is under examination is what very existence of different kinds of

pleasurable experiences means for describing the nature of pleasure itself. Heterogeneity and the response to the problem are more fully discussed in Chapter 1.

D1: A theory of pleasure will explain the apparent heterogeneity of its instances and will unify the conventional distinction between pleasures of body and mind.

Another, complementary approach to answer the Heterogeneity Problem is available – that of divide and conquer. The common approach is to divide pleasure into categories such as sensory and intellectual and explain one in terms of the other. The most favoured is that of defining sensory pleasures as the ‘simpler’ kind of pleasure, and using them to explain intellectual pleasures. Fred Feldman, for one, inverts this line of thinking but explaining our sensory pleasures as reducible to attitudinal (roughly, mental) pleasures (2004), (1988).

In our ordinary talk, ‘pleasure’ (especially in its plural noun form) is sometimes taken loosely to mean bodily pleasures, the most canonical of these being orgasm. In the philosophical discourse, the more general meaning is assumed, in order to include “the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional intellectual gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments.” (Sidgwick, 1907/1981, p. 127) It is hoped that even a brief perusal of the above sample of pleasurable experiences will persuade the reader, the intellectual and emotional are as deserving of the term as the bodily.

The convention of dividing pleasures into categories has a long history. When people talk about pleasure, we tend to think of ‘pleasures of the flesh’, such as food, wine, sex, massages, hot baths etc. This tendency toward the
sensual in the hedonic canon was acknowledged by Aristotle:

But as the pleasures of the body are the ones which we most often meet with, and as all men are capable of these, these have usurped the family title; and so men think these are the only pleasures that exist, because they are the only ones which they know. (Aristotle, 2004, p. 1153b)

But, as discussed above, we get many instances of pleasurable experience from many different sources. And so the tendency is to start forming categorisations, as was the case with the Cyrenaics, who since Aristippus denied the greater worth of pleasures of the mind as compared with those of the body. "They consider bodily pleasures more valuable than those of the mind", wrote Diogenes Laertius about the Cyrenaics, "and bodily pains worse than those of the mind" (Ossowska, 1961, p123), while Kant distinguished between the pleasure of the pleasant (which arises when the sensual desires which we share with the animals are satisfied), the pleasure of the good (which is connected with our interest in morals), and the pleasure of the beautiful (which is the result of a free play of the faculty of imagination) (Kant, 1914), while Jeremy Bentham considered there to be fourteen types of pleasure (Bentham, 1817). And then of course J.S. Mill described his 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. Mill declares that persons who are familiar with the pleasures of the higher faculties - the intellect, the feelings and imagination, the moral sentiments - prefer these pleasures markedly to the lower, purely physical pleasures, and would not be willing to relinquish the higher pleasures for any amount of the lower, even though they know the higher pleasures to be “attended with a greater amount of discontent” (Mill, 1863, p. 120). Therefore the higher pleasures are superior in quality and intrinsically more desirable. While this is an explicitly stated value judgment, but
you’ll find that that is implicit in Aristotle and especially Plato, and in many other philosophers who talk about pleasure. We should make a notable exception for Jeremy Bentham, who said that, “pushpin is as good as poetry” (1962, p. 253).

   Even in the current pleasure literature there is an implicit distinction between bodily pleasures (also called sensory pleasures) and intellectual pleasures. Even if this distinction is acknowledged, philosophers then go on to concentrate on bodily pleasures. Presumably this is because they are ‘simpler’ and we can call them to mind with more ease; once bodily pleasures are accounted for, the implication goes, we can expand the theory to account for intellectual pleasures.

   But is this really the case? For the game of tennis example (or substitute some sport or game you enjoy) it seems that has both physical and mental properties that are enjoyable. Philosophers often speak as if a game of tennis were a simple unitary experience, when of course it is very complex. If the game of tennis itself (composed of both physical and mental aspects) is the object of the pleasurable experience, then does that count as a physical or mental pleasure? Alternatively, if the game is broken down into its physical and mental components and they are the objects of pleasure individually, are we mistaken in thinking we can take pleasure in a game of tennis? Another difficult case is aesthetics. Why should a person who takes delight in a harmony of colours be treated as a person having distinguished mental pleasures, while the person who

---

2 See (Aristotle, 2004) and (Plato, 1993) but note that he is often also thought to hold the view that a life that does not give any importance to pleasure is the best life.

3 For example see Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of tennis (Ryle, 1953, chapter 4) or for a similar example, Philippa Foot’s discussion of gardening (Foot, 2001, chapter 7).
enjoys an artfully combined salad be expected to experience only a bodily pleasure? Aesthetic pleasures play on very complex notions and yet are often felt very simply and forcefully, seeming to bypass cognition and tap into something more fundamental and emotional. Simply categorising pleasures into mental/intellectual versus bodily/sensory does not do justice to either of these examples.

Even without the difficult cases such as tennis or aesthetics, is there a case for treating pleasures of the mind and pleasures of the body separately? Hedonic dualism states that bodily pleasures and pleasures of the mind are independent phenomena which must be treated separately. A comprehensive theory of pleasure will be able to link these two broad classes together.

A related problem is that there are hedonic differences between people, and that this is broadly found to be acceptable and even expected. ‘Different strokes for different folks’, ‘whatever floats your boat’, ‘there's no accounting for taste’, ‘à chacun son goût’ – in whichever language it is held to be true that people like and enjoy different things. Some foods such as oysters, offal and pungent cheeses elicit sighs of delight in some or groans of disgust in others. Certain sexual practices are considered the limits of rapture by some people and leave others cold. This between-individuals difference in pleasure is clearly not due to anything intrinsic to the object but due to the subject of the experience. While certain typical objects are found to be pleasurable by the vast majority and therefore people who do not confirm to this pattern may be considered by some to be out of the norm, there is no object so universally loved or despised object that exceptions cannot be thought of. A comprehensive theory of pleasure will
account for this fact.

Alongside this fact, there are also intra-individual differences to account for. That is the fact that many of us like certain things at one time and not another. Cool showers are very different experiences on hot, clammy days and freezing cold ones. The sight of a juicy burger provokes different reactions in a hungry worker and a man reaching the finishing line of an all-you-can-eat competition. A theory of pleasure ought to be able to take into account the fact that the same person will enjoy different things at different times.

This multi-faceted problem is subsumed and somewhat misrepresented in the literature as the Heterogeneity Problem. The basic outline of the Heterogeneity Problem states that there are many different instances and sources of pleasurable experience. The challenge for any theory of pleasure is to identify what unifies them and the whole structure of the classical pleasure debate is determined by how the two strains of theories (the phenomenological theories and the attitudinal theories) answer this challenge. The nature of the Heterogeneity Problem is discussed in detail in Chapter 1, and the strategies the two types of theory use to answer that problem are discussed in detail in chapters 2, 3 and 4, though to how the Heterogeneity Problem motivates the debate is also noted in the brief outline to the theories in section 0.2 of this introduction.

0.1.2 Second Desideratum

Another form of diversity is the many ways we think about pleasure. Ecstasy,
happiness, joy, gladness, approval, contentment, bliss, thrill, satisfaction, rapture, delight and plain old good mood are all forms of positive affect that seem to contain or pertain to the notion of pleasure, in varying ways. Although the main aim of this thesis is not to give an account of how pleasure sits in relation to, say, happiness, it will be assumed that pleasure can and does form a component of more complex emotions. The second desideratum will be explaining how pleasure plays a role in our emotional landscape.

D2: A theory of pleasure will explain how pleasure fits into a wider picture of the emotions, including its relationship to pain.

Pleasure and pain are often taken as part of the emotional landscape, but the exact nature of their fit is unclear. Hedonic theories of emotions, such as those espoused by Bennett Helm or Irwin Goldstein, suggest all positive emotions are pleasures (and conversely that all negative emotions are displeasures). Pleasure and happiness are an especially important pairing to consider. The Greeks recognised the difference between the two and had the terms hedonia for pleasure and eudaimonia for happiness. A rough distinction is that pleasure lasts a relatively short amount of time while happiness is a longer lasting state that takes into account several different factors contributing to a person’s welfare, and has less emphasis on how a person feels. Even so, it is unlikely a person who never had any pleasurable experiences could be truly called happy - anhedonia is in fact a symptom of depression. We think pleasurable experiences somehow ‘feed’ into one’s happiness. It might well be the case that the longer term state of happiness might be somehow dependent on short-term pleasure experiences. If it is genuinely the case that a person could not be happy without having a
pleasurable experience, with the complete theory of pleasure will be able to explain the link between short-term states and longer-term status.

It seems at least superficially true that all pleasures seem to have some kind of valence in a positive or negative direction (Frijda, 2001). Valence here simply means the overall characterisation of an emotion as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. This usually taken as self-evident, but even a brief inspection of the emotions makes it clear that a) it is difficult to categorise some emotions either way and b) some emotions may have genuinely mixed valence. The first is seen with an emotion such as anger. Traditionally seen as negative, anger can also be seen as positive in that it is energising and uplifting, it can fuel people through otherwise challenging circumstances and be channelled productively in furtherance of righteous causes. What makes an emotion a negative one is not clearly defined in the literature, and it may just be one that is accompanied by feelings of (emotional) pain. This brings us to b) that some emotions are mixed. A classic example is nostalgia, but again anger is a good example in that in an episode of anger something has clearly gone awry and is frustrating the subject, but also the subject’s anger can be accompanied by pleasurable feelings such as elation. Another classic example is schadenfreude, or enjoying another person’s pain or failure. These ‘dark pleasures’ must also be taken into account.

Another important connection is between pleasure and pain. Often philosophers of pleasure will treat pain as its exact opposite (and even treat the two as if they were on a continuum) while others argue that pleasure and pain cannot be opposed. This thesis will be cautious about treating pleasure and pain as direct opposites but nonetheless often refer to the pain literature for support
in formulating thoughts about pleasure. A complete theory of pleasure will explain the nature of the relationship between pleasure and pain, including why they *seem* to be opposites to many people (even if they are not in actuality). Another dark pleasure, perhaps the most famous kind, is that of the masochist, the seemingly unique-to-humankind ability to, in some circumstances, take pleasure in our own pain.

### 0.1.3 Third desideratum

The last desideratum brings us to another set of problems that are second only in importance to the Heterogeneity Problem in their impact on the pleasure debate so far. The two problems – the *Euthyphro Problem* and *Finlay’s Problem* – are mirror images of each other. Both comment of pleasure’s relation to motivation, our last not but not least desideratum:

*D3: A theory of pleasure will explain its connection to motivation*

We think of pleasure as being bound up with motivation – it seems natural to desire what we find pleasant.\(^4\) The promise of pleasure is thought of as a rational justification for action. But what we desire does not always bring us pleasure, and we don’t always desire pleasant things. Moreover, we can even desire unpleasant and even painful things, as the case of the masochist shows. A theory of pleasure must explain why pleasure and motivation usually co-occur, but also leave room for the fact that do not always do so.

The *Euthyphro Problem* is especially troublesome for attitudinal theories of

\(^4\) A related question is if we desire pleasure itself.
pleasure. That is, if it is an attitude that explains why an experience is pleasurable, then we cannot appeal to pleasure to explain why some experiences evoke that attitude – i.e. liking or pleasure (see chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the problem) without redundancy. On the flipside, Finlay’s Problem challenges phenomenological theorists to explain if, pleasure is merely phenomenological, then it seems intimately bound up with desire and motivation in a way that other phenomenological properties do not (Findlay’s Problem is discussed in chapter 2).

0.2 Introducing the three theories of pleasure

Now that we have seen what is required from a theory of pleasure, let us turn to the currently available options: phenomenological, attitudinal and representational. The first two types of theory arise specifically as a response to the first desiderata introduced above, though it’s important to note that they do not address all of the associated problems. The Heterogeneity Problem is the idea the pleasurable experiences seem very different, and it is most often implied that this is to do with the causes or objects of those experiences. Inter and intra-individual differences in pleasure experiences, though clearly related to the Heterogeneity Problem, are not often discussed.

0.2.1 Phenomenological theories of pleasure

There are two main versions of phenomenological theory: Distinctive Feeling theory, which says pleasure is an independent feeling causally linked to sources of pleasure; and Hedonic Tone theory, which says pleasure is an integral aspect of
experience which is not independent of its source. They all agree that what makes a pleasurable experience pleasurable is something to do with the phenomenology of that experience. The main line of attack against these theories is known as the Heterogeneity Argument (based on the Heterogeneity Problem, see above and chapter 1). Traditionally, each theory is judged on its ability to respond to the argument.

The principal attraction of phenomenological theories is their consistency with the intuition that the pleasantness of an experience is somehow right there in the experience itself. *Phenomenological* theories of pleasure all identify pleasure with something in the phenomenology of an experience – this is also sometimes known as the *Felt-Quality View*.\(^5\) This family of theories is also termed ‘internalist’ because they claim that what makes a pleasure experience pleasurable is something internal to the experience.\(^6\) Phenomenological theories appeal to the intuition that pleasure is right there in the experience itself. A sensation or feeling is a relatively non-mysterious mental event which has duration, and a phenomenological theory can account for different intensities of pleasure by either a) saying that sensations or feelings can have the property of intensity or b) that the feelings or sensations can be aggregated to account for different intensities of pleasure.

The two types of phenomenological theory are *Distinctive Feeling* theory and *Hedonic Tone* theory. The general phenomenological theory schema below is filled in different ways by different theories:

---

\(^5\) Christopher Heathwood uses this terminology, see his (Heathwood, 2011).

\(^6\) Feldman (2004) makes this distinction.


**X is pleasurable if X is an experience with a certain kind of intrinsic phenomenology.**

Chapters 2 and 3 look at the Distinctive Feeling and Hedonic Tone theories respectively.

Historically, phenomenological theories have been thought to be so susceptible to the Heterogeneity Argument (chapter 1) that most debate and criticism centres around this problem, and as the various theories become more sophisticated to answer that argument, the main strength given by the intuitive appeal of phenomenological theories lessens. The idea of a sensation of pleasure is (relatively) easy to understand, but what exactly is a *hedonic tone*? Or a *pleasure dimension*? Appeals to analogy with colour and volume are somewhat illuminating but not totally satisfactory, as the critical discussion of Hedonic Tone theory in Chapter 3 will show.

Phenomenological theorists are also in a difficult position regarding the problem of deciding what counts as instances of pleasure: for example if enjoying working on a maths problem really counts as an instance of pleasurable experience, given the sensations one may or may not expect to feel. It seems more suitable, on phenomenological theories, to draw a narrower boundary around what we think of pleasurable experiences, but this can face accusations of being arbitrary and question-begging. This is related to the Heterogeneity Problem in so far as the more diverse instances of experiences that count as pleasurable, the less easy it is to see what they might have in common, phenomenologically speaking.
0.2.2 Attitudinal theories of pleasure

If the response of the phenomenological theorist to the Heterogeneity Problem is not to your liking, then the alternative is to embrace attitudinal theories. Their answer to the question “what do all instances of pleasurable experience have in common?” involves the attitude to the subject of that experience has towards its object. But what is meant by ‘attitude’? There is a longstanding tradition of describing mental reality by contrasting ‘attitudes’ with ‘contents’. Among attitudes we count believing, desiring, knowing and perceiving, while contents are most often expressed as complementary propositions.

There is more than one version of the attitudinal theory, delineated by which attitude they take to explain what makes an experience pleasurable, which can be seen as instances of the general schema:

\[
\text{Experience } X \text{ is pleasurable if } X \text{ is an experience in which a subject of } X \text{ has a certain kind of attitude toward the object of } X.
\]

To flesh out an account, the “certain kind of attitude” might be ‘desire’, ‘liking’ or as kind of sui generis pro-attitude. These theories are reductive in the sense that facts about pleasure are just facts about desire, motivation or preference – attitudes which are familiar items of our mental furniture. The supposed
strengths of attitudinal theories is that they move away from problems of heterogeneity and give grounds for building a link between motivation – the third desiderata on our list.

Attitudinal theories also capitalise on the intuition (and the trend in current philosophy of emotion) that affective experiences have intentionality. That is to say they are in some way directed on an object or proposition, be it taking pleasure in an artwork or being pleased that my preferred party won the election. However, this commitment to intentionality is open to counter-examples – what about experiences of pure ecstasy that don’t seem to have any particular objects (they may well have a cause, such as a spiritual awakening or a drug-induced high, but this is not the same as having an intentional object). This can be seen as the phenomenologist’s parallel to the Heterogeneity Argument in that it produces evidence from introspection of certain pleasure experiences as an argument against its opponents. In chapter 1 I will argue that for either camp, this is not a legitimate tactic.

Attitudes have what Searle (1983) calls a mind-to-world or a word-to-world (or a representation-to-world) direction of fit. The origin of this distinction is often thought to be Elizabeth Anscombe’s example of a man with a shopping list: his list can either be seen as a descriptive list of what has already been bought or an imperative list of what he ought to go and buy (Anscombe, 1957, p.54).

This is succinctly explained by Michael Platts:
The distinction is in terms of the direction of fit of mental states to the world. Beliefs aim at being true and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit with the world, not vice versa. Desires aim at realization, and their realization is the world fitting with them; the fact that the indicative content of a desire is not realised in the world is not yet a failing in the desire, and not yet any reason to discard the desire; the world, crudely, should be changed to fit with our desires, not vice versa. (Platts, 1979, p. 257)

That is, if the experience and the world fail to match in the relevant respects, the experience (and not the world) is faulty it has failed in its function of matching the world. Such indicative representations stand in sharp contrast to things like desires and commands, which function not to represent the way things are but (very roughly) the way things should be. So a desire-based attitudinal theory does not have the option of misrepresentative pleasure experience, which may be an advantage or disadvantage.

An attitudinal theory concentrates on identifying the attitude that links pleasant experiences but is silent on its role beyond that – is the attitude directed on an object or a proposition? What ramifications does a change of attitude have on experience (if any)? It is unclear.

Historically, the attitudinalists have not only put forward this positive account of what unites pleasure, but also made it a parallel negative claim that there is no phenomenological element that is present in all pleasant experiences. This is because the phenomenological view is thought to be the most intuitively appealing, a kind of default 'naïve' view, and therefore, persuading others to embrace the attitudinal view requires also persuading them that the
phenomenological view is false. After all, if the phenomenological view works then there is no need to develop a less intuitively appealing view. But this is a matter of dialectical strategy rather than necessity. All the attitudinalist needs to do, to count as an attitudinalist, is to embrace the idea that every instance of a pleasurable experience also involves an instance of his or her preferred attitude.

0.2.3 Attitudinal vs. phenomenological theories of pleasure

Having said that, it is a matter of fact that the debate is set up so that the classic confrontation is between that of attitudinal theories of pleasure and phenomenological theories of pleasure. Phenomenological theories argue that what unites instances of pleasurable experience is something to do with their phenomenology while attitudinalists claim that that is not the case and that only thing that can unite instances of pleasurable experiences is the attitude a subject has towards either an object or state of affairs. This attitude is usually desire, though ‘liking’ and a sui generis ‘pro attitude’ have also been pressed into service.

The driver of this has been the observation that when we introspect on our pleasure experiences we cannot find this supposed phenomenological element that links all of them. This is formed into the Heterogeneity Argument against pleasure, which is explored in more depth in the next chapter. The introspective basis for the argument has not gone unchallenged, with some phenomenologists claiming that they do in fact observe such an element. Here I restrict myself to observing that phenomenologists merely have one theoretical commitment, that there is a phenomenological element in common, while
attitudinalists (contingently) give themselves both a positive and negative commitment to uphold - the first being that there is an attitude each experience has in common, and the second being that is also no phenomenal element in common either. Phenomenologists do not have to comment on the matter of what attitudes are involved either way and so can allow that the positive commitment of attitudinal theory may or may not be that case, and that it is only the negative commitment that puts the two camps in contention. This is at the point at which the debate finds itself in a stand off, with both camps claiming victory of sorts. At this point another type of theorist enters the fray: the representational theorist.

0.2.4 Representational theories of pleasure

Until recently, the pleasure debate has dominated by phenomenological theories (which were assumed to be non-intentional) and attitudinal theories (which were intentional in so far as they discussed attitudes directed towards objects, but precluded phenomenology). The representationalist theories discussed here combine both aspects of these theories, because they assume there is some phenomenological entity to be explained (as per the phenomenological theories and directly contrary to traditional attitudinal theories) but that that phenomenology can only be explained with reference to its intentionality or representational contents. Although it straddles the divide between the two conventional camps, representationalism sits uneasily with either, as it ignores the classic starting point for the pleasure debate, the Heterogeneity Argument.
One historical reason that representationalists ignore the Heterogeneity Argument is that these theories are developed from a different topic in philosophy of mind – that of pain. Some theorists of pain advance a representationalist theory that is meant to cover both positive and negative affect, though in practice it is assumed that once they have satisfactorily explained pain it will merely be a case of extrapolating out a correlating theory of pleasure.\(^7\) Accounts include Colin Klein’s *imperativism* (2015) and *evaluativism*, embraced by Michael Tye (2002) and David Bain (2003, 2013) among others. The difference between these accounts lies in what representational content they believe underpins the phenomenal content of pleasure (and pain). The basic idea can be sketched like so:

\[ \text{If } X \text{ is pleasurable then } X \text{ is an experience which has a certain representational content.} \]

Desire Satisfactionism claims that an experience is pleasurable if it represents the satisfaction of some desire that the subject holds. Imperativism states that the representational content of pain (and by inference, pleasure) is a command. Evaluativism claims that the representational content of pleasure and pain is that the experience represents their objects as good or bad, respectively. Each version of the representational theory is assessed in chapter 5.

\(^7\) One such philosopher (Tye, 2005) is covered here, though evaluativists such as (Bain, 2003) also come under this heading. Some philosophers also call this intentionalism about pain. I will use the terms interchangeably, though I prefer representationalism due to its suggestion of indicativeness as well as the attributiveness of pleasure.
The next step in clarifying representational accounts is to understand what it means to have representational content. Eric Schwitzgebel calls any account of representation contentive just in case it treats as representational anything meeting the following condition:

(A) It has propositional (alternatively: intentional or semantic) content.

Accounts of the sort Schwitzgebel counts as contentive are those that treat all the following types of things as representational: beliefs, desires, and the other so-called ‘propositional attitudes’; sentences and other linguistic acts; pictures, maps, and potentially certain kinds of artistic objects. (Schwitzgebel 1999, p158)

Indicative accounts of representation require a further condition. Not only must any representation or representational state have content [condition (A)], but also:

(B) The content of a representation is supposed to match up (alternatively, in normal conditions matches up) with the way things are in the world. If it does not, misrepresentation (itself a type of representation) has occurred.

On an indicative account, representation has an informational role to play because it is somehow reflective of the state of the world. Exactly how the “match up” between content and world is achieved will differ in different accounts. It is clear that desire, as a world-to-mind type of attitude, does not come under this description, where as other classic “propositional attitudes”,

---

8 For example, Tye makes use of ‘teleosemantics’ to explain how world and content reliably match up.
such as a belief, do. So, imperativism would not be have to give an account of what it might mean for a pleasure or pain experience to misrepresent, while it may be the case that Desire Satisfactionism and evaluativism do.

0.2.5 Representational vs. attitudinal and phenomenological theories of pleasure

Representationalism comes at the problem from a different place from either attitudinal or phenomenological theories. For our two traditional accounts, the idea that there is a phenomenological element in common for pleasure experiences is exactly what is up for debate. Instead, for representational accounts, it is assumed that there is such a phenomenological element and it is this element that is the explanandum of representational experiences. One explanation for this difference lies in considering the origin of each approach. Attitudinalists and phenomenologists tend to be concerned with moral philosophy and are looking for a theory of pleasure to press into service for theories such as hedonism or for various welfare debates.

Representationalists, on the other hand, started developing their theories in regard to pain, where it is accepted as uncontroversial that pains have a phenomenological element in common that needs explaining – and are adapting a theory of pain to work for a theory of pleasure. Therefore, though it might seem natural to think of representational accounts as being a version of a phenomenological account because of their implicit acknowledgement that all pleasure experiences have a phenomenological element in common. However, representationalists have at least as much in common with attitudinalists in their
insistence that intentionality, the directedness of pleasure on or towards objects or states of affairs, is an integral part of their theory of pleasure. Representationalism could therefore be seen as a hybrid of phenomenological and attitudinal theories – acknowledging the existence of pleasure phenomenology while insisting that attitude has something to do with the generation of that phenomenology. If we just stick to understanding either theory by their positive claims then this is not problematic – there is nothing inherently contradictory in an experience having both phenomenology and intentionality after all (and many people would claim it is in fact necessary). But when we remember that negative claims and arguments that both of the traditional camps have made in an attempt to undermine each other, it makes it seem like this hybridisation makes even more work for representationalists to do – they must take on the claims about phenomenology (or lack of it) from the attitudinalists, worry about how to link in motivation (a problem for both sides) and try and explain potentially non-intentional experiences of pure ecstasy (an argument produced by the phenomenologists against the attitudinalists). In essence, attitudinalists/phenomenologists put less emphasis on the mechanics of experiences and therefore the accounts seem less satisfying from a philosophy of mind point of view, where as representationalists do not always acknowledge that pleasure experience is not simply an inverse of pain experience and if there is such a thing a pleasure phenomenology it has its own special quality of elusiveness that must be explained.

I have claimed that representationalists have at least as much in common with attitudinalists as phenomenologists. In contemporary philosophy of mind
the usage of words such as ‘attitude’ and ‘representation’ do a lot of work – and the many different circumstance in which these useful words come to the rescue inevitably mean there is a certain amount of bagginess in their definition.

The very fact that both attitudinal and representational accounts make use of the concept of intentionality show that the must be related in some way but it doesn’t follow that representational accounts are a type of attitudinal accounts. Instead both are forms of intentionalist accounts. An attitudinalist account considers how the subject is related to an object by what attitude the subject takes towards that object. Different variants of attitude are put forward but desire is usually thought of as the most successful. Representational accounts (especially impure ones) are concerned with both attitude (or mode) and intentional content and how this is realised in phenomenal content.

This means a representationalist theory has more commitments than attitudinal ones. An experience, structured representationally, consists of an attitude directed upon either an object (non-propositional) or a state of affairs (propositional) so the representationalists need to have something to say about both the attitude and the content of experience. Representationalists could usurp desire theorists by co-opting desire as the attitude in question (as in Desire Satisfactionism) but in practise the favoured tactic has been to concentrate on evaluativism, which puts the emphasis on the ‘content’ element of the equation, as does imperativism. In a broad brushstroke, evaluativists think that a pleasant experience is so in virtue of the fact that an object or state of affairs of being represented in experience as having the property of ‘good’.
Occasionally the mode of representation is also delved into and often perception is thought to be the best model for exactly how this property is apprehended.

**Thesis plan**

The first section of the thesis (chapters 1 2 3 and 4) describes traditional opposition between attitude theories and phenomenological theories as a response to the Heterogeneity Problem. The second section (chapters 5, 6 and 7) turns its attention to representational theories of pleasure. Chapter 5 introduces representationalism, while chapter 6 concentrates on what I consider to be the promising version of that theory, evaluativism. Chapter 7 contains my development of evaluativism in respect to the self and the notion of attention as an attitude.

**Summary of Desiderata**

*D1: A theory of pleasure will explain the apparent heterogeneity of its instances.*

*D2: A theory of pleasure will explain how pleasure fits into a wider picture of the emotions, including its relationship to pain.*

*D3: A theory of pleasure will explain its connection to motivation*
Chapter 1: The Heterogeneity Problem

The organising principle for much of the pleasure is to be found in the apparent heterogeneity of pleasurable experiences. This chapter will introduce and describe the Heterogeneity Argument against phenomenological theorists, which is usually considered to be so compelling that the mainstream position in the philosophy of pleasure is that of the attitudinal theorist. This chapter investigates the Heterogeneity Argument in detail, arguing that its success or failure turns on the methodology it employs – that of introspecting on our pleasurable experiences. It is shown that an unconsidered use of introspection is not a sound method for understanding our pleasurable experiences, both due to the nature of those experiences and through empirical evidence that shows that we are often wrong about our affective experiences, or assign meaning to them in such ways that undermines them.

This chapter does not endorse scepticism about introspection in general, although it does consider some sceptical worries about being able to determine the structure of a pleasure experience by merely introspecting it. Nor does it advance a thoroughgoing scepticism regarding our knowledge of our own pleasurable experiences. It will be tentatively agreed that we can and do have some self-knowledge about pleasurable experiences, in so far as we are aware of
having them and they are in many ways informative about ourselves and the
world. Pleasure, the thesis as a whole will go on to show, is in itself a ‘way of
knowing’; that is to say pleasure is a form of epistemological access to what is
valuable for ourselves, but one that is highly corruptible due to its complex
nature. I will argue in chapter 7 that pleasure is a form of paying attention, and
that attention is easily manipulated. In this chapter, what will be under
examination is whether introspection is the best method for gaining knowledge
about pleasurable experiences and, if using introspection is ever successful in
reporting on pleasurable experiences, what kind of knowledge it yields. This
chapter aims to demonstrate that deliberate introspection on pleasurable
experiences yields results that are unclear and is not a trustworthy source of
justification for claims about what kind of thing pleasure is.

Without trustworthy introspective evidence, it will be seen that the
foundations of the Heterogeneity Argument are fatally undermined. The
Heterogeneity Argument implicitly relies on the authority and infallibility of
introspection over our pleasurable experiences. Once introspection is weakened
as a source of evidence, the Heterogeneity Argument becomes much less
compelling. I then go on to suggest that considering the function of pleasurable
experiences is a more important factor in building a theory than attempting to
introspect on pleasure.

---

\(^9\) The reader is asked to keep in mind the distinction between knowing when one
is having a pleasurable experience and knowing what the structure of that
experience is.
1.1 Raindrops on roses, or, the infinite varieties of pleasure: setting up the Heterogeneity Argument

The sources of human pleasure are famously varied. I like the taste of chilled Sancerre and hot tea. I enjoy arthouse films, thrillers, good books, bad books, the feel of freshly made beds, the smell of freshly mown grass, finishing a crossword puzzle, looking at the stars, feeling warm sun on the back of my neck, miserabilist indie music of the 80s and hearing the sound of laughter. All of these can be said to give me pleasure or to be pleasurable experiences.

It is customary practically to the point of obligation to open a paper on pleasure with such a list. The reason for this is that the central problem motivating the philosophy of pleasure is known as the Heterogeneity Problem. This problem can be framed as the question: *what is it that unites all these experiences such that we call them pleasurable experiences?* Pleasurable experiences are diverse. The sources of these experiences are almost as numerous as the subjects who experience them. Some obvious sources of pleasure include sex, food, drink and our social interactions with other people. But, as the Julie Andrews tune demonstrates, many causes are particular to an individual. Furthermore, though some sources of pleasure are considered unusual and even to be frowned upon, it is also commonly held that it is normal for different people to gain pleasure from different things.

This is the starting point for many, if not most, recent papers on pleasure. Philosophers of pleasure such as Ben Bramble (2011), Heathwood (2006), Aydede (forthcoming) (2014), Feldman (2004), (1988) and many more take this as the Ground Zero for pleasure:
We can feel pleasure from eating a juicy peach, smelling clean laundry, emptying a full bladder, seeing the friendly smile of a passing stranger, solving a puzzle, taking a warm bath on a cold day, hearing the laughter of children, watching a cat play with a rubber band, climbing into a soft bed, thinking of someone we love, soaking up the sun, and so on. (Smuts, 2010, p. 11)

Pleasure, it is widely believed, is sometimes felt in response to characteristic sensations such as a massage, the scent of warm brie, the sight of graceful movement, and the like, and at other times felt in response to more cognitively sophisticated mental events such as thoughts about the success of one’s child in her chosen profession, witnessing an elegant move in a chess match, or hearing a radio advertisement that strikes one as humorously devoid of irony. (Schroeder, 2004, p. 73)

The enormous variety and diversity in the qualitative phenomenology of all pleasant experiences (as well as unpleasant ones) is striking. (Aydede, 2014, p. 119)\(^\text{10}\)

The Heterogeneity Problem is a problem precisely because figuring out what our pleasurable experiences have in common is surprisingly difficult. Ordinary language might lead one to think that the experiences in question ‘give’ us an extra something, and this extra something is pleasure. Under this view, pleasure is a thing which is logically separable from the experience or object which ‘caused’ it. From this point, it seems natural to think that pleasure is a kind of sensation caused by certain sorts of stimuli, and that pleasurable experiences are those experiences which include a sensation of pleasure, introduced earlier as the *Naive View of Pleasure*. What unites the experience of drinking cool white wine and basking in the hot sun, according to the naive view, is the fact that each produces a sensation of pleasure which is the same in each case (though may be

\(^{10}\) I include a variety of quotations here to demonstrate just how pervasive and fundamental the Heterogeneity Problem is considered to be within the literature.
present in greater or lesser quantities).

The Heterogeneity Problem is reconfigured as the *Heterogeneity Argument* when directed against this naive view. In a nutshell, the argument claims to demonstrate that there is no such sensation or phenomenological property common to all pleasurable experiences. The move is one from observing that there are many different kinds of pleasurable experience to claiming that these many different kinds of pleasurable experiences have nothing in common, phenomenologically speaking.

This move finds one of its earliest expressions in Sidgwick:

> [F]or my own part, when I reflect on the notion of pleasure, using the term in the comprehensive sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratification, no less than the coarser and more refined sensual enjoyments; the *only common quality that I can find* in the feelings so designated seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term ‘desirable’. (Sidgwick, 1981 (1907), p. 127)

Like Sidgwick, many modern theorists of pleasure have taken this as a cue to abandon phenomenological theories of pleasure and formulate theories based on some sort of mental attitude instead.\(^{11}\) This creates the now-traditional split in the field of the philosophy of pleasure between attitude theories and phenomenological theories, both conceived of as responses towards the Heterogeneity Problem. Later chapters will examine these established viewpoints. But first I will turn to examining the Heterogeneity Argument itself.

\(^{11}\) This is despite the fact that phenomenological theorists have fought back by addressing the Heterogeneity Argument into their theories, as explored in chapter 2.
in more detail.

1.2 The Heterogeneity Argument

To recap, the Heterogeneity Argument is a move from the observation that there are many different examples of pleasurable experience to the conjecture that there is nothing in common, phenomenologically speaking, between these experiences that fits the picture painted by the naive view of pleasure. So when we think of drinking a cold beer and hearing a symphony, these experiences seem so different we cannot find a common phenomenological element between them. This, on the face of it, runs counter to the idea that pleasure is essentially phenomenological. Because it would seem natural to expect that if pleasure is essentially phenomenological that we ought to find a common phenomenological element between our pleasure experiences, the pressure is then on a phenomenological experiences to account for this.

The Heterogeneity Argument can therefore be expressed:

1. According to phenomenological theories of pleasure, all instances of pleasurable experiences are pleasurable in virtue of sharing some phenomenological feature.
2. There is no phenomenological feature shared by all instances of pleasurable experience.
3. Therefore, phenomenological theories are false.

At first glance, the Heterogeneity Argument looks to be a potentially convincing argument against phenomenological theories. The work for the proponent of the argument is in providing evidence for the second premise. Once this is achieved,
by the validity of the argument, the conclusion must be true.

For some writing on the topic of pleasure, that is not much work at all. For those writers, premise 2 (that there is no phenomenological feature shared by all instances of pleasurable experience) is so obviously the case that it is a paragraph’s work to demonstrate it is so. If we inspect our experience, calling to mind various examples of pleasurable experience, then according to these theorists it becomes obvious that they are very phenomenologically different, and that there is no phenomenological commonality between, say, getting into a freshly made bed and listening to heartfelt music.

For instance David Sobel, when writing on hedonism, states:

> A common objection to hedonism as an account of well-being is that there is no single sensation that is common to all our different experiences of intrinsic value. The pleasures of walking barefoot through the grass arm in arm with one's love have so little phenomenologically in common with the pleasures of winning a tense tennis match or eating a good burger or working through a challenging philosophical problem that we do not understand the instruction to maximize the sensation that these different activities share. (Sobel, 1999, p. 230)

Other philosophers to ask us to ‘search’ our experiences for clues about pleasure include Hedonic Tone theorist Roger Crisp, who states:

> If the advocate of heterogeneity is seeking in enjoyable experiences something like a special sensation, such as sweetness, or a tingle or feeling located in a certain part of the body, such as an itch or pins and needles, or indeed something like a perceptual quality such as redness, he will fail. (Crisp, 2006, p. 196)

And attitudinalist Fred Feldman, who says:
The central difficulty is straightforwardly phenomenological. The alleged feeling of pleasure itself has proven extremely elusive. No matter how carefully they scrutinize their feelings, phenomenological researchers fail to locate the indefinable feeling. (Feldman, 1988, p. 59)

And, he adds more specifically:

Personally I doubt there is any such feeling [of pleasure]. I have never felt it. (Feldman, 2004, p. 85 footnote 5)

The methodology of ‘searching’ one’s experiences, though not explicitly detailed in most cases, seems to be that of introspection. Aydede explicitly refers to introspection in his case against phenomenological theories, “Introspective evidence favours the thesis that what unites all pleasant sensations is their being liked or desired and not there being a discernible phenomenal feel or tone common to all pleasant sensations...the attitudinal theorists think that introspection favours their side.” (Aydede, 2014, p. 123)

So, to make the Heterogeneity Argument more explicit, it can be laid out like so:

1. According to phenomenological theories of pleasure, all instances of pleasurable experiences are pleasurable in virtue of sharing some phenomenological feature.

2. It is evident from introspecting one’s own experiences that there is no phenomenological feature shared by all instances of pleasurable experience.

3. Therefore, phenomenological theories are false.

12 Again I use a variety of quotations here to show that this datum is accepted by many theorists from both sides of the aisle.
Identifying introspection as the methodology which supports premise 2 makes it clear that premise 2 is resting on at least three assumptions. These assumptions are:

1) Pleasure is always consciously experienced.

2) All experienced phenomena are amenable to introspection.

3) Pleasure is the kind of phenomenon that is not altered by introspection.

There are several problems for the Heterogeneity Argument generated by questioning these assumptions, which I will do in later sections. However, the most obvious and simple problem is that not everyone is in agreement that introspection does in fact reveal the truth of premise 2.

This chapter now goes on to look at two arguments against the reliability of introspection. The first is introspective disagreement and the second is that if some introspective judgments are shown to be unreliable, then we have reason to distrust all introspective judgments. The argument from introspective disagreement, it is shown, does not mean that introspection is a worthless source of information but rather a vague and fuzzy one that is open to different interpretations. The second, the argument from unreliability, is a critique aimed at a very general conception of introspection and, under a more specific definition, we can see that some introspective judgments are less reliable (or more open to distorting effects) than others. I then go on to consider whether phenomenal contrast argument would a more suitable version of the heterogeneity argument, given what has been discussed about the nature of introspection.
1.3 Introspective disagreement

Despite the confidence with which supporters of the Heterogeneity Argument assert the obviousness of the lack of common phenomenology, not everyone agrees this is the case. In fact, the debate surrounding the Heterogeneity Argument is an excellent example of thoroughgoing introspective disagreement. On one hand we have Sidgwick, Feldman and others telling us they cannot detect any common phenomenology for pleasure, while Smuts, for example, claims to detect a ‘glow’ or ‘hum’ that corresponds with a phenomenological element of pleasure experience: “My suggestion is that pleasurable experiences—whether of eating a peach or solving a puzzle—all have this, pick your metaphor, warm hum.” (Smuts, 2010, p. 15)

When we introspect, we are looking at our own phenomenology as individuals, but the claims philosophers make as a result of introspecting are claims about phenomenology qua human beings. Theorists from both phenomenological and attitudinal positions are not content to claim that ‘this is what it is like for me’, but that how they are describing pleasure experiences is true for all human beings. Three slightly different claims are conflated here:

Claim 1: I cannot discern a common phenomenal feature shared by all instances of my pleasurable experiences.

Which is sometimes conflated with:

Claim 2: It is not the case that there is a common phenomenal feature shared by all
instances of my pleasurable experiences.

What cannot be discerned is not the same as what does not exist. Absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence after all. Although not being able to discern something might be evidence that potentially supports the claim that something does not exist, it is not proof that something does not exist. Claim 1 might also be conflated with a third claim:

*Claim 3: No one can discern a common phenomenal feature shared by all instances of their pleasurable experiences.*

The claim that *I* cannot discern something clearly does not support the claim that *nobody* can discern it. Furthermore, moving from either claim 1 or 3 to claim 2 purely through the methodology of introspecting one’s own experience is inferentially unsound. The rest of this section discusses potential explanations for introspective disagreement and concludes that if we are to avoid ‘pounding on the table’, the lack of phenomenal commonality claimed by at least some people must still be resolved. It also introduces a third possibility, that for most people the phenomenal feature in present is neither obviously present nor absent, but in fact the results of a phenomenological investigation of our pleasure experiences are vague and fuzzy and it is hard to give either a positive or negative answer on the question.

The very existence of disagreement among thoughtful, charitable theorists about what introspecting on pleasure tells us supports caution in claiming
introspection is reliable. The existence of introspective disagreement gives us a \textit{prima facie} reason to doubt the reliability of introspective investigation of pleasure. At this point it should be reiterated that this scepticism is not about whether we \textit{know if} an experience is pleasurable or not (though this too may be in doubt) but whether introspection can give us an insight into the structure and nature of a pleasurable experience qua its being pleasurable.

Bayne and Spener (2010) make the point that introspective disagreement occurs on matters of judgments that are freestanding or only weakly supported (they use the term ‘scaffolded’) by the existence of other beliefs or actions regarding the object of introspection. So in a strongly scaffolded judgment, the content of the introspection aligns with the perceptual judgment and the action taken. In these cases, introspective disagreement is rare. Bayne and Spener pinpoint affective states as being especially likely candidates for generating weakly scaffolded judgments:

\begin{quote}
Introspective judgements about affective experience provide some evidence in favour of this proposal. Such judgements are weakly scaffolded insofar as the first-order judgments which the subject might be disposed to make when endorsing the content of that emotional experience will not typically bear a very tight match to the content of the introspective judgment. (In part, this is because it is unclear what the precise content of the first-order judgements would be.) This suggests that introspective access to affective experience is likely to be problematic, and indeed there is a good amount of empirical evidence for this view. (Bayne & Spener, 2010, p. 21)
\end{quote}

Indeed, from a purely anecdotal perspective, it does not seem controversial to say we have all experienced moments when we have avoided objects, experiences or people we claim to find highly pleasurable. In these cases, our
actions do not endorse our explicit judgments of the pleasurableness of those experiences. Given that we genuinely believe a certain experience will be highly pleasurable (and are not just claiming so) then two possible interpretations spring to mind. One is that we suffer from weakness of will because there is some fault in the link between our judgment and our will to act. The other is that our explicit beliefs about an experience do not match up with our implicit beliefs about it. Both interpretations deserve consideration – the first is a difficulty for those who maintain that pleasure and pain are tightly bound up with motivation, the second is a difficulty for those who claim that our judgments about pleasure are incorrigible, because of the nature of pleasant experience. For this chapter the second interpretation is clearly most concerning while the first is more properly dealt with in the fourth chapter.

In summary, if introspection about pleasure experiences was completely reliable then the existence of such disagreement means that either human beings do not have uniformity either in pleasurable experiences themselves, or in the ability to introspect pleasurable experiences. Below I first explore both possible explanations.

*Explanation 1: Differences in pleasure experiences themselves*

The first and most obvious potential cause of introspective disagreement is that the subject of the disagreement is actually different for different people. This would mean that for some there is no pleasure phenomenology attached to their pleasurable experience, and for others there is. Smuts genuinely experiences an obvious “warm glow” throughout his pleasurable experience, and Feldman genuinely experiences no such phenomenology.
There are familiar problems in investigating individual phenomenologies. If we take these statements as accurate then some people experience a specific phenomenological element they call ‘pleasure’ and some do not. If that is the case then one way of characterising the difference would be that some people are lucky enough to have the full pleasure experience and some have an impoverished experience – the hedonic equivalent of only being able to see in black and white while some can see in full colour. But the problem would then remain of explaining how the hedonically impaired know how to identify pleasurable experiences while those experiences were phenomenologically lacking. It would be as if a person without black and white vision could reliably identify red objects without ever experiencing red. From a functional perspective, it would make the phenomenological element in question redundant.

So even if Smuts is right and he does experience a warm glow of pleasure during each pleasurable experience, he still has to explain pleasure experiences as if he did not, because the existence of people who do not experience such a glow (i.e. the phenomenological element) and yet can still identify pleasure experiences show that the phenomenological element is epiphenomenal. With this in mind, if introspective disagreement was a result of genuinely different experience across subjects, the Heterogeneity Argument would remain unresolved, as it would just narrow the group of people to which it applied.

*Explanation 2: Individual differences in ability to introspect experiences*

---

13 See Daniel Dennett’s plea for heterophenomenology (Dennett, 2007) for a discussion of the difficulties of investigating first-person experience.
If different experience is not a useful point from which to explore introspective disagreement, then perhaps rather than difference in experience, it is *difference in ability* to introspect on those experiences which explains introspective disagreement. At first glance it seems unlikely that only some human beings would be able to introspect effectively on their pleasure experiences. However, there does exist a condition known as alexithymia, which refers to ‘a personality dimension that involves both cognitive defects, including difficulties in recognising, describing and distinguishing feelings from bodily sensations of arousal, and affective deficits, including difficulties in emotionalizing and fantasizing.’ (Samur, 2013, p. 1) The favoured hypothesis for explaining this condition is that these individuals cannot describe their feelings because they cannot feel them, or if they do, have difficulty telling them apart from non-emotional physical sensations. While I’m not proposing that attitude theorists are merely alexithymic philosophers, I do think this illustrates that there can be striking differences in individual abilities to feel and report on those feelings, given that a pathological condition is often an extreme version of individual differences. If pleasure is a feeling or other phenomenological item as some phenomenological theorists hold, and a significant proportion of the population have some differences in the ability to recognise, describe and distinguish their own feelings, then these individual differences might explain this introspective disagreement.

However, that is a tangential speculation. Given that these philosophers claim their introspections are informative not just about their own experiences, but human pleasure experiences in general, we ought to treat them as such.
I suspect that for most people the answer is not as clear-cut as either Smuts or Feldman suggests. Perhaps when we think of experiences of beer and symphonies the phenomenological differences seem much more pertinent than the similarities. When we think of the pleasurable experiences in more closely aligned categories – say eating a peach and drinking fresh lemonade – the similarities become more salient. It is difficult to know whether the similarities and differences of the other non-hedonic phenomenological aspects of these experiences cloud our judgments. For thinking of certain experiences, such as solving crosswords or looking at art, Feldman seems right, and in others (perhaps the more intense experiences such as orgasm might be the most illustrative) talk of warm glows or hums seems right too. The point is that the introspective evidence favours neither Feldman nor Smuts outright but instead seems opaque and difficult to read. As introspective evidence is meant to provide obvious support for premise 2, this does not look good for the attitude theorists who use the argument against the idea that the connection between all pleasurable experiences is phenomenological theorists. But neither does it help the phenomenological theorists. If pleasure is phenomenological element of our experience, it does seem to be the case, at least prima facie, that it ought to lend itself to introspective investigation.

I am going to call the fuzzy and opaque nature of our introspection of pleasurable experiences the limits of introspection on hedonic experience. This kind of misattribution is described by Schwitzgebel by means of a card trick experiment where the participants are surprised to learn how narrow their range of visual acuity really is (outside of a small range they cannot tell the
difference between a jack and a queen; this is not discovered by introspection but by the fact they cannot report on which card it is). He states: "they seem to discover—in fact, I think they really do discover—that visual experience does not consist of a broad, stable field, flush with precise detail, hazy only at the borders. They discover that, instead, the center of clarity is tiny, shifting rapidly around a rather indistinct background." (Schwitzgebel 2018, p.256) The pleasure case is, I believe, similar. Not only is the depth of what we can understand about the nature of pleasure limited if we only use our introspection to form judgments about it – and furthermore that there is an actively deceptive tendency to believe that we do have full access to its nature via introspection. Instead, observations from introspection must also be supported by findings from cognitive science and philosophical analysis.

The next section is devoted to discussing the nature of introspection and some empirical evidence regarding these limits. I will then argue that the fact that introspection on hedonic experience is difficult and vague ought to be a new starting point for exploring the nature of pleasure.

1.4 The Heterogeneity Argument and introspection

1.4.1 What is introspection?

It is necessary at this point to find out exactly what is meant by introspection. Unfortunately this is not as simple as we might like. William James said that "the word introspection need hardly be defined – it means, of course, looking into our own minds and reporting what we find there." (James, 1890, p. 185) ‘Looking within’ is the literal meaning of the word ‘introspection’, and introspection as a
kind of looking – the “inner-sense” view – (as espoused by Armstrong (Armstrong, 1963) and others) postulates the presence of some kind of internal scanning system which monitors (at least some of) our mental states and can be modelled on our perceptual faculties. Other philosophers, such as Sydney Shoemaker (2001) argue that introspection must be differentiated from perception in that it has to be more reliable and more bound-in with the mental states under introspection than the inner-sense view suggests. The proponents of the Heterogeneity Argument do not make clear their conception of introspection but from use of the terms ‘seeking’, ‘scrutinizing’, and ‘failure to locate’ it seems reasonable to assume that something akin to the inner-sense view is informing the argument.

In order to give the most flexible interpretation of the Heterogeneity Argument then, we will say that introspecting, at its most basic, is coming to know the contents of our minds through some first-person method. Overgaard and Sorensen say introspection is “when the subject directs attention not towards the object as such but towards the very state of being conscious of the object”. (Overgaard & Sorensen, 2003, p. 77) This is useful because it differentiates between the subject having a mental state and reflection on or awareness of that state. For example, I might be looking at a field in winter and perceive that the grass is brownish green, but this is not the same as introspecting on my visual state and concluding that I perceive the grass as brownish green. My colour experiences in this case (and in general), though I may not introspect upon them in actuality, are available to introspection; but having a colour experience is not the same as introspecting on that colour
experience. My colour experiences are the kind of thing that can be introspected upon and (in general) with some accuracy under the right conditions. Although my perception of the grass may be inaccurate (say if it is in fact bright green but I am temporarily colour-blind) I am not wrong about how the grass appears to me. Applied to the Heterogeneity Argument, the underlying assumptions are not just that I can tell when I am in a pleasurable state, but that I can reflect upon the qualities of that state and that those reflections have an inbuilt accuracy.

The difference between being in a mental state and reflection on that mental state is also shown in our ability to make judgments on that and verbalise those judgments, whether to ourselves or others. Cassam says introspection is “a form of awareness that serves as a basis for making first-person statements in which the first-person pronoun is used as a subject”. (Cassam, 1995, p. 318) Like James, Cassam thinks that the introspective state necessarily lends itself to statement-making and therefore to propositions. For the proponents of the Heterogeneity Argument, this is obviously reflected in the propositional judgments formed that pleasurable experience 1 does not share any phenomenological quality with pleasurable experience 2 (but see the discussion of extrapolating reports from introspections in section 1.6, below).

Finally, Smithies claims “introspection is peculiar in the sense that it is different in certain epistemological respects from other ways of knowing about its subject matter. And second, introspection is privileged in the sense that it is better in certain epistemological respects than other ways of knowing about its subject matter.” (Smithies, 2012) Again, this homes in on the idea that introspection, on the right subject, is accurate, and that this accuracy derives
from intimacy with its object. Introspection, in this interpretation, is privileged because it has special epistemological access to its objects.

This cursory examination of introspection characterised as reflective, explicit, verbalisable and privileged over other methods, will be used to test the empirical findings on what happens when we try to gain information about our pleasurable experiences. In summary:

1) Introspection is a higher-order reflection on a lower-order mental state.

2) Introspection provides grounds for explicit, verbalisable judgements about that mental state.

3) If a mental state is amenable to introspection, introspection yields infallible knowledge of that state.

I’ll be using these statements about introspection to test whether our investigation of our pleasure experiences does what we might expect a successful instance of introspection to do. But first I will turn to some more general worries about the reliability of introspection.

1.4.2 General worries about introspection

Many philosophers have held that knowledge of our own conscious experience is of particular importance. Since Descartes (at least) our knowledge of our minds has been considered epistemically privileged. According to this viewpoint, if I judge that I am in pain, then that judgment is immune to error and correction. Furthermore, the epistemic qualities of that judgment tell us something about the nature of pain itself.
More recently though, cognitive scientists have held that many of our mental processes are inaccessible to our introspective gaze:

A more pervasive limit on self-knowledge, we suggest, is the fact that much of the mind is inaccessible to conscious awareness...That is, there are no motivational forces preventing people from knowing their thoughts and feelings; instead, much of the mind is simply inaccessible to consciousness. (Wilson & Dunn, 2004, p. 499)

This directly contradicts the Cartesian idea that everything that goes on in our mind is accessible to introspection. But even if only a fraction of our mental processes are available to introspection, is at least our knowledge of those proves at least secure? Many philosophers doubt even this is the case. Even in philosophy, introspection is not accepted by all theorists as a reliable source of evidence about one’s own experiences. Eric Schwitzgebel, for instance, says:

Most people are poor introspectors of their own ongoing conscious experience. We fail not just in assessing the causes of our mental states or the processes underwriting them; and not just in our judgments about non-phenomenal mental states like traits, motives, and skills; and not only when we are distracted, or passionate, or inattentive, or self-deceived, or pathologically deluded, or when we are reflecting on minor matters, or about the past, or where fine discrimination is required. We are both ignorant and prone to error. (Schwitzgebel, 2008, p. 247)

These include worries about introspection applied to emotion:

The inadequacy of any approach to emotion based solely or mainly on introspectively accessible aspects of the mind is apparent from the experimental studies described above showing that much of emotional processing occurs unconsciously, as well as by the fact people often find their emotions puzzling. Consciously accessible appraisal processes cannot be the way, or at least the only way, the emotional brain works.
LeDoux and Schwitzgebel's scepticism is strong, perhaps too strong for our purposes, but it nevertheless cautions against assuming that we are good introspectors of our own experience. It is in fact the appearance of introspection – seemingly privileged and intimate – that can lead to mistakes about how our minds work. So, the argument goes, (1) if introspection were a reliable belief-formation process, then we would be able to frame correct judgments about the phenomenology of our current conscious experience; but (2) there are some cases we are typically unable to form such correct judgments; therefore, (3) introspection is unreliable.

Perhaps, the introspector counters, we make mistakes about complicated reasoning, but not about our phenomenal states. But recent research has revealed that our judgments about our conscious perceptions do not always match up with the implicit visual systems used to guide us in simple tasks such as walking, for example, according to Wilson and Dunn, when people who previously completed a walking task without difficulty were asked to repeat the task while reflecting upon, the number of mistakes increased significantly (Wilson & Dunn, 2004, p. 501).

The implication of the study is that we have implicit visual 'judgments' (on which our usual walking actions are based) to which we do not have conscious access, where conscious access is demonstrated by verbal reports. The accuracy of the non-conscious judgments is demonstrated by the usual adeptness and facility of most people while walking. Applying higher-order judgments to this process decreases rather than increases the ease of walking, demonstrating,
according to the investigators, that the act of introspection interferes with the processing and application of the lower-order judgments efficiently.

Emotion is an especially fertile field for researchers exploring the disassociation between experiential states and consciousness of them. Schooler states, “For example, if extensive introspection can cause people to make decisions that they later regret then one very reasonable possibility is that the introspection caused them to ‘lose touch with their feelings’.” (Schooler, 2002, p. 341). Schooler found that continuous hedonic monitoring (i.e. whether the listeners were enjoying the music) significantly reduced individuals’ post-music happiness ratings, relative to a condition in which participants listened to music without monitoring. These findings suggest that continuous hedonic monitoring can alter experience, implying that in the absence of monitoring instructions, individuals are, at best, only intermittently meta-conscious of their affective state.

Schooler also notes that people instructed to introspect on their reasons for making decisions often make non-optimal choices. The presumed reason behind this is that as people analyse their experiential states they become more divorced from them – their access to how they feel is less accurate than before they began the introspective process. If, as per the Kantian view noted in the introdution, our feelings are meant to help us in making choices; that they are the means of currency which allows weighing up one option against another, then if our access to our feelings is interfered with then the process of making decisions will be impacted upon, leading to non-optimal choices. This leads to the next consideration against the Heterogeneity Argument – that the
very act of introspecting our affective experiences may alter and diminish them.

1.4.3 Stories we tell ourselves: inference and confabulation

Another problem with introspection is that we fit our interpretation of our feelings and behaviours with external cues. The idea that we may guess what we feel from our own behaviour has most famously been put forward by William James, who thought we know we feel fear because we run from the bear, rather than the other way round (James, 1890). More recently, self-perception theory claims that individuals infer their own attitudes and preferences in much the same way as they infer those of others.14 Self-perception theory has accounted for why subjects assess a task as less interesting if they receive a reward for it. The decreasing in interestingness of the task comes about because the subjects infer that they must be doing the task for the reward rather than any inherent pleasant feature of the task itself. Further studies have also shown that presence of mirrors affects hedonic self-rating, the inference being that external cues are as useful as internal ones in judging one’s pleasurable experience. If our knowledge of our affective states was solely from introspection, then it ought not to be so permeable to external influences as the empirical evidence suggests. This implies that not all of our judgments about our affective or hedonic states come from introspection. Research on such disparate topics as perception, motor learning, personality, attitudes, and self-esteem reveals a frequent discordance between implicit and explicit measures of internal states. There are several reasons why this might be the case, such as people’s desire to distort their

14 See (Laird & Bresler, 1992) for more details on Self-Perception theory.
attitudes on explicit measures due to self-presentational concerns. The discordance has been found even in domains in which self-presentational concerns are low, however. There is substantial evidence that implicit measures often tap mental processes that are non-conscious and inaccessible to introspection (Wilson, 2002). Whereas it is relatively unsurprising that people lack conscious access to the mental processes that allow them to judge slant or perform somersaults, the apparent lack of access to one’s traits, attitudes, and self-concept is noteworthy.

It is also the case that we simply might not have the right language for framing our introspective reports, or that to put our introspeculations into the framework of language can impose upon them restrictions they might not otherwise suffer.

Susanna Siegel argues that:

The simple principle that identifies the contents of the reports with the contents of experiences faces the difficulty that there is no natural language expression used exclusively for reporting the contents of experiences as opposed to the contents of beliefs that one actually has formed or is disposed to form on the basis of experience. So some more complex principle would be needed to link such reports and contents. The fact that a report is based on introspection of an experience does not suffice to show that its contents are experience contents. (Siegel, 2007, p. 132)

In other words, the very difficulties of rendering introspection into a verbalisable report means that those reports are not sufficient evidence from which to divulge the whole nature of that experience. According to Siegel, the mystery lies in the fact that we believe phenomenal character of experience ought to be open
to introspection, but even if we grant that it is, it does not follow that
introspection tells us, with sufficient precision, what the contents of that
experience are.

1.5 Preserving introspection

Though so far I have used a very general notion of introspection, it seems
appropriate to delve deeper into the concept. It seems both unintuitive and
inexpedient to reject the idea that we can introspect on our pleasure experiences
at all. For one thing, this just doesn’t seem to be the case. Our pleasurable
experiences tell us about the world and would surely lose some of that
informative role if they could not be reflected upon at all. Secondly, a
thoroughgoing global scepticism a la Schwitzgebel is as challenging for the
phenomenologist as those who seek to dismiss them, and indeed would put the
brakes on any project of trying to understanding the nature of pleasure. As there
approximately 60,000 words of this thesis left to go it is clear I do not agree with
that.

Rejecting global scepticism about pleasure introspection does not have to
mean accepting that a type of experience is completely transparent to the
introspector. The leap that the attitudinalists have asked us to make is from the
fact that we are more often then not aware of undergoing pleasurable
experiences and that there are some things we can say about what a pleasurable
experience is like, to the conclusion that we know everything about the internal
structure of a pleasurable experience, which seems specious.
Perhaps this is best understood by going back to the nature of introspection. I referred above to the idea that there is a difference between attending to the experience itself and the verbalisable judgments that are a result of attending to that experience. In the traditional characterisation of introspection the two are interlinked and in fact for some the first guarantees the second. Giustina and Kriegel (2017) however, argue that there are two different kinds of introspective state; one which involves ‘facts’ and one which involves ‘things’. This is inspired by Dretske’s distinction between ‘fact-awareness’ and ‘thing-awareness’ (Dretske, 1993). The claim is the parallel distinction can be applied to introspective awareness.

To understand the distinction as applied to perception, suppose you are visually presented with a green tree and everything goes well. It seems that at least two statements are true:

(1) You see the green tree.
(2) You see that the tree is green.

According to Dretske, the mental states reported in (1) and (2) are different. The state reported in (1) he calls thing-awareness, because what you are said to be (visually) aware of is a thing – a (green) tree. The state reported in (2) Dretske calls fact-awareness, because what you are said to be (visually) aware of is the fact *that* the tree is green. (Giustina & Kreigel, 2017 p 4)

According to Dretske, fact-awareness is a propositional attitude that involves the deployment of concepts, allowing it to be directly expressible, while
thing-awareness is an objectual attitude that is non-conceptual and only indirectly expressible.\(^{15}\) For Giustina and Kriegel, this distinction maps directly on to introspection, and that in the act of introspecting, two different mental states are reported, which can be usefully labelled ‘thing-introspection’ and ‘fact-introspection.’ The claim is that all three differences between thing- and fact-awareness apply also to thing- and fact-introspection: thing-introspection is an objectual attitude, which does not deploy concepts, and which is not directly expressible; fact-introspection is a propositional attitude that deploys concepts and is directly expressible.

The important result of this distinction is that, according to Giustina and Kriegel, typical arguments for the unreliability of introspection target only fact-introspection, leaving the presumed reliability of thing-introspection entirely untouched. Emotional reports, of the type used by Schwitzgebel as evidence of the unreliability of introspection are obviously the product of fact-introspection precisely because they are verifiable. A counter argument might be that, if fact-introspection is grounded in thing-introspection, then it is possible that it is thing introspection that is at fault. Giustina and Kriegel reply:

\(^{15}\) When \(S\) is fact-aware that \(a\) is \(F\), the content of \(S\)'s mental state is the proposition \(<a\ is\ F>\) so typically fact-awareness would take the form of a belief. By contrast, when \(S\) is thing-aware of \(a\), the content of her mental state regarding \(a\) is not a proposition involving \(a\).
uncertain or erroneous fact-introspection seem straightforwardly traceable to misapplication of a concept. (Giustina & Kriegel 2017, pp.14-15)

So, we have a method of explaining the apparent difficulties with introspecting on our experiences while preserving some of the facets outlined at the beginning of the chapter. If we grant that our thing-introspection of pleasure is trustworthy while questioning the reliability of the attendant fact-introspection, we can still use phenomenological evidence, albeit with a different method.

It is surprising, in the face of these criticisms, that an alternative method has not been considered. Susannah Siegel argues that introspection alone is not enough to discover the contents of experience (Siegel, 2007). Instead she recommends the method of phenomenal contrast. Put simply this ask us to take the opposite tack to the Heterogeneity Argument and instead of comparing two supposedly pleasurable experiences and looking to what (if anything) they have in common, we ought to contrast a single pleasure experience with a single non-pleasure (neutral) experience and see how they are different. Seigel’s proposal differs from the Heterogeneity Argument because instead of trying to use the reports of introspection to generate a theory of the target of hypothesis, the hypothesis is constructed first and the product of introspection is used as evidence second.

According to Siegel:

The main idea behind the method is to find something that the target hypothesis purports to explain, and see whether it provides the best explanation of that phenomenon. Instead of taking a specific experience as input and delivering as output a verdict on its contents, then, the method’s starting point is a target hypothesis, and it
aims to reach a yes-or-no verdict. It is thus a way of testing hypotheses, rather than a way of generating hypotheses in the first place (Siegel, 2007).

Since contents are supposed to be phenomenally adequate, any target hypothesis will predict that any two experiences differing with respect to the hypothesized contents will differ phenomenally as well. It is thus possible to use the phenomenal contrast as the thing to be explained. The ‘target explanation’ will say the experiences contrast phenomenally because one of them has the hypothesized contents, while the other one does not. This lands us in a difficulty though, as neither attitudinalists nor phenomenologists have told us what these supposed contents’ are according to their theories. The next step is to examine these theories more closely in chapters 2 and 3.

1.6 Chapter summary

Since Sidgwick, the Heterogeneity Problem (that is, how to group very different experiences together under the term ‘pleasurable’) has been the catalyst for dividing the pleasure debate in opposing theories – phenomenological theories of pleasure and attitudinal theories of pleasure.

The Heterogeneity Argument (derived from the Heterogeneity Problem) is targeted against phenomenological theories of pleasure. The strength of the argument has long been thought to be in its second premise – that one cannot detect any common phenomenal feature by which we can group pleasure experiences together. However, this chapter has demonstrated that it relies on conflating different claims (i.e. moving from a claim about individual phenomenology to a claim about human phenomenology in general, and moving
from what is discernible during introspection to the structure of pleasurable experiences) and ignoring worries and empirical evidence about the ability of introspection to give us reliable evidence about our hedonic experiences. More complex phenomenological theories attempt to avoid the argument by explaining why the phenomenology of pleasurable experiences is hard to track, vis-à-vis their preferred phenomenological account. Chapters 2 and 3 will go on to present the current forms of phenomenological theories, *Hedonic Tone Theory* and *Distinctive Feeling Theory*, and explain their accounts of why it should be that pleasure phenomenology does not provide reliable and obvious phenomenology to the majority of subjects.

But it has not been the sole aim of this chapter to show that phenomenological theories are still in with a shot. In exploring the difficulty of introspecting pleasurable experiences, it has been noted that the direction of attention during a pleasurable experience is just as important as the phenomenology of the experience. It has also been noted that humans very often have spotty access to what brings them pleasure, confabulate after the fact about what they enjoy, and that people routinely disagree about the nature of pleasure and what they feel. By presenting two different notions of introspection – thing-introspection and fact-introspection – the chapter discussed where some of those issues come from while still preserving our ability to introspect on pleasurable cases of pleasure. Instead of the Heterogeneity Argument is suggested we look to the mechanism of phenomenal contrast cases which use a similar thought experiment, but are theory-led, rather than trying to derive theory from observation.
Chapter 2: Pleasure as a Distinctive Feeling

Chapter 1 of this thesis showed that the Heterogeneity Argument against phenomenological theories is not as damaging as usually supposed. Still, it places pressure on phenomenological theories to explain why the argument has seemed so persuasive. Pleasure phenomenology, if such a thing exists, is a strange and fuzzy type of phenomenology that causes problems for the introspector. This chapter will examine the explanations of why this might be as proffered by Distinctive Feeling theory.

A further problem for phenomenological theories which is much less often examined is that of pleasure’s connection to motivation. If pleasure is conceived of as a sensation, then why is it so attractive? This is sometimes called Findlay’s problem and will be explored in section 2.3.4.

A final problem for phenomenological theorists is pleasure’s relationship to pain. Pleasure and pain are normally thought of as opposites. If pleasure is a feeling or aspect of experience, there is extra work for the phenomenological theorist to do in saying why we think of pleasure as opposite to pain. Hedonic Tone theorists have a natural explanation to hand (pain is just negative hedonic tone) but Distinctive Feeling theorists have more work to do in explaining this view.

It will be shown in this chapter that the key difference between the phenomenological theorists is the different theoretical underpinnings provided by each theorist’s understanding of what exactly the idea of ‘pleasure
phenomenology' is, and how it is situated with regards to our experiences more generally. Distinctive Feeling theory in particular runs in to problems with its characterisation and understanding of phenomenology more generally.

2.1 Separating the phenomenological theories

This chapter is focused on the Distinctive Feeling theory of pleasure. However, it is useful to take a moment to clarify the difference between that and its rival phenomenological theory, Hedonic Tone. The divergence between the two theses stems from their approach to the nature of the phenomenology of pleasure. For a Distinctive Feeling theorist, the phenomenology of pleasure is essentially independent of other sensory/phenomenological elements of experience. So for example, the taste of a strawberry may be the cause of a sensation of pleasure, but the taste sensation and the pleasure sensation are two separate things. For a Hedonic Tone theorist, pleasure is not independent of other phenomenology – it is a dimension of it. So, in the strawberry case, the taste of the strawberry has a positive hedonic tone which is not independent of the taste sensation. This is sometimes illustrated with reference to sound (volume is not independent of sound but a dimension of it) and colour (hue or brightness again is not an independent phenomenological element but a dimension thereof). It is important to note this basic difference in approach not only to separate the two types of phenomenological theory, but also to appreciate that there are theoretical underpinnings that need to be teased out: for the Distinctive Feeling theorist (as will become clearer in the next section) the phenomenology of an experience is somehow constructed of independent units. For a Hedonic Tone theorist, the phenomenology of an experience is not necessarily composed of different units.
2.1.1 Distinctive Feeling theory

The Distinctive Feeling theory is often cited as the chief phenomenological theory, but considering its position as touchstone, is held by surprisingly few philosophers. Perhaps its supposed status derives from philosophically articulating the naive view of pleasure discussed in Chapter 1. The Distinctive Feeling theory boils down to the claim that there is a certain distinctive ‘pleasant feeling’ that accompanies, or is part of, or is felt during, all pleasure experiences. Although in practice the distinctive feeling of pleasure might not present itself to us separately from its causes or objects, it is ontologically separable from them, just as any effect is separable from its cause or object.

*Distinctive Feeling Theory: X is pleasurable if X is accompanied by an independent sensation/feeling of pleasure*

Historically, this view is attributed to G.E. Moore:

> It is enough for us to know that pleased does mean ‘having the sensation of pleasure’ and though pleasure is absolutely indefinable, though pleasure is pleasure and nothing else whatever, yet we feel no difficulty in saying we are pleased. (Moore, 1962, p. 13)

So, for Moore at least, pleasure is a sensation, which though indefinable and ineffable, is obvious to everyone who experiences it. This simple view, as a version of the naive view of pleasure, is of course open to the Heterogeneity Argument, as discussed in Chapter 1. What a more sophisticated version of the theory must do is explain why the distinctive feeling of pleasure is not obvious to

---

16 It is sometimes attributed to Moore and defended by Benjamin Bramble in his 2011 paper, *The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure*, which will be discussed in more detail.
those theorists, such as Feldman and Heathwood, who deny its existence.

2.2 Answering the Heterogeneity Problem

According to Distinctive Feeling theory, ‘sensory pleasures’ are ordinary sensations, such as the taste of chocolate or the feel of silk, that are accompanied in some way by yet further feelings or sensations of pleasure. These sensations of pleasure are always the same across subjects and across experiences. Duration and intensity, in this theory, can be accounted for as properties of the specific ‘pleasure feeling’ or sensation. Pleasure as a unitary phenomenon, that is to say that in each pleasurable experience, the phenomenological difference may be supplied by other sensations while the feeling of pleasure is always the same. So when enjoying eating strawberries and drinking champagne, the phenomenological difference resides in the taste sensations caused by the strawberries and the champagne, but both will cause similar feelings of pleasure, (excepting for differences in intensity.)

So, the heterogeneity of pleasure is explained by the idea that each pleasure experience is made up of non-pleasure features, plus pleasure sensations or feelings. The non-pleasure features lend the diversity, and the pleasure sensations, or elements, bring unity to pleasure experiences, while also being able to account for how we measure pleasure experiences against one another.

This idea of pleasure as a kind of currency – ‘gold’ – is seen in the utilitarianism of Bentham (1838-1843) and Mill (1963-91), where pleasure and pain are susceptible to addition and subtraction (the ‘hedonic calculus’) precisely because of their unitary nature. This notion is revived in the modern
behavioural economists who recast pleasure in this sense as ‘utility’\(^{17}\).

### 2.2.1 Causal or compound?

An important point to note here is that the relationship between the ordinary sensations and the distinctive feeling has not been clearly laid out. One obvious possibility is that ordinary sensations cause the distinctive feelings of pleasure. This captures some ordinary notions of how pleasure works – the taste of the chocolate causes me to feel good, the sound of the music caused a pleasurable thrill down the spine, etc. Call this the *Causal Distinctive Feeling theory*:

*Causal Distinctive Feeling theory: X is pleasurable if X causes an independent sensation/feeling of pleasure*

So the experience ‘tasting chocolate’ counts as pleasurable because it causes *another* experience: independent feelings of pleasure.

Another possibility is that pleasurable experiences are compound experiences consisting of both the target ordinary sensation and the pleasurable feeling. The relationship between them is that they are parts of the same experiential whole. Call this *Compound Distinctive Feeling theory*:

*Compound Distinctive Feeling theory: X is pleasurable if X is a compound experience of non-hedonic sensations accompanied by independent sensation/feeling of pleasure*

According to this reading, what would be pleasurable would not be the taste of chocolate itself. Instead the compound experience consisting of the taste of

\(^{17}\) See (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)
chocolate and the distinctive feelings of pleasure would be the bearer of the property ‘pleasurable’. This goes against ordinary language use to some extent, but does capture the idea that in some circumstances a subject can eat chocolate and not find the experience pleasurable but still be having the same taste sensations.¹⁸

2.2.2  Bramble’s Distinctive Feeling theory

A more recent version of the theory is endorsed by Ben Bramble. Again, he does not elaborate on what he takes a feeling to be, but does add to the Distinctive Feeling theory by arguing that it is not only the presence of the distinctive feeling of pleasure that explains the hedonic characteristics of an experience, but also the distribution of these feelings throughout the experience. The distinctive feeling is difficult to locate because it scattered through experience in a very fine-grained way. According to Bramble:

The reason is that, if the distinctive feeling theory is true, most instances of ‘the pleasant feeling’ are, taken by themselves, virtually imperceptible. They occur in extremely small quantities (or low intensities), and in very abstract or ethereal locations in one’s experiential field, locations that are not at all easy to direct one’s attention toward, or focus upon. What does a pleasant experience of sunbathing have in common phenomenologically with one of drinking a cool beer on a hot day? Just that it has a whole lot of these tiny, independently virtually imperceptible, feelings scattered throughout it. (Bramble, 2011, p. 10)

From this passage we can take the salient features of the Distinctive Feeling, ¹⁸ The complication of what exactly should be the bearer of the property ‘pleasurable’ or even ‘pleasant’ will be revisited in Chapter 5, when the object view and experience view will be discussed in relation to representationalism about pleasure.
according to Bramble’s theory. Pleasant feelings:

a) Have the ability to come in different intensities

b) Have the ability to come in finely discriminable locations within the experiential field

c) As singular entities, pleasant feelings are virtually imperceptible, but en masse aggregate to create perceptible levels of pleasant feeling

d) Occur in abstract or ethereal locations in the experiential field

From c) we begin to see that Bramble’s Distinctive Feelings are small, basic units which can aggregate during an experience (Bramble, 2011, p. 10). But from d) we can also see that the characteristics of any given pleasurable experience can be quite different because the patterning of the feelings within the experiential field will give rise to different phenomenologies. Rather like a pointillist picture, the arrangement of the ‘dots’ can give rise to different affective ‘images’. Bramble’s theory is a singular attempt to deepen and expand the otherwise undeveloped Distinctive Feeling theory. This section will now turn to look at problems with Bramble’s theory.

2.3 Criticisms of Distinctive Feeling theory

2.3.1 Sensation or feeling?

The first problem with Bramble's theory is interpreting what exactly he means by ‘feeling’. Distinctive Feeling theory is often interpreted as proposing a ‘sensation’ of pleasure, and criticised because there does not appear to be such a sensation when we introspect on our experiences. The use of the term ‘feeling’ is
perhaps meant to avoid this criticism. A feeling isn’t necessarily a sensation, although the terms ‘feeling’ and ‘sensation’ are often used interchangeably in everyday discourse and it is not clear what Bramble means by the word ‘feeling’ here. We have two broad uses of the word: one as a synonym for sensations (bodily or perceptual) and the other as a synonym for emotions (or part of emotional experience) and moods. Bramble could either be using ‘feeling’ to mean sensation (or sensation-like), emotion (or emotion-like) or a something in between. I shall argue that by not being specific about his use of the term ‘feeling’ Bramble allows too much vagueness into his theory and ultimately adds nothing to a general phenomenological theory of pleasure.

Phenomenally conscious mental states are typically divided into four types of phenomenal states: 1) perceptual experiences such as seeing, hearing, or smelling; 2) bodily sensations such as pain and hunger; 3) felt emotions such as fear, rage, joy; and 4) moods such as elation, depression, boredom – and these are often contrasted with non-phenomenal intentional states such as belief. On this schema, ‘feelings’, depending on how the word is used, could fit into any of the four categories, for we often speak of feelings of rage, fear, boredom, hunger and pain, as well as describing how external objects ‘feel’ to the touch, such as tactile feelings of smoothness, for example.

According to H.N. Gardiner, the initial derivation of the word ‘feeling’ is as a synonym for ‘sensation’ (especially associated with touch), that is a perception stimulated by a sense organ, but the word evolved to mean a sensation-like experience without an obvious association with a sense modality:
'Feeling' denotes the act or process of such perception, or, again, the capacity for it, or, finally, its 'content,' i.e., the content of the specific present modification of the experience of the individual percipient, as distinguished from the perceived object,- the felt quality, or thing. Closely connected with this primary meaning is the reference of the term to all experiences which... are not obviously assignable to any special organ. (Gardiner, 1906, p. 57)

As feelings are not restricted to being the products of sensory causes, they open up the range of things that can be causes of feelings. Thoughts or judgments can also cause feelings, answering the potential criticism that a phenomenological theory of pleasure can only account for sensory pleasures. On this interpretation, a ‘feeling’ of pleasure is preferable to a ‘sensation’ of pleasure. But if feelings are not caused by sensory inputs, what are they caused by?

Some theories of how feelings come about include Damasio’s characterisation of feelings as “the mental representation of the physiological changes that characterize emotions” (Damasio, 1999, p. 781). LeDoux says “feelings come about when the activity of specialized emotion systems gets represented in the system that gives rise to consciousness” (LeDoux, 1998, p. 282). Goldie distinguishes between bodily feelings (the consciousness of bodily changes) and ‘feeling towards’ i.e. feeling with intentionality. All either directly or indirectly point to some kind of representation. As well as bodily feelings and intentional feelings, we have ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe, 2008), ‘feelings of knowing’ (Bayne & Montague, 2011), and one could even, as Nussbaum does, maintain that sometimes use of the term ‘feeling’ actually refers to certain kinds of judgments or beliefs (Nussbaum, 2001). Bramble does not specify any of these types of feelings or acknowledge that his ‘distinctive feelings’ have any
representational function, although that doesn’t mean that they do not. Without specifying what he means by ‘feeling’, it does not seem Bramble can give a complete account of what pleasure is.

One option is that Bramble is using the word ‘feeling’ as synonymous with ‘sensation’, a mental phenomenon which is ostensibly easier to track than the nebulous ‘feeling’. There is great overlap between the words ‘feeling’ and ‘sensation’ as they are used in ordinary language, but a few features we can point to include that a sensation appears to be localised in the body and is the product of one or more of the sense modalities, with dedicated transducers and processing areas of the brain, whereas a feeling is more diffuse and can be harder to pinpoint. Particular sensations may be associated with or constitutive of certain feelings – so the rolling in my stomach (localised sensation) is part of my feeling of agitation (general, and both bodily and potentially emotional in character).

Both feelings and sensations are *prima facie* phenomenological, i.e. there is something is like to have a feeling, or have a sensation. They are subjective, and the subjective properties of an experience are those that specify what having the experience is like for its subject. A ‘sensation’ denotes the sensory, rather than conceptual, part of the perceptual process. A sensation is meant to be independent of the conceptual apparatus of the subject experiencing it.19 While

---

19 See Dretske’s *Seeing and Knowing* for the idea that “if one systematically strips away from a given perceptual act all the accretions due to past experience, all the collateral information, anticipations, interpretive and inferential elements, all the habitual or conditioned associations, then one will be left with a 'pure sensory core’.” (Dretske, 1969 p75)
some philosophers hold that all *perceptual experience* is conceptualised\(^{20}\), it is worth noting that we allow that animals have sensory experiences and those experiences are not conceptualised. In principle, we allow that sensory experiences are separable from conceptualisation.

On this view then the sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content).\(^{21}\) Therefore, one can experience a sensation without understanding what that experience is – for example tasting a strange new flavour while remaining completely ignorant of its source or taxonomy. One might not even have the concepts of taste or sensation, yet still taste and sense things.

Feelings on the other hand, according to the above theories, allow for representational content, either conceptualised or non-conceptualised. So we have non-conceptual sensations and feelings that are representational and either conceptual or non-conceptual. Bramble, however, specifically rejects the idea that pleasant experiences are pleasant because of something that they represent – so he can stipulate that distinctive feelings are non-representational yet still feelings, but is unclear how they are different to sensations.

But if Bramble does not really mean ‘feeling’ because he does not want to allow representationalism but instead means to use the term ‘sensation’, it might

---

\(^{20}\) See (Runzo, 1982), who proposes that the possession of concepts is a necessary requirement of perception.

\(^{21}\) See Chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion of this subject. Sensations may well have representational content, but here, for the sake of fleshing out the Distinctive Feeling theory according to the only Distinctive Feeling theorist, I follow Bramble in assuming that sensations are not reducible in this way.
be though he is much more restricted in what he can allow causes those sensations because sensations are technically only transduced through our sensory apparatus. However, it is important to note that for Bramble an experience doesn’t have to be the cause of the distinctive feeling, only accompanied by the distinctive feeling. Perhaps this move is to allow pleasurable experiences with a not obviously sensory profile – such as solving the crossword puzzle – to count as pleasurable experience. It is tempting to interpret Distinctive Feeling theory as being applicable only to a narrow range of sensory pleasures (i.e. pleasurable experiences with sensory objects/ causes) because it naturally lays emphasis on the sensory nature of pleasurable experiences. However, on the face of it, there is no reason to think that only sensory experiences can cause sensations or feelings of pleasure. So Distinctive Feeling theory can also apply to cases such as winning a prize by stating that a belief (that I won) can cause a feeling of pleasure.

If we consider the fact that Bramble means distinctive feelings to be purely independent sensations, trouble arises. Pleasure, if it is an independent sensation or feeling, (as opposed to the secondary quality specified by Hedonic Tone theories, see Chapter 3) nevertheless seems mostly generated by other sensations. It does not seem to be able to exist on its own. A potential counterexample is that of drug-induced euphoria. The drug is indeed the cause of the euphoria or pleasant feelings but it is not the object of them. But just because the cause and object do not line up in this instance, does not mean the pleasure is objectless – drug-induced pleasure is indeed often reported to be in the enhanced sensory experience. Nevertheless, the possibility

---

22 Bramble specifically dismisses representationalism in a footnote (Bramble, 2011 p.13)

23 If eating a bar of...
chocolate gives me these three concurrent but independent sensations – taste, texture and pleasure (I don’t have to experience them as independent) – then it should be possible to subtract one or more without too substantially affecting the others. So we can imagine our taste buds suddenly failing yet still feeling that soft, molten creaminess of chocolate, but without the chocolate taste. Or perhaps having no feeling in our mouths when eating the chocolate but nevertheless being flooded with the particular taste of chocolate (perhaps this is similar to what happens when we smell food, or we can get odd tastes in our mouths during illness). But imagine eating the chocolate, neither tasting nor feeling it, and yet still getting pleasure from it, enough to even say ’I really enjoyed eating that chocolate’ without having had any sensory awareness in the mouth. For in this thought experiment, the ‘sensation’ of pleasure is delivered directly from the chocolate, and getting pleasure without other sensory input should be as possible as feeling the texture without perceiving any of the flavour. So identifying the bar as the source of pleasure, without any other sensory modality being involved should make complete sense to us. And yet it does not. The argument can be set out like this:

1. According to the Distinctive Feeling theory, pleasurable feelings are logically independent of other feelings/sensations.

2. Pleasure cannot be experienced independently of other feelings/sensations.

of pure euphoric ‘rush’ that doesn’t seem have a sensory object should be taken more seriously than it is by current theorists of pleasure. I will return to this topic in my treatment of orgasm, which provides a similar potential counterexample (see chapter 7)
3. Therefore, Distinctive Feeling theory is false.

However, there is a further assumption in this argument – that the ontological independence of pleasure feelings ought to be reflected in the experiential independence of pleasure. It may well be a contingent fact about human beings that pleasure feelings do not appear to be independent as they are experienced, even if they are in fact.

Bramble’s proposed characterisation of ‘the pleasant feeling’ relies on its frequency, intensity and distribution to explain epistemological difficulties, especially those arising from introspection. Each individual occurrence of the pleasure feeling is hard to detect or focus on, rather like each individual raindrop in a cloud. That pleasure feelings seem hard to detect or characterise when we introspect then sits better with the Distinctive Feeling theory. What seems to be phenomenologically different in different cases is actually a difference of frequency and distribution of pleasure sensations – that is, sensations sharing a single nature, that “distinctive feeling”, rather than a diversity of sensation with different natures.

2.3.2 Independence from target sensation

Distinctive Feeling theory purports to answer the Heterogeneity Problem (that is, the variety of pleasurable experiences) with the simple solution that although the sources of pleasure are varied, the product is the same in each instance, namely, the distinctive feeling. The answer to the Heterogeneity Argument, which states that a common phenomenological element cannot be detected, is less straightforward. Simply put there are two claims in tension here: one is the
Distinctive Feeling theorist’s claim that every pleasurable experience involves a feeling of pleasure, and the Heterogeneity Argument’s claim that such a feeling cannot be detected in experiences. In order to preserve both claims and resolve tension, the Distinctive Feeling theorist must show that there is something about the distinctive feelings of pleasure that means they don’t appear in experience in an obvious manner. Bramble’s solution is that these feeling particles are ‘small and diffuse’. However, this requires a further explanation – why are distinctive feelings different from other feelings and sensations in presenting themselves this way? How is it possible for a feeling to be small? It is not clear here if ‘small’ is meant to be literal or metaphorical. Feelings and sensations have functions as information-bearers which are only enhanced by the ability of the subject to be aware of them and be able to direct his or her attention upon them, at least in the case of bodily sensations. Feelings of pleasure presumably also have information for us, so why should they hide in the manner Bramble is suggesting? Without expanding upon this important point it is hard to get a purchase on what Bramble takes the function of pleasure to be (if he takes it to have one).

2.3.3 Opposition to pain

If pleasure is an independent feeling, then its relationship to pain becomes mysterious. It is common practice both in philosophy and everyday life to treat pleasure and pain as a pair of opposites. But if both are sensations it becomes difficult to see why they should be treated so any more than the sensation of hearing middle C and the sensation of seeing red, which are not treated as opposites at all.

In reply to the objection it can be pointed out that some sensations are
thought of as pairs of opposites – seeing black and white for example. The visual experience of black is caused by a complete absence of all the wavelengths of light reflected from the object of perception whereas the visual experience of white is caused by the presence of all the visible wavelengths of light reflected from the object of perception. Analogously, it is possible that pleasure and pain have an oppositeness that is characterised by some causal relation to their sources. Another possibility is that pleasure and pain just have a primitive opposite relation that cannot be explained further.

However, a more detailed look at the pain literature reveals that pain and pleasure are not always treated as exact opposites. The majority of pain theorists take it for granted that there is such a thing as a sensation of pain but that this sensation is not the complete description of a pain experience.

One reason for this differing treatment is that pain is considered to have a dedicated sensory network consisting of nociceptors – sensory receptors and nerve fibres specialised in transmitting pain signals. This has been treated as good evidence for believing there is such a thing as an isolable pain sensation. It is commonly assumed in both philosophical and scientific literature that there is no equivalent sensory system for pleasure. However, recently a study on hairy skin (McGlone, Wessberg, & Olausson, 2014) has claimed that certain touch receptors may also transmit ‘affective signals’ during pleasurable experiences of touch. On the one hand this study could be a promising avenue for Distinctive Feeling theorists to explore in support of their claim that pleasure is a feeling or sensation. If pleasure can be mediated by a dedicated network of receptors in the same way other sensory experiences are then there is a much stronger basis for
the idea that it is a sensory experience itself. However, the problem with this idea is that it could only apply to pleasurable experiences involving touch; as has been noted, there are many types of pleasure experience which would not be explained by the existence of these ‘pleasure receptors’.

2.3.4 Connection to motivation (Findlay’s problem)

A final problem for Bramble’s Distinctive Feeling theory is known as Findlay’s objection, after J.N. Findlay:

Were pleasure and unpleasure peculiar qualities of experience, as loud and sweet are peculiar qualities of what comes before us in sense-experience, it would be a gross empirical accident that we uniformly sought the one and avoided the other, as it is a gross empirical accident in the case of the loud or the sweet, and this of all suppositions the most incredible and absurd. Plainly it is in some sense trivially necessary that we should want pleasure (or not want unpleasure). (Findlay, 1961, p. 177)

In essence, the objection is that Distinctive Feeling theory cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure. Our attraction to pleasure is more than a mere empirical accident; there is something about the very nature of pleasure which means it is attractive that Distinctive Feeling theory cannot account for. A Distinctive Feeling theorist cannot evoke the goodness of pleasure or the badness of pain because sensations in themselves are not good or bad.

Heathwood voices a similar objection when he says:

[If] pleasure really is just another sensation among others... [then] just as there is the taste of chocolate, the feeling of the sun on your back, and the sound of Ella Fitzgerald’s voice, there is the sensation of pleasure. On [phenomenological theories] it must just be a contingent fact about us humans that we tend to like and want this feeling of pleasure
To illustrate the problem from another angle: we can imagine circumstances in which ordinarily pleasant sensations become unpleasant. The previously enjoyable taste of oysters can trigger very strong feelings of disgust after one bad experience involving food poisoning. But if we can even try to imagine an independent feeling of pleasure, could we imagine becoming averse to this feeling just through a bad experience? It seems like there is something about this putative feeling which means if it exists it must necessarily be attractive, which does not seem to be explainable if it is a pure sensation.

Counterexamples to this problem are people who feel bad about pleasure (ascetics) or good about pain (masochists). Simply put, it seems there are some people who are averse to the pleasure feeling or attracted to the pain feeling. However, these counterexamples are not as simple as they look. For the ascetic would admit that pleasure is still attractive – and that it is pleasure’s very attractiveness that is aversive because it has further spiritual or moral implications. Likewise, the masochist still experiences pain as bad in some sense (there is still something essentially aversive about the experience) but that experience is attractive for reasons beyond how it feels. Not only this, but it is essential to pain’s attractiveness (for the masochist) that it is ‘bad’ in some sense of the word.

The complexity of the example can be understood by considering the masochist: for him or her attractive pain only happens in certain emotionally charged situations. When a masochist stubs his toe on the doorstep he does not
also experience a thrill of delight at the pain he feels – it is just a painful (and annoying) occurrence. So although pleasure or pain can become aversive (for pleasure) or attractive (for pain) through association, their essential attractive or aversive character remains and is actually an important part of understanding the experiences of the ascetic or the masochist.

Examining these counterexamples leads to a slightly more complex version of the question. The reason the ascetic was averse to pleasure is that she found it in some way bad. Precisely because the ascetic is a special case we can see that ordinarily when we are attracted to something it is because we find it to be good, and when averse, we find it to be bad. It was stated earlier that sensations in themselves cannot be good or bad, but of course we can judge certain sensations to be good or bad – for example if the colour black has certain superstitious associations, an experience of black could easily be judged a ‘bad’ sensation.

So perhaps the answer to Findlay’s objection is not that we are attracted to pleasure and pain in themselves but that we judge them to be good or bad and are attracted to what we find good or bad. The problem is that this just merely shifts the burden of explanation in two directions – firstly to why we find pleasant experiences good (and therefore attractive) and secondly to why we find good experiences attractive. After all, all that has been observed is that in many cases people find what they consider to be good attractive and what they find pleasant to be also attractive.

1) People are (generally) attracted to what they consider good

2) People are (generally) attracted to pleasant experiences
Therefore people are (generally) attracted to pleasant experiences because they consider them to be good.

This layout of the reasoning shows more clearly one possible mistake – to infer a causal relationship between pleasure and judging something to be good. The first two premises only show a correlation between pleasantness and goodness, not a causal relationship.

Bramble proposes the following answer to the good/bad version of Findlay's objection:

If the distinctive feeling theory is true, then a painful experience, even if its subject does not mind it – even indeed if he is not aware of it at all – still hurts (i.e. possess the distinctive phenomenal feel characteristic of pain). It is just for this reason that a pain is bad even if it is not minded by its subject... Similarly, a pleasant experience, even if its subject has no notion that it is going on, still possesses the phenomenal feel characteristic of pleasures. This is why it is good. Why is it the involvement of the pleasant feeling, rather than, say the sound of Ella Fitzgerald's voice, the smell of jasmine or yellow phenomenology, that is what makes an experience good? There is no answer to this question, but also no need for one. (Bramble, 2011 p214)

So, according to Bramble, the fact that pain hurts (and pleasure feels pleasant) are just primitives that are the only explanation needed for why pleasant experiences are good and painful experiences are bad. This suffers from the first burden-shifting problem. All Bramble has done is state that pleasant experiences are good (and therefore attractive). His comment on why pleasant experiences are good is to put it down to their phenomenology (even when we are unaware of that phenomenology.) But this is still vulnerable to the objection that we ordinarily take sensations - such as the colour yellow or the sound of waves - in
themselves to be good or bad. When we do take sensations to be good or bad, we usually explain it in terms of the larger context of those sensations, such as the colour yellow indicating the presence of a toxin or the crashing of waves indicating that the flood defences have been breached. Bramble's treatment of phenomenology has no obvious way of linking phenomenology and its potential 'goodness' or 'badness' to wider contextual information.

A better response is his worry about evaluative judgments:

The second objection... is that it overintellectualises our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. Is it really plausible that, normally, when I want a massage, a beer or to listen to The Beatles Abbey Road etc, I want these things because I believe my experiences will be good or valuable? Isn't it rather that I want them just because I expect them to be pleasant?.. Non-human animals share our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain, but it is not clear that they can even think normatively. (Bramble, 2011 p215)

Bramble's objection here is that, according to attitudinal theories, in order to make evaluative judgments we need to be first-personally aware of our pleasure experiences as good and our pain experiences as bad. But this just doesn't describe how many of our pleasant experiences happen and even more decisively, excludes infants and animals from being attracted to pleasurable experiences, which is not acceptable (as Bramble himself agrees). Evaluative judgment cannot save Distinctive Feeling theory from Findlay's objection.

However, evaluative processes do not have to be judgments. As Bramble himself says, we can make unconscious evaluations and in fact it is probably that the majority of our evaluations are processed unconsciously. If people can be attracted to experiences they evaluate as good without knowing they evaluate
them as good or having to make any sophisticated and time-consuming normative judgment, then it looks like a better description of pleasure experiences which includes evaluations is possible. This also lets infants and animals back into the fold. The challenge is for Distinctive Feeling theorists to incorporate evaluation into their theory without becoming attitude theorists.

2.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has described the Distinctive Feeling theory and found two main problems: the first is that ‘feeling’ has not been defined when there is a range of interpretations. Some of the arguments against distinctive feeling theory by attitude theorists are targeted at the theory as if it were modelled specifically on sensations, but a non-sensory model which avoids some of these problems is also possible.

The second strong argument against Distinctive Feeling theory is Findlay’s objection that modelling pleasure as a sensation or feeling fails to do justice to the strong attraction we usually feel toward pleasurable experiences. One suggestion has been that we evaluate pleasant experiences as good and are therefore attracted to them as good. The reply to this is that it places too high a cognitive demand on subjects that include infants and animals.

Therefore, the development of Distinctive Feeling theory is twofold: to articulate a more precise notion of ‘feeling’; and to describe how evaluation fits into the picture in order to avoid Findlay’s objection. The Distinctive Feeling theory as drawn by Bramble is not yet refined enough to achieve either of these tasks.
Chapter 3: Hedonic Tone Theories

This chapter will now turn to the more sophisticated variant of phenomenological theories: Hedonic Tone theories. The first section will give an overview of how Hedonic Tone theories have been described in the pleasure literature. It will then turn to the area where Hedonic Tone theories do the most work: crafting a reply to the Heterogeneity Argument. Hedonic Tone theorists make use of the determinable-determinate relation in order to answer the argument, though, as will be seen in this section, there are at least two different ways this can be done; as is so often the case, the neatest answer is also the one that, on more careful inspection, does not truly embody the determinate-determinable relation it relies upon. The correct use of the term gives us some tools to answer the Heterogeneity Argument but also raises more questions: what are the determination dimensions of pleasure? Are they just feeling good and feeling bad? These questions are not addressed by Hedonic Tone theory and ultimately it will be argued that though Hedonic Tone theory is off to a promising start, without fleshing out this important technical part of the theory, Hedonic Tone theorists are in danger of simply claiming that pleasant experiences are those that ‘feel good’, a no doubt true but hardly very informative statement. This chapter then does not seek to reject Hedonic Tone theories, but to show how current theories are suffering from under-elaboration and need to be much richer if they are to be convincing.
3.1 Overview of Hedonic Tone Theories

This chapter will now turn to the more sophisticated variant of phenomenological theories, compared to the Distinctive Feeling theory surveyed in Chapter 2. Like the Distinctive Feeling theory, Hedonic Tone theories are a species of phenomenological theory in that they focus on a phenomenological aspect of pleasure, but instead of characterising pleasure as an independent ‘distinctive feeling’ (as per the Distinctive Feeling theory), pleasure is seen as a dependent aspect or feature of a sensation. It is important not to confuse the concept of a ‘hedonic tone’ with any particular sensation, thought, volition, perception or emotion. Hedonic Tone theorists accept that as long as we are talking about these kinds of mental states, we will indeed fail to find one that is shared by all pleasant experiences. Rather, the idea is that all pleasant experiences bear a certain property that make them feel good: the positive hedonic tone. Hedonic tone has variously been described as a kind of ‘glow’ or ‘aura’ that pervades experience.24 These metaphorical terms are meant to indicate that though hedonic tone is phenomenological in nature, it is not discrete or atomistic in the way the distinctive feeling is characterised. The aura or glow cannot exist independently of the object (in this case, the pleasant experience) that is ‘glowing’ or ‘aureating’.

One of the original versions of Hedonic Tone theory was formulated by C.D. Broad:

> It seems to me that there is a quality, which we cannot define but are perfectly well

---

24 (Duncker, 1941) see also (Smuts, 2010) for this kind of metaphorical description of hedonic tone.
acquainted with, which may be called “hedonic tone”. It has two determinate forms of pleasantness and unpleasantness. A pleasure then, is simply a mental event which has the pleasant form of hedonic tone, and “a pain” is simply any kind of mental event which has the unpleasant form of hedonic tone. There is not a special kind of mental event, called “pleasures and pains”; and to think that there is is as if one should solemnly divide human beings into men, women and blondes. (Broad, 1930, pp. 229-30)

So, according to Broad, ‘a pleasure’ is any mental event, be it sensation, thought, experience or feeling, which has a distinctive ‘pleasant tone’, and pleasantness and unpleasantness are properties of experience. The pleasant tone is indefinable but we all know it by acquaintance, Broad claims. He goes on to claim that hedonic tone is a determinable property (in this case with two determinate forms, pleasantness and unpleasantness or pain) in much the same way colour is a determinable property with several determinable forms. Crisp also makes use of this relation, and the claim is examined more closely in the discussion of his theory below.

Karl Duncker is also an important source for Hedonic Tone theory, stating “Pleasure is an essentially incomplete experience. It exists only as a “side” or “property” as an “abstract part” of a more comprehensive experience. It is pleasantness of something, more precisely: a tone of pleasantness or hedonic tone pervading an experience. The flavour of the wine is, as it were, “aglow with pleasantness”. (Duncker, 1941, pp. 399-400)

Duncker is keen to stress that pleasantness is not an attribute of experience, where an attribute is an essential constituent that cannot be removed or reduced to zero without annihilating the whole. Unlike intensity, duration or qualitative character, an experience, Duncker claims, can exist...
perfectly well without hedonic tone. Rather, hedonic tone is an aspect of other parts of the comprehensive experience. This will be taken up further below in the discussion on Kagan’s analogy with pleasure and volume.

*Dunker’s Hedonic Tone theory: X is pleasurable if X has a pleasant hedonic tone that pervades it and this hedonic tone is dependent on other non-hedonic aspects of X.*

Duncker specifically address the sensory pleasure-attitudinal pleasure divide. For any mental event, be it sensory or cognitive, a hedonic tone can pervade its non-hedonic features. Duncker goes on to suggest that the primary mode of pleasantness for consciousness of states of affairs is that of emotional response. So for my consciousness of winning a prize to be a pleasant consciousness, I must *feel* a glow of pride at the thought of my achievement.

Shelly Kagan has suggested an alternative position, however, according to which pleasantness lies on a dimension, making use of an analogy with the volume of sounds:

It is obvious that loudness or volume is not a kind of sound. And it seems plausible to insist that loudness is not a single kind of component of auditory experiences. Rather, volume is a dimension along which sounds can vary. It is an aspect of sounds, with regard to which they can be ranked... Similarly, then, pleasure might well be a distinct dimension of mental states, with regard to which they can be ranked as well. Recognition of the qualitative differences between the experiences of hiking, listening to music, and reading philosophy need to call into question our ability to identify a single dimension – pleasure – along which they vary in magnitude. Once we have a picture like this in mind, we might in fact be prepared to insist that there is a sense in which pleasure is an ingredient common to all pleasant experiences. (Kagan, 1992, p. 172)
Kagan’s characterisation of pleasure as a dimension of experience in the way volume is a dimension of sound experiences has some intuitive appeal. After all, sounds can be very different (honking, ringing, drumming, etc.) and yet still be compared not only as being sounds (i.e. according to their sense modality), but also by the volume that they have. By analogy, the very different experiences that we call pleasurable are equivalent to the honking, ringing, bashing sounds, and their pleasurableness is a dimension of them by which they can be compared.

*Kagan’s Hedonic Tone theory: X is pleasurable if X is a mental state and X ranks positively on the pleasure dimension.*

So, for example, the experience of eating a peanut butter cup would be pleasurable if and only if that experience was a mental state and ranked positively on the pleasure dimension. The problem with Kagan’s thesis is clear: the burden of explanation has simply been shifted to explaining what the ‘pleasure dimension’ is. This will be discussed further in section 3.2.

Roger Crisp also advocates a Hedonic Tone theory that suggests analogy with colour (Crisp, 2006, p. 628). Crisp rejects Distinctive Feeling theory, but proposes that pleasure does have phenomenology. Pleasure experiences feel pleasurable in the same way red experiences look ‘coloured’ – that is to say we perceive the property of ‘colouredness’ via a specific colour property such as ‘cherry red’ or forest green’. Crisp goes so far as to say pleasure is a quale, in so far as it is a quality of experience, but that this quality of experience is actually a quality of some first-order property of the experience. This can allow us to formulate Hedonic Tone theory as follows:
Hedonic Tone theory: \(X\) is pleasurable if \(X\) has a property \(p\) which itself has a quality \(q\), which is its hedonic tone.

Crisp's theory is usually taken as the best representation of Hedonic Tone theory overall. Crisp also puts forward the determinable-determinate reply to the heterogeneity argument, which is the most sophisticated response available to the phenomenological theorist, as discussed in the next section.

Hedonic Tone is usually interpreted as being monistic – that is to say there is one hedonic property – of which the best example is Kagan's concept of a 'pleasure dimension'. This is also the concept used throughout cognitive science, psychology and other scientific disciplines that address the topic of emotions, where it is also referred to as 'positive/negative affect' or valence (see the discussion in section 3.2). There is an alternative interpretation that offers a pluralism about Hedonic Tone, stating there are many hedonic tones. This is best exemplified by Crisp's approach. The implications of both pluralism and monism about Hedonic Tone will be discussed further in section 3.2.

### 3.2 Answering the Heterogeneity Argument

Traditionally, the chief argument against Hedonic Tone theories has been the Heterogeneity Argument. As a phenomenological theory, Hedonic Tone theory is vulnerable to the criticism that there just is no common phenomenology between pleasurable experiences. Given that Hedonic Tone theorists (such as Crisp) generally concede that the Heterogeneity Argument has some traction, their next move must be to explain how their theory accounts for the problem.
As we have gleaning from the overview of Hedonic Tone theories, the favoured response is to invoke the determinable-determinate relation. Broad uses the term ‘determinate form’ for pleasantness and unpleasantness. He later expands on this idea:

It is commonly assumed that hedonic tone is a determinable quality having two and only two determinate forms under it, viz., pleasantness and unpleasantness, though of course each can be present in various degrees of intensity. This may well be true, but there is another possibility at least worth mentioning. Is it not possibly that there may be several different determinate forms of pleasantness and unpleasantness, just as there are several different shades of redness and several different shades of blueness? (Broad, 1930, p. 232)

Broad is here presenting the determinable-determinate relation as a solution to the Heterogeneity Problem, and has given us two ways in which it might be used. The first is to say Hedonic Tone is a determinable and can be determined one of two ways – either pleasant or unpleasant. Call this the simple view pleasure determinable. Another is that Hedonic Tone is determined in multifarious ways and that each pleasurable experience counts as a determinate of the determinable. Call this the complex view pleasure determinable. Consider Broad’s analogy of pleasure with colour: the bivalent pleasure determinable would be equivalent to a black and white world, where objects could be black or white or shades of grey (because black and white could be delivered in different intensities). The many-instances pleasure determinable, on the other hand, would be the equivalent of a polychromatic world where objects can be realised in any colour.

Like Broad, Crisp also uses the determinable-determinate relation, and for Crisp there are as many determinables as there are ways of enjoying oneself, or
sources of pleasure, and those who cannot find a common quality between pleasurable experiences are making a fundamental error. Trying to compare a game of tennis and feeling a cool breeze on a hot day will of course on one level fail, because one is hot, sweaty and active and the other cool and passive. As activities, of course they are unalike. But this, according to Crisp’s reasoning, is as simplistic as having an experience of red and an experience of blue and concluding because red does not look in any way like blue they have nothing in common. But of course they do have something in common – they are both colours. If we can puzzle out in what respect an experience of red is like an experience of blue (and to say they have something in common because they are both colours does not seem intuitively troubling) then we can do the same for pleasurable experiences.

So, it seems on the face of it that Hedonic Tone theorists such as Crisp have provided a neat answer to the Heterogeneity Argument. The next stage is to investigate the determinable-determinate relation more closely in order to find out if it does the explanatory work Crisp thinks it does.

3.2.1 What is the determinable-determinate relation?

In order to understand how the determinable-determinate relation can help Hedonic Tone theorists such as Crisp answer the Heterogeneity Argument, we must first explore the relation itself. The following features capture the essence of the relation:

**F1. The determination relation holds between property types**

The determinable-determinate relation was introduced by W.E. Johnson (1921)
and is classically illustrated with the example of colour. Red is a determinate of the determinable Colour. Scarlet is a determinate of the determinable Red. Everything that is red is coloured, and everything that is scarlet is both red and coloured. Blue is also a determinate of the determinable Colour. Everything blue is also coloured, and so on. In themselves, our experiences of red are nothing like our experiences of blue – there is no phenomenal property they have in common. Yet both blue and red are recognised as colours, and furthermore, recognised in such a way that does not depend on reference to light-wave frequency or underpinning scientific properties; though these may be our only way to articulate the difference between them, having these concepts is not necessary for recognition. This recognition of red and blue as colours is natural, just given our ordinary understanding of colours, so it seems that what differentiates red from blue, or any other colour, is just redness itself, and what makes red and blue part of the same class has nothing to do with redness or blueness, but something to do with the fact that they are both colours. So for instance, Scarlet is a determinate of the determinable Red. But Red itself is a determinate of the determinable Colour. So Red is only a determinable relative to Scarlet, and a determinate relative to Colour. This gives us a scheme Scarlet-Red-Colour forming a chain. An important postscript to the above criterion is noting the existence of what Funkhouser (2006) calls a super-determinable. A super-determinable is the end of the line in the chain of determinables and their determinates. So Colour is the super-determinable in the chain Scarlet-Red-Colour because there is no further determinable it can become a determinate relative to. Colour itself is not a property of an object, but is only instantiated through particular colours. So an object has a colour, but does not have colour
Why bother with the determinable-determinate relation when trying to work out how red and blue fit into the same class? Can’t we just use the species-genus relation? Plato is a philosopher, an example of genus-species, seems to have the same construction as red is a colour. But there are differences in the logical properties of these two sentences. Plato can be a teacher, husband, human being as well as philosopher, and without those other roles interfering (logically) in his membership of the class Philosopher. Plato as an object can be a member of many classes. He is a member of that class as long as he exhibits the right characteristics. Two members of the class Philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, resemble each other on account of each having a property Philosopher – this is the differentia that picks them out from other individuals who are not Philosophers.

But whereas we can say “all humans are animals which are rational”, how could we fill the gap left for a differentia in “all red things are coloured things which are . . .”? (Searle, 1959, p. 141)

In other words, redness is not colouredness plus some extra quality X; and blueness is not colouredness plus some extra quality Y; but to be red or to be blue is a special way of being coloured.

Searle’s definition:

In short, a species is a conjunction of two logically independent properties—the genus and the differentia. But a determinate is not a conjunction of its determinable and some other property independent of the determinable. A determinate is, so to speak, an area marked
Searle's idea of an 'area marked off' is an interesting one. It suggests that a determinable provides some sort of logical space which is occupied by its determinates.

\[ F2. \text{The determination relation is one of specificity} \]

Stephen Yablo's characterisation of the relation is simple:

\[
P \text{ determines } Q \iff \text{ for a thing to be } P \text{ is for it to be } Q, \text{ not } \text{simpliciter, but in a specific way.}
\]

(Yablo, 1992, p. 252)

This notion of specificity is quite vague and requires further explanation. A. N. Prior wrote:

Determinates under the same determinable have the common relational property, presupposing no other relation between the determinates themselves, of characterising whatever they do characterise in a certain respect. Redness, blueness, etc., all characterise objects, as we say, "in respect of their colour"; triangularity, squareness, etc., "in respect of their shape." And this is surely quite fundamental to the notion of being a determinate under a determinable. (Prior, 1949, p. 13)

But as the notion of ‘in a specific way’ is not very clear, it is necessary to fall back on an example. Scarlet, as has been noted, is a more specific way of being red, which is in itself a specific way of being coloured. To be square is a specific way of being a rectangle, which is a way of being shaped. So according to the above criterion, for an object to be red is for the object to be coloured in a specific way (i.e. in a red way). A determinable property X is therefore determined only with respect to its X-ness. At first it may seem trivial to say that...
the specificity of a determinable-determinate relation is just that the determinate determines the determinable ‘in a certain respect’, for surely all relations are fulfilled in a certain respect.

However, Funkhouser goes on to point out that not every instance of specification of a determinable counts as determination. For instance specifying that an object is red-and-square is not a determinate of the determinable red. Therefore, determination is a specification that can only happen according to (“in respect of”) certain features. For colour this is saturation, brightness and hue – these are the only features by which colours can be distinguished from one another. Funkhouser calls these the determination dimensions of a property. The challenge is finding out why some features of properties are specifically relevant, i.e. are determination dimensions, and some are not. As Funkhouser puts it:

Property $P$ determines property $Q$ if and only if $P$ differs in nature from $Q$ only along the schematic determination dimensions of $Q$, such that the values along these variables consistent with instantiating $P$ are a proper subset of the values consistent with instantiating. (Funkhouser, 2006)

Funkhouser recommends a posteriori investigation of how determinates can vary in order to discover the determination dimensions of the determinate:

How do we discover the determination dimensions of a given determinable, $X$? The easiest way is simply to inquire after the ways in which determinates under the determinable $X$ can differ from one another with regard to their $X$-ness. Since colors can differ from one another only with respect to hue, brightness, or saturation, these are the
determination dimensions for colored. This may seem like a crude test, but the procedure can be supported with a scientific one. The scientific investigation of colored and sound, for example, has led to distinctions among different color concepts and sound concepts, as well as empirically discovered dimensions along which colors differ from each other and sounds differ from each other. (Funkhouser, 2006)

So, according to Funkhouser we can also discover more about determination dimensions by looking for differences between determinates, rather than looking for similarities. Furthermore, we can look to scientific investigation for support – our intuitions regarding what makes a property the determinate of a determinable can be refined and articulated by using scientifically grounded concepts. So if pleasure is truly a determinable we will be able to, with the aid of science, articulate the determination dimension(s).

F3. The determination relation is transitive, asymmetric and irreflexive

Another way of putting the determinable-determinate relation is in modal terms: every instance of Scarlet is necessarily an instance of Red, but not every instance of Red is necessarily an instance of Scarlet. This leads to another feature, that of levels of determination – Red and Blue are same-level determinates of Colour, but Red and Scarlet are not. Hence an object can be both Red and Scarlet all over, but not Red and Blue all over.

Same-level determination: P&R are same-level determinates of Q if they both determine Q but neither is the determinate of each other.

If two determinates cannot occupy the same point on an object at the same time, then determinates (of the same level) under the same determinable are
incompatible. Determinates ‘compete’ for position, reinforcing Searle’s ‘space’ metaphor. However, it is perfectly possible for an object to instantiate determinates of more than one determinable – so the ball can be red and spherical at the same time.

F4. The determination relation allows comparison

Determinates under the same determinable admit comparison in a way not available to pairs of properties that do not fall under the same determinable – for instance, purple is closer to blue than to orange. No such comparison can be made between properties that do not fall under the same determinable. Purple for instance is no closer to star-shaped than it is to circular.

With these four criteria in mind we can now turn to the application of the determinable-determinate relation to the Heterogeneity Problem.

3.2.2 Applying the determinable-determinate relation to the Heterogeneity Problem

The earliest example of applying the determinable-determinate relation to pleasure by analogy with colour is found in the Philebus. Plato says:

Soc: Colours certainly won’t differ insofar as every one of them is a colour; but we all know that black is not only different to white, but in fact its very opposite. And shape is most like shape in the same way. For shape is all one, but some of its parts are absolutely opposite to one another, and others differ in innumerable ways. (Plato, 1993, p. 401)

Socrates is here trying to prove to Protarchus that pleasurable experiences can be very different while still counting as examples of pleasure, in order to show that some pleasures can be good and others bad while both still deserving of the
name ‘pleasure’. So while black and white seem wholly different as phenomenal experiences, there is (at least) one way in which they are similar – they both belong to the class Colour. By analogy, pleasurable experiences can seem wholly different and still fit into the class Pleasure.

The next section will look more closely at the logical features of the determinable-determinate relation to see how they can be cashed out for pleasure experiences. For this I will refer to the four criteria given above on the subject. This will not necessarily be exhaustive or even very complex, but give us a basis for understanding the relation.

3.2.3 Examing the determinable-determinate relation for pleasure

Can we sketch out a picture of what I will call the pleasure determinable, that is a determinable which acts more or less in the same manner for pleasurable experiences as the determinable Colour does in colour experiences? Crisp describes it as ‘feeling good’ without it being any particular sort of feeling, but declines to say more about what ‘feeling good’ means. We have already mentioned some of the features of the relation: specificity, the incompatibility of same-level determinates and the chain nature of the relation. Following Funkhouser, I will add a few more of the features of a determinable-determinate relation. These will be illustrated with respect to colour and then attempted to be applied to pleasure.
F1. The determination relation holds between property types

Consider our red example: red is a property. A pleasurable experience is not itself a property, but an entity that instantiates many properties. Now determinable-determinate relation for colour may be instantiated in an entity or object, such as a rose, but Searle is very specific that the determinable-determinate relation is not Colour-Red-Rose, but Colour-Red. So the experience here is equivalent to the rose. It may well be a concrete instantiation of the relation, but it is not part of the relation. Where the pleasurable experiences themselves form the determinates of the determinable Pleasure/Hedonic Tone, cannot fulfil the requirements of the determinable-determinate relation.

Roger Crisp makes use of the relation in his own theorising. Crisp’s argument from analogy with colour can be stated thus:

1. A pleasurable experience is analogous to an experience of colour.
2. Colours do not have to resemble one another in order to determine the same determinable (that is, Colour).
3. Therefore, by analogy, pleasurable experiences do not have to resemble one another to determine the same determinable (that is, Pleasure).

So, it might be thought that a game of tennis (one kind of pleasurable experience) does not have to resemble eating ice cream (another kind of pleasurable experience) in order to determine the determinable Pleasure. The determinable-determinate relation is helpful to Hedonic Tone theory because it purports to explain how pleasurable experiences can be members of the same set without having any particular feeling (i.e. of pleasure) in common. The Heterogeneity Argument (developed from the Heterogeneity Problem and usually directed at
phenomenological theories by attitude theorists) claims that when we introspect on our pleasurable experiences we find no distinctive phenomenology of pleasure, and any theory that relies on such is incorrect. This is most obviously troubling for Distinctive Feeling theorists, but Hedonic Tone theorists such as Crisp will want to safeguard themselves from this argument. It seems, on the face of it at least, that the determinable-determinate relation provides an elegant means of avoiding the problem.

Crisp says the Heterogeneity Argument is mistaken in only considering ‘determinates of pleasure’. The Heterogeneity Argument considers pleasurable experiences, so it seems Crisp is implying that pleasurable experiences are the determinates of the determinable Pleasure. This is the interpretation given by Attila Tanyi:

> To invoke a distinction from metaphysics, pleasure is the determinable, not the determinate (Crisp 2007: 109). Both are real experiences. The determinates are the particular instances of pleasure and are just as real as our experience of, say, redness is. The determinable is their feeling goodness, which is just as real as our experience of color is. (Tanyi, 2009)

However, the above argument conflates the actual colour properties with experiences of colour. Crisp provides a more refined version of his theory that hones in on feelings as the determinates of pleasure.

> But there is a way that enjoyable experiences feel: They feel enjoyable. That is, there is something that it is like to be experiencing enjoyment, in the same way that there is something that it is like to be having an experience of colour. Likewise, there is something that it is like to be experiencing a particular kind of enjoyment (bodily
enjoyment, perhaps, or the enjoyment of reading a novel), in the same way that there is something that it is like to be having an experience of a particular colour. Enjoyment, then, is best understood using the determinable/determinate distinction, and the mistake in the heterogeneity argument is that it considers only determinates. Enjoyable experiences do differ from one another, and are often gratifying, welcomed by their subject, favoured, and indeed desired. But there is a certain common quality - feeling good - which any externalist account must ignore. The determinable/determinate distinction also helps us to be clear about the role of 'feeling' in this analysis: Feeling good as a determinable is not any particular kind of determinate feeling. (Crisp, 2006, p. 109)

According to Crisp, individual pleasurable experiences do not need to be like one another to count as pleasurable, but it must be something to do with their phenomenology that makes them a certain kind of experience (i.e. pleasurable). This is meant to explain why pleasurable experiences belong to the same category without presenting themselves as alike (i.e. have a resemblance relation to one another), analogous to the way red and blue belong to the same category 'colour', without being alike. The Heterogeneity Argument, Crisp claims, is mistaken in that it only considers determinates, that is, each occurring pleasurable experience, but not the determinable which these determinates determine. This determinable is 'feeling good' but 'feeling good' is itself not any particular kind of feeling.

So it would be more accurate to represent Crisp's argument from analogy like so:

1. A pleasurable experience is analogous to an experience of colour.
2. Colour experiences do not have to resemble each other in order to determine the same determinable (experience of colour).
3. Therefore, by analogy, pleasurable experiences do not have to resemble each other to determine the same determinable (experience of pleasure).

The move is made from talking about how properties of objects form determinable-determinate relations to how properties of experiences do. The move is not an unwarranted one, but it does change at least one factor: the super-determinable in this instance is no longer an abstract such as Colour but Experience and perhaps even Consciousness. Hedonic Tone then, is a phenomenal property – phenomenal properties are properties characterising what it is like to be a subject, or what it is like to be in a mental state (Chalmers, 2004).

We recognise experiences of red and blue as instances of colour experience. By pursuing the analogy, the question is now, how do we recognise certain phenomenological properties of experience as instances of the determinable Feeling Good/Hedonic Tone/Pleasure?

Christopher Heathwood levels this criticism at Crisp:

Crisp’s theory is that enjoyable feelings are all determinates of the determinable being enjoyable. But this doesn't answer the question. We want to know why these feelings (and, relatedly, why these feelings) are determinates of the determinable enjoyableness (this is just a convoluted way of asking why they are enjoyable). Crisp’s view seems to be that it is just a primitive, inexplicable fact that these feelings are the enjoyable feelings. Insofar as we think this fact is a fact that should be explicable, Crisp’s theory is unsatisfying. (Heathwood, 2007)

At the moment, it does seem like Crisp’s theory is troublingly vague. If only some qualia are determinates of Pleasure, then, as in Heathwood’s expression, why
those qualia? Perhaps Crisp means the specific sensory features of enjoyable features. If so, we might think it obvious which qualia count in some cases. When I'm eating ice cream, there are phenomenological properties I can point to as being involved in the pleasurableness of the experience such as taste, texture, coldness etc. without much trouble. I know that the sweet taste and creamy texture are enjoyable elements of the experience, while the colour of the spoon I use to eat the ice cream is hedonically neutral.25

The problem with this move is that we are then faced with the fact that eating ice cream may only count as a pleasurable experience on a hot day. On a cold day it may be positively unpleasant, despite the presence of all of the same phenomenological properties. The problem here is that it seems if a property is a determinate of a determinable then it always ought to be a determinate of that determinable, regardless of circumstance, yet no sensory element of experience can be said to determine Pleasure consistently. For we have all had experiences where the most reliable sources of pleasure fail to excite and though this is disappointing it is not bizarre. It would be bizarre to find that something that is usually yellow (i.e. the surface of a tennis ball) was not only not yellow, but not even coloured, one day – and back to yellow again the next. If something instantiates a determinate property, then it seems it must always instantiate a determinate property of that kind (if not the same property then a determinate property of the same determinable at the same level, i.e. if a tennis ball ceases to be yellow, then it must be another colour, such as green).

25 Though see the work of Charles Spence (e.g. Spence et al, 2015) on unexpected factors in taking pleasure in eating, such as the colour of the room one is eating in, the weight of the cutlery and the sounds one hears as one eats.
A second issue is that it does not fit with Crisp’s own theory, which was stated as “X is pleasurable iff X has a property p which itself has a quality q, which is its hedonic tone”. (Crisp, ibid) So, the relevant properties we are considering – the sweetness and creaminess for example – themselves have a second-degree property (or quality) of hedonic tone. Hedonic tone is the determinate in question, not the qualia of the ice cream experience.

I suggested earlier that we ought to be treating experiences as equivalent to objects in pursuing the colour analogy – important in terms of instantiation but not strictly part of the determinate-determinable relation. Instead it is the properties of these entities that are fulfilling the roles of determinate or determinable. So what properties of experience might fulfil the role of determinates for our proposed pleasure determinable? Crisp vaguely suggests ‘feelings’, which I take to mean sensations for such experiences as eating chocolate or a massage, and something less specific in experiences such as solving a maths puzzle – perhaps a ‘feeling of satisfaction’.

F2. The determination relation is one of specificity

Crisp’s determinable-determinate solution to the Heterogeneity Argument brings us to the next feature of the relation, the nature of specificity and, most importantly, the determination dimensions of pleasant experiences.

It was noted earlier that the determination relation is one of specificity – a determinate is a property that is a more specific version of its determinable. But it cannot be specific in just any way – it has to be specific in a way that is
proprietary to that determinable. Simple determinables have only one
determination dimension while complex determinables can have several. Crisp
has argued for viewing pleasure as a complex determinable in some places but
has not provided the determination dimensions needed for such a view. Indeed it
seems he admits that pleasure is really a simple determinable when he states:

First, enjoyable-ness is usually taken to be a single property of a variety of experiences.
Eating, reading, and working-to use three of Griffin’s examples-are very different from
one another. But if you experience each, I may ask you: ‘Did you enjoy those activities?
Did you enjoy the experience of those activities? Did your experiences in each case have
the same felt property-that of being enjoyable?’. Of course, they are all enjoyable in
different ways and for different reasons; but they are all enjoyable… Enjoyable
experiences do indeed differ in all sorts of ways; but they all feel enjoyable. (Crisp, 2006
p. 629)

Crisp is here using the terms ‘pleasurable’ and ‘enjoyable’ interchangeably –
 enjoyment cannot count as the determination dimension because it is the
determinable in question. Elsewhere it is suggested that ‘feeling good’ is the
determination dimension and that it ranges from good to bad. Now we are back
in the territory of valence. Crisp hopes for ‘external validation’ by pointing to
recent research on the ‘physical correlates’ of pleasure (Crisp, Hedonism
Reconsidered, 2006, p. 630). And while Funkhouser suggests correlating
empirical support in aid of finding out the determination dimensions of a
determinable, this is not enough. ‘Feeling good’ (or bad) may well be the
determination dimension of pleasure but there simply is not enough detail in
Crisp’s exposition of the theory to understand how this is meant to work.

_F4. The determination relation allows comparison_
Red and blue are comparable in a way that red and square are not. We can say red is more like orange than it is like blue, but we cannot say red is more like square than it is like circle. This is related to the notion of specificity outlined above.

Crisp argues that comparison is one of the supporting factors in his use of the relation:

First, enjoyableness is usually taken to be a single property of a variety of experiences. Eating, reading, and working—to use three of Griffin’s examples—are very different from one another. But if you experience each, I may ask you: ‘Did you enjoy those activities? Did you enjoy the experience of those activities? Did your experiences in each case have the same felt property—that of being enjoyable?’ Of course, they are all enjoyable in different ways and for different reasons; but they are all enjoyable. Second, I can ask you to rank those experiences in terms of how enjoyable they are. Note that this is not asking you which you prefer, since you may have preferences which are not based on enjoyment. Nor is it asking which is better. It is asking you to rank the experiences according to the degree to which you enjoyed each. (Crisp, 2006 p. 629)

For pleasure the intuition is split. On one hand, I can often say I find one experience more enjoyable than another. But it can get more difficult as we compare examples from different fields. Is playing chess more or less enjoyable than the taste of strawberries and cream? For some people there will be an obvious answer, but not for others. However, this seeming lack of comparability is not because there is no frame of reference between the two experiences; people who have a difficult time answering that question find them equally (or almost equally) enjoyable, but for different reasons.
3.2.4 Objections to using the determinate-determinable relation to answer the Heterogeneity Argument

a. The aptness of the colour analogy

Ben Bramble finds Crisp’s analogy between colour and pleasure inapt:

Crisp's suggestion is both subtle and interesting. However, I think it cannot be right, because the analogy with colours is inapt. Crisp is surely right that all coloured experiences are phenomenologically alike, in a way that none of them is like any non-coloured experience. This likeness, however, seems to me to be just that they are all visual experiences. If an experience is coloured, then, we can be certain, it is a visual one. How is an experience of seeing a rainbow phenomenologically like one of seeing a red phone booth, but unlike one of hearing a jackhammer outside my bedroom window? The answer is just that the first two are visual experiences, while the third is an aural one.

(Bramble, 2011, p. 208)

Clearly, Bramble is correct that two colour experiences will be visual rather than any other modality. It is the case that, (excepting considerations of synaesthesia) only visual experiences are coloured. Certainly both Bramble’s examples revolve around objects that are experienced in respect to colour rather than some other property they might have in common (by contrast, I might experience the phone booth and the jackhammer as being nearby, and the rainbow as far away). But if all that coloured experiences really have in common is that they are visual experiences, how do I know blue and red are the colours of certain objects, but that a very shiny glazed surface isn’t also a kind of colour – or shape for that matter? These are also data about properties of objects that I receive visually, and although practically I might be able to tell them apart after a good few years of learning, the natural and instinctive difference by which we know colour and
shape are not the same thing is missing from this picture. Colour is recognisably so because it occupies a certain part of our visual experiences, namely the surfaces of objects.

Bramble points this out himself but misses the full impact of the argument. He says:

It is certainly true that the experiences of particular colours seem to be phenomenologically like each other in a way additional to their being visual experiences. This additional way similarity, however, it seems to me, is that they are experiences of some of the ways in which visual experiences must come. If you are having a visual experience, then it must come in one, or more typically, some combination of, these shades of colours. If I am correct, then, still no helpful analogy can be drawn with pleasant experiences. Pleasant experiences, clearly, are not ways in which experiences associated with a particular sense must come. Pleasant experiences can be visual, aural, gustatory olfactory, tactile or emotional. (Bramble, 2011)

Bramble seems to be implying that determinate-determinate relations are restricted to intra-sense modality experiences. For him, the supra-modality of pleasurable experiences is proof enough that pleasurable experiences cannot be explained by the determinable-determinate relation.

Bramble's argument can be presented like this:

1) Determinables are features associated with how experiences associated with particular sense modalities present themselves.

2) Pleasure is not associated with one particular sense modality.

3) Conclusion: pleasure is not a determinable
We can easily defeat premise 1 by noting that Shape is a determinable which can be detected by more than one modality – sight and touch. Simple determinables, such as mass or velocity, are not specifically associated with any sense modality. However, it does seem to be that case that there may be some interesting connections between sense modalities and determinables, which I will look at below.

More importantly however is that premise 1, while perhaps containing a lot that is pertinent to the determinate-determinable relation, is not only not true but also not a germane characterisation of the relation. The point of the distinction is as a logical description of certain relations between properties, not how they are presented in experience. That we detect these properties via our sense modalities in most cases is not relevant.

A more effective objection might be that if colour is one way visual experiences must come, then pleasure or pleasantness (if it is a supra-modal determinable) is one way all experiences must come. The determinate-determinable tactic, if it is to skirt around Bramble’s objection, seems to commit itself to applying to all experiences, when intuitively we might characterise many of our experiences as not pleasurable. Even allowing that the pleasure determinable (in its Hedonic Tone form at least) might encompass negative experiences, what about neutral experiences? If the determinate-determinable tactic is going to work, then it seems all experiences must instantiate a determinate of the pleasure determinable, if there is no particular restriction (generated by sense modality or otherwise) on what kind of experiences fall under the Pleasure/Hedonic Tone determinable.
Additionally, Crisp wants to include other properties of experience that are phenomenological but not sensory if he wants experiences such as solving a maths puzzle or reading a novel to benefit from the determinate-determinable tactic.

As we have seen from the discussion of determination dimensions, this is actually useful. If all qualia must have a hedonic tone, then this places less stress on finding out what the determination dimensions are – it may be that the only determination dimension is experience.

In fact the requirement for every experience to instantiate hedonic tone through its qualia works well with the colour analogy, because every object has to (appear) to have a colour. Even transparent or reflective surfaces appear to have colours because they take on the colours of what they reflect or what is behind them. This is because all objects have surfaces and all surfaces (appear to be) coloured. By analogy then, all experiences have qualia and all qualia have hedonic tone. A quale is the equivalent of a surface in the analogy.

b. **Hedonic Tone theory cannot apply to non-sensory pleasures**

It has been argued that since Hedonic Tone theory states that pleasure phenomenology is a property of a property of an experience, such as a taste or a sound or a smell, it cannot explain pleasant non-sensory experiences, such as playing a game of chess or reading a novel. However, this presumes that there is no phenomenology involved in a game of chess or reading a novel. So for
example, reading a novel might involve hearing words as if read aloud, or even a vaguer ‘feeling of being immersed’ or the ‘feeling of finding out what will happen’. As long as one accepts that there are ‘feelings of’ beyond the usual five senses, then Hedonic Tone theory does not have to apply to only pleasures that have a sensory source. As long as reading a book counts as an experience, and therefore has some phenomenal qualities, it can come under the auspices of Hedonic Tone theory.

3.3 Chapter Summary

The Hedonic Tone view of pleasure gets its strength from preserving what is intuitively compelling about the naive view of pleasure, but answering the Heterogeneity Argument in a philosophically persuasive way. As the Heterogeneity Argument is considered the strongest argument against phenomenological views of pleasure, once it is refuted it seems that Hedonic Tone should be the dominant force among pleasure theories. However, this chapter has shown that Hedonic Tone theorists do not delve deep enough into their own metaphysical mechanism. The determinate-determinable relation says we ought, with the aid of empirical enquiry as necessary, to be able to identify the determination dimensions that allow us to recognise pleasurable experiences that are different from one another as pleasurable experiences. So far Hedonic Tone theorists have not done so, but this chapter offers a hesitant endorsement of Hedonic Tone theory in that it believes this project is possible – more detail is all that is required. In this the representationalist theories of pleasure (discussed in Chapter 5) come to the fore, offering more in-depth understanding of how a Hedonic Tone theory could actually be put into practice.
Chapter 4: Attitude Theories of Pleasure

Theories of pleasure divide into two main camps based on their answer to this question: what do all pleasurable experiences have in common? The previous chapters considered phenomenological theories of pleasure, according to which all pleasant experiences have the same phenomenological element in common. Whether an independent ‘distinctive feeling’ or a hedonic tone, what is shared is to do with how these experiences feel. Attitude theories of pleasure make up the other dominant family of pleasure theories, and for these attitudinal theories the answer to what all pleasurable experiences share is something to do with the attitude the experiencer has towards the object of that experience.²⁶

There are varying shades of attitudinal theory, depending on the attitude used and how it is applied, but something all attitude theorists agree on is that the hedonic status of an experience is not dependent on its intrinsic ‘feel’, or phenomenology, but on the relation in which the subject stands to the experience.

So, attitude theorists of pleasure hold, there is no special phenomenology involved in a pleasant experience beyond the sensory phenomenology given by that object. Take for instance Fred Feldman on the subject:

'Pleasure' in this context [i.e. according to phenomenological theorists] is assumed to indicate some sort of feeling, or sensation. But Attitudinal Hedonism understands pleasure to be something different - an attitude. (Feldman, 2004, p55)

²⁶ Some attitude theorists go even further than positively stating that pleasure experiences are explained by the attitude the subject has towards the object of that experience; the vast majority also state that phenomenology plays no explanatory role.
And more specifically:

\[ \text{P} \text{leasures need not have any 'feel'. We know we have them not by sensation, but in the same way (whatever it may be) that we know when we believe something, or hope for it, or fear that it might happen. (Feldman, 2004, p56) } \]

The point of Feldman’s theory and other attitudinalist theories is not that pleasurable experiences have no feeling but that all their phenomenological qualities are exhausted by the ordinary sensory qualities associated with flavour, smell, sight, texture etc.\(^{27}\)

The phenomenological theorist on the other hand has no problem with saying there may be certain attitudes that go hand-in-hand with pleasurable experiences the vast majority of the time. In fact, the phenomenological theorist thinks it likely that pleasure phenomenology and pro-attitudes co-occur the vast majority of the time, but that having a pleasurable experience and having a certain attitude towards that experience are not a conceptual necessity.

Attitude theories, on the other hand, reject that there is any kind of pleasure phenomenology that can be deemed “the distinctive feeling of pleasure” or the “hedonic tone”, and whether we deem an experience pleasurable or not depends only on the relation in which the subject stands to the experience.\(^{28}\) All theories depend on the attitude taken by the experiencer to the experience to answer the question If they don’t all feel alike, what do pleasure experiences have

---

\(^{27}\) Feldman is quite strict in this matter, (see Feldman 2004, p 80-81) while Heathwood, as we shall see in chapter 3, does not come down quite so strictly, leaving his view open to more than one interpretation.

\(^{28}\) Which is not to say that pleasant experiences don’t have phenomenology, just that the phenomenology is exhausted by the sensory aspects of the experience. This has the rather strange outcome that if I eat a chocolate ice-cream and dislike it, this experience has the same phenomenology as an experience where I eat the very same chocolate ice-cream and like it. All that is different between the pleasant and unpleasant experience is my attitude towards the experience.
There are a variety of attitude theories which can be seen as instances of the general schema:

\[ X \text{ is pleasurable if } X \text{ is an experience toward which a subject has a certain kind of pro-attitude.} \]

Some versions state that pleasure experiences are those pursued for their own sake (motivational attitude theories); others that they are experiences we like (preferential attitude theories); or experiences that we desire (desire attitude theories). These theories are reductive in the sense that facts about pleasure are just facts about desire, motivation or preference – attitudes which are familiar items of our mental furniture. The differences between these attitudes are for our purposes minimal. They are generally based on differences in terminology linked with discussion of value theory. Therefore, for simplicity's sake, I will group them together as desire-based attitude theories.

### 4.1 Desire-based attitude theories

In the following section I will concentrate on Christopher Heathwood's desire-based attitudinal theory of pleasure as the most detailed version of this kind of theory. He traces the development of his theory by situating it among historical ideas about an attitudinal theory of pleasure, most famously that of Henry Sidgwick:

> When I reflect on the notion of pleasure, using the term in the comprehensive sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratification, no less than the coarser and more refined sensuous enjoyments; the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term 'desirable'. (Sidgwick, 1907/1981, p.
In the last part of the above quotation, it appears that Sidgwick is proposing a desire-based version of attitude theory, that is, any experience I designate as pleasurable is one I find desirable. I stand in the attitude relation of desire to the experience:

Desire-based attitude theory of pleasure: \( X \) is pleasurable if \( X \) is desired by the subject.

Of course we can think of many examples of things we desire but that are not also pleasurable. If I broke my leg, I might desire to have it set properly so it would heal well, but of course that does not mean having a broken bone set is in any way a pleasurable experience. This leads to a common distinction in the literature, between intrinsic and extrinsic desire. I do not intrinsically desire to have my broken bone set for its own sake, but for the sake of proper healing. If bone-setting made no difference to the outcome, then I would not opt to do it for it would actually be an unpleasant experience. Only intrinsic desires, then, are admissible as candidates for pleasure experiences.

William Alston formulated his own version of desire-based attitude theory:

To get pleasure is to have an experience which, as of the moment, one would rather have than not have, on the basis of its felt quality, apart from any further considerations regarding consequences. (Alston, 1967, p. 345)

The conative element here is ‘rather have than not have’, which gives us a very broad conception of desire – an emphasis on the felt quality of experience as the source, cause or object of the broad desire, with the desire itself intrinsic (‘apart
Intrinsic-desire-based attitude theory of pleasure: X is pleasurable if X is intrinsically desired by the subject.

Richard Brandt has offered an influential definition of intrinsic desire:

Something is intrinsically desirable (undesirable) if and only if and to the degree that it is an experience with a subjective element that the person wants to prolong. (Brandt, 1979, p. 39)

On a Brandtian formulation of intrinsic desire, the attitude theory would then be formulated as follows:

Intrinsic-desire-based attitude theory of pleasure: X is pleasurable if a subjective element of X is such that the subject of X wants to prolong it.

Working out what it means for something to be intrinsically desirable is not, however, so straightforward. If I prefer to be tasting chocolate rather than not tasting chocolate right this second, it seems likely that I might also prefer to be tasting chocolate than not tasting chocolate the next second. Likely perhaps, but not guaranteed. Thus we seem to need to factor in an element of temporality – a desire to prolong is a future-directed desire. Alston’s formulation keeps the desire to the present and this may be a mistake. The importance of temporality will be discussed in the critique of attitude theories.

Christopher Heathwood refines desire theories even further:

Here’s what has to happen... for a sensation to count as a sensation of pleasure. The sensation occurs. Its subject becomes acquainted with it. Its subject forms a de re desire for it while it is still occurring. Then and only then, I say, does a sensory pleasure occur.
So, when I eat a green ice cream, the taste of green ice cream is a sensory pleasure during the experience of eating the green ice cream if and only if during the green ice cream eating experience I desire of the taste of green ice cream intrinsically and *de re* that it be occurring at that time.

Notice that instead of desiring the taste of ice cream, which might seem the more natural formulation, I desire of the taste of ice cream that it be occurring. To satisfy the *de re* requirement, the specific taste of *this* green ice cream (in this case, mint) is desired rather than the taste of any green ice cream, whatever it may be (say mint, apple or pistachio). Heathwood also puts this in a more informal way: I give the taste of this green ice cream a mental “thumbs up” (Heathwood, 2007, p. 25). So, Heathwood agrees that there is a broad scope for pleasure. He thinks a pleasure theory should be able to explain attitudinal pleasure. However, his theory only focuses on sensory pleasure.

The great strength of attitude theories is their ability to solve the Heterogeneity Problem and find unity in the seeming diversity of pleasure. Being extremely broad, they can link in the difficult cases of pleasure satisfactorily and conform to our introspective observations that instances of pleasurable experience seem to be very different from one another.

An advantage of the desire-based attitude theory is meant to be that it reduces something mysterious (pleasure) to something non-mysterious (desire). However, refinement of the theory places increasing restrictions on the conception of desire available to attitude theorists. It must be intrinsic, *de re*, and contemporaneous with experience. In the further critique of attitude theories it
will be seen that desire is increasingly restricted until it seems to be a less recognisable notion of desire, which undermines some of its alleged explanatory advantages.

Temporality is an important factor in desire-based attitude theories, as shown by the requirement at time t in Heathwood’s formulation. Often we find things we strongly desired disappointing. The little girl who looked forward to Christmas for weeks finds the actual day tiring, boring and flat. The man who saved all his money to buy a new car gets no joy from driving it and it remains locked in his garage. These examples illustrate the obvious – that we are not very good at predicting what will bring us pleasure. But if pleasure is just desire, how is it possible things we desire bring us no pleasure? Desire-based attitude theorists insist on the temporality clause to account for this. Only contemporaneous desire is enough to make an event or experience count as pleasurable. If the man does not get pleasure from driving his car, that is due to the fact that during the experience he has no intrinsic desire to be driving his car. Precedent desires (his desire to own and drive the car before he actually did so) are of no relevance to his current experiences. This seems odd. If occurring desires for an object are not related to precedent desires for an object, and furthermore we don't have a very good handle on how and why they exist, where do the occurring, spontaneous desires involved in pleasure experiences come from?

Another issue of temporality is brought out in the Brandtian formulation. Brandt states that pleasurable experiences are those we desire to prolong. So if eating cherries is a pleasurable experience, then I will want to carry on eating
cherries. Of course at some point, I’m going to get sick of them and both the relevant pleasure status and the relevant desire to prolong the experience cease. But which comes first? I often carry on eating a little while after I feel sick of the cherries. On the Brandtian formulation it seems this shouldn’t happen – the desire to prolong and the pleasantness of the experience would cease simultaneously and I would therefore stop eating exactly when the experience stopped being pleasant but before it had a chance to become positively unpleasant and make me feel ill.

Another problem for the Brandtian view is that of ephemeral pleasures. If I walk past a jasmine plant blooming at night, its heady floral odour might be very pleasant but I may well have no wish to prolong it, even though it has not become unpleasurable or even neutral in any way.

Desire-based theories also face the Euthyphro problem. That is, if it is desire that explains why an experience is pleasurable, then we cannot appeal to pleasure to explain why some experiences are desirable. I’m eating a cream cake, and it is a pleasurable experience. According to the desire-based attitude theorist, I am contemporaneously and intrinsically desiring that experience. But the question of why I desire the experience of eating the cream cake now seems difficult to answer. The desired-based attitude theorist has removed one of the answers we customarily give to the question “why do you crave a cream cake”. The common answer “because it is pleasurable” becomes explanatorily redundant. Cream cake eaters don’t commonly give that answer answer couched in evolutionary terms – cream cakes are sources of fat and sugar and so forth – and if this was the only appropriate answer, would mean that anyone ignorant of
the theory of evolution could only talk nonsensically about their reasons for
eating fat- and sugar-laden food, when we do in fact think of ‘because it's
pleasurable’ as a perfectly good answer.

Hume also thought that pleasure preceded desire, rather than the other
way round, stating “[t]is obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or
pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or
propensity.” (Hume, p414)

According to Smuts:

If we accept the motivational theory we cannot say that people pursue experiences for
pleasure. This would simply amount to saying that they pursue such experiences
because they desire them. But we want to know why they desire them, not merely that
they desire them. We knew that already. Hence, if we accept the motivational theory,
pleasure cannot function in any informative motivational explanation. This is a very odd
consequence. One that is too much to swallow if a compelling alternative theory is
available. The motivational theory of pleasure answers on the wrong side of this
Euthyphro-style problem. Commonly, one describes an experience as pleasurable as a
way of explaining why people would or should pursue it. (Smuts, 2010 p250)

So, for example, if I want a glass of wine, that desire seems to be based on my
prediction it will taste delicious or make me feel good, not the prediction that I
will desire it when I get it, which is how the desire-based attitude theorist would
(or ought to) frame it. It is hard to understand how human beings could be such
motivated creatures if many of our desires are merely for future desires. It is
important to stress that on a general desire-based attitude theory my occurrent
desire for future wine is not the same desire as the desire I will have for the wine
when I do eventually get hold of a glass (and it is a pleasurable experience). The
desire involved in pleasure experiences is contemporaneous and intrinsic after all, so preceding desires for wine cannot count. The connection between preceding desires and contemporaneous desires seems mysterious.

The desire-based attitude theorist, though, only has to point out that though pleasure is reducible to desire, we don’t have to be aware of it as desire at the time. For a crude comparison, think of a cognitive scientist who believes mental states are reducible to brain processes – she does not have to claim that anyone experiencing a mental state is aware that it is a brain state and is experiencing it as a brain state. To predict future mental events, that person does not have to predict future brain states because mental events are merely a *mode of presentation* of brain states, so our cognitive scientist claims.

This might start to point towards answering some of the temporal worries noted above. If our desires during pleasurable experiences are presented to us in a certain way, rather than being obvious to us directly, then this might explain the time lag between stopping eating the cherries and stopping desiring them. According to D-BAT if eating the cherries is no longer pleasurable, then I no longer desire to eat the cherries. So why do I continue to eat the cherries? If I am not aware of my desire (or lack thereof) qua desire but rather qua pleasure, then this might explain the reason why it take me a few minutes to understand that I really don’t want the cherries anymore. The presentational guise of desire is important to how we react to it. So, with regards to the jasmine example above, if I was standing next to the night-blooming jasmine for a few minutes, its odour might quickly become cloying. As I was moving past it, I did not have time to find this out, as other desires (such as getting to where I was going) overrode the
desire to prolong the smell of jasmine. The means by which I would find out that I had a desire for the smell of jasmine at t1 and not at t2 would be that I found it pleasant at t1 and cloying at t2.

The trouble with this move is that it looks possible, at least on the face of it, that the mode of presentation might be phenomenological, and this is not available to the traditional attitude theorist. Attitude theorists claim that there is no special phenomenological common element to pleasurable experiences, ruling out the idea that attitudes could present themselves phenomenologically in pleasure experiences.29

The desires involved in desire-based attitude theories are starting to look a bit odd. They are not precedent desires, the kind of desires we are most familiar with, but contemporaneous. They are not necessarily very clear or obvious to us what they are when we do have them. As attitude theorists do not wish to go down this route, then one way round the Euthyphro problem is to search for an alternative attitude (to desire) to use as the basis of the theory.

4.2 Problems for desire-based attitude theories

4.2.1 The strangeness of desire

As we have seen, the most successful candidate attitude for attitudinal theories of pleasure is desire, given its obvious links with pleasure. And it is generally agreed that the most successful formulation of desire-based attitude theory (shortened to D-BAT) is formulated by Christopher Heathwood like so:

\[ D\text{-BAT: } X \text{ is pleasurable iff } X \text{ is a sensation } S, \text{ occurring at time } t, \text{ and the subject of } \]

29 Feldman specifically excludes this possibility. Heathwood is not as clear.
S desires, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S, that it be occurring at t. (Heathwood, 2007 p32)

Heathwood comments on his own thesis:

Here's what has to happen according to [D-BAT], for a sensation to count as a sensation of pleasure. The sensation occurs. Its subject becomes acquainted with it. Its subject forms an intrinsic de re desire for it while it is still occurring. Then, and only then, I say, does sensory pleasure occur. [D-BAT] reveals the essence of sensory pleasure.

(Heathwood, 2007, p. 32)

Points to note include that Heathwood has limited himself here to talking about sensory pleasure, though he believes that this thesis could apply to non-sensory pleasure also. What makes a pleasant experience a ‘sensory pleasure’ is that the target of the desire attitude is a sensation.

Also note that Heathwood has a particular kind of desire in mind, one that is contemporaneous with the sensation occurring. Heathwood does not give a detailed account of what he means by desire as a general term, he takes it as a ‘primitive’- that we are all intuitively aware of, though he does provide some illustration by saying that:

As I understand the notion to be used here, desires are the paradigmatic “pro-attitude.” to desire something is simply to favour it, to be for it, to be “into” it. Metaphorically speaking, it is to give the thing a mental “thumbs up.” (Heathwood, 2007, p. 25)

This of course is not a very specific explanation of what desire is. Heathwood has deliberately left his description of desire open, but the problem is that this now sounds too vague to be a good description of desire. A ‘thumbs up’ could just as easily refer to liking or other positive evaluation.
In fact, Heathwood does have more to say about desire, which I will lay out below. Though he refers to it in general as a primitive pro-attitude, the types of desire he thinks are relevant to his theory of pleasure are in fact quite specific.

For comparison’s sake, let’s look at a statement of what we might call the ‘simple dispositional’ notion of desire:

*Simple dispositional notion: To desire that P is to be disposed to bring about that P*

This notion is not Heathwood’s notion, though he would not deny this is a facet of desire. The point is to show that his vague ‘thumbs up’ notion is wide enough to include any standard feature of desire, while the notion of desire he uses for his theory of pleasure stands in contrast to relatively uncontroversial features of desire. The intuitive notion has (at least) three features. The first is that desires are always desires that. So I don’t desire an apple, but I desire a state of affairs along the lines of: ‘that I possess an apple’ or ‘that I am eating an apple’. This is what makes desire a propositional attitude. The second is that desire is action-guiding: the desire that P means that, all other things being equal, I will be disposed to bring about the state of affairs that will satisfy that desire. The third feature is that this means desires are standardly supposed to be future-directed. If the state of affairs P is already the case, then one cannot be disposed to bring it about.

To recap, we have three features of desire from the simple dispositional notion (I will call such desire A-desires, to distinguish them from a more specific notion of desire I will talk about later):

1) A-desires are directed at states of affairs rather than objects
2) A-desires are action-guiding

3) A-desires are future-oriented

I will contrast this simple dispositional conception of desire with the notion Heathwood uses in D-BAT. Although Heathwood claims not to have anything special to say about desire other than it is the paradigmatic pro-attitude, he does have quite a bit of elaboration to make on the particular kind of desire that he thinks pleasurable experiences are reducible to.

From Heathwood's theory of pleasure:

\[ X \text{ is pleasurable if } X \text{ is a sensation } S, \text{ occurring at time } t, \text{ and the subject of } S \text{ desires, intrinsically and de re, at } t, \text{ of } S, \text{ that it be occurring at } t. \]

We can extract three features of the special notion of desire Heathwood has in mind (which I will call B-desires).

1) B-desires are intrinsic

2) B-desire are de re

3) B-desire are contemporaneous with their objects

I'm going to leave the first two aside and just discuss 3 in this paper. It was stated in the simple dispositional theory that desires are future-directed. Here is what someone who might be called a standard theorist, Wayne Sumner, has to say about desire:

I can desire now only that something occur later. Desires are always directed on the future, never on the past or present... In being future directed in this way, wanting once again contrasts with liking or enjoying. I can (occasionally) only enjoy what I already have, while I
Already, A-desires and B-desires are different because of their temporality. Heathwood argues elsewhere that B-desires must be contemporaneous to their object. While I'll leave aside the debate about whether desire can truly be contemporaneous with its object, though I am inclined to agree with Sumner, here I will just note that this makes the notion of B-desires at the very least a highly specialised one for theoretical use, rather than an attempt to describe our usual idea of desire.

In conclusion, A-desires describe a notion of desire that is similar to our everyday conception of desire. When, as I might ordinarily say "I want a pizza for lunch", my desire is directed at the future state of affairs that I will be eating a pizza and this implies that I will do certain relevant things to bring this state of affairs about. The notion of desire used by Heathwood is particular to his theory. B-desires are intrinsic, de re and contemporaneous – that is when I do finally eat the pizza and it is delicious, its very deliciousness consists in my having a contemporaneous, de re desire for the sensation of eating pizza which lasts exactly as long as the sensation of pizza-eating is enjoyable for. This, whether it is a tenable description of a type of desire, is certainly not the ordinary, everyday use of the word 'desire'.

4.2.2 The Euthyphro problem

This section will examine the strongest argument against desire-based attitudinal theories of pleasure: the Euthyphro problem. This paper will show that there are in fact not one but two Euthyphro problems for desire-based attitude theorists to answer. The first, which I call the external Euthyphro, has
encountered two countermoves which purport to avoid it; this paper will show that these moves undermine one of the fundamental tenets that motivates traditional attitudinal theorists, which is to deny that pleasurable experiences have any special phenomenology and therefore pleasurable experiences cannot be explained or indeed identified by how they feel. I will then show that the second Euthyphro problem, the internal Euthyphro, which is not addressed at all in the current literature, is just as damaging for desire-based attitude theories. Desire-based attitude theories in their current form therefore cannot be sustained.

Desire-based theories face a counterargument known as the *Euthyphro problem*. The problem is this: if it is desire that explains why an experience is pleasurable, then we cannot appeal to pleasure to explain why some experiences are desirable without risking circularity. For example: I’m eating a cream cake and it is a pleasurable experience; according to the desire-based attitude theorist, its pleasure status is reducible to the fact that I am contemporaneously and intrinsically desiring that experience. But the question of *why* I desire the experience of eating the cream cake then becomes difficult to answer. I cannot appeal to the pleasure of the experience as a motivating and terminating reason for my action without being caught in circularity because, if pleasure is reducible to desire, all I am saying is I desire the experience of eating the cream cake because I desire it. Just to note, Euthyphro casts pleasure as a *motivating reason*, but is silent on whether it is a normative reason. In our ordinary talk, pleasure is

---

30 Evolutionary answers to this question might be perfectly acceptable, but we also want to be able to include answers from people ignorant of evolutionary theory
meant to *explain* my desire, but doesn’t necessarily justify it.

*Aaron Smuts makes the same point:*

If we accept the motivational theory we cannot say that people pursue experiences for pleasure. This would simply amount to saying that they pursue such experiences because they desire them. But we want to know why they desire them, not merely that they desire them. We knew that already. Hence, if we accept the motivational theory, pleasure cannot function in any informative motivational explanation. This is a very odd consequence. One that is too much to swallow if a compelling alternative theory is available. The motivational theory of pleasure answers on the wrong side of this Euthyphro-style problem. Commonly, one describes an experience as pleasurable as a way of explaining why people would or should pursue it. (Smuts, 2010, pp. 250-251)

Smuts thinks that giving up our ability to explain why we desire certain states of affairs in terms of their ability to give us pleasure is counterintuitive and ultimately too costly. Better to give up D-BAT and find an alternative theory of pleasure.

Expressed as an argument:

1. According to desire-based attitude theory, $X$ is pleasurable iff $X$ is a sensation $S$, occurring at time $t$, and the subject of $S$ desires, intrinsically and *de re*, at $t$, of $S$, that it be occurring at $t$.

2. According to desire-based attitude theory, if a subject desires $X$ because it is pleasurable then a subject desires $X$ because (by substitution) $X$ is a sensation $S$, occurring at time $t$, and the subject of $S$ desires, intrinsically and *de re*, at $t$, of $S$, that it be occurring at $t$ (simplifying to read: a subject desires $X$ because the subject desires $X$).
3. If desire-based attitude theory is true then ‘S desires X because X is pleasurable’ is a trivial statement.

4. ‘S desires X because X is pleasurable’ is not a trivial statement.

5. Therefore, desire-based attitude theory is false.

The problem is one of circularity, and it seems that we must either reject desire-based attitude theory or reject the possibility that people desire experiences because they are pleasurable (premise 4). But the fact that people desire experiences because they are pleasurable is useful and informative, so we must keep premise 4 and reject desire-based attitude theory. Euthyphro, it seems, is a compelling argument against desire-based attitude theories of pleasure.

However, this describes what I will call the *external* Euthyphro problem. As ordinarily discussed in the literature, the Euthyphro problem is considered to be the problem for D-BAT of explaining how and why one desires ‘pleasurable’ experiences if the pleasurable nature of experiences is reducible to desire. I call this the external Euthyphro problem because the desire under discussion is the desire directed towards the sensation ‘from the outside’, as it were. But there is a further Euthyphro problem to address: the *internal* Euthyphro problem. This is the problem for D-BAT of explaining why we have the special B-desires (intrinsic, contemporaneous and de re as they are) towards our ongoing sensations. Again, D-BAT cannot appeal to pleasure to explain these desires without risking circularity. Heathwood seems to regard them as spontaneously generating towards certain sensations. But why some sensations and not others? Heathwood does not comment. I call this the internal Euthyphro because B-
desires are sometimes described as internal to the overall pleasurable experience. I will continue for most of the paper to discuss the external Euthyphro, just referring to it as the Euthyphro in line with the literature, but return to comment on the internal Euthyphro at the end of the paper.

In regards to the external Euthyphro (henceforth just Euthyphro, in keeping with how it is usually referred to in the literature), it seems to entail that either Heathwood must reject D-BAT or accept that the statement ‘S desires X because X is pleasurable’ is trivial. However, Smuts’ criticism is too quick. The desire-based attitude theorist can respond that if I form a desire for a cake, and when I eat that cake it counts as a pleasurable experience, then I have not one but two desires – a future-directed desire for the cake experience, and then, while I am eating the cake, an intrinsic contemporaneous desire for that experience. The second premise can then be reformulated:

1. According to desire-based attitude theory, if a subject desires X to happen in the future because it is pleasurable then a subject desires X to happen because (by substitution) X is a sensation S, occurring at time t, and the subject of S desires, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S, that it be occurring at t (by reduction, a subject desires X to happen at future time t, because the subject will desire X at future time t).

So, there are two different desires in play, an A-desire and a B-desire. The first is a future-orientated desire that experience X will come about. This accords with the intuitive notion of desire as mentioned above. The second desire is the ‘intrinsic, contemporaneous desire’ (the B-desire) that will come about when X actually happens.
In order to illustrate these details, let's imagine someone being asked about why they want a particular experience. The superficial reading of the conversation goes like so:

Q: Why do you desire to eat the cake?
A: I desire to eat the cake because it's pleasant.

This answer recast according to D-BAT then becomes:

A*: I desire to eat the cake because eating cake is a sensation “taste of cake”, occurring at time t, and I, as the subject of “taste of cake”, desire, intrinsically and de re, at t, of “taste of cake”, that it be occurring at t.

And because of course no one ever speaks like this, translated back into normal English the answer becomes:

A**: I desire to eat the cake because I desire to eat the cake.

So it still seems like D-BAT is vulnerable to Euthyphro, but we haven’t yet fitted in the differing notions of desire D-BAT makes use of. A conversation using Heathwood’s B-desire becomes:

Q2: Why do you A-desire to eat the cake?
A: I A-desire to eat the cake because it's pleasant

A*: I A-desire to eat the cake because eating cake is a sensation “taste of cake”, occurring at time t, and I, as the subject of “taste of cake”, desire, intrinsically and de re, at t, of “taste of cake”, that it be occurring at t.

A**: I A-desire to eat the cake because I B-desire to eat the cake
When we ask each other about why we desire certain objects, we are using our standard notion of desire, which is future-directed towards states of affairs. But D-BAT is using a different notion of desire. Temporality is also important to this notion.

Q3: Why do you A-desire (at t1) to eat the cake (at t2)?

A: I desire to eat the cake because it will be pleasant at t2 (prediction)

A*: I A-desire to eat the cake because eating cake is a sensation “taste of cake”, occurring at time t, and I, as the subject of “taste of cake”, desire, intrinsically and de re, at t, of “taste of cake”, that it be occurring at t (prediction).

A**: I A-desire (at t1) to eat the cake (at t2) because I will B-desire (at t2) to eat the cake (at t2) (prediction)

So our A-desires are, in part, predictions of what our B-desires are going to be. This is important because this shows that desires have an epistemic component. My A-desires are in part based on my beliefs about the future.

But this still doesn’t dissolve the Euthyphro problem. The question remains Why do I form A-desires for the states of affairs I form B-desires for? This in itself constitutes a Euthyphro problem, for it seems Heathwood cannot reply that ‘I desire them because they are pleasurable’ without again encountering circularity.

4.2.3 Heathwood’s sense/reference solution to Euthyphro

The desire-based attitude theorist, though, only has to point out that though
pleasure is reducible to desire, we don’t have to be aware of it as a desire. For a crude comparison, think of a cognitive scientist who claims mental states are reducible to brain processes – she does not have to claim that anyone experiencing a mental state is aware that it is a brain state and is experiencing it as a brain state. Heathwood formulates a similar response:

According to the theory, when a person says [I want to taste that beer], he says, “I want to taste that beer because when I taste that beer I will be intrinsically desiring the taste I get.” Of course, the person might not realize, or even positively deny, that he is saying this, but this is simply because he doesn’t accept the motivational theory of pleasure. If Frege is right, the statements about numbers are statements about sets. It is no argument against the reduction of numbers to sets that people who speak about numbers don’t realize, or would even positively deny, that they are talking about sets. Likewise, it is no argument against the reduction of pleasure to desire that people who speak about pleasure don’t realise that they are talking about desire. (Heathwood, 2007 p. 38)

So, the lynchpin of Heathwood’s theory is that while pleasure is reducible to intrinsic, contemporaneous desire, it nevertheless might not look like desire to the people who experience it.

The problem with this response is that it looks like Heathwood is helping himself to tools that have been ruled out by the stated aim of attitude theorists, which is to provide a theory of pleasure that does not rely on pleasurable experiences having any particular phenomenological features in common.

1) According to D-BAT, when a subject has a pleasurable experience the subject stands in an A-desiring relation to a sensation, (as opposed to a non-pleasant experience, in which case the subject does not stand in the A-
2) In order to avoid Euthyphro, during a pleasurable experience it doesn't
appear to the subject that they are in an A-desiring relationship to a
sensation but instead appears another way (undefined).

3) By definition, matters of appearance in experience are matters of
phenomenology.

4) So, when a subject has a pleasant experience (as opposed to a non-pleasant
experience), the apparent difference between those experiences is a
matter of phenomenology.

5) Therefore, there must be some phenomenological element that does occur in
pleasurable experiences and which does not occur in non-pleasurable
experiences.

What is the phenomenological element that that does occur in pleasurable
experiences and which does not occur in non-pleasurable experiences? If we
take Heathwood as following the same explicit line that Fred Feldman put
forward, than this cannot be a sensation or other phenomenology particular
pleasure this answer is not open to Heathwood.\textsuperscript{31} Attitude theorists are specific
in ruling out a phenomenological commonality between pleasurable episodes.
Any such phenomenological element that appeared in all and only pleasurable
experiences would be by definition, a special “feeling of pleasure”\textsuperscript{32}, insofar as it

\textsuperscript{31} Currently that seems justified as Heathwood states: “phenomenological
reflection seems to reveal that, unlike with the sensation of red and its causes,
there is in fact no single, distinctive, feel [of pleasure] (Heathwood, 2011, p90)
\textsuperscript{32} where a feeling of pleasure is used loosely to cover all the possibilities put
forward by phenomenological theorists such as Smuts, Crisp and Bramble
is ‘special’ or ‘distinctive’ to pleasurable experience. In contrast, for phenomenological theorists, allowing attitudes a role in contributing to pleasurable episodes is not antithetical to their chosen theory. Heathwood, the phenomenological theorist might say, has just described the mechanisms that underlie pleasure, but that to count as pleasure, still require that special phenomenological element.

One response that Heathwood could give is that B-desires don’t have to appear at all to the subject. They could be phenomenologically silent. Desires are attitudes in the same way beliefs are attitudes, and we don’t expect beliefs to be phenomenologically salient.

Remember though that B-desires have been tagged by Heathwood as a ‘reason-giving state’. And there is good reason to think that reason-giving states, for at least most of the time, are apparent in some way to their subject, for reasons are things we can reflect upon and incorporate into our rational framework. If we were not aware of these desires then we could not make plans and predictions using these desires as reasons. The reason-giving nature of Heathwood’s desires means we have to be aware of them in some way and so they cannot be phenomenologically silent.

1) We do not have to be aware of our B-desires as desires [as suggested by Heathwood’s ‘Fregean’ solution above]

2) We have to be aware of reason-giving states in order to use them as reasons.

3) B-Desires are reason-giving states.

4) If desires are reason-giving states by (3), we have to be aware of our desires
(at least when they are useful as reason-giving states).

5) Therefore, Premise 4 contradicts 1 unless our desires can present themselves to us as something else and we are therefore aware of our desires but not as desires.

Premise 1 is a simplified version of Heathwood's Fregean solution in which he claims that, "it is no argument against the reduction of pleasure to desire that people who speak about pleasure don't realise that they are talking about desire" (Heathwood, ibid). Premise 2 is the intuitive idea that if I want to genuinely use a desire (or any other reason-giving state), as a reason, then I must be aware of it in order to do so. Heathwood also claims that B-desires are reason-giving states (premise 3). So, we must be aware of our B-desires if we want to use them as reason-giving states. This of course undermines premise 1 unless when we are aware of B-desires we are not aware of them qua desires but identify them as some other reason-giving state.

But if we are not aware of our desires as desires, what are we aware of them as? One suggestion, that we are aware of them as a component of a complex state, is given by Heathwood here:

Enjoyment is a complex state consisting of an experience (or some other state), together with a desire for that experience (or state) to be going on. So what provides the reason to choose chocolate is that fact that, if I choose chocolate, I will be having an experience that I simultaneously desire to be having. Desire is one component of this; another component is the experience. (Heathwood, 2007, p. 98)

How does a desire become a component of an experience? One suggestion is that is an experience itself. I shall now turn to a very similar response to
Heathwood’s, proposed by Michael Brady in his writing on pain. In examining this response, I will flesh out one way Heathwood’s proposed answer could work, but will show it suffers from the same problem of becoming inadvertently phenomenological.

4.2.4 Brady’s component response to the Euthyphro dilemma

Michael Brady, here writing on pain, proposes a componential response to the Euthyphro dilemma, where both the target sensation and the desire that it should cease contribute to the overall character of the experience:

The important thing to bear in mind is that attitudinal theories which appeal to desire are relational accounts of painfulness. That is, such accounts explain painfulness in terms of a relation between a pain sensation and some other component: in our case, desire or aversion. If so, however, then strictly speaking those who support relational accounts should deny that it is the pain sensation that is painful. They should, instead, maintain that what is painful is the pain sensation plus the desire that it cease. It is thus the experience consisting of a pain sensation and a desire the sensation cease that is the bearer of the property ‘painful’. But then the desire theorist can argue that Euthyphro-type questions are not appropriately raised against her account of painfulness. Since it is the compound experience [my emphasis] of the pain sensation plus dislike of this sensation that is painful, it is false that we desire that the pain sensation cease because the sensation is painful. For the sensation, by itself, is not painful. But since it is the compound experience of the pain sensation plus desire that it stop that is painful, it is also false that the desire that the sensation stop makes this sensation painful. For again, the sensation, by itself, is not painful; indeed, the whole point of desire theories is to accommodate the fact that sensations are not, by themselves, painful. (Brady, unpublished)

Brady’s solution to the Euthyphro consists, like Heathwood, in choosing
response number 2: accept D-BAT and affirm that ‘S desires X because X is pleasurable’ really means: ‘S desires X because S desires X’. For Heathwood, ‘S desires X because S desires X’ is not vacuous because it really means ‘S A-desires X because S B-desires X’, which is meaningful. For Brady, ‘S desires X because S desires X’ is not vacuous because according to Brady’s view, ‘S desires X because X is pleasurable’ invokes two desires: a desire for X, which is pleasurable. And a desire that partly constitutes X’s being pleasurable, namely a desire that some sensation Z be occurring. In fact, Brady goes even further and denies that ‘S desires sensation X because sensation X is pleasurable’ is even genuinely meaningful. It is not possible for sensations simpliciter to be pleasurable. It is the combination of sensation and desire for that sensation that is pleasurable, according to Brady. To put this in a concrete example, S desires a peach because the peach is (presumably predicted to be) pleasurable, and, if the peach lives up to its promise, that very pleasurableness is constituted by a contemporaneous for some sensation (say, the taste of the peach) to be occurring – it is, to use the framework in the quotation from Brady given above, a compound experience of the peach taste sensation plus the desiring of this sensation that is pleasurable.

What is the structure of a compound experience? Perhaps the most simple answer would be that element of a compound has the same ontological status as the compound itself, much like the bricks in a house all have the same ontological status as each other. In that case than, the peach taste sensation and the desire for this sensation would have the same status as each and as of the compound they make up – i.e. they would all be experiential. That is one way to understand the structure and results in admitting that the (further) desire for the peach
sensation is in itself experiential and therefore has phenomenological impact. This option is discussed further below.

Another possible way to understand this structure is by referring to a representationalist account. As will be discussed further in chapter 5, a strong representationalist account analyses experiences in terms of intentional content. So a strong representationalist account could show that such a compound experience would have its intentional content from both the sensation and the desire, so that is one possibility. Another is an impure representationalist account which analyses experience in terms of intentional structure – that is attitude (sometimes called mode) and content will both impact on the phenomenology of the experience. While this does not result in admitting that desire itself is phenomenological, it does mean admitting its presence will change the phenomenology of experience, which given Brady’s other comments on pain, seems to be the most acceptable way of conceptualising the notion of a ‘compound experience’ if the phenomenological account of desire below is to be rejected.

Right at the beginning of this chapter it was noted that the trend is to assume that attitudes have no phenomenological impact and that phenomenology can be explained in terms of content alone. Part of the reason for this can be traced back to an influential distinction between phenomenal (‘P’-) consciousness – that is, phenomenal experience with ‘what-it’s-like’-ness – and access (‘A’-) consciousness, which is mental states with content available for use in reasoning and the rational control of action. Block provides examples of states he takes to be paradigms of these types of consciousness:
The paradigm P-conscious states are sensations, whereas the paradigm A-conscious states are ‘propositional attitude’ states like thoughts, beliefs and desire, states with representational content expressed by ‘that’ clauses. (Block, 1995, p. 230)

By contrasting desires against sensations, Block appears to imply that desires do not have any phenomenology. But he actually explicitly says that desires do have ‘P-conscious properties’ (Block, 1995). Moreover, he claims that ‘a feature of P-consciousness that is often missed is that differences in intentional content often make a P-conscious difference’ (Block, 1995 p. 230). So, according to Block and, I would suggest, a reading of our own experiences, an occurrent desire exhibits both (in Block’s terminology) A-conscious and P-conscious properties; that is to say an occurrent desire (usually) is *about something* but also *feels a particular way*. Attitudinal states such as desire need not be conscious, but when they do make their mark on consciousness, the manifestation of these attitudinal states is experienced and what is experienced changes one’s overall phenomenology.

I suggest that this is the reading Brady has in mind when he gives his solution to the Euthyphro problem. This alternative to Heathwood’s answer suggests that there is a compound experience consisting of sensation S plus the intrinsic and contemporaneous desire the subject of S has for S because that desire also has phenomenal properties (i.e. is also experiential in nature). This is a more complex reading, bringing with it at least two underlying assumptions: a) that experiences can be compounds, and b) that the attitude of desiring can form part of a compound experience. For a) I assume that experiences can be compound in at least this sense: when I drink a cup of coffee, my experience of drinking the cup of coffee is composed of other experiences such as the experiences of the taste, smell, temperature and appearance of the coffee.
Perhaps in practice the overall experience of drinking coffee could not be broken down into these elements and remain meaningful, but it still makes sense to us to talk of the ‘elements’ of our experience. However, as the coffee example shows, it should be that the elements of an experience are in themselves experiences. So the experiences of the taste, smell and temperature of coffee are all experiences which go together to make up the experience of drinking coffee. This implies that for Brady’s compound experience argument to work, desire also has to be a kind of experience (assumption b).

An occurrent desire certainly can be an experience, although perhaps a complex one, as was shown in the earlier discussion of the nature of desire above. Given that being possessed of a desire can mean having experience of that desire, then it seems that, prima facie, it could be part of a compound experience. But it seems we cannot make sense of the idea of an occurrent desire experience which has no phenomenology. And why should we have to? Being possessed of an occurrent desire is an experience which does have a particular phenomenology, a feeling of urgency or compulsion which is known to us all. Claiming that desire in certain cases is experienced is no stretch. It is practically a truism.

So, for Brady’s argument to work, the desire for a particular sensation would itself have to be experienced, which is to say have a particular phenomenology. The compound of “sensation + B-desire” would then count as a different experience to that of the experience of the sensation. As the compound experience is different to the sensation experience, and the (B) desire is directed at the sensation experience not the compound experience, the sensation
experience is not ‘pleasurable’. It is the compound experience that is the bearer of the quality ‘pleasurable’. Therefore the answer to the question “why do you desire sensation X?” would never be “because it will be pleasurable”, as sensations are never pleasurable. Only compound experiences are pleasurable. That is why Brady thinks that sort of question, taken at face value, is ultimately meaningless. (Brady, unpublished)

As Brady endorses Heathwood’s account, we can use this as the basis of his theory of affective experiences, modifying it to include his account of sensation plus desire as a compound experience which is the bearer of the property ‘painful’ (or pleasurable).

*Brady’s desire-based theory of pain: an experience X is a painful iff X is a compound of sensation S and desire D, both occurring at time t, and the subject of S experiences desire D, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S, that it NOT be occurring at t.*

And as Brady thinks his theory will expand to pleasurable experiences, we can also formulate the following:

*Brady’s desire-based theory of pleasure: an experience X is pleasurable iff X is a compound of sensation S and desire D, both occurring at time t, and the subject of S experiences desire D, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S, that it be occurring at t.*

For example: “The subject of the experience ‘drinking coffee’ desires that experience because it is pleasurable,” reads as (by substitution) “The subject of the experience ‘drinking coffee’ desires that experience because the experience
‘drinking coffee’ is a compound experience composed of the sensation ‘tasting coffee’, at time t, and also the subject of sensation ‘tasting coffee’ will experience contemporaneous and intrinsic desire for the taste of coffee at time t.”

Like Heathwood, Brady needs the special notion of desire for his theory. As with Heathwood’s B-desires, they are contemporaneous, intrinsic and de re. Additionally, according to Brady, they are also experienced and phenomenologically salient. Call them B* desires as they are essentially the same as Heathwood’s B-desires, with added stipulations of being experienced and phenomenologically salient.

Brady also thinks our ordinary language is mistaken. When we talk of desiring certain sensations, such as the taste of ice cream, because they will be pleasurable, we are just wrong. The sensation is not in itself pleasant. So I never have an S-desire for the taste of ice cream, but rather an S-desire for the experience (taste of ice cream plus B*-desire for the taste of ice cream).

Brady is right that his version of the desire-based attitude theory defeats the Euthyphro problem, but at too high a cost to the desire-based attitude theorist who wishes to preserve the original shape and intent of her thesis. The key to defeating Euthyphro is that the contemporaneous desire for the experience should be different enough from preceding desire as to be unrecognisable to its subject. Furthermore, that desire must be experienced (i.e. conscious and with phenomenology) to achieve that aim. But it was seen that in many cases the desire-based attitude theorist relied on the fact that we can have unconscious desires and, furthermore, deny that there is any special phenomenology characterising pleasurable experiences. Brady’s experienced
desire, accompanying as it must every pleasurable experience, now looks like it counts as a phenomenological element of experience common to every pleasurable experience – precisely what the attitude theorist wanted to deny. The denial of a common phenomenological element was meant to both placate the Heterogeneity Argument and capture the introspective evidence that supposedly supported it and was the very reason for formulating attitude theories in the first place.

What I will call *Brady’s dilemma* can be expressed like so:

1. [By heterogeneity] There is no common phenomenological element to pleasurable experiences.

2. [Thesis] What pleasurable experiences have in common is our desire for those experiences (or elements thereof).

3. To avoid the Euthyphro problem, pleasurable experiences must be compound experiences made up of sensations and desires.

4. In order for a desire to make up a part of a compound experience, it must also be an experience.

5. Every pleasurable experience therefore must include an experience of desire.

6. The experience of desire is therefore a common phenomenological element to every pleasurable experience.

7. Premise 6 contradicts premise 1, so either premise 1 is false and we accept that the heterogeneity argument is ungrounded, or premise 6 is false and Brady’s version of D-BAT is false.
Again, Brady has avoided Euthyphro by mutating his own theory into a phenomenological theory, for the experience of desire is the common phenomenological element all pleasurable experiences have in common. Brady could accept this of course and become a phenomenological theorist who happens to claim that the experience of desire connects all pleasurable experiences. But the motivation for appealing to desire was the impetus provided by the Heterogeneity Argument. If Brady did accept that the Heterogeneity Argument was ungrounded, the rationale for appealing to desire disappears.

4.2.5 The Internal Euthyphro

There is still a cost associated with appealing to desire even if one switches teams and becomes a desire-based phenomenological theorist (D-PAT). The arguments so far only deal with A-desires. At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that there is a second Euthyphro problem still to contend with – the internal Euthyphro problem – which has not yet been dealt with. The question (a question of two parts) still remains: how and why do we form these putative special intrinsic, de re contemporaneous desires for sensations we are currently experiencing? Neither Brady nor Heathwood give an explanation. For the how part of the question, perhaps it is thought they generate as a matter of biological imperative. This goes against the de re requirement of B-desires though. By making B-desires de re, Heathwood is requiring that there be a reference-sustaining causal relation between the B-desire and the target sensation. As a reminder here is Heathwood’s descriptive story of the formation of a B-desire:

The sensation occurs. Its subject becomes acquainted with it. The subject
forms an intrinsic *de re* desire for it while it is still occurring. Then, and only then, I say, does sensory pleasure occur. [D-BAT] reveals the essence of sensory pleasure. (Heathwood, 2007, p. 32)

The relation in question is one of acquaintance then. Heathwood's *de re* requirement is stipulated in order to make sure that it is the sensation itself that is desired; in other words, that the desire is intentionally directed towards the target sensation. This requires the subject having acquaintance with the sensation. In usual cases this is not problematic – we are directly acquainted with our sensations.

Aydede criticises the *de re* requirement as being too strong:

> Although problematic, let's grant that beliefs and desires can themselves be *de re* - as opposed to their ascriptions being *de re*. Skipping the many subtleties here, we may take this requirement, on the part of the affect-making desires, to have some sort of reference-sustaining ongoing causal relation to sensations. But of course not any ongoing causal relation to sensation will do: it needs to sustain reference (aboutness, directedness). What does this mean? The subject of the sensation must already be capable of thinking of her sensations in the sense of being capable of singularly referring to them and predicating a feature to them – note that such a thought would, by the very nature of what it's about, be an introspective thought. In this context, to say of a desire about a sensation that it is *de re* is to say that the sensation is such that the desire makes the subject aware of it - in some direct sense. (Aydede, 2014, pp. 125-6)

Aydede's point is twofold. First, that is simply not an accurate description of pleasant experiences – we do not have to think, introspect or ascribe in order to enjoy. Second, that this level of ascription is not available to many subjects who we do think capable of having pleasurable experiences, namely children and
Another problem for B-desires is that according to Heathwood’s story, they are guaranteed to be true whenever they are tokened. Heathwood claims that the desires form once the subject gets acquainted with a sensation she or he is already having. But, as Aydede notes, this gets the mind-to-world direction of fit for desires wrong. If an intentional mental state is such that it is guaranteed to be true every time it is tokened, intuitively, it is not a desire. This addresses the why part of the internal Euthyphro question – why would a B-desire form for a sensation we already have? The purpose of desires is to motivate us into getting what we want. Again, Heathwood has no answers and it looks like B-desires have become so stretched and warped from our intuitive idea of what a desire is that they aren’t even desires any more.

4.3 From attitude theories to representationalism

It seems that desire is the strongest candidate attitude for an attitudinal theory of pleasure. However, in order to answer the Euthyphro argument, we must either declare that attitude itself changes the phenomenology of an experience – providing a bridge between attitude theories and phenomenological theories. This bridging argument can be expressed as follows:

1) To solve Euthyphro, pleasurable experiences must be a compound experience made up of the target sensation and another element (for desire theorists, a desire, etc)
2) The parts of a compound experience must themselves be experiences
3) Therefore, the additional element must itself be an experience
4) All experiences have phenomenology
5) Therefore, the additional element has phenomenology

If we accept that the additional element, whether it be desire, liking or some other sui generis pleasure attitude, must be experienced in some form, then we also accept that this additional element has some form of phenomenology. The mistake so far on the parts of the phenomenologists has been to assume that phenomenology is akin to sensation (as the Distinctive Feeling theorists would have it) or a quality of sensation (as the Hedonic Tone theorists would say). But these models are too coarse. There are other discussions of phenomenology – the feeling of knowing debate, for example – which allows us to see that while sensations are one kind of phenomenological occurrence, they are not the only kind.

Alternatively, if desire theorists wish to preserve the idea that desire in itself does not have phenomenology, they could look to a theory of experience that allows for the structure of experience as well as its content to influence phenomenology.

So what kind of theoretical machinery ought to be harnessed? One possibility is that of representationalism. Representationalism is a widely discussed thesis that, while still controversial, has many supporters in both

33 It might also be said that the additional component has phenomenological influence without being phenomenologically salient itself – it is this idea that Dennett is getting at in his story of the Maxwell House coffee tasters who suddenly find after years of sampling coffee they no longer enjoy the taste. One claims the taste itself is different and he doesn't like the new flavour, while the other claims that the taste is the same but somehow he has changed. “When he told his wife,” writes Dennett, “she said, 'Don’t be silly, once you add the dislike you change the experience.’” (Dennett, 1988). For our purposes one collapses into the other – as long as the dislike or desire has some sort of phenomenological presence then we can start to construct a phenomenological theory of pleasure.
philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Its main claim is that all phenomenological content is ultimately representational content. If, for the sake of delving deeper into the nature of the ‘additional element’, we grant that representationalism is true, then a representational theory of pleasure could be the bridge between phenomenological and attitudinal theories of pleasure.

1. Representationalism states that phenomenal content is representational content.
2. Pleasurable experiences have proprietary phenomenal content of some sort.
3. Pleasurable experiences have proprietary representational content of some sort.

It is therefore the task of the representationalist to find out what that representational content is. The next two chapters will explore representationalist theories from Tim Schroeder, and Michael Cutter and Brian Tye, and find that though they manage to move on from both the Heterogeneity Argument and Euthyphro problems that bog down the phenomenological and attitude theorists that form the traditional opposing forces in the pleasure debate, they do not formulate what exactly pleasure represents precisely enough.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34} It will be important to demonstrate that representational theories avoid the Euthyphro dilemma also, which, prima facie, seems like they would be able to use the same tactic as Heathwood and invoke a Fregean distinction to escape the dilemma. This will be discussed further in the chapters on representationalist theories.
4.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has shown that two major responses to the Euthyphro problem lead their proponents into proposing phenomenological theories of pleasure, against their original intentions. The discussion of the Euthyphro problem shows that in order to escape Euthyphro, the sorts of desires involved in a pleasurable experience must have some sort of phenomenological impact. Either they change the experience of the object, or they themselves (as Brady suggests) become part of the experience.

The response has also failed to answer the secondary internal Euthyphro: why and how would we B-desire sensations? Desire-based attitude theories in their current form cannot answer this question and ought to be rejected.

If we consider that both attitude and phenomenological theories make important contributions to – and individually fail to offer complete and satisfactory explanations of – pleasure, we can start to plot a very different theoretical basis for explaining pleasure. The discussion of the Euthyphro problem requires that pleasure have some sort of phenomenological presence. The discussion of the Heterogeneity Argument has shown that brute sensation won’t cut it as the model for explaining that phenomenological presence.

Hedonic Tone theories go some way in refining what the phenomenological model ought to be but stop short of delving into the complicated machinery of what lies beneath the surface appearance of a pleasure experience. This machinery has to explain the differences between pleasure experiences, the relationship between pain and pleasure, what makes something a sensory
pleasure and what makes something an intellectual pleasure, and why something can be pleasurable one day and not the next.

Representationalism offers a way to explain these factors. The next two chapters will explore the representationalist theories of Schroeder, Klein and Cutter and Tye, and conclude that though they are headed in the right direction, both theories are not precise enough to answer all these questions. The final chapter will then take inspiration from current debate in the philosophy of emotions to fill in the gaps.
Chapter 5: Representationalist Theories of Pleasure

So far I have followed the contemporary debate about pleasure by presenting the phenomenological and attitudinal approaches. For many theorists, this exhausts the landscape. But in the discussion of theories of pleasure, there is one possible approach that has been overlooked – reflecting its general status in the philosophy of pleasure – that of the representationalist theory.

This chapter will first introduce representationalism in general and how it might be applied to a theory of pleasure. It will consider some problems for a general account. It will then move on to answer ‘Block’s Challenge’ from the viewpoint of two prominent theories – Tracking Representationalism and Desire Satisfactionism. It will show that the first of these is more successful but is still underdeveloped as a theory of pleasure (it was initially developed as a theory of pain).

5.1 Overview of representationalism about pleasure

Representationalism in general terms is considered a very attractive position in philosophy of mind, due to its promise of a naturalistic account of mental phenomena that is also compatible with cognitive science. However, one facet of philosophy of mind that is not under representationalism’s sway is that of affect. This is most likely because pleasure, along with pain, has been taken as a standard counterexample to representationalist theses of mind. The idea, according to those opposed to representationalism, is that pleasures and pains self-evidently have no representational content and therefore constitute
counterexamples to the representationalist programme. In response, some representationalists, notably Michael Tye, have developed theories of pain to fit in with their overall accounts, but work on equivalent theories of pleasure has been significantly lacking.

Representationalism, broadly speaking, is the umbrella term for a group of theories which state that to have an experience with a certain qualitative character is to have an experience that represents the world as being a certain way. When you look at the sky, you have a ‘blue experience’. On the one hand, the experience is of blueness in that it represents something blue (and this is its representational content). On the other hand, the experience itself ‘feels bluely’; there is something it is like to undergo an experience of blue (this is the experience’s phenomenal character). Representationalism states that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Furthermore, strong representationalism states that representation exhausts qualitative experience, while weak representationalism concedes that there may be additional factors to representation involved in phenomenal experience.

Representationalism of either kind is not popular in the philosophy of pleasure, especially in comparison to pain, for two reasons. Firstly, representationalist accounts are structured in such a way as to need some sort of phenomenology as their explanandum. As the discussion of the Heterogeneity Argument has shown, that there is such a thing as pleasure phenomenology is controversial in the

---

35 One of the most prominent ‘anti-representationalists’ is Ned Block. See his (Block, 1995) and (Block, 1996) for a summary of his views.
36 See Tye’s paper Another Look At Representationalism About Pain, 2005
37 One notable exception is Timothy Schroeder’s Desire Satisfactionism, which will be explored in section 5.3.1 of this chapter.
Some philosophers, such as Fred Feldman, deny the existence of any distinct phenomenology, claiming that for any given pleasure experience the phenomenology of the experience is the phenomenology of the senses alone. Contrast this to the pain debate, where it is generally accepted that pains have a phenomenology of some kind, although of course the details are hotly contested. Without an agreement on the explanandum, it is hard to see how a representationalist theory of pleasure can get off the ground.

The second reason is that certain possible discriminatory features that give support to representationalist accounts of pain, such as location or duration, are much vaguer in pleasure experiences. Perhaps the exception here is orgasm, which in these respects is much more similar to pain than other kinds of pleasure experiences. And while orgasms in their intensity may seem like the canonical pleasure experience, they are in many ways not at all typical of most of our other everyday pleasure experiences. Everyday pleasure experiences seem much more difficult to assign a location to in the body, or give a duration to, making them much less like sensations than either pains or orgasms appear to be. A representationalist theory of pleasure would have to account for this vagueness inherent in pleasure experience.

Nevertheless, I want to argue that a representationalist account of pleasure can be motivated. If we can put aside the above worries and run with a representationalist account that explains many empirical facts about pleasure.

---

38 However, it is not so controversial in philosophical accounts of pain that there is a distinctive phenomenology of pain. See the discussion in Chapter 1 on the differences between philosophical accounts of pleasure and pain.
39 See (Feldman, 2004)
and works in a convincing explanation of the vagueness of pleasure, it may be the best option. My treatment of the Heterogeneity Argument in Chapter 1 has shown that currently there is no compelling reason to either accept or reject the existence of a phenomenology of pleasure – in some circumstances (orgasm again being a notable example) it seems that there must be a phenomenological element above and beyond that given to us by the senses. In others (a game of chess perhaps) it is not so obvious that there is. Given the undecided outcome of the Heterogeneity Argument, the otherwise successful nature of a representationalist account may tip the balance towards concluding that pleasure has some sort of phenomenology, though of course it would not be an obvious or straightforward phenomenology, and that in itself would need further explanation – explanation which can be given by a representationalist theory.

A further reason to investigate a representationalist account is that if pleasurable episodes all represent the same sort of thing (have the same representans), then we are at least part of the way to answering the Heterogeneity Problem-: unity is provided by the kind of thing the seemingly heterogeneous pleasure experiences represent.40

What might a representationalist theory of pleasure look like? A broad characterisation of representationalism can be given as follows: to have an experience is to represent the world as being a certain way.41 Under this simple summary then, to have a pleasant experience is to represent the world (or an object in the world) as being a certain way. At first glance, this seems uncontroversial (though, for a little added complication, see section 5.2.2 on

40 The same representans can have multiple representata.
41 I follow Tim Schroeder (Schroeder, 2001) in using this broad summary.
whether the term pleasant modifies the experience or the object itself).

Representationalist theories can then be individuated by how they claim the phenomenological explanandum represents the world to be. Traditionally, one of the main challenges to representationalism is that pains and orgasms seem to be states without representational content, that is, they do not represent the world to be a certain way at all. Indeed, Ned Block writes, “The representationists should put up or shut up. The burden of proof is on them to say what the representational content of experiences such as orgasm and pain are.” (Block, 1996, p. 178) In short, a representationalist account of pleasure needs to identify how a pleasure experience represents the world to be – or, what is the representational content of that experience? In the words of Schroeder:

To have an experience is to represent the world to be a certain way - to represent the world as instantiating those properties one experiences the world as having - and nothing more. There are qualifications to be made and subtleties to consider, but the heart of the proposal is that the way the world looks (sounds, smells, etc) to us is determined entirely by how we pre-cognitively represent the world to be. (Schroeder, 2001, p. 508)

One outcome of the representationalist commitment is that representations have intentionality. An intentional state represents an object or a state of affairs as being a certain way. For instance, if I see a tomato as red, I am visually representing the tomato to be red. This allows for misrepresentation. If the tomato is in fact green but by some trick of the light appears to be red, my visual experience does not track the actual physical properties of the tomato as we think it ought to. A representationalist about mental state X is to not only committed to providing an account of what it is for that state to represent, but also to misrepresent.
One advantage of representationalism is its fit with cognitive psychology, which assumes that the mind is a representational system which mediates between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs. Explanations in cognitive science are both functional and decompositional, that is to say, our various cognitive capacities can be decomposed into their basic representational components, and the way these components function together can be shown to give rise to these capacities. So a good explanation in cognitive psychology will be one that can account for what we know about sensory input, behavioural data and neurophysiological knowledge.

The kind of representationalism discussed in this chapter refers to the phenomenal character of experiences - how they feel to the subject of those experiences. So, in line with what I have said above, our phenomenological world, our experiences and how they seem to us, are at base representational in nature, and a cognitive scientist is legitimate in taking them as her subject matter. I am going to base my characterisation of representationalism on that of Michael Tye, though of course there are many other variations of representationalism. Tye is a strong representationalist - that is he claims that the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted or wholly constituted by its representational content. Weak representationalists admit that experience has phenomenal qualities above and beyond its representational content. I take Tye’s model as the more extreme version in order to get a clearer understanding of how representationalism works, though it might be that a more subtle version of the theory is ultimately more suitable to a theory of pleasure.

So, according to Tye:
Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experience. At a minimum the thesis is one of supervenience – necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character... According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions. (Tye, 2002, p. 137)

So apart from the obvious identity claim, further claims we can pull out from this statement are (1) the claim that experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character and (2) that if we change the representational content of an experience, we will change the phenomenal character of an experience.

Claim 1: NECESS Experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.

Claim 2: NECESS Changing the representational content of an experience will change the phenomenal character of an experience.

Many philosophers of mind have endorsed representationalist theories of some kinds of experience, but how the anti-representationalist camp sees pain and pleasure is a major area of difficulty for the representationalist movement. Indeed Ned Block specifically throws down the gauntlet on this very issue. He says:

The representationists should put up or shut up. The burden of proof is on them to say what the representational content of experiences such as orgasm and pain are. (Block, 1995)

I'll call this Block's Challenge.
How individual representationalists answer Block’s Challenge will obviously be of great interest to anyone developing a representational theory of pleasure or pain. I explore two accounts below.

So, assuming of course that pain is a kind of experience and therefore has phenomenal character, we can extract a few claims a representationalist about pleasure might want to make:

- Pleasure experiences have representational content and this content determines their phenomenal character.
- Phenomenologically identical pleasure experiences will have the same representational content.
- Changing the representational content of a pleasure experience will change the phenomenological character of a pleasure experience.
- Pleasure is a legitimate subject for cognitive psychology.

The first claim is the most important and will make or break any representationalist theory of pleasure.

5.1.1 Why be a representationalist about pleasure?

As has been discussed above, representationalism about pleasure is not a popular position in the current pleasure debate. It is unclear if there is even a phenomenal property ‘pleasure’ which can fit into the usual representationalist model. So in order to justify going out on a limb by tentatively accepting what many philosophers of pleasure explicitly reject (that there is such a thing as pleasure phenomenology) there must be other reasons in favour of trying out a representationalist theory of pleasure.
5.1.2 Pleasure's information-bearing role

Part of the motivation for accepting representationalism about pleasure is the evolutionary-teleological picture of pleasure as having some information-bearing role (though this might not exhaust all or even many of pleasure's fundamental characteristics). There are strong empirical reasons for thinking pleasure plays a role in our relations to our environments, social experiences and learning. One of the best ways of explaining information is by using the notion of representation.\(^42\)

What does the existence of pleasure achieve? A natural place to start answering this question is to see what pleasure achieves for a person qua human organism. The function of something is not necessarily identical to its uses or to what it is good for, or even all the things it does. For a start, one of the many things my computer does is take up space on my desk, which is not its function. A distinction must be made between things that a system does 'by accident', so to speak, and things which are essential to that system. It is also important to look at how features of an object or system may be useful for many reasons, but not all of those things are its function. The sound of a heartbeat is useful for diagnostic purposes, but the function of the heart is not to make a sound. The function of the heart is to circulate blood around the body. What is the difference between epiphenomena which are useful (as in the sound of the heartbeat) and function? According to Larry Wright, useful accidents such as these can be dealt with by using a kind of 'let’s pretend' talk (Wright, 1973). The sound of the heartbeat functions as an indicator of the heart’s health. We make use of this

\(^{42}\) See (Vorms, 2008)
sound as if it was designed for this purpose. So design, of some sort, is integral to the notion of function. But many systems and objects which are not designed per se – such as the heart – still have functions. ‘Design’ for these natural functions can be understood as the explanation of how those features which enable the function got there. The only explanation possible in natural objects or systems, in the absence of an intentional designer, is an evolutionary one.

Function is not identical with goals or with underlying mechanisms that produce either actions or goals. Goal-directedness, for example, is a predicate of action, whereas it is perfectly possible for systems that are incapable of actions to have functions. Functions must therefore be identified in the context of an aetiological explanation of the origins and subsequent development of a phenomenon. A functional explanation of pleasure will therefore take into account the developmental history of pleasure within human beings, cumulating in an explanation of how pleasure benefits and maintains, i.e. is useful to, the human organism. Consider Canfield’s analysis of usefulness in natural functions:

That C is done is useful to S means if, ceteris paribus, C were not done in S, then the probability of that S surviving or having descendants would be smaller than the probability of an S in which C is done surviving or having descendants. (Canfield, 1964, p. 292)

Usefulness, then, can also be termed survival value, in that the usefulness of C can be translated in terms of adding to or subtracting from the probability of survival. Most recently, empirical studies of pleasure have made use of an evolutionary starting point for explanation – fulfilling both the aetiological requirements of a functional explanation and showing how the experience of
pleasure brings benefits (couched in terms of survival value) to human organisms. 'Pleasure', says psychologist Paul Martin, 'entices us to behave in ways that are biologically beneficial... in the sense that they would generally have helped our ancestors to survive and reproduce in their natural environment' (Martin, 2009). Paul Bloom puts it even more simply:

Why is there so much joy in quenching thirst, and why is it torture to deprive someone of water for a long period? Well that is an easy one. Animals need water to survive, and so they are motivated to seek it out. Pleasure is the reward for getting it; pain is the punishment for doing without. (Bloom, 2011, p. 4)

Antonio Damasio adds that:

Pain and pleasure are part of biological design for obviously adaptive purposes... Turning to the simple example of pleasures associated with eating and drinking, we see that pleasure is commonly initiated by a detection of imbalance, for instance, low blood sugar or high osmolality. The unbalance leads to the state of hunger or thirst (this is known as a motivational and drive state) which leads to eventual acts of eating and drinking.


Damasio’s position is perhaps the most illustrative of how this approach defines pleasure’s function in terms of solving problems posed against the survival of an organism. Lack of fluid is a survival problem, thirst motivates the action of seeking fluid, and the experience of pleasure rewards this action. Quenching thirst is just one of the many examples of the kinds of things that cause or are the objects of pleasurable experience – and the least controversial of these sources of pleasure are also the most biologically salient. Almost everyone gets pleasure from some form of food, sex or social bonding. In fact, not to get pleasure from at
least some of these things is seen as indicative of mental illness.

So far this chapter has claimed that pleasure has a function, defined in the broader context of evolution. This function has been broadly defined as increasing the probability of survival by aiding the solving of biological problems. This is broad indeed. Bloom’s summary points to how these problems are manifest in the world and how an organism reacts to it – the seeking of water for example – while Damasio points to self-awareness of the state of the organism itself as the motivator of action. In each conceptualisation solving the problem is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. Both of these facets – internal and external – at their most basic involve information, that is information about the state of the organism and information about the world. The ‘affect as information’ theory is an account of how perception and thought are influenced by affective states where pleasant-unpleasant feelings are ‘embodied information’ (Storbeck, 2008). This chapter now argues that, unlike phenomenological or attitude theories, representational theories of pleasure are best positioned to capture this notion of pleasure as information.

There are strong empirical reasons for thinking pleasure plays a role in our relations to our environments, social experiences and learning. One of the best ways of explaining information is by using the notion of representation. What this information tells us, and how, will be discussed in section 5.1.2. The account that best encapsulates this notion is Cutter and Tye’s Tracking Theory of Representationalism (or just Tracking Representationalism). Tracking Representationalism can be expressed formally like so:

43 See for example, (Frijda, 2010), (Cabanac, 2010) and (Carver, 2003)
When optimal conditions obtain, a token state $S$ will represent a property $P$ for individual $x$ when $x$ tokens iff $p$ and because of $p$. (Cutter & Tye, 2011)

According to tracking theory, a token of a state represents a state of affairs when that token co-varies with it under optimal conditions. Artificial (or conventional) representational systems provide information about a property because they have been designed to take advantage of the co-variance of a property within the system and a property without the system. A favoured example of this is that of a mercury thermometer. The mercury in the thermometer (within-system property) represents the surrounding temperature (without-system property) when the heights of the mercury are set to causally co-vary (by means of a temperature gauge) with various temperatures under optimal conditions (Tye, 1995), (Dretske, 1995). So, the mercury provides a representation of the temperature of the surroundings, and this representation can be regarded as informative. Similarly, the claim from Tye et al is that the systems which underlie pain experiences have developed the function of providing information via representation.

5.1.3 Answering Euthyphro/Findlay’s objections

Throughout the previous three chapters I have argued that the Euthyphro problem and Findlay’s objection are actually much more decisive and important arguments in the pleasure debate than the Heterogeneity Argument, which is given much more prominence in the literature. The Euthyphro problem states that if pleasure is reducible to a desiring attitude, then we cannot apply to pleasure as a reason of why we desire things. By identifying pleasure with desire, desire-based attitude theories bind the two too tightly together to allow for
explanation. Conversely, phenomenological theories are open to Findlay's objection that if pleasure is just a feeling like any other then there seems to be no grounding for the close link between pleasure and motivation we intuitively see. Representationalism allows the right amount of distance between pleasure and motivation in that they are connected but still have explanatory relevance. The key is that if our goals and priorities can be represented within pleasurable experience, weaving motivation right into our experiences of the things we enjoy, then Findlay's objection can be answered. This may seem oblique but will be answered fully in chapter 7. The Euthyphro problem is answered by the appearance/reality distinction that, as chapter 4 demonstrated, is open to representationalists.

5.1.4 Answering the Heterogeneity Problem

A further reason to investigate a representationalist account is that if pleasurable episodes all represent the same sort of thing, then we are at least part of the way to answering the Heterogeneity Problem – unity is provided by the kind of thing the seemingly heterogeneous pleasure experiences represent. It has been stated above that the worries provoked by the Heterogeneity Argument should be put aside for the time being, so discussing it again here might come as a surprise. The purpose of this section is merely to point out that the Heterogeneity Problem is slightly different to the Heterogeneity Argument in that the Problem merely points out the vast array of pleasurable experiences and poses the quandary of finding what links all these experiences together. Phenomenological theories answer the problem quite simply by saying it is the phenomenology of a specific ‘pleasure’ type that links these together. The Argument develops the Problem by
specifically saying it cannot be phenomenology that links these experiences together and that therefore some kind of attitude must provide the connection. Representational theories answer the problem insofar as they presume that there is phenomenology that links these experiences together – in doing so they do not on the surface offer anything more than standard phenomenological theories. But representational theories might improve on the standard theories by allowing us to see ‘behind the curtain’ of pleasure phenomenology and in doing so, let us understand why pleasure phenomenology is not obvious or does not act like regular sensory phenomenology.

5.1.5 Allowing affect to be part of a larger theory of mind

A further interesting reason to consider a representational theory of pleasure is given to us by Timothy Schroeder:

The second and more intellectually significant reason to speculate that pleasure and displeasure might be representational is that pleasure and displeasure are curiously isolated as non-representational types of experience. Most sorts of experience are clearly representational in the weak sense of having associated representational content... This isolation of pleasure and displeasure is reason for suspicion. We might accept that pleasure and displeasure are the exceptions to the rule that experience has associated representational content, but it is not unreasonable to take an apparent exception to the rule as a problem to be solved by incorporation under the rule. (Schroeder, 2001, p. 511)

That pleasure and pain ought to be similar to other sorts of experiences is not a prima facie reason to accept that they are representational in nature. However, a theory of pleasure (and pain) which explains how these states interact with other kinds of experiences is clearly valuable, and interaction may be better explained if all experiences have representational structure. However, this is
only a weak reason to consider a representationalist theory of pleasure – a thoroughgoing representationalist will of course want to explain all mental phenomena in her terms and therefore look for an explanation of pleasure for her preferred approach. Anti-representationalists such as Block will of course take the opposite route.

In a related consideration, it should be noted that representationalism is often taken for granted in the cognitive sciences, with its related notions of input-output and structural representation (Ramsay, 2010). Representationalism also allows for experiences to be naturalised by reducing them to more ‘naturalistically acceptable’ entities. Both of the factors mean a philosophical theory of pleasure that is built on representationalism will dovetail more smoothly with theories of pleasure (or ‘affect’) in the cognitive sciences, which while not an overpowering reason to accept it, does increase its possible usefulness.

Overall, the considerations listed above are not, so far, wholly convincing without a more detailed picture of what a representationalist theory of pleasure would look like. The rest of this chapter will now consider some general problems for a representationalist account and, once these have been answered, turn to worked-out representationalist theories of pleasure, specifically those of Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011) and Timothy Schroeder (2004).

5.2 Representationalism and transparency

The seed of the notion of phenomenal transparency is usually given as this famous passage from G.E. Moore's paper “The Refutation of Idealism”:
the fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term. The term “blue” is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have called “consciousness” – that which a sensation of blue has in common with a sensation of green – is extremely difficult to fix. [...] And in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent – we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there is something, but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognized.

(Moore, 1903, p. 446)

Tye, a noted defender of the transparency of experience, adds this:

Whatever the nature of the qualities of which we are directly aware when we focus upon how the surfaces before us look, these qualities are not experienced as qualities of our experiences but rather as qualities of the surfaces. And this is so, even if the qualities involve relations to intrinsic qualities of experiences. For the former qualities are the ones of which we are directly conscious. Since we are not conscious of their relational nature, we are not conscious of any intrinsic qualities of experiences involved in that nature. (Tye, Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience, 2002, p. 138)

This gives rise to the Strong Transparency thesis:

[ST] Any quality that we can epistemically encounter when introspecting on our experience is a quality only represented by this experience, thus is not a quality of the experience.⁴⁴

So, to briefly illustrate, when I introspect the perceptual experience of a blue object, the so-called ‘blueness’ of my experience is merely a representation of the

⁴⁴ Adapted from Aydede & Fulkerson (2014, p. 180)
actually blue object that I experience. My experience is not itself blue. According to representationalists, nothing is blue expect the object of experience itself.

Transparency is taken by representationalists as support for their thesis when it comes to matters of perception. However, when it comes to matters of affect, it is not as clear that transparency holds. This is because if there are any qualities that we can introspect that are not attributable to the objects of experience, then representationalism is refuted. Sensations, pains and other affective qualities are thought to be good candidates for the non-attributable qualities. In fact, Murat Aydede and Mathew Fulkerson state:

We intend to show that affective qualities are such qualities [i.e. non-transparent]. We will show that representationalism is false on account of the fact that it cannot explain affective phenomenology in its preferred terms. (Aydede & Fulkerson, 2014, p. 181)

The germ of Aydede and Fulkerson’s critique is that when we have a pleasant or unpleasant experience, we are indeed aware of qualities of our experience rather than qualities of an object when we introspect upon that experience. The repercussion of this claim, if it could be demonstrated to be true, might even undermine the whole representationalist project, not just for affect but for all mental states. Note that this sets Aydede and Fulkerson, and indeed all those who believe that it is just brutely obvious that affective phenomena disprove representationalism, in direct opposition to those many philosophers of pleasure
who claim that when they introspect their experiences, they cannot detect a pleasure phenomenology at all.\(^\text{45}\)

At first glance this seems like good news for the representationalist. If attitudinalist philosophers of pleasure agree that there is no such thing as affective qualities of experience then ST is not violated and representationalism holds. But if one wants to be a representationalist about pleasure and pain (as Cutter, Tye and Schroeder clearly do) then the very structure of a representationalist account they give – that of representans and representatum – requires phenomenal character, which other attitude theorists deny.\(^\text{46}\) Perhaps this is why representationalists focus on pain. There is no disagreement among philosophers of pain that there is such a thing as pain phenomenology. Many philosophers of pain in fact posit that pain is multi-componential, including at least a sensory-discriminatory aspect and a motivational aspect.\(^\text{47}\) Explaining the sensory-discriminatory aspects of pain actually lends itself to a representationalist explanation of pain; it is the motivational aspect that is assumed to be a far greater challenge. To paraphrase Block, the problem for strong representationalists such as Tye is that of giving an account of what the painfulness of pain represents. This will be answered in section 5.3.

\(^{45}\) It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that currently attitudinal theories are the standard position in philosophy of pleasure precisely based on the supposed introspective evidence – that is the lack of any detectable pleasure phenomenology. It therefore seems somewhat ironic that the evidence against the representationalist is affective phenomenology.

\(^{46}\) Which is not to imply that a representationalist theory of any mental state has to fit this pattern, just that this is the format that both Tye & Cutter and Schroeder have chosen to use for their theories.

\(^{47}\) David Bain explains this distinction in (Bain, 2003). See also Nikola Grahek
Another way of thinking about essentially the same problem is given to us by Aydede & Fulkerson:

When we talk about how pleasant the taste of the strawberry is, we may be attributing the pleasantness to our subjective experience, or we may be attributing it to whatever objective sensible qualities are responsible for our experience. (Aydede & Fulkerson, Affect: representationalist's headache, 2014, p. 177)

According to Aydede & Fulkerson, both of these statements are correct:

1) The strawberry is pleasant.
2) My experience of it is pleasant.

The representationalist, it seems, is bound by transparency only to accept sentence (1) and reject sentence (2), because properties belong to objects, not experiences. Aydede and Fulkerson call this the Object View (OV):

(OV): Affective qualities fundamentally qualify objects rather than the experiences of them, and for any x and affective quality A, if x is A and x is an experience, then x is A only derivatively.

So according to the OV, only the strawberry itself is truly pleasant, while if we say ‘the taste of the strawberry is pleasant’ then this is only the case in a derivative sense. The opposing view is given as the Experience View (EV):

(EV): Affective qualities fundamentally qualify experiences and for any x and affective quality A, if x is A and x is NOT an experience, then x is A only derivatively.
In other words, according to EV, the taste of the strawberry is pleasant and if we say the ‘strawberry is pleasant’ this is only the case derivatively.

Representationalism then seems to naturally lead to OV, with its commitment to experience representing properties of objects, rather than EV, which would make pleasant and unpleasant experiences non-transparent. EV, however, seems to be the more intuitively appealing view, because it allows us to accommodate some scenarios where objects are pleasant in some ways and not in others. Say the strawberry has grown in the shape of a worm. It looks quite disgusting but tastes sublime – and this accords easily with EV, where the visual experience is qualified by the affective quality of unpleasantness, and the taste experience is qualified by the affective quality of pleasantness. According to OV, the strawberry itself would (appear to) be both unpleasant and pleasant.

To sum up, in order to answer the Euthyphro problem, we need an appearance/reality distinction. The attitude we hold towards an object – be it desire or some other – must be able to appear as something other than desire. We turn to the representationalist account to provide the layered structure that allows this – the representans does not have to resemble the representatum, after all. But this very solution causes problems when we think about attributing properties to objects rather than experiences.

At this point we must turn to a more subtle version of representationalism to satisfy both the Euthyphro problem and the problem of transparency. Tim Crane (2009) refers to notion of mode to understand how our approaches to the same intentional content can yield different results. For
example, *judging* that <p> is not the same as type of mental state as *wishing* that <p> or *fearing* that <p>, even though they share the same content. So to capture the intentional structure of an experience we don’t just specify the experiential content but also the relevant mode of experience which relates us to the content in question. Call this view *impure intentionalism*.\(^{48}\) Impure intentionalism is rejected by Tye, but that need not concern us. After all, if mode and content are both part of intentional structure, then saying that phenomenology is fixed by both mode and content is still claiming that phenomenology still supervenes entirely on intentional structure. We can still embrace the representationalist slogan that there cannot be two experiences which are identical in their intentional nature but differ in their phenomenal character.

If we can learn lessons from what Tye has to say about the intentional content of a pain experience but refine it by also saying that the mode of the experience also has ramifications in describing the nature of pleasure (as the Euthyphro problem demands of us) then we ought to take whatever tools best do the job. Still, Block’s challenge remains for mode as well as content. An impure version of representationalism about pleasure and pain must now answer two questions: *What content?* and *What mode?* These questions will be answered fully in Chapter 7.

Introducing impure intentionalism will inevitably have a knock-on effect on the Strong Transparency thesis. So, as both Cutter and Tye cash out what they take to be the representational contents of pleasure experiences, it will be

\(^{48}\) This term is after Crane (2009). Byrne (2001) calls this view intra-modal intentionalism but the term does not seem to be widespread.
important to note which properties are available for introspection and how this impacts on how we respond to the Heterogeneity Argument. This will be discussed in Chapter 7.

5.3 Answering Block’s Challenge

As stated above, this chapter will examine two representationalist theories of pleasure (or affect): a) Timothy Schroeder’s Desire Representationalism and b) Michael Tye and Brian Cutter’s Tracking Representationalism. For each theory I will concentrate on how they answer Block’s Challenge (see Section 5.1 above), that is to say the question of what exactly pleasure represents. For Schroeder, the answer to Block’s challenge is that pleasure gives us a report on how well our desires are being satisfied. For Cutter and Tye, the response is that pleasure represents the objects of our experience as exemplified by the property good for me.

5.3.1 Desire Satisfactionism

In the previous chapters I surveyed the current state of the pleasure debate in philosophy. It was found that traditionally theories of pleasure are divided into attitude theories and phenomenological theories. This division is motivated by the theories’ varying response to the Heterogeneity Problem. One theory, however, did not fit the traditional categorisation scheme. In section 2.2 it was noted that Timothy Schroeder, although he calls himself a theorist of hedonic tone, is in fact, an ‘anomaly’.

The reason for his anomalous status within the traditional scheme is that instead of responding to the question of whether pleasurable experiences have
any special 'pleasure phenomenology', he takes it as a given that there is a phenomenological explanandum to be addressed when discussing pleasurable experiences. This explanandum is perhaps misleadingly entitled 'hedonic tone' though his theory is not allied with those of other hedonic tone theorists. Rather this is just his term for the special phenomenology of pleasure experiences, however that may manifest itself.

Schroeder's theory is different to the other theories of pleasure because it is explicitly a representational theory of pleasure. It states that pleasure within experience is just a representation of whether or not our desires are being satisfied. A summary statement of the theory is like so:

*Desire Satisfactionism: X is pleasurable if X has a positive hedonic tone, i.e. phenomenologically represents our desire regarding the object of experience X as being satisfied.*

So, Schroeder's Desire Satisfactionism\(^4^9\) account of both pleasures and pains qualifies as a representationalist view, stating as it does that pleasure represents positive changes in net desire satisfaction, i.e. that our desires are currently being satisfied. Schroeder is motivated by the intuitive correlation between getting what we want and pleasurable experience:

By and large, getting what we want pleases us, and being pleased is a sign that things are going our way. Similarly, having our desires frustrated is unpleasant, and being displeased is a sign that things are going against our wishes. This simple correlation does nothing to establish the existence of an essential connection between hedonic tone and desire

\(^{4^9}\) *Desire Satisfactionism* is also the name Chris Heathwood gives to his theory of welfare, according to which your life goes well as long as your desires are satisfied (Heathwood, 2006)
satisfaction, but it motivates the search for such a connection.

Contrary to the debate described in Chapter 1 (the notion of hedonic tone, it is implied, successfully answers the Heterogeneity Argument) in which attitude theorists argued against phenomenological theorists that pleasure is or has any kind of feeling or hedonic tone, Schroeder takes it as a datum that hedonic tone exists, basing this assumption on a basic folk psychology of the phenomenon which tells us that pleasure and displeasure are ‘feelings’, and draws comparison with the usual five senses, the most pertinent similarity between the senses and hedonic tone being that they ‘make a difference to consciousness’ and that ‘there is ‘something it is like’ to be pleased or displeased. Essentially pleasure and displeasure are (or are aspects of) conscious, phenomenological experiences and it is those experiences Schroeder sets out to explain. The most striking difference, on the other hand, between the phenomenology of the senses and hedonic tone is that hedonic tone (pleasure or displeasure) tells us about a subjective response rather than the objective property of an object, as the senses do (or at least purport to). There are two main objections to Schroeder’s theory (which also apply to Klein’s theory, mentioned below) that are important to understand:

**Objection 1: Dead Sea Apples**

The first objection is familiar from the discussion of desire-based attitude theories. We often come into possession of our heart’s desire, only to find it turning to ashes in our mouths (hence the name ‘Dead Sea Apples’ bestowed by Sidgwick). According to Schroeder’s theory, to desire something and then to possess it is to guarantee pleasure because pleasure just represents the
satisfaction of desire. Yet we know from experience that this is not always the case (recall the example of the Ferrari-owning banker). According to Schroeder we ought to see an increase in pleasure commensurate with the strength of desire being satisfied, yet it seems some of our most fondly held dreams and ambitions lead to flat affect and lack of pleasure. A more prosaic example of this disjuncture between strength of desire and magnitude of pleasure is seen in the case of addiction. It has been observed that in the case of addiction, when wanting (desire) increases, pleasure actually decreases. The desire for drugs is incredibly strong, outstripping rational planning for oneself and causing one to neglect other needs and desires. However, self-reports by addicts describe pleasure gained from drugs as being much lower than when taking drugs in the pre-addiction stage. In fact, drug addicts are often no longer able to give reasons at all for their drug-taking. There are not reasons as such, only causes.

Berridge also notes experiments where cocaine addicts are given micro-doses of cocaine and the addicts report feeling both no pleasure from the dose, and none of the usual other affects they might expect from the drug; in fact the doses are often referred to as ‘empty’ because the addicts believe there is no cocaine in them. Yet the addicts still work for these doses which have no phenomenological impact on them at all, suggesting that there is a direct link between desire and behaviour which bypasses the felt experience altogether.

On the flip side of this objection is that often things we had no particular desire for can occasionally bring us great pleasure, for instance the sudden delightful smell of flowers on an evening walk. Call this the problem of Unexpected Pleasures.
Problem 1: Dead Sea Apples

1. According to Desire Satisfactionism, a subject’s felt pleasure represents the satisfaction of her desire.

2. In the banker example, the banker’s desire to own a Ferrari is satisfied.

3. The satisfaction of the banker’s desire has to be, according to Desire Satisfactionism, represented by the banker’s felt pleasure.

4. The banker has no felt pleasure.

5. To preserve Desire Satisfactionism, Schroeder must say either that 2 is false and the banker didn’t really have a desire OR that 4 is false and the banker did indeed have pleasure but she didn’t know about it.

If we are to take the banker’s self-report of desire seriously then it seems the only option left open to Schroeder is to say that the banker did have pleasure but didn’t know it. But recall that Schroeder claimed that one of the advantages of Desire Satisfactionism is the pleasure tells us things about our desires. If pleasure is meant to be informative about desire then it would seem odd to have pleasures but not be aware of them. So claiming that the banker has pleasure but is unaware of it is not an attractive option for Schroeder.

In fact, Schroeder opts to say that the banker did not have a desire for the Ferrari. He does not dismiss her prior desire for the Ferrari but instead says that a desire for the Ferrari when she obtains it is missing. Like Heathwood’s A-desires and B-desires, what counts is the desire for the state of affairs when it
obtains, not the preceding desires.

In this way, Heathwood thinks that pleasure still is informative about desire. The banker’s lack of felt pleasure informs her that her predictive desire was incorrect about (what is now) her occurrent desire. That one desire mispredicts another is hardly unusual. And in a sense we can see that we might say of the banker that it turned out she didn’t want a fancy car after all.

But does Schroeder’s answer work for the reverse problem, that of Unexpected Pleasures?

**Problem 2: Unexpected Pleasures**

1. According to Desire Satisfactionism, a subject’s felt pleasure represents the satisfaction of her desire.

2. In the flowers example, smelling flowers is accompanied by felt pleasure.

3. The occurrence of felt pleasure for me, according to Desire Satisfactionism, represents the satisfaction of my desire to smell those flowers.

4. I have no desire to smell the flowers.

5. To preserve Desire Satisfaction, Schroeder must say either 2 is false and I didn’t really have a pleasure OR that 4 is false and I really did have a desire to smell the flowers but I didn’t know about it.

Again, Schroeder does not want to deny the existence of my pleasure if I believe it to exist – to do so would be counterintuitive and undermine Schroeder’s view.
of pleasure as informative. Instead he claims I did indeed have desire to smell flowers that I did not know about, which fits with his stance.

Schroeder differentiates between standing desires and occurrent desires. So while I might not have had an occurrent desire for the smell of flowers (and therefore it seemed to me like I had no desires), I did have a standing desire for them. Relatedly, Schroeder explains that we have narrow desires for specific states of affairs, such as my desire to be tucked up in bed by 10pm, or broad desires, such as my desire not to eat anything that will cause me to vomit. So the experience of smelling flowers fits in with my broad desire for a class of fragrant smells which might also include the smell of baking bread, cut grass and dusty rooms. One objection to this move is that what links the members of the above class together is the fact they bring me pleasure – ‘fragrant’ is after all just another way of saying ‘pleasant’. So, in essence, all broad desires are desires for pleasure, and if pleasure is a representation of satisfied desire then broad desires are just desires that my desire be satisfied. Of course all desires in a sense are that my desires be satisfied; this is just the motivational oomph of desire. But if narrow desires also have this quality then how do narrow desires (directed as they are at specific states of affairs) get the specificity that broad desires lack? Furthermore, Schroeder’s appeal to broadness has not solved why the smell of flowers and bread are in that class but the smell of new cars and baking soda are affectively indifferent to me.

Schroeder also uses this to explain how we get pleasure or displeasure from situations we hadn’t even envisaged – his inventive example is the displeasure one would get from mopping the floor with a comatose terrier. He
claims that although the vast majority of people have never envisaged such an experience coming to pass, and therefore possess no particular desire regarding this experience, as it belongs to a broad class of experiences we might be averse to, perhaps entitled 'experiences that are cruel to animals', we nevertheless already in some sense have a standing desire regarding this bizarre situation. But how does this fit in with his concept of desire? As we have seen, to desire a state of affairs, according to Schroeder, is to constitute it as a reward, while to be averse is to constitute it as a punishment. Certainly being forced to mop with a terrier by someone else would be a punishment, but what if one found oneself accidentally mopping with a sleeping dog, perhaps because one had mistaken it for a mop? My aversion to this situation would not be because I constituted it as a punishment (either before or during the unfortunate mistake) but because I think cruelty to animals is a bad thing. This points the way to an underlying factor that Schroeder has missed in his discussion: that these 'broad desires' are linked together by our values. The question of value will be discussed further in the examination of Cutter and Tye’s Tracking Representationalism, in the second half of this chapter.

5.3.2 Klein’s Imperativism

One alternative representationalist account of pain, which has not yet been applied to the case of pleasure, is the imperativist stance. Imperativism about pain is broadly the idea that pain phenomenology is has a content that commands rather than describes. As Colin Klein puts it:

I argue that pains are exhausted by their content, but that this content is imperative rather than representational. Pains thus command rather than
describe. Commanding is still a way of having content, however, and so intentionalism is preserved. (Klein, 2007 p518)

The main point of difference is in what is represented by a painful experience.

Klein develops his point:

Continuing the analogy, there are many types of meaningful sentences, and each has a content. Not all sentences are declarative, though, and we are happy with a pluralism of types of content - there are interrogative, imperative, and subjunctive sentences as well as declaratives. Each of these sentences has a distinct kind of content irreducible to the others. (Klein, 2007 p518)

So, the line between evaluativist theories of affective experience and imperative ones is not only down to the specifics of the kind of content they present in the attempt to answer Block’s Challenge, but also in that evaluativist content such as “this is good” or “this is bad” (in its simplest form) is indicative, which is to say it has a set of correctness conditions, versus imperative, which instead has a set of satisfaction conditions. To give a flavour of what imperative content could include, consider sentences such as “do this!” “don’t do that!” ‘more of this’ “less of that!”. A sentence such as “Bill is making the bed” is either true or false, while “Bill, make the bed!” is neither.

While there is a very interesting debate regarding imperativism for pain to be looked at, I shall restrict myself to whether it can apply to pleasure. It is not clear whether Klein thinks his theory extends to pleasure, though if he wants it to be a description of all affective experience it clearly ought to. So, while I will try
and answer Block’s Challenge for pleasure on behalf of Klein, any shortcomings in the response are my own.

What, according to the imperativist, would be the content of a pleasure experience? I propose it would be either “more of this!” or “keep doing this”. This makes Klein’s account aligned with motivational accounts, either attitudinal version or Schroeder’s account. As such, the same arguments that applied to Schroeder can work here. So, many strongly motivating experiences do not seem to be pleasurable, the drug addiction case being the most vivid. The more addicts are motivated to “keep doing this” it seems the less likely they are to feel pleasure in carrying out their addiction. Similarly we can refer back to the Dead Sea Apples case and see that things we are highly motivated to get are not pleasurable at all when we get them. Finally there is a parallel with the unexpected pleasures case that there are very gentle pleasurable experiences that while wonderful in the moment don’t seem to require “more of this” or “keep doing this” but merely pass through our lives in a beautiful, fleeting instant.

While these comments are brief, because a) it unclear whether Klein ever intended for his theory to extend to pleasure and b) to avoid repeating those criticisms against Schroeder that also apply to Klein, there is one more salient question to ask of imperativism. All commands require a commander. And to be an effective commander requires authority, or one is free to ignore her commands. So, in the pain case (at least for the paradigmatic pain cases described by Klein), it seems like the commander must be the body, but it is not
clear that this transfers to the pleasure case. Who or what has the authority to command us to keep doing what we are doing? \(^{50}\)

### 5.3.3 Cutter & Tye's Tracking Representationalism

This chapter will recap Cutter and Tye's characterisation of the affective element of a pain experience. It will then expand this characterisation to include all affective experiences, positive and negative. It will show that while apprehension of value is necessary to the *painfulness of pain*, it is also necessary to the *pleasantness of pleasure*. This applies not only to what may be thought of as our typical pleasure and pain experiences within the body, but also more general pleasant and unpleasant experiences.

To recap, Cutter and Tye present a representationalist theory of pain that claims that the phenomenal character of a pain experience is identical to its representational content. The representational content of a pain experience is divided into two parts. First, the sensory aspect of pain is given by the location and physiological type of a bodily disturbance. The second aspect, the ‘badness’, ‘unpleasantness’ or ‘painfulness’ of pain, is given by representation of a valuational property ‘bad for me’. It is this second aspect which will be the focus of discussion for the rest of the chapter.

Cutter and Tye's characterisation of a pain experience can be summed up as:

*The content of a pain experience of an individual A is something like: There is a*

\(^{50}\) As this is not an aspect of imperativism that Klein address I will say no more about it except to note that it felt germane to the discussion of selves in Chapter 7.
bodily disturbance of (physiological) type d in location l, and d is bad for A's self to degree x. (Cutter & Tye, 2011)

The question of degrees of badness will be discussed in the next section. This section will discuss the two aspects of the content of a pain experience and widen out Cutter and Tye's thesis to include non-bodily unpleasant experiences and also pleasant experiences.

Cutter and Tye's account of the content of pain requires that there be two aspects to a pain experiences given by two types of content. This is supported by a general consensus in pain studies in which the sensory and affective aspects of pain can be considered as potentially dissociable phenomena.

However, if the first aspect of pain gives us the location and type of disturbance (that which makes the pain bodily) then it seems like the second aspect has no such anchor to the body. Many objects or states of affairs other than bodily disturbances can be 'bad for me' and do not result in typical bodily pains. What makes a pain a pain (as usually understood) is that its object is bodily disturbance. Pains can therefore be thought of as members of a larger set of experiences which represent their objects as bad for me.

Cutter and Tye also subscribe to this idea:

We have focused on the painfulness or negative affective quality of pain experience. But pain is just one of a number of negatively valanced experiences. There are other experiences with a negative affect, such as the experience of smelling excrement or eating rotting meat. More importantly for the present discussion, there are also experiences, such as the experience of having an orgasm or eating a ripe strawberry, which have a positive affect. We say that strawberries taste good and orgasms feel good,
and intuitively, when we say such things we are (at least obliquely) commenting on the phenomenal character of our experience of strawberries and orgasms. Our account of the content of pain experiences has a natural extension to affectively positive experiences: when individual A has such an experience, the experience represents its object as good for A to a certain degree. The property of being good for A will be identified with being apt to benefit A, and the explanation of how our experiences come to represent this property will proceed along the same lines as the explanation given above for how pain experience comes to represent the property of being bad for one.

(Cutter & Tye, 2011, p. 105)

So, for Cutter and Tye, in typical cases pain experiences are a subset of a wider class of experiences with negative affect or valence. Experiences which represent their object as being bad for the subject are not necessarily pain experiences but are necessarily unpleasant experiences, according to Cutter and Tye's formulation.

Most critiques of Cutter and Tye focus on the mechanism of Tracking Representationalism, but at least one philosopher, Murat Aydede, also challenges their choice of representational content:

I'm not sure how to understand Tye’s proposal. It seems that whatever the badness or goodness of those qualities properly detected by experiences might come to at the end, these second-order qualities are simply not the kind of qualities that can be detected or tracked... There just doesn’t seem to be any natural property of a tissue damage suitable and simple enough to be transduced. Surely the burden of proof is on Tye to show us that pain experiences normally carry information about a certain quality of tissue damage that constitutes its badness. What natural property is it that can be so detected? If it’s not a natural property, what reasons are there to think that it’s the kind of property whose instantiations can be detected in the information-theoretic sense? We need to be told.

(Aydede, The Main Difficulty with Pain, 2005, p. 131)
Aydede is right to call on Cutter and Tye to point to a natural property (or at least a detectable property), because their Tracking Representationalism requires it in so far as it is part of a larger project to naturalise pain phenomena. Cutter and Tye must be able to demonstrate that the badness of tissue damage is causally relevant to the person’s being in the internal state she is in (Cutter & Tye, 2011, p. 93). They attempt to do so by explicitly identifying the ‘bad for me’ property with being apt to harm:

Assuming a naturalistic worldview, then, we should not suppose that being-bad-for-you is a spooky or primitive non-natural property. Plausibly, the property of being bad for you is just the property of being apt to harm you... If what it is for something to be bad for you is to be apt to harm you, what is it for something to harm you? While the notion is difficult to make precise, we take it that there is no great mystery about what it is for something to harm something else, or about how it is consistent with a naturalistic worldview that something could be harmed. Since Darwin, we are all now familiar with how the notion of a teleological system can be made naturalistically acceptable. We can understand the notion of harm in relation to the notion of a teleological system. Very roughly, something harms a teleological system to the extent that it hinders that system (or one of its subsystems) from performing its function(s). (Cutter & Tye, 2011, pp. 100-101)

So, according to Cutter and Tye, ‘bad for me’ is identified as ‘apt to harm me’, and ‘apt to harm me’ is the same as ‘apt to hinder my functioning’. This is clearly meant to be interpreted in a bodily sense. As a person I might have social functions such as being a teacher, but it won’t be a painful experience for me if I

---

51 It also seems that ‘bad for me’ has to be natural/detectable without the subject’s possession of such concepts as ‘good’ (which would be problematic if we want to include animals and infants in our range of subjects).
do not teach. Cutter and Tye are thinking of bodily functions, such as oxygen uptake, digestion, temperature regulation and the like. Impediment of these functions will result in pain, according to Cutter and Tye. At its core, the experience of pain is a representation of how well (or not) our homeostatic systems are doing. Homeostasis is defined by A. D. Craig as ‘a dynamic and ongoing process comprising many integrated mechanisms that maintain an optimal balance in the physiological condition of the body, for the purpose of survival. In mammals, these include autonomic, neuroendocrine and behavioural mechanisms’ (Craig 2003, p. 303).

There are, however, a few problems with naturalising the notion of harm using homeostasis:

_Problem 1: ‘Proper’ or ‘optimal’ are themselves non-natural properties_

Karen Neander gives this assessment of natural function: ‘To attribute a natural function... to something is to attribute a certain kind of normative property to that thing. That is, it is to attribute an evaluative standard to it that it could fail to meet, even chronically.’ (Neander, 1999, p. 14) This first criticism is relatively easily dealt with. ‘Optimal’ is here understood as a normative term where that norm has been generated by evolution. So optimal in this case just means best suited for survival in usual cases for that species. Suffering harm will threaten a creature’s survival prospects and frustrate its ability to reproduce. This hinders

---

52 At least according to the notion of pain Cutter and Tye are discussing here, though with a broader notion of pain that might include social pains. See (Corns, 2014) for a discussion of the connections between physical, social and emotional pains.
the central evolutionary goal of gene propagation. So the normative terms involved can be reduced to one naturalised norm given to us by evolution.

**Problem 2: Sub-optimality is not always represented by pain**

The second problem is more pressing for Cutter and Tye. Disruption or less-than-optimal functioning in classical homeostatic systems is often represented by non-pain phenomenon such as hunger, thirst or feeling too hot or cold (although all of these feelings can become painful if intense enough).

One possible explanation is that mild thirst is not painful because it doesn’t also represent damage - the body is not irrevocably harmed at the point of mild thirst. It is missing the sensory-discriminatory element we associate with pain experiences. It is, however, unpleasant – that is, the state of being dehydrated is represented as bad for me. Thirst will become painful at the point that I am so dehydrated that other bodily functions become compromised. Until that point, the specific phenomenology of thirst is derived from the biological system that supports it, so it could be thought of as a specific type of pain whose determination dimensions are given by its neural underpinnings.

The converse problem is that many pain experiences have only loose connections to homeostasis. A cut to the finger does not threaten the body’s essential core mechanisms. A person could live quite well with a permanently open finger wound provided it was kept free from infection and yet this would be

53 Interestingly, the evolutionary goals of survival and gene propagation, which are usually congruent, occasionally dissociate and clash (many insect species die in the breeding process for example). In these cases gene propagation wins out.
a painful way to live. A cut finger is problematic in at least two ways 1) the integrity of the envelope of skin is compromised and 2) it prevents full use of the hand. So pain is based on the disruption of more than one norm -
1) homeostasis
2) bodily integrity
3) unimpeded motor control
All of which reduce to their aptness for promoting survival. Disruption of any of these norms can be said to be ‘apt to harm’ in that it will reduce chances of survival.

*Problem 3: Pleasure does not necessarily equate with optimality in this sense*

Problem 3 is the true problem for Cutter and Tye’s account. As has been noted before, philosophers of pain often assume their account can also easily apply to pleasure without realising that there are some asymmetries between how their account would play out. Cutter and Tye’s notion of harm is one such example. That impeding certain functions can be equated with harm which can be identified with ‘bad for me’ seems to make sense, but the same cannot be said of harm’s opposite – benefit. For it is quite difficult to render benefit from just the notion of proper functioning. Proper functioning can be thought of as a zero, or set point for a homeostatic system. Consider the blood flowing round my body. When it is impeded in some way that will either be painful or lead to painful consequences. But when blood flows round my circulatory system according to its proper function I do not feel pleasure. To get round this we need an alternative definition of harm that relies less on functioning, and more on expectation and prediction. From a philosophical point of view:
Under the "otherwise-condition", or "O-C" definition, we say that harm occurs when the ongoing course of events is deflected, for the worse, by some particular event E. That is, because of E the person’s current condition is adversely different from that condition in which he would otherwise have been, had E not occurred. (Morreim, 1988, p. 10)

And from a scientific one:

An example is the notion of harm. Here again, we can offer a defining statement: "Harm is a loss relative to an entitlement. An individual’s entitlements are governed by rules and expectations that are shared by the community." This statement obviously covers many different kinds of harm, from physical injury to loss of property, and also to loss of reputation, depending on the nature of the entitlement that is violated... an entitlement is a socially endorsed normal state, also called a reference state, relative to which losses are defined. A reference state is an expectation that a valued state will be maintained.

(Kahneman & Sunstein, 2005, p. 97)

Both Morreim and Kahneman emphasise expectations. For this notion of harm to work, we have to be able to compare the current state with a body state. So a cut is a harm because cut skin functions less well than uncut skin. Instead of having an overall normative idea of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ as applied to function, all we need is ‘less’ or ‘more’ where a body part is achieving what it was designed for either less well or more well than expected. Compare this to Schroeder’s Desire Satisfactionism, where hedonic tone did not represent desires themselves but the net increase in satisfaction of our desires relative to expectation. The problem with Schroeder’s idea was the use of the word ‘desire’. As shown in section X, to make any sense of desires being involved in this property our normal notion of what constituted a desire had to be contorted beyond all recognition. But replacing
‘desires’ with ‘good’ or ‘benefits’ opens up the terrain. Getting what we desire (very generally speaking) benefits us, but some things we don’t desire benefit us also. What we can take form Schroeder’s theory is that, just as speaking of desires being satisfied doesn’t give us as much information as talking about desires being satisfied relative to expectation, so speaking of benefit simpliciter is not very informative and risks being unnaturalisable.

A synthesis of Cutter, Tye and Schroeder’s position would look like this:

Pleasure represents the property ‘good for me’ where that property is identified with property of being apt to benefit me, and benefit is defined as ‘doing better than expected’.

How this synthesised thesis cashes out and how it answers the problems the previous theories of pleasure have faced is a job for the last chapter (Chapter 7). In Chapter 6 we will take diversion around perceptualist theories of emotion to see whether perceptualism is the right form of representationalism for our purposes and discuss how appraisals fit in to this scheme.

5.4 Chapter summary

This chapter first discussed representationalism in general and the advantages and difficulties with applying it to pleasurable experience. It then turned to cashing out representationalism by looking at what three representationalist

---

54 Cutter and Tye, Schroder and Bennett Helm are all perceptualists (Cutter & Tye, 2011)
theories – Schroeder’s Desire Satisfactionism, Klein’s Imperativism and Cutter and Tye’s Tracking Representationalism – proposed as the representational contents associated with pleasure experiences. It found that though there were problems with each, a synthesis could indicate a way forward.

The disadvantage of Cutter and Tye’s theory was that its attempt to naturalise the ‘bad for me’ property with a teleological notion of harm is not easily generalisable to pleasurable experiences. However, a notion of benefit which takes advantage of Schroeder’s idea of measuring net benefit relative to expectation has legs and will be further investigated in Chapter 7.
Chapter 6: An Evaluativist Theory of Pleasure

This chapter turns to the evaluative theory of pleasure, which states that pleasure experiences are to be understood as representing the positive value of their objects for their subjects. As such it is a representationalist theory of pleasure. As evaluativist theories of pleasure are not well discussed usually in the literature – usually as an addendum to the evaluativist theories of pain, there are two potential models to take inspiration from – the aforementioned evaluativist theories of pain or evaluativist theories of pleasure. Instead of following the usual tactic of explaining other kinds of pleasure in terms of sensory pleasure, it looks at the work done by Bennett Helm (2002) in the emotions to try to understand sensory pleasure in terms of emotional pleasure. This chapter starts by recapping the overall position on pleasure so far, then moves on to establishing why emotions can be thought of as a type of pleasure or pain experience – giving us license to take some insights from the philosophy of emotions, particularly evaluativist theories of emotions. It then argues that though perception is a worthwhile model for trying to understand how the representation of value comes about in a pleasure experience, we should not take it literally – for emotional apprehension is a sui generis form of information gathering about value. Taking the arguments from the emotions debate as its model, it assesses the analogy between perception and emotion and finds that while the analogy between them is illuminating, there are two important potential differences to note: the case of mixed feelings, and the connection between emotional/affective experience and attention. Ultimately though, the difference comes down to their relative positions in the cognitive architecture,
with a broad-brushstrokes portrait showing that affective processing happens after initial perceptual input (though there is much interpenetration between the two processes, especially at sub-personal levels).

6.1 Recap of the three types of theories

This thesis has so far considered the three main approaches for theories of pleasure (phenomenological, attitudinal and representationalist), showing that though all three have their advantages and disadvantages, it is representationalism that is best suited to explaining pleasure. What still needs to be refined is what exactly the pleasure experience is supposed to represent. The last chapter offered an endorsement (with reservations) of Cutter and Tye’s (2011) proposal that pleasure and pain are to be understood as representations of value properties, with the experience of pain representing the value property ‘bad for me’ and pleasure representing the value property ‘good for me’. As Cutter and Tye focused almost entirely on offering the analysis for pain, this chapter will now investigate more closely the theory that a pleasurable experience is one in which the object of that experience is represented as instantiating the value property ‘good for me’. As the theory is meant to apply to both pleasure and pain, I will refer to both as ‘affective experience’, taken to mean (relatively) simple pain or pleasure experiences such as stubbing one’s toe or eating chocolate, as well as more complex emotional experience.

It was noted in the introduction that the majority of philosophers of pleasure first give an analysis of bodily pleasure, presuming it to be the most simple kind of pleasure, and then expand that analysis to other kinds of
pleasure.\textsuperscript{55} Instead this thesis will now take the opposite approach. Inspired by Bennett Helm, who claims that emotions are a type of pleasure and pain (Helm, 2002), I will start by considering the evaluative approach to the emotions.

Emotions are considerably more complicated experiences than simple kinds of affective experience such as stubbing one’s toe or eating a piece of cake, yet the basic structure of the evaluative approach to emotions and to simple affective experiences is the same: both say those experiences are constituted by the detection (by perception or otherwise) of value. What is the difference between the two? If emotions are types of pleasure and pain, as Helm claims, then they are determinates of pleasure and pain – in other words an emotional experience is a specific way of being an affective experience (see Chapter 3). Fear is a specific kind of pain experience and pride is a specific kind of pleasure experience. This maps neatly with the idea that pleasure and pain represent the determinable value properties ‘good for me’ and ‘bad for me’, and emotions their determinates, such as ‘dangerous’ or ‘threatening’.

The first step then is to examine evaluativism about emotions as an example of evaluativism about pleasure – a reversal of the usual device of analysing bodily or simple pleasures first. This section will then lay out the core thesis of the evaluative theory of pleasure, taking Cutter and Tye’s theory as its template, comparing it to current evaluative theories of emotion and finding that the two run in parallel.

\textsuperscript{55} In fact, many philosophers start and stop at bodily pleasure. A notable exception is Fred Feldman (Feldman, 2004)
This chapter will have two main areas to investigate. The first will be to examine whether during a pleasurable experience we can be said to be *perceiving* the property ‘good for me’ – that is to say whether the kind of representation involved in pleasure experiences is perceptual representation. It will then examine whether perception makes a good model for explaining how value properties are detected, concluding that though perception makes a good starting place for understanding the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, the model is best understood as illustrative rather than literal. It will then discuss the evaluative theory of emotions as an example of the evaluative theory of pleasure and pain in a certain realm. The second is to investigate what kind of property ‘good for me’ is. In this section it will be noted that the process of evaluation is particularly important and yet not discussed as much as it could be, leading to supplementary discussion drawn from the psychological theory of the emotions. In the light of what has been learned from the emotions case, bodily pleasures and pains will then be discussed. Once these two main tasks have been completed the chapter will interrogate these findings from the perspective of experiences with bodily and non-bodily objects.

Before investigating the mechanics of the evaluativist theory of pleasure, it is a good idea to recall the advantages it has over the other theories of pleasure presented in the previous chapters. Evaluativism about pleasure is preferable to desire-based attitude theory because it does not face either of the Euthyphro problems presented in Chapter 4. The core of the Euthyphro problems is this: by identifying ‘pleasure’ with ‘desire’, neither concept is admissible for doing explanatory work about the other – there is no gap between the concepts that
would allow this to happen. The evaluativist theory answers the Euthyphro problems by showing that pleasure and desire are not identical, even if they are intimately connected. The hurdle for desire-based theorists is that this involves admitting there is such a thing as *pleasure phenomenology*, the denial of which is a central tenet of those theories. Evaluativism about pleasure and traditional desired-based theory are therefore in opposition. This is unfortunate because aside from the question of phenomenology, both theories share an interest in the underlying processes of a pleasurable experience that phenomenological theories can sometimes miss.

Evaluativism also answers the problem that most vexes phenomenological theorists, sometimes referred to as Findlay’s problem. Findlay's problem asks why, if pleasure is a simple sensation or even a tone of a sensation, is it so intimately connected with motivation? Sensations do not motivate people in the absence of other considerations. It is only when sensations are integrated into a more complex web of desires and beliefs that they gain any motivational weight; for example, seeing a green traffic light is not inherently motivating but becomes motivating in the context of a learned set of traffic rules and the desire to get somewhere in your car. If pleasure was, like seeing green, merely a sensation, asking the question ‘why did you do X’ would not be answerable with ‘because X is pleasurable’ any more than ‘because X looks green’, without the sort of context specified above. Evaluativism about pleasure supplies this kind of context. Pleasurable experiences are inherently motivating because they represent their objects as good, and in certain conditions good can be interpreted as desirable, as worth spending resources on, as congruent with goals. Part of the ‘message’ of
pleasure is that action may be required. While this obviously becomes touches on the internalism-externalism debate about motivation, that debate is concerned mainly with how judgments (moral or otherwise) motivate, while this theory discusses how experiences may motivate. On the face of it, the evaluativism here proposed should be favourable to internalists about motivation, but given the differences between judgments and experiences, there is still more exploration to be done. It should be noted that internalism about motivation is a controversial thesis, and arguments against it would also have to be considered by the evaluativist if indeed the evaluative theory of pleasure lines up with internalism about motivation, as it appears to do.

This section has given two rough outline answers to the most pressing questions in the philosophy of pleasure. It will be the task of the next sections, as they deal with how pleasure phenomenology is generated and what it represents in more detail, to give fuller answers. Before going on to do so, it will be noted that the other problem in the philosophy of pleasure, the Heterogeneity Problem, should also be dealt with. Much of this thesis has been devoted to downplaying the importance usually accorded to this problem, showing that instead of demonstrating that there is no such thing as pleasure phenomenology, all the Heterogeneity Problem shows is that pleasure phenomenology is not straightforward and is not particularly amenable to introspection. Nevertheless, in normal circumstances we might expect any kind of phenomenology to be readily available to introspection and to be able to use our own experiences of it as evidence about its nature. The evaluativist account of pleasure will still have on its hands the task of explaining why this is not the case for pleasure.
Throughout the further discussion I will adopt the same approach as Schroeder and Cutter and Tye and assume that pleasure phenomenology exists and is the target phenomenon of the theory. However, as the discussion unfolds, reasons why pleasure phenomenology is hard to pin down will emerge. How evaluativism answers the Heterogeneity Problem will then be presented in Chapter 7.

6.2 Evaluativism and pleasure

The evaluativist theory of Cutter and Tye (2011) has already been discussed in Chapter 5. Other prominent evaluativists include Bennett Helm (2002) and David Bain (2003). Helm thinks that pleasant and painful experiences are felt evaluations, a form of perception of value that presents as ‘feelings of negative import’, while Bain claims that painful experience consists of ‘(i) undergoing an experience that represents a disturbance of a certain sort, and (ii) that same experience additionally representing the disturbance as bad for him in a bodily sense’ (Bain, 2013, p. 82). Note that both theorists concentrate on pain when discussing affective experience and that both claim we perceive value.56 Stripping away individual differences, the core evaluativist thesis stands as:

\[ X \text{ is a pleasurable experience if } X \text{ represents its object as instantiating the property ‘good for me’.} \]

56 As Bain’s theory is fairly congruent to Cutter and Tye’s (though of course differing in many specifics and more illuminating with regard to important topics such as justification and rationality of action and the normativity of pain) I will concentrate here on Helm’s theory, which is novel for many reasons but the main ones I am concerned with are a) how affective experience relates to emotional experience and b) how occurrent affective experience relates to standing cares and concerns.
Pleasure and pain are classified as affective states – they belong in the domain of affective science – and are therefore related to the emotions, but are not in themselves emotions. An important task for an evaluative theory of pleasure will be to integrate itself with an evaluative theory of emotions and yet also be able to explain why we don’t think of pleasure and pains as emotions, for it seems, *prima facie* at least, that if the same theory can explain both emotions and pleasure, then pleasure ought to be considered as a kind of emotion.

One possibility is thinking of pleasure as a component of emotion. An emotion is a complex state and can have parts. So, an emotional state could be made up of a judgment, a predisposition to act a certain way, and a feeling of pleasure or pain that gives rise to the overall valence of the emotion (positive or negative). The problem with this account is that it does not seem to do justice to the phenomenology of our emotions. The awfulness of anger is different to the awfulness of fear and the values that these emotions encapsulate seem to us to be embedded in how they feel; the pain of fear and the pain of anger are not interchangeable.

I previously stated that we don’t think of pleasure as a kind of emotion and this is a possible problem if we want both to be explained in terms of value. But another option is given to us, one strongly espoused by Bennett Helm, which states that instead of pleasure being a kind of emotion, our emotions are kinds of pleasures or pains – so to refer back to the discussion of determinable/determinate relations. Helm states:
To understand what is distinctive about emotions as such is to understand them to be a distinctive kind of evaluative response, namely that of a pleasure or pain: to feel fear, for example, is just to be pained by danger, where such pain just is the evaluation implicit in one’s fear. (Helm, 2002, p. 15)

So, according to Helm, pleasures and pains are distinct kinds of mental states of which emotions are subtypes. What we think of as the negative emotions are pains, and positive emotions are pleasures. Emotions, whether positive or negative, are phenomenal and evaluative states. They are responses to/directed upon situations and so have a variety of intentional objects. An emotion has both a target and a formal object – that is the characteristic evaluation implicit in that emotion type which distinguishes it from other emotion types. So, the formal object of anger is offensiveness, the formal object of sadness is loss etc. If I am angry at you I evaluate the target object of my emotional state (you) in terms of the formal object – I find you offensive.

Another important concept is warrant. Warrant is to do with how justified my emotional response is, if there really is something offensive about you or dangerous about that dog. Helm believes that what has been overlooked in recent evaluative theories is how much one’s personal cares affect the warrant of an emotion:

This means that my feeling of fear involves not only a formal object (i.e. dangerousness) and a target (i.e. that which gets evaluated as dangerous) but also a focus: that background object having import in terms of which, given the circumstances, the formal object
So, for example, I only feel joy at the news of good exam results because I cared about passing the exam, and that this care was part of a bigger web of concerns such as doing my best, advancement in my career, having people think well of me. My overall concern for passing the exam is what makes my joy at good grades both intelligible and warranted. According to Helm's theory, in experiencing joy at passing the exam I evaluate passing the exam as good but not in a cognitive manner – it is a *felt* evaluation.

Helm’s theory has the advantage over cognitive theories in that felt evaluations essentially present themselves phenomenologically. Instead of believing a spider is dangerous or harmless, I *feel* that it is either dangerous or harmless - I feel fear. This explains how I can hold seemingly contradictory positions on the spider. For Helm:

[T]he point of describing emotions as feelings is to highlight their passivity in contrast to the more active evaluations we make in judgment: the capacity for emotion is a kind of receptivity to evaluative content, and particular emotions are passive exercises of that receptivity. Conversely, we might say, the import of the situation - the dangerousness of the ball, its having this import given the import of the vase - impresses itself on us in our feeling a particular emotion, in something like the way colours impress themselves on us in perception. (Helm, 2002, p. 16)

To summarise, for Helm emotions are species of pleasure or pain which, in perception-like manner, impress upon us the import of the target object in terms
of the import of a background object, in a distinctive way, characterised by the formal object of that emotion.

Consider a case involving a ball and a vase. The dangerousness of the ball is presented in terms of the preciousness of the vase. The ball is only felt to be dangerous because I care about the vase not being broken. Furthermore, the emotion is stronger the more I care about the background object. So, I might feel mild fear in the case of the vase, but in the case where I see my son in the path of a speeding car the fear is much more intense because I evaluate the car as much more dangerous because my care for my son is much greater than my care for the vase.

Helm's theory copes well with showing how different situations evoke the same emotion (because the pattern of objects and cares are the same) and can be stronger or weaker because our care for the background object is more or less intense. Not only are emotions perceptions of situational value (the ball crashing into the vase is a bad thing) but also a report on our long-term values – and this fits with ideas of emotions being short occurrent episodes of intense feeling and also long-term dispositions to feel a certain way.

Helm's version of the theory gives a good clue as to how evaluativism about emotions fits with evaluativism about pleasure. A positive emotion such as joy is a type of pleasure in much the same way that red is a type of colour. Pleasure is the perception of value. In the next section it is noted that there can be thick or thin values (or more specifically, thick or thin axiological predicates). If pleasure
in general is the apprehension of what is good for me, the emotion of joy is a particular mode of apprehending what is good for me. This solves an apparent problem for formal objects in emotions. For many emotions it is obvious how we ought to characterise the formal object which plays a definitive role. For fear it is danger, anger, offensiveness etc. But for others it seems that we fall back on seemingly circular properties. In the case of joy this is particularly pronounced – the formal object of joy is the joyful. The problem is obvious: if joy is defined (in part) as an apprehension of the joyful, then the joyful cannot be defined as that which brings joy. This makes it difficult to assess an emotion for warrant; fear is warranted if its object is truly dangerous. But if I have an experience of joy (i.e. its target object is apprehended as joyful) then that object is guaranteed to be truly joyful.

6.3 Pleasure, emotion and value properties

Human lives are moulded by value. Value judgments are ubiquitous in our thoughts, actions, conversations, hopes and dreams. Yet value properties are not always taken seriously. Although we talk of the world in value-laden terms, many people want to deny value properties are ‘out there’ in the world. By ‘value property’ I mean a type of property that objects or events can have which can exemplify a value such as good, bad, ugly, shameful, elegant, etc. There are also value relations such as being valuable for someone, being less valuable than X, being more valuable than X and being more valuable for someone than X. Objects such as persons, animals, cups, cushions, landscapes and biological and psychological states can exemplify value properties and stand in value relations
‘Bad’ or ‘good’ are thin axiological predicates (value terms) as well as being values themselves. Examples of thick axiological predicates include ‘cowardly’, ‘elegant’, ‘shoddy’, ‘brave’ etc. Thick axiological predicates are determinates of thin axiological predicates because to be elegant for example is to be good (all things being equal) in a certain way. Being elegant is a way of being good that involves being refined, restrained and aesthetically pleasing. In this example, ‘good’ is the determinable while ‘elegant’ is a determinate of good. As the evaluative theory of pleasure is concerned with the properties of ‘good for me’ and ‘bad for me’ we will leave these thick axiological predicates aside but note that the thick/thin distinction will be important when discussing pleasure and the emotions.

The evaluative theory of pleasure states that an experience of pleasure is in some way a representation of the object of that experience instantiating the property ‘good for me’. So when I enjoy eating a piece of chocolate, there is something about the phenomenology of that experience that represents the chocolate as instantiating the property ‘good for me’. The chocolate, at least as it is represented by experience, is the bearer of the property. Certain things are the bearer of impersonal values, such as world peace or justice. These are states of

\[ \text{See (Mulligan, 1998)} \]
\[ \text{Mulligan prefers ‘valuable’ and ‘disvaluable’ for the thin value predicate I have in mind – this has the advantage of sounding more morally neutral than ‘good’ and ‘bad’. However, I stick with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ as per Cutter and Tye’s usage, though ‘valuable’ and ‘disvaluable’ would also work throughout, if the reader prefers.} \]
affairs that can be arguably valued without reference to anything else. On the other hand, certain things only matter to me, such as whether my desk is tidy. All of the preceding examples refer in some way to order in the world, but it is clear that most, if not all, people would decline to ascribe any value to the state of my desk.

What kind of property is ‘good for me’? Clearly it must be a relational property: the chocolate only has the property because of the relationship it stands to me. Relational properties can make sense of differences between the objective truths of some claims. For instance, that triangles have three sides is an objective truth that is also a necessary truth, and the property ‘three-sidedness’ is an intrinsic, non-relational property instantiated by triangles. That water boils at 100 degrees is only true in ordinary conditions – at high altitudes water boils at a lower temperature. So the property ‘boils at 100 degrees’ is a relational property instantiated by water only when it is in ordinary conditions.

One thing to note is that by claiming that pleasurable experiences attributes the ‘good for me’ property, the evaluativist does not rule out the existence of the non-relational value property ‘good’ as a kind of value. The claim that something is ‘good’ means it is good from all points of view and I take it the fact that something could be good for everyone, or even just good in general (with or without anyone being aware of it), does not contradict that there can be some things that are good for me and that I can be aware of those

59 Note that both G.E. Moore (1962) and Thomas Hurka (1987) argue against ‘good for’ as a replacement for ‘good’.
things as good for me.

As well as being a theory of pleasure and pain, evaluativism is a popular approach in the philosophy of emotions.\(^6\) Emotions can inform us about the world of values – for example, my fear that you will steal my badge collection informs me that I believe that you constitute a threat to my collection, my sadness at the theft shows that it constitutes a loss, while my joy in acquiring a rare Dennis the Menace badge shows that growing my collection is important to me. It is hard to imagine a human being having a full and varied range of emotional experiences without also having cares and concerns for other people or things and ultimately themselves.\(^1\) It is also hard to imagine someone taking pleasure in things without finding them in some way valuable – ‘valuable’ here meant in the most general sense. A person might deny attributing any value to how food tastes, instead thinking of it as fuel for the body while he goes about his high-flying career. However, as long as that person takes some sort of pleasure in a well-made meal and displeasure in a bowl of tasteless gruel, there is a *prima facie* intuitive reason to think that the well-made meal is more valuable to him than the gruel, even if on the grand scheme of things the taste of food is not as important to this person as achieving his career goals.

Emotional cognitivism (Greenspan, 1988) or judgmentalism (Nussbaum,

---

60 See for example (de Sousa, 1987), (Tappolet, 2005), (Charland, 1995) and (Stocker, 1996); and of course (Anscombe, 1957) and (Helm, 2002)
61 Emotions could also tell us about abstract values, such as my outrage in the face of injustice. However, I leave aside abstract values to concentrate on more everyday examples, in order to avoid discussing how those abstract values manifest themselves, i.e. whether one could care about injustice without caring about the victims of injustice.
2001) comes under criticism because it seems to miss out the very ‘emotionality’ of emotions. One can hold the belief that an unexploded bomb is dangerous and desire to have it removed, without feeling afraid. Conversely, one can believe that a spider is perfectly harmless and still be terrified. Today, many emotion theorists\textsuperscript{62} hold that emotions are perceptual experiences of value. Such theorists hold that sadness is the perception of a loss or that fear is the perception of danger. This retains the intentionality and evaluative nature of emotions while allowing that emotions also have an essential phenomenology that must be explained.

One reason to endorse evaluativism about emotion is that it gives us a way to differentiate between the emotions – emotions can be delineated with reference to which value they react to. This chimes with our ordinary language about the emotions – often our value predicates derive from the emotional reaction in question. Things are shameful, contemptible, lovable or admirable, for example. Emotional experience presents these properties as being objective and instantiated by objects or situations. There is intuitive appeal in thinking of emotions as having mind-to-world direction of fit, i.e. they aim to reveal the world as it really is.\textsuperscript{63} In an experience of fearing a spider, it really seems that the spider is dangerous. Similarly, in our experience of the well-made cocktail, it really seems to me that the drink is pleasant.\textsuperscript{64} In so far as affective experience purports to reveal evaluative properties of objects, just how are these properties

\textsuperscript{62} See (Elgin, 2008); (Tappolet, 2012)
\textsuperscript{63} See (Anscombe, 1957). While pleasure has a mind-to-world direction of fit, desire has a world-to-mind direction of fit.
\textsuperscript{64} See Chapter 5’s discussion of Object View vs Experience View
attributed? One option is that our evaluative beliefs are the crucial ingredient: Sarah’s ordinary apprehensive belief that the dog is heading towards her, combined with her evaluative belief that the dog is dangerous, renders her fear intelligible. Although this evaluative judgmentalism may have gained some traction in the philosophy of emotions, it is not an appealing option for pleasure or pain. Emotional situations often involve some belief formation, but pleasure and pain experiences often do not. To say that I believe that the cake is good for me and therefore eating a cake is a pleasant experience seems wrong in two ways: firstly, it is usual to think that I form the belief about the cake after tasting it, and secondly, I might well believe that the cake is bad for me, and still enjoy it. Correspondingly there are two problems for the evaluative judgmentalist here: the first is the seeming priority of affect over belief in experience, and the second is that evaluative judgments and affective experiences might not match up.

6.3.1. Criticisms of evaluative judgmentalism

a) Criticism 1: Pleasure without corresponding belief

Taking again the experience of eating chocolate cake, it seems at least possible I might have a pleasant experience of eating chocolate cake without having any corresponding belief about it. Even if this does not seem likely for adult humans, we certainly want to be able to include animals and infants as possible subjects of pleasurable (and painful experiences) and it is questionable that they have the doxastic capacities required to satisfy evaluative judgmentalism. To hold the

65 Examples of evaluative judgmentalists include (Nussbaum, 2001) and (Solomon, 2007)
relevant kind of beliefs one must master the concepts involved in the propositions one holds to be true and this is unlikely to be true of infants and animals, and even though possible in the case of adults, it does not seem a good description of what actually happens in pleasure experiences.

Another way of having pleasure without the corresponding evaluative judgment is to have a mismatching evaluative judgment. I might enjoy my cake and yet believe it is bad for me. In the emotions case I might believe that someone is despicable and yet love them to distraction. According to evaluative judgment, a person with such a mismatch is being irrational because they are holding conflicting beliefs. Even in the emotions case it does not seem plausible to suggest that anyone who has ever loved unwisely or feared unnecessarily is in the grip of full-blown irrationality, and it seems even less likely in the simple pleasure case that anyone who has ever indulged in cake while believing cake to be bad for them was irrational.66

One tactic to avoid this criticism is to suggest that emotional or affective experiences rely on less committed doxastic attitudes – sometimes referred to as construals (i.e. (Greenspan, 1988), (Roberts, 2003)). Construals, however, are also vulnerable to the charge of being too conceptually demanding for children and animals. The pressure to move from beliefs proper towards construals suggests that it is worth abandoning the idea that the evaluative element of either pleasure or emotion is evaluative judgment, and turn to a different kind of

66 In the emotions case, the debate focuses around recalcitrant emotions. In the affective case, pleasure we know to be bad for us is sometimes said to be akratic.
attitude to allow for the phenomenological nature of both pleasure and the emotions to be accounted for.

b) Criticism 2: Belief without the corresponding pleasure

The flipside of the criticism that evaluative judgmentalism is too cognitively demanding is that we can hold evaluative beliefs of the requisite kind, but not have any particular affective experience. I might judge a spinach salad to be good for me, but not enjoy it. Similar examples from the emotions include judging a dog to be dangerous without feeling any fear or judging a person to be despicable without despising her. Intuitively, we say that a person who holds these beliefs without any feelings is not undergoing an emotional experience; judgmentalism ignores the fundamental phenomenology of an emotional experience. In the philosophy of the emotions, where phenomenology is a given, this is a strong criticism. But as we have seen, incorporating phenomenology into an account of pleasure is not deemed necessary by some, so a version of evaluative judgmentalism might still be attractive to those who have no trouble believing that pleasure has no particular phenomenology.

One possible way to understand how we come to know about value via affective experience is to use perception as a model. In standard sensory perception, physical objects are presented as being coloured, as having a certain shape, as being soft, quiet, bitter etc. In pleasurable experiences, objects are presented as being ‘good for me’ via my experiences of them. The next section will turn to the analogy between affective experience and perceptual experience. This analogy has been debated at length in the emotions literature, so the
emotions case will be the starting point for this discussion, noting along the way how points brought up for emotions cases cash out in terms of the simpler affective experiences.

The evaluativist theory of pleasure states that X is a pleasurable experience if X represents its object as instantiating the property 'good for me'. This section of the chapter will leave aside the nature of the property represented (for the moment – there will be more discussion of the 'good for me' property in chapter 7 and now concentrate on how that property is represented.

6.4 Chapter summary
This chapter started by examining Bennett Helm’s claim that emotions are determinates of pleasure or pain. If emotions are forms of pleasure and pain then this gives us permission to co-opt various emotion theories and use them to explain pleasure – specifically perceptual evaluativism.

Pleasure and pain are either perceptions of value or they are their own sui generis forms of apprehension of value that still have enough in common with perception to be called perception-like. Whether one thinks of the perceptual model as literal or non-literal depends on one’s position on perception. If one has a broad definition of perception as apprehending certain properties that that mode of experience is attuned to, then affective experience counts as perception.

If one wants to have a stricter idea of what counts as perception, including its use in dedicated sensory modules and place in the cognitive hierarchy, then it
does not. What matters for the purpose of this chapter is that using perception as a model for emotional and affective experience draws out some important points about the conveyance of information in a manner that combines both attitude and phenomenology.
Chapter 7: Pleasure, Values and Selves

This chapter will begin with a brief overview of what has been said in the previous six chapters, summarising how the traditional antagonism of attitudinal versus phenomenological theories of pleasure has been rejected and the two positions have come together to form a representationalist theory of pleasure. The last chapter argued for representationalist theories of pleasure overall, but questioned the theories currently on offer due to their claims about what the representational content of pleasure is. This chapter will now go on to fill in that blank by showing that the value property ‘good for me’ is (as the evaluativists claim) what is represented by a pleasure experience, but that to fully understand this property, we need to talk about the ‘me’ as well as the ‘good for’. It then goes on to propose that the correct theory of pleasure is indeed an attitudinal theory of pleasure but that this does not mean, as some theorists have it, that pleasant experiences lack a proprietary phenomenology or that all the phenomenology of a pleasure experience can be accounted for merely by sensory phenomenology. While other attitudes have been proposed before, the correct candidate, it is suggested, is the often overlooked attitude of attention. The interweaving of attention and pleasure in our affective lives is then discussed.

The beginning of the last chapter of a thesis is a good place to give a brief restatement of what has been said so far: in the first chapter I introduced the Heterogeneity Problem as the key catalyst for the pleasure debate – dividing philosophers of pleasure into either phenomenological theorists or attitude theorists. I demonstrated that the Heterogeneity Argument (derived from the
Problem of the same name) was not as decisive an argument against phenomenological theories as is often presumed. What did come out of the discussion of the Heterogeneity Argument was that trying to examine our own pleasurable experiences for clues to their structure is self-defeating. A more profitable line of thinking is to investigate what pleasure's function might be. However, the argument could not be totally dismissed and a weaker version still led to the rejection of the naive view of pleasure. The more sophisticated variants of phenomenological theories, however, still remained in play.

Chapters 2 and 3 turned to these phenomenological theories, comparing the Distinctive Feeling theory with Hedonic Tone theories. Neither was found to be ultimately convincing, in the main because there was not enough of a detailed explanation of how the proposed phenomenological pleasure features – either distinctive feelings or hedonic tones – work. Two important points did rise out of the discussion however: the first was that a theory of pleasure had to be able to explain pleasure's integration with motivation, which phenomenological theories currently do not (this is referred to in the chapter as Findlay's problem); the second was that the determinable-determinate relation might be the key to explaining the apparent heterogeneity of pleasure experiences.

The fourth chapter gave an in-depth discussion of attitudinal theories of pleasure. Attitudinal theories were ultimately rejected (at least in their current form) because the attempt to reduce pleasure to desire (or other attitude) led to the Euthyphro problem – that is to say that if pleasure is reduced to desire, then the concept of pleasure no longer has any explanatory role in questions of human
motivation, when it seems that the opposite is true. Findlay’s problem and the Euthyphro problem form a diametrically opposed pair. For phenomenological theorists, the problem is that the connection between pleasure and motivation that they describe is too loose (in fact, it is non-existent) and for attitude theorists the connection is too tight.

The fifth chapter examined representational theories of pleasure with the hope of navigating a middle path between attitude theories and phenomenological theories. Representational theories are outside the mainstream of the pleasure debate because they assume something that the Heterogeneity Argument was meant to mitigate – that pleasure experiences involve a pleasure phenomenology (however that might be cashed out). This phenomenology, argued the representationalist, represents its object as being a certain way. For Tim Schroeder, feelings of pleasure represent the net satisfaction of one’s desires. For Michael Tye and Brian Cutter, they represent the object as possessing the evaluative property ‘good for me’. It was argued in this chapter that both Cutter and Tye’s theory and Schroeder’s theory were not satisfactory, but together their respective answers to the question: “what are representational contents of a pleasurable experience?” could point the way to a fuller theory of pleasure.

This chapter will now set forth my answer, that the phenomenal content of a pleasurable experience (qua its pleasantness) presents its object as possessing the evaluative property ‘good for me’. The next stage in the argument is to accept that pleasure is essentially attitudinal (though as argued in several
other places, this does not preclude it from being phenomenal, as many theorists assume). As other attitude candidates have been examined and rejected in Chapter 4, a new contender is introduced to the field that of attention. The connections between affectivity, perception, attention and the self (selves) is then examined in greater detail, revisiting our old friend the heterogeneity argument and understand why if affectivity relies on attention then the heterogeneity argument cannot be applied.

7.1 The ‘good for me’ property

Emotions – including pleasure and pain experiences – are often defined as embodied appraisals (see Prinz, 2003). These appraisals can be understood as embodied, automatic representations of the relation of the self to the environment under the control of normative sets of cares and concerns – these sets I call selves. Selves in this context are to be understood as terms of art to capture something of the everyday idea of an individual having different facets to their person – their public self, private self, physical self, emotional self and so on. It also is meant to connect directly with the ‘me’ part of the ‘good for me’ value property. I argued in Chapter 5 that Cutter and Tye did not give a very fulfilling account of what it means to be good (for me) or bad (for me). Here I try to redress that by discussing values and selves and how the two interact.

It is time for the evaluativist theory of pleasure to answer Block’s Challenge: what is it exactly that pleasure experiences are meant to represent? Like Cutter and Tye, I propose the answer is that pleasure experiences represent
their objects as instantiating the property ‘good for me’. Unlike Cutter and Tye, I argue that the ‘me’ is at least as important as the ‘good’ in the ‘good for me’ property. The discussion of selves and experience of self will also reveal that not only do we need a value property relative to self, but a stance of ‘welcoming’ to be able to fully comprehend the nature of pleasurable experience. The first task then is to try and understand what is meant by ‘good’ and ‘good for’. Once that has been established we will turn to how we understand ‘me’ and what it means for something to be ‘good for me’.

First a note on how I understand ‘good for me’ as a property. It is a relational property in so far as it consists in a certain relation being satisfied. It is common to state that a relational property of a thing depends on what properties are had by other things (see for example Rasmussen 2014, Edwards 2014). So for example, the property of being next to is a relational property. There is currently a cup of tea next to me, but later on, if the cup is moved (the cup changes its location property) then it no longer has the property of being next to (me) and I am no longer next to the cup. Then I no longer exemplify the property of being next to the cup. In this situation, what happens to the cup in a sense happens to me. More generally, what happens to things distinct from me affects the relational properties I have. However, just because I have described here a relation with something extrinsic to me, that does not mean the concept of relational property is co-extensive with the concept an extrinsic property. Weatherson and Marshall (2012) give the example that the property of having longer legs than arms is an intrinsic property—it is a property one has
independently of how things are outside of oneself—but it is a relational property in that it involves the relation *longer than*. This is a property that is intrinsic, yet relational.

### 7.1.1 Values revisited

Value and value properties were given only a brief description in Chapter 6. In order to find out more about evaluations it is necessary to explore an analysis of value and see if it can provide a characterisation of value that fits with the criteria discussed above.

A distinction can be drawn between relative and neutral attributions of value. Suppose you and I are competing in the Great British Bake-Off, and I win the Baker of the Week award – it would make sense for you and I to have very different reactions to this turn of events. I would take great pleasure in this award and celebrate the outcome, whereas you would be pained by it and feel the need for commiseration. If someone else, observing this difference, were to ask which of us is correct, the sensible response would be to reject the question: although our responses differ, neither of us incorrect. It is good-for-me that I win and bad-for-you to lose and those two attributions can be correct at the same time. This constitutes an agent-relative attribution of value. This is analogous to judgment without difference found in perceptual cases where a positional judgment is relative to the perspective of an observer. If I say the window is on the left and you say it is on the right, then, if we are standing in the positions that
those observations imply, then we are both correct.

In contrast to this is the idea of agent-neutral value, which (briefly) is where we consider things to be good or bad not in relation to any person, or perhaps in some cases to every person, rather than individuals. I mention the concept to highlight the distinction and to alleviate any worries that I am proposing that in all instances value can be conferred or is judged relative to persons. A person enjoying something that we take as immoral, such as harming another person, will experience that as good-for-her in some sense but it does not mean it is good in the agent-neutral sense, at all. As such I leave aside discussions of agent-neutral value here to concentrate on agent-relative value.68

Relatedly, value statements can be divided into three categories: unspecified, viewpoint and categorical (Hansson, 2006). Unspecified statements assign value unrestrictedly – for example we might say the outcome was good. Viewpoint statements refine the ways in which things can be good, so a viewpoint value statement would be the outcome was morally good (it could have also been aesthetically good, financially good, or one of any other number of ways in which things can be good). Often seemingly unspecified statements are actually viewpoint statements; we take it for granted that when an artist says the outcome was good, she means artistically so, and when the teacher says the...

68 This links in to discussions in ethical theory about problems with hedonistic approaches. In trying to give an account of pleasure and its relation to value, this does not mean condoning (or otherwise) a hedonistic account of the good life.
outcome was good, he means educationally so. The third group is that of categorical value statements. This includes statements like ‘this is a good bike’ or ‘he is a bad father’. In most cases, category specification indicates that several criteria of evaluation, constituting the standards for the category in question, are being used. The list of criteria for a good bike or a good teacher may be quite long.

The three types of value statements may interact. For instances, the criteria of a good shirt might be to keep you warm and appropriately covered, but also to look good. A good shirt therefore might fulfil certain criteria (as per category value statements) but also be good from an aesthetic viewpoint (as per viewpoint category statements). The shirt might achieve its aesthetic value via or concurrent with fulfilling its categorical criteria. So what makes a shirt look good (aesthetic value) might also be what makes a shirt good at providing warmth – i.e. a luxuriant material that is both pleasing to the senses and has excellent insulation qualities – and it is this warmth that makes it a good shirt qua shirt. In a society that is not overly concerned with warmth, its aesthetic value might be more relevant than its ability to fulfil categorical criteria. In such a society we might see many shirts that are not very good at fulfilling the criteria for shirts but are nevertheless considered aesthetically pleasing. Welcome to the world of fashion.

Most objects we encounter can have categorical value statements assigned to them. Those that do not, according to Hansson, are objects that we do

---

69 Though of course an artist could sometimes mean educationally so and the teacher artistically so; the point is that missing viewpoint is taken to be supplied by context.
not have usual standards for because they do not feature as useful parts of our lives:

The first type are the value-inert categories, those for which we have no standard at all. There are no good stars, or bad protons. Wild animals are another example. The farmer may have a good cow but the hedgehog in his farm is neither good nor bad, for the simple reason that we have not developed a standard for hedgehogs. If we started to eat hedgehog meat, we would soon develop a standard for good and bad hedgehogs.

(Hansson, 2006, p. 427)

The conclusion of Hansson’s discussion of value statements is that the process of assigning categorical value is one of deciding whether the object in question fulfils (and to what degree) the standards we have for it. So the standard for a good cow (in usual circumstances) is one that provides lots of milk. As both the shirt and cow example illustrate, most of these categorical criteria are to do with an object’s function and how well it is fulfilled – a good pen is one that writes well, a good tennis racket enables a cleaner return etc.

Discussions of value often centre around discussion of ‘the good’. According to Christine Korsgaard, the relational ‘good for’ is often not fully distinguished from the ‘good’ and if it is, it is treated as its poor relation:

Indeed the very expression ‘good for’ seems to suggest the good comes first, and then stands in some sort of relation, the for-ness relation, whatever that might be, to the person or other animal for whom it is good. For all that, however, I think the notion of ‘good for’ is the prior notion. Or, to put it a better way, I think there is something essentially relational about the notion of the good itself. I think that good means something roughly in the neighbourhood of welcome… I think there is such a thing as the good, only because there
are creatures for whom things can be good; that is, creatures who can welcome or reject the things they experience. (Korsgaard, 2013, p. 4).

Korsgaard distinguishes between 'good' in the 'evaluative sense', that is as a word we apply to any kind of thing we interact with or have a use for; and good in the sense of 'the good' or the *summum bonum*, which is supposed to be the end of all our strivings (Korsgaard, 2013). When we use 'good' in the evaluative sense, according to Korsgaard, we are referring to the object's performance or its capacity to perform in its designated role or function (parallels can be drawn with the way Cutter and Tye talked about harm 'hindering proper functioning', see Chapter 5). An evaluatively good thing is good *at* or good *for* some purpose or function so it seems natural to say what norms govern the assessment of its performance.

### 7.1.2 Fitting Attitude analysis of value

According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value\(^\text{70}\), the 'good' is what it is fitting to favour in some sense (different versions of the analysis cash out 'favour' differently). In other words, it reduces evaluative claims ("X is good") to deontic claims about attitudes that it is fitting to have ("I ought to desire X" or "I ought to cherish X"). According to the FA analysis, the appropriateness of a response is explanatorily prior to the evaluative property (an object is valuable in terms of a relevant response being appropriate), therefore responses cannot be explained in terms of evaluative properties. So while we can explain what is good in terms

\(^{70}\) (Deonna & Teroni, in press) discusses the FA analysis extensively.
of what it is fitting to favour, we cannot explain what is fitting for me to favour in terms of what is good.

The FA analysis of value: Object X has value iff it is fitting to favour/like/desire X.

The FA analysis provides a bridge from talking about values in general to talking about values for me. To think that something has personal value is to evaluate it as having value for someone:

FA analysis of personal value: Object X has value for me iff it is fitting for me to favour/like/desire X.

The key manoeuvre the FA analysis allows is to be able to understand personal value in terms of a set of non-value properties (recall that one of the criticisms of Cutter and Tye was the ability of the value property ‘good for me’ to be transduced or processed as information.

FA analysis of personal value in terms of norms: Object X has value for me iff X has a set of non-value properties that make it fitting for me to favour/like/desire X.

To make use of the FA analysis, the evaluative theory of pleasure will have to show why in the case of pleasure, what is ‘good for me’ is fitting for me to favour. In order to avoid the kind of circularity exemplified by the Euthyphro problem for desire, it cannot be that it is fit for me to favour an object or state of affairs because it brings me pleasure. If that were the case then my pleasurable
experience would be a representation of an object as exemplifying the property ‘good for me’ where ‘good for me’ is understood as what brings me pleasure. This would mean pleasurable experience merely represented pleasure.

Instead, as FA analysis suggests, we need to examine ‘good for me’ in terms of norms. The task is to identify the norms against which pleasure can be assessed as fitting or not. Cutter and Tye provide initial direction in their notion of harm (as discussed in chapter 5). This fits well with the FA analysis, which allows for the appropriateness of the response to an object to be determined by other properties:

A noteworthy feature of the FA analysis is that, in it, it is properties other than the value properties that provide reasons to respond to the valuable thing by taking up an attitude to it. The reason we ought to take a certain responsive stance is to be looked for among the subjacent properties and not in what supervenes on those properties. It is the set of value-making properties that provides us with a reason to take a pro-attitude to the valuable... In other words, to be valuable is to have the property of having a value-making base that gives us reason to have a pro response to the valuable object. (Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2011 p. 24-25)

The challenge then is to describe this value-making base; the problem faced now is to explain how non-axiological properties can provide me with a reason to favour something. Non-axiological properties, I will suggest, can provide me with a reason to favour something in light of facts about myself. The FA analysis asks us to understand values in terms of norms. Norms, though usually thought of as socially constructed, can also be thought of as psychological or biological entities
– the ‘rules’ that govern our minds and bodies in their functions. This thought is expressed by Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni when discussing the possibility of biological functions acting as norm-givers for values apprehended by emotional states:

The first option is to proceed by reference to the biological function the emotions supposedly have: the relevant norms would be teleological in nature. A given emotion is appropriate if it promotes the fitness of the subject undergoing it (or alternatively that of the subject’s social group or some of its genes). (Deonna & Teroni, 2015, p. 159)

So, for example, fear of snakes is appropriate because one of the teleological norms involved would be the avoidance of harm. However, Deonna and Teroni go on to reject these biological norms as not being able to do full justice to the evaluative considerations we bring to bear on a situation and guide the way we measure appropriateness of a response. So, if you throw a lovingly chosen gift in the bin in front of me there may be a story to tell about the teleological norm of social acceptance and its benefit for survival, but this doesn’t seem to fully capture why the act is so hurtful. If you asked me why I was upset I would not invoke my genetic predisposition for forming close bonds and expressing those bonds through mutual exchange, but rather point out that rejection of a gift is emblematic of the low esteem in which you hold our relationship. So emotional episodes cannot only be described in terms of biological/teleological norms but must also make use of facts about myself, my personal history, my social relationships and perhaps most importantly how I view myself.

Marc Lewis adds:

On any given occasion, self-organising appraisals thus gravitate toward attractor states
that are codetermined by phylogenetic, cultural, and experiential histories. Biological and cultural constraints influence the way cognitive elements fit together and the way cognitions and emotions reciprocally activate each other, but these constraints are continuously modified by the emergent structure of each individual ontogeny. Both universal and idiosyncratic constraints thus guide self-organising appraisals, allowing for normative themes and individual variations in cognition-emotion interactions. (Lewis, 1996)

So, Deonna and Teroni are right to say that biological/teleological norms cannot tell the whole story when it comes to emotional cases. But perhaps these norms are suitable in simple cases of pleasure and pain. Consider ‘me’ in bodily terms. What is good for this ‘me’ is my body’s survival. This is a baseline norm programmed by evolution that is not in itself a value property. These representations of value are not specific to any sensory modality (though see the discussion of affective touch in Chapter 3). This chimes not only with our experience but speaks to an important function of pleasure. It is suggested by many cognitive scientists, such as Morten Kringelbach, that the evolutionary function of pleasure is to allow us to compare the value of different objects or situations and rank them, and guide behaviour in order to maximise survival. The affective system is one that weighs up options in the light of risks and benefits, needs and desires, availability and opportunity (Kringelbach 2014, p. 124).

In order to fully understand the ‘good for me’ property, and to tie in what we understand about values with the biological and psychological functions of pleasurable experience as described above, my suggestion is that we understand the ‘me’ in ‘good for me’ as identical to the sets of norms. We can of course have
more than one set of norms governing different areas of our lives. These are our different ‘selves’ – emotional, biological, social and more.

7.2 Pleasure and selves

Throughout this chapter there have been several reminders not to forget the importance of the ‘me’ part of ‘good for me’. This section of the chapter will now investigate the relevance of the ‘me’ which an object or state of affairs might be good for. ‘Me’ is the subjective equivalent of ‘I’. While ‘I’ act, things happen to ‘me’. William James notes this duality when he remarks:

Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal existence. At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total self of me, being as it were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject, must have two aspects discriminated in it, of which for shortness we may call one the Me and the other the I. (James, 1892, p43)

Cutter and Tye’s property of ‘good for me’ has already been discussed with respect to the ‘me’ understood in bodily terms – what I will call the bodily self. What is good for the bodily self is those objects and states of affairs which promote the survival of an organism and the smooth functioning of its systems. Conversely ‘bad for me’, where the ‘me’ is the bodily self, is understood in terms of what harms or impedes the functions of that body. But pleasure and displeasure are not just relevant to the operation of our bodies. As the breadth problem (see Chapter 1) noted, there are many different types of pleasurable experience. There is an intuitive need to categorise these experiences. This
chapter will put forward the suggestion that we can broadly categorise ‘pleasures’ by which ‘me’ the ‘good for me’ property invokes. The first section will revisit Cutter and Tye’s story of harm and benefit and provide a more detailed account of affect in relation to the bodily self, especially in terms of pleasure (as pain has already been dealt with extensively).

It is important to note here that ‘self’ is a term of art. It is not meant to invoke problems of personal identity over time but reference the idea that we have multiple ‘selves’ or personae that are brought out by different circumstances. ‘Self’ in this context is shorthand for webs of cares and concerns that exist in the relevant realms of human experience. So although I talk about two selves, the bodily and the emotional, there certainly are more selves (as I understand them). For example the aesthetic self will be the ‘me’ that is made up of aesthetic concerns, while the social self will be identified with the web of cares I have at the social level. These selves will not be totally isolated from one another of course. The bodily, emotional and social selves could all be involved in a sexual experience for example. I will argue in that the presence of more than one ‘self’ is the source of seeming affective conflict. In the ‘mixed experiences’ problem, the same experience has value for one self and disvalue for another. Reconciling this conflict is a particularly human hobby.

Finally, I will argue that the notion of self is a good starting point for addressing part of the Heterogeneity Problem. The kernel of the argument is that the phenomenology of pleasure reflects the ‘self’ involved. So the pleasure phenomenology of orgasm is obviously bodily because the value represented is
‘good for the bodily self’, while the pleasure of eating reflects both the bodily state and the fact that attention is drawn to the food itself, meaning the phenomenology is derived both intero- and exteroceptively. The pleasure phenomenology for emotional experiences is again different as it involves selves that are based on emotional cares which are long-term.

7.2.1 The bodily self

The idea of a ‘bodily self’ can be explored in several different ways. The first is epistemic: how we know our bodies (and therefore our bodily selves). The second is phenomenological: what is it about bodily experiences that we construe as ours rather than belonging to other people?

Identifying different ‘selves’ as constituent of the same person is hardly without precedent. Ulric Neisser identifies five ‘types’ of self: the ecological, the interpersonal, the private, the extended and the conceptual selves (Neisser, 1988). These ‘types’, Neisser explains, are really different types of information stream about the overall self. Without necessarily following his divisions of type, we can initially follow Neisser’s lead in identifying the source of a bodily ‘self’ as the information stream about ourselves that originates in and refers to our bodies. Specifically this means the information supplied by our interoceptive and proprioceptive systems. As mentioned earlier, these are the perceptual systems by which we learn about the status of our bodies. Somatosensory information from receptors on the surface of the skin and from mechanoreceptors in deep skin layers, joint capsules and muscles plus feedback from moving body parts
and ‘efference copies’ of motor commands all go to make up proprioceptive information (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007), while other interoceptive information includes homeostatic feedback from the viscera and other autonomic responses. But an information stream does not (on its own at least) a self make. According to Goldenberg, ‘the image of one’s own body results from integration of synchronous afferences from different senses into a coherent spatial structure’ (Goldenberg, 2005, p. 89). The information stream that contributes to the representation of the body as it is right now also needs to be given a structure – in other words, be organised into a body map.

Within this loose definition of bodily self, Shaun Gallagher differentiates between body schema and body image (Gallagher, 2005). Body schema is distinguished by the fact it mainly operates prior to or outside of intentional awareness. According to Gallagher: ‘Although it has an effect on conscious experience... [it is] a subconscious system, produced by various neurological processes, that plays an active role in monitoring posture and movement’. (Gallagher, 1995)

Body image, on the other hand, has these three aspects:

• The subject’s perceptual experience of her body.
• The subject’s conceptual understanding of the body (including ethical

---

71 Perceptual sources such as vision also contribute to this information stream by telling us where we are in relation to the world – i.e. by providing a sense of perspective.
72 What I am calling a body map is often also called a body schema (see Head and Holmes, 1912), I use body map to distinguish from Gallagher’s body schema. Although I view these concepts as very similar, body map is used here just to indicate that information about the body is given coherence by structuring it spatially.
and/or scientific knowledge).

- The subject’s *emotional* attitude towards her body. (Gallagher 1995)

In contrast to the sub-personal nature of body schema, body image has intentional status in that it is either a conscious representation of the body or a set of beliefs about the body (Gallagher, 1995, p. 228) which is accessible to conscious thought. So even when we are not consciously aware of our own bodies, the body image is dispositionally available.

Frederique de Vignemont (2004) distinguishes between the marginal body and the thematic body, where the first occupies the margins of consciousness and the latter becomes the focus of conscious. With its emphasis on perceptual, conceptual and emotional sources of body representation, the thematic body is closely aligned with Gallagher’s body image. The marginal body, however, occupies a level between the body schema and the body image: de Vignemont says of marginal bodily consciousness: ‘Like the body schema, it is continuously present, always in the background of consciousness. Like the body image, it represents the body as a whole... Marginal bodily consciousness manifests the feeling that my point of view on the world is always anchored in this body that belongs to me.’ (de Vignemont, 2004, p. 147)

From an extremely brief survey of discussions of bodily selves within the literature we have Neisser’s emphasis on the source of information, Gallagher’s approach based on separation between personal (intentional) and sub-personal representations of the body, and de Vignemont’s refinement of this division to allow for different levels of awareness of the body in experience.
Pain is also shown to have an effect on the body schema. A task which involves mentally rotating one’s own hand so it is aligned with a stimulus hand found that sufferers of unilateral arm pain had longer response times than control subjects. The investigators concluded that ‘the brain representation of the body is influenced by pain... these data complement and extend previous demonstrations that pathological conditions may alter the body schema’. (Schwoebel, Friedman, Duda, & Coslett, 2001, p. 2104). Currently, these studies can be used as evidence of deep connection between the representation of the body and the experience of pleasure and pain. What they do not show is the direction of that interaction.

The evaluativist theory I am proposing says that pleasure or pain is a representation of a value property in relation to a self, and that phenomenology will be determined by which self is involved in that relationship. So self has to be prior to pleasure or pain. But if pleasure or pain can alter self, is this a problem for the theory? Body maps are very basic representations of bodily self that operate under one norm: the preservation of bodily integrity. There are more complex self-representations that encode multiple goals. This chapter now turns to discussion of pleasure with respect to the emotional self.

7.2.2 The emotional self

Discussions of the bodily self have a wealth of empirical data from which to draw. Other selves are more difficult. As the discussion of pleasure and emotion touches on, different selves are involved in different types of pleasant experience. So, the warm bath involves the bodily self – various sensory factors
in this experience are represented as ‘good for me’ because they in some way promote the functions of my body. But when I receive good news about funding, this is also a pleasurable experience that engages a self which involves much more complex self-understanding.

According to Jan Slaby and Achim Stephan, this self-understanding can be characterised like so:

Roughly, it is the conceptual sphere which contains a person’s values, attitudes, goals and also her overall conception of the world and her place in it. Usually, this has been construed by philosophers in a rather intellectualistic manner, for instance as a web of beliefs (Davidson) or as “total theory” (Quine) or in some other form of more or less explicitly articulated framework. We think that although a person’s self-understanding might still be rightly described as conceptual (since it can be articulated in principle and is informable by utterances or other kinds of conceptual contents), it is not primarily an explicit propositional structure like a web of beliefs or a general theory. (Slaby & Stephan, 2008, p. 512)

A similar picture is given by Shaun Gallagher’s characterisation of the ‘narrative self’ (Gallagher, 2000), a notion originally imported from the cognitive sciences by Daniel Dennett (1991). The narrative self is a more or less coherent self that is constituted by ‘stories’ we tell ourselves – stories which have the function of linking past memories and future intentions, explaining our actions to ourselves and making sense of our reactions. The self is posed as both narrated and narrator. The idea of narrative self-constitution is apparent in the work of Gazzaniga, who proposes that the left hemisphere has the task of stitching
together autobiographical memories to form a personal narrative that enables the sense of a continuous self (Gazzaniga, 1998). Joseph LeDoux also comments:

The self can be defined as the collection of genetic and individual memories that constitute your personality (LeDoux, 2002). Self memories are complex multimodal representations not about experiences you've had so much as representations about who you are, both historically and futuristically (Fuster, 1997; Tulving, 2002; Stuss et al, 1998; LeDoux, 2002; Levine, Black, Cabeza, et al, 1998). Whenever you encode an immediate experience, you not only retrieve semantic and episodic memories related to the stimulus, but also episodic memories of the self (Tulving, 2002; Kihlstrom, 1987; LeDoux, 2002). Episodic memories of the self are sometimes called autonoetic memories and conscious awareness of the self through such memories is called autonoetic awareness (Tulving, 2002). (LeDoux, Emotional Colouring, 2012)

The narrative self so described by Gallagher and Gazzaniga is, in my terminology, the basis of the emotional self. The emotional self is constituted by a web of cares and concerns that themselves are formed by past experiences, hopes for the future, social relationships, and self-perceptions.

While emotional and bodily selves are the focus here, there are of course are multiplicity of possible other ‘selves’: intellectual, aesthetic and moral are all other potential candidates. Furthermore, these selves are interrelated because the web of cares and concerns that make up these selves can overlap. A further point to note is that this aids our understanding of how pleasure can be influenced by both bottom-up and top-down considerations.
7.2.3 The boundaries between selves

An important part of considering selves involves a sense of the difference between the self and other objects. It is the capacity, according to Carruthers (2007), to represent the ‘body/not in my body’ distinction. Along with this feeling of being distinct, comes the recognition that you have your own perspective on the world (Damasio, 1996, p. 238). You experience your body “from the inside” (Martin, 1995, p. 267). That is, you seem to be contained or bounded within your body. Hence anything outside of your body seems distinct from you. This experience of boundedness in your body is related to the sense of having your own perspective on the world. (Martin M., 1995). Any time something impacts on your boundaries you know where on your boundary that impact occurred (Damasio, 1996). Thus, in generating a sense of what and where your boundaries are, you are able to generate your own perspective. This is another component of the sense of embodiment. The notion of the boundaries of the self is useful for our purposes because it allows us to think about what is happening during pleasurable experiences of eating and drinking. Here we are aware of food as the object instantiating the ‘good for me’ property but we are also aware of incorporating food into our body, of expanding what we understand as being part of ourselves. Pleasant experience can then be conceived as a function of the ease with which our representation of what is and isn’t ourselves can be updated. A negative equivalent is disgust. Take a case of eating a bad oyster. The object of disgust is the rotten oyster but there is also an element of bodily disturbance. The function of disgust is to help us avoid contaminants and disease. So it makes sense that while the primary object is the possible contaminant itself, there would also be some attention given to the state
of the body in order to monitor whether it had come into contact with the contaminant.

7.3 Which attitude? Attention and pleasure

The previous section introduced and analysed the notion of selves as sets of cares and concerns that provide the norms by which we can understand the role of value in affective experience. By elaborating on the ‘me’ component of ‘good for me’ we not only have a greater understand of affective experience itself but how individuals can come to have contradictory affective experiences.

The next task then is to understand how the ‘good for me’ property is apprehended by the subject. There are two potential understandings of this property. This first is as a property of the object. Presumably this property cannot be a primary quality, because there is a mind-dependent aspect to it. Therefore we are not really interested in the property as the property of an object per se but how the mind has attributed that property to the object. An obvious analogy to draw here is colour – whether an apple is really red (as opposed to having a certain light-reflectant quality) is moot. The point is that the subject attributes the property of redness to the apple and so, for some discussions at least, we are permitted to talk as if redness is a property of the apple. The second potential understanding is of this property as a phenomenal property – i.e. as a property of experience rather than the property of the object of that experience. Because a phenomenal property is, in most experiences,
tightly bound up with how the subject of experience assigns properties to objects, there is room for confusing the two.

Now it becomes clear why representationalism is such an important part of the discussion. Representationalism explains the mechanics of how exactly phenomenal properties are bound up with the properties attributed to the object (also known by representationalists as the representational property or intentional content). To simplify the discussion in chapter 5 enormously, phenomenal properties are a result of the way intentional content is represented within experience. 73

The next step then is to interrogate the way intentional content is presented within affective experience. For this we need to turn to the attitudes which enable this presentation and discover which is the most suitable for affective experience. The current contenders are desire, as discussed in chapter 4, perception, as touched on briefly in chapter 6 and a previously undiscussed candidate, attention, which I will address here. First I will examine the motivations behind proposing perception as the correct attitude and the reasons for rejecting it. Then I will introduce attention and show how it makes use of some of the same positive motivations as perception but avoids the negative ones.

73 Neither attitudinal theorists nor phenomenal theorists have really delineated whether they were talking about affectivity as a phenomenal property or intentional content, though of course one suspects that the attitudinalists are more interested in intentional content and the phenomenalists are interested phenomenal properties.
Evaluative theories of emotion often turn to perception as the ideal model of how value properties are represented in emotional experience. Christine Tappolet writes:

If we accept the claim that emotions have contents of this sort, then it becomes natural to claim that emotions are like sensory perceptions in that they allow us to be aware of certain features of the world, namely values. (Tappolet, 1997)

The first task then is to set out a definition of perception. In its widest sense, perception is about gaining access to information about the outside world via perceptual experience, at least on the traditional five-sense model. But even this broad brushstroke is not quite right, because proprioception is also a form of perception – the perception of the state of our bodies. The temptation is to be ultra-broad and claim perception is just gaining access to information about the world or our bodies. But we have ways of gaining this information that are non-perceptual – I can find out if an ice cube is cold by seeing if it causes condensation in a glass or using a thermometer. Touching the ice cube results in a certain kind of experience of cold; looking for condensation or reading a thermometer allows me to deduce the ice cube’s relative temperature. So the process of perception must somehow produce phenomenological experience in its subject, which (in normal circumstances) is the means by which information is gathered by the subject.

A useful if simple conception of perception, then, is as information
gathering that results in, and is presented to its subject via, phenomenological experience, without specifying what kind of objects are the usual targets of perception. As such, the evaluativist can claim that pleasure is a direct analogue with perceptual experience: information about an object’s value status has been gathered and the very process constitutes the pleasure phenomenology. If perception is attitudinal, in that it is directed upon objects, and phenomenological, in that it results in distinctive experiences which are in some way essential to the subject’s access to the information it carries, then the perceptual model has the potential to account for the link between phenomenology and intentionality in affective experience.

Representationalism is very influential in the philosophy of perception. For a representationalist, what it is like to have a phenomenal state is a function of the state’s representational content. According to Bayne (2009), for perception: ‘phenomenal content is that component of a state’s representational content which supervenes on its phenomenal character’ (pp. 386-7). In this way of thinking, the phenomenal content of the pleasurable experience of eating chocolate could be expressed as ‘chocolate is good for me’ supervening on the pleasure element of the chocolate experience. The perceptual model is appealing to the evaluativist because it combines intentionality (attitude) with phenomenology via representation. But for an attitudinal theorist, who is convinced there is no particular phenomenology involved in pleasure experiences, this will need further argument to become a persuasive picture.

74 Although differences between the kinds of objects involved in perception might be useful for distinguishing between modes of perception.
Further similarities between affect and perception are needed to draw out and anchor the analogy between the two; these similarities are *phenomenology, non-conceptual content, passivity and correctness conditions.*

**a) Phenomenology**

Phenomenology is, given what has just been said above, obviously the most controversial and yet simultaneously compelling reason to consider perception as the model for affective experience. For classical attitudinalists there is simply no phenomena to explain here. But for others, especially those working in emotion theory, the 'feel' of affective experience is an important explanandum. The first potential disanalogy between perceptual and affective experience is that if the value property being detected by a pleasure experience is not just "good" but "good for me", as I have claimed, then an affective experience is not just apprehending a value property *simpliciter* but a relational property between self and object. However, when we consider perceptual experience we can also see that, though it may not always be the most obvious facet of the experience, we do in fact perceive things as being spatially located with respect to ourselves - I hear the door bang shut behind me, feel the cushion underneath my left leg or see the clouds above me. According to Bill Brewer this is not achieved by our continually perceiving ourselves along with the things around us, and thus recovering our position with respect to them:

[In purely perceptual terms, this mode of presentation is tied to the idea of a focal point behind the perceptual field, as its origin. Something more than mere perceptual experience is required to anchor this point to a determinate item in the perceived world, and thus to locate the subject of perception. So there is nothing which would be purely]
perceptually identifying an object of perception as the subject of that perception.

(Brewer, 1992, p.18)

The second disanalogy is more troubling for the supporter of perceptualism. It is rare (and potentially impossible) to encounter within a single perceptual experience elements that contradict one another in a purely perceptual way. It is not common to see and apple that looks both small and large, or all-over red and all-over green. The only potential examples I can think of include contradictions from the different modalities, such as something looking smooth but actually feeling rough, or an op-art image that appears to moving but is quite obviously going to be still to the touch. However it is fairly common to have affective experiences that are contradictory – for example taking pleasure in something that makes one also feel ashamed or guilty at the same time, or experience lust for someone you intensely dislike. An obvious response is found in my proposed enhanced emphasis on the role of multiple selves within affective experience. As explained above, this kind if split affective experience comes from one ‘self” finding something to be ‘good for me’ and another find it to be ‘bad for me’. But this kind of multiple perspectivity is not characteristic of perceptual experience.

A related problem involves considering people who take an active delight in affectively negative experiences – i.e. the problem of masochism. This is solved by understanding the structure of a masochistic experience like so: the masochist takes pleasure in (detects a positive value property in) painful experience X where experience X is painful precisely because it involves detecting a negative value property. If affect were indeed literally perceptual then this would be the equivalent of someone perceiving a perceptual experience, which, as far as I
know, is not possible. Perception does not admit of the layering or nested structure that affect does. And of course this reminds of Bramble’s earlier critique levelled at this idea (see chapter 2). In order to have affective experience, we usually first have some other kind of experience, whether it be perceptual, quasi-perceptual or cognitive (though many theorists argue instances of pure pleasure are possible, all seem to admit that they are fairly rare). Affective experience seems to, in general, rely upon some sort of ‘base’, usually perceptual or cognitive. Affective phenomenology seems to be parasitic on other modes of thought or experience in a way that perceptual phenomenology is not. The analogy becomes looser, or indeed fails, on whether we think perception consists only in perceiving i) objects that are ii) out in the world. More liberal perceptualists might claim that we can also perceive things within the boundaries of our skin (backed up by the science of interoception, though this isn’t usually conceived of as a straightforward case of ‘perceiving one’s insides’) and that we might also be said to perceive entities over and above objects, such as concepts, situations and affordances (see Bayne 2009 for a discussion of phenomenal liberalism).

b) **Passivity and authority**

Whether or not we take the perceptual model at face-value, something about the idea that pleasure and pain detect value does chime with a common-sense notion that affective experiences tell us about the world of value in a way that is more compelling than merely thinking about or reflecting upon value, again in a way
that seems analogous with how perceptual experiences seem immediately compelling. Mark Johnston calls this compelling quality the “authority of affect”:

By “the authority of affect” I mean not to refer to its sheer effectiveness as a source of desire or action, but rather to the fact that the presence of affect can make the desire or action especially intelligible to the agent himself. It can make the desire or act seem apt or fitting in a way that silences any demand for justification... In this way affect is akin to perceptual experience considered more generally. Perceptual experience makes immediate perceptual beliefs about the perceived scene seem apt or fitting in a way that silences a demand for justification for those beliefs. (Johnston, 2001, p.189)

However, pleasure and pain are not as passive as perception in that there can be a large amount of top-down manipulation of what becomes a pleasant experience. Context can have a significant impact on what objects we evaluate as good or bad for us – for instance a hot cup of tea is good on a cold day but not so good on a sweltering one. Though context also plays a role in perception, the interplay of several types of contextual information and its importance seems much more pronounced in affective experience.

c) Correctness conditions

Another potential point of analogy is that both perceptions and affect can both be thought to be ‘correct’ in certain circumstances. My perception of three blackbirds on a green lawn is accurate just as long as there are indeed three blackbirds on a lawn (and there means by which this perception has come about are not dubious). The perceptual belief which is based on this perception is therefore correct. If pleasure (and pain) experiences are simply the detection (or
otherwise apprehending) of value properties then this ought to have rather
clear-cut epistemological implications: that evaluative beliefs about the goodness
of something can be justified by our pleasant or otherwise experiences. In other
words, affective experiences can constitute reason or evidence for evaluative
judgements in much the same way that our perceptual experiences can
constitute reason or evidence for our perceptual judgements.

Another disanalogy, suggested by Michael Brady, is that emotional or affective
experience is more likely to impel us to explore our experiences and their
relationship to the justification in our beliefs that is not seen in the perceptual
mode. According to Brady:

This is not simply a point about psychology when it come to forming evaluative beliefs;
instead, the fact that we are typically moved to seek and discover reasons that have a
bearing on our emotional situation has normative import too. For it reflects the fact that
in normal circumstances it would usually be impermissible for us to take our emotional
experiences at face value or to think that the need for justification is silenced. (Brady
2013 p.88)

Brady goes on to imagine himself as the member of a hiring committee. During
the interview he feels uneasy and on this basis forms the view that the candidate
is untrustworthy. It would be, according to Brady, prompt him investigate this
feeling further, ideally from a non-emotional angle. Furthermore, it would
unjustified and indeed unethical for him to recommend against the candidate on
this basis alone.

There are a few points to note when considering Brady's example. The
first is if it is meant as a description of how people act then it is both accurate
and inaccurate. People do indeed form judgments of others based on uneasy feeling. Sadly, unlike Brady, they are often not motivated to investigate further, or if they are it is only to seek confirmation of that feeling. Perhaps even more important to note is that this example is not a direct analogy with a perceptual experience. If I see three blackbirds on the lawn and from this perceptual experience form the belief that there are three blackbirds on the lawn, there is clearly a replication of content there that is not the case when experiencing an “uneasy feeling” and forming the belief that “this candidate is untrustworthy and does not deserve the job” – the second case involves extrapolation and embroidery. While this does perhaps speak against the example for its purpose of showing that we don’t or ought not to place reliance on evaluative belief in the same way that we do with perceptual, it unexpectedly sheds light on another disanalogy between evaluation and perception. In cases of affective or emotional experience the experience itself tends to be more nebulous and undefined than perceptual experience and we have to do much more interpretive work to draw beliefs from it than in the perceptual case. 

This is not to say this is a complete disanalogy – it is rather a difference of degree. For in perception we do do a fair amount of interpretation and extrapolation to make the incoming information “fit” with the world-view we already hold, just as in affective experience. The difference is more at the level we do this at (usually sub-personally in perceptual experience) and the fact that we do seem a bit more prepared to accept novelty in perceptual experience (the

75 See for example the recent work of Lisa Feldman Barrett (2017)
child in the middle of the road for example) while we are more inclined to shape affective experiences to meet our already-held expectations.

The final disanalogy I want to consider is the relationship between affective experience and attention. Much like the discussion above it doesn’t fall easily into the category of evidence against perceptualism. Indeed it could be evidence for the perceptualist’s case, as both perceptual experience and affective experience are closely connected with attention. In order to explore it fully I give it its own section below.  

7.3.1 Affective experience and attention

William James famously said that ‘everyone knows what attention is. It is the possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seems several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thoughts. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from something in order to deal effectively with others” (James 1890). Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2012) states that “I find that ordinary usage of the term “attention” centers around a unique concept that is not picked out by any other term in the

76 It was previously suggested in Chapter 1 that attention is an important concept that has been neglected in the traditional discussion of pleasure and pain, however, any emotion theorists acknowledge that emotions are important in directing and focusing our attention. Ben-Ze’ev states that “like burglar alarms going off when an intruder appears, emotions signal that something needs attention.” (Ben-Ze’ev 2000. p.13).
English language: the act of mental selection. Put another way, ordinary usage of “attention” centers around the concept of actively prioritizing select mental entities over others for the use of mental resources, resulting in a particular use of mental resources," (p536). Attention involves ordering and sorting experiences in terms of what is important - it is hardly possible to decide what is important in the moment without having a pre-determined list of goals or standards to measure a certain item against – and a complex version of this list is exactly what I have in mind for my concept of a self (more on this below).

In chapter 4 several different candidates for the attitude involved in attitudinal pleasure were put forward. The strongest of these was desire but it was eventually rejected because of the Euthyphro problem. An alternative theory was a sui generis pleasure attitude put forward by Fred Feldman, which was rejected for being ad hoc and lacking clarity. Instead I propose that we consider attention the attitude involved in affective experiences. This would mean that instead of perceiving evaluative properties, the proposal is that we attend to evaluative properties.

One major question with the thought that attention is the attitude involved in pleasurable experience is that attention does not often make it into the list of attitudes when they are discussed in philosophy of mind. This is, prima facie, a bit odd when we consider how we ordinarily talk about attention. Attitudes are mental entities that encapsulate direction and what is more directed than attention? Attending to something seems to exhibit the same
intentional directedness that characterises seeing something, fearing something or desiring something.

The reasons to favour attention as the attitude in question are summarised below:

1) As in affective experience, attention can be directed on to an object itself, or a state of affairs

2) Attention can be parasitic on other attitudes such as perception, thoughts or desires. All of these can also be involved in pleasurable experiences

3) Attention can be directed at objects in the world or towards the self

4) Attention can be both controlled by the subject in some cases and exert control over the self in others.

7.4 Selves and attention

It was previously suggested in Chapter 1 that attention is an important concept that has been neglected in the traditional discussion of pleasure and pain. Experiences of pleasure not only involve the direction of our attention onto an object but also the continued consumption of attention. In the case of pain experiences, attention is directed towards the self, while in what we think of as merely ‘unpleasant’ situations, attention is drawn outwards. Again, with pleasure, attention can be drawn to external objects or towards.

Salience, in neuroscience, is the property of an object that captures and consumes attention. A saliency map is a topographically arranged so that it
represents the saliency points of a scene. Possibly the most influential attempt at understanding bottom-up attention and the neural mechanisms that underpin it was made by Koch and Ullman (1985). Their model proposes that the different visual features that contribute to attentive selection of a stimulus (colour, orientation, movement etc.) are combined into one single topographically oriented map, the saliency map, which integrates the normalised information from the individual feature maps into one global measure of conspicuity. According to Koch and Ullman (1985 p. 221), saliency at a given location is determined primarily by how different this location is from its surround in colour, orientation, motion, depth etc. Saliency maps are currently in use for describing how attention is manipulated in visual processing but are now beginning to be applied to affective processing. Legrain et al (2011) have suggested that the so-called pain matrix actually reflects a multimodal network involved in the detection of salience – in other words, a saliency map specifically for noxious and/or threatening stimuli.

There seems to be a feedback relationship between saliency, focused attention and positive affect (McCay-Peet, Lalmas, & Navalpakkam, 2012) in which emotionally salient objects seem to allow subjects to focus upon them more easily, while scoring higher in measure of positive affect, which may increase the saliency of the object.
7.3.2 Attention and the heterogeneity problem

Some researchers have noted that the direction of attention towards the self is especially correlated with negative affective experiences. Palfey and Salovey, for example, observe that, “Negative affectivity (a disposition to experience distress, nervousness, sadness, and other negative emotional states), for example, is correlated with introspective characteristics, including attention to feelings, analysis of thoughts and behaviors, and concern with the self as object” (1992, p306). Carver and Scheier (1990) proposed that affective states may motivate self-regulatory processes. The inward focus makes salient the individual's objectives and expectancies for completing these objectives. Positive affect signals success in one's current approach to a goal objective and thus results in rapid termination of this self-regulatory process, whereas negative affect creates persistence in the examination of one's objectives and expectancies (Carver & Scheier, 1990). This continued evaluation produces self-focused attention. It is the aversive quality of affective experience that signals a need for self-regulation of goal states and affect itself.

As such, it is clear that attention has an obvious impact on the heterogeneity problem. If attention itself is the attitude which constitutes affective experience, then asking philosophers or anyone else to pay attention to their internal states will inevitably disrupt the very process they are trying to examine. Another general assumption that underlies the use of introspection in the original form of the Heterogeneity Argument is that experiences are the kinds of entities that enter and exit upon the stage of consciousness and that the introspector, like an audience, watches the stage without affecting the
performance. Although William James is often quoted about the nature of introspection, his remark about the difficulty of carrying it out is less often cited:

Let anyone try to cut a thought across in the middle and get a look at its section, and he will see how difficult the introspective observation of the transitive tracts is. . . The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks (James, 1890, pp. 236-7)

James did not think that we already know the nature and full range of thought and feeling simply because we are able to look into our own minds, but he did not deny that introspection was possible, just that it has its limits.

Dan Zahavi sums up this worry when he says:

One of the urgent methodological questions that phenomenology has to face up to is the question of whether and to what extent experiential subjectivity can be made accessible to direct examination. If subjectivity, rather than being an object that we encounter in the world, is the very perspective that permits any such encounter, can it then at all be grasped and described, or is it only approachable ex negativo? Will any examination necessarily take the subject as an object of experience and thereby distort it beyond recognition? (Zahavi, 2015, p. 184)

The worry captured in this statement is that introspection transforms the very experiences it is meant to be informing us about. Applied to the Heterogeneity Argument we can see that if introspecting on our experiences transforms them, then all we have evidence about is how pleasurable experiences are during introspection, not what pleasurable experiences are like tout court.

Introspection is an analytical process and tends towards the breaking down
of experiences into their components. This could well destroy the synergistic nature of experience and the relationships between elements of experience, which contribute to the overall nature of the experience itself, may be lost under the introspective gaze. Zahavi comments:

To some extent, reflective self-consciousness is distinguished by a certain detachment and withdrawal, since reflection deprives the original of its naïveté and spontaneity. To put it another way, reflective self does not merely differ from pre-reflective self-consciousness by its intensity, articulation, and differentiation, but also by its quality of othering. Becoming a theme to oneself is also a matter of becoming divided from oneself. Reflective self-consciousness consequently involves a form of alienation. It is characterized by a type of self-fragmentation that we do not encounter on the level of pre-reflective self-consciousness. (Zahavi, 2015, p. 188)

Recall that in Chapter 1 a distinction between fact-introspection and thing-introspection was made, inspired by Giustina and Kriegel (2017). They argued that we could question the infallibility of fact-introspection without undermining the integrity of thing-introspection. A simplified look at their model of thing-introspection will be useful to understand the role attention plays. Rejecting the classic two-state model, where introspection is a second-order state that represents the both the first-order state and itself, they instead propose a one-state model which understands “an introspective state as structurally identical to a regular, non-introspective conscious state, differing only in respect of the distribution of a certain resource, which we may call attention” (Giustina & Kriegel, 2017, p.154). On this view, a regular conscious experience of a green tree represents both the green tree and itself, but does so with a certain characteristic distribution of attention: most of one’s attention is dedicated to the tree, and
only a small amount is dedicated to the seeing of the tree. What happens in thing-introspection is that this standard attention distribution is reversed: most of one’s attention is dedicated to one’s seeing of the tree, and a smaller amount to the tree. As the very structure of pleasurable experience encompasses attention, an act which involves shifting and manipulating attention will mean a different sort of experience.

Another problem is that introspection often goes hand-in-hand with justifying how we feel and act, and this justificatory process can be obfuscatory and even damaging. Wilson & Dunn say:

One kind of introspection that can go awry is thinking about the reasons why we feel the way we do. It might seem like a relatively easy matter to access and report such reasons (e.g., why we like or dislike different models of cars), and that such an analysis would sharpen decision making (e.g., which car we should purchase). There is considerable evidence, however, that people have limited access to the reasons for their evaluations and that the process of generating reasons can have negative consequences. (Wilson & Dunn 2003)

So, the very act of attempting to introspect one’s own pleasurable experiences distorts the phenomenon under the mind’s microscope – in fact it actively changes it. Because introspection is associated with low mood, it seems possible trying to remember or imagine pleasant experiences is undermined or cancelled out by the negative aspects produced by the very act of introspecting. The Heterogeneity Argument asks us to carry out a thought experiment in non-optimal conditions, rather like trying to study an ice cube in a desert. Therefore I repeat my assertion that it is time to downgrade the importance of this argument in the pleasure debate, while still maintaining that we can certainly use
introspection as phenomenological evidence (especially in terms of noticing and
categorising experiences of pleasure) even if it doesn’t tell us everything about
the structure of pleasure.

One useful service that the Heterogeneity Argument can provide for us
before we cast it aside is to provide some extra support for attention as the
correct attitude involved in affective experience. Its failure, precisely because the
unwarranted manipulation of attention (by asking ourselves to introspect),
highlights the crucial generative role attention plays in pleasurable experiences.
The problems shown with introspecting also support the use of
representationalism as a theoretical model. According to the impure
representationalism used in this model, phenomenal content is determined by
both intentional content and intentional mode. The inconclusive nature of our
affective phenomenology, partner with our tendency towards introspective
disagreement on the subject points towards a complex structure of this type.

7.4 Another look at the desiderata
Talk of the Heterogeneity problem means that it is time to revisit the desiderata
outlined in the introduction and see how the evaluativist theory of pleasure I am
proposing fares when measured against them.

D1: A theory of pleasure will explain the apparent heterogeneity of its instances
and will unify the conventional distinction between pleasures of body and mind.

Most theorists confine themselves to explaining ‘sensory affect’, eschewing the
non-sensory pleasures such as joy or the pleasure of solving a crossword. But a
substantial theory of pleasure ought to be able to explain all these instances without prioritising one over the other. To illustrate the difference between the two ideas, Aydede gives the example of a strawberry farmer who hates the taste of strawberries yet takes pleasure in eating a ripe strawberry because she knows it means her crop is ready to harvest (Aydede, 2014). Her strawberry-eating experience is therefore a non-sensory pleasure, according to Aydede, because the experience itself is not pleasant. But this doesn’t mean there is no pleasure phenomenology, according to evaluativism. When the taste of the strawberry is evaluated according to the criteria that make up the bodily self, it is found to be lacking. But when it is evaluated according to the criteria that makes up the emotional self (the hopes the farmer has for her crop, what it would mean for her future success etc.) then it rates positively. The change in phenomenology between a non-sensory and a sensory pleasure is explained by a change in the criteria set (‘self’) against which an object is measured – but ultimately all those criteria sets (‘selves’) belong to the same subject.

The evaluative account of pleasure in part takes inspiration from recent evaluative accounts of the emotions. Two decades ago, emotion theory was in thrall to reductive accounts that understood emotions in terms of other mental states, typically bodily sensation, desire or beliefs. So, to briefly recap, according to cognitivists, fear is the belief that something was dangerous, and the appertaining desire to avoid it.

Instead, if we define the formal object of joy as ‘the good’, this circularity does not occur. My joy at passing the exam is a presentation of the fact of passing
the exam as good (for me), rather than joyful. But we are still faced with the problem of individuating instances of pleasure that are joy from instances of pleasure that are not joy. Imagine the experience of finding out you are the recipient of generous funding that will allow you to continue your life's work. Compare that to soaking in a warm bubble bath. The first is joyful and the second is merely pleasant. According to my analysis, both are felt apprehensions of the value property 'good for me' – so why are they phenomenologically different (similar in many way perhaps but with difference to account for)? Discussing the phenomenology of pleasure brings us back to the beginning of the thesis and the Heterogeneity Argument. To recap, the Heterogeneity Argument claimed that since we cannot find any common phenomenology between pleasurable experiences, there is no such thing as pleasure phenomenology. Chapter 1 downplayed the importance of the Heterogeneity Argument but nevertheless admitted that if pleasure phenomenology exists, it is not obvious or straightforward in the way we take sensory phenomenology to be.

Evaluativism about pleasure responds to the Heterogeneity Argument by claiming that the key to solving heterogeneity is in the set of cares and concerns (i.e. the self) the object in question is evaluated against. An object that is ‘good for’ the bodily me (i.e. evaluated against the criteria presided over by the norms of the body) will have a certain kind of pleasure phenomenology that is realised at least partly in a bodily way. An object that is ‘good for’ the emotional me will be evaluated against the criteria driven by the narrative construction of my self-image. The phenomenology will therefore be realised in differing and more complex way as the set of emotional cares and concerns I have are more complex.
and more individualistic, based as they are on my temperament, my beliefs, my past experiences and my hopes for the future.

My suggestion is not to look at the ‘good’ part of ‘good for me’ when working out the difference between joy and pleasure, but to focus instead on the ‘me’ aspect. If we have to concede that both make use of the thin axiological predicate ‘good’, which can only be made more detailed by changing it into a thick predicate, then ‘me’ is the only thing that can change. My proposal is that while soaking in a warm bath is good for the bodily me, the news of my funding success is good for the emotional me. Hence the first is primarily classified as a bodily experience and the second as an emotional experience. The difference in the phenomenology is generated by the different self which is the background object (in Helm’s terms, see Chapter 6) that generates import in the emotional experience.

The method of grouping affective experiences by their objects is useful because it starts to illuminate an answer to the Heterogeneity Problem. Positive affective experiences are grouped in the first instance by whether their object resides within or without the body. This is why when we think of an orgasm and the joy of completing a crossword they do not seem to have much phenomenologically in common. We are now ready to make use of the concept of determination dimensions proposed by Crisp (2006) and explained in chapter 2, to make sense of the difference in pleasure phenomenology. We can now lay out three of the determination dimensions: direction of attention, object and background object.
How the determination dimensions result in different types of affective experience: a rough outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background object/value</th>
<th>Bodily self</th>
<th>Emotional self</th>
<th>Boundary self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Good for me’</td>
<td>Orgasm</td>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>Pleasure of eating/drinking, pleasant touch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Bad for me’</td>
<td>Pain, hunger thirst</td>
<td>Sadness, anger, fear</td>
<td>Disgust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So, according to Cutter and Tye, pain experiences are experiences of bodily disturbances represented as being bad for me (the subject) plus, in typical cases, sensory properties of location and physiological type. Cutter and Tye claim their characterisation can expand to positive affective experiences also, but do not discuss this claim any further. The obvious positive equivalent to pain is an orgasm. That is, a bodily disturbance represented as having positive valuational properties (is good for me) as well as properties of location and physiological type. If this is the case, we would expect to find other corollaries between pain and orgasm (see next section). Other kinds of pleasure which take bodily disturbances for objects could include satisfaction of bodily needs, such as satisfying hunger or thirst. Hunger and thirst have also been included along with pain in the negative bodily disturbances box, yet we do not count them as pain
experiences. However, they do not present a problem for Cutter and Tye’s account, as when they become serious and urgent enough, (when they are at a level to threaten survival as per Cutter and Tye’s idea of harm) they do indeed present as pains.

**D2:** A theory of pleasure will explain how pleasure fits into a wider picture of the emotions, including its relationship to pain

It is interesting to note that what gives emotions this extra layer of complexity is the different model of the ‘self’ used in assessing the value properties the object is represented as having. To recap, a pleasure experience is one in which the object of the experience is represented as having ‘value for me’. It is my contention that in emotional pleasure experiences the ‘me’ in question is constructed differently to the ‘me’ in bodily pleasure experiences. So for bodily pleasure experiences, the ‘me’ is basically my body and the state it is in at the time of the experience (this is how homeostatic information influences pleasure experiences – for example how hunger makes food taste better). For an emotional experience, the ‘me’ is constructed from my character, general emotional tendencies, personal history etc. as well as my current state of being tired or hungry (well known to affect emotions).

One of the problems that came out of the discussion of the evaluative theory of the emotions was that of mixed feelings. Christine Tappolet was correct when she said that mixed emotions were to do with different respects:
But given that something can well be both attractive in one respect (as a challenge to one’s limits, for instance), and unattractive in another respect (as dangerous) there is no contradiction. This is not different from a situation in which something is desirable qua being pleasurable and undesirable qua being a threat to your health. (Tappolet, 2005, pp. 230-1)

However, Tappolet did not elaborate on what it means for something to be attractive in one respect and dangerous in another. The evaluativism I propose does. The cliff face is dangerous in so far as it poses a threat to bodily integrity – it is incongruent with the presiding norms of my bodily self. However, it is congruent with the norms of my emotional self – the set of cares or concerns built on my self-narrative and self-conception as an adventurous and daring person.

The evaluativist theory of pleasure I am proposing also helps us make sense of masochism. When explaining masochism, it is very important to remember that masochists don’t just get pleasure from things that cause non-masochist pain. The notion of selves I have put forward allows us to understand bodily pain as a phenomenology that represents its object (in this case bodily disturbance) as ‘bad for body-me’. Masochists feel the pain in the same way as non-masochists, but the pain becomes the object of a pleasant experience. A simplified story might go like this: getting whipped causes the masochist pain (the pain experience represents the bodily disturbance as bad for her body) but the phenomenological state of pain itself then qualifies as an object for

---

77 Desire theories, it was claimed in Chapter 4, had trouble making sense of masochism (and also asceticism) unless they adopted Brady’s solution to the Euthyphro problem.
representation, and is represented as instantiating the property of good for the emotional self. All that is needed is for this self to be partially based on such cares or concerns that, for whatever reason to do with one’s emotional history, pain is welcomed or evaluated in certain circumstances as a good thing. Neither traditional attitudinal theories nor phenomenological theories have the apparatus to correctly describe the masochist’s experience – only a combination of the two will do.

When discussing pleasure and pain, some theorists expend all their energy on explaining one and assume the other will fall in line just by virtue of being ‘opposite’. Despite some of the differences noted so far, such as differences in phenomenology and attention, there is still a pressing need to explain the connection between pleasure and pain. The evaluativist theory of pleasure I have proposed can do this because it takes more than one factor into account. Firstly, the bond between pleasure and pain, its ‘oppositeness’, is explained by the value property each one exemplifies. Put simply, pleasure is the apprehension of the good, and pain the bad, and, as far as good and bad are opposites, pleasure and pain are also opposites. However, pleasure and pain also involve attention. In line with Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build hypothesis of the positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2005) and Csikszentmihalyi’s work on flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), it should be noted that in most cases of pleasure experience, attention is drawn away from the self and towards external objects (orgasm is a notable exception). Frederickson’s explanation of this is that from an evolutionary perspective, a feeling of pleasure encourages exploration and engagement with the world. In the opposing case of pain, attention is drawn inwards as we focus
on problems and how to fix them. I expand upon this idea by saying the pleasure experiences involve a ‘welcoming’ stance, and that when our attention is drawn outwards to objects we represent as ‘good for me’ we also soften the boundaries of that ‘me’ to allow new things – people, ideas, situations – to become part of our concept of ourselves. In unpleasant experience the reverse happens: boundaries close to repel possible threats. This is of course purely a speculative idea but it is one that meshes Frederickson’s observations regarding the adaptive advantage of engaging with the world and my own thoughts on selves. We can see it demonstrated quite literally in the case of food we enjoy\footnote{A New York Times article recounts the case of a study in which Swedish and Thai women were given food from each others cultures to observe the impact enjoyment had on nutrient uptake, food that is unappetizing or unfamiliar is less nutritious to the consumer than food that otherwise has the same nutritive value. (Brown, 2006)} – welcoming it in and allowing it to become part of our bodies – to more metaphorical versions where we embrace ideas, people and circumstances that give us pleasure and update our self-image with regard to them.

\[D3: \text{A theory of pleasure will explain its connection to motivation}\]

Motivation troubles both phenomenological and attitudinal theories. For the phenomenological camp there is Findlay’s problem, which states that thinking of pleasure as a sensation cannot explain its close connection to motivation. Why, if pleasure is just a sensation like the sound of middle C, are we motivated towards it? The Distinctive Feeling theorist cannot answer this question satisfactorily. On the other hand, the desire-based attitude theorist gave too strong a response and
felled foul of the Euthyphro problem(s). An evaluative theory plots a middle course between these two theories. But showing that pleasure is a phenomenological representation of our evaluative processes it shows the in-built connection with desire and preference. When an object is evaluated as ‘good’ we are motivated towards it and even incorporate it into ourselves, according to externalists. Though not indefeasible, this statement seems to have some intuitive strength – there are many occasions where it is difficult to separate out a thing’s apparent goodness and my motivation to do or experience that thing. The evaluativist theory of pleasure I have set forward can encompass this observation, and build upon it, because if pleasurable experiences are functions of our dispositional sets of cares, preferences and, in the right circumstances, desires, then there will be an obvious link between pleasure and motivation. On the other hand, it is not necessary to desire something to evaluate it as good. This explains moments of unexpected pleasures – something is presented to us and though we do not desire it, we think it good or it fits with our standards for things of that sort. The link is strong, but not too strong. The fact that the property in question is not merely ‘good’ but ‘good for me’ where ‘me’ is my own set of cares and concerns, means that by representing an object as ‘good for me’ we are also representing it as ‘congruent with my goals’ or ‘likely to help my achieve as desire’. Goals and motivations are built in to these statements, but these statements are not goals in themselves, but assessments – meaning they are still contentive rather than conative.
7.6 Chapter summary

By rejecting the division between attitudinal and phenomenological theories and using instead a representational theory (which is itself both attitudinal and phenomenological) I hope to have shed some of the most problematic issues for the philosophy of pleasure, namely how to explain our apparent difficulties with introspecting on pleasure, how to explain pleasure’s connection with motivation and how to connect all the many and various instances of pleasurable experience.

This chapter answered Block’s Challenge by stating that pleasant experiences represented their objects as instantiating the value property ‘good for me’. What sets this version of evaluativism apart from other evaluative theorists such as Cutter and Tye is its emphasis on explaining this property in terms of both what is ‘good’ and what is ‘me’ and how the property ultimately connects the two.
Chapter 8: Concluding remarks

This thesis argued that pleasure experiences are apprehensions of value and that they represent their objects as ‘good for me’. Understanding this particular value property mean understanding that values are measured against standards and concerns and we can think of these normative groupings as ‘selves’. By introducing the notion of different selves we can understand the apparent huge range of phenomenology involved in pleasure experiences. To get to this point, the traditional division between phenomenological and attitudinal theories of pleasure ought ot be abandoned, unified by a representational, evaluativist theory.

The jumping-off point for this thesis was to question the force of the Heterogeneity Argument, the point at which phenomenological and attitudinal theories of pleasure divide. The Heterogeneity Argument implicitly relies on the authority and infallibility of introspection over our pleasurable experiences. Due to the nature of pleasurable experiences, however, and through empirical evidence that shows we are often wrong about these, or assign meaning in such ways that undermines them, it was shown that introspection is not a sound method for understanding hedonic experience. Once introspection is weakened as a source of evidence, the Heterogeneity Argument becomes much less compelling. I went on to suggest that considering the function of pleasurable experiences is a more important factor in building a theory than attempting to
introspect on pleasure. One upshot of this discussion is that it demonstrates that
the Heterogeneity Argument does not prove what it sets out to prove: that
phenomenological theories of pleasure cannot be correct.

The thesis then turned to examining the traditional theories as they are
currently proposed. Distinctive Feeling theory asserts that pleasure is an
independent feeling causally linked to the sources of pleasure; although in
practice the distinctive feeling of pleasure might not present itself to us
separately from its causes or objects, it is ontologically separable from them.
Despite often being cited as the chief phenomenological theory however, it is
held by surprisingly few philosophers. This chapter examines the Distinctive
Feeling theory and finds problems in two areas: the lack of specificity of the
concept of ‘feeling’, and the connection between the so-called ‘distinctive feeling’
and motivation.

Like the Distinctive Feeling theory, Hedonic Tone theories are a species of
phenomenological theory in that they focus on a phenomenological aspect of
pleasure, but instead of characterising pleasure as an independent ‘distinctive
feeling’ (as per the Distinctive Feeling theory), pleasure is seen as a dependent
aspect or feature of a sensation. The determinable-determinate relation is
helpful to Hedonic Tone theory because it purports to explain how pleasurable
experiences can be members of the same set without having any particular
feeling (i.e. of pleasure) in common. The Hedonic Tone view of pleasure gets its
strength from preserving what is intuitively compelling about the naive view of
pleasure, but answering the Heterogeneity Argument in a philosophically
persuasive way. However, Hedonic Tone theorists do not delve deep enough into their own metaphysical mechanism. This thesis then does not seek to reject Hedonic Tone theories, but to show how current theories are suffering from under-elaboration and need to be much richer if they are to be convincing.

Alongside phenomenological theories, attitude theories make up the dominant family of pleasure theories. Attitude theories state that the hedonic status of an experience is not dependent on its intrinsic ‘feel’, or phenomenology, but on the relation in which the subject stands to the experience. All depend on the attitude the experiencer has of the experience to answer the question *If they don’t all feel alike, what do pleasure experiences have in common?* The great strength of attitude theories is their ability to solve the Heterogeneity Problem and find unity in the seeming diversity of pleasure. But what is meant by ‘attitude’? It seems that desire is the strongest candidate attitude for an attitudinal theory of pleasure. However, desire-based theories face a counterargument known as the Euthyphro problem: if it is desire that explains why an experience is pleasurable, then we cannot appeal to pleasure to explain why some experiences are desirable without risking circularity. In order to answer the Euthyphro argument, we must declare that attitude itself changes the phenomenology of an experience – providing a bridge between attitude theories and phenomenological theories.

For many theorists, phenomenological and attitudinal approaches exhaust the landscape. But there is one approach that has been overlooked – reflecting its general status in the philosophy of pleasure – that of the
representationalist theory. Broadly speaking, representationalism is the umbrella term for a group of theories which state that to have an experience with a certain qualitative character is to have an experience that represents the world as being a certain way. Strong representationalism states that representation exhausts qualitative experience, while weak representationalism concedes that there may be additional factors involved. This thesis examined two representationalist theories of pleasure: Timothy Schroeder’s Desire Representationalism and Michael Tye and Brian Cutter’s Tracking Representationalism. For each theory I concentrated on how they answer Block’s Challenge, that is, how they deal with the burden of proof to say what the representational content of experiences such as orgasm and pain actually are. Though there are problems with each theory, a synthesis of the two could indicate a way forward.

The evaluative theory of pleasure states that pleasure experiences are to be understood as representing the positive value of their objects for their subjects. This chapter investigates two main areas. The first is whether during a pleasurable experience we can be said to be perceiving the property ‘good for me’ – that is to say whether the kind of representation involved in pleasure experiences is perceptual representation. The second is what kind of property ‘good for me’ is. It will be noted that the process of evaluation is particularly important and yet not discussed as much as it could be, leading to supplementary discussion drawn from the psychological theory of the emotions. Evaluative theories of emotion often turn to perception as the ideal model of how value properties are represented in emotional experience. If perception is
attitudinal, in that it is directed upon objects, and phenomenological, in that it results in distinctive experiences which are in some way essential to the subject's access to the information it carries, then the perceptual model has the potential to account for the link between phenomenology and intentionality in affective experience.

The traditional antagonism of attitudinal versus phenomenological theories of pleasure has been rejected and the two positions have come together to form a representationalist theory of pleasure. The last chapter argued for representationalist theories of pleasure overall, but questioned the theories currently on offer due to their claims about what the representational content of pleasure is. This thesis went on to fill in that blank by showing that the value property ‘good for me’ is what is represented by a pleasure experience. The current orthodoxy in affective science is that pleasurable experiences consist of at least two ‘pleasure’ components, ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’. The evaluativist theory of pleasure can incorporate this into its theory by drawing parallels between hedonic phenomenology and liking, and between the evaluative mechanisms that have been described that underpin that phenomenology and wanting. Describing those mechanisms is important because it shows that the other attitudinal approaches can be incorporated into the evaluativist framework; dispositional desires, cares and preferences can all go into making up the ‘self’, which is the standard by which objects of pleasurable experiences are measured.

In an attempt to unify the field in pleasure research, leaving behind the traditional division of attitudinal versus phenomenological theories, this thesis
has taken an extremely wide view. One of the downsides of this is that some of the question raised in this thesis deserved to be addressed in much more detail than spaced allowed. The connection between pleasure and pain, for instance, was raised many times, but really merited a thesis of its own. Another area hardly touched upon but of great interest was the connection between pleasurable experience and the warrant and justification of our beliefs about what will bring pleasure. Yet another interesting topic is how our pleasant experiences now connect to what we believe will bring us pleasure in the future. I hope that further study of these questions will reinforce the theory of pleasure I have put forward.
Bibliography


