Political Concepts and Prefiguration:
A corpus-assisted enquiry into democracy, politics and community

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ABSTRACT

The concept of prefigurative politics, generally referring to the creation of an alternative society within the here and now, has proven highly productive in understanding contemporary social movements that aim to contest the thorough entanglement of capitalism and democracy. Today, the concept is rapidly crossing disciplinary boundaries. In translation studies, it has been suggested that prefigurative politics can function as a useful framework for the study of semiotic processes of resistance and dissent. Beyond expressing the desire for another world, language, it is argued, may actively contribute to its construction. This doctoral thesis sets out to investigate the cultural conditions and linguistic suppositions that sustain this claim. It argues that the drive to enact social change by semiotic means finds expression in a long tradition of revolutionary language use that can be captured through the complementary lenses of dialectical reasoning and political correctness, paradigms that govern the dynamic interaction between the transgression and imposition of norms. Culturally, the concept of prefiguration as a political means of expression has been called upon twice during the previous two millennia. In social movement studies, the concept was introduced in the late 1970s to capture changes in the behaviour of Marxist movements, and came to be widely applied in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Many centuries before, the patristic tradition invoked the concept to fortify the Christian narrative in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Roman empire. At both times, the global political system was in grave disarray. Drawing on the connection between political instability and the call for semiotic innovation, I analyse two corpora selected from the larger Genealogies of Knowledge corpus. The first corpus consists of post-Marxist academic works that respond, in ways both direct and indirect, to the global uprisings of 1968. The second set of data consists of contemporary journal articles drawn from ROAR Magazine, a publication that primarily responds to the global uprisings of 2011. A corpus-assisted approach identifies both common and anomalous textual constructions, and thus reveals central sites of lexical struggle. The analysis takes as a starting point the patterns of use of the concepts democracy, politics and community, which have been in circulation since the dawn of reflection on political organisation yet still play a central role in activist and academic conceptions of an alternative world. The study shows the continued relevance of Biblical and Marxist salvation histories for the interpretation of contemporary changes in the political vocabulary, and semiotically substantiates the thin line between declarations of anarchy and invocations of authority as toed by the subversive imagination.
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Incarnations of Prefiguration

The concept of *prefiguration* has been called upon twice during the previous two millennia. Once by the Church Fathers, and once by social movement researchers. At both times, political instability reigned. The patristic tradition invoked the concept to fortify the Christian narrative in the aftermath of the Sack of Rome by the Visigoths. In social movement studies, the concept was introduced to explain changes in the behaviour of Marxist movements, and came to be widely applied in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Carl Boggs (1977), who introduced the term *prefiguration* in social movement vocabulary, was unaware of *prefiguration*’s heuristic usage, yet it has since been observed that there are remarkable parallels between the two. At heart, prefiguration denotes a figure of correspondence between an event or sign that foreshadows, and one that fulfils. In the Church’s *typological* usage, one may think of the relation between the type John the Baptist and the antitype Jesus Christ. Politically, one may think of consensus decision making as a principle announcing the possibility of leaderless organization.

There are two sides to the correspondence, and historically the focus shifted between the prophetic function of foreshadowing and its fulfilment in salvation. The two poles together shape a narrative development in which everything possible finds its proper place as a confirmation of a prophecy and a reiteration of its promise, thus giving rise, politically as well as theologically, to an intricate structure of figures of mediation, be these vanguard movements or saints. Once the narrative is exhausted, however, the concept of prefiguration comes to be used as a demand for a new revelation, a new anchoring point for a prophetic discourse. This is currently its major function in the realm of political contestation, yet its other functions remain relevant, and the purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the prefigurative demand for a renewed political imagination has come to affect the usage patterns of a number of ancient political concepts, specifically *democracy*, *politics*, and *community*. In this chapter, I first discuss prefiguration as prophecy in the context of the recent financial crisis, and establish the connection with the Marxist heritage. I spell out the parallels between Marxist and Christian salvation history, and discuss, in this regard, the mediating function of the prefigurative paradigm. Finally, I discuss the current
call for a new revelation with reference to recent expansions of the scholarly usage of prefiguration, before presenting my research questions and laying out the blueprint of the thesis.

1.1.1 Prophecy

At the end of the previous millennium, global market players compounded various kinds of debt in complex financial products meant to boost ‘the stability and resilience of the financial system as a whole’ (Helleiner 2011: 70). Debt repackaging became a major business, especially in the United States. Yet ultimately the intricate virtual machinations of the banking industry derive from material phenomena. A housing bubble had been inflating in the States, fuelled by substantial mortgage lending to ‘less creditworthy borrowers’ (ibid.: 69). Property, a major component of the ever expanding catalogue of securities, proved to be an insecure investment. The bubble burst. Several hedge funds, privileged investment schemes in principle built to withstand market volatility, went down first. In the spring of 2007, as the reciprocal exposure between financial institutions and ‘mortgage-related financial products’ became threateningly clear, concern and uncertainty intensified across Europe and the United States (ibid.). The banks reversed their previous generosity both locally and internationally. The global economy saw its allowance reduced, and ‘financial contagion’ spread across ‘many sectors and countries’, ultimately severely affecting the ‘real economy’, and thus the living standards of the world’s population (ibid.).¹

By all indications, ‘the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 was the most severe since the Great Depression of the 1930s’ (Helleiner 2011: 68). Given its direct impact on people’s daily life, the problem quickly became political. Across the board, governmental reaction to the crisis was twofold. Financial institutions beyond saving were relinquished, but massive capital injections safeguarded the survival of the most powerful establishments, irrespective of whether or not they were accountable for the crisis. Too big to fail. Simultaneously, public spending and welfare mechanisms were rolled back. In the UK, for instance, the Conservative-led coalition government promised in 2010 that ‘a platform of austerity’ was bound to ‘reign in the overblown state, restore stability to the economy, and bring Britain

¹ Italics and other means of emphasis are always represented as in the original. Where emphasis is added, this is stated after the relevant quotation.
out of crisis’ (Howard and Pratt-Boyden 2013: 731). Hardship was presented as the cure for hardship to a populace, it seemed, too small to save. While the chiefs of capital had already received their absolution, the political rhetoric aimed at the citizenry was one of collective sacrifice (Graeber 2013: 123).

From 2010 onwards, anti-austerity sentiment gave rise to widespread public unrest. Well-documented examples of protest actions against austerity include the 15-M Movement in Spain and the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece, with the most visible in the media as well as the scholarly literature being Occupy Wall Street. These movements combined an anti-austerity stance with a pro-democracy appeal (Flesher Fominaya 2017). National governments had proven powerless in the face of the crisis and were perceived to side with the banking industry rather than with the afflicted populace. The revelation of this democratic deficit spelled a profound legitimation crisis: what went, in the West, for democracy, was deemed unfit to carry the name.

Beyond resistance to the degeneration of democratic ideals and the enormous power of seemingly unaccountable financial institutions, social movements such as 15-M and Occupy shared a means of embodied expression. By occupying public spaces, they politicized the standstill rather than the march. The movements of the squares established encampments at open enclosures such as Syntagma Square (Athens), the Puerta del Sol (Madrid), and Zuccotti Park (New York). They experimented with economic alternatives such as ‘bartering and exchange systems’, and with political alternatives such as assemblies stimulating participatory decision making (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 184). The idea of the square as a micro-society giving shape to the social relations aspired to while expressing discontent with the current state of affairs was partly derived from a series of uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, commencing just months before the Western anti-austerity protests took shape. In particular, Tahrir Square (Cairo), where protesters managed to set up field hospitals and food banks in the face of severe repression, became a ‘main symbol and source of inspiration’ for a number of international protest movements (van de Sande 2013: 233). The Arab uprisings, stretching from Morocco to Syria and dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’, were ‘informed by preceding grievances and ambitions for change’ and responded to long-standing issues of corruption, dismal living conditions, and human rights infringements (Cottle 2011: 647). The resulting occupations, only a small part of the unfolding historical
drama, should not be seen as equivalent to the Western anti-austerity protests. However, shared pro-democratic aspirations and strategies, as well as international expressions of solidarity and recognition, led to the integrated perception of ‘a global wave of protests’ (Flesher Fominaya 2017: 1).

Western news media reporting on the Arab uprisings granted ‘early recognition to the protesters’ aims, sense of grievance and cause’ (Cottle 2011: 654). On the other hand, Western media coverage of Occupy, for instance, initially expressed dismissal. The movement was accused of ‘a lack of seriousness, owing to its refusal to issue a concrete set of demands’ (Graeber 2013: 59, 88). Countering this perception, activists argued that ‘the process is the message, or that the movement is its own demand’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 192). Graeber (2013: xvii) argues this was part of the reason Occupy has been declared ‘dead since the evictions of November 2011’. He goes on to state that, nevertheless, ‘people’s political horizons have been broadened’, and that not acknowledging this comes down to a failure to understand the movement (Graeber 2013: xvii). In relation to the uprisings in Tahrir Square, it has similarly been argued that to see the revolution as a failure may come down to a lack of insight into the motives of the people involved (van de Sande 2013). While the conditions of existence for a world beyond oppression were not in place, another world could be conceived, and to a limited extent, enacted, as illustrated by the construction of micro-societies in various squares around the globe. In this regard, the efforts made by the movements of the squares are said to exemplify ‘prefigurative politics’, or ‘the sphere in which action itself becomes a prophecy’ (Graeber 2013: 233). According to Graeber (ibid.: 294), the solidarity shown at various encampments revealed a universal truth, an origin that implies a future: ‘all societies are communistic at base, and capitalism is best viewed as a bad way of organizing communism’.

One and a half centuries earlier, the Communist Manifesto had intervened in a very similar economic and political situation, and sought to break with the past in every manner possible. The ten identifiable measures set to materialise in developed nations once the proletariat seizes power include the ‘abolition of all right of inheritance’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 33). Marx and Engels (ibid.: 52) openly declare that their ends can be attained only by ‘the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions’. The manifesto is introduced as a clarification. Communism had so far been a spectral presence, a vague threat, an insult to
direct at one’s political opponents. Marx and Engels seek to strengthen this diluted discourse, and to proclaim their vision for all to hear. Soon, the full stop gives way to the exclamation mark in scathing polemics mimicking the whining bourgeois. In the final exclamation, Communism becomes manifest, it materializes, through the imperative that ends the essay: ‘Working men of all countries, unite!’ (ibid.: 52). The phrase rings like a spell – gone the feeble spectre, raised the proletarian body. The characteristics of the manifesto as a genre, here prototypically on display, are theatricality and performativity (Puchner 2006: 5). Like all political manifestoes, the Communist Manifesto ‘is singularly invested in doing things with words, in changing the world’ (ibid.). Such is the promise presented: ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 52). The year is 1848, the year of the People’s Spring, the greatest wave of revolutionary upheavals Europe ever witnessed.

In France, a major site of struggle, the revolution had been inevitable. Under King Louis Philippe I, power had increasingly come into the hands of the ‘financial aristocracy’ (Marx 2001: 36). The state became dependent upon loans from the wealthiest among the bourgeoisie, who saw fit to keep the state indebted in order to guarantee their political influence. Outside of this small clique, the ‘petty bourgeoisie of all gradations, and the peasantry also, were completely excluded from political power’ (ibid.: 37). Encouraged by impunity, the ruling elite became ever more bold in its transgressions against their own laws and customs. It took two ‘economic world events’, however, for the people’s dissatisfaction to erupt into violence (ibid.: 40). First, failed harvests led to famine. Second, England underwent ‘a general commercial and industrial crisis’, which involved ‘the bankruptcy of the London wholesale grocers, on the heels of which followed the insolvencies of the land banks’ (ibid.: 41). This crisis could still be felt in France when the revolution finally broke out. Louis Philippe I was dethroned, and the Second Republic declared. Its motto, an echo: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.

The banking system, organ of the finance aristocracy, attempted to discredit the young republic by cutting down the money supply to merchants and manufacturers. The decision backfired. Distrust in the financial institutions led to a bank run, meaning that customers collectively sought to withdraw more money than the banks could provide (Marx 2001: 53). At this point, Marx argues, the provisional government could have let the crisis run its
course, as ‘the bankruptcy of the Bank would have been the deluge which in an instant would have swept from French soil the finance aristocracy, the most powerful and dangerous enemy of the republic’ (ibid.). However, the government, seeking to abate the crisis, endeavoured to sustain the system by strengthening its level of centralisation. The ‘provincial banks’ were all transformed ‘into branches of the Banque de France’ (ibid.: 54). Later, the government, in dire straits, contracted loans from the *Banque*, pledging ‘the state forests’ in return (ibid.). Further money to support the government was sought through taxation. Ultimately, the revolution ‘strengthened and enlarged the bankocracy’, while the public was spurred to make ‘patriotic sacrifices’ (ibid.).

According to Marx (2001: 44), the proletarians had thought they would be able to ‘emancipate themselves side by side with the bourgeoisie’, but were betrayed by the republic they helped to establish. Continued protests led to insurrection, which was violently suppressed. The proper stakes of the conflict were revealed to be ‘the preservation or annihilation of the bourgeois order’, and the bourgeois order prevailed (ibid.: 63). Marx (1918: 12) argues that the time was not yet ripe for a truly proletarian revolution, as ‘no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room in it, have been developed’. Bourgeois society is held together by a ‘capitalist integument’, which is eventually bound to ‘burst asunder’, but capitalism must fully exhaust itself before any alternative may properly be installed (Marx 1976: 929). In the meantime, one is to live through ‘the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 10). In 1848, the economic conditions did not yet allow for a major overhaul of social relations. The inadequacy of the material base for the fulfilment of the revolutionary struggle was reflected in the inadequacy of revolutionary consciousness. While aiming to create ‘something that has never yet existed’, the 1848 revolution became a parody of 1789, copying ‘battle-cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history’ in a mere ‘borrowed language’ (Marx 1994: 187-188). Marx (ibid.: 190) argues that to succeed, the proletarian revolution ‘cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future’.

Before the material conditions allow for its fulfilment, however, the poetry of the future will clash with the practices of the present. The proletarian mark of the 1848 revolution was the proclamation of a ‘social republic’, a governmental structure aimed at equal political
participation for all (Marx 1994: 193). This promise did not materialize into a genuine share in decision-making power for the masses. Consequently, the revolutionary period was characterized by a ‘confused mixture of high-flown phrases and actual uncertainty and clumsiness’ and by an ‘enthusiastic striving for innovation’ that resulted in a ‘thorough domination of the old routine’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, confusion produced clarity, as the ultimate suppression of the proletariat by a coalition of bourgeois forces had revealed the true content of the class struggle, and thus announced a clash to come. Marx exclaims: ‘The revolution is dead! Long live the revolution’ (Marx 2001: 66). The promise had already been uttered, the mark made: ‘the social republic appeared as a phrase, as a prophecy’ (Marx 1994: 196).

Marx (1918: 11-12) is adamant that ‘the mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness’. The failure of the 1848 French revolution arguably confirms this, and Marx’s discussion of the events displays a fair amount of intellectual triumphalism. In the Manifesto, one reads, in the same vein, that ‘when people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 31). According to Marx, the bourgeoisie, given time, will produce ‘its own grave-diggers’ (ibid.: 20). Industry requires labour. Under the factory roof, the labourer is taken out of isolation and granted the possibility of association (ibid.). In unison, the workers are bound to overthrow their oppressors. The ‘victory of the proletariat’ is ‘inevitable’ (ibid.). Why then, given such inevitability, the Manifesto’s injunction that all working men unite? What requires a historical constative to be formulated as a political imperative?

1.1.2 Salvation

In the year 410, Alaric I, king of the Visigoths, made good use of the Roman empire’s excellent roadways to wreak havoc across the Italian peninsula, eventually ransacking Rome, and thus inaugurating the collapse of the city’s occidental rule. Less than three decades
earlier, emperor Theodosius I had ‘established Christianity as the official religion of the empire’ (Dyson 1998: xii). To the ruling classes, it seemed unlikely to be a coincidence that the inauguration of a God of meekness was followed by humiliating defeat (ibid.). Blasphemous voices arose. A worried Augustine, bishop of Hippo, decided to write a work absolving Christianity of any involvement in Rome’s demise. The work quickly grew in scope and ambition, and *The City of God against the Pagans* became a theological treatise of considerable proportions, leaving no stone unturned regarding apparent contradictions at the heart of the doctrine of the Church.

Confronted with the great deluge, Augustine ponders. He knows that there are animals on faraway islands. How, after the Flood destroyed everything, could they have reached these remote locales? Perhaps, he suggests, God created them anew. Yet why then were animals of all living species harboured in the Ark in the first place? It must be the case, he concludes, that ‘animals of all kinds were included in the Ark not so much for the sake of replenishing the animal populations as for that of prefiguring the various nations, and so presenting a symbol of the Church’ (Augustine, 1998: 707). God concerns himself with fashioning prophetic correspondences, not with logical progression, and Augustine routinely evokes this template throughout his oeuvre. Auerbach (1984: 53), in his seminal discussion of the concept of *figura*, states that ‘figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfils the first’.

Jerome, Augustine’s contemporary and patron saint of translators, employs prefigurative rhetoric in ways both subtle and overt. At the end of the fourth century, he translated from Greek into Latin a papal letter for the personal use of a fellow in faith. The translation ‘soon became public’, however, ‘and incurred severe criticism’ on the grounds of alleged falsification of the original content (Jerome 1954b: 112). Jerome (ibid.: 113) clarifies what he believes to be the root of the accusations levelled against him, namely that he has not ‘rendered word for word’. In a well-known feat of positioning at the heart of the study of translation, he insists that the criticism is misguided, because ‘it is the sense we have to look to and not the words’ (ibid.: 117). The majority of the letter then provides examples of changes in wording that permeate the scriptures. Jerome (ibid.: 116) argues that his critics should not blame him for similar slight alterations, but rather ‘concede to [him] in the case
of a simple letter what, whether they like it or not, they will have to concede to the Apostles in the Holy Scriptures’. The issues of wording that surface in comparing scripture, for Jerome, do not arise from inaccuracy, but from the apostle’s intention ‘to formulate dogmas rather than to hunt for words and syllables’ (ibid.: 115). Given the opposition between word and sense invoked earlier, Jerome equates sense with dogma. Holy writ is to be translated and interpreted in accordance with the underlying ‘law of the gospel’ (Jerome 1954a: 99). The latter quote is from an earlier letter to the bishop Paulinus. It addresses the teachings of the Bible as illustrated by the correspondences between the two Testaments, and has served as a preface to the Gutenberg edition of Jerome’s Vulgate, which since the 1450s for centuries held the position of highest textual authority in the Roman Catholic Church. As an overt example of the typology of foreshadowing and fulfilment outlined by Auerbach above, the letter proclaims about Jesus Christ that ‘it was in the Law and in the Prophets that he was foreordained and prefigured’ (ibid.: 98). Prefiguration thus happens by decree, and the study of its manifestations can aid one in gaining insight into the unfolding of the divine plan. Furthermore, imitating the figures of authority that came before amounts to fulfilling one’s heavenly task on earth. Consequently, in comparing himself to the apostles and in insisting on the importance of ‘sense’ in the study of their writings, Jerome is not just mobilizing the means of rhetoric to ward off criticism of his persona. He sets out to reveal the intention of the Lord through imitation of his followers. The recognition of prefiguration serves to bring about the revelation of a final purpose, and thus to facilitate acting accordingly.

In Augustine too, prefiguration serves to approximate a state of holiness. He fashions lived experience as a site of moral ambiguity, subject to the draw of two competing cities. In the Earthly City, ‘princes are as much mastered by the lust for mastery as the nations which they subdue are by them’, and in the Heavenly one, ‘all serve one another in charity’ (Augustine 1988: 632). Augustine’s sympathies lie with the heavenly realm, as the earthly one is essentially tainted by original sin. His legacy is ‘the experience of being fallen in a fallen world, in need of redemption, salvation and integrity’ (Grey 1988: 477). The world of men is corrupt; ‘the entire creation is flawed’ (ibid.). Only alignment with the Heavenly realm can deliver on the prefigurative promise that divine bliss can be ‘lived in the present’, despite the fact that its true realization may only occur ‘in the future’ (Scholl 2016: 321).
Marx’s vision of the communist society to come is by far the most influential salvation history since the Biblical account. He presents history as a sequential development from primitive communalism to slavery, and from slavery to feudalism. Feudalism eventually gives rise to capitalism, the mode of production characterised by bourgeois ownership of the means of production (Bod 2013: 255). The final stage, ‘socialism and communism’, will abolish such ‘private ownership of the means of production’, and can only be realised through a proletarian revolution (ibid.). The revolution will end ‘the history of class struggles’ which has so far determined ‘all hitherto existing society’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 2). The lust for mastery is to evaporate as all come to serve one another in charity. Marx’s work aims to ‘educate the next generation of leaders of the working class’ by handing them the tools to perceive both the ‘objective preconditions’ and the ‘necessity of the historic task’ (Nicolaus 1973: 24). The Christian and the Communist doctrine both demand that one conforms to what is announced, and thus fulfils what is determined. The conundrum that closed section 1.1.1, namely why the science of history requires imperatives given that the course of history is already determined, is properly speaking not a question, but a mystery, something that beckons revelation. Both the Marxist and the Church Father are apprentices in clairvoyance. Marx’s historical materialism is a gospel in as far as it reiterates the enigma of prefigurative interpretation: that which is determined demands to be enacted. Destiny inscribes dogma.

1.1.3 Mediation

In 2014, Pope Francis declared the sainthood of former popes John XXIII and John Paul II. Francis (2014: 2) explains that the Lord had granted them hope and joy, which they passed on to the grateful ‘People of God’. Drawing on a number of Biblical references, he observes that ‘this hope and this joy were palpable in the earliest community of believers’ (ibid.). The strength of their faith, despite the doubts presented by the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, serves to contrast the new saints with the incredulous Thomas, who had to touch Jesus’s wounds to believe they were there. The wounds of Jesus symbolise the redeemer’s martyrdom for the sake of humanity, an argument which Francis (2014: 1) supports by quoting ‘Saint Peter, quoting Isaiah’. Both John XXIII and John Paul II are honoured for
‘renewing and updating the Church in keeping with her pristine features, those features which the saints have given her throughout the centuries’ (ibid.: 2).

Francis’ entire homily is composed of interrelated prefigurative elements. Through quotation, one finds a stress on verbatim connections between the Old and the New Testament and their applicability to the present day. The Incredulity of Thomas forms part of the standard iconography of the Church – the event is depicted in formulaic artworks across continents and centuries. The scene of Thomas’s doubt confirms that dissent is a natural part of the development of Christianity. The renewal attributed to both Popes, especially regarding John XXIII’s role in convening the Second Vatican Council, which ran from 1962 to 1965 and was partly an emergency response to modernity’s dynamism as it affected religious orthodoxy, stresses not only the popes’ ingenuity but also the power of the Church and its members to overcome dire circumstances. This capacity is a central characteristic of martyrdom, as documented in centuries of hagiographical writing – the narration of saints’ lives. Thus, the wounds of Jesus stress both his vulnerability and his strength, complementary attributes that guarantee a Biblical parallel to any event the Church has to weather. Finally, in quoting Saint Peter, of which the Pope is deemed the successor, Francis confirms the institutional framework guaranteeing the continuity of authoritative speech inherited from the first among the Apostles. The Church’s whole interpretative framework guarantees the applicability of a prefigurative relation that ultimately leads back to Scripture.

Canonization, or the declaration of sainthood, is a prerogative of the papacy. The formalisation of this procedure, taking place from the eleventh century onwards, meant that popes could ‘control models of holiness’ and reinforce their position as ‘keepers of the keys to the kingdom’ (Prudlo 2015: 15). As the veneration of saints often sprang from local traditions of devotion and veneration, sainthood not only provided illustration, but also a site of mediation between the Church and its scattered adherents. Saints and their attributes are a primary motif in Christian art, and the use of images was of major representative importance in an era of widespread illiteracy. In short, ‘sainthood was an essential correlative to the spread of the Gospel’ (ibid. 2015: 13). Given the attitudes of the other religions of the book, ‘the admission of the graven image by the Christian Church’ is a remarkable development (Kitzinger 1954: 85). This admission did not go uncontested, and in
times of schismatic upheaval iconoclasm remains the strategy of choice. Idols once
decorated are toppled and decapitated. Pictorial representation spreads the faith, but also
engenders accusations of apostasy.

Remarkably, however, accusations of apostasy tend to go hand in hand with a return to
orthodoxy rather than with an abolition of doctrine, and this principle has for centuries
immunized the Church against the ultimate consequences of its representational
permeability. The figure of the martyr become saint has always provided ‘models of
resistance and defiance for heterodox sects who saw themselves and their suffering at the
hands of the Church authorities’ (Tracy 2012: 32). Rejecting the canon of saints is a saintly
gesture, dissent is an integral part of the divine plan as declared, and always returns one to
fulfilment of the self-sacrificial paradigm perfected by Christ, who worked towards the
necessity of his announced death. Determination despite determinism, such is, as discussed
above, the mystery of both the Marxist and the Christian. Smashing the symbols that
represent the central mystery is a sign of rejection that invites reiteration. There is no
outside of Scripture.

The integrative function of the Church’s doctrinaire framework is necessitated by the fact
that the fulfilment of salvation history is always suspended. As long as the gates of the
heavenly city are not in sight everything has to announce them. The Communist prophecy
faced the same task once it achieved a modicum of success. According to Marx and Engels,
‘the emancipation of the working class was to be realised by that class, not by its self-
appointed representatives’ (van Ree 2000: 261). The tension between historical description
and political imperative, however, required that the Manifesto ‘did ascribe to the
communists the theoretical advantage, in comparison to the mass of proletarians, of an
insight into the conditions, the course and the general results of the movement’ (ibid.: 62).
The requirement of a vanguard could not be denied, especially after the Russian revolution
of 1917. Lenin had fulfilled what Marx had foreshadowed, yet universal salvation was in
abeyance. The dream of a global classless society was simultaneously confirmed and put on
hold. Prophecy had to be transformed into orthodoxy, and any practical or theoretical
development to come had to elaborate the initiated scheme while confirming its invariable
validity. Stalin (2013: 7) writes: ‘Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-
Leninist party’. Mao declares: ‘The force at the core leading our cause forward is the
Chinese Communist Party. The theoretical basis guiding our thinking is Marxism-Leninism’ (Schram 1966: 1). These sentences open Stalin’s *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* and Mao’s *Quotations*, publications that greatly influenced state doctrine in the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

The hyphenated merger of the thought of Marx and Lenin inscribes the pattern of succession with an incontestable quality, and finds a parallel in the structure of foreshadowing and fulfilment presented by the Old and New Testament. Theory and practice are merged, simultaneously confirming and reversing Marx’s (1997: 402) aphorism that while ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways’, ‘the point is, to change it’. His own philosophy had become part of a revolutionary change that, in its turn, demanded a consistent interpretation of the world. Canonization in the Marxist tradition has always to refer back to this primary instalment of lineage. Through Marx, Lenin holds the keys to the heavenly city, and passes them on to the various vanguard representatives leading the international struggle towards a classless society.

When, shortly after the Second World War, ‘the communists seized power’ in Czechoslovakia, the ‘Soviet ideologists described this as additional proof of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory of historical determinism’ (Svec 1988: 982-983). As ‘the U.S.S.R. was the only country with substantial experience in building an entirely new, communist social system’, Moscow saw fit to assert its vanguard role in Eastern Europe (ibid.: 983). Russia’s westward expansion in terms of political influence and transfer of expertise were welcomed as an expression of manifest destiny. Twenty years later, Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia to violently suppress The Prague Spring, a series of mass protests demanding democratization and economic reform. Moscow intervened to safeguard the interests of a corrupt elite, and attempted to explain the invasion in terms of the need for inter-communist cohesion. Oppression and imperialism became the hallmarks of a vanguard state sworn to obliterate exactly these inequities. The Soviet Union was revealed to ‘not abide by Marxism-Leninism in any consistent way, neither in its domestic nor foreign policy, but only use it, or twist it, in an attempt to impart seemingly noble motives to its increasingly cynical actions’ (ibid.: 985). The ‘invasion of Czechoslovakia led to a series of at least four protest suicides by burning, the first by Jan Palach in Prague’ (Crosby et al. 1977: 64). The world watched as Palach performed his self-immolation, a conclusive
act of iconoclasm that shatters any process of mediation between a populace and its political class. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the catalyst for the Arab Spring, offers a tragic historical parallel.

The events in Czechoslovakia formed part of a global wave of uprisings that would permanently impact the structure of the international left. The communist elite was found wanting. It had betrayed both its ideals and its militants (Wallerstein 1989: 435). After more than a century of experimentation, socialist revolutionaries could no longer ignore the historical suggestion that any ‘revolutionary vanguard party, with its authoritarianism, centralism and emphasis on discipline’ reproduces ‘the authoritarian structures of the state’ (Newman 2007: 9). In response to the prolonged delay of the dissolution of the state, faulty perceptions guiding socialist strategy had to be eradicated. The rewriting of the socialist canon resulted, on the one hand, in the ‘doctrinaire revival of the most inflexible models of the Marxist vulgate’ (Melucci 1996: 207). On the other hand, it engendered a full-scale ‘rebellion against bureaucracy, conformity, of anything that fettered the human imagination, a project for the revolutionizing not just of political or economic life, but every aspect of human existence’ (Graeber 2013: 276).

In late 1960s France particularly, ‘an unprecedented number and variety of local groups’ heeded the call for revolution ‘beyond the point of production, to include all spheres of social life and all structures of domination’ (Boggs 1977: 119). The revolutionary activities were short-lived, but were to have a profound influence on France’s institutional and academic development, as illustrated by continental philosophy’s philosophical trajectory during the previous half century (Newman 2007: 9). As Newman (ibid.) explains, major thinkers such as ‘Laclau, Badiou, Rancière, Hardt and Negri, and Derrida have all sought, in different ways, to diagnose and redefine radical politics, and to explore its possibilities in the wake of Marxism’. What defines their relationship to Marx, as well as to the political sphere in general, is that their writings may suggest ‘some form of anarchist or anti-authoritarian politics of emancipation’ (ibid.). The reintroduction of anarchist thought was equally central to the development of social movements after 1968. Having come to the conclusion that revolutionary vanguards and socialist parties tend eventually to exhibit the oppressive qualities they are meant to contest, social movements increasingly sought from the outset to embody the ‘social relations, decision-making, culture and human experience’ they
envisaged as desirable (Boggs 1977: 100). Addressing this phenomenon, Boggs (ibid.) identifies the continuity of a ‘prefigurative tradition, which begins with the nineteenth century anarchists and includes the syndicalists, council communists, and the New Left’. The concept of prefigurative politics was taken up a few years later by Breines (1980: 421), who, in a discussion of the New Left, describes the practice as ‘essentially antiorganizational’ and ‘antihierchical’, with ‘participatory democracy’ being a central feature.

Today, social movements’ ‘skepticism towards the state, bureaucracy, and party politics as well as representation, hierarchies, and power in general’ has only intensified (Rohgalf 2013: 152) In the twenty-first century, nothing raises more suspicion than ‘mediations, intermediaries, constructions, and representations’ (Innerarity 2016: 88). Occupy, for instance, did not deliver specific demands because of its deep ‘mistrust of the very form of political representation itself that would respond to such demands’ (Nail 2012: viii). This mistrust is not only directed towards political adversaries. In his discussion of the movement, Graeber mocks adherents of the Workers World Party, a Marxist-Leninist organization, for being ‘the sort of people who actually like marching around with pre-issued signs and listening to spokesmen from somebody’s central committee’ (Graeber 2013: 27). Later on, he discusses the question of who the early Occupy movement sought to address: ‘Who were we calling to join us? The oppressed? The excluded? The people? All the old phrases seemed hackneyed and inappropriate’ (ibid.: 38). Distrust of representation involves a dissociation from organisations with similar goals that operate differently, as well as from received vocabulary.

The rejection of a vocabulary deemed to be outdated finds its counterpart in novel coinages. Referring to his dismissal of the role of the Workers World Party at a political assembly, Graeber (2013: 27) gauges the sentiment of the crowd: ‘Most seemed to be horizontals: people more sympathetic with anarchist principles of organization, nonhierarchical forms of direct democracy’. He is aware of the register he writes in: ‘to adopt activist parlance, this wasn’t really a crowd of verticals’ (ibid.). Verticals, supposedly in support of rigid hierarchies, are further ridiculed for being the sort of people producing apologetics for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The apostasy of the ‘old left’ requires explicit identification and condemnation. The icons are burned, the canon is abolished, yet adherence to doctrine is mocked in a specific parlance, a language that requires instruction in a pre-issued worldview.
Similarly, *Occupy* did not have demands, but this refusal to represent is indicative of a strict adherence to the political ideals of autonomy and self-representation. In an online call to ‘stop listing demands’, a protester reminds his collaborators that they ‘don’t speak for everyone in this’ (distortion 2011). Curiously, the slogan the movement adopted, ‘We are the 99%’, fully inverts such representational caution. The slogan is a claim of mass delegation imparting vanguard status on the occupiers. It presents the activists as martyrs, spokespersons of an oppressed sacrificial surplus. The canon, in short, can be rewritten, but dissent always returns to the foundational form: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 2).

The refusal to issue demands and the preference for spontaneous rather than structured action is rooted in a historical process of disenchantment related to the suspicion of vanguardism. Marx promised the workers a world to win, and handed the philosophers a world to change. Augustine fashioned a world of grace behind the curtains of corruption. These worlds can be intimated, but not inhabited, before their time arrives. Their eventual manifestation, however, goes undisputed, and so does the event that will inaugurate them. The Last Judgment is announced, and so is the great proletarian revolution. Both events will relegate the whole of history to ‘the prehistoric stage of human society’ (Marx 1918: 13). The final end of the realm of the present ‘is what makes all particular events potentially intelligible’ (Fukuyama 1992: 56). Salvation history is a totalitarian hermeneutics, as it must either encompass everything or collapse.

The Great Leap Forward, the Final Solution and the Great Purge serve as the principal examples illustrating the perils of impatiently turning the pages of a narrative structure imposed upon human development. Such massacres are not restricted to socialist states or to the twentieth century, but find parallels in earlier calamities such as the Inquisition and the Reign of Terror. Contemporary prefigurative social movements not only reject political representation for its tendency to reproduce the evils of the past, but also reject narrative emplotment for its tendency to inaugurate the evils of the future. Consequently, the anarchist tendency manifesting itself in movement activity is an expression of allegiance to ‘another possible world, itself plural in its possibilities’ (de Sousa Santos 2006: 110). This focus on proclaiming the possibility of alternatives rather than defining them was reinforced by the events of 1989, which saw the ‘decisive collapse of communism as a factor in world
history’ (Fukuyama 1989: 25). Despite a venerable tradition of prophecy to the contrary, capitalism did not exhaust itself, but rather tightened its grip on the personal as well as the political sphere. Hence the credo: ‘there is no alternative’ (Monod 2017: 3).

1.1.4 Revelation

According to Marx, the French proletariat’s prophecy resided in the phrase *social republic*. According to Graeber, the prophecy of the American precariat emanated from the occupations it performed. Melucci (1996: 1) holds that social movements ‘are a sign’; like prophets, they ‘announce what is taking shape’. Auerbach (1984: 54) formulates the prefigurative correspondences observed in sacred texts as relations between ‘the sign and what it signifies’. In short, the structure of foreshadowing and fulfilment characterizing both religious and political instances of prefiguration ultimately depends on an inherently semiotic interpretation, which can properly be called translational. Independent of whether one is concerned with relations between events, social practices, or linguistic objects, the prefigurative relation depends upon a declaration of equivalence, of a similarity that does not indicate strict identity, and is therefore simultaneously proclaimed and revealed (Hermans 2007: 6, Tymoczko 2010: 3). The concept of prefiguration results from the potential to perceive correspondences within and between sign systems. Prefiguration, in other words, is a trope of translatability.

For Jerome, divine revelation, in principle shrouded in mystery, does not inhere in individual sacred texts straightforwardly, but in the correspondences divulged by their mutual encounter. Translation is obliged to preserve and further the revealed harmony. The ideal of translatability manifests in texts that do not leave room for the singular inclinations of a particular translator, but demand submission to a decreed development. In the end, the task of the translator is equal to that of the imitator of Christ and the Marxist revolutionary. The mystery remains that the gospel must be spread despite yet because of its fully determined status. In Jerome’s account, there is ultimately no distinction between translation and prefiguration, as both are expressions of an ordained structure of foreshadowing and fulfilment. Within this scheme, events are conceptualised as representations, and representations as events. There is no divide between the social and the linguistic, as both realms only function to pronounce their mutual final cause.
This merger is illustrated in the linguistic practices of a variety of contemporary social movements exhibiting prefigurative inclinations. Regarding the World Social Forum, for instance, activists have stressed the need for ‘prefigurative’ communication practices that ‘are in keeping with the broader principles of horizontality, openness and participation’ (Stephansen 2016: 30-31). From this perspective, language serves as an ideological auxiliary reinforcing organisational conformity. The complete absorption of language into the category of social action, however, also suggests the reverse operation. Baker (2016a: 6) remarks that prefigurative endeavours have so far been restricted ‘to organizational and interactional’ models and suggests that ‘extending the powerful concept of prefiguration to the use of verbal, visual and aesthetic languages’ can enable activists and researchers ‘to construct an alternative world in the here and now’. This claim is backed up with reference to Melucci’s (1996: 358) assertion that ‘it is enough to structure reality using different words for the power monopoly over reality to crumble’.

Graeber (2013: 302) similarly concludes that ‘the moment any significant number of people simultaneously shake off the shackles that have been placed on that collective imagination, even our most deeply inculcated assumptions about what is and is not politically possible have been known to crumble overnight’. Prefiguration, in this respect, involves a ‘commitment to creating the future in the present, by not allowing the present to shape or constrain the horizon of possibility’ (Baker 2016a: 6). Baker (2016b: 2) exemplifies her argument by discussing the logo of the Egyptian media collective Mosireen: ‘the logo is full of possibilities and open to a range of potential interpretations, all empowering and all resisting reductive, facile representations of the group and the events they document’.

Contrary to the Communist and Christian salvation histories presented above, prefiguration for Baker does not involve integration into a predetermined pattern. Revolutionary determination no longer implies the paradoxical reconciliation with a historically prescribed fate, but escaping this predicament could arguably produce the absence of a sense of direction.

In the absence of a determined view of historical necessity, the lexical invocation of guiding principles and values steers movement activity. Lexical items such as politics, community and democracy are repeatedly invoked. Boggs (1977: 104) envisions prefiguration as giving rise to ‘an entirely new kind of politics’. Breines (1980: 421) argues that community is a
central notion and keyword of prefigurative politics, and describes it as an association unfettered by the ‘instrumental relationships characterizing state and society’. Both identify democracy as a central aspiration of prefigurative movements, and prefigurative activists today, whether they operate in Athens, Cairo, London, or Moscow, still uphold democracy as a primary political value, the content of which needs to be continually reinvented and reasserted (Ishkanian and Glasius 2017). In short, activist endeavours to radically open up the sphere of political possibility maintain an ancient vocabulary. The creation of an activist parlance fit to announce an entirely new set of social relationships not only involves relatively novel coinages such as horizontals and verticals, but also the reclamation of an etymological heritage.

Concepts such as democracy, politics, and community, however, have for centuries been ‘essentially contested’, meaning that ‘endless disputes’ about their proper meaning are central to the concepts’ circulation (Gallie 1956: 169). Disputes have engendered a proliferation of possible interpretations, and at present the situation is one in which the concept of democracy, for instance, seems to have become synonymous with ‘the permanent struggle over the concrete content of democracy’ (Buchstein & Jörke 2007: 195). The social and the semiotic blend together in the desire for the revelation of the true content of the ideal. Occupy, it is argued, ‘created a crisis of legitimacy within the entire system by providing a glimpse of what real democracy might be like’ (Graeber 2013: xvii). The revelation of the meaning of terms representing political values coincides with the concrete realisation of their as yet undecided content. Democracy is called for in the name of democracy. Within the paradigm of openness to a variety of potential alternatives, the suggested function of political concepts within contemporary revolutionary discourse is both to foreshadow and to fulfil the alternative world they announce. The purpose of this thesis is to describe how this double demand affects the patterns of use of these key concepts.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis explores the following primary research question:
How are the concepts democracy, politics, and community used by post-Marxist philosophers and contemporary radical commentators, and in what way can the concept of prefigurative politics clarify the observed usage?

The concepts democracy, politics, and community are selected for study because they remain essentially contested, despite having been central to the public vocabulary since the dawn of reflection on political organization.

The data for the study consist of two subcorpora selected from the larger corpora created by the Genealogies of Knowledge project (see chapters 4 and 5 for further details). The first subcorpus, consisting of post-Marxist works covering the period from the late sixties to the present, is selected on the basis of their status as a response, in ways both direct and indirect, to the global uprisings that took place during the spring of 1968, which inaugurated a major and continued reconsideration of the theoretical positions and the strategic vocabulary of the revolutionary left. These include works by Étienne Balibar, Jacques Rancière and Jacques Derrida, among others.

The second set of data consists of contemporary journal articles drawn from the publication ROAR Magazine; these are selected on the basis of their status as a response to the global uprisings that took place during the spring of 2011. These protests and revolutions were characterised by a high degree of grassroots experimentation, and by the intensive exploitation of media technologies. New forms of organisation, once again, necessitated the creation of a novel vocabulary to describe demands and grievances, and to negotiate strategies, visions and relations.

A final factor contributing to the selection of the two sets of primary material is their complementary relation to the concept of prefigurative politics. This concept is increasingly called upon to describe the semiotically complex practices of contemporary social movements. While the concept’s roots are often traced back to anarchist experimentation, the Marxist tradition is equally hospitable to a prefigurative interpretation. It may therefore be hypothesised that both sets of text display a number of characteristics that may properly be called prefigurative. To investigate this claim, it is necessary to formulate a number of tributary research questions.
What are the characteristics of prefigurative politics, and how are they expressed in textual material?

What differences and similarities can be observed between the usage of democracy, politics and community within and across the material studied?

What do these observed differences and similarities tell us about the rhetorical strategies used in the selected texts, and can these strategies properly be called prefigurative? What is the role of figurative language use and translation choices in this respect?

What additional conclusions can one draw from the application of a prefigurative interpretation? In what way does this concept improve understanding of the relations between a particular sets of texts? And in what way do these relations in turn improve understanding of the concept of prefiguration?

These questions are addressed using a corpus-assisted methodology. This choice was made because a corpus facilitates the identification of unusual as well as high-frequency patterns, which essentially reveal major instances of conceptual contestation. This necessitates a more specific research question relevant to the analyses below:

What collocates consistently accompany the lexical items democracy, politics and community, and what do they reveal about the function of these concepts in the texts studied?

On a final note, attention should be drawn to the fact that the post-Marxist corpus consists of translated material, and that the ROAR Magazine corpus consists of largely untranslated online material. Where relevant, the question of linguistic and media transfer will be addressed, as it often proves productive in the conceptual analysis.

1.3 Overview of the Thesis Structure

This thesis consists of six chapters, including the current introduction, a theoretical chapter, a methodological chapter, two analytical chapters, and a conclusion. The current chapter introduced the concept of prefiguration as it functions in the Christian heuristic tradition and in social movement research. Christian prefiguration, or typology, identifies formal
correspondences between Biblical events. The first event, usually drawn from the Old Testament, foreshadows a later occurrence, usually within the New Testament. The binding of Isaac, for instance, can be read as announcing the sacrificial paradigm that will find its culmination in Jesus’ crucifixion. In social movement research, prefiguration denotes a correspondence between political practices and principles observed in the present that are projected to find fulfilment in an envisaged future social structure. I have illustrated, with reference to the Marxist and Christian salvation histories, how certain sets of correspondences may come to constitute a narrative framework encompassing the entire development of social movements or religious denominations. In other words, the Christian prefigurative framework is not limited to the semiotic contents of the Bible, and the paradigm of prefigurative politics is not limited to interactions with the concrete and material environment in which political contestation takes place. Both come to meet at the point where signification and social structure are mutually informative to the point of being indistinguishable. Given this convergence, recent work in Translation Studies (Baker 2016, Taviano 2016) has suggested that prefigurative politics can function as a useful framework to study semiotic processes of resistance and contestation. In other words, it has been argued that, beyond expressing the desire for another world, language may actively contribute to its construction.

Building on this suggestion, Chapter 2 discusses the politicisation of communication from two angles. In section 2.1, I consider modes of expression circulating within as well as about contemporary social movements deemed prefigurative, and illustrate their close affinity with a certain history of dialectics. Dialectics, as a mode of process philosophy, aims to capture change through the interaction of contradictions. The dialectical perspective finds early expression in the work of Heraclitus and comes, through Hegel, to characterize the materialist world outlook of Marx and Engels. The communist salvation history presented earlier in this chapter is explicitly shaped by the belief that the contradiction between social classes is to find resolution in the abolition of private property and the realisation of communist society. Proponents of the materialist dialectic such as Mao and Stalin applied the principles of communism to their dominions, and further developed the philosophy to provide a concise, comprehensive set of guidelines. Bearing a strong element of scientific necessity, the struggle between contradictions has inspired a great amount of revolutionary
artistic output, which I exemplify with reference to Surrealist collage, Situationist bricolage, and Soviet montage. Finally, I consider two very different phenomena that have both become prime examples of prefigurative politics, namely the Zapatista uprising and the Occupy movement, and illustrate how they negotiate their modes of political expression with reference to dialectical interactions of unity and opposition. The overall import of section 2.1 is to illustrate that there is a long history of semiotic contestation preceding the current call for a prefigurative politics of the sign, and to illustrate how the Marxist framework has continued to exert its influence on expressions of political dissent.

A prefigurative politics of signification aims to alter the social structure through linguistic intervention, and in this regard it is closely aligned with the phenomenon known as political correctness. In section 2.2, I discuss the historical emergence of political correctness in Mao’s endeavours to create a proletarian body unified in thought. I then consider contemporary expressions of political correctness, which are exemplified through efforts to appease tensions along the lines of race and gender. Particular attention is paid to euphemistic chains, practices of linguistic reappropriation, and the controversy surrounding pronominal interventions on the part of feminist and transgender activists. The alleged correspondence between social structure and linguistic expression at the heart of political correctness is shown to be grounded in particular invocations of linguistic relativity that today mainly manifest in the political sphere, but have historically structured restrictions on speech concerning a wide range of taboo subjects. Linguistic relativity is further explored with reference to the performative functions imparted on particular linguistic formulae. I then illustrate how dialectical sensibilities and principles of political correctness both inform the performative function ascribed to the sign as a prefigurative tool, namely the function to provide a glimpse of another possible world. Given the broad range of potential strategies of conformity and transgression shaping the field of political contestation seen through the lens of dialectics and prefigurative politics, I argue that the specificity of the prefigurative paradigm is to be found in the particular vocabulary that signifies the values aspired to in its name. In this regard, I identify the concepts of democracy, politics, and community as central to current expressions of prefigurative politics. Their prolonged contestation, however, precludes facile judgements on their function in contemporary political discourse.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the research context of the current thesis, which forms part of *Genealogies of Knowledge*, a corpus-based research project whose major outputs are a number of historical corpora and a dedicated suite of software that supports linguistic analysis. In order to clarify the project’s remit, I briefly discuss the conceptual history of *genealogy*. I then discuss the particularities of the corpora built by the project. Overall, the corpus is based on the historical continuity between Greek, Arabic, Latin and English scholarship. The project’s different subcorpora hold texts in these languages from the time period when they served as lingua francas for the dissemination of political and scientific discourse, and they are thus envisaged to facilitate enquiries into the evolution and contestation of particular constellations of concepts circulating within these broad domains. Given the major shift of medium that has occurred during the last decades, the English corpus is split into a body of texts arising from late print culture, and a body of digital-born publications. After discussing the internal divisions and external determinations of the *Genealogies* corpus, I consider the tools it provides to investigate the textual data it makes available, paying specific attention to a number of visualisation plug-ins that have informed my analysis. Finally, I outline the importance of patterning within concordance-based research, focusing on collocational phenomena, and on the connection between text and context.

In short, the first two chapters approach the phenomenon of prefigurative politics, especially as regards its potential linguistic implications, from a number of interlocking and complementary angles. The broad historical patterns of Christian and Marxist salvation histories, and, importantly, the political crises in which they come to the foreground, are illustrated to shape the current state of the concept, and so are the vibrant histories of revolutionary rhetoric and linguistic engineering. The first two chapters thus provide the context of the prefigurative paradigm. The third chapter considers the relations between context and text. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, consider potential textual manifestations of prefigurative politics. That is to say, having earlier identified *democracy*, *politics* and *community* as terms central to current invocations of prefigurative politics, both within social movements and in research about their aims and strategies, I set out to investigate these concepts’ patterns of use at two historical junctures in order to shed light on how they have come to function as foundational to contemporary expressions of political dissent.
In chapter 4, I query a corpus of ten academic publications that, without necessarily presenting themselves as Marxist publications, all bear witness to the major schism in academic culture and revolutionary thought that occurred in 1968. All the works included in this corpus are translations from Romance languages, mostly French, and all of them have a direct connection to Parisian intellectual culture. For each of the concepts around which the thesis is structured, I identify, by means of the concordance browser, the most significant patterns of use, and then attempt to find broader tendencies that manifest across patterns and publications. Overall, it is found that the corpus abounds in negative determinations. There is a strong desire to open up conceptual categories for a productive usage outside of the terms’ received history, but the final decision on the concepts’ meaning is continually and consciously deferred. From the perspective of political correctness, this corpus conforms to the general restriction that it is taboo to define. From the perspective of dialectics, contradictions are disseminated rather than integrated. From the overall perspective of prefiguration, the concepts studied are made to occupy the function of a prophecy that, paradoxically, finds its fulfilment in its continued status as a promise. Related to this broad observation, it is found that the paratextual material in the corpus is more consistent, in terms of textual patterning, than the body of texts it surrounds.

In chapter 5, I query a corpus of one hundred online journal articles from ROAR Magazine, a publication that aims to foster the radical imagination in response to the 2011 global wave of protests. While many of the authors writing for the journal have an academic background, the corpus is, in contradistinction to the texts discussed in Chapter 4, not philosophical in orientation. Consequently, linguistic patterns are generally more consistent and more directly conflictual in function. The Marxist reference structures this corpus too, as ROAR is an explicitly anti-capitalist magazine. From the perspective of political correctness, one finds in ROAR the construction of a moral universe based on a fundamental distinction between positive and negative values. Dialectically speaking, the corpus displays a tendency to spell out the oppositions in the concepts under scrutiny, and to argue for a resolution that strongly favours one side of the equation. In terms of prefiguration, democracy, politics, and community are mobilized not just as prophetic placeholders, but as expressions of a fundamental desire for salvation. Despite this more affirmative setup, the concepts remain
expressions of a reasonably vague visionary perspective, and thus ambiguity continues to surround the concepts under scrutiny.

In the concluding chapter, I further expand upon the contents of both corpora, and provide a concise comparison of a number of interrelated patterns found within them. Focusing on the concepts’ function as conditions of existence for a renewed political imaginary, I discuss various resources and strategies of prefiguration in the conceptual sphere, including the use of metaphorical and typographical markers. A number of tensions that inform the whole thesis, such as the balance between conformity and transgression and between autonomy and authority, are then foregrounded and brought to bear on the recent protest movement Extinction Rebellion, which in many ways lends itself to a prefigurative analysis. The final chapter also provides a number of suggestions for further research, particularly with reference to the Genealogies of Knowledge corpus.
2 THE LANGUAGE OF PREFIGURATIVE POLITICS

In the Introduction I discussed the dual historical emergence of the concept of prefiguration in relation to Christian and Marxist salvation histories, ultimately to arrive at its present incarnation as a potential semiotics of resistance. The present chapter argues that contemporary prefigurative politics is shaped by two linguistic preoccupations: *dialectics* and *political correctness*. In section 2.1, dialectical thinking, particularly leading up to or within the communist tradition, is discussed with reference to Heraclitus, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Stalin, and Mao. Their shared philosophical endeavour is illustrated to have exerted considerable influence on revolutionary representational practices, examples of which are drawn from Surrealism, Situationism, and Soviet cinema. Ultimately, dialectically charged phrasing is shown to guide and explain seemingly contradictory scholarly statements about prefigurative social movements, as well as expressions emerging from within the movements themselves. In section 2.2, a short history of political correctness serves to identify its main characteristics, which are shown to closely correspond to those of prefigurative politics as it has been applied to semiotic practice. Examples of political correctness concerning race and gender further elucidate the particular linguistic relation it bears to prefiguration, mainly through a shared performative application of the principles of linguistic relativity. Both the tendency towards political correctness and the dialectical movement can be resisted or exploited for political purposes, and such complex interactions provide hindrances to as well as resources for academic and activist portrayals of another possible world. Section 2.2 ends with a consideration of the concepts of *democracy*, *politics*, and *community*, which are central to contemporary prefigurative politics.

2.1 Dialectics

2.1.1 Means-Ends Equivalence

On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) ‘launched an armed uprising’ in the state of Chiapas, Mexico (Stahler-Stolk 2010: 269). Seemingly appearing out of nowhere, the insurgents had for a decade been gathering beneath the foliage of the Lacandón jungle, a space of dissent they shared with ‘independent peasant groups’, ‘Maoist organizers’, and ‘Liberation Theology catechists’ (ibid.). During the decade birthing the
Zapatistas, Mexico’s natural resources had increasingly come under the control of international corporations, who had gained a foothold after the country’s 1982 debt crisis. The influx of new capital was required for the economy to recover. New economic policies ‘had a devastating impact on poor peasant and indigenous communities’, whose constitutional claim to native land found itself increasingly embattled by Mexico’s opening up to the world market (ibid.: 270). The Zapatistas intervened when the battle between ancient land rights and the maximisation of agricultural productivity seemed to have been definitively decided in favour of the latter, as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) demanded land privatisation and cleared the path for cheap imports that would devastate the local farming industry. The revolutionaries took their name from Emilio Zapata, who in 1910 fought for ‘communal ownership of rural land’ (Kelly 1994: 542). Zapata’s victory had guaranteed protection against corporate resource ownership for decades, yet now required an armed reiteration.

The Zapatistas’ ‘military occupation of major towns in Chiapas was short-lived’, as the group differed from previous ‘vanguardist Latin American rebels’ in ultimately abandoning the aim to seize state power (Kelly 1994: 569, Stahler-Stolk 2010: 269). Instead, they demanded autonomy to ‘build a more participatory and just order from the community level upward’ (Stahler-Stolk 2010: 270). Civil society was sympathetic to their demands, and the Mexican government was forced into dialogue (ibid.). Currently, a number of autonomous municipalities fall under the protection of the Zapatista army, and their ‘structures of self-governance’ have evolved from ‘assembly-based community-level practices’ into more integrated ‘regional structures called caracoles’ (ibid.: 279). Nonetheless, governmental structures remain highly decentralized, as illustrated by the phenomenon of ‘autonomous schools’ that foster ‘community involvement in shaping the curriculum’ (ibid.: 275). The Zapatista ‘goal of creating more horizontal and participatory spaces’ is ‘based on the concept of mandar obedeciendo (leading by obeying)’, and the resultant alternative practices are currently seen as a form of prefigurative politics, in which autonomous communities are ‘giving their own meaning to concepts such as “democracy”’ (ibid.: 275, 284). Local in implementation, the Zapatista struggle became a global phenomenon through the rapid spread of information facilitated by the growth of the Internet (Chadwick 2006: 125). The movement’s iconography – horse, gun, mask – helped attract international
attention to its predicament, and the rebels consolidated the solidarity their image inspired by organising events such as the International Encounter for Humanity and against Neoliberalism, which was held in 1996 to connect with other movements seeking alternatives to the ongoing process of market-controlled globalization.

The International Encounter helped inspire the Battle in Seattle, a mass protest that pitted the United States police force against a variety of movements aiming to disturb a meeting of the World Trade Organization. The nascent alterglobalization movement later gave rise to the World Social Forums, whose slogan, Another World is Possible, remains a mantra of contemporary anti-capitalist protests. In short, the Zapatistas elicited a global response by initiating a process of local ‘interruption and withdrawal’ (Mansoor 2016: 252). Their struggle for autonomy rather than representative power has inspired comparisons with a growing number of social movements colouring the past two centuries, including anarchism and feminism, movements in retrospect all considered ‘prefigurative’ (Nail 2016: 377). Attention to the concept of prefiguration has sharply risen since the 2011 global wave of revolutions and protests, and the Zapatistas, who have managed to maintain participatory structures as regards government, agriculture, and education, have increasingly come to serve as the main and foundational example of the envisaged ‘other world’ (ibid.).

Over the past three decades, the sites of application of the concept of prefigurative politics have multiplied synchronically as well as diachronically, and proposed definitions have multiplied in tandem, up to the point where prefiguration might be considered a mere ‘conceptual touchstone’ encompassing ‘widely divergent meanings’ (Cornish et al. 2016: 115, 118). Despite the proliferation of potential meanings, ‘it often seems to be taken for granted that prefiguration implies an acceptance of democratic norms’ (Teivainen 2016: 25). Gordon explains, in this respect, the intertwined circulation, common since the early uses of the term by Boggs (1977) and Breines (1980), of ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ definitions of prefigurative politics (Gordon 2018: 527-28). A formal definition, ‘limited to the mere correspondences between goals and practices’, in principle allows for associations with all sorts of endeavours across the political spectrum, while a substantive definition imposes a ‘value-content’ (ibid.: 527).
Substantive definitions typically involve the rejection of capitalism, patriarchy and racism, and the celebration of ‘principles of solidarity, pluralism, equality, and horizontality’ (Maeckelbergh 2011: 9, Parker 2017: 163). At heart, prefigurative politics is presented as ‘democratic and egalitarian’ (Cornish et al. 2016: 116). Substantive definitions may develop into further analyses of the political situation. Some argue, for instance, that ‘political apathy is a result of the withering away of community’, and that ‘strong community prefigures strong democracy’ (Chadwick 2006: 26). Community thus becomes a precondition for the intensification of democratic processes, and a political strategy may be developed based on this perceived order. More commonly, however, definitions of prefiguration take the shape of pleonasm or tautology, as in the statement that ‘democratic goals need to be achieved through democratic means’ (Cornish et al. 2016: 116). Such prototypical definitions bridge the substantial and the formal, and this distinction itself becomes impractical regarding principles such as horizontality and anti-authoritarianism, which derive their substance from the formal (absence of) structure they suggest. The main concrete example supporting definitions of prefiguration is the assembly, a feature central to the Zapatista uprising, the World Social Forum, as well as the various movements of the squares that erupted in 2011. Assemblies, in this context, are political gatherings in which everyone is free and encouraged to participate, and which display no formal leadership structure. Decision-making processes at such assemblies typically strive towards consensus, with voting considered suboptimal.

Taking apart the formal configuration of prefigurative practices, Yates (2015: 2) argues that ‘prefigurative politics is best understood as the compound of five identifiable processes, combining experimentation, the circulation of political perspectives, the production of new norms and conduct, material consolidation, and diffusion’. Yates, who studied a number of Barcelona’s autonomous social centres, provides an elaboration and a set of examples for each component. ‘Diffusion’, for example, refers to ‘the demonstration and diffusion of practices, orders, devices and perspectives’, and is exemplified by the distribution of alternative media (ibid.: 14). Yates (ibid.: 4) outlines these components in order to arrive at a more analytically useful framework than the one offered by a focus on ‘means-ends equivalence’, which in his view does little to clarify prefigurative practice. He acknowledges ‘the classic example of participatory decision-making, where a more egalitarian future as a
goal or ‘end’ may become in some way actualised through the process or ‘means’ of establishing consensus, but finds no other clear illustrations (ibid.).

In general, however, it is exactly the assertion of a means-ends equivalence that has guided sociological enquiry into prefigurative politics. Flesher Fominaya (2014: 10) describes prefigurative politics as referring ‘to the practice of instituting modes of organization, tactics and practices that reflect the vision of society to which the social movements aspire’. In rephrasing a common activist response to the perceived inefficacy of prefiguration, this reflection is reduced to the assertion that ‘the process is the message, or that the movement is its own demand’ (ibid.: 192). Similarly, while Franks (2003: 20) contends that prefiguration presupposes that ‘what is desired must also be involved in the methods of reaching that aim’, Gordon (2018: 522) identifies statements of a full-blown ‘ethos of unity between means and ends’. One encounters here principles of correspondence that collapse into semi-dogmatic assertions of conceptual identity. Applied to ephemeral phenomena such as the occupation of squares rather than the long-standing organisational practices exemplified by the Zapatistas, the means-ends equivalence turns from a descriptive category into a philosophical dogma that profoundly affects the perception not only of social movement activity, but of perceptive categories in general.

For some theorists, the unification of means and ends implies a revision of temporality as a whole, as well as of the barriers between dream and deed. It has been argued in this regard that ‘prefigurative politics means removing the temporal distinction between the struggle in the present and a goal in the future; instead, the struggle and the goal, the real and the ideal, become one in the present’ (Maeckelbergh 2011: 4). For Maeckelbergh (ibid.: 9), values such as diversity and horizontality are not strictly locatable and identifiable, but emerge from a practice that is always a process. The philosophically charged evaluation of social movements that foregrounds the merger of real and ideal as part of a process-based worldview plugs into an ancient philosophical discussion that has for centuries shaped the revolutionary imagination, namely the discussion on dialectics.
2.1.2 Heraclitus to Mao

The ‘unity of the real and ideal’ is a phrase used by Hegel (2006: 75) to describe the philosophy of the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus, one of the earliest documented philosophers arguing that ‘process precedes substance’ (Prey 2012: 258). The cosmological search for the primal element that structures the material world led other pre-Socratics to ponder the elemental primacy of air or water, but for Heraclitus reality as ‘eternal flux’ is best ‘symbolised by the simultaneously destructive and creative power of fire’ (Williams 1958: 403). Only fragments survive of Heraclitus’ philosophy, the order and attribution of which are uncertain. Passed on through the work of later philosophers, the most famous phrases associated with his legacy are: ‘War is father of all and king of all’, and ‘One cannot step twice into the same river’ (Kahn 1979: 53, 67). Hegel insists that what has reached us bearing the name of Heraclitus is ‘excellent’, and attributes to him the idea that ‘the absolute is becoming’ (Hegel 2006: 72). It has been argued that ‘on Hegel’s own authority, we can regard Heraclitus’s dialectic as the first, and perhaps most important, forerunner of the Hegelian dialectic’ (Williams 1958: 40).

The term dialectic, closely related to dialogue, derives from the Greek, more specifically from ‘the verb that means to engage in conversation’ (Sachs 2007: 5). The term is etymologically constructed out of dia, meaning split in two, opposed, or clashing; and logos, as referring to reason; hence the full term means ‘to reason by splitting in two’ (Nicolaus 1973: 28). The early Greek philosophers ‘were also among the earliest natural scientists’, and they were especially interested in ‘phenomena of change, motion, process’ (ibid.). Observing that an object’s ‘motion includes both the beginning and its opposite, the end’, some concluded that ‘motion is the unity of these opposites’, and therefore a contradictory concept (ibid.). The contradiction defining motion affects how one may characterise the objects it applies to. The incapacity to enter the same river twice, for instance, stems from the fact that the identity of the river depends upon its continuously changing content. The fire consumes itself as it grows. There is no essential difference between its waxing and its waning. Such observations generate endless discussions about what, at a certain stage, truly exists in the world. According to Hegel (2006: 75), Heraclitus’ great intervention in this debate was his recognition of ‘being and non-being as abstractions in which there is no truth’, while ‘what is first true is only becoming’.
Hegel would dedicate a great body of philosophical work to the exploration of the concept of becoming, as in the famous passage on the master-slave dialectic, in which two conceptions of self-consciousness assault each other. Self-consciousness can either be ‘self-sufficient’, considering ‘being-for-itself’ as ‘its essence’, or it can find its essence in ‘being for an other’ (Hegel 2018: 112-113). The relation between the self-sufficient master and the slave to reflection, who come to meet on the battlefield of consciousness formation, is mediated by recognition. The master sees the servant as inessential and subordinate, but through this comparison eventually comes to view the slave as ‘the object which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself’ (ibid.: 114). The slave is fearful of the master, upon whose recognition his own self-consciousness depends. This fear, however, eventually leads him to confront ‘the fear of death, the absolute master’, and in death he discovers the independence of his own consciousness (ibid.: 115). The servile consciousness, which obeys the imperative to recognise rather than deny another entity’s self-sufficiency, realises that rather than simply being consumed to fulfil desire, objects can be cultivated to abate fear. Through this process of ‘formative activity’, servility eventually gains mastery over itself (ibid.: 116). However, if untouched by the possibility of personal dissolution met in absolute fear, the development of skill may well indicate an alienation from the universal conditions of existence, and thus precludes the complete integration of one’s consciousness.

Competing translations of the Herrschaft und Knechtschaft passage waver between the term servant and the term slave. The fragment in its entirety has mostly been titled lordship and bondage in translation. The anthropomorphic representation of two complementary and contradictory pathways to self-consciousness has invited a variety of social, historical and psychological interpretations, none of which can lay claim to finality. The movement of thought on display in the metaphorical struggle between contestants in a game of recognition and desire has been presented as a prime illustration of Hegel’s method, presumably moving from thesis, through antithesis, to synthesis, yet Hegel himself never identified this formal definition of dialectics in relation to his own work. The spread of this arguably reductive schema as a summary of Hegel’s procedure has in turn been attributed to Marx (Mueller 1958: 413). In a polemic criticising the French anarchist Proudhon, Marx (1955) indeed speaks of ‘thesis, antithesis and synthesis’, or ‘position, opposition,
composition’. For the benefit of ‘those who do not know the Hegelian language’, he offers ‘the ritual formula: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation’ (ibid.).

Terminological considerations aside, the formula has also served as an alleged blueprint of Marx’s own thought, and in this context, the master-slave dialectic has taken a central interpretative role. The passage explores the tension between oppressor and oppressed, and ascribes a central role to labour as formative in the emancipation of consciousness. It can therefore be linked to the opposition between bourgeois and proletariat that is to find its synthesis, or ultimate resolution, in an overthrow of the established order and the dissolution of class conflict. Marx, however, never specifically referred to this passage in his work (Arthur 1983: 69). In general, the history of dialectical thinking consists of a series of spurious interpretations and attributions that give rise to endless dispute, further complicated, and partly explained, by the dialectic’s self-reflective status as a movement of thought aimed at capturing the movement of various phenomena, including thought. In tracing the outline of what presents itself as foundational, universal or self-evident, the dialectic necessarily shifts shape.

In other words, ‘Hegelian dialectical development’ is not a deployment of a particular content within universality but the process by which, in the passage from one particularity to another, the very universality that encompasses both also changes’ (Žižek 2000: 316). Marx’s proletariat, within this scheme, becomes the historical actor bound to fulfil and therefore end this movement: ‘a class in chains is to destroy all chains, a particular class is to end classes, the complete loss of humanity is to redeem humanity’ (Easton and Guddat 1997: 16). Hegel has been characterised as an idealist who came to conclude that ‘only the logical concepts worked up by the mind have any reality’ (Nicolaus 1973: 27). Marx, on the other hand, is characterised as materialist, situating matter rather than concept as the ultimate reality in which becoming resides. In the end, the nature of the dialectic is bound to efface this distinction, which primarily becomes a discussion of precedence. Either matter or mind must guide the motion towards their integration.

Engels, ‘whose work popularised Marxist philosophy more than Marx’s own’, realised that if the dialectic was material rather than ideational, it had to fundamentally apply to natural phenomena (van Ree 2000: 272). Engels considered recent scientific discoveries such as ‘the
living cell, the concept of energy, and Darwin’s discovery of the mechanism of evolution’ and concluded that dialectical movement was proven in the observation that ‘all things are interrelated, mutually dependent, causing each other and turning into each other, and developing from the lower into the higher’ (ibid.). In a way, Engels’s venture into the dialectics of nature represented ‘no more than a summary of the modern, evolutionary view of the world’ (ibid.). Engels’s formulation of scientific laws that could capture both natural and social developments remained distinctly influenced by Hegel, to whom he ascribes the identification of three laws: ‘The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa’, ‘the law of the interpenetration of opposites’, and ‘the law of the negation of the negation’ (Engels 1939b).

The transformation of quantity into quality is illustrated by the fact that liquids have a ‘definite freezing and boiling point at a given pressure’ (Engels 1939b). When heating water, it remains liquid throughout every increase of temperature, until, at a set point, it suddenly changes state and starts to evaporate. The negation of the negation can be illustrated by the life-cycle of plants. In suitable conditions, a grain of barley ‘germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain’ (Engels 1947). As soon as the plant comes to bear seed, ‘the stalk dies, is in its turn negated’ in the production of not one, but dozens of grains of barley (ibid.). Moreover, cultivation will result not only in larger quantities of barley, but also in ‘qualitatively improved seeds’, which illustrates that each repetition of the negation of the negation works towards a ‘process of perfection’ (ibid.). This law thus encompasses the first one, which relates changes in quantity to changes in quality. The final law, the interpenetration of opposites, also interlocks with the other two laws, as negation and change depend upon the interaction of conflicting forces.

Engels discusses this law at length with regard to motion, which he considers to consist of both attraction and repulsion. The sun emits heat which the earth attracts, and this life-giving heat sets in motion the earth’s lifecycle as a continuous expenditure of energy (Engels 1939a). This process of repulsion generates an atmosphere fundamental to the temporal acquisition of the heat expelled by the sun, thus guaranteeing further attraction. Engels returns to the problem of motion as fundamental to the dialectical outlook, firmly inscribing himself in a tradition commencing in Ancient Greece. In his most notable philosophical
contribution, Stalin (2013: 17) reinforces this connection by tracing back the principles of Engels’s ‘dialectical materialism’ to Heraclitus, via Lenin. Stalin makes a distinction between dialectical materialism as primarily applying to ‘the phenomena of nature’, and ‘historical materialism’ as the application of its philosophical principles ‘to the study of society and of its history’ ibid.: 7). Historical materialism’s object of study must be the elucidation of the determining conditions for the evolution of human society, and Stalin illustrates his approach by following the scientific procedures of eliminating hypotheses until a single plausible explanation for social change remains the only possible one.

Stalin (2013: 27-28) first considers whether society could be determined by geographical environment, and rejects this hypothesis given that the evolution from a communal system, through a slave and a feudal one, to the socialist U.S.S.R., has taken place within a relatively static geographic environment. He then considers whether population density could be indicative of a society’s destiny. This hypothesis too is rejected. Stalin argues that while Belgium’s population density is 26 times as great as the U.S.S.R.’s, the country ‘lags a whole historical epoch behind’, as ‘in Belgium the capitalist system prevails, whereas the U.S.S.R. has already done away with capitalism and has set up a socialist system’ (ibid.: 29). He concludes that the only possible explanation for social change is the transforming relation of ‘the mode of production of material values’, as production relates humans both to their natural environment and to the other members of their species (ibid.: 31). Differences in society, in how one can live one’s life, are only radically altered when changes manifest, be it through the acquisition of skill or the development of tools, in the way basic needs such as food and shelter are procured and distributed. Under capitalism, ‘private capitalist ownership’ stands in glaring contradiction with ‘the social character of the process of production’, and revolution will occur to resolve this contradiction (ibid.: 33).

Mao (1967: 1), who invests heavily in investigating the nature of ‘contradiction’, defines it as ‘the law of the unity of opposites’, which is to be ‘the basic law of materialist dialectics’. Mao argues that ‘all processes from beginning to end; motion, things, processes, thinking—all are contradiction’ (ibid.: 28). Phenomena such as ‘identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence, interconnection or mutual co-operation’ are all effects of the contradictory nature of reality (ibid.: 38). In short, ‘identity is relative, and struggle is absolute’ (ibid.: 46). Nevertheless, every situation and every object
appear in concrete conditions and are therefore determined by a particular struggle. Dialectics must teach one to ‘observe and analyse the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions’ (ibid.: 7). One cannot, however, resolve everything at once, and the revolutionary task consists of identifying the one ‘principal contradiction which plays the leading role’ (ibid.: 31). Under capitalism, this is the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (ibid.: 29).

The ‘task of Communists’, says Mao (1967: 42-43), is ‘to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution’. Stalin (2013: 16) similarly concludes that ‘we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion’. At this point, the importance of conceptual evolution reasserts itself into the materialist dialectic. As the mode of production is the determinant factor, labour relations determine ‘the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions’ (ibid.: 31). Once material conditions have opened up the space for new ideas to arise, however, ‘they become a most potent force which facilitates the carrying out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, a force which facilitates the progress of society’ (ibid.: 31). In a foreword to Mao’s Quotations, readers are told it ‘is essential to study many of Chairman Mao’s basic concepts over and over again’ (General Political Department 1968: xxxi). Thought comes to shape the revolution, and speech comes to determine its progress. Another preface to the Quotations presents the work as ‘an inexhaustible source of strength and a spiritual atom bomb of infinite power’ (Piao 1968: xxxiv). Originally a military publication, the book, its first publishers state, was distributed ‘to every soldier in the whole army, just as we issue weapons’ (General Political Department: 1968: xxxii).

2.1.3 Revolutionary Rhetoric

The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, in between battles and skirmishes, invested greatly in rhetoric to further its struggle. Subcomandante Marcos, the most prominent revolutionary engaged in the uprising, is a prolific author, some of whose writings have been translated and collected under the title Our Word is Our Weapon. Marcos, generally identified as a
‘Jesuit-educated, former university lecturer’, entered the jungle influenced by ‘the texts of Marx and Mao’ (Higgins 2000: 359). He joined the Zapatista movement a year after it had been founded by ‘three Indians and three mestizos’ who had set up their first camp in a densely vegetated area of land ‘known as el desierto – the desert’ (ibid.: 360-361). He had come in order to teach revolutionary theory, but while communicating with the Indians frequently encountered a language barrier. Political conversations, often focused on the subject of Mexican history, revealed that Spanish fell short of capturing the Indians’ ‘cultural markers’, most notably with reference to their conception of time (ibid.: 363-364). The Indians seemed not to differentiate between events in a distant past and events that had taken place only recently. History as a sequence of segmented events dependent upon rigorous chronology was a foreign concept to them. In order to further mutual comprehension, Marcos listened to the myths and parables of the Indians, and found his role transformed from ‘one of teacher to that of pupil’ (ibid.: 366). Marxist doctrine and Maoist method gave way to literary experiment, yet the dialectic remained. In coming to terms with the changing status of the Zapatista movement, Marcos describes it in patently oxymoronic terms: ‘a tender fury. A nameless name. An unjust peace made war. A death that is born. An anguish made hope. A pain that smiles. A silent shout’ (Marcos 2001a: 20). Two years before the uprising, he writes: ‘The prophecy is here: When the storm calms, when rain and fire again leave the country in peace, the world will no longer be the world’ (2001b: 37). Marcos had arrived to seize upon the revolutionary moment announced by imminent changes in the mode of production that would inevitably pit the peasants against corporate capitalism. This motivation did not disappear, but it became enmeshed within a complex network of processes at the heart of which was ‘the possibility for a human being to have a space for dignity’ (Higgins 2000: 368). The revolution became ‘essentially moral’ (ibid.). What was needed was not just the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, but a wholesale reconsideration of social relations starting at the local, communal level. By moving away from the principal contradiction of class struggle, attention spreads towards a boundless set of conceivable spaces of conceptual opposition, as illustrated in Marcos’ poetic juxtapositions of elements such as anguish and hope, joy and pain, and rain and fire. Having relinquished, in principle, his vanguardist leadership role, though not the visibility associated with it, Marcos comes to channel prophecies as a mere annunciatory vehicle.
Two millennia earlier, John the Baptist similarly shaped a revolutionary discourse by recuperating the classical elements of water and fire that structured early dialectics. John announced that he may baptise with water, but that one yet to come ‘shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire’ (Matthew 1997: 5). He refers to Jesus Christ, who will further John’s task of harvesting souls for the faith. The wielders of water and fire come to meet when Jesus insists that John baptises him. Jesus does not just confirm his predecessor in his role, but temporarily grants him baptismal authority in a reversal of positions between servant and Lord. This enjoining sparks recognition from above, and thus establishes a relation between the lower and the upper realms: ‘And lo a voice from heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well-pleased’ (ibid.). This statement, in turn, articulates the mystery of the Trinity – the unity of opposites between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The celestial movement of attraction and repulsion between these manifestations of the deity guide Biblical salvation history. In the scene of the baptism, the contradiction between the type that foreshadows and the antitype that fulfils is resolved in divine approval of their interpenetration, the catalyst that sanctions the spread of the faith. Prefiguration is a dialectical movement, in as far as its typological progression from type through antitype to interpretative interpenetration corresponds to the scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Marcos, moving away from the Maoists and Liberation Theologians co-occupying the Mexican jungle, begins their discourse anew.

Revolutionary poetry, as old as writing, finds a significant incarnation in the dialectical experiments of Subcomandante Marcos in his capacity of prophet. Earlier applications of the same scheme can be found throughout the history of revolutionary poetics, perhaps most explicitly in the work of the Surrealist art movement. Breton, the movement’s principal theorist, repeatedly echoes Marx in his insistence ‘that the activity of interpreting the world must continue to be linked with the activity of changing the world’ (Breton 1969: 240). He argues for the application of ‘dialectical materialism as a general theory of knowledge’ and identifies Hegel as the inventor of ‘the dialectical machine’ (ibid.: 237). The metaphor of the machine is not coincidental, but expresses the surrealist tendency to value automatism, or unconscious creation. Automatism for some time served as ‘the immobile prime mover of the surrealist movement’ (Laurent 1989: 114). Giving free reign to the unconscious would dialectically resolve the opposition between ‘perception and representation’ that mires the
revolutionary imagination (Breton 1969: 278). By extracting the anomalous from the mind and projecting it, surrealism aimed to provoke an answer from ‘outer reality’ (ibid.). It sought to induce a revelation. It is somewhat unclear which entity is invoked, but ‘it may be predicted that in large measure this something will be’ (ibid.).

2.1.4 Surrealism, Situationism, and Soviet Cinema

Breton (1969: 27) playfully lists precursors and contemporary inspirations of the surrealist movement: ‘Saint-Pol Roux is Surrealist in his use of symbols. Fargue is Surrealist in the atmosphere. Vaché is Surrealist in me. Reverdy is Surrealist at home. Saint-Jean [sic] Perse is Surrealist at a distance’. The list extends beyond these boundaries, but the extract suffices to illustrate Breton’s procedure. With every new identification, linguistic categories blend into each other. The element of containment in shifts from indicating function (use of symbols) to location (the atmosphere) to influence (me). Location is further infused with the elements of situation (at home), and perception (at a distance). In Breton’s list as a whole, the central term Surrealism thus serves as a conduit for subtle changes of interpretation that defy synthetic integration unless one is willing to suspend the difference between perception and representation, the merger of which resolves the contradictions introduced by Surrealism’s arrival upon the particular page and the historical scene. While identifying Surrealists, Breton is both denying and calling forth a definite content for Surrealism. The potential impact of Surrealism’s announced arrival increases in tandem with the suspension of its definitive articulation. Consequently, for surrealism, ‘the problem of action, of immediate action to be taken, remains intact’ (ibid.: 210). No coherent strategy can result from its shifting occupations. The problem is how one may ‘reconcile Surrealism as a method of creating a collective myth with the much more general movement involving the liberation of man’ (ibid.). In Surrealist practice, the realization of art and the realization of a revolutionary politics coincide, but they mainly do so in a belated arrival, in the promise of a will be.

Debord (2014: 103), in an appreciative critique of Surrealism’s efforts, ascribes the movement’s inadequacy for generating social change to its attempt ‘to realize art without abolishing it’. Dadaism, the attempt to ‘abolish art without realizing it’, is presented as its logical counterpart, and their synthesis results in Situationism (ibid.). Situationism thus aims
to mobilize, within artistic practice, the Marxist equation of the simultaneous abolition and realization of philosophy that transforms interpretation into social change. It operates in reaction to the observation, articulated by Debord shortly before the events of May 1968, that ‘in societies where modern conditions of production prevail, life is presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles’ (ibid.: 2). In other words, ‘history has been arrested in representations’ (Collier 2016: 14). Furthermore, each representation is an instance of ‘reification and commodification’ serving as an icon of the ‘total submission before capital’ (Bonnett 1999: 25). Consequently, the social imagination has been stunted, and the task of revolutionary art is to illustrate ‘the limitations of existing social practices’, or to ‘reveal the inadequacy of the present’ (ibid.: 28). A decade before Debord’s theoretical intervention, the Situationist International had already indicated that the preferred strategy for the creation of alternative imageries was détournement, ‘the reuse of pre-existing artistic elements in a new ensemble…that confers on each element its new scope and effect’ (Internationale Situationniste 1959). The practice combines both ‘parody and seriousness’ and responds to the ‘urgent necessity and the near impossibility of initiating and carrying out a totally innovative collective action’ (ibid.).

Among contenders such as be reasonable, demand the impossible and it is forbidden to forbid, the motto beneath the cobblestones, the beach (sous les pavés, la plage) has become the ‘definitive slogan’ of both the Situationist movement and the French uprisings of 1968 in general (Collier 2013: 13). The slogan captures the opposition between nature and culture, or spontaneity and civilization. Historically, paved roads serve as the conduits of both imperial expansion and dissolution. Mediating these contradictions, one finds the opposition between destruction and creation enacted through the suggested removal of cobblestones. The injunction to build barricades and assault authority figures with rocks is barely implicit. The practice of reassembling pre-existing elements into a new ensemble thus travels from the simple observation that roads rest on sand to the incitement of violent liberation, which abolishes the slogan’s artistic function by realising its imperative. As indicated by its alliterative structure, the phrase, despite its serious implications, is too playful not to be slightly detached and ironic. This playfulness, however, is essential. Irony is exceptionally situational in its determinations. It overturns the univocal interpretation of signs and distorts the coherence of discourse by flouting its maxims, thus calling for an
investigation of context that must ultimately reveal the status of society as a repressive spectacle (Grice 1975). The representational crisis and the riotous barricade are to emerge together. Situationists find resources for inciting this dual insurgence in ‘mutation’, a strategy of ‘rupture from within’ adequate to a historical epoch in which ‘alternative spaces outside the system cannot be developed’ (Bonnett 1999: 25).

While the walls of Paris were being covered in luid revolutionary slogans, behind these walls, a similar movement was set in motion by the condensed slogans of a continental academic tradition overwriting its canonical heritage. Différance arrives in the gap between perception and representation, gesturing, through a silent, wilful misspelling of différence, to the incongruities of speech and writing, which it desires to re-mark but refuses to resolve. In this capacity, différance is said to be ‘neither a concept nor a word’ (Derrida 1981: 40). If it had a definition, ‘it would be precisely the limit, the interruption of the Hegelian relève wherever it operates’ (ibid.: 40-41). Hegel teases out ‘binary oppositions’ and works through their contradictions only in order to introduce ‘a third term’ that brings resolution (ibid.: 43-44). Différence, contesting this process, requires a double ‘gesture’ of traversing beyond the oppositions, but without neutralizing them, and such would be the role of deconstruction (ibid.: 41). This process of examination thus produces an ‘irreducible and generative multiplicity’ captured by the term dissemination, which ‘means nothing, and cannot be reassembled into a definition’ (ibid.: 44-45). Différence and deconstruction are coined to encapsulate contradictions that do not seek resolution, but rather set in motion a process of contamination furthering a general détournement of philosophy as text. Dissemination, in resisting the final assembly, spreads undecidability. Différence, deconstruction, and dissemination are metaphors for motion, the force that drives dialectics yet threatens to swallow it at the point of simultaneous realisation and abolition. Resisting the dialectical closure immunises the terms conducting this motion from being affected by the discourse they generate. Différence becomes the immovable prime mover of deconstruction, a surrealist automatism unworking every act of formative appropriation that would settle the separation of master from slave in the process of signification.

Surrealism, and the various intellectual, artistic, and revolutionary movements that inform it or follow in its wake, all aim to set in motion the dialectical machine through the suggestive capacities of representational assembly. As illustrated above, Surrealism employs, among
other methods, the motif of the list for this purpose. Historically, the practice of listing is likely to have extensively developed in tandem with ‘the coming of writing’, which consequently produced ‘a change in consciousness’ heavily affected by the possibility of logographically manipulating the perceived universe (Goody 1977: 75). As an ordering principle, the list may be distinguished from schemata such as taxonomies or networks, as it often consists in naming a number of properties ‘without trying to establish a hierarchical relationship among them’ (Eco 2009: 18). Listing may thus indicate ‘an imprecise image of the universe’ characteristic of ‘primitive cultures’ that are yet to decide upon the exact relation between the variety of concepts and entities that populate the mental and physical world (ibid.). Primitive, in this sense, means foundational. The construction of a list corresponds to the establishment of an emerging worldview eliciting the authority on which it is founded. Listing is also ‘a mode of classifying’ that creates a ‘semantic field’ which ‘includes some items and excludes others’ (Goody 1977: 103). Détournement and différance serve as procedures that fracture the semantic field’s fencing to allow for a process of cross-fertilisation, cultivation and consumption that does not discriminate between peasant and poacher. They are equals in the eyes of dissemination, which the dialectic machine perceives as montage, the dynamic equivalent of Surrealist collage and Situationist bricolage.

The Soviet film director Eisenstein considered montage to be ‘a tool for disassembling and reassembling the flow of historical phenomena in order to produce connections, sequences and constellations capable of revealing morphological analogies between apparently heterogeneous forms that are different from one another in time and space’ (Somaini 2016: 21). In other words, montage, the ‘nerve of cinema’, fashions prefigurative correspondences, and it does so dialectically (Eisenstein 1977a: 48). In discussing his silent movie The Battleship Potemkin, Eisenstein mentions the influence of Engels’s Dialectics of Nature, the laws of which were discussed above (Eisenstein 1977c: 160, Eisenstein 2000). Numerous scenes in The Battleship Potemkin can be interpreted as direct applications of these laws. Originally released in the U.S.S.R. in 1925, the movie commemorates the 1905 Russian Revolution, an uprising that foreshadowed the events of 1917, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Soviet Union. The topic of the film is a mutiny of sailors against officers, which later develops into a fight between Tsarist military and the populace of Odessa. The
film’s opening scenes show the rising frustration of the sailors as they are continually mistreated by their officers. The conflict escalates when the sailors find the meat intended for their meal to be infested with maggots. The officers, with the support of the ship’s doctor Smirnov, deny there is an issue with the food, and order it to be prepared and served. While the cook commences to cut up the meat, the discussion goes back and forth. The mess hall is shown to be arranged for the meal. Intermittently, the screen shows a pot of boiling soup. Finally, an intertitle appears, which reads: ‘boiling soup’.

Intertitles, in the movie, are used for a variety of purposes, broadly divisible in four categories. Firstly, quotation serves to frame the historical and ideological significance of the events. The movie opens, for instance, with a quote from Lenin stating that revolution is the only just war. Second, intertitles are used for the identification of protagonists and antagonists, as in the case of doctor Smirnov. Thirdly, intertitles serve to spell out reported speech. In all three cases, the necessity of textual intervention is clear. Images could not deliver identical information. The fourth category of intertitles, however, provides descriptions of the images shown, as in the case of boiling soup, which follows an image of boiling soup. Its function is only revealed with reference to the immediately following intertitle, which reads ‘The men seethed with rage’. Combined, both intertitles instantiate the well-known conceptual metaphor ‘ANGER IS THE HEAT OF FLUID IN A CONTAINER’ (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987: 198). The men refuse to eat the soup, yet continue their labour, until they are confronted on deck by the ship’s captain, who orders that ‘All who enjoyed their soup, step forward!’ The petty officers do, the sailors do not. The bourgeois sides with the aristocracy, and are ordered to turn against the sailors, who are sentenced to death. The class struggle takes off when the soup reaches boiling point. Or, as Engels illustrates the law of the transformation of quantity into quality: liquids have a ‘definite freezing and boiling point at a given pressure’ (Engels 1939b). In intensifying capitalist conditions, revolt is inevitable.

Upon hearing the proclamation of a common death sentence, a sailor looks up at one of the ship’s towering masts, which takes the shape of a cross. Shot from below, the image is reminiscent of the Christian icon of veneration that symbolises Jesus’ sacrifice. Gradually, the man sees the shapes of hanged men appear, dangling from the crossbars, a vision of his imminent demise both confirming the sacrificial function of the cross, yet negating the
procedure of crucifixion. The condemned men try to escape, but as there is no escape for
the proletariat out of capitalist conditions, there is no outside the boat for the sailor at sea.
They are driven together for execution. A priest appears on the scene. The petty officers
ready their guns. The priest is seen clenching a miniature cross. The officers take aim. A
sailor’s voice erupts, awakening the officers out of their false consciousness: ‘Brothers! Who
are you shooting at?’ The officers do not fire. The revolution breaks out. The sailors take
hold of the guns. The priest holds high his cross. Wielding it to make way, he implores
‘Remember the Lord’. He is pushed over and falls down. So does the cross. The iconography
of the crucifixion and its institutional power have both been negated, yet the element of
sacrifice granting the cross its particular force has not. The primary agitator, Vakulinchuk,
gives his life in the revolt. Once ashore in Odessa, the sailors set up a shrine to honour him.
A placard placed on his body reads: ‘killed for a plate of soup’. Rumour spreads about the
noble martyr. Men come to pay their respects. Women kneel and gather round weeping.
People sing: ‘Eternal glory for those who died for the revolution!’ The plate of soup has
overcome the cross, and in the process the seed of sacrifice, separated from the stalk of
institutional religion, gives rise to revolution dedicated to a higher calling. At work is Engels’s
law of the ‘negation of the negation’, which, through a recurrent process of shedding roots
and bearing fruit, gradually works towards ‘perfection’ (Engels 1947).

The phrase killed for a plate of soup appears on a placard shown within a shot, and thus calls,
in translation, for a subtitle to an image rather than to an intertitle. This happens once
before, early on in The Battleship Potemkin. Before the mutiny, two sailors are shown
reluctantly doing the washing up. Among the white dishes, one black plate passes through
their hands. The plate carries a circular inscription along its edge. The sailor is shown turning
the plate to read it. He mouths the words: ‘Give us this day our daily bread’. He frowns,
shows his comrades, then angrily smashes the plate. The plate is smashed because it
signifies a betrayal of the promise of proper sustenance. The inscription itself is a request,
and only comes to be read as a promise after its perceived betrayal. The inference made by
the sailor requires the perception of a fundamental injustice in the failure of masters to
sustain their servants which is both provoked and confirmed by the prayer. The request not
met transforms into a promise betrayed, and ultimately takes the form of an imperative
that, if not obeyed, justifies violence: ‘Give us this day our daily bread!’.
Within this scene, subtitles have a major impact on the position of the spectator. The phrase ‘Give us this day our daily bread’ is completed in the subtitles before the sailor has given the last turn to the plate, and before he has finished mouthing the words. The movement towards the revelation of betrayal is thus initiated within the viewer before it manifests on screen, and the smashing of the plate becomes an anticipated event that, when fulfilled, inaugurates a cathartic process that promises the sailor as well as the spectator further appeasement through violence. Through the particular sequencing of the montage, and reinforced by the apparition of text, the film generates what Eisenstein considered, next to its organic compositions, the film’s most significant quality: pathos (Eisenstein 1977c: 159).

The third and final law of dialectics, ‘the interpenetration of opposites’, was illustrated by Engels with reference to the cosmic forces of attraction and repulsion, the principles of galactic pathos (Engels 1939a). The plate, which has taken the place of the cross, exemplifies the interaction of these forces in the generation of an object on the one hand ‘sacred’ or ‘consecrated’, and on the other ‘dangerous, forbidden, and unclean’ (Freud 1938: 41). The plate, like the cross, symbolises both promise and betrayal, violence and reconcilement, growth and destruction.

Eisenstein (1977b: 38) asserts that ‘montage is conflict’, and that conflict is ‘the basis of every art’. Heraclitus says: ‘War is father of all and king of all’ (Kahn 1979: 67). It is not a coincidence that dialectics finds a fertile ground in the field of cinema. Dialectical philosophy and cinematic production both aim to capture motion, and thus to manipulate the passing of time. Movies such as The Battleship Potemkin developed Eisenstein’s understanding of ‘how cinema could contribute to the production of a powerful, epic vision of history and to the construction of a widely shared collective memory’ (Somani 2016: 28). For this purpose, Eisenstein interrupts ‘the continuous flow of time in order to produce sequences of anachronic junctures’ (ibid.). Through montage, events are placed outside of time and reintegrated with other events that foreshadow and fulfil them. This prefigurative paradigm is clearly on display when Eisenstein critiques ‘Russian Orthodoxy by portraying revolutionaries and their supporters as saintly’, yet does so by borrowing ‘not only the images of the church but also its logic’ (ibid.: 62-63). In reassembling a received iconography, Eisenstein’s art seeks to ‘create new views by creating contradictions in its audience’ (ibid.: 52). The contradictions require a transcendent resolution, and thus encourage the audience
‘to transform their perception of the quotidian into an awareness of something grander than themselves’ (ibid.: 63). Eisenstein stages the unfolding historical drama and extends an invitation to partake in its development.

2.1.5 Demands and Slogans

If the Zapatista uprising is perceived as a remarkable success in the struggle against global capitalism, and a prime example of prefigurative practice, *Occupy Wall Street* is frequently characterised as its dysfunctional heir. Popular assemblies find parallel application in movements ‘around the world from the Zapatistas to the Occupy Movement’, but the latter is often deemed a ‘manifest failure’ for its inability ‘to effect transformative structural change, or articulate a coherent vision of an alternative society’ (Gardiner 2017: 32, Nail 2016: 377). Occupy ‘refused to affiliate with non-governmental organizations or political parties and resisted providing a unified list of demands’ (Permut 2016: 180). The single ‘unified slogan provided by the movement was the statement ‘We are the 99%’’ (ibid.).

These characteristics can indeed be read as markers of political pubescence, but they also bear witness to a significant dialectical motion. The 99% is an abstract, numerical category that comes to serve as an identifier of class through the transformation of quantity into quality. It is the marker of a servant’s self-consciousness, only established in recognition of the master. For Occupy, identity is determined by economic inequality, which reveals itself as the primary contradiction, the element that requires intervention.

The movement seizes upon the financial industry’s metaphorical connection to a particular location, *Wall Street*, the realm of pure commerce, exchange or transaction, and sets up a human barricade. The motion of capital is interrupted. The commoners rise from beneath the corporations as the beach from below the cobblestones. They cannot be ignored, yet do not receive recognition. Claims of leaderless organisation are relegated to the realms of ‘mythology and public performance’ (Smucker 2014). Occupy is considered too disorganised, yet surreptitiously too organised, subject to ‘the tyranny of structurelessness’, a phrase that cannot fail to echo ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Freeman 2004). Participants in the Occupy movement are actors, only representing the perennial 99%, and further extending the invitation to play the part of the ‘part with no part’ (Rancière 1999: 11). The script is easy to remember: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’
Capitalism continually intensifies ‘the contradiction between the exploiting and the exploited classes’ (Mao 1967: 47). We are the 99% does not merely separate the bondsmen from the lords, but refers to an increasingly symmetrical antagonism between both parties.

The mobilisations of the Global Justice Movement, which took place at the turn of the century, framed themselves as ‘carnivals against capitalism’, and ‘festivals of resistance’ (Graeber 2013: 240). In contrast, Occupy was less ‘whimsical’ (ibid.). Today, carnival ‘connotes parody, hence a strengthening of the law’ (Kristeva 1986: 50). Actions aimed at ‘overturning traditional values’, reversing hierarchies, and transgressing laws contribute to the perception of the social order as necessary rather than unduly repressive (McKenna 1992: 35). Music festivals, for instance, are massive modern carnivals that create frenzied, permissive micro-societies, yet after a number of days, exit queues brim with nothing but the desire to go home, to return to established conditions. This return is currently a remarkably docile procedure. Historically, carnivalesque conditions are ‘the foreplay of bloodletting’ (ibid.). Carnival, at heart, is ‘murderous, cynical and revolutionary in the sense of dialectical transformation’ (Kristeva 1986: 50). Yet only if it is not whimsical. Occupy Wall Street, it is argued, ‘is not a party, it’s a community’ (Graeber 2013: 240). The establishment of a community, Eisenstein believes, requires the ‘dismemberment and reconstitution of a sacrificial body’ (Somani 2016: 64). The daily bread has been withheld. At the encampment, the signs read: ‘eat the rich’ (Cassidy 2011).

Hegel (2001: 332) wrote that ‘a political revolution is sanctioned in men’s opinions when it repeats itself’. Presenting a prefigurative reading of history developing through foreshadowing and fulfilment, he explains that through ‘repetition that which at first appeared merely as a matter of chance and contingency becomes a real and ratified existence’ (ibid.). Marx, commenting on the failed 1848 revolution, reverses the pattern, stating that all great world events occur twice, yet ‘the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce’ (Marx 1994: 187). In 1848, the insurgents copied ‘names, battle-cries and costumes’ from previous revolutions; their ‘borrowed language’ revealed the uprising to be a mere ‘parody’ (ibid.: 188). Occupy Wall Street does not borrow demands. The movement explicitly distances itself from the ‘hackneyed and inappropriate’ revolutionary vocabulary of the past (Graeber 2013: 38). A single phrase is uttered. Its content is numerical, adopting...
the impersonal, calculated sign-system of their opponents in the finance industry, yet imbuing it with functions of identity, antagonism and threat. *We are the 99%* is both untrue, and ambiguous in its implications. In other words, it is an ‘inconsequent statement’, a figure ‘germance to carnivalesque language’ (Kristeva 1986: 49). The statement does not change form but assumes different roles as it furthers the dialectical machine from the proclamation of a group identity to a claim to power, and thus displays, semiotically, the cornerstone and stumbling block of prefigurative politics: means-ends equivalence.

The occupation has dissolved, but the slogan is not yet exhausted. If the core of the carnival is to reveal itself, the events of 2011 may, in hindsight, turn from performance into rehearsal. If farce turns into tragedy, the slogan’s numerical value can serve as a moral value. After the sacrifice, the justification, the response to the demands of a reinstated reason. Justice through unanimity: *We are the 99%*. The formation of a community that finds self-consciousness with reference to a historical 1% that structures a muted memory. Trading halls turn into temples. Wall Street still a bloodstained altar. Viscosity: attraction and repulsion – the abject, taboo. In its shifting applications, not all of which have been fulfilled, the slogan exemplifies a discourse of carnival that ‘breaks through the laws of language censored by grammar and semantics and, at the same time, is a social and political protest’ (Kristeva 1986: 36). There can be no difference between ‘challenging official linguistic codes and challenging official law’ (ibid.: 49). Melucci (1996: 358) reaches the same conclusion: ‘it is enough to structure reality using different words for the power monopoly over reality to crumble’ (ibid.). These statements are injunctions, which may be read as mandatory or prohibitory, depending on what one perceives to either light or loom behind the law. The issue of obedience and resistance to linguistically codified norms will be further explored in section 2.2.

In this section I have focused on the revolutionary potential of particular semiotic interventions. Dialectical movement has proven particularly useful as a framework to come to terms with various expressions of linguistic dissent, not only because contemporary social movement research produces formulations closely aligned to the tradition of process philosophy, but also because the Marxist dialectic has explicitly inspired a number of historical revolutionary movements in their endeavour to effect social change through the manipulation of language. Whether the gradual resolution of contradictions is seen as a
process one should either resist or accelerate depends upon particular historical conditions and ideological predilections. The Zapatista movement, for instance, has come to operate under the principle of balance. The contradictions between the local and the global, autonomy and delegation, and reform and revolution have come to inform rather than erase each other. Surrealism, on the other hand, aims to liberate the unconscious, and in this regard suggests that one celebrate the leap into the unknown, whatever it may bring. Both operate in the prophetic mode, along rhetorically similar lines of fragmentation and re-assembly, but their visions of liberation are not necessarily congruous, if at all clear. This short overview of revolutionary language use ended with a consideration of Occupy’s main slogan, which was shown to reproduce the primacy of the class struggle, and to express the potential for radical revolutionary change, including, as the historical pattern would suggest, its implications of violence.

The movement, however, was not violent, and the contemporary tendency for protest movements to operate peacefully if the conditions allow it is in many ways remarkable. Nonviolent resistance, as prototypically exemplified by Gandhi’s Salt March, requires a strong moral code, and in today’s prefigurative politics one finds indeed a strong focus on principles. The issue of means-ends equivalence that opened this chapter is, in part, a moral rather than strategic determination, which has also come to deeply affect communicative practices in prefigurative social movements. That is to say, the codification of conduct in accordance with an envisaged social structure finds parallel expression in the linguistic sphere. If language can be mobilised as a tool for resistance and transgression, it can equally serve to consolidate processes of consent and coercion that determine shared principles of speech. Section 2.2 engages with political correctness, which has in recent decades come to the foreground as a central factor in the negotiation of gender and race relations. I argue that the normative concerns exemplified by the paradigm of political correctness are as important as the transgressive tendencies described above to characterise the language of prefigurative politics.

2.2 Political Correctness

In the early 1970s, as disappointment with the intellectuals of the ‘old left’ and with the Soviet Union’s political evolution grew, socialist revolutionaries across the globe found
alternative inspiration in the work of Mao (Wallerstein 1989: 436). For Mao, ‘it is the masses, rather than the intellectuals, who spontaneously generate revolutionary ideas’ (Barker 2002: 32). In order to ‘counter-balance the primacy of the party-state, Mao envisaged the transition to communism as ‘a process rooted in grassroots structures of authority’ such as ‘revolutionary committees’ and ‘communes’ (Boggs 1977: 120). Regarding the historical task of the proletariat, Mao ‘laid great stress on spontaneous action, rather than the mere mechanical execution of orders’ (Schram 1968: x). In order for the revolution to be successful, however, the people’s spontaneity had to be guided by a set of values and principles able to combat the oppressive ‘patterns inherited from the past’ (ibid.). In order to foster initiative on the part of the people, they had to be subjected to processes of ‘thought-reform’ that would empower them to take up their historical role (ibid.).

In 1965, in recognition of the importance of instruction for effective action, China’s armed forces were, as mentioned in section 2.1.2, provided with a book of quotations by Mao, whose thought was to represent ‘the application of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism’ (General Political Department 1968: xxxi). One year later, the government issued ‘tens of millions of copies’ of the Quotations for the benefit of the general populace (Barnett 1968: v). Today, the ‘little red book’, credo of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, remains the second-most widely distributed work of all time, outnumbered only by the Bible. The Cultural Revolution aimed to purge remnant elements of capitalism from the nation, a process that demanded the whole population’s political participation, and Mao’s thought would ‘arm the minds of the people’ for the final struggle with bourgeois bad faith (Piao 1968: xxiii). Considered universal in application, people were urged to consult the book for guidance regarding ‘every field of activity’ (ibid.). In short, the recognition of the role of the masses in the production of ideas ultimately led Communist China ‘to amalgamate all the elements of social practice under the strict jurisdiction of the party line’ (Barker 2002: 20).

Mao came to insist that the official party line must at all times be safeguarded from deviant speech, thought and behaviour, a stance that came to be known as ‘political correctness’ (Hughes 2010: 63). In the late 1960s, the American New Left adopted the phrase, but the idea remained relatively out of the spotlight until the late 1980s, when it surfaced on university campuses across the United States (ibid.: 3, 63). While still predominantly relevant to the realm of Anglophone academia, the present-day variety of political
correctness has spread throughout various political and professional environments, mainly across the Western world. In its current guise, the phenomenon ‘is fundamentally concerned with changing norms’ (ibid.: 38). The main targets are ‘offensive language, prejudiced attitudes, and insulting behaviour towards the marginalized’ (ibid.: 8). The aim is to ‘undo past injustices’ in order to [improve] social relations’ (ibid.: 3). The strategy mainly consists of introducing ‘new, neutral, and unfamiliar lexical forms’ while simultaneously ‘[diminishing] the currency of established demeaning vocabulary’ (ibid.: 16).

Political correctness encompasses a highly normative set of communicative practices mobilised to further a moral agenda. The prescriptions and proscriptions of the politically correct paradigm therefore form a ‘progressive orthodoxy’, a still-developing mode of heightened awareness of the part language plays in either sustaining or challenging existing inequalities, the ultimate aim of which is to change the world by changing the language used to describe and interpret it (Halmari 2011: 830, Hughes 2010: 46). This description of political correctness fits the description of prefigurative politics as explicitly extended, in Translation Studies, to the realm of semiotics.

2.2.1 Prefiguration in Translation Studies

Taviano (2016: 284), defines ‘prefigurative politics’ as ‘political activism aiming at the construction of an alternative world in the present, rather than in an ideal future’, and applies this paradigm to the field of semiotic production. Her most extensively developed example concerns Desert Heat, a hip hop duo from the United Arab Emirates. Focusing on the duo’s song Terror Alert, she illustrates how it presents a ‘sharp contrast between the Western labelling of Arabs and the reality that Palestinians experience as human beings’ (ibid.: 290). The song’s music video presents images of the horrors Palestinians in Gaza undergo, and hints at the complicity of the international community. These images are accompanied with a vocal ‘repetition of the term “terrorist”’ (ibid.). The label is thus detached from the suffering Arab population and passed on to the international war machine and its representatives. The aim of the song is to challenge ‘Western prejudice’, and to provide alternatives to ‘predominant narratives’ of terrorism and resistance (ibid.: 290-291). The activist lyricists of Desert Heat aim to ‘subvert stereotypes’ in order to
‘illustrate the shortcomings of certain categories by asserting their [multifaceted] identity’, and by providing an “insider’s version” of Palestinians’ experiences (ibid.: 291).

Taviano’s main theoretical point of reference is Baker (e.g. 2016a: 6), who advocates, in a collection of texts concerning the Egyptian Revolution, the prefigurative use of language ‘to construct an alternative world in the here and now’ (ibid.). One of the contributions in the volume addresses translational practices within the YouTube interview series Words of Women from the Egyptian Revolution (Mortada 2016). The Words of Women collective expresses ‘its commitment to a queer and transfeminist politics’ by replacing ‘the masculine o and feminine a with x’ in the Spanish subtitles it provides with its videos (ibid.: 134). Mortada (ibid.: 133-134) explains how there had been considerations of adopting a common strategy regarding Spanish gender-neutral subtitling, namely replacing the masculine o and feminine a with @. Challenging the patriarchy would thus consist in the replacement of ‘both todos and todas’ with tod@s. However, it is increasingly common for members of the queer community to completely reject the binary, and sensitive to such orientations, Words of Women decided to use an x, opting for todxs rather than tod@, in order to fully break with the possibility of interpreting @ as ‘a visual combination of the masculine o and feminine a’ (ibid.: 134). While the translators showed concern ‘about the implications of imposing [their] queer politics on the speaking subject’, they decided in favour of general ‘non-conformity’, given that the erosion of the ‘hetero-normative binary’ was central to ‘the landscape of the revolution and the vision of the world [they wished] to create’ (ibid.: 134-135).

Both Taviano’s and Baker’s examples are attempts at thought-reform meant to challenge prejudice. In Taviano’s example, the term terrorist is reclaimed by representatives of the group it is commonly and uncritically applied to, namely Arabs. Appropriation is meant to expose the inappropriateness of imposing labels that ignore intra-group differences. Highlighting the subjective nature of the term terrorist ultimately delegitimises its application, and suggests that the concept corresponding to the term is unfit to categorise human beings. Ultimately, this lexically induced realisation should alter intercultural conduct on the part of the receiving public. The strategy employed by Words of Women functions similarly, but is linguistically more demanding. The substitution of x for a and o in the Spanish vocabulary defies pronunciation. Given the audiovisual and multilingual setting
of this subtitling intervention, as well as the continuously contextualising nature of linguistic exchange, the viewer of the queered textual material will receive conflicting information, and will therefore be presented with a choice: either mentally back-translate into the common tongue or adhere to the ideological framework and overrule hxx [sic?] sense of sight, hearing and socialisation. The latter choice requires a rupture with received patterns of thought: perception must be altered so as to discard the category of gender. The absence of gender distinctions is meant to end oppression for those excluded by the binary that shapes the category. For this purpose, signs are made to clash with their environment in the belief that they can reshape it. Or, as the rapper KRS-One states in another example offered by Taviano: the conviction is that ‘Words create reality’ (Taviano 2016: 285).

Such statements subscribe to the ‘doctrine of radical linguistic relativity’ most famously researched by Whorf (Kay and Kempton 1984: 65). Whorf was a subtle scholar who conceded that there are ‘connections but not correlations or diagnostic correspondences between cultural norms and linguistic patterns’, meaning that it would be impossible to predict what a society looked like if only provided with its language system (Whorf 2012: 204). The activist belief that linguistic interventions are able to actively restructure society presents an intensification of the Whorfian hypothesis that assumes not just a connection between broad cultural and linguistic patterns, but the possibility to seize upon these connections and operationalise them according to one’s transformative preferences. In short, the prefigurative potential of language as discussed by Baker and Taviano represents a mobilisation of linguistic relativity. In this context, the prefigurative label is novel, but the underlying logic is not. Phenomena characteristic of political correctness such as euphemism and linguistic reclamation provide prototypical examples of the same attitude towards language, and are therefore revealing about the alleged workings of prefiguration.

### 2.2.2 Euphemism and Reclamation

Euphemism denotes a linguistic act of substitution. Instead of using an expression that might cause offence, one opts for semantic circumlocution in order to avoid ‘direct reference to some embarrassing topic or condition’ (Hughes 2010: 18). The opposite strategy, the use of dysphemism, aims to frame a referent in a markedly harsh manner. Topics that generate a large amount of euphemistic language use are ‘[war], death, politics,
birth, fornication, bodily functions like excretion, reticence, social rank and other social relationships’ (Burchfield 1985: 28). As sensibilities change over time, some taboo subjects are treated with increased caution, while others are no longer in need of veiled language. A historical example concerns our interaction with the animal world. In Germanic and Slavonic culture, ‘the bear was at one time an object of terror’ (ibid.: 16). This explains why, in the languages of these cultures, the words used to refer to the animal in question do not stem from the Indo-European root for ‘bear’, but are ‘derivatives of the Indo-European noun meaning ‘the brown one’’ (ibid.).

An important aspect of euphemism is ‘the element of shared knowingness’ (Enright 1985: 10). Calling a bear ‘the brown one’ would not make sense if the actual reference was opaque. The object of terror must not be named because its presence is unwelcome, yet discourse cannot do without a conventional terminology for the animal. This token avoidance of a taboo subject suggests a strange belief that one can, in fact, trick the universe in conversation. The object of distress is not named and therefore not present, while it is still, although slyly or cautiously, identified. In ethnographical writings, one finds reference to a commonly observed ‘prohibition against pronouncing the name of the deceased’ (Freud 1938: 94). The Masai in Africa resolve the complications resulting from this taboo by ‘changing the name of the deceased immediately upon his death’, seemingly assured ‘that the ghost does not know his new name and will not find out’ (ibid.: 95). At work here are sets of contradictory assumptions about the way language and its referents interact. On the one hand, there is a belief that words and things are one and the same, that a bear and bear are equally frightening. One would be inclined to consider, in this respect, the act of naming as an act of summoning that equates the mention of a reference and its apparition. On the other hand, the use of euphemism indicates a belief in the arbitrariness of the sign: the set of sounds suitable for referring to a single referent can be reconfigured at will.

The preoccupations of euphemistic coinage are subject to change. While large mammals such as bears no longer pose a threat, and are therefore no longer considered a taboo subject, in our age ‘a marked tendency has emerged to place screens of euphemism round the terminology of politics and race’ (Burchfield 1985: 14). At present, one encounters the
circulation of numerous lexical items specifically moulded ‘in the hopes that attitudes towards disadvantaged groups will change if language is reformed’ (Halmari 2011: 829). ‘Ethnic’, for example, is used ‘as a euphemism for ‘black and brown’’, and ‘the poor’ have been called ‘deprived’, ‘underprivileged’, and ‘disadvantaged’ (Hoggart 1985: 176). The latter example shows that political taboo subjects such as divisions of class and race generate many competing euphemisms that might obtain general currency for a while, but are bound to be replaced by others in the long run. Indeed, the use of euphemism tends to set in motion a ‘chain reaction’ of replacements, as the initial substitutions ‘become tainted by association with what they seek to disguise’ (Halmari 2011: 829, Hughes 2010: 18).

Euphemistic chains suggest that while naming issues or referents differently might avoid causing offence, it is less effective in altering deep-seated attitudes. The chain, generated by association, serves as a conduit for a process of contamination that transfers received attitudes upon novel signifiers. Consequently, circumlocution does not emancipate a referent. One might even take the opposite stance: the fact that it is deemed necessary to reinvent the language used for referring to people of colour or the poor suggests that the people discussed require a degree of avoidance reminiscent of predatory animals and malevolent spirits. Euphemism may function as an accusation of impropriety. In other words, the assumption of linguistic relativity that underpins the use of euphemism may just as well counteract its potential for generating social change.

The importance of ingrained attitudes to the referent in question becomes all the more clear when one considers the practice of ‘[linguistic] reclamation, also known as linguistic resignification or reappropriation’ (Brontsema 2004: 1). The practice involves the adoption of a pejorative or hateful term that stigmatises a certain group of people, by those people themselves, in a way that affirms their value and self-determination. As an instance of value reversal, reclamation is closely linked to style figures such as irony and sarcasm. Whereas, in the past, one could not ‘refer to himself as a nigger without either a total lack of self-pride or bitter sarcasm’, today ‘[those] who cannot conceive of nigger as anything but a racial epithet subscribe to an out-group interpretation that fails to recognize the complexity and diversity of nigger’s in-group usage’ (Lakoff 1973: 58, Brontsema 2004: 7). Broadly speaking, ‘nigger remains a term of insult when used by whites of blacks (as it was originally), the reclamation usage being current only among some blacks’ (Hughes 2010: 30). The divide
between insiders and outsiders points to the privilege of those initially stigmatised to exempt themselves from a linguistic proscription. This privilege, however, can be transferred to members of other ethnic groups by the so-called *n-word pass*, which grants a non-black person, should they wish to do so, the right to address their black peers with the word *nigger*. In May 2018, for example, the leading hip hop artist Kendrick Lamar performed at the Hangout Festival in Alabama, and ‘invited a white fan on stage to rap along with him’ for the duration of the song ‘m.A.A.d. City’ (O’Hagan 2018). Faithful to the lyrics, the woman in question uttered the word *nigger* multiple times. Booing noises emanated from the audience. Lamar interrupted the performance and asked her not to voice a specific term. She apologised. The woman assumed she had received an *n-word pass* along with the invitation to come on stage, but the privilege was not granted. Hip hop is currently the best-selling music genre in the world, and is heavily dominated by Black artists using a reclaimed vocabulary that remains taboo for a major portion of fans. The concept of the *n-word pass* does not refer to a physical object and might be considered a joke, but it points towards a major cultural complication.

The example of Lamar’s performance intensifies interracial tensions, but reclamation may also engender the opposite effect, as illustrated by the spread of linguistic practices initiated by black people on a number of social media platforms, most notably Twitter (Brock 2012). Blacks use ‘Twitter disproportionately more than other demographic groups’, and they have also been noted to use it in a different manner (ibid.: 530). While Twitter may serve multiple purposes, such as consulting the news or supporting a brand, it is suggested that black users are more likely than others to employ the platform to engage in conversations with acquaintances, thus creating elaborate reciprocal conversations (ibid.: 543). Seeking to contextualise their utterances for the complex network in which they engage, blacks were among the early adopters of the ‘user-created meta-discourse convention’ according to which a hashtag serves as an ‘expressive modifier’ (ibid.: 534). Intra-conversational homogeneous use of hashtags generates viral trends that become visible to users initially uninvolved in the developing discourse. Often noted for its humorous and engaging content, *Black Twitter* evolved from a niche into a model to emulate.

A recurrent source of humorous discourse on Twitter concerns internet memes, running gags mostly consisting of a formulaic image and caption. Numerous popular meme formats
play on recognisability. Black people’s comical observations on recognisable behaviour are often introduced by the phrase ‘Niggas be like’ (Caldwell 2018). Joking about (sub)cultural behaviour has spread to humorous observations on any sort of worldly entity, resulting in phrases such as cat niggas be like, typically accompanied with a picture of a laser pointer and an inordinately excited feline. In this context, phrases such as white niggas and Chinese niggas have also surged in popularity. The term wigger or wigga, a contraction of white nigger, has been around for decades, and has been used both to ridicule and to acknowledge people from other ethnicities imitating black culture, whether it be in terms of a love for hip hop music or in terms of copying speech patterns associated with African-American vernacular (Smitherman 1994: 298). Within the format of benign jokes pointing out particular behavioural attitudes, however, the phrase white nigger mainly serves as a means of identification. The stigma of specification thus initially falls upon groups other than Blacks, who dominate this particular mode of joking. Whites are framed as the anomaly when ethnic precision is required, thus reversing the effect of phrases such as people of colour. The phrase black niggas, however, also occurs, indicating a further process towards synonymy between people, or even beings, and niggas. These developments are heavily influenced by social media usage in the United States. Within this particular context, the lexical reclamation process has progressed to the point where a former slur can be applied, often with humorous effect, to every conceivable entity. As a result, the racial tensions and divisions inherent in the term’s usage are ultimately neutralised.

2.2.3 The Pronoun Controversy

Whereas euphemism and reappropriation are primarily concerned with the way in which something or someone is represented, other strands of political correctness have focused upon whether or not something is represented in the first place. The best known example concerns the battle against the assumption that the masculine pronoun can be apolitically upheld as the generic pronoun. Since the 1970s, feminists have argued that ‘generic he is sexist in its implication that the generic person is male by default’ (Curzan 2014: 117). People who took issue with this arguably phallocentric inflection of the language have proposed solutions that generally fall into two categories: proposals are either meant to erase difference, or they are meant to highlight it. The first category can be exemplified by
the increased use of ‘they’ as a singular generic pronoun (ibid.: 120). In contrast to using he or she, this pronoun allows one to avoid differentiating along the lines of gender, and consequently not to prioritise either the masculine or the feminine. The second category, which is geared towards equal representation rather than undifferentiation, takes recourse to constructions such as he or she, s/he etc., or to a more assertive use of generic she, from the viewpoint that it is only fair to prioritise the underrepresented. The success of such efforts, especially those geared at highlighting the feminine, at times at the expense of the masculine, has been immense, and the use of generic he at present raises eyebrows in a large number of professional environments. Nevertheless, even early proponents of combatting sexist bias in language, such as Robin Lakoff, have expressed their surprise at the attention given to pronominal change. Lakoff (1973: 75) expressed her scepticism by recommending that one should ‘attempt to change only what can be changed’. Her priorities lay with other features of the sexism debate, such as counteracting the demeaning use of ‘mistress’ and ‘professional’ as applied to women (ibid.: 74). As a linguist, her argument builds upon the idea that one chooses ‘consciously and purposefully among nouns, adjectives and verbs’ while pronominal usage is more habitual, and rather ‘less open to change’ (ibid.: 75). Nouns, adjectives, and verbs are more open to change overall because they form open word classes. Personal pronouns, on the other hand, constitute a closed word class.

While society at large has accepted that the use of generic he reveals a masculine bias, highlighting the feminine as a complement or in opposition to this pronoun has generated problems of its own. Constructions such as he or she invariably highlight the normative binary structuring of our gendered landscape, and this binary itself has come under increased scrutiny due to a perceived lack of inclusiveness with regard to people who do not conform to either of the categories, as in the example of Words of Women Spanish subtitles discussed earlier (Mortada 2016). If language, as the initial argument runs, should reflect the diversity of the society it helps to structure, linguistic space should be opened up for those who fall in between rigid categorisations. There have been attempts, for example, to consistently ‘use the created pronoun ze for transgender individuals’ (Curzan 2014: 118). There is, however, no consensus on such matters, and the movement towards considering gender as a spectrum has further complicated the issue of generating an appropriate
number of pronouns. On the internet, a space where the boundaries of self are continually in flux, non-traditional pronouns (such as ey/em/eir and xir/xim/xyr) abound, and nothing but a user’s preference, and possibly their eagerness to engage in a certain community, predefines the pronoun of choice (Oakley 2016: 5).

When pronominal usage becomes a primary marker of identity the likelihood of unchecked proliferation increases, up to the point where one arrives at a situation in which pronouns for each individual have to be learned alongside their proper names. On Twitter, it has recently become voguish to specify one’s preferred pronouns below one’s username, and the practice is spreading to e-mail signatures as well. There is no end in sight for the fragmentation of proper address, since it has been argued, as a critique of real name policies on social media, that people feel the need to ‘display different attributes in different social contexts’, rather than a ‘single or dominant identity’ (Edwards and Mcauley 2013: 3). For the time being, the excesses of (pro)nominal splintering are largely restricted to the experimental spaces of the digital world, but the precedents they set are not to be ignored.

Underlying this process is the same dual attitude to language observed with reference to euphemistic coinages. On the one hand, language the master seems to be all-powerful in defining one’s identity. On the other hand, language the servant can be instructed at any point to better express one’s claims about oneself. In this case, the balance sought for by this simultaneous awareness of the violence and vulnerability of language assumes a situation in which all that can be represented is represented. The sheer variety of experience, and the infinite set of dividing lines along which it can be ordered, mean that attempts at reaching this state of absolute correspondence between language and the remainder of reality would cripple language severely, and are unlikely to reach a state even close to fulfilment.

Nevertheless, the feminist argument for increased visibility and recognition in linguistic situations where nothing seems to proscribe a focus on the masculine has undeniably been successful. That does not mean, however, that it has unequivocally furthered the feminist cause. Susanne de Lotbinière-Harwood (1990: 9), a feminist translator, has argued that ‘making the feminine visible in language means making women seen and heard in the real world’. The all too easy representative correspondence between language and the remainder of experience once more cannot be taken for granted, and neither can the
structure of cause and effect she professes. It could be argued that ‘social change creates language change, not the reverse’ (Lakoff 1973: 76). From this point of view, the female population must have been in a position of sufficient power before the changes discussed could be initiated. The pronoun controversy could then be considered a consolidation of a change in status rather than a contestation of patriarchal discourse. One could, however, interpret this critique in a more affirmative sense. Even if women in principle already had the power they were supposedly trying to gain, it could be argued that ‘the use of the neutral he... makes women feel shut out, not a part of what is being described, an inferior species, or a non-existent one’ (ibid.: 75). The issue then becomes one of self-perception, and of a longing for empowerment and validation, which when granted builds up the confidence needed for further struggles. In this light, pronominal fragmentation does not signal division but rather the promise of further progress towards a more equitable society.

Instances of political correctness are generally met with approval when they are perceived as legitimate expressions of resistance to oppression, and with suspicion when they are seen as undue assertions of authority. The success of the campaign to replace generic he with expressions such as he or she is today seen as unproblematic and based on fair principles. The tendency towards pronominal proliferation in accordance with one’s preferred gender identity, however, is currently a major point of contention, as illustrated by the passing into law of the Canadian Bill C-16. The bill proposed an extension of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which protects people from discrimination on the grounds of factors such as race, sex and marital status. The extension sought to add ‘gender identity or expression’ to the list of ‘prohibited grounds for discrimination’ (Wilson-Raybould 2016). The Act protects against violence and unfair economic treatment, but also sets out to punish ‘hate propaganda’ (ibid.). The drive to protect ‘gender expression’ from ‘hate propaganda’ has raised considerable suspicion, most notably on the part of Jordan Peterson, a Canadian academic and clinical psychologist, who rose to international fame as a vocal opponent to the bill’s implementation. He argued that the bill, if made law, would create a pathway towards ‘compelled speech’ (Peterson 2017). The government would be able to punish people should they, for instance, refuse to refer to people using their preferred pronouns. Perceived as such, the bill could radically endanger free speech. While, through custom or law, it is common for human societies to have rules for what cannot be said, regulating what
has to be said tends to be seen as despotic. Although associated policy does, the bill itself does not specify pronominal *misgendering* as a potentially punishable offence, and Peterson’s interpretation of the bill has been contested by various legal scholars (ibid.). Nevertheless, the controversy’s further development partly confirmed his suspicions.

In 2017, Lindsay Shepherd, a graduate student at Wilfrid Laurier University, showed her class a clip from a television programme in which Peterson explains why he would resist the mandatory usage of pronouns such as *ze* and *zer* (Haskell 2017). Upon hearing Shepherd’s presentation, the university’s Diversity and Equity office as well as two professors intervened and called for a meeting, which the student secretly recorded. She was accused of creating a ‘toxic environment’ by showing the clip (ibid.). It was suggested her conduct might be in violation of Bill C-16. After the release of the recording and the following investigation, the student was found not to have violated university policy, but the story resulted in ample comparisons of the University to the Inquisition, or more commonly, to an Orwellian institution. The self-appointed protectors of the oppressed had become the perpetrators of oppression through the control and manipulation of language.

### 2.2.4 Narratives and Performatives

An excessive, institutional example of political correctness is found in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, in which the prefigurative connection between linguistic practices and social structures is developed up to the point of mutual indistinction. Orwell (1987: 312), in the Appendix to the book, explains that ‘Newspeak’ is ‘the official language of Oceania’, ‘devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism’. Orwell’s fictional fabricated language, does not, like euphemism and pronominal visibility, initially emerge from a longing to emancipate a suppressed minority, but rather from a hegemonic social group’s need to consolidate its power. Meeting ideological needs in this case is interpreted as making it impossible for speakers of the language to conceive of unorthodox thoughts. The language is full of what appear to English speakers to be ‘unnatural compounds’ and ‘unidiomatic collocations’, almost ‘such as a computer or robot might devise’ (Hughes 2010: 103). As an excellent example of social engineering, the term ‘Newspeak’ quickly gained currency and is now ‘used to refer to any contrived political discourse, essentially euphemistic and polysyllabic, official and obfuscatory’. Hughes adds that many instances ‘of
political correctness were almost immediately regarded as a form of Newspeak’ (Hughes 2010: 103, 104). A telling example from the novel concerns the naming of the four leading governmental agencies regulating Oceania’s affairs. The Ministries of Truth, Peace, Love, and Plenty are respectively concerned with propaganda, war, policing, and starvation (Orwell 1987: 6). While the ministry of Plenty might, in an impoverished nation, appear to simply not live up to its intended function, the other three names constitute blatant lies. Obfuscation is furthered in the relevant Newspeak abbreviations ‘Minitrue, Minipax, Miniluv and Miniplenty’, which seem to suggest bijou and tender institutions rather than totalitarian strongholds (ibid.: 6, 225). Integrating and shortening compounds is a recurrent feature in the Newspeak vocabulary, as euphonic ‘short clipped words’ are designed ‘to make speech, and especially speech on any subject not ideologically neutral, as nearly as possible independent of consciousness’ (ibid.: 321). This aim of unreflective speech is important, as the effects of euphemistic naming are, as discussed above, bound to be temporary. In the end, there is no reason why peace would not come to mean war transparently. Abbreviation, then, is one of the techniques that must ensure a ‘cutting out of most of the associations’ that any word tends to evoke (ibid.: 320).

In an effort to reduce the risk of inducing consciousness of the actual state of affairs, speech is not only made as fluent and opaque as possible, it is also heavily restricted: the vocabulary of Newspeak grows ‘smaller instead of larger every year’ (Orwell 1987: 322). The final aim is to make language completely independent of thought, and in fact superfluous or even ultimately absent. As one of the designers of Newspeak’s most recent dictionary formulates it in the novel: ‘The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect. Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak’ (ibid.: 55). This utopian ideal in which unorthodox speech is impossible because speech is barely available depends largely on a feat of deliberate untranslatability: it should be made impossible to translate between Oldspeak, which basically corresponds to English, and the final version of Newspeak (ibid.: 324). The movement towards a continuous *flatus vocis*, and eventually towards mute materialism, is an instantiation of a salvation history promising the erasure of the alienation suggested by the distance between sign and referent. The true content of English Socialism is to reveal itself in the absence of its expression. In the Orwellian dialectic, with the end of speech comes the end of history. The slogan of the Party ruling Oceania runs ‘Who controls
the past controls the future, who controls the present controls the past’ (ibid.: 37). The totalitarian tendencies inherent in the construction of an all-encompassing narrative, as well as the use of propaganda, seem to be openly on display, yet the Party also insists that no alterations to history have ever been made. What is true now was true at all times.

Prefiguration in Biblical hermeneutics functions in the same way. Although novel correspondences can be revealed and explored, truth already emanated from Scripture before such interpretations were directed towards it. The same goes for the salvation history of Marxist dialectics. The critique of the Marxist endeavour to predict a clear pattern for society’s development that may ultimately mask its base conditions features prominently in Orwell’s description of ‘English Socialism’. The fulfilment of this prefigurative paradigm as it appears in Orwell’s novel seems particularly grim, because it is recounted primarily from the perspective of a suffering proletarian who disagrees. Literature is more suitable to the dystopic than the utopian imagination, as the martyr, a hero, needs a structure against which to assert his agency for a narrative to be captivating. Orwell, in critiquing a strand of communist thought that may lead to a reversal of the heavenly realm it announces, fashions a dystopia, and in doing so reverts to the original enunciative position of communist discourse. For the communist, the present is a dystopia, a continual struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed. Today, Nineteen Eighty-Four enjoys the status of a prophecy.

The contemporary fear of Nineteen Eighty-Four incarnate is fed by minor social developments, whether it concerns visual surveillance or language control, that are interpreted, in prefigurative fashion, as signs of a totalitarianism to come. Resistance to the Canadian Bill C-16 was, au fond, about the creation of a precedent for increased corporate and government control. In a similar way, skepticism about climate change often involves the belief that measures such as carbon taxes set dangerous precedents for the monetisation of humanity’s shared environment. Resistance to acknowledging global warming and to the criminalisation of hate speech both partly result from the suggestion that undue control is implemented in the guise of care and compassion. The precedent is the legal equivalent of the element of foreshadowing that structures prefiguration, and the apocalyptic fear that a propaganda machine masking as a Ministry of Truth will manifest itself is seen to be confirmed at the moment of a cultural narrative’s passage into law. In the
case of *Words of Women*, commitment to a queer ideology through language control inspires solidarity because it opens up a platform for what is seen as a repressed discourse. Limited in reach, its intended effect will most likely be restricted to ‘gender-aware activists’ (Mortada 2016: 133), and the claim is one of freedom of expression. Activists contesting the legal implementation of a highly similar linguistic practice make the same claim to freedom of expression. The specific content of the discussion, in this case the lexicalisation of the grammatical category of gender, is only an instantiation of a broader conflict about the institutionalisation of speech.

A clear illustration of this broader conflict is evident in the trajectory of Babels, ‘the international network of volunteer translators and interpreters that set out to cater for the communication needs’ of the World Social Forum and that subscribes to prefigurative politics (Boéri 2012: 271). Babels’ translators and the WSF shared a set of principles: they both valued, for instance, ‘horizontality’ over ‘verticality’, and considered themselves to be part of a ‘process’ rather than an ‘event’ (ibid.). In this context, numerous attempts were made to politicise translation practices. Rather than ‘simply providing support in the dominant language’, Babels aimed to provide various interpretation services for ‘minority languages’, in order to ‘foster participation’ among delegates of underrepresented communities (ibid.: 279). Ensuring equal access to information and equal participation in political discussions thus became one of Babels’ central preoccupations. However, in 2016, Babels severed links with the Social Forum on the grounds of ‘political, strategic and procedural decisions’ (Babels Coordination 2016). Upholding ideological principles resulted in the decision not to translate or interpret at all. The communication declaring Babels’ withdrawal from the 2016 Social Forum ends with an expression of commitment ‘to ensuring all voices can be heard and understood as we strive to build another possible world’ (ibid.). Yet, for Babels, a horizontal, participatory translation practice is not ‘meaningful’ if it is not conducted within an environment that conforms to the same values (ibid.). In other words, Babels considers ‘extra-linguistic conventions’ a requirement for the communicative creation of ‘new deontic states of affairs’ (Brożek 2011: 17). The world to be built is presented as a precondition for its own construction. The effect sought by Babels is means-ends equivalence, the function required is performativity.
The *Communist Manifesto*, after explicating the promise of another world, ends with the performative ‘WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 52). These words institute the proletarian body, which comes to incarnate the spectres of communism. In the Catholic Eucharist, the phrases ‘THIS IS MY BODY’ and ‘THIS IS MY BLOOD’, which echo Jesus’ words at the Last Supper, are spoken when consecrating bread and wine, which come to incarnate the body of Christ. The Holy Spirit oversees the procedure. Both expressions are performative, intersemiotic declarations of equivalence, as they effect a material change in the world through utterance (Hermans 2007: 89). Both depend upon strict narrative patterns. The communist performative is guaranteed by the materialist dialectic. The bourgeoisie, given time, will produce ‘its own grave-diggers’, for industry requires labour, and united under a factory roof, the workers are bound to associate and eventually to perceive the injustice of their conditions (Marx and Engels 2015: 20). In unison, the workers are bound to overthrow their oppressors. The ‘victory of the proletariat’ is ‘inevitable’, and as a result, so is the effect of the performative (ibid.). Christ’s sacrifice, and his Second Coming, are equally certain. The ritual reminder that Jesus’ presence is more than spectral is subjected to strict liturgical conditions concerning speech and body language. Conformity is required to confirm what is certain. This is the mystery that constitutes spiritual community. The Communist and Christian expressions of incorporation function effectively as performatives because the change they introduce is presented as fully predictable. The world declared is a precondition for its own proclamation. Performatives are always echoes.

Mao’s book of *Quotations* (Schram 1968: xxiv) faithfully reproduces the Marxist echo in its epigraph: *WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!*. Spelling out the necessary correspondence between social unity and linguistic conformity for the performative to operate, Mao (ibid.: 179) expresses the hope that soon ‘we will all be speaking the same language’, namely ‘the common language of the communist world outlook’. In a more condensed but essentially identical statement, Orwell writes: ‘Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak’ (Orwell 1987: 55). The same envisaged correspondence between communicative practice and social structure, although not driven quite as far, is found in Babels’ (2016) conviction that their participation is not ‘meaningful’ in a space that does not uphold the principles of horizontality and linguistic diversity. De Lotbinière-Harwood (1990: 9) relies on a similar
principle of direct correspondence between language and the social world when arguing that ‘making the feminine visible in language means making women seen and heard in the real world’. The Germanic warrior, beneath the foliage, refuses to mention the bear, knowing it might incarnate its spectre. Within given conditions, language is assumed to produce certain predictable effects. It is tempting to aim at reversing the procedure, to make language structure social conditions, but generally language engineering remains disreputable. Political correctness is an accusation raised when a particular declaration of equivalence is seen to overstep its due authority. In retort, the practice is not defended, but denied. The relation between a speech act and its institutional framework can vary from minute habit to comprehensive orthodoxy. Relative to the perception of this relation, performative conventions spread through imitation, consent or coercion, as illustrated by the various pathways of political correctness discussed above.

Black Twitter, for instance, is a dynamic virtual community that has no rigid boundaries or set rules. It engenders conformity through appeal. Reciprocal imitation sustains its organic development. Following its speech conventions is a matter of personal desire for participation in a high-status group. The feminist movement is an equally dynamic phenomenon, and identification with its aims may signal formal affiliation to an activist body or political institution, but may equally well depend upon the recognition of a set of loosely delineated shared values. Feminism has exerted a major influence on contemporary society, and certain speech conventions engendered through feminist efforts have become widely adopted institutional requirements that depend upon the manufacture of consent. Pronominal representation, one of the more remarkable achievements of present-day language engineering policies, has evolved significantly in the wake of the feminist success, but its current developments meet with a high degree of resistance. Appeals to respect and recognition clash with accusations of coercion. Opponents, suspecting a major institutional power behind what is perceived as a vast application of performative force, speak of a transgender lobby. Their appeal is to common sense: If we allow this, what will be next? Where does this end? The notorious transgender lobby, by now taking on conspiratorial proportions, is perceived as contributing to social collapse by spreading confusion among the young and vulnerable (Doward 2019). By aiming to align grammar with identity, they propose a performative embodiment whose effect is not predictable. A ritual to which no
single narrative corresponds is bound to summon the demons. The practice of overturning traditions, hierarchies and identities might well inaugurate the essence of carnival: slaughter. The dialectical machine is already churning. Opposition to Bill C-16, in defense of law and order, has dug its own grave by asking the forbidden question: Whose law is this anyway? Questioning the particular crumbles the universal.

2.2.5 Logos

In his discussion of the World Social Forum, de Sousa Santos (2006: 110) identifies, among contemporary activists, a broad concern for ‘another possible world, itself plural in its possibilities’. No single narrative corresponds. The means are as many as the ends, given that ‘extending the powerful concept of prefiguration to the use of verbal, visual and aesthetic languages’ may enable activists and researchers ‘to construct an alternative world in the here and now’ (Baker 2016a: 6). If such endeavours are scarce, or seemingly ineffective, one must remember that semiotic activists are often ‘working under extreme conditions’ that do not always allow for elaborate experimentation (Baker 2016b: 5). Nevertheless, examples abound. Baker, in her most thoroughly developed example of prefigurative politics, discusses the logo of the Egyptian media collective Mosireen. Khalid Abdallah, one of the collective’s founders, draws attention to numerous innovative aspects of the logo, which consist of an Arabic inscription of the collective’s name embedded in a black circle. In Arabic, the word mosireen (مصرين) generally means determined or resolute, yet can also be read as a misspelling of misryeen (مصريين), which means Egyptians (ibid.: 8). The gap between speech and writing is explored to simultaneously assert and question categories of identity. Différance rears its head. Below the name in the logo, one finds a list of voweling instructions. If they are read as a sentence, they spell ‘assemble, break, pull together’ (ibid.). Drawing on techniques of collage and montage, Mosireen is Surrealist in Arabic. Abdallah stresses the sense of determination emanating from the logo. When things are darkest, he explains, if ‘you push that little bit further, you sometimes hit the bit where it starts, you know’ (ibid.). The law of contradiction requires that one experience night terrors to wake up refreshed. A welcome desert retreat for the prophet.

Overall, the logo ‘is full of possibilities and open to a range of potential interpretations, all empowering and all resisting reductive, facile representations of the group and the events
they document’ (Baker 2016b: 8). Abdallah’s discussion echoes a perennial tradition of revolutionary poetics aiming to hatch consciousness in social conditions whose very foundation is perceived to be oppression. The problem, at present, is how to determine the outcome of the performative. What guides determination when the principle is plurality? What keeps the bear behind bars and the demons at bay? For Mao, this issue was minor. Despite the carnival, he knew how to recognise them. Nevertheless, it’s better to take precautions. Socrates is reported as saying: ‘democracy comes into being, I imagine, when the poor have won, and they kill some of the others’ (Plato 2007: 255). In this respect, Occupy might have provided ‘a glimpse of what real democracy might be like’ (Graeber 2013: xvii). This is not, however, what Graeber meant by real democracy, and it is not what is meant in the description of *Mosireen’s* logo as ‘prefigurative in its democratising potential’ (Baker 2016b: 7). In Baker’s article, the argument for ‘democratising potential’ is strangely underdeveloped, cut off halfway, followed by a deflecting ‘more importantly’ that introduces an instance of wordplay (ibid.). The claim for a movement towards democracy rests upon the observation that, within the logo, ‘formal and informal registers of Arabic’ are mixed (ibid.). The principal contradiction is metaphorically identified. The language of the state and the language of the street symbolise the bourgeois and proletarian class elements. Yet the metaphor is not pursued. The representation of class struggle is not interpreted as demanding any resolution.

The less cautious Hegelian would fashion a ‘third term’ that cleanses the logo of its class contradictions – of necessity: dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet the disciple of *différence*, interrupting the ‘Hegelian relève’, learns to traverse ‘beyond the oppositions, but without neutralizing them’ (Derrida 1981: 40-41). Eagleton (2003: 227) identifies the post-tragic spirit: ‘Dionysus returns not as tragic sacrifice but as the infinite proliferation of play, power, pleasure, difference and desire as an end in itself’. Means-ends equivalence. The result is ‘political pessimism on the one hand, and aesthetic or theoretical *jouissance* on the other’ (ibid.). There is, however, still determination to be found in the fear of death, a reminder of radical self-consciousness. The dialectical machine is not allowed to operate, but it remains on stand-by, as a prompter, a side-lined *souffleur* that insists on the proper unfolding of the historical drama. Its spectral presence keeps things afloat, but its bodily gestures are ignored. The central characteristic of prefiguration is decided to be experiment. This is now
an *improv* theatre. The machine is not so easily rused. It knows improv conventions. Throw a term at the actors and they will try to represent it. A third term emerges from below the stage, the term that founded the metaphor to begin with: *democracy*. An invitation to dig up the Socratic daggers? Not necessarily. Right before discussing the logo, Baker (2016b: 5) refers to a list, quoted from Maeckelbergh (2009), which contains several central values characterising ‘today’s global culture of activism’. She singles out *solidarity* and *diversity* as particularly important in representational practice. Values such as ‘rejecting individualism’ and ‘carnival as subversion’ are not taken up in the condensed inventory (Baker 2016b: 5-6).

Democracy, at base, identifies the people in contradistinction to the rulers. Its suggested development is that the people become the rulers. Kill some of the others, says Socrates. This is where the supplementary values become essential for present-day peaceful protest. Dialectically speaking, preaching solidarity is to deny others self-sufficiency. Supporting diversity is to deny that contradictions require resolution. Both operations fundamentally frustrate the development of the master-slave dialectic, which becomes a struggle precisely through the agitating recognition of an other’s self-sufficiency that precludes one’s own. The proposed values are customisable plugins to the dialectical machine, designed to prevent democracy’s positive feedback loops, best captured in the phrase *if yesterday we ate the rich, what’s on tomorrow’s menu?*. The threat of violence cannot be erased from the invocation of democracy. However, values such as solidarity and diversity, while not precluding the identification of the contradiction that, once identified, tends to escalation, make it feasible to acknowledge it without dire consequences. After all, instead of democracy, the goal is ‘democratising potential’ (Baker 20126b: 7). That is to say, it can be argued that a balance is sought between the elements presented in *Mosireen’s* metaphorical representation of class contradictions, the balance of a representational equality that does not drive at the unity of opposite’s fulfilment through violent conflict.

Metaphors ‘enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor’s production helps to constitute’ (Black 1993: 38). They reveal that ‘the world is necessarily a world *under a certain description*’, and simultaneously introduce to this description the potential for change (ibid.). Consequently, ‘a metaphorical statement involves a rule violation’ (ibid.: 24). To produce poetry is to break the law, yet to break the law is to create it. The prefigurative motivation ascribed to *Mosireen’s* logo is to break the law, and release the procedure’s
creative potential without reiterating its repressive conclusion, without setting in stone ‘a
certain description’. The aim is not metaphor, but ‘metaphoric potential’ – another world is
possible. In the post-tragic revolutionary imagination, democratising potential and
metaphoricity become symbiotic, perhaps synonymous. The Greek metaphora means to
carry across. The Latin translatio, too, means to carry across. The possibility of etymology
itself undoes the difference between translation and metaphor – historically, transmission
cannot discriminate between the two procedures. Change is the only factor recognised by
etymology – from the Greek etumos, true. Even Hegel’s (2006: 72) Heraclitus knew ‘the
absolute is becoming’. Dwelling in metaphoric or translational potential is to stay put in the
middle of the river which one can’t enter twice: to occupy the position of change.

To occupy the river is forever to leave behind the spectacle of its shifting banks. Détournement turns into deterritorialization. In the river, ‘there are only relations of
movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987: 266). The arborescent dialectic – the peak of the pine is the pinnacle of the
rigidly rooted bronchial hierarchy – gives way to the rhizome, which knows ‘no beginning or
end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo’ (ibid.: 225). Mushroom caps are only available when it’s the season, but below the fallen foliage, the
rhizome abides. Global capitalism would tell you otherwise – fresh produce year round – but
that’s only mirage, cultivated in the now stable conditions of Plato’s cave, a false plane of
consistency producing uniformity. The true ‘plane of consistency’ is a ‘plane of composition’,
of interactions that do not conform to a pre-imposed developmental resolve. One may call it
‘the plane of noncontradiction’ (ibid.: 266). During the intermezzo, Historical Drama’s
thespians gather in the coulisses, changing clothes, exchanging properties. In the absence of
an audience, their congregation does not inspire conflict. The dead mingle with the living –
their demise was only a tragic device, reversible performance. The sentries, screaming of
fright just minutes before – shivers in the audience, hope this ends well! – now powder the
demon’s visage. He barely looked ghostly enough. The souffleur draws back the curtain,
holding high an hourglass. The actors, revelling in their jouissance, are reluctant to go back
on stage. The part imposed on them bores them. Is the audience even paying attention? The
souffleur pushes them onward, whispering threateningly: ‘Remember, without them, you
are nothing!’ In the corner, in the robe of the sorcerer’s apprentice, a youngling wishes his
peers would take things seriously. He knows he could make a real change if he practised enough. In his hands, a book on method acting. First rule: ‘to deny contradiction is to deny everything’ (Mao 1967: 28).

2.2.6 Contested Concepts

As this chapter so far illustrates, the interaction of the principles of dialectics and the norms of political correctness create a broad spectrum in which homogeneity and heterogeneity, transgression and conformity, or chaos and order, all come to interact in a myriad number of ways. Reversals are never far off. At the heart of play resides the desire for rules. One finds, for instance, the monitoring of speech continually vacillating between gentle emancipatory potential and authoritarian repression. Similarly, a thin line between autonomy and automatism upholds the various instantiations of revolutionary rhetoric. Consequently, the phenomenon of prefigurative politics gains clarity but not specificity when approached through the lenses of dialectics and political correctness. In Chapter 1 prefigurative politics was historically contextualized with reference to Christian and Marxist salvation history. The intricate set of correspondences mediating between prophecy and salvation generates contradictions of its own. Dissent may figure as orthodoxy, revolution can be seen as law, and revelation may come to serve as confirmation. In short, the set of cultural patterns that determines the phenomenon of prefigurative politics does not suffice to fully comprehend its current manifestations. In section 2.1.1, it was discussed, in this regard, that descriptions of prefigurative politics, beyond a formal structure of correspondences, usually include substantive delineations. Substantive definitions tend to concentrate on a number of ancient political concepts.

The first mention of prefigurative politics, for instance, ascribes to it the ambition to produce ‘a vision of revolutionary democracy’ (Boggs 1977: 100). Soon afterwards, ‘community’ was identified as a central feature to the endeavour, with the concept referring to ‘the more direct, more total and more personal network of relationships than the formal, abstract and instrumental relationships characterizing state and society’ (Breines 1980: 421). In the end, ‘prefigurative structures’ were argued to constitute ‘a new source of political legitimacy’, creating ‘an entirely new kind of politics, breaking down the division of labor between everyday life and political activity’ (Boggs 1977: 104). Both Boggs and Breines in
essence describe a mythical return to a prelapsarian totalitarianism, a non-narrative benign unconscious. Whatever is constructed is corrupted, but beyond the horizon awaits the promise of a more fitting, more adjusted, more correct political paradigm. To heed this promise requires an act of faith, a belief that corruption can be reversed if only a number of fundamental principles were respected. The terms democracy, politics and community, which have come to partly carry this promise, have been in circulation since the dawn of reflection on political organisation, and have been contested for centuries. To understand the language of prefigurative politics, it is therefore necessary to consider their current semantic developments.

A short overview of the term democracy’s late history indicates that the concept’s most remarkable feature is its semantic flexibility, which led Williams (1983: 97) to argue that ‘no questions are more difficult than those of democracy’. With reference to the concept, he elaborates on two interconnected developments: the change from a pejorative to a favourable connotation, and the gradual professionalisation of its denotation. The ominous prospect of mob rule, attached to the term in ancient times, was purged, in modern times, from democracy’s institutional operationalisation as a legitimate form of government by replacing the idea of direct participation with what we now know as the electoral system of representative democracy (ibid.: 95). However, the success of the representative model, as evidenced by its largely unquestioned adoption as a Western if not global ideal (Hanson 1989: 68), has consistently inspired calls for its amelioration. The various alternative conceptions of what democracy might consist of are often geared towards the more radically inclusive paradigm that initially deterred support for any form of democratic government.

This process of step-by-step modification is still underway, as each instance of increased public involvement in decision-making procedures unearths new potential domains for the implementation of citizen-based government. McLennan (2005) argues that ‘in contemporary society, all sorts of previously “non-political” relations are steadily coming under democratic interrogation’, as a result of the common understanding that ‘democracy’ points towards a society in which ‘citizens are supposed to be free and equal’ (ibid.: 74). In line with the ethical imperatives of freedom and equality, and as a consequence of the connective possibilities of new media combined with an increased popular cynicism towards
representative government, the idea of democracy increasingly recognises the no longer ominous prospect of ‘mass’ rule (ibid.: 75). Despite obvious logistic and organisational issues, participation ‘is often a central theme in today’s activist debates about democracy’ (della Porta 2016: 136). A participatory democracy, which is assumed to engender more equality, would be ‘direct, horizontal and self-managed’ (ibid.: 138).

Thus, the dominance of the model of democratic governance is associated with its present-day reliance on electing professional politicians, a practice which limits participation in favour of representation, but the suppressed anarchic principles of popular rule have gradually resurfaced in an attempt to reclaim a previous denotation of democracy as direct participation. Difficulties concerning the viability and implementation of more direct forms of political participation have given rise to new questions of democracy, and differences of opinion have, throughout the years, resulted in an exponential accumulation of the possible adjectives complementing the term, to the point where it may be claimed that ‘political motivation perhaps comes less from the pull of democracy per se, and more from the appeal of the combinations it forms with various – very different – qualifying terms’ (McLennan 2005: 76). Despite the proliferation of alternative ideas continually reorienting the discussion surrounding democracy, the primary usage of the term still situates it solidly within the electoral, institutional sphere.

Whereas the conceptual difficulty involved in circumscribing or defining democracy seems to originate in a series of internal oppositions – such as participation versus representation – the fluidity of politics primarily signals a problem of delineation. It is hard to decide on what does not constitute politics. The open-endedness of the concept ‘has led some authors to speak’, for instance, ‘of the political as a concept that cannot be reduced to politics’ (Raynaud 2014: 804). In other words, politics as practised and experienced at a certain place at a certain moment in time is only an articulation of a much wider frame of reference which itself is irreducible. The possibility of distinguishing a variety of shades and determinations in a loosely configured concept also surfaces in the process of translation. In French, for example, ‘the noun politique refers to two orders of reality that English designates as two different words, policy and “politics”’ (ibid.: 803). However, distinguishing between these two can be somewhat problematic. While a policy designates something like a consistent and relatively identifiable code of conduct, politics also mediates between
thought and practice. That is, politics and policy presuppose one another, and their linguistic separation denotes a cultural decision rather than a conceptual necessity.

Like democracy, politics is generally associated with practices such as debating and voting, but ‘contemporary radicals have manifested an alternative view of “politics” that moves it from cabinets, legislatures, and back rooms to the streets and public squares’ (Gould 2016: 305). Gould (ibid.: 306) refers to phenomena such as ‘occupations of factories and public spaces, and neighbourhood assemblies that become new sites of politics in which people can think together, experiment, develop new capacities, and try to build new social relations’. Such a conflation of gathering, thinking, experimenting and relating to one another as one single activity effectively once more lays bare the central issue: as the condition of existence of any body politic, politics will always raise the question of whether there are, in fact, boundaries to the contestation of common life.

Of community, lastly, Raymond Williams (1983: 76) could still declare in his seminal Keywords that ‘it seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term’. Williams traces back this general terminological approval to the nineteenth century, when community would be evoked to express ‘more direct, more total and therefore more significant relationships’ than the ‘instrumental relationships of state, or of society in its modern sense’ (ibid.). Despite the general connotation of contented belonging, Williams also notes a ‘polemical edge, as in community politics’, which, he argues, ‘normally involves various kinds of direct action’ (ibid.).

In New Keywords, Yúdice (2005: 53) notes how the favourable sense of ‘unmediated’ community is being eroded by a new trend in local politics, in which ‘the discourse of community is used to legitimate conservative private assistance and self-help projects and liberal public-private partnerships that “empower” communities to govern and even police themselves’. In addition to acknowledging this trend, the recent Keywords for Radicals outlines another source of frustration surrounding the use of the term, primarily pertaining to activist contexts. While community is considered ‘the proper location from which activism should arise’, the notion is ‘predicated on the establishment of an inside/outside boundary’ (Lamble 2016: 106-107). ‘For this reason’, Lamble (ibid.: 107) argues that ‘many activists
remain wary of appeals to community’. As she puts it, ‘efforts to forge collective identities can simultaneously reinforce marginalization and exclusion’ (ibid.).

In present-day usage, the concept of community has thus lost much of its favourable appeal. On the one hand, it is argued that the term could be used more exclusively, as to guard it from appropriation by governmental surveillance mechanisms. On the other hand, the term is critiqued for its exclusionary connotations. The issue of how to be tight-knit without becoming impermeable is thus at the heart of the question of community. The Dictionary of Untranslatables, a philosophical reference work, derives ‘community’ ‘from Latin communis, “what belongs to everyone” (Anon. 2014: 159). Depending on one’s personal outlook, this qualification can denote either a town hall or the very essence of humanity, which explains why the concept of community functions in both these areas of experience. Consequently, ‘of all the keywords currently circulating among activists, “community” is perhaps the most frequently used, least explicitly defined, and most elastic in its meaning’ (Lamble 2016:103). Elasticity is an invitation for contestation and reconceptualisation, and it should not be surprising that philosophical discourse on interrelation has, since the 1980’s, structured itself around the concept of community, in an attempt to ‘think around and even from within the common’, an effort for which we seem as yet ‘to lack even a vocabulary’ (Esposito 2013: 90).

Naturally, other concepts than democracy, politics, and community that have known widespread political usage throughout the ages could have been chosen for study. One may think for instance of equality, state, revolution, or perhaps most obviously in the context of the current research, anarchism. Anarchism, as a political orientation laterally relatable to anarchy, although the latter is still often taken to denote a frightful vision of chaos, usually means devotion to the absence of formal leadership structures, and is, as the previous discussion has so far illustrated, closely linked to the tradition of prefigurative politics. The motivation for a prefigurative politics in which egalitarian political means foreshadow egalitarian political ends can, from this perspective, be seen as a utopian endeavour shared by various emancipatory movements (Kinna 2016). Currently, anarchist ‘principles of freedom’ are increasingly drawn upon to ‘potentially displace the hegemony of representative democracy and capitalism’ (Milstein 2010: 79). The explicit resurgence of anarchism as a legitimate political aim, however, is today still restricted to limited circles in
the activist and academic environment. While, as discussed above, contemporary demands for democracy are reincorporating the radical egalitarianism of anarchist thought, they do so mostly in relation to the term democracy, not the term anarchism. That is to say, the current study investigates conceptual changes via their lexical manifestations, and while the relevance of anarchist thought may be on the rise, the relevance of democratic terminology is today of much greater scope and import. Similar concerns have guided the choice for the other two concepts that form the core of the present thesis, politics, and community. While their patterns of usage may be very specific within a particular discursive niche, the concepts themselves circulate within a communicative domain that is not restricted by any particular ideological or institutional limitation.

In short, it has been observed that democracy currently functions as ‘a synonym for the permanent struggle over the concrete content of democracy as a set of political institutions and spaces for political intervention’ (Buchstein and Jörke 2007: 195). Consequently, the struggle over ‘the meaning of democracy would thus itself be an essential part of fulfilling the promise of democracy’ (ibid.). The same holds true for politics and community. In prefigurative terms, the suggested function of said concepts within contemporary revolutionary discourse is thus to both foreshadow and fulfil the alternative world they are brought to announce. As I have argued in this chapter, one may reasonably expect to find, in today’s usage of the terms in question, a strong component of moral codification, and an explicit awareness of political concepts as the expression of a unity of opposites. In chapter 4 and 5, I will seek to illustrate these contemporary developments in a contested vocabulary with reference to a corpus of academic texts shaped by the revolutionary left’s reorganisation in response to the uprisings of 1968, and a corpus of online journal articles produced in response to the uprisings of 2011. These corpora display a certain historical continuity, despite the differences in medium, means of expression, and explicit motivations pertaining to the texts they consist of. Specifically, I will investigate the usage of democracy, politics, and community in both corpora, making use of a set of software tools, including a concordance browser. The set of tools as well as the investigated corpora are part of the output of the Genealogies of Knowledge project, which is discussed in chapter 3. In section 3.3, I will further elaborate on lexical patterning as it relates to concordance-based research, and as it informs the study of conceptual transformation.
3 CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE GENEALOGIES OF KNOWLEDGE PROJECT

In the first chapter, the concept of prefiguration was historically situated within the Marxist and the Christian rhetorical tradition and their role in times of political crisis. In the second chapter, the concept was semiotically approached through the lens of dialectics and political correctness. It was specified how the concepts of democracy, politics, and community have come to circulate as essential pillars of contemporary prefigurative politics. This thesis investigates the use of these terms in a corpus of post-1968 academic publications that uphold the Marxist reference, and a corpus of online journal articles responding to the 2011 global financial crisis and the protests that emerged in its wake. The current chapter explicates the method of concordance-based research as it informs the analysis of both textual corpora. Section 3.1 discusses the Genealogies of Knowledge project from two angles. Firstly, the emergence of the term genealogy as a mode of research is contextualised by explicating the biological metaphor that sustains it. Secondly, the composition of the corpora built by the project is discussed in terms of its material and cultural determinations. Section 3.2 exemplifies the use of the Genealogies of Knowledge concordance browser and its plugins. Section 3.3 discusses the elucidation and interpretation of textual patterns as the central principle of concordance-based research.

3.1 Genealogies of Knowledge

Darwin (2009), after an insightful journey on the HMS Beagle followed by decades of rumination, lays the foundations of evolutionary biology by making a case for ‘natural selection’ as the mechanism that defines the outcome of an organism’s process of adaptation to its environment. Darwin’s theory of kinship and variation stirred considerable controversy, particularly through the implication that humanity’s extended family includes our fellow primates, who quickly turned from laughing stock into mirror image. A central publication guiding this reversal of fate was Huxley’s Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (1863), a title that can easily be read as a reprimand for hubris. Our late departure from the simian troop can be illustrated, for instance, by the fact that the brains of man and chimpanzee are more similar than those of chimpanzee and lemur (ibid.: 120). Huxley bases much of his evidence on old skulls of primates, as described by explorers of caves,
adventurers whose pattern of motion was a true historic reversal. Discussing skulls found by the cave of Engis, Huxley (ibid.: 142) attributes to the early palaeontologist Schmerling a most curious observation: ‘The earth which contained this human skull exhibited no trace of disturbance: teeth of rhinoceros, horse, hyaena, and bear, surrounded it on all sides’. If the objects discussed were still animated, disturbance, surely, would leave its trace, but covered by layers of dust, threats are reduced to oblivion.

Toying with expanding skulls and brains along the evolutionary tract, Huxley characterises mankind as the species that thirsts, primarily, for thought. Since the coming of the ‘philosophers of Greece’, he says, ‘the human larva has been feeding vigorously’ on ‘mental food’ (Huxley 1963.: 73). As the butterfly, fruit of the larva, suggests, the result of spiritual growth will be magnificent, but the transition process is likely to be ‘accompanied by many throes and some sickness and debility, or, it may be, by graver disturbances’ (ibid.: 142). Looking to the past, disturbance is gradually erased; looking to the future, it is an expectation compromising even the most pleasing of procedures. Soon after the evolutionary paradigm gained scientific traction, pleas were made to perfect the human gene pool through selective breeding. We had been milking cows and petting dogs for ages, gradually adjusting their traits to a perfectly agreeable domesticity, so why not strive for an ‘improvement of the inborn qualities’ of the human population? (Galton 1904: 1). Similar claims had been common since the abandonment of the malformed in Ancient Greece, but now the idea had a scientific drive behind it. According to Galton (ibid.: 3), the new discipline of eugenics was to ‘disseminate the laws of heredity’ and investigate the conditions under which human populations thrive. Galton (ibid.: 3) advocated for ‘setting forth the national importance of eugenics’, which ‘must be introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion’, in order that humanity might see to its own breeding activity, and thus ensure ‘that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races’ (ibid.: 5). Henceforth, ethnic cleansing had a science of fate behind it, a rationalisation resulting in the scrupulous study and brutal fracture of innumerable human skulls.

If man’s descent from the ape could spark malicious utopian dreams of divine ascension, it resulted as well in the dissolution of divine origins, and often the two streams of thought gradually went hand in hand, in the sense that the only way, really, would be forward. Nietzsche (1911: 50) observes that ‘in former times people sought to show the feeling of
man’s greatness by pointing to his divine descent. This however, has now become a forbidden path, for the ape stands at its entrance, and likewise other fearsome animals, showing their teeth in knowing fashion, as if to say, No further this way! The teeth, once again, have become a disturbance. Nietzsche (1913: 2), observing the accidental quality of human values in the absence of a transcendent origin would come to express grave concerns about ‘the genealogy of our moral prejudices’. Values, ephemeral and volatile on the geological, biological and even cultural time scale, could be subjected to critique, based on an investigation of the conditions under which ‘they experienced their evolution’ (ibid.: 9). This process requires one to review, ‘with new eyes, the immense, distant and completely unexplored land of morality’, which would be ‘practically equivalent to first discovering that land’ (ibid.: 10).

Foucault (2007: 6), in response, would later outline, as ‘opposed to a genesis oriented towards the unity of some principal cause’, the possibility of ‘a genealogy, that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements’. In other words, Foucault seeks to determine which contextual elements, at a given point in time, lead to the constitution of an acceptable unit of meaning. In order to do so, one needs to exclude ‘the fundamental point of view of the law’, which clouds contingent conditions under the cloak of common sense (ibid.: 61). Foucault (ibid.) terms this level of analysis the ‘archaeological level’. When digging, if you stumble upon a skull, look for the teeth that surround it. Foucault (1997: 144) stresses, however, that the genealogical procedure does not impose ‘a predetermined form’ on the vicissitudes of the present.

In this respect, ‘genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people’ (Foucault 1997: 146). Rather, genealogy approaches history as a gambling game, and seeks to illustrate that the ‘iron hands of necessity’ are only shaking ‘the dice-box of chance’ (Nietzsche 1911: 118). Each throw of the dice presents a temporary constitution, and patterns may be derived from the general progression of throws, but the vast potential of possible combinations between the pips precludes any definite predictions. The stakes, however, are continually raised, and genealogy, documenting turns of fate, ‘seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection’: ‘not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations’ (Foucault 1977: 148). Tracing shifting
dominance relations is not a procedure that limits itself to institutional force or interpersonal struggle, but extends into the functions imparted upon the senses: once required for ‘hunting and warfare’, ‘the eye was not always intended for contemplation’ (ibid.). Revelling in the dissolution of constancy, ‘the genealogist...will push the masquerade to its limit... Genealogy is history in the form of a concerted carnival’ (ibid.: 161). For the genealogist, his own historical method is, in part, a charade which operates between the celebration of transgression and the concession that, amidst the carnival, the most forceful expression of transgression is the imposition of the law.

The Genealogies of Knowledge project, officially named ‘Genealogies of Knowledge: The Evolution and Contestation of Concepts Across Time and Space’, aims, as indicated by its title, to be both a fossil record and a frenzied feast. The project takes concepts as its starting point, selected in their capacity of terminologically traceable units of meaning. In particular, two constellations of concepts are focused on: those relating to the body politic, such as those expressed in English by the lexical items democracy, state and rights, and those relating to scientific, expert discourse, such as evidence, causation and fact (Genealogies of Knowledge 2019). The project aims to ‘explore how our understanding of these concepts has evolved since they first emerged’, but also to document how, today, dissenting voices are contesting the inherited meanings attached to the concepts in question (ibid.). In accordance with the layer of dusty docility that surrounds the far gone, the project situates radical conceptual revisions mainly in the present. The division between the ancestral and the animated is partly determined by a shift in medium. To study how the concepts first emerged, evidence is sought in books, to study their current conflictual variation, material from cyberspace is taken as a point of reference.

The project foregrounds translation as the sine qua non of conceptual heredity, and the site at which meaningful transformations take place. At this point, the central choice in terms of representativeness is made in the decision to document material in four lingua francas that have shaped the intellectual fate of Europe: Greek, Arabic, Latin and English. As such, the project inscribes itself in a long tradition of the imagined community of transferred power captured by the notions of translatio imperii and translatio studii. The vanguard role in political and scientific development, from the gathering of territory to the discovery of truth, has been passed on, through the generations, from one place to the next, through gradual
processes of dissemination and decline. Invoking the dual translatio scheme usually involves the suggestion of culmination and fulfilment on the part of the final inheritor. In Imperial Russia, for instance, the comparison to Imperial Rome became a ‘major vehicle for the assertion of nascent nationalism’ during the eighteenth century (Baehr 1978: 2). One may note that Russian is not a language considered by the Genealogies Project. The various waxing forces in the world, although they agreed on the general pattern, never agreed on whose turn it was to shine, and, looking backwards, decisions on the matter remain reasonably arbitrary. Nevertheless, Athens figures as a central locus in any European invocation of the scheme. Across the board, the translation of empires and disciplines involved the translation of textual material, and thus myths, concepts, images, histories, methods and materials travelled far and wide. Today still, the winged hat and sandals of Hermes are perfectly recognisable, illustrating the cultural freedom of movement enjoyed by the messenger God of trickery, trade, and ‘border-crossings’ (Maitland 2017: 33-34).

Today, the great inheritor of empire goes uncontested: continually alternating between despotism and anarchy, cyberspace has firmly established itself as the territory where the concentration of political power and scientific development exceeds in intensity all previous historic incarnations of dominance. The domain itself has come to reign, reminding all that eternal flux is the natural state of being. In this respect, Michael Cronin has proclaimed that ‘our present age, which is often referred to as the information age with its corollary, the knowledge society, should more properly be termed the translation age’ (Cronin 2013: 3). His argument is based on the equation of convertibility and translatability, through the lens of which he interprets the observation that any piece of information, in any modality, is convertible into the language of binary code (ibid.). The Genealogies project faithfully contributes to the consolidation of the digital empire. Each text collected for its corpus is rendered machine-readable through a process of adaptation that involves removing empty space and segmenting elements such as paragraphs, subtitles, and footnotes, all in accordance with a grammar declared in extensible mark-up language. Numbered and indexed, their physiognomy greatly altered through a typography-conforming process of text-editing and extension conversion, the tokenised lexical items have moved from the printed page or the website to an anonymous server, keeping still until they are called upon by a query, a message expressed in a shape recognised by the code.
The texts gathered by the *Genealogies of Knowledge* project go back up to 2500 years, and its material is stored and made available in three scripts, the Greek, the Arabic, and the Latin. Yet ancient manuscripts were not collected in their first documented form, but through copies, carefully prepared for publication in a more practical format guaranteed by Gutenberg’s moveable-type printing press and the efforts of decades of digital scholarship. Thus, authorship dates go back to the fifth century B.C., but publication dates of material in the corpus are situated, at the earliest, in the nineteenth century. This means that all the material, at some point, has been subjected to copyright law, in place for the benefit of publishers since the Stationers’ Charter of 1557, for the benefit of authors since the 1710 Statute of Anne, and cognizant of the translator since the 1886 Berne convention (Atkinson and Fitzgerald 2014, Howsam 2015). In the digital empire, however, the countercultures of cyberspace have more recently declared war on existing copyright regulations. Both corporate and free-floating catch-phrases and buzzwords such as ‘open access’, ‘creative commons’ and ‘copyleft’ indicate a desire to assert a ‘fundamental human right to access our shared knowledge’ (Nesson 2012, ix). As a result, one finds a fundamental rift between the modern content of the *Genealogies* corpus and its ancestral one in terms of the conditions of availability. Today, the living are more generous than the dead. Which raises the question: what’s in the corpus?

In the Greek subcorpus, one finds, to give only a few examples, writings by Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Hippocrates, Herodotus, and Thucydides, in accordance with the project’s concern for the scientific, the political, and of necessity, the historical. One finds Averroes and Alfarabi in the Arabic section of the corpus, and Cicero and Aquinas in the Latin one. In the English subcorpus, one finds Kant, Kuhn, Mouffe and Arendt. Yet by the nature of the whole corpus, the focus of which is largely translated text, one also finds, at each stage, renditions of most of what came before. Original texts, commentaries and translations together form clusters of linguistic output that, at each stage, hint back to a distant past that resides a mouse-click away. The corpus is only searchable by script, but its subcorpora, even if mainly behind the scenes, interact continually. Aristotle, for instance, is well-represented at every stage of historical progression. Concerning the internet-based corpus material, the selection is not author-based, but publication-based. Among other outlets, one finds *OpenDemocracy* and *Discover Society*, *Mother Jones*, *Climate Depot*, and *Activist Post*, outlets that shift
between scientific and political viewpoints across broadly imagined spectra of dissent. All these outlets are united by the fact that they aim to disseminate a viewpoint in opposition to a perceived conceptual and ethical corruption that may be situated within consensus opinion, malicious disinformation, or media conglomerate production. Thus, the English corpus, which consists of two sections – the Modern English corpus containing print material dating back to the mid-nineteenth century and the Internet corpus containing articles published in the twenty-first century – features old tomes of preserved lore as well as vibrant expressions of conceptual intervention. By a simple query for long established term such as power, the concordance stages disputes between Cratylus and climate change activists. In the levelling workings of the concordance browser, The Great Conversation continues as a concerted carnival.

All this indicates that canonisation is perhaps the force that most determines the Genealogies of Knowledge corpus. Arnold (2001: 2), championing the cultural application of atavistic eugenics, wrote: ‘culture [is] a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits’. He expresses a common sentiment which ascribes to the past the function of an eternal wellspring of youth. The reason for this rejuvenating potential, however, can be no other than the fact that at the root of concepts and terminological constellations, there is to be found ‘not the inviolable identity of their origin’, but rather ‘dissension’ (Foucault 1977: 142). Genealogies of Knowledge, in short, presents a canon of discord, the surface tensions of which lead back straight to the heart of the early dialogues of the loitering and bearded. It can be no coincidence that in the English part of the corpus, to which the current study is restricted, the most frequently occurring personal names are Socrates, Plato, and Marx, the first two formalising the dialectic as a force of reason, the latter setting it in motion as a reason for force, and thereby establishing himself as an ambiguous figure carrying the insignia of what may properly be called a revolutionary tradition.

The information on personal names is drawn from a frequency list generated by the Genealogies software, and it is significant in itself that the machine does not differentiate names from any other tokens that happen to float around. A lexical item is a lexical item,
and that is enough. This goes to show that the environment through which the corpora are accessed, too, creates some particular determinations, which should be illustrated before the corpus is mobilised as a tool for study. That is to say, in using the *Genealogies* corpus, the fundamental relation is one between concept, text, potential translation, and the laboratory in which these elements are made to interact. The laboratory itself operates, if not necessarily as an evil genie, at least as a mad scientist, lumping together a host of unrelated statements in accordance with a keyword, in the hopes of a pattern come to life. In this sense, more than a tool for collage, bricolage and montage, *Genealogies* is an experiment in gothic necromancy, composing chaotic aggregations of disassembled body parts that might, God willing, raise themselves without wreaking havoc. In section 3.2, I will illustrate the workings of the corpus by following the trace of Marx, more specifically by considering two translations of the *Communist Manifesto*.

### 3.2 The Concordance Browser and its Plugins

The first page of the *Communist Manifesto* pins down both its origin and its projected future development: ‘Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, and Danish languages’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 2). A first thing to note in the quotation is ‘the *Manifesto*’s obsession with its own translations’, which is later confirmed in the prefaces produced by Marx and, mainly, Engels, for the German, Russian, English, Polish and Italian editions (Puchner 2006: 3). The writing of prefaces went hand in hand with a claim to authorship. In the quote above, one is confronted with a manifesto sketched by various international anonymous signatories, and the first edition of the text indeed ‘omitted the names of its authors and presented itself as an anonymous pamphlet’, thus suggesting the proclamation of a unified proletarian point of view (ibid.: 33). The change towards a claimed authorship would occur as a preservative effect after the failed 1848 revolution, in which the document was originally meant to intervene. In the process of dissemination, an origin was imparted upon the text.

The *Genealogies* corpus holds two English translations of the *Manifesto*, namely the first one and the most widely distributed one. The first English translation was produced in 1850 by Helen MacFarlane. In 1871, this version was reproduced in *Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly*,
an early female-led American journal. The text in the corpus derives from a digitisation of the journal’s print. The other translation in the corpus was produced by Samuel Moore in 1888, and approved by Engels. It remains to this day the canonical version, and the copy in the corpus is taken from a recent collection of selected writings by Marx (Simon 1994). Both can be selected for study in the sub-corpus selection interface of the *Genealogies* browser, which allows the user to construct a study corpus by choosing among publication dates, authors, translators, publishing formats, and so forth (Figure 3.1).

![Figure 3.1: Genealogies subcorpus selector (partial)](image)

Once the texts are selected, one types a keyword in the concordance browser’s search box to generate concordances. The concordances will show the keyword in the centre, surrounded by an adjustable amount of co-text. On the left-hand side, the document a given line is taken from is specified by its file number. Sorting the concordance lines can be done using buttons to sort left or right, which will display them in alphabetical order according to a certain position along the horizon, up to six steps away from the keyword. It is, in addition, possible, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, to delete lines that cloud one’s view, to request an
extract of text larger than the concordance line, or to display the text’s metadata to check its provenance. The metadata correspond, largely, to the features that can be selected in the subcorpus interface, complemented with a short summary of the text in question.

The concordance partly represented in Figure 3.2, which consists of fifty-six lines, is generated by a search for the word we. A search for we promises to generate interesting results, given the intriguing enunciative conditions of the Manifesto. When the manifesto first appeared, it was not Marx and Engels speaking, but the communists. Furthermore, pronouns, usually posing as innocuous, shape political discourse more than any other word category, and as discussed in Chapter 2, they can become quite controversial in use. At the most basic level, the simple act of positioning indicated by the use of a pronoun is integral to the shape of any statement presented as a call to action. Alphabetically sorted at one position to the right, the seven first lines returned by the concordance search are presented in Figure 3.3.
The concordance lines stress the aim of the abolition or destruction of private property (lines 2-5). Furthermore, there is a clear stress on the distinction between a *we* which aims and a *you* that reproaches, indicating that part of the manifesto is written as a polemical dialogue. It is, furthermore, this *you* to whom belongs the property up for destruction, which imparts a threatening quality on the lines in question (line 5). Remarkably, all these lines are from MacFarlane’s translation, which suggests a fair difference with Moore’s in terms of phrasing. Moore seems, for instance, not to use *aim*. A consideration of the corresponding concordance lines (not represented in Figure 3.3) indicates that he favours the verb *intend*. Semantically, the difference is minimal. Metaphorically, *aim* suggests a more militant procedure.

Perhaps the most notable part of Figure 3.3 is line 7, in which ‘a frightful hobgoblin stalks throughout Europe’. The corresponding part of Moore’s famous translation runs: ‘A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism’ (Figure 3.4, line 2). In Macfarlane’s version, the spectre is replaced with a ghost, but also preceded by and equated with a stalking, ‘frightful hobgoblin’. A folkloristic, mischievous addition, which furthermore leads her to start the sentence anew: ‘We are haunted by a ghost’. That is to say, the supposed authors of the manifesto are the ghost’s first targets. Oddly so, because the ghost’s other opponents, Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, who have aimed to lay the ghost to rest, or ‘exorcise’ it, are also the opponents of the communists (Figure 3.4). This ambiguity is explained by the fact that both parties intend, in some sense, to expel the ghost, although the communist does not seek to exorcise, but to incarnate the spectre. Logically, in this sense, the ghost never appears in the text after the manifesto’s introductory pages. The *we* introduced by MacFarlane, however, can also be interpreted as bringing the community of readers into the
document: all of us, it seems, are haunted by the ghost, and through this interpretation, once the document is published in America, the ghost crosses the Atlantic. On its arrival, it takes on a body.

Given the spectral presence of communism, it might well be of interest, in this small corpus, to look for a further clarification of the political position expounded by the authors of the work. How do you recognise a communist, and perhaps, how do you become one? What features are directly associated with the term communism, and, in its human form, communist? Who constitutes the authorial we?
A search for communism renders 28 concordance lines. A quick overview of significant modifying elements in the term’s vicinity can be generated by the concordance mosaic (Figure 3.5), developed by Luz & Sheehan (2014), who developed the entire Genealogies interface. The mosaic was inspired by the work of one of the founders of corpus linguistics, John Sinclair (2003), who used similar representations in his didactic work. The mosaic is a rectangular display divided into tiles, each of which features a word in the immediate environment of the keyword under examination. Different tiles are demarcated by shades of a given colour. The display above for communism is based on ‘Column Frequency (No Stopwords)’, and thus the size and order of the tiles simply display which terms are the most frequent at a given position to the left or the right of the keyword. Stopwords (such as the, and, and of) are removed in the above presentation to facilitate the interpretation of meaningful patterns, but the mosaic represents them on request. The frequency mosaic may help to interpret texts, but should be used in close correspondence with the concordance, and the plugin includes an option that allows the user to move from any combination of items in the mosaic to the actual lines in which they feature in the concordance. In the above example, for instance, one would be tempted to interpret communism as an agent of deprivation, but the relevant concordance lines read ‘communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society’ in Moore, and ‘communism deprives no one of the right of appropriating social products’ in MacFarlane. The difference between power and rights is readily noted, as is MacFarlane’s gender-neutral rendering.

On the right of Figure 3.5, the display is based on collocation strength, or the statistical tendency of words to co-occur within a given body of text. Four statistical measures can be applied within the mosaic tool, which produce different results based on varying interpretations of the dependence relation between words, and varying assumptions about the nature of distribution in linguistic data. The first one is MI-score, or mutual information, which tends to foreground low-frequency associations. Z-score, the second measure used, computes differently, but has a tendency to produce similar results. MI3 Score and Log-Log, two other measures built into the mosaic, derive from MI, but aim to balance the other measures’ bias towards the highly unexpected, and thus often, infrequent combination, by giving more weight to more commonly used, high-frequency items. In the figure above,
which displays the MI3-score option, the items shown are those that are particularly likely to occur in the vicinity of communist, but not of a frequency so low that this association is based mainly on their complete absence anywhere else in the texts.

Reading the mosaic, one notices, first, American and German, terms that reflect the publication’s framing by the American magazine that reproduced it, specifically, as the Manifesto of the German Communist Party. There is thus, an editorial presence in the text, which supplements that of the authors and the translator. On the right of the keyword, a focus on literature and publications is evident, suggesting a similar editorial source for the pattern, but in fact, ‘communist literature’ is used in the body of the text rather than paratextual material alone, and in both translations. That is to say, at the time of its foundational expression, communism was already inscribed in a growing body of work. The big empty space to the left of the keyword reflects the fact that the MI3 measure in this case ascribes much greater significance to the particular right-hand side associations. The particular view on display is termed global in the mosaic, meaning that calculations take place across all positions to the left and right. A local view produces columns of equal height, with the size of the tiles indicating significance within a certain position, rather than within the concordance as a whole.

Having been assured by the corpus that communism does not deprive, but also having been referred to the literature for a clear characterisation of communist, a useful search for further clarification might involve the communist’s nemesis, the bourgeois. The software interface includes another useful plugin, named Metadata Facets, which segments data from the concordance along features such as author, publication format, year of publication, or translator. The tool reveals that despite the textual extension offered by the editorial presence in MacFarlane’s text, the term bourgeois occurs less than half as frequently in her rendition of the Manifesto as in Moore’s (Figure 3.6). Looking at the concordance lines, it becomes clear that she tends not to use the term when it is part of a larger, idiomatic usage such as petty bourgeois. MacFarlane, as she explains in a translatorial footnote, prefers to translate Kleinburger as shopocrat. This choice is indicative of a larger difficulty of Marx’s term bourgeois to gain foothold. The bourgeoisie is supposed to be the ruling class in capitalist society, and therefore it should represent one of the opposed sides that give shape to the fundamental contradiction and the site of struggle, but its manifestations are
far from terminologically homogeneous. The same holds for *proletarian*, a term that has gradually fallen out of usage.

A query for petty bourgeois in the corpus requires one to use the correct sequencing grammar in the search box, which is *petty+bourgeois*. Next to the plus sign, a useful symbol is the *wildcard*, represented by *. The asterisk, to be used at the beginning or the end of a string, indicates that it can be instantiated by an unspecified amount of unspecified characters until a full word-form, a token, is identified. Searching for *communis* will thus return both *communism* and *communist(s).* Searching for patterns that are not limited to a type – the set containing all tokens of the same form – can be further aided by the use of regular expressions. One can, for example, search for “b[aeiou]d” to retrieve any sequence of the consonant *b* and the consonant *d* connected by any vowel in the English language. Results will include instances of *bud, bad* and *bid.* Vertical bars (|) make it possible to search for potential substitutes or alternatives (as in “*proletarian|bourgeois*”). Combining features
of the regular expression grammar thus facilitates the search for highly abstract patterns encompassing complex sets of either semantic or formal relations.

The use of a varying vocabulary for central elements in a given discourse, as illustrated by the competing terms *petty bourgeois* and *shopocrat*, indicates two central issues concerning keyword-based research into conceptual change. Firstly, a term and a concept do not fully overlap, but come to meet and part ways at specific junctures. As a result, the transparency of semantic categorizations suffers: it is immediately clear that the *petty bourgeois* is a type of *bourgeois*, but the *shopocrat* might not be so easily identified. A concordance browser partly counters these troubles, however, because of its nature as a tool that reveals patterns. If the *shopocrat* behaves lexicographically like the *bourgeois*, the two must be closely related. In reverse, while many authors might mention *communism*, they may all be speaking of different things; the broader textual pattern will however be indicative of the function of a term in a specific text, and thus of its specific meaning as used. One might, for instance, look for *spectre*, *ghost* and *hobgoblin*, and derive from the corpus what defines their differences and similarities. In carrying out such a search, something odd happens. The *spectre* and the *ghost* occur, respectively, three and four times in the texts, but because of the limited distance between these occurrences, the browser conjures up, within the co-text, a host of duplicate, supplementary ghosts and spectres, as in the overlap between lines 2 and 3 in Figure 3.7. The browser does not only decontextualise to a certain degree, it also generates data of its own. We can infer, from this example, that the corpus is an amplifying device, one which tends to slightly intensify the patterns the researcher is searching for. The issue of patterning is further discussed in the next section.

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Figure 3.7: *spectre/ghost/hobgoblin* concordance (full)
3.3 Patterning

The major benefit of using a corpus for the study of running text consists of the fact that corpora provide ‘a large empirical database of natural discourse’, thus ‘[enabling] analyses of a scope not feasible otherwise’ (Biber et al. 1994: 169-170). While providing the researcher with ample material for analysis, and thus with a sound basis for testing hypotheses, the quantity of data available for study also presents the researcher with difficulties concerning orientation. A corpus does not automatically suggest the best entry point for undertaking the study of a selected set of keywords. The visualisation plugins discussed in section 3.2, however, can provide the researcher with sensible cues. They derive from statistical analyses of the data at hand, and ‘using computerised corpora’ is a practice ‘born out of a statistical methodological philosophy’, which attaches great importance to ‘the search for – and belief in the importance of – recurring patterns’ (Partington et al. 2013: 8). If a certain linguistic pattern occurs frequently or regularly, it is considered significant, because it ‘can be used as the basis for predicting how other, as yet unanalysed chunks of language will behave’ (Partington et al 2013: 8). A pattern, in this sense, ‘is a phraseology frequently associated with (a sense of) a word’ (Hunston and Francis 2000: 3).

The interpretative as well as predictive value of pattern analysis in the context of the current research project, then, is grounded in ‘the Hallidayan assumption that all linguistic usage encodes representations of the world’, and different patterns therefore ‘encode different points of view’, which are bound to be politically salient (Stubbs 1996: 130). Indeed, the linguistic ‘root of “ideology” is the Greek “idein,” which refers to patterns or forms that can be seen’ (Bannerji 2016: 207).

The empirical observation that lexical items usually occur within a relatively fixed pattern has been interpreted as evidence for the idiom principle, the hypothesis that ‘a language user has available to him or her a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be analysable into segments’ (Sinclair 1991: 110). This principle operates in opposition to the open-choice principle, which posits an extensive paradigmatic variability at each slot in the syntagmatic structure of an utterance. Because of the constraints imposed by the idiom principle, this division between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axis has to be abandoned in many cases in favour of a view based on the ‘co-selection of lexis and grammar’ (Stubbs 2009: 120). According to this
principle, it ‘makes little sense to ask what the individual word means, since this depends on how it is used in different phrases and grammatical constructions’ (ibid.). Thus, the observation that lexical items are co-selected is interpreted as indicative of the fact that grammar as a selection system does not function independently from its lexical counterpart. When speaking of patterns confirming the interdependence of lexis and grammar, the conceptual vocabulary of corpus-linguistic studies usually clusters around the investigation of collocation, colligation, semantic preference and semantic prosody. Only collocation is directly observable, while the other three conceptions require a motion of interpretative abstraction based upon the primary attestation of a collocational phenomenon.

The term collocate is used for any word that occurs in the specified environment of a node or keyword, and collocation thus denotes a specific combination of two lexical items, although in many cases the term collocation is reserved for combinations that cross a certain statistical threshold of significance. As touched upon in section 3.2, the research community employs a variety of statistical measures for ascribing the status of collocation to a combination of words or larger units of meaning. The scope of legitimate correlation is also a matter of debate. Sinclair restricts the environment in which collocations can occur to a space of ‘four intervening words’, but concedes that this measure is problematic in the context of his own argument for multi-word units of meaning (Sinclair 2004b: 141). Sinclair also introduced the principle of mutual collocation, which suggests that, often, two items that both co-occur with a given lexical item are unlikely to co-occur with each other significantly (ibid.: 142). Thus both full and politic collocate with body, but they do not collocate with each other. This phenomenon provides additional evidence for the idiom principle.

Colligation is variously defined as either ‘the collocation of a lexical and a grammatical item’, or as ‘the co-occurrence of grammatical phenomena’ (Partington 1998: 80, Sinclair 2004b: 142). In contrast to the former, the latter formulation, which implies reciprocity of correspondence, is relatively unproductive. Adhering to this definition, colligation would often be no more than a corpus-linguistic term for what is usually called agreement. Singular nouns, for example, will tend to co-occur with singular verb forms. This kind of morphological agreement is typically widespread, even in a language like English, which has shed the majority of its inflectional categories. As the loss of mutational capacity has been
replaced in English with a heightened focus on word order, observing colligation as the co-occurrence of grammatical categories still implies a certain circularity, for the description of grammatical categories is partly based on factors of position. In other words, grammar is a matter of composition, and colligation as a reciprocal principle can consequently do little more than explicate a presupposed structure.

The former definition is more enlightening, as it can alternatively be phrased as ‘the co-occurrence of words with grammatical choices’ (Sinclair 2004: 174). Something different is imagined here, namely a case of restriction, which reserves a certain grammatical choice for the realisation of a unit of meaning with the keyword as core, without there being any discernible reason but a specific instantiation of the principle of co-selection. Tognini-Bonelli (1993: 196), for example, observes that the adjectives actual and real, while quite similar at first sight, show very different grammatical behaviour, as actual is much more likely to be preceded by a definite article. One could also treat this example as a simple instance of collocation, but as the is a function word it gears the description towards grammatical conclusions.

Semantic preference, a further interpretative abstraction suggested by the recurrent combination of certain linguistic items, ‘is the relation of co-occurrence between the phrasal unit and words from characteristic lexical fields’, and therefore it is a matter of ‘textual coherence’ (Stubbs 2009: 125). Sinclair presents as an example the co-occurrence of the phrase the naked eye with terms relating to ‘visibility’, such as see (Sinclair 2004: 32). A slightly different way to approach semantic preference is to consider it as explicating ‘the association of formal patterning with a semantic field’ (Stewart 2010: 10). This formulation implies that collocation and colligation are both drawn on to establish a preference, and that preference is seen as a feature inherent in a larger unit of meaning, rather than as a principle of association derived from the inclinations of the node word. A similar variability in locating the interpretational category can be traced in the discussions surrounding a final canonical concept of corpus-linguistic research, namely semantic prosody.

The concept of semantic prosody is mostly called upon to interpret the evaluative functioning of larger units of meaning. The first examples of semantic prosody were provided by Louw (1993). Louw (ibid.: 158) attributes to Sinclair the coining of the term
‘semantic prosody’ to refer to, for example, the fact that the verb ‘happen’ is habitually associated with unpleasant events’. The ‘habitual collocates denoting such unpleasant events ‘are capable of colouring it, so it can no longer be seen in isolation from its semantic prosody, which is established through the semantic consistency of its subjects’ (ibid.: 159). The phenomenon is called prosody because of the analogy with Firth’s discussion of ‘phonological colouring… capable of transcending segmental boundaries’ (ibid.: 158). The concept allows Louw to make interesting observations based on the breaching of a certain prosody. Whenever, for instance, a word is used outside its habitual context, an inference of irony or insincerity can be made on the basis of a clash of connotations.

The concept of semantic prosody is highly debated. Whitsitt, for example, reads Louw’s approach as follows: ‘if several different words all sharing the same semantic trait are frequently used with another word, meaning will be passed, over time, from that group to the other word’ (Whitsitt 2005: 284). Whitsitt then discusses two problems this definition seems to disregard. The first one is that the ‘corpus… is organized synchronically. The essence of the phenomenon of semantic prosody is, however, historical change: meaning being transferred between terms which appear together frequently over time’ (ibid.: 287).

Simply put, one cannot observe change in a static environment. The second source of trouble, which is related to the first one in its assumption of a certain linearity, pertains to directionality. The word which is said to be influenced by its company is initially posited as ‘an empty form… innocent of meaning’, and ‘the flow is always one-way, from strong, full, bad words, into the weak, empty, innocent forms’ (ibid.: 292). Whitsitt rightly reads ‘an organizing myth’ in this hypothetical process (ibid.).

An alternative to diachronic mythologising is to treat semantic prosody as a feature of pragmatics. Stubbs, who relates semantic prosody to ‘illocutionary force’, considers it to be ‘the communicative function of the whole unit’, an indicator of ‘communicative purpose’ (2009: 124-125). However, when taking the longer sequence as a starting point ‘there is the risk of stating the obvious’ (Stewart 2010: 160). As an example, we shall take the first full-fledged study of semantic prosody, Louw’s work on the word utterly. Relatively in accordance with the view questioned above, he states that ‘the concordance shows that utterly has an overwhelmingly ‘bad’ prosody: there are few ‘good’ right-collocates’ (1993: 160). Indeed, ‘utterly arid…utterly ridiculous’ and ‘utterly unsympathetic’, which all figure in
the corpus evidence he provides, are not agreeable phrases (Louw 1993: 160). However, if one avoids focusing on the node under scrutiny, and takes the larger unit of meaning as indicative of a certain prosody, attention is drawn to frequent co-occurrences such as 'utterly against' (Louw 1993: 160). In ascribing an evaluative worth to this phrase one would very likely reach 'conclusions which were transparent from the outset' (Stewart 2010: 78). There is little point in proving that *utterly against* has a prosody of strong disapproval, as this is simply what the expression denotes.

Nevertheless, the concept of semantic prosody is useful when it is able to conjoin divergent semantic tendencies in an overarching potential for meaning-construction. The difference of perspective is minimal, but significant. If one starts out from Louw's (1993) observation that any phrase that contains the intensifier *utterly* expresses disapproval, or from Sinclair's claim that 'the verb *happen* is associated with unpleasant things' (1991: 112), pragmatic effects do not arise from a breach in the prosody, but from its consistency. Irony or discomfort, for example, can then be observed whenever intuition ascribes a connotation to an individual word that is not realised in the larger unit of meaning in which it takes part. From this point of view, semantic prosody is yet another strong indicator of the workings of the idiom principle, or the principle of co-selection. In response to its conceptualisation as a feature of pragmatics, semantic prosody has at times been equated with the 'boundary of the lexical item' (Sinclair 2004: 34). Another way to put this is to say that 'semantic prosody' is an indicator of '[functionally] complete units', considered 'to be the building blocks of communication' (Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 19, 183). Such statements are a logical outgrowth of the lexicographical origins of concordance-based research, a major insight of which was that the primary unit of meaning is not necessarily the word, yet they also defy the logical consequences of the investigation of larger units of meaning. The principle that guided the extension of the unit of meaning is patterning, and linguistic patterning knows no final boundary. In this respect, one may well be reminded that for Firth, 'patterns such as assonance and alliteration were subsumed under the category of collocation', and that 'there is theoretically no qualitative difference between word with word, word with phrase, phrase with phrase, even phrase with clause and clause with clause collocation' (Partington 1998: 16-17). Indeed, all these combinations 'can be studied as phenomena of patterning in a text' (ibid.: 17).
The lack of complete self-sufficiency of meaning pertaining to any assertion of a theoretical unit is indicative of the interpretative issue that patterns do not so much reside in objects, but rather in the cognitive setup of the human animal. Our brains ‘are masterful pattern recognizers’ (Kucera 1992: 411). Consequently, ‘the search for patterns is found in all humanities disciplines (from linguistics to historiography), in all periods (from Antiquity up to the present day), and in all regions (from China to Europe)’ (Bod 2013: 172). Furthermore, a pattern ‘can range from the local to the global’, as the notion of pattern can refer to anything from ‘a grammatical rule’ to ‘a historical trend such as the increase of the number of democratic states during the last decades’ (ibid.). If, then, a ‘linguist must be clearly aware of the levels at which he is making his abstractions and statements and must finally prove his theory by renewal of connection with the processes and patterns of life’, the linguist must select not only the relevant linguistic characteristics of an object of study, but also the relevant patterns of life that immediately bear upon their manifestation (Firth 1968b: 19). This does not mean that something approaching a unit of meaning cannot be found in a corpus. On the contrary, encountering a repeated pattern or an exception to such a structure, the limits of which can clearly be established, is highly informative, exactly because such an encounter seems to initially defy the cosmic structure of absolute interrelation. To study collocational phenomena is to capture that which presents itself as self-sufficient, and from thereon the appreciation of the context that provides the conditions for this alleged self-evidence may proceed. From this perspective, the hypothesis guiding this thesis is that the pattern of prefiguration, the figure of a promise in between foreshadowing and fulfilment, can be productively brought to bear on the usage patterns of democracy, politics and community.

A criticism often levelled at corpus-based research is that its data are ‘as decontextualized as any linguistic information could possibly be’ (Partington 1998:145). Addressing this issue, this thesis takes as a starting point for analysis phenomena observed in concordance lines and visualisations, but always re-establishes the relation with the broader cultural context to put forward a richer, context-sensitive interpretation. The Genealogies of Knowledge corpus is rich in metadata, which facilitates movement between text as concordance and text as publication, and throughout the analysis information is drawn from within and beyond the boundaries of the corpus. For this procedure to be effective, I have chosen to
analyse two relatively small corpora, one consisting of academic works and one of online articles. Their composition is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
4 THE POST-MARX CORPUS

The current chapter is an investigation into the concepts democracy, politics, and community as they have been used in a number of academic works selected from the Genealogies corpus primarily on the basis of their original date of publication. Further selection principles are specified below. As discussed in Chapter 1, the year 1968 ‘was marked by demonstrations, disorder, and violence in many parts of the world’, and this global wave of uprisings has been seen as ‘one of the great, formative events’ in modern history (Wallerstein 1989: 431). Wallerstein (ibid.: 434) has identified, as central to the protests, the break with the ‘old left’. The two great failures of the Marxist-Leninist left had been its inability to successfully combat capitalism and to realise socialist society. If failure, to some extent, can be forgiven, treason cannot, and the aggression shown in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union in 1968 marked a fundamental break not just between Eastern and Western communists in Europe, but also between the grassroots and the Party. A newly found radicalism wavered between the intensification of orthodoxy and the proclamation of various strands of heterodoxy. Internal tensions in the formation of a new left arose around issues such as the relation between ‘individual and collective emancipation’, and between criticism and revolution (Gilcher-Holtey 2008: 204). If some perceived a global, liberating, emancipatory project, others were more sceptical and ascribed the protests to boredom, confusion and the need for struggle, especially regarding Western Europe. About the students rioting in France, Fukuyama (1992: 330) argued that ‘if the greater part of the world in which they live is characterized by peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy, then they will struggle against peace and prosperity, and against democracy’. Regardless of one’s position on the matter, the events of 1968 had, especially in France, a major impact on intellectual culture, and on contemporary philosophy in particular.

In addition to date of publication as an initial criterion of selection, I further restricted my corpus to texts that stand in direct relation to the intellectual schisms of 1968, which were centred around the relevance, interpretation and application of Marxist thought. The resulting corpus contains the following texts, in order of original date of publication in the source language (see Appendix 1 for full details): Althusser and Balibar’s Reading Capital [1968], Nicos Poulantzas’ Political Power and Social Classes [1968], René Girard’s Violence and the Sacred [1972], Antonio Negri’s Marx Beyond Marx [1979], Jacques Derrida’s
Specters of Marx [1993], Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s Retreating the Political [1997], Alain Badiou’s Metapolitics [1998], Jacques Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics [2000], Enrique Dussel’s Twenty Theses on Politics [2006], and Étienne Balibar’s Equaliberty [2010]. I have not included works published after 2010, as 2011 marks the year of the next global wave of revolutions, the textual implications of which are the topic of Chapter 5.

The relations between the authors included in the corpus are many, and find particularly intense expression in the role played by the École Normale Supérieure, an institution for the French intellectual elite founded during the French Revolution. The first book in the corpus, Reading Capital, consists of a series of papers delivered there under Althusser’s guidance. Althusser was a mentor to Poulantzas, and a teacher to Badiou, Rancière and Balibar, all of whom distanced themselves theoretically from Althusser in the aftermath of the events of 1968 (Badiou 2001: 88, Gallas 2017: 258-259). A class entitled Philosophy for Scientists, at which Althusser spoke alongside Balibar and Badiou, coincided with the eruption of the protests, which were not received enthusiastically by Althusser. He did not express support and would remain ambivalent about the movement’s revolutionary value. The protesters were indignant at his silence and seeming retreat into theory. The graffiti on the walls read: *A quoi sert Althusser?* (What good is Althusser?). Rancière (2009: 115) would later speak of this disappointment and raise the question of how it could happen that his teacher’s ‘radical re-foundation of revolutionary Marxism ended up providing the restoration of the Academic order with its sharpest theoretical weapons?’ Badiou, shortly after the end of the course, ‘began investing his political energies in the setting up of a Maoist breakaway organization’ (Barker 2002: 2).

Negri’s Marx Beyond Marx consists of a series of seminars delivered at the École, at the invitation of Althusser, and the school hosted the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political, led by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe. Derrida, too, was educated at the institute. The remaining authors in the corpus, Dussel and Girard, were educated elsewhere in Paris, and later left Europe, but never abandoned the influence of continental thought. In the case of Girard, it should further be noted that of all the authors in the corpus, he stands out because Marx does not serve as a theoretical reference for him. Violence and the Sacred sought to abandon both Marxist theory and a certain interpretation of Freud, the two
figures that guided the Parisian scenes both inside academia and on the barricades (Chartre 2016: 21). Girard would, after his emigration to the United States, keep a calculated distance from the Parisian scene, although at times expressing sympathetic judgement about the works of Nancy and Derrida. While markedly different in their choice of subject matter, it has been observed that Girard and Derrida operate along very similar lines, in the sense that the former interrogates a scapegoat mechanism as the foundation of human culture, and the latter a mechanism of textual exclusion as the basis for conceptual stability (McKenna 1992: 12). Both spoke at the 1966 Johns Hopkins University conference *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*, an event which marked the importation of structuralism from France into the United States, and simultaneously spelled the end of a coherent structural research paradigm (Macksey and Donato 1972).

Indeed, beyond Marxism and the 1968 uprisings, the texts in the corpus arguably display, in varying degrees, the influence of *poststructuralism*. Poststructuralism, at base, has been characterised as a discourse questioning the binary oppositions that uphold structuralist analyses of social and semiotic systems, such as the distinction between signifier and signified, or between nature and culture. Poststructuralist thought would have inaugurated a ‘carnivalesque order of reason’, eating its way through the foundations of conceptual systematicity, but in this sense would continue to operate within the connective tissue provided by structuralist interrelations (Dosse 1997: 22). The issue with poststructuralism remains that authors supposed to characterize it ritually distance themselves from the label, and the same goes, to some extent, for structuralism. *Reading Capital* (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 7) starts out with such a disavowal, in stating that despite all efforts to the contrary the provided ‘interpretation of Marx has generally been recognized and judged, in homage to the current fashion, as ‘structuralist’’. With regard to post-categorizations, the issue does not need to be complicated any further. The condition of postmodernity, aptly characterised by the absence of metanarratives, and symptomatically confirmed by the call for prefiguration, could barely engender schools of thought that provide a stable means of identification. It should be noted as well that, despite the centrality of Marxist theory as a subject matter, the authors in the corpus could barely be characterised as Marxist, as at every turn of theory, they express in one way or another ‘that *Marxism doesn’t exist*’ (Badiou 2005: 58). The *post-* in the title of the current chapter is in this regard best
explained with reference to Althusser’s (1970: 14) specification that ‘we did not read Capital as economists, as historians or as philologists’, ‘we were all philosophers’. If Marx’s aim was to set philosophy to work as a tool of revolution, a certain pause occurred around 1968, where the text was considered, once again, in its capacity as philosophy. That is to say, Marx’s place in the canon of thought was consolidated perhaps at the expense of adherence to the revolutionary imperative expressed in his work.

The fact that this corpus is selected on the basis of philosophical heritage merits further consideration. It is self-evident that in some respect, whatever is said is said ‘in response to something that has been said before’ (Teubert 2007: 52). Yet when we speak of a philosophical heritage, the relation between utterances is often more specific, more conscious, and more sustained. Whitehead famously claimed that ‘the European philosophical tradition’ can be safely described as ‘a series of footnotes to Plato’ (Whitehead 1929: 53). While he meant to indicate a continuity in the set of ideas discussed rather than an actual system of reference, the quote does illustrate a fundamental fact about the discipline of philosophy, which is distinctly canonical, and therefore intrinsically diachronic. The texts in the corpus will therefore always bear both implicit and explicit reference to material that is formulated outside its confines, and such connections will be traced in the analysis where historical context is indispensable. The exchange between textual evidence within and beyond the corpus is at the core of a corpus-assisted approach.

Furthermore, on numerous occasions, as we will see, the concordance indicates a high degree of specificity pertaining to the use of a vocabulary item. At such points, attempts are made to clarify the terminology used. Of interest in this respect is the fact that although poststructuralism could be characterised as inherently ‘challenging definitive truths’, and exploring ‘relativity in meaning’, its ambiguities have given rise to a high degree of doctrinaire terminological discussions and scrupulous practices of translation and dissemination (von Flotow 1991: 80). While Badiou’s work, mathematical in inspiration and partly opposed to the excesses of discursive experimentation, ‘is designed to be as indifferent as possible to the language in which it is conveyed’, other texts in the corpus are notorious for seeming to aim at untranslatability (Hallward 2001: xlix). This situation is aggravated by the fact that a number of texts in the corpus, such as Althusser’s and Negri’s,
were originally presented as lectures, and thus ‘bear the mark of these circumstances: not only in their construction, their rhythm, their didactic or oral style, but also and above all in their discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations and uncertain steps in their investigations’ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 13). All the texts in the corpus are translations, mostly produced by philosophers in their own right who greatly invest in conveying the ‘signature’ of the authors involved, even if this involves, as in the case of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, transmitting ‘the unheimlich nature of their way of work’ (Sparks 1997: ix). Translators and editors of the works involved, in their capacity of conversant philosopher and attentive conveyor, often provide a sizeable amount of paratextual material to introduce a system of thought or to explain their own choices. Paratextual material forms part of the corpus, and will often prove central to the analysis.

In short, in sections 4.1 to 4.3 I will investigate the textual patterns in which the keywords democracy, community, and politics occur in the corpus of texts outlined above, which totals about one million words. Remarkable patterns of association will be discussed as regards their prefigurative potential, that is to say, the degree to which they signal the desire for the creation of another world. The contemporary focus on prefiguration as a political strategy antedates some of the material in the corpus, and the enquiry is therefore in part a projection. The concepts investigated, however, have in some sense been central to the organisation of political life since the dawn of reflection upon it, and if they have come to serve the principles of prefiguration, they must have been prepared to do so.

4.1 Democracy

As signalled in section 2.2.7, the concept of democracy has gradually shed its derogatory connotations to become a generally commended political ideal. Whereas for ‘two millennia politicians and philosophers regarded democracy as an inferior form of politics’, it is widely held that ‘we currently live in a world that agrees on the importance and desirability of democracy’ (Hanson 1989: 68-69). At the same time, it has been argued that while ‘the value of democracy became transcendent, its meaning was lost in the cacophony of competing interpretations of democracy’ (ibid.: 69). The question that guides the following enquiry is what function is fulfilled by the various conceptual alliances democracy is made to form, and what strategies are employed to distinguish a certain usage of democracy against
alternative interpretations. Mosaic representations and concordance lines are provided to visualise general patterns in the immediate co-text of the keyword. If broader stretches of co-text are required for the analysis to proceed, expanded extracts serve as points of reference. When the discussion focuses on a single stretch of text from a specified publication, reference is made to the work in question.

4.1.1 Western Liberal Democracy

A search for democracy in the corpus returns 501 results, a fairly high frequency in a corpus of approximately one million words, and across the relevant concordance lines one collocational pattern stands out as being of special interest. The most frequent element occurring next to democracy, discounting stopwords, is liberal (Figure 4.1). Only of, which we will come back to later, occurs more often. A collocation strength analysis indicates that the combination liberal democracy, at 32 instances, is highly significant (Figure 4.2).

![Figure 4.1: democracy column frequency](image)

2 Captions for mosaic representations explicate the query fed into the concordance browser in italics (e.g. democracy), and the particular type of representation chosen (e.g. column frequency). Where collocation strength is concerned, as in Figure 4.2, it is specified whether the view is local or global (see section 3.2) and which statistical measure is used. The mosaic creates columns ranging up to four positions to the left and the right of the keyword, but print readability is often compromised when moving away from the centre. For this reasons, the majority of mosaic figures in this thesis are cropped to include only the most significant elements.
Semantically, the term *liberal* is as evasive as *democracy*. The concept carries ‘only a relational meaning, as a function of the existence or absence of other political or social movements’, and is therefore highly conditioned by the geographical context in which it is invoked (Audard and Raynaud 2014: 572). In the corpus, this need for geographical specification is confirmed by the fact that, with three occurrences, the most frequent word level trigram containing *liberal democracy* is *Western liberal democracy*. That is to say, a number of authors introduce a geo-cultural, politicised anchoring point to frame the discussion. When examining the immediate co-text of this triplet as it occurs in the corpus, an internally consistent, triumphant discourse is discernible, yet this assessment is embedded within a more critical, distancing appraisal. The three lines in question read as follows:

But what is one to think today of the imperturbable thoughtlessness that consists in singing the triumph of capitalism or of economic and political liberalism, “the universalization of **Western liberal democracy** as the endpoint of human government,” the “end of the problem of social classes”? 

Figure 4.2: *democracy* collocation strength (local, MI3)
those who, like Fukuyama, sing (as for Kojève, he is not singing) “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as endpoint of human government” and the victory of capitalism that would have “successfully resolved” the “class problem,” and so forth.

Badiou would first highlight the fiction of State sovereignty, and expose the myth of the superiority of Western liberal democracy over the totalitarian regimes of the East.

Western liberal democracy, as the above usage suggests, is claimed to have outlasted ‘the totalitarian regimes of the East’ as a system of government, and its alliance with an economically victorious capitalism, which ensures its further ‘universalization’, would have inaugurated the ‘end of the problem of social classes’. This outlook, however, is by no means sanctioned. The first two lines, both from Derrida’s Specters of Marx (1994), lavishly employ distancing modal verbs, question marks and quotation marks. The second of Derrida’s lines identifies the main proponent of the view announcing the great universalization as Francis Fukuyama, the American political scientist whose questioning article ‘The End of History?’ (1989) was followed by the affirmative book The End of History and the Last Man (1992). The third extract, from Badiou’s Metapolitics (2005), characterises ‘the superiority of Western liberal democracy’ as a myth. Despite the obvious parallels in formulation, the line does not make reference to Fukuyama. It does mention, however, Badiou, indicating that the line forms part of the paratext rather than the body of Metapolitics.

In fact, the line can be found in the translator’s introduction to the work. In the relevant passage, the translator, philosopher and director Jason Barker discusses another work of Badiou written in 1985, before Fukuyama stirred up the debate about the dwindling relevance of alternatives to liberal democracy for the inaugurated ever present. The introduction itself, however, was written by Barker in 1998, and it is therefore not implausible that the particular phrasing has been influenced by the debate in question. In sum, the discussion so far reveals that the lines containing the central trigram Western liberal democracy in the corpus derive from quotation or from translatorial framing. The
corpus does not offer insight into one or more monological expositions, but into a polemic involving multiple heterogeneous actors and positions, a conspicuous feature of which is Derrida’s repeated dismissal of identical quotations from Fukuyama. No fewer than 26 out of 32 occurrences of the phrase *liberal democracy* in the corpus stem from Derrida’s work, and the majority of them mention or quote Fukuyama, making his name the most significant collocate of the phrase (Figure 4.3).

![Figure 4.3: liberal+democracy collocation strength (local, MI3)](image)

No other authors are mentioned in the concordance lines for *liberal democracy*, although one additional historical figure is referred to, namely Marx, in addressing ‘the supposed death of Marxism and the supposed realization of the State of liberal democracy’ (Derrida 1994: 62). The reference to Marx leads us to the crux of the polemic at hand. Derrida and Fukuyama differ in their approach to the heritage of Marxism. For Fukuyama (1989: 4), Marx is the ‘best known propagator’ of ‘the end of history’, a hypothetical event that Fukuyama agrees and expands on. Their major disagreement is to be found in Fukuyama’s observation that history does not end with the inauguration of a truly communist society, but with the acknowledgement that such an event will never take place (Fukuyama 1992: 131).
Derrida’s critique of this position is not aimed at any political system as such, but at the
series of argumentative assertions Fukuyama deploys to declare one political system
immortal and all the others deceased. What the concordance lines do not immediately tell
us, is what Derrida considers to be the merits or flaws of Western liberal democracy, or how
he evaluates Marxism. A search for Marxism in Specters of Marx returns 93 lines, 6 of which
contain the pentagram a certain spirit of Marxism. As a further query reveals, a number of
similar patterns form around the terms Marx and Marxism (Figure 4.4). Quite a few of the
concordance lines in question, however, stem from the editor’s introduction to the work, as
suggested by the mention of Derrida’s name in the co-text. These lines occur in rapid
succession at the end of the introduction, right before the opening of the book proper. The
wording suggests that the editor understands Derrida as aiming to make a case for a varied
heritage of Marxist thought, which is not to be considered as a homogeneous totality that
can be declared outdated together with certain historical failures that carry the Marxist
insignia. The addition of a certain thus supports the claim that the proper name Marx and
its derivatives are always to remain polysemous. From this perspective, the quotation marks
around the repeated and carefully attributed phrase Western liberal democracy serve to
declare this unit of meaning as referring to Fukuyama’s singular mode of speech, which can
only be upheld in relation to a restricted interpretation of the Marxist heritage.

| always already moves within a certain spirit of Marx | it should also be noted that, for Derrida, in speaking of a certain spirit of Marxism the editor understands Derrida as aiming to make a case for a varied heritage of Marxist thought, which is not to be considered as a homogeneous totality that can be declared outdated together with certain historical failures that carry the Marxist insignia. The addition of a certain thus supports the claim that the proper name Marx and its derivatives are always to remain polysemous. From this perspective, the quotation marks around the repeated and carefully attributed phrase Western liberal democracy serve to declare this unit of meaning as referring to Fukuyama’s singular mode of speech, which can only be upheld in relation to a restricted interpretation of the Marxist heritage. |

Figure 4.4: certain+[5]Marx* concordance – Specters of Marx (11/55)

Concordance captions explicate, in italics, the relevant query (see section 3.2 for the syntax of the concordance browser). For Figure 4.4, one can derive that the pattern searched for consists of the lexical item certain, followed by terms such as Marx, Marxism, or Marxist within a span of five positions to the right. When
Remarkably, while in *Specters of Marx* Fukuyama is being chastised for allegedly erasing the polysemy of the Marxist tradition and its protagonists, he is simultaneously criticised for productively introducing conceptual polysemy. Fukuyama’s argument is in part considered problematic because it opportunistically presents liberal democracy ‘here as an actual reality and there as a simple ideal’ (Derrida 1994: 62-63). Yet, all the spectral and divergent occurrences of ‘a certain’ Marxist thought are in the end not conceivable without the ‘actual reality’ of a *Marx* that engendered the trends and tendencies that carry its name. This is the human Marx who Derrida (ibid.: 13) does not shun when it serves him well, and who remains identifiable as one of the companions known as ‘Marx and Engels themselves’. Derrida, in short, endeavours to perform a dual conceptual evacuation. The appearance of *Marx* and *democracy* in a particular, allegedly restrictive discourse is identified and discussed in order to quarantine the function, evaluation and combination of these particular terms in said discourse. Consequently, the terms remain available to alternative conceptions and developments. Simultaneously, the grounds on which this conceptual salvage operation rests remain, of necessity, as productively inconsistent as the discourse intervened in.

4.1.2 Democratization of Democracy

Returning to the full concordance for *democracy*, we find that the second most significant collocation in the corpus, according to the local MI3 measure, is *democratizing democracy* (Figure 4.2). As the concordance browser reveals, all four lines containing this combination stem from Balibar’s *Equaliberty*, and all of them make reference to a book edited by Boaventura de Sousa Santos entitled *Democratizing Democracy* (Figure 4.5). The book’s subtitle ‘Beyond the liberal democratic canon’ recalls the discussion above. In contrast to Derrida’s references to Fukuyama, Balibar’s references to de Sousa Santos suggest a sizeable measure of agreement. The co-occurrence of *democracy* with *democratization*, its most significant N-2 collocate, reveals a similar verbal sequence – *democratization of democracy* – specific to Balibar and again, as he acknowledges, traceable to de Sousa Santos’
work (Figure 4.6, line 8). These two related formulations present us with a phrasal compression of the rhetorical strategy discussed at the end of section 4.1, in which at various times both claims and critiques of the conflation of real and ideal can function to support one’s argument (Figure 4.5). That is to say, both expressions invoke an ideal through its alleged undecided state. They suggest the essence or core of democracy can potentially be reinforced or strengthened, but the tautological nature of this operation indicates that it is not clear what this as yet unrealised essence might consist of.

The concordance lines for *democratization of democracy* provide, however, some pointers regarding the perspective Balibar expresses through the use of the phrase. The expanded lines below correspond to lines 9, 8, 6 and 5 in Figure 4.6 above:

> The expression "*democratization of democracy*" is extremely plastic, I know.
what I call elsewhere, following others (Boaventura de Souza Santos), the
democratization of democracy - in my view the only thinkable alternative to the
"de-democratization" (Wendy Brown) of contemporary societies.

the extension of the domains of political invention and intervention, which
announces the possibility of a democratization of democracy,

Unities of action or alliances are always justified by the discovery of multiple forms
of inequality or exclusion that belong to the same system, and consequently can
contribute to the same process of democratizing citizenship (or, as some now say,
the "democratization of democracy")

The use of the phrase democratization of democracy requires the concession of its plasticity,
but is necessarily called upon as the opposite of a de-democratization. In the third extract,
the phrase announces the possibility of introduces a further distance from a concept already
mired in circularity. Furthermore, the announcement itself depends on an extension of the
realm of political activity, a procedure similar in structure and aim to the democratization of
democracy. In the fourth fragment, however, a means out of the tautological expanse is
provided by the concept of citizenship, which is presented as interchangeable with
democracy. The concordance lines consequently suggest that a reconsideration of
citizenship is essential for a revaluation of the concept of democracy. A search for citizenship
in the corpus returns 375 lines, only six of which occur in publications other than Balibar’s
Equaliberty. The mosaic indicates that co-citizenship, at eight occurrences, is by far the most
salient combination to be found in these concordance lines (Figure 4.7).
Co-citizenship, as one can infer from the term’s direct environment in the corpus, is just one of many possible terms for the concept Balibar is aiming to pin down:

I'm looking for the words - as **co-citizenship** or con-citizenship, a community of co-citizens that crosses borders.

I prefer the expression "diasporic citizenship" - or, on the local level, **"co-citizenship"** - to that of nomadic citizenship (though it is perhaps in part a matter of convention) the **"co-citizenship"** of nationals and foreigners.
And I conclude them with a proposal for "co-citizenship" in the world of migrations and diasporas in which we now live.

A number of terminological alternatives are raised, such as nomadic or diasporic citizenship, both of which focus on the concept of citizenship’s extension to include a space for movement, rather than being limited to locality. Balibar’s proposal is presented not necessarily as a radical intervention, but rather as a necessary adjustment to the current state of affairs. Migrations and diasporas, which now shape daily reality, indicate that the world’s populace is constantly in flux. As things stand, however, there remains an intimate connection between the ‘creation of nation states’ and the concept of citizenship, and ‘a citizen’ is still considered to be a ‘member’ of a particular ‘political community’ (Turner 2005: 30, Walzer 1989: 211). In contrast, Balibar’s migratory attempts at reconceptualising citizenship and its relation to democracy hinge upon the figure of border crossing, and it is no coincidence that, in addition to the democratization of citizenship and democracy, we find two lines suggesting the democratization of borders (Figure 4.6, lines 1 and 2). Naturally, when ‘the scale of political organization changes, unity and trust collapse and a different understanding of citizenship is required’, but to anchor citizenship in the activity of crossing borders approaches a radical reorientation that threatens to erase the concept’s scope altogether (Walzer 1989: 214). Citizenship, border and democracy would thus all partake in a mutually informative transformation that exhausts their present anchoring as structures of confinement and separation.

Balibar informs us that such a transformation would involve a ‘self-limitation of state sovereignty’ (Figure 4.6, line 1, further right co-text). As Hindess (2016: 329) explains ‘[sovereignty] refers to the legal and practical capacity of a state to enforce its rule over a specific population and territory’. A border is constitutive of this legal and practical capacity, which continually reinforces its own foundation – to rule over a territory is to demarcate it. The proposed limitation of sovereignty must therefore affect conceptualisations of population and territory as well. Limiting sovereignty limits the degree to which a population can be said to form part of the same political community, as shared subjection to a power structure contributes to the sustenance of identity and belonging. Limiting
sovereignty also restricts the significance of the border as a separation between two geographically identifiable entities and the communities that reside in them. The democratisation of borders, as taken to involve limiting the power held by the bodies that reciprocally define its constitution, ultimately erodes borders, and therefore the national anchoring of the concept of citizenship. The intended effect of democratization as conceptual erosion is coherent with reference to borders and citizenship, but not immediately transparent in relation to democracy itself.

Balibar, as mentioned before, explicitly addresses the plasticity of the expression democratization of democracy. The concordance line in question (Figure 4.6, line 9) forms part of an endnote in which he once again acknowledges his debt to de Sousa Santos, who is said to contrast ‘high-intensity democracy’ with its ‘low-intensity’ counterpart. In the low-intensity variant, a ‘monopolization of power takes place’, while high-intensity democracy would be characterised by ‘relations of shared authority’ (Balibar 2014: 305, de Sousa Santos and Avritzer 2007: lxii, lxv, lxviii). The relevant endnote is the very last one to the introduction to Equaliberty, and its final sentence makes reference, for further information on de Sousa Santos’ views on democracy, to an article primarily concerned with the Cuban situation. In this article, de Sousa Santos characterises ‘liberal democracy’ as ‘low-intensity democracy, because it is arguably ‘limited to creating an island of democratic exchange in an archipelago of (economic, social, racial, sexual, or religious) despotisms that in effect control the lives of citizens and communities’ (de Sousa Santos 2009: 47). He goes on to argue that ‘democracy must exist beyond the political system’ and that ‘socialism is democracy without end’ (ibid.). One could question whether a cluster of competing systems of influence is ever more despotic than a structure without end, but more interesting here is the specific metaphor de Sousa Santos selects to illustrate his point. He uses the image of a natural body of water to represent the borders between various spheres of life, while advocating that these borders should be overcome. His imagery does not invoke the artificiality of the separation of a political category from its surrounding social mechanisms, but presents the current situation as a natural order. One can interpret this in two ways. Possibly, de Sousa Santos is seeking to foreground the drastic measures necessitated by the demand that democracy be extended beyond the political. In order to bring together the structures of social life under the banner of democracy, we are faced with the phenomenal task of not
just reinterpreting the world, but of reorganising the earth. The alternative point of view presents us with an equally valid interpretation. De Sousa Santos might be arguing that what constitutes a proper democracy is not the full integration of all that exists into the category of politics, but simply the multiplication of meaningful relations between the various, and clearly distinct, human *modi operandi*. The islands will always be separated, but that does not mean traffic between them should not be encouraged. From this perspective, Balibar’s insistence on the *democratization of borders*, in relation to the increasing mobility (whether forced or wilful) of the human race as a whole, also gains in clarity. The border should be conceptualised as a place of encounter and negotiation, rather than one of suspicion and separation.

Consequently, the process of conceptual erosion identified earlier seems to be anchored in a belief that containment and rigidity are detrimental to any democratic endeavour. Eroding the formal structure that delimits the reach of a political category must result in a more meaningful manifestation of its inherent potential. The border, a porous membrane that contains the conceptual space in which categories such as nation and citizen are stored, is, as indicated before, a constitutive effect of the global political order. While mounting frontal challenges against national or global institutions requires significant mental and physical effort, challenging the border as an abstraction upon which hinges the stability of the whole can be quite forcefully done on the basis of purely conceptual grounds. After all, a border is the result of scarcely more than a performative declaration. Any effort to actualise the border as a concrete structure in the world, for example by raising walls or fences, invites both instant suspicion (*Tear it down!* and great excitement (*Build that Wall!*), as it is by no means a self-evident procedure. We thus arrive at a viewpoint which characterises the separation of humans, institutions, and nations as inherently damaging, while the relational aspect of being (whether it is envisaged in terms of co-citizenship of nationals and foreigners or as the implementation of democratic structures in community life) is promoted as the proper means to *democratize democracy*. In this conception of democracy reside the offer and the demand to relate, and thus the right and responsibility to participate. Democracy would be the motion towards unbounded inclusion in a world without end.
4.1.3 Democracy to Come

In section 4.1.1, it was mentioned that of is the most frequent collocate at the left-hand side of democracy (Figure 4.1). While the phrase democratization of democracy, which was shown to feature in the work of a particular set of authors both inside and outside of the corpus, has led us to consider a limited number of the occurrences of the sequence of democracy, the great majority of them remain to be discussed. A search for the combination of democracy returns 101 lines, a great number of which share a semantic preference for terms highlighting the status of democracy as conceptual or notional rather than referential. The sequence of democracy is commonly preceded, for instance, by the terms concept, idea, notion, question, problem, or dilemmas (Figure 4.8). This phenomenon feeds seamlessly into the earlier observation that the authors represented in the corpus have taken up the task not so much of defining democracy, but of making sure the concept retains a critical function beyond its circulation in a number of specific discursive articulations. Explicating that the status of democracy is perennially under negotiation, ultimately defers averral with reference to a definitive conception of democracy.

Figure 4.8: of+democracy collocation strength (local, Log-Log)
Another way to tentatively deploy concepts, or even to fully distance oneself from a specific usage of them, is to employ scare quotes, as we have seen with regard to Fukuyama’s embedded position in the corpus. Both scare quoting and notional modification thus disavow positive assertion and conceptual ownership. Often, both techniques will occur together. The combination notion of, for instance, features quotation marks in its direct right-hand vicinity in 43 out of 174 instances in the corpus (e.g. Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9: notion+of concordance (7/174)

It should also be noted, however, that the connection established between the cluster idea/notion/question and democracy serves to categorise democracy in a particular conceptual set. Halliday and Matthiessen discuss this type of pattern under the heading ‘Head as Classifier’ (2014: 393), which suggests that idea, notion, and question are constructed as classes, and democracy as belonging to all these classes in turn. The terms under consideration are not very useful in terms of class delimitation, because they are in principle applicable to anything, but they can be revelatory in terms of class inclusion, as suggested by the concordance lines in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: of+democracy+and concordance (7/16)
The most frequent word to the right of of democracy is and. Some of the relevant concordance lines indicate opposition along a spectrum, for example in the oscillation of democracy and tyranny (line 5). Others serve the purpose of enumerating a list of values, as in democracy and freedom (line 6). Phrases such as the ideal of democracy and emancipation or the idea of democracy and of human rights are related to the latter listing practice, but give rise to a peculiar form of conceptual equivalence, as in this extended extract of line 2 above:

in the name of a new Enlightenment for the century to come. And without renouncing an ideal of democracy and emancipation, but rather by trying to think it and to put it to work otherwise.

In this passage, democracy is presented as similar or even identical to another notional concept. The noun ideal remains in the singular, and is not repeated to modify the second concept. Democracy and emancipation, just as democracy and human rights, are presented not just as members of the same class of ideas, but as members taking up the same or an equivalent position in that class. The space occupied by democracy is thus a space shared with a number of ethically inflected concepts that are introduced as naturally co-occurring with the democratic demand. The examples involving human rights and emancipation return us to Derrida’s Specters of Marx, a work which presents us with a number of variations upon the theme identified (Figure 4.11). In one of the book’s concordance lines for of democracy, the term’s position in the sphere of ideas and ideals is explicitly questioned through the use of scare quotes (line 3).

Figure 4.11: of+democracy concordance – Specters of Marx (complete)
I discussed earlier the similar function of quotation markers and the particular type of notional modification expressed by idea of. Their simultaneous (rather than simply combined) usage here produces a particular kind of layered irony that makes it impossible to decide upon the attitude towards or the discursive location of the idea in question. The fragment, extended, reads:

the idea, if that is still what it is, of democracy to come, its “idea” as event of a pledged injunction that orders one to summon the thing that will never present itself

The fragment, part of a sentence that takes up close to half a page, is remarkable for its continuous shifting of linguistic hierarchies and determinations. Not only does the author distance himself from his introduction of an idea as an idea (which might as well be considered an event), he also refuses to locate the whence with regard to the demand for the coming of democracy. The pledge and the injunction cancel each other out conceptually, the order to summon establishes a chain of verbal commands, and the refusal of the idea to present itself in the end cancels out this particular relation of command, which explains why the idea, if never represented, might as well not be an idea at all. In short, democracy is, through a number of rhetorical machinations, situated fully outside of the grasp of the discourse from which it arises. In discussing this extract, I have glossed over the phrase democracy to come (line 3), which in the corpus is unique to Derrida, who uses it four times in Specters of Marx (Figure 4.12).

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1 democracy to come, not of a future democracy in the future present, not even of a regulating idea
2 democracy to come, its “idea” as event of a pledged injunction that orders one to summon the very
3 democracy to come). Now, even in this last hypothesis, fidelity to the inheritance of a certain Marx
4 democracy to come and thus for justice. We have suggested that the event we are prowling around

Figure 4.12: democracy+to+come concordance (complete)

In the relevant lines, Derrida establishes an undefined yet causal relationship with justice (line 4), and confounds every possible referential anchoring, with the effect of projecting, as discussed before, the phrase out of reach of its own surroundings. Mainly, he does so
through an enumeration of negative specifications: it is not *of a future democracy, a regulating idea, or a utopia* (line 1). The mixture of indefiniteness and prudent specificity has attracted the attention of a large number of interpreters in search of a meaningful rejuvenation of the concept of democracy. Patton (2007: 11), for example, insists, with reference to this particular construction, on ‘both the essentially indeterminate character of the concept and the essentially open-ended character of the future of democracy’. In more assertive terms, Caputo (2003: 25) argues that ‘democracy to come calls for a new revolution, another and still more radically democratic revolution, a revolution in the name of the democracy to come’.

Whatever one’s position on the matter, it is clear that *democracy to come* has come to serve as a newly introduced unit of meaning that needs consideration on its own terms, quite like Fukuyama’s *Western liberal democracy*, although attitudes towards and critical assessments of both units may of course heavily vary. A potential difference, as indicated before, is that Derrida refuses to anchor this freshly coined unit of meaning even in his own discourse, thus taking the utmost care not to repeat the metonymic sleight of hand Fukuyama is accused of: to represent a part as the whole, and then to declare the discussion closed. That is to say, the *democracy to come*, in opposition to *Western liberal democracy*, would always be open to (even if not equal to) a *democratization of democracy*. On the other hand, by placing this democracy that is to come out of reach, by not delineating its structure and by deferring its manifestation, it comes to be irretrievably anchored beyond both the writing it arose from and the speech it gives rise to, immobile and unassailable on its own grounds, and sunk in foundations it fails to display.

Derrida, however, did not coin the phrase *democracy to come*. The phrase is a translation of the French *démocratie a venir*. *Avenir* is the French term for *future*, etymologically derived from *temps à venir* or *time to come*. Derrida (1994: 69) thus splits up the concept of futurity into its constituent parts in an operation which is not transposable into English. He initiates this process in *Spectres de Marx* more explicitly when writing of l’à-venir, which in translation is rendered as ‘the future-to-come’. The translator, Peggy Kamuf, duplicates rather than separates, and in the process multiplies the use of hyphens. In one instance a hyphenated form of ‘democracy-to-come’ occurs in the book (line 4), whereas the French
has no such explicit markers of combination for *démocratie à venir*. The result is an interlingual mirror image. Whereas the French lays bare the foundations of futurity in relation to the democratic promise through disjoining them, the English tries to represent these foundations by integrating a number of juxtaposed parts. The peculiar formulation this gives rise to might partly explain the sustained attention this newly constructed unit of meaning has consequently received in the Anglosphere.

The rendition of the French expression into Germanic languages other than English, like Dutch or German, could have followed the French morphological structure more closely, potentially rendering structures such as *toe-komst* and *Zu-kunft*. In contrast, the high prevalence of Romance vocabulary in English in this case gives rise to a situation in which the Romance roots of the nominal term *future*, as opposed to the Germanic roots of the verbal structure *to come*, preclude a rhetorical reliance upon metaphorical transparency for the production of an adequate translation. However, the introduction of a necessarily marked construction has allowed for a further spread of and attention to the productive post-modifier *to come*, which in the corpus also occurs in combinations such as *justice to come*, *community to come*, or even the *to-come* of ‘our’ History (Figure 4.13).

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1. Figure 4.13: *to+come* concordance (5/106)

The first pattern investigated, *Western liberal democracy*, signified a hypothetical closure of the dialectical movement of history, as put forward by Francis Fukuyama. This particular political paradigm was said to no longer host grievous contradictions within its own development, and therefore to signal the dusk of man as a political animal. The proposal met with great resistance, as it was seen to radically constrict the horizon of possibility, particularly regarding the possibility of contesting the alliance between capitalist
development and political equilibrium. Partly Marxist in method, Fukuyama’s proposal seemed furthermore to tranquilise the revolutionary potential of the communist promise. Derrida, in response, sought to quarantine Fukuyama’s claim to the concept of democracy, but in order to do so had to evacuate a certain democracy so far beyond Fukuyama’s reach that it was ejected beyond the discussion that germinated its possibility, somehow to be anchored there, beyond the end of history. The result of this procedure, the postulation of a democracy to come, leads straight to the heart of prefiguration as a political strategy. While inserted for purposes of deferral, perhaps infinitely so, the to come always establishes a relationship of foreshadowing between type and anti-type, the latter presented as both uncertain and necessary, or absolutely determined, but from an unattainable perspective.

An alternative strategy that grapples with the same difficulty, namely locating the perspective or position from which emanates the potential for change beyond the dialectical procedure of gradual complete subsumption, was found in the phrase democratization of democracy. Balibar, in alliance with de Sousa Santos, sought to free up a space for the diffusion of democracy, but had to do so through eroding the structures that currently sustain it, and thus the tautological structure of the argument came to involve a reconsideration of terms such as citizenship and sovereignty. Democratic means-ends equivalence was supplemented with a host of carefully constructed contradictions such as nomadic citizenship and the co-citizenship of nationals and foreigners. The publication in which this procedure took place is termed Equaliberty, a title consisting of ‘a deliberately baroque phrase’, ‘a portmanteau term, impossible and yet possible only as a play on words, that never alone expresses the central proposition’ (Balibar 2014: 46). Equality and liberty both depend upon each other, yet continually threaten to cancel each other out, as do citizenship and nomadism. Forging a single concept to capture the contradiction serves as an endeavour to productively trace a balance between both concepts rather than erase either side of the unity of opposites in question.

To convincingly capture this balance in speech, however, is by no means self-evident, and even a portmanteau word might gradually tilt over to either side and exhaust itself, which is partly what explains the chain of terminological interventions safeguarding the conceptual proposal: nomadic citizens, diasporic citizens and citizens crossing borders all aim to catch a
novel categorisation, that, in the strictest possible sense of the term, is politically incorrect. Consensus discourse on democracy, citizenship or sovereignty cannot accommodate such notions. Overall, then, one finds a breaching of conceptual borders, correspondent with a desire to transpose this metaphorical operation to concrete reality. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that the works discussed in this section ultimately cannot be conceived without reference to the fall of the Berlin Wall – the erasure of this border bore both the promise of intensified cultural hegemony under the capitalist umbrella, and a renewal of heterogeneity in revolutionary discourse. Both promises came true.

4.2 Politics

4.2.1 Between Politics and the Police

*Politics* is one of the most common nouns in the corpus. A search for the term returns 1477 concordance lines, placing the item in the 65th position in the frequency list (between here and so). Its most habitual immediate collocate, between, occurs to the left of the node word. In the great majority of instances, the combination between politics is further complemented with and. This trigram mainly occurs in Rancière’s *The Politics of Aesthetics* and Badiou’s *Metapolitics*, each of which presents us with an even larger lexical pattern (Figure 4.14). The lines from Rancière’s work (1-3), all of which in fact belong to the translator’s introduction or the glossary of technical terms, speak of a conflict that is also a meeting ground, whereas those from Badiou (4-6) discuss a relation that may be considered a gap, and both do so while contrasting politics with yet another rather elusive structure. This remarkable correspondence is not coincidental. Badiou (2005: 116) himself argues that his notion of ‘the state of the situation’ (line 6) is another possible name for Rancière’s *the police*. Both authors thus feel the need to each coin a different specific term to carve out a similar conceptual space in contrast to the one occupied by politics.
Badiou’s lines establish a further distinction between the State and the state of the situation. Jason Barker (2002: 11), who translated the volume currently under consideration, discusses elsewhere ‘Badiou’s convention of employing ‘State’ where a political category is involved, and for the most part, ‘state’ or ‘state of the situation’ in order to refer to ontology in general’. In the same vein, Peter Hallward (2001: ix), in the introduction to his translation of Badiou’s Ethics, affirms that ‘Badiou’s overall use of the term ‘state’ incorporates a classically Marxist understanding of the political state as much as it overlaps with a simple intuitive understanding of the ‘status quo’’. In opposition to the tenacity of the status quo, ‘Badiou’s philosophy seeks to expose and make sense of the potential for radical innovation’ (Badiou 2001: viii). In Badiou’s terminology, such a ‘break with the ordinary situation’ is called ‘an event’ (Badiou 2001: ix). The situation can thus be thought of as a ‘realm of established interests and differences, of approved knowledges that serve to name, recognize and place consolidated identities’, while an event inaugurates the production of ‘a truth’ which escapes ‘the classifications of the state’ (Badiou 2001: viii–ix, emphasis in original). Importantly, the ‘happening’ of the event ‘cannot be proved’, but ‘only affirmed and proclaimed’ (ibid.: ix). Furthermore, ‘a truth’ only ‘comes into being through those subjects who maintain a resilient fidelity to the consequences of an event that took place in a situation but was not of it’ (ibid.: x). The Russian Revolution of 1917, for instance, can only be considered to constitute an event by taking into account the adherence to its truth by the subjects that come to be subjects through their dedication to the alleged event. This short overview, drawn in part from a translator’s introduction to a philosophical body, should illustrate that for Badiou words such as truth, subject and event take up a specific role in a vocabulary that rests upon a number of interlocking definitions. Using the phrase state of the situation allows him to adhere to the revolutionary critique of the State without losing sight of the broader conditions of social distribution and the grounds upon which they
can be challenged. After all, the terms *state* as well as *situation* are suggestive not only of placement and positioning, but also of conditions that are essentially temporary, and therefore always subject to the potential coming of a rupture initiated by an event.

Rancière’s *police*, which is taken to refer to ‘the dividing up and distribution of the various parts that make up the social whole’, does seem to fulfil a fairly identical conceptual function (Chambers 2011: 306). However, whereas the *state of the situation* remains ambiguous in terms of agency, and can easily be thought of as an impersonal structure, the *police* seems to invite more agentive interpretations. Evans and Fernández (2018: 2), for instance, characterise Rancière’s *police* as ‘the process of governing and organizing humans in communities subject to hierarchies and power relations’. The process of governing, of course, requires an agent that is actively engaged in doing so. *Politics*, within this framework, ‘is the irruptive event that challenges the hierarchical order in the name of radical equality’ (Bassett 2014: 887). One would be hard-pressed not to read into this schematic outline an image of the heroic rebel revolting against a repressive authoritarian regime, yet Rancière (1999: 28-29) on numerous occasions insists that his characterisation of ‘the police’ is not reducible to the truncheon-wielding ‘petty police’ tasked with maintaining ‘law and order’. He also insists that his use of the term is broad, ‘“neutral,”’ and ‘nonpejorative’ (ibid.: 29). This expanded usage of *police* is in the first instance supported by the broad usage the term historically enjoys in French but, as Badiou points out, Rancière also seems to draw his ‘neutral’ usage from the etymologically related Greek concept of the ‘polis’ (πόλις) (Badiou 2005: 116). The word ‘polis’ holds a number of potential meanings, but mainly unites the senses of ‘settlement’ and ‘community’, or more prosaically of ‘houses’ and ‘people’ (Herman Hansen 2006: 56). It would indeed be reasonable to invoke the birth of institutionalised human settlement as the dawn of a neutrally structuring order that might be termed the *police*, an order which is essentially ‘a manner of partitioning’ rather than a form of ‘repression [or] even control over the living’ (Rancière 2001: 7). However, the repeated assertion of supposed neutrality, the insistence that ‘the essence of the police […] is not repression’, as echoed by Rancière’s translator in his glossary to *The Politics of Aesthetics*, in the end fails to overrule the pejorative connotation that clings to ‘the police’ (Rancière 2006: 89). Next to his own work and that of Badiou, two works in the corpus explicitly refer to Rancière’s conception of ‘the police’, namely Balibar’s *Equaliberty* and
Dussel’s *Twenty Theses on Politics*. Balibar is cautious when handling the term, but Dussel (2008: 142), in a much more straightforward manner, states that a Rancièrian ‘police relation’ is in essence a ‘relation of domination’ (ibid.). All further occurrences of the term *police* in Balibar’s and Dussel’s works, while mostly not specifically responding to it, overwhelmingly challenge Rancière’s neutral characterisation of the *police* (Figure 4.15).

![Figure 4.15: police collocation strength (local, Z-score) – Equaliberty and Twenty Theses on Politics](image)

The mosaic in Figure 4.15 indicates that the term *police*, as used by Balibar and Dussel, has a strong semantic preference for terms indicating the use of force, and more specifically for strategic, militaristic and intrinsically violent actions. Police activity is characterized as a series of attacks on the integrity of bodies (*tortures*), dwellings (*raids*), and neighbourhoods (*banlieue*). The term *nonpolitical* does not modify *police* in the concordance lines, but rather occurs in the enumerative assertion that ‘Totalitarianism is the exercise of power through non-political, police, or quasi-military means’ (Dussel 2008: 16). For Dussel as well, then, *the*
police is opposed to politics. Yet according to Dussel, politics proper is of the people, and police interventions constitute a breach in their natural relations. In short, Rancière’s argument presents politics as an intervention that may rupture the police order, while for Dussel the police is what ruptures the structure of politics. This subtle difference rests on their respective evaluations of consensus. Dussel (ibid.: 39) describes consensus as a process which ‘unites wills and binds power as a joint force’, and which in correct measure may ensure an agreeable measure of ‘citizen participation’. Rancière (2001: 10), in contrast, characterises consensus as ‘the reduction of politics to the police’. He argues that consensus only achieves ‘the reduction of the people to the sum of the parts of the social body, and of the political community to the relationship of interests and aspirations of these different parts’ (ibid.). Consequently, politics proper can only arise out of dissensual aspirations.

Rancière’s eruptions of politics thus always depend upon a degree of disagreement. Disagreement will surface with reference to the ‘fundamental axiom’ of ‘equality’ and the ‘transgression of established boundaries’ it necessitates (Deranty 2003: 37). Politics ‘does not simply presuppose the rupture of the normal distribution of positions between the one who exercises power and the one subject to it’ (Rancière 2001: 3). Rather it ‘requires a rupture in the idea that there are dispositions proper to such classifications’ (ibid.). Rancière explains his axiom of equality by means of the master-slave dialectic: in the primal scene, a slave and a master are able to take up their respective positions only because they are both equally capable of understanding the social relation in which they take part (Rancière 1999: 16). It is reason which orders and classifies, yet all are equally masters of reason. Given the fact that this scene is mythical, and therefore instructive in a descriptive rather than prescriptive manner, we might still understand Rancière’s social order, and therefore the distinction between politics and the police, to be neutral. Yet, as we have seen, Rancière’s contemporaries as well as his various interpreters are inclined to draw more bold conclusions from invoking the police, and not without reason.

Rancière was heavily influenced by Althusser, who argued that individuals come to function as proper subjects through constant ‘rituals of ideological recognition’ (Althusser 2001: 117). In a famous passage, Althusser speaks of ‘interpellation or hailing’ in this regard as a ‘precise operation’ which may be ‘imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’’ (ibid.: 118). By acknowledging the call and
reacting to it, one confirms one’s identification as a subject and therefore one’s position in the social order. Althusser finds it necessary to remark that ‘the policeman’s practice of ‘hailing’ is quite extraordinary as it concerns ‘the hailing of ‘suspects’” (ibid.). Althusser thus identifies a specific situation that can be metaphorically extended in order to understand a constant process of subjection. While explaining his distinction between politics and the police, Rancière takes up this passage and retains the metaphor, but inverts its argument. According to him, the police dismisses rather than hails. The function of the police would be to say ‘that there is nothing to see on a road, that there is nothing to do but move along’ (Rancière 2001: 8). Politics, then, would ‘consist in transforming this space of ‘moving-along’ into a space for the appearance of a subject: i.e. the people, the workers, the citizens’ (ibid.).

Besides the twist given to Althusser’s argument, the main difference between the two thinkers’ positions is that for Althusser, the police serves as a metaphor for what he calls ideology, while for Rancière the police serve as a metaphor for what he calls the police.

Rancière’s remarks, in which the metaphor’s tenor and vehicle appear under the same name, partly explain why his translators do not translate police as polity, policy or any other related term with similar etymological roots and present-day associations that would require less insistence that the police is not to be understood as the police. In terms of effect rather than cause, they also clarify the reception of Rancière’s work, which seems to inspire both inert defeatism and visionary agitation. While it may be argued that ‘Rancièrian politics’ refers to ‘a state of permanent revolt against the state and the police order as a whole’, there is always the suggestion that ‘politics can do nothing’ other than ‘renegotiate the police order’ (Bassett 2014: 891, Chambers 2011: 318). We encounter here a tension between a descriptive and a prescriptive interpretation of the philosopher’s work, between the identification of a state of affairs and the implicit imperative of a reaction against it.

The inversion of the metaphor of police hailing reveals the location of this tension. Althusser indicates that one could give many examples of the reciprocally constitutive encounter between ideology and the subject, and that the specificity of the police operation is that it identifies subjects as suspects. In retaining the basic structure while twisting the positions of the argument, Rancière characterises the police as neutral in principle, albeit ultimately suggesting that it should arouse legitimate suspicion in practice. Badiou’s strategy, as hinted at before, is fully congruent. By always retaining the reference to the state, he does not
have to distance himself from a certain ‘Marxist tradition’ in which ‘the State is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus’ (Althusser 2001: 92). While the state of the situation can be considered a neutral ontological abstraction, the reference to the State ensures that the all-encompassing system of social relations is always regarded with suspicion. Badiou’s philosophy of truth and the importance he grants to its pursuit only becomes a call to practical intervention through the assumption that the state of a situation is, to a certain extent, unjust and in need of disruption.

4.2.2 Attempt to Depoliticize

As illustrated in the previous paragraphs, both Badiou and Rancière propose a vital conflict between an essentially insurrectionary politics and the state of affairs it seeks to intervene in. While this conflict must of necessity remain ‘irresolvable’, so as to guarantee the oppositional existence of any politics at all, Rancière can be said to identify ‘three forms of political philosophy’ that ‘dissolve, in various ways, the conflict between politics and the police: archi-politics, para-politics, and meta-politics’ (Figure 4.14, line 1, 3). The mosaic indicates that the prefixes in question are among the most significant left-hand collocates of politics in the corpus (Figure 4.16).

Figure 4.16: politics collocation strength (local, Z-score)
The combinations are all exclusive to Rancière’s *The Politics of Aesthetics*, although none of the concordance lines containing these structures are found in material actually produced by Rancière (Figure 4.17). The lines either derive – as suggested by the provision, within the concordance lines, of French equivalents and multiple references – from the translator’s glossary, or from an afterword to the book by Slavoj Žižek. The glossary and the afterword both paraphrase another work of Rancière, namely *Dis-Agreement*, and suggest that the conceptual lines drawn in said book might be helpful in coming to terms with *The Politics of Aesthetics*. The prefix *ultra* stands out for its Latin rather than Greek heritage. *Ultra-politics* does not occur in Rancière’s schema (although *Dis-Agreement* contrasts the ‘ultrapolitical’ with the ‘infrapolitical’ (Rancière 1999: 85)), but in this context represents an addition provided by Žižek, who, while endeavouring to programmatically summarise a complex argument provides a number of variations on a theme to explain Rancière’s terminology as well as his own supplementation of it. The most conspicuous recurrent feature in his descriptions of archi-, meta-, para-, and ultra-politics is their characterisation as a number of attempts (Figure 4.17, lines 5, 6, 14, 16, 19, 20).

```text
ultra-politics the attempt to depoliticize conflict by way of bringing it to an extreme via the direct
para-politics the attempt to depoliticize politics (to translate it into the police-logic): one accepts
archi-politics the ‘communitarian’ attempts to define a traditional close, organically structured by
archi-politics BP 90–1; D 61–93; DW 117–20; LA; PHP. Ochlos (L’Ochlos) Rancière uses this Greek
meta-politics That is what I was saying earlier regarding Faubert and microscopic equality. There
para-politics and meta-politics. D vii–xii, 61–93; DW 117–20; TTP. Political Subject (Le Sujet pol
para-politics 71, 88 Parole muette, La 57 partition of the sensible, the see distribution of the s
Meta-Politics (La Meta-politique) Meta-politics, one of the three principal forms of political philosophy.
archi-politics one of the three major types of political philosophy, is to be found in Plato’s attar
Meta-politics one of the three principal forms of political philosophy, emerges out of Marx’s criteri
Para-Politics (La Para-politique) One of the three kinds of political philosophy, para-politics is the
meta-politics the political conflict is fully asserted, as a shadow-theatre in which processes – who
para-politics and the appeal to a communal incarnation of social truth that is strictly homologous
para-politics is the result of Aristotle’s attempt to square the circle by integrating the egalitarian
ultra-politics 71–2 uncanny, the 63 universal, the 51–2, 70, 76 polemical 51 political 51–2 singular
ultra-politics - is thus an attempt to gentrify the properly traumatic dimension of the political;
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Figure 4.17: archi-politics|para-politics|meta-politics|ultra-politics concordance (16/21)
In Žižek’s reproduction of Rancière’s critique of political philosophy, a larger pattern arises around the verb ‘to attempt’. The bigram is consistently followed by a verb indicating a sense of neutralisation, suggestive of a distortion of politics proper, which is assumed to be essentially conflictual. Examples include depoliticize, de-antagonize, gentrify, square and suspend, but also resolve and establish (Figure 4.18)

These descriptions are in a number of cases subject to further verbal accumulation. To depoliticise is to translate, to de-antagonise is to formulate, and to suspend is to disavow and/or regulate (lines 1, 2, 6). In addition to the accumulation of verbs, one may notice a proliferation of ‘circumstantial elements of Manner’, which ‘construe the way in which a process is actualized’ (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 318). A prepositional pointer announcing such circumstantial elements is the word by (lines 2, 3, 4, 8). Various similar elements (including via) are used in the concordance, and often a single concordance line harbours a number of them. An open-ended string of capricious explanation is being elaborated among a set of shifting quasi-synonyms (line 2 and 1, expanded):

one is tempted to supplement Rancière, the most cunning and radical version of this disavowal is ultra-politics, the attempt to depoliticize conflict by way of bringing it to an extreme via the direct militarization of politics

para-politics: the attempt to depoliticize politics (to translate it into the police-logic): one accepts
Žižek, in short, presents us with a set of incomplete and periphrastic paraphrases, but in doing so is faithful to the text he is interpreting. Indeed, for Rancière (1999: 65) all the hyphenated distortions of politics point towards ‘the paradox of the achievement-elimination of politics’. The philosophical effort of adequately grasping politics can only result in its disappearance or, with reference to the above discussion, its subsumption in the police-logic. This must be so because politics always implies a distortion of any supposedly consistent order’s claim to be a definite representation of the various relations constituting the social and their respective legitimacy. Žižek, then, can in his treatment of Rancière’s typology only re-present the encounter ‘in which the paradox or scandal of politics is exposed: its lack of any proper foundation’ (ibid.: 61).

That is to say, because politics cannot be defined (doing so would be to engage in the project of its hyphenated assailants), there can also be no final word on what the various threats to the emergence of politics might definitively consist of. From another, and not necessarily contrary, perspective, characterising these types of political philosophy as attempts affects their description in so far as an attempt implies the likelihood of failure. Žižek is sympathetic to this possible failure to the degree that he does not grant the terms in question the satisfaction of a complete definition, yet widely elaborates on the potential strategies that they might encompass. The description becomes the practice it describes, while ever deferring discursive closure, and the verbs highlighted above (translate, formulate, regulate) display an awareness of this effect on the part of Žižek, who gleefully avoids the trap he set for himself, namely the trap of taking part in the achievement-elimination of politics by circumscribing its incomplete manifestations and thereby fulfilling their aspirations.

One cannot fail to notice a persistent irony here. Rancière coins a number of neologisms in order to safeguard the concept of politics from misrepresentations. Earlier we saw how, with similar aims he engaged in a laboured process of redefinition with regard to the police. Yet in the end, the excessive care taken to construct a suitable terminology leaves the central term, politics, devoid of any proper delineation. Indeed, at times his own phrasing becomes indicative of the void surrounding politics, as when he defines ‘political activity’ as
‘whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination’ (Rancière 1999: 30, emphasis added). Not only can bodies shift places, places themselves can also change direction, and whatever action initiates such movements can adequately be called politics. Rancière is not unaware of this, and in a certain sense it is in the revelation of this paradox of conceptual instability underlying his project of conceptual critique that his writing is no longer strictly descriptive or prescriptive, but rather becomes illustrative. Rancière (2009: 120) explicitly states that concepts such as police and politics do not consistently refer to the same thing throughout his work. He is, in essence, not concerned with ‘what politics is’, but rather with ‘what it might be’ (ibid.: 119).

In the end, Rancière creates a discourse that displays the same characteristics as the world it aims to describe: unstable and open to disruption. Badiou, as we saw at the very beginning of the discussion, essentially does the same when he configures a terminological space that merges commitment with unpredictability in search of truth. Furthermore, a politics of what might be is no different in its prefigurative orientation than a democracy to come. Once again, the result is a mutually constitutive composition of type and anti-type that must be posited, although its image can only be imperfectly approached. We thus encounter a textual body that is purposely constructed to be unstable because it is founded on the exploration of a tension between the persistence of structure and the possibility of agency.

In this set-up, terms such as politics and police, despite the numerous attempts at provisional definition, display an irreducible plasticity of meaning. From this perspective, Rancière’s fascination with etymology by no means indicates reverence for linguistic authority or nostalgia for the past. On the contrary, invoking the historical interlinguistic trajectory of political concepts illustrates how the only continuous feature in discussions of politics has been the gap characterising their relation to the reality they attempt to intervene in.

It is no coincidence, given the explicit contingency of texts such as Rancière’s, that repeated rather than shifting descriptions of politics occur more frequently, as the corpus has indicated, in afterwords and introductions. According to Genette (1997: 1), paratextual elements (such as the items just listed, but also titles, notes and blurbs, etc.) ‘ensure the text’s presence in the world’. As the subtitle of the English translation of his book on the
topic tells us, a paratext is a ‘threshold of interpretation’. Whatever surrounds the main text determines its reception, the impact a text makes in society, and its successful integration into the flow of communication. Consequently, the contributions to a scholarly work by editors, translators and critics must facilitate its subsumption in the state of the situation, and reduce any incongruity between the textual object and its commercial as well as intellectual environment. That is to say, the use of neologism and redefinition encountered in this section constitute forms of small-scale resistance to conceptual consensus, but conformity to a pattern – linguistic, institutional, or otherwise – is always ensured in a series of interventions that balances dissemination and integration. The corpus, in this respect, has proven to be an excellent guide to instances of pattern supplementation, a strategy imposing conventional interpretations on a text that resists defining its own boundaries.

The patterning of politics in the corpus is in many ways similar to that of democracy, although it arguably operates on an even more abstract level. In the conflict between politics and the state, or between politics and the police, one finds a stress on the necessity to retain both sides of opposition, and to resist any process that might contribute to politics’ institutional ossification. The primary motive is to resist the dialectical movement towards a status quo that can accommodate expressions of dissent as figures of its own production. Both democracy and politics are used as placeholders that, conceptually, ensure the potential for a rupture in political practice. Yet whereas the drive to democratize cannot do without an expansive procedure of values, politics, in the corpus, is explicitly asked to retain a function of distortion. Politics, in other words, is made to occupy the position of change, in a procedure of détournement that prioritises disorientation as the primary condition for intervention. Neologisms abound, as they did in section 4.1, yet they serve not just to announce, but also to call out. Terms such as meta-politics and para-politics serve first to interpellate thought procedures that move under the guise of common sense. Once they are identified, however, before the threshold of the work is reached, they are asked to move along. In this sense, the works discussed set up a policing system aimed at safeguarding the space for conflict, the incorrect, and the incorrigible. In short, politics operates under the figure of paradox, and presents a frustration of the prefigurative demand that whatever is foreshadowed shall be fulfilled.
4.3 Community

4.3.1 Within the Community

The concept of community generally functions to establish a boundary between an inside and an outside (Lamble 2016: 107). In the corpus, the immediate co-text of the word explicitly confirms to this general pattern of usage (Figure 4.19). Outside is the most frequent collocate at the N-2 position, followed by within. Another striking feature revealed by the mosaic is that the definite as well as indefinite articles collocate with community to an unusual degree. The, especially, modifies community in no fewer than half (460) of its occurrences (864) in the corpus. At this point, it should be noted that 26 out of 28 instances of within and outside the community derive from a single work, namely René Girard’s Violence and the Sacred (1977).

Figure 4.19: community collocation strength (local, Log-Log) – left co-text
The concordance lines for outside the community drawn from Girard’s work predominantly present two complementary acts of movement (Figure 4.20). The first type of movement consists of a repulsion (e.g. lines 3, 6, 11), while the second one consists of an attraction (e.g. lines 7, 8, 9, 10). Drawn or chosen from outside the community is a concrete and corporeal victim, while expelled or kept outside the community is a condition, namely violence. The departure of the victim, however, as in line 6, indicates that the attraction of a victim only functions as the necessary condition for his expulsion. The concordance for within the community clarifies the connection between the attraction and repulsion of a victim through the elements of sacrifice (Figure 4.21).
Girard insists that ‘the function of sacrifice is to quell violence within the community’ (line 14). Girard terms this intrinsic connection between sacrifice and the expulsion of violence the scapegoat mechanism, which he postulates is at the root of culture and society. Underlying this hypothesis is the assumption that human behaviour is governed by mimetic desire. Antagonism originates in the rivalry for objects and positions this desire entails. Distinctions between a community’s members dissolve as models turn into rivals, and the threat of violence increases. At the height of such a crisis of common order, an individual, a borderline figure that is not truly situated within, is singled out as accountable for the state of chaos and forcefully excluded from the group. This act of unanimous violence restores law and order until desire runs wild once more, and violence once again requires sacrifice.

As the concordance lines indicate, violence may appear in the guise of evil emanations, bloodshed, conflicts, dissensions, rivalries, jealousies, and quarrels, endless revenge, tensions, or feuds (Figure 4.21, lines 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 13). The characterisation of violence as the primary catalyst of a community’s behaviour, and as an element that can be expelled, indicates that the inside/outside boundary is essentially metaphorical. Violence is only ‘outside’ in as far as it does not manifest itself. Metaphorical and concrete boundaries are further enmeshed in line 10, in which the victim is called the prisoner. A prisoner of course finds himself outside of the standard communal relations of his environment, but, by definition, very much within its spatial boundaries. Furthermore, line 10 is of particular interest as it mentions a proper name –Tupinamba – that provides a concrete example of the practices Girard is interested in. The Tupinamba were a cannibalistic people from the northwest of Brazil, who regularly performed a theatrical ritual of sacrificial integration. When the tribe captured foes, the captives ‘participated in their captors’ daily activities and married into their families’ (Girard 1977: 274). To some extent, they even received preferential treatment, until the time of sacrifice approached. At that moment, ‘the prisoner’s “escape” and recapture would be “ritually staged”’ (Girard 1977: 275). The prisoner would then be deprived of food, and ‘forced to resort to stealing’, and therefore ‘encouraged to violate the laws’ (ibid.). Thus trespassing, ‘the prisoner drew to his person all the community’s inner tensions, all its accumulated bitterness and hatred’ (ibid.: 276). Together with the victim’s execution, these tensions would dissolve and order would be restored.
As indicated by this fragment, Girard’s method consists of analysing historical documents and ancient myths, to find therein, throughout historical time and geographical space, similar instances of sacrificial practices that may properly be called theatrical. The hypothesis he offers is that at a distinct and unidentifiable moment in the past, they were not. This is why he insists on distinguishing between a *surrogate victim* (the most common collocation containing *victim* in the corpus) and an *original victim*. Tribal or broader cultural remembrance of a cathartic event at the very beginning of conscious communal organisation is supposed to suggest that order can be born out of chaos through a violent, unanimous act of expulsion. The reason for the persistent staging of a mythical founding event that must forever remain hypothetical would be that it works. Rather than waiting for the worst of violence to manifest itself, it is allegorically countered before it reaches its full ferocity. An additional factor revealed by the Tupinamba case is the necessity of a radical suspension of disbelief. However staged or theatrical the sacrificial procedure may be, all participants must at some point believe that they are not merely putting up an act, but are actually partaking in a rightful culmination of concentrated anger. The community must be fully convinced that their victim embodies evil for the remedy to be effective, and they must believe so indiscriminately (Girard 1977: 81-82).

The necessity of *unanimity* cannot be overstated in this regard. For a rebirth of community to occur, the experience of concentrated hatred and subsequent relief must be all-encompassing. This explains why in *Violence and the Sacred*, except for *the* and *a*, *entire* and *whole* are the most frequent collocates of *community* at the N-1 position. The words *entire* and *whole* do not serve to indicate a distinction with some part or fraction of the community, but to put emphasis on the involvement of the community as a whole. The necessity for a unanimous group of people to act out a narrative template without acknowledging that their actions are mere representations gives rises to the slightly paradoxical situation in which the community is most successful when it is least aware of its own agency. The concordance for *entire community* indicates Girard’s complicity in the rhetorical construction of this ultimate disavowal of agency (Figure 4.22).
Community, in these lines, often occurs at the end of the clause or sentence. A distinction can be made between those sentences in which the community undergoes a mental transformation, and those in which the community is affected by a material process. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 224, 226, 245, 248) have explored such representations of experience in detail. They use the categories of ‘Actor’, ‘Process’, and ‘Goal’ for material clauses, which describe ‘concrete change’ in the ‘material world’, and the categories ‘Senser’, ‘Process’, and ‘Phenomenon’ for mental clauses, which are concerned with the experience of ‘consciousness’. In the concordance, mental clauses typically and unsurprisingly present the community as a Senser being affected by a variety of malevolent phenomena (lines 3, 4, 13, 15). More interestingly, wherever the changes described take place in the material world, the Actor tends to be the threat of violence, while the community is quite passively construed as the affected Goal (lines 5, 6, 11, 12). Destruction and contamination continually threaten the fragile community, and as mentioned before its members will only be able to ward off such threats if they are simultaneously scrupulous about and unaware of the strategy they use to do so. The community, of necessity, simply undergoes.

Intriguing, from this perspective, is that Girard, despite the manifold concrete examples he provides for his thesis, devotes most of his efforts to a unification of rites, and thus to the
description of the hypothetical and universal event of violence undergone yet overcome at the beginning of history. In this description, *the community* is never specified. In the rest of the corpus we find examples such as *European, national, economic, or academic community*, but Girard, in the very few instances where he characterises the community other than through the use of emphatic *entire or whole*, uses terms such as *crisis-ridden, sacrificing or shattered*. Girard’s community, then, is not just afflicted by the cosmic or divine pendulum of chaos and order, but is fully characterised by it. In the absence of a concrete setting in which the universal primal violence occurs, the community takes up the position of such a setting. Rather than as a proper actor, the entire community comes to serve as the stage on which the battle of good versus evil takes place. This identification of subjects and setting leads to a situation in which *the community* becomes the condition of the description of its own appearance. In other words, at the dawn of signification, interpretation, and experience, *the community* is always already there.

### 4.3.2 The Power of the Community

Girard’s work, as discussed in section 4.3.1, might seem to leave remarkably ‘scant space for the political’ for a theory that is primarily concerned with human interrelation (Scubla 2013: 1). At first sight, a very different view arises from the full corpus, in which *political* is the most frequent left collocate of *community*, except for the definite and indefinite article. Most of the occurrences of *the political community* come from Dussel’s *Twenty Theses on Politics*. Dussel, in this book, seems much more eager than Girard to reclaim conscious agency for the community, and, by extension, its members. A phrase that occurs solely in this work, and does so 17 times, is the ‘power of the community’ (Figure 4.23).
In these lines, two declarations of equivalence are repeatedly invoked. Firstly, the *community* is treated as synonymous with *the people* (line 1, 2, 10, 12, 14). Secondly, the *power of the community* is often accompanied with its specification as *potentia* (line 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17). This last assertion of an interchangeability of terms is important to the extent that it governs a whole argument, as one can derive from its numbered and capitalised occurrence in the last line of the concordance, signalling a title. What then, does *potentia* signify? The further co-text of line 3 and 4 propose:

Potentia, then, is our starting point, but on its own this *power of the community* - while representing the ultimate foundation of all power - still lacks real, objective, empirical existence.

the necessary institutionalization of the *power of the community*, of the people, constitutes what we term potestas.

Line 8 and 13 indicate that *potentia* gives rise to *potestas*, and that *potestas* destroys *potentia*. In other words, what Dussel seems to attempt in these concordance lines is to spell out the necessary relations between the indeterminate sovereignty of a certain
population and its manifestation in institutional mechanisms that constitute the necessary consequence, but also the potential annihilation of this originary power. Dussel’s strategy here consists of repeatedly indicating, naming and situating the necessary primacy of popular power, so as to provide a framework for a balanced discussion of opposing forces that always threaten to head towards visions of either anarchy or total domination. He does so by importing a Latin term, potentia, and its derivative opposite, potestas. Potentia is invoked to provide a new foundation for a set of relations pertaining to power, community and a people that cannot be further defined (as proper circumscription would depend on a linguistic if not concrete ‘institutionalisation’ of the power under discussion, and thus on a disturbance in the balance of opposing forces he seeks to sketch). Potentia is pure capacity. While approaching the subject with wholly different motivations, Dussel seems after all to arrive at a point not dissimilar from that of Girard with regard to the description of community: whatever aspects of it one highlights, it primarily functions as a condition of existence, as a necessary point of departure for the discussion of people as existing together.

Importantly, in all the concordance lines above, Dussel uses the definite article. The indefinite article barely accompanies the word community in his work. In English, ‘the meaning of the indefinite article is to signal that the following noun group is new information’, while a definite article usually means that the noun in question ‘has already been introduced’, is identified by the immediately following ‘phrase or clause’, or ‘is obvious in the context’ (Sinclair 2003: 98). In short, community in both Girard and Dussel’s discourses serves to indicate a presupposed category, a foundational concept. Community, is ‘obvious in the context’ because it provides this context, because it constitutes or even because it is this context. In both Girard’s and Dussel’s sense of the word, nothing takes place that does not affect the community, and there can be no discourse in which it is not ‘already introduced’. The high frequency of the definite article preceding community in the study corpus as a whole confirms that this trend to treat community as a condition rather than a consequence is widely shared among the authors in the corpus. Community constitutes the already given. Once we try to think what it does, how it is manifested, or what it tries to achieve, it seems we are thinking of something other than community proper.
4.3.3 Inoperative Community

The previously established sense of *community* as foundational yet inactive suggests the relevance of the concept's second most significant collocate in the corpus, *inoperative*, which I have so far not discussed (Figure 4.19). All the instances of *inoperative community* are bibliographic references, and they all refer to the same work, namely Jean-Luc Nancy's *The Inoperative Community* (1991), a translation of the French *La Communauté desoevrée* (Figure 4.24). Most of the references occur in *Retreating the Political* (Sparks 1997).

*Retreating the Political* stands out for its use of *community* in general, as articles do not constitute the vast majority of left collocates for the concept like they do in the rest of the study corpus. We find for instance, rather than a crisis in *the* community, a *crisis in community* (Figure 4.25, line 4). In addition, community is predominantly presented not as an entity but as a set of relations that might or might not translate themselves into a *figure* or *manifestation* (lines 1, 8, 9, 10).

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2. in the next section parenthetically.

3. For sure, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy do not project their receptivity ‘to what is at stake in community’ to every ‘I’ and every ‘we’, and which is this selfish prior to all singularity and all community, but politics as the occasion of a crisis in community. In order to clarify his position, LACOUE-LABARTHE, perspective, the differences which work and which produce other places (which community would be founded on a determination of community as subject, MARIE-CLAIRE BOONS remarks that the relation is the question of the passage to community but it is equally the question of the passage to an immortality which, in this world, is not failure’. 2. It comes from the relation of community to itself wherein it can itself present or reflect totality and the actual manifestation of community. This supposes an entire elaboration all the

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Figure 4.24: inoperative+community concordance (complete)

Figure 4.25: community concordance – *Retreating the Political* (10/33)
The use of a zero article in English, as exemplified in these concordance lines, indicates ‘generalization or abstraction’ (L’Huillier 1999: 314). All these lines were originally written in French, and while in Old French one would still ‘expect to find the definite article with concrete nouns and the zero article with abstract nouns’, modern French no longer specifies abstraction in this way (Epstein 1994: 71). As a consequence, ‘a French definite article... may be a zero article in English’ (L’Huillier 1999: 303). A translator mediating between these languages will, for every occurrence of the definite article in French, have to decide on translating it with definite or with zero reference. No slight matter, as this involves communicating whether the concept or entity in question needs to be considered as concretely identifiable, or rather as notional or abstract. We read, for example, in Nancy’s *La communauté désœuvrée*, that ‘il s’agit en revanche de penser la communauté, c’est-à-dire d’en penser l’exigence insistante et peut-être encore inouïe, par-delà les modèles ou les modelages communautaristes’ (Nancy 1999: 59, emphasis added, italics in original). In translation, we read: ‘it is a matter rather of thinking community, that is, of thinking its insistent and possibly still unheard demand, beyond communitarian models or remodelings’ (Nancy 1991: 22, emphasis added, italics in original). In the translation of this sentence, which is fairly indicative of Nancy’s broader intellectual project, the translator has opted to not render an article, and this is not a unique case in the book. However, Figure 4.25 shows that in the book’s title, the phrase that governs its contents as a whole, the article is retained.

The French and the English versions of the title are neatly juxtaposed in line 1 and 3 of Figure 4.24. The presence of the article in the translated title stands out even more given that everything else in the title is altered. A post-posed adjective becomes a pre-modifier, for instance, and thereby the possible association with the past participle, and thus with a result of a process rather than a static condition, is no longer enabled. Retaining the article, then, cannot be a matter of mere formal compliance, it has to be a conscious choice, but one that fundamentally alters the relation of title to text. Whereas the French text relies on continuity of article usage, the English one establishes an inevitable break between a sense of community that can be specified and one that must remain abstract. It might well be that this discrepancy forces the English reader to see more clearly what is at stake, to actually experience the *unheard demand* cited above, while the French reader would have to be
more familiar with the philosophical discourse in question to grasp the innovation proposed by Nancy. One can only be speculative in these matters, but they are indicative of a strange phenomenon in which text and context come to be reversed. The zero article appears at the limit of the possibility of complete equivalence between languages. It cannot properly correspond, and thus always refers back to the full context of its own situated discourse, and its own ‘proper’ language. An invisible signifier in any language is only upheld by language-internal structures that indicate this absence to constitute a presence. Remarkably, it is linguistically indicative of the already given yet never specified set of relations that characterised community in the discourse of the authors mentioned above. The act of writing and the invitation to translate converge in this singular prefigurative construction, in which the demand for a new community lays bare the demand for a new language, aware of the zero that pervades all, but not all too eager to occupy its significance.

4.4 Closing Remarks

All of the previous analyses have gravitated towards the outer edges of the textual material under scrutiny, towards the paratextual material that constitutes the numerous thresholds of the corpus. This should come as no surprise, as paratexts tend to be more structured than the material they enclose. They introduce connections to other publications and clarifications of the terminology used, and thus consolidate as well as supplement patterns governing, but not necessarily manifest within, the body of text. The concordance browser draws one’s attention to either highly common patterns, or highly uncommon associations, thus prioritising such editorial and translatorial interventions. The work of translation was shown to involve choices pertaining to issues such as hyphenation and article usage, and decisions in this regard deeply influence the discourse under consideration. It is important to note, in this regard, that whereas concordance-based work has mostly sought to expand the reach of units of meaning beyond the word, there is a good case to make for increased morphological awareness. If co-selection is the general principle, texts that display a tendency to engage in etymological and metaphorical wordplay select their primary combinations on a level more minute than the lexical.

As far as the content of the previous analyses is concerned, perhaps the broadest recurrent pattern concerns the evocation and contestation of a certain horizon or border. Throughout
the previous sections, one encounters disagreement on where the scope of a particular concept finds its ultimate boundary, and on whether the establishment of such a boundary can be considered adequate to begin with. Fukuyama’s endeavour to ascribe an endpoint to history, and Derrida’s attempt to investigate this foreclosure, both constitute a temporal instantiation of this conflict over a concept’s proper scope. Rancière’s insistence on the conceptual vacuum within politics as suggestive of the concrete void beneath offers a more spatial incarnation of this concern over the location of an ultimate boundary. In the discussion of community, where the categories of time and space met in their explicit absence, one ultimately finds the most advanced consequence of the movement initiated by a wilful expansion of a conceptual horizon, namely a concept’s referential transformation into the condition of existence of its own discursive position. Once uprooted, a concept comes to encompass the structures that once restricted its reach. Throughout this process, conceptual definitions have tended to be negatively determined or apophatic. Strong statements about what does not necessarily pertain to democracy, politics and community are more common than statements pinning down exactly the term under discussion. As illustrated, novel coinages and paradoxes are mobilised to forestall a dialectical closure of the concepts’ reach, and thus to ensure it remains applicable and evocative rather than referentially restricted. The concepts function as placeholders for a revelation to come.

Three books selected for inclusion in the corpus did not explicitly figure in the discussion: Poulantzas’ Political Power and Social Classes, Althusser and Balibar’s Reading Capital, and Negri’s Marx Beyond Marx. These works share a number of characteristics. They are among the oldest, longest and most explicitly Marxist texts in the corpus. With explicitly Marxist, I mean to suggest that they do not, as is the case for most of the other works, consider Marxism as simply a relevant figure of philosophy, but also consider philosophy as a useful tool for the elaboration of Marxism. The corpus software did not single out any uses of democracy, politics and community in these three books as being of particular interest. Given this congruence of a number of contextual and statistical factors, one might suppose that these texts operate under a set of different cultural presuppositions than the ones discussed in more detail above. It is likely that the works of Althusser, Negri and Poulantzas employ democracy, community and politics as non-foundational concepts that are not in need of reconceptualisation. It should be noted, however, that should political rather than
politics have been at the centre of attention, Poulantzas’ work would have proven to be of the utmost relevance to the analysis. This means that strictly adhering to a concept’s formal features, rather than considering all its possible variants, immediately cancels out a number of potential research paths. This choice was made in good faith, as corpus-linguistic studies on numerous occasions have indicated that one should not be too confident in considering legitimate the interchangeability of what appears to be variants within a single lemma. On the other hand, while the analysis did not directly engage with relatives of the nouns chosen for enquiry, be these democratic, communities or polity, the vocabulary addressed tended to consist of larger clusters of mutually informative categories, illustrating that self-foundational phrases such as democratization of democracy are not self-enclosed, but employed to clear the ground for a larger conceptual overhaul.

Finally, an absence is always both constitutive and revelatory. The hidden presence of the texts that did not feature in the analysis has certainly shaped the calculations of significance that guided the discussion, but more importantly the lack of centrality they seem to ascribe to the concepts selected for study highlights that the struggles over the location of a set of conceptual horizons are themselves bound by a distinct outlook. In the texts discussed, conceptual centrality was often attached to a term’s function in the description of a mythical metaphor involving sovereigns and servants, or sacrificial scenes. In thus conflating the birth of word and world, lexical contingency is often obscured. One may certainly acknowledge that the concepts of democracy, politics and community have evolved up to the point where they can function as a condition of existence, and can therefore serve to sustain a worldview. On the other hand, exactly their inscription in the belated introduction of a primal scene reveals that a narrative structure has endured in which these concepts simply play their part, awaiting the coming of the next lexical avatar. That is to say, the typological heralds of a text’s prefigurative potential ultimately indicate a position that is not restricted to its instantiation. The analysis of a concept is confirmed to be, of necessity, an analysis of the relations it reveals. The next chapter will further this mode of investigation with reference to the same concepts, but in a body of texts that is conditioned by the events of 2011 rather than 1968, digital rather than print publication, and activist rather than academic writing, although these determinations in many respects overlap.
5 THE **ROAR MAGAZINE CORPUS**

The corpus studied in this chapter consists of material from *ROAR (Reflections On A Revolution) Magazine*, an online outlet for news and socio-political commentary which describes itself as ‘an independent journal of the radical imagination providing grassroots perspectives from the front-lines of the global struggle for real democracy’ (*ROAR*, ‘About’). The full *Genealogies* corpus holds 103 articles from *ROAR*, selected on the basis of the frequent occurrence of certain political keywords of interest to the project, among which the ones under scrutiny. The three shortest articles, two summaries of embedded YouTube videos and one reproduction of a *Nuit debout* manifesto, were excluded from the analysis. My study corpus thus consists of 100 articles, amounting to 276,851 tokens (Appendix 2).

The magazine hosts articles from a variety of contributors, many of whom have an academic background, and all of whom write from an activist perspective. Four authors that have more than two publications each in the corpus are the political writer Janet Biehl, the ‘sociologist, translator, and activist’ Theodoros Karyotis, Erik Forman, a ‘rank-and-file organizer in the fastfood and education sectors’, and Carlos Delclós, ‘a sociologist and researcher’ (descriptions taken from the *ROAR* website). Seven articles in the corpus appear under the name ‘*ROAR Collective*’, the organisation responsible for the publication. At the head of the magazine stands its founding editor, the political economist Jerome Roos. Roos is a frequent contributor to his own journal, and he is represented in the corpus by eleven original articles and one translation.

The journal’s *About* page explains that *ROAR* was founded ‘in 2011 to provide theoretically-informed analysis of the global financial crisis and the popular mobilizations that emerged in its wake’. In 2013, Roos was joined by co-editor Joris Leverink, two of whose articles are included in the corpus. The current website was launched in 2015, along with a quarterly print journal. The last print edition was published in the autumn of 2018, and the editors explain on their Patreon page, through which they currently receive monthly donations from 128 people, that the journal has since returned ‘to its roots as an online magazine’ (*ROAR*, ‘Patreon’). The corpus holds articles from every year since 2010 up to 2017. In line with the growth of the magazine, the number of articles included increases continuously from 2010 (1 article) to 2016 (35 articles). There are only 9 articles from 2017 in the corpus, as the data collection process ended during that year. Articles range from interviews to
book reviews, and the material on the website extends far beyond that available in the printed journal. Topics often take the shape of journalistic reports on current events or more general reflections on political engagement. Most of the content is original, but often texts are reproduced from affiliated outlets. Translation occurs, but is by no means the default mode of operation for ROAR. The corpus holds only 3 translations, 2 from Spanish and one from German. To amalgamate this generous variety of textual sources and approaches, the website employs multiple connection strategies. Most evidently, all contributions share an outspoken progressive tone, and are situated on the left of the political spectrum. In addition to writing style and ideological orientation, coherence is also achieved by exploiting the affordances of the internet format.

Figure 5.1: ROAR Magazine’s style
The layout of the magazine is aesthetically pleasing, and its content is lushly illustrated with photographs and pictures. A banner containing the logo appears on top of every page. Further homogeneity is created through the consistent use of red, black and white (Figure 5.1). Yet more telling than the universal online importance of design is the tendency to stress the politicisation of editorial decisions. The copyleft logo, guaranteeing the freedom to translate or republish with non-commercial intent as long as reference is provided, features prominently. The phrase next to it, All Wrongs Reversed, engages in wordplay with the fixed expressions of intellectual property. Verbal play also determines the list of topics under which the journal's output are categorised. The use of alliteration, as in Borders & Beyond, imbues the categories with the quality of slogans. The search for poetic value is transparent, which might lead one to question the categories' appropriateness, as accuracy seems to be subordinated to style. Yet at the same time the poetic connection appeals to the human intimation that form is indicative of essence, thus suggesting the presence of an absolute truth in the conjunctions presented. In any case, one is free not to comply with the categorisation, as the website provides a search function returning and thereby grouping articles in reaction to a query, and it also provides multiple linkages within and beyond the website through the use of hyperlinks.

In sum, two simultaneous tendencies operate on the website, which, among other things, make the medium relatively different from printed books, the material analysed in the previous chapter. Firstly, there is an emphasis on the use of rhetorical resources, in multiple modalities, to guarantee that the website remains a coherent whole. On the other hand, these same means destabilise the linearity of the content and provide an infinite number of alternative contexts for each utterance. By accessing online material through a concordance browser, we are reducing some of the options for organising the material, and adding others, but we are doing so, in essence, according to the same principles that guided the initial online presentation. Iterability, or the potential for decontextualisation, is a defining characteristic of written language, and this does no harm to the corpus-linguistic dogma that meaning is function in context. The ultimate aim of concordance-based research is to establish what co-text, in a particular environment, cannot be considered context. In other words, the idiom principle urges one to reveal which lexical items, in a particular set of textual material, are not co-occurring by chance, but are co-selected because of functional
necessity. The principle of corpus-linguistic enquiry is decontextualisation, and at the limit of this procedure’s possibility reside the meanings the method uncovers.

Indeed, the importance of the corpus lies not merely in its capacity to indicate what can be combined, but primarily its tendency to reveal what, textually, cannot be separated, even if conceptually the ultimate motivation is to separate coterminous elements. In the previous chapter this principle was illustrated by the frequency of patterns such as *Western liberal democracy*, suggesting resistance to the idea that the possibilities of democracy are exhausted by its Western liberal incarnations. The phrase *démocratie à venir*, etymologically transparent and therefore firmly conjoined in French, was illustrated to call, on occasion, for the hyphenated translation *democracy-to-come*. The hyphens fulfil the task of securing a unit of meaning under threat of disintegration. The forces of *politics* and *police* had to be consistently juxtaposed to render identifiable the conflict that engenders them. Differences in the article systems of English and French, lastly, illustrated a profound destabilisation of a concept’s scope once the rules of fixed co-occurrence become unclear. Mediating between *la communauté* and *community* presents the translator with equal scope for creativity and confusion.

In this chapter, frequent patterns of co-occurrence often take the shape of open-ended lists. In section 5.1 on *community*, for instance, undesirable social attitudes such as sexism and racism tend to flock together in extensive accusatory passages. The practice of flexible listing defies easy application of corpus-linguistic analytical categories such as semantic preference, as they are modelled on the idea that a unit of meaning consists of a core element and its immediate co-text. A list, however, as discussed in section 2.1.4, may leave its core implicit and its boundaries beyond the horizon, remaining essentially unstructured. Consequently, the categories provided by functional grammar, which were often helpful in the previous chapter, do not necessarily clarify the particularities of the present corpus, and will therefore not be employed. In order to comprehend, beyond linguistic composition, the principle of selection that constitutes the unstructured lists encountered in the corpus, extensive theoretical engagement will complement the analysis of the corpus where necessary. The section on community is especially heavy on background information, as it lays the groundwork for what is to follow in the next sections. Importantly, the social movement activities that gave rise to the development of prefigurative theoretical
frameworks at the beginning of the present decade are the explicit topic of the material under scrutiny, and as the section on politics will illustrate, multiple authors in the corpus are either aware of or explicitly engage with the concept of prefiguration. As is bound to happen at the intersection of theory and data in conceptual research, the shared vocabulary of language and metalanguage and their symbiotic equivalence demands, ultimately, that research distances itself from its material by re-imposing metalinguistic status. That is to say, any interpretation of a linguistic object necessarily introduces a semantic conflict, not because meaning defies transmission, but because statements demand the separation between themselves and the object that invites them. As Heraclitus says, one can’t wade through the same waters twice. That being said, evidence for the analysis presented is provided throughout the following sections. Often the co-text discussed extends beyond the material captured in the screenshot, and where necessary the analysis will refer to an article as published on the website rather than as queried through the browser. Collocational phenomena, where relevant, are complemented with focused discussions on the uses of metaphorical language and on particular translation decisions impacting the material under consideration. While consisting of three separate sections, the chapter presents a continuous argument focused on the represented authors’ prefigurative motivation to linguistically configure an alternative world.

5.1 Community

5.1.1 Imagined Community

A search for community in the corpus returns 152 results, with no modifying element in the keyword’s direct environment occurring more than three times. Two of these thrice-occurring modifiers, both adjectives at the N-1 position, constitute the common collocations imagined community, and international community. Both these phrases are clear examples of the corpus-linguistic idiom principle, the hypothesis that ‘each word in [a] text is used in a common phraseology’, and that ‘meaning is attached to the whole phrase rather than to the individual parts of it’ (Hunston 2002: 143). The importance attached to the study of collocation is founded upon this principle. When collocational predictability seems to be absent, its counterpart, the open-choice principle, is invoked. The fact that a common
Phraseology is used, however, does not mean that the exact meaning of multi-word units is transparent. In fact, regarding *international community* as well as *imagined community*, one finds a marked tension between the collocations’ patent usage as fixed expressions, and the suggestion that they hold idiomatic status, meaning that they ‘carry meanings which cannot be deduced from their individual components’ (Baker 2018: 69).

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Figure 5.2: *international+community* concordance (complete)  
121 (1), 149 (2), 172 (3)⁴

A first use of *international community* in the corpus occurs in an article about protests in Thailand (Figure 5.2, line 1). The phrase is used to denote a political body that is forceful enough to put pressure on a country’s ruling institutions, but no further specifications are made. The second use concerns protesters in Tunisia, who seem to gain reassurance from the perceived support of the international community (line 2). One key player of this body, the USA, is foregrounded. The final concordance line deals with the Kurdish revolutionary struggle, and its author takes a markedly critical view of the phrase *international community*, which is said to consist of ‘the EU, United States, and others’ (line 3). This view is neither novel nor unique. Chomsky, for instance, holds that, while it should make reference to representatives of about every country that partakes in the United Nations, ‘the term is regularly used in a technical sense to describe the United States joined by some allies and clients’ (Chomsky 2002: 34). In the concordance line in question, pointing out the illusory nature of *so called* international community serves to delegitimise the organisation’s labelling of certain political groups as *terrorists*. Indeed, the phrase often serves the purpose of ‘generating legitimacy for those who act in its name’, and consequently refusing to accept the name as sincere comes down to refusing its judgements (Buzan and González-Peláez

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⁴ As was the case in the previous chapter, the string in italics refers to the relevant search. The number of lines constituting the complete concordance is supplied when not all lines are represented. Below this information, the Internet Corpus file numbers indicate the articles the relevant lines occur in. Additional information on these articles can be found in Appendix 2.
2005: 31). The author in question, Rafael Taylor, adds to the EU and the United States the imprecise ‘and others’, indicating that not only does the phrase ‘[mean] different things to different people’, it may mean different things for the same person at different times (ibid.). It seems that the meaning of the international community depends on how its perceived judgements are, in turn, judged by a particular actor. The international community, then, is not an organisation, but a perspective either aligning itself or competing with other perspectives regarding international relations. One finds here an expression that is to be used even when deemed improper, for pointing out one’s scepticism regarding the phrase is part of the process of political positioning itself.

The collocation imagined community, too, demands to be used as part of the stockpile of received political vocabulary, even when one’s personal usage defies established denotations. Two of the phrase’s occurrences in the corpus refer to the concept of nationalism (Figure 5.3, lines 2 and 3). The expression, as well as the connection to nationalism, is retraceable to the hugely influential book by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983). This reference is not made explicit, as certain academic phrases come to circulate as common currency. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the authors in the corpus are not aligned with the opinions expressed in the work that popularised the concept. Anderson’s work clearly states that ‘all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined’ (Anderson 2006: 6). In that respect, ‘communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ (ibid.). This clearly runs counter to the argument in line 3, whose author, Erik Forman, contrasts ‘the imagined community of nationalism’ with ‘a real community based on the material interdependence of all life on earth’. In contrasting
imagined with real, the author equates imagined with imaginary. The author’s preferred real community, however, is yet to be constructed, and is therefore no less imaginary.

Imagined, imagination and imaginary are generally not used derogatively within ROAR Magazine, which presents itself as a journal of the radical imagination. Community also enjoys considerable positive usage throughout the corpus. In that respect, imagined community, once used with slight disdain and twice explicitly rejected in the concordance lines, must be considered a particular unit of meaning that is fully opaque without the association with nationalism. Understanding the usage furthermore requires the knowledge that nationalism is to be considered in a negative light. This evaluative stance, too, does not sit well with Anderson’s original conception. Indeed, Anderson (2006: 141) has critically pointed out that it has for a long time been fashionable among ‘progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals’ to ascribe to nationalism a ‘near pathological character’ with ‘roots in fear and hatred of the Other’ and ‘affinities with racism’. Forman directly makes this association, and adds sexism and homophobia to xenophobia and racism while constructing his list of the ‘bedfellows’ of the nationalist imagination (line 3). The term bedfellows, an imprecise metaphor of association, leaves in the dark the exact nature of the asserted connection. For the sake of the article’s argument, this indefiniteness is crucial. Phenomena such as sexism obviously predate the rise of nationalist thought, and the number of potential causal determinants involved in mediating between such cultural characteristics are too great to establish a reasonable model of correlation. One finds here an operationalisation of the process observed in early approaches to semantic prosody: ‘if several different words all sharing the same semantic trait are frequently used with another word, meaning will be passed, over time, from that group of words to the other word’ (Whitsitt 2005: 284). The shared semantic trait here, as the extracted concordance line points out, would be oppression, and nationalism would be on the receiving side of blemish through association with a host of oppressive figurations.
Figure 5.4: racism/sexism/xenophobia/homophobia concordance (11/35)

35 (1), 36 (2), 54 (3), 78 (4), 113 (5), 128 (6-7), 129 (8), 154 (9), 162 (10-11)

The concordance line in question does not provide an exhaustive list, but mentions ‘other forms of oppression’ (Figure 5.3, line 3, Figure 5.4, line 9). Potential candidates for the list’s expansion are easily found in the corpus by searching for the identified components racism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia. Of thirty-five concordance lines returned, eleven present separate lists consisting of more than two negatively evaluated attitudes. As this number excludes lines representing the same stretch of text, it is clear that the terms in question are overwhelmingly used in a context of enumeration. The full catalogue found in the concordance when building upon the terms associated with the imagined community of nationalism further consists of misogyny, transphobia, abuse, rape culture, hatred on campuses, colonialism, patriarchy, anti-rationalism, racialized violence, scapegoating, ableism, authoritarian thought process, populist terminology, clever recruitment patterns, colonial massacres, deportations, intensified exploitation at work, the destruction of our life-giving planet, vigilante attacks, refugee crisis, and religious discrimination. In the corpus, purported causes as well as effects for these phenomena include, next to nationalism, neoliberal institutions, capitalism, Donald Trump’s election, fascism, and liberalism.

Such distinct phenomena can be grouped together because the principle of categorisation relates to moral judgement. As discussed, the concordance lines are concerned with identifying instances of the injustice of oppression, and the list is able to expand indefinitely because, for some, ‘all exercise of power is understood to be oppressive’ (Podur 2016: 296). One may read in this attitude an extension of the Marxist doctrine of eternal class struggle
applied to every field of human interaction. Subjection and domination are seen as characterising every negotiation between distinct identities, and this is viewed as inherently unjust. This development towards the revelation of ever more fields of application for perceived oppression is strongly shaped by the discourse on intersectionality as popularised by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991: 1242-1243), who influentially noted that ‘feminist and antiracist discourses have failed to consider intersectional identities such as women of colour’. A notion of ‘triple oppression’ regarding the maltreatment of Black working class women quickly developed, which later led to the question of ‘how many social divisions are involved and/or which ones should be incorporated into the analysis of the intersectionality process’ (Yuval-Davis 2006: 195, 201). A further complication of intersectional analysis is that, while it aims to uncover the reciprocal influence between distinct forms of oppression, it cannot do so from the vantage point of a stable hierarchical view, as this would lead to a ‘victimhood tournament’, or what has even more disparagingly been called the ‘oppression Olympics’ (Martínez 1993: 23).

Once the dualism of oppression and domination is presented as the binary lens through which to correctly perceive the world, and given the realisation that it would be counterproductive to establish hierarchies between its different manifestations, clear differences between the elements under consideration are covered up in the process of listing. Racism, sexism and homophobia, for instance, have since ‘the final third of the twentieth century’ seemingly presented ‘the big three obstacles to a just social order in the United States’ (Wickberg 2000: 42). The term homophobia, however, only gained currency in the early 1970s, and it differs from the other terms in a number of significant ways. Firstly, it designates attitudes deemed incorrect as originating in a ‘psychological complex’ or even a ‘mental illness’ (ibid.: 45). In a radical reversal of faiths, the coinage took place around the same time that homosexuality itself was declassified as a mental illness. A further factor separating racism and sexism from homophobia is that, in principle, racism and sexism can be seen as neutral categories applying to both sexes and all races in any direction of discrimination. Homophobia, on the other hand, explicitly ‘designates homosexuals as its objects and victims’ (ibid.: 44).

One finds thus, when approaching the social sphere through the framework of oppression and domination, an ever-expanding list of quite varied sites of oppressive relationships that
are irreducible to each other, and simultaneously one finds a broad array of potential manifestations of these particular power relations that extend into the domain of the invisible and unconscious. Sexism, for instance, is seen to be sustained through male privilege, and white privilege is seen to uphold racist power structures, yet these privileges are said to be hidden beneath ‘the myth of meritocracy’, or the ‘myth that democratic choice is equally available to all’ (McIntosh 1989: 11). McIntosh (ibid.: 10-11), in an early publication on white privilege, lists phenomena as diverse as being able to purchase bandages that match one’s skin colour and freedom from harassment when shopping as examples of white privilege, and her 26 examples obviously do not lay claim to exhaustiveness. Her analysis of the problem shades into the conspiratorial, as she believes that people are being kept ‘unaware that freedom of confident action is there for just a small number of people’, with the purpose of keeping ‘power in the hands of the same groups that have most of it already’ (ibid.: 12). She laments that her ‘schooling gave [her] no training in seeing [herself] as an oppressor, as an unfairly advantaged person, or as a participant in a damaged culture’ (ibid.: 10). From this perspective, any advantage one person holds over another can and should be scrutinised, and where merit is asserted privilege must be suspected. Any perceivable hierarchy then becomes intrinsically evil.

This view of the exercise of power as always suspect and never justified has permeated both academic discourse and activist practice. Opposed to the hierarchical model of human interrelation one increasingly finds the ideal of horizontality. In his discussion of the World Social Forum, De Sousa Santos identifies, as mentioned in sections 1.1.2 and 2.2.6, the core values of ‘diversity, plurality and horizontality’, which together signal ‘another possible world, itself plural in its possibilities’ (de Sousa Santos 2006: 110). Beyond the Social Forum, ‘the values of horizontality, non-hierarchy and pluralism’ are generally said to inform ‘contemporary protest movements’ (Baker 2016b: 1). These values, as discussed, are often brought in connection with ideas about prefigurative politics. The world to be created in the midst of the present hellscape of oppression and domination will fence off its suffering by not allowing the reproduction of discrimination. The process of prefiguration, in its attempt to create a world in which nothing comes to dominate or even represent anything else, posits the double demand that all differences indicative of plurality and diversity are
acknowledged, yet none are imbued with comparative value. As in an expanded line 3, Figure 5.3:

In the place of the imagined community of nationalism and its bedfellows of racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia and other forms of oppression, we must construct a real community based on the material interdependence of all life on earth.

In section 2.1.4, the practice of listing was discussed with regards to surrealist montage, a procedure aimed at evoking novel social configurations through the assemblage of seemingly disparate conceptual elements. In this regard, it was explained that listing as a mode of categorization is likely to have extensively developed together ‘with the coming of writing’, which produced ‘a change in consciousness’ heavily affected by the possibility of logographically manipulating the perceived universe (Goody 1977: 75). As an ordering system, the list may be distinguished from principled representations such as taxonomies, as it consists, at least in the cases discussed, of naming a number of properties ‘without trying to establish a hierarchical relationship among them’ (Eco 2009: 18). Listing may thus indicate ‘an imprecise image of the universe’ characteristic of ‘primitive cultures’ that are yet to decide upon the exact relation between the variety of concepts and entities that populate the mental and physical world (ibid.). The construction of a list corresponds to the establishment of an emerging worldview. As the principle of categorisation that governs the lists discussed above is that of a moral judgement, one witnesses an attempt at the construction of a dualistic cosmology characterised by the overarching struggle between good and evil, corresponding to a political distinction between vertical and horizontal organisation. Interestingly, Anderson imagined the nation – which in the concordance line above was presented as an overarching construct reinforcing the oppressive evils of hierarchical organisation – ‘as a community, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 2006: 7). This conflict of perception ultimately comes down to a struggle for representation. The nation as a concept indeed imports a measure of equality, as a national imagination works against ‘the divisions of class, culture, and ethnicity’ (Turner 2005: 30). Yet, just as the international community is seen as an imaginary unit legitimising state violence against less powerful nations, the national community may ultimately not
eradicate, but rather mask internal divisions, and therefore facilitate oppressive operations along any imaginable axis of difference.

5.1.2 Every Member of the Community

In section 5.1.1, the process of listing was seen to produce endlessly expandable catalogues of thought and behaviour. Because the perception of oppression governed the compilation of these lists, various quite distant phenomena were grouped together. In the corpus, a similar process of assimilation through juxtaposition can be observed regarding the oppressed themselves. Among the ‘marginalized groups in Turkey’, we find ‘the LGBT community, the Alevi and the Kurds’ (Figure 5.5, line 1). Alevi is primarily a religious designation, and Kurd an ethnic one, while LGBT finds itself situated on the crossroads of sexuality and gender. LGBT is an acronym that stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender. The abbreviation, however, is continually expanding to include more identifications under its umbrella. In a recent article concerned with intersectionality and autonomous media production, the authors speak of ‘racialized or BIPOC (Black, Indigenous and People of Colour) groups, as well as LGBT+ and non-binary groups and networks’ (Jeppesen and Petrick 2018: 10). In a footnote, they explain that they will use ‘LGBTQ+’ or ‘queer and trans’ to refer to LGBTQQIP2SAA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, questioning, intersex, pansexual, Two-spirit, asexual, and allies’) and ‘non-binary groups and individuals’ (ibid.). The authors further acknowledge that ‘the terminology changes quickly’ and that the acronyms they use ‘may fall out of use’ (ibid.). The list effectively conflates ‘differences between gender, sex, sexual orientation, sexual identity, and sexuality, categories which by no means themselves provide stable distinctions (Oakley 2016: 9). Labelling of this type can be said to help people gain confidence through ‘an accurate,
nuanced description of their feelings, gender, and desires’ (ibid.). It may be perceived that underrepresented identities are done justice by lexically putting them on the map. Yet critics of acronyms such as the above may also feel that they derive from ‘the framework of gender that has been constructed by the hegemonic binary’ (ibid.). The distinctions, in this sense, only gain value through the implicit invocation of a heteronormative point of reference. Furthermore, a certain portion of the community described, namely the LG, seems to be the ‘default’ marker, with the others remaining slightly ‘deviant’ within the community (ibid.). For this reason, one might assume, the authors of the article referenced above make additional and specific reference to non-binary groups and individuals. A related usage combatting the resilience of ingrained cultural oppositions is that of trans*, a concept derived from ‘computing language where an asterisk following a term broadens search results’ – as it does in the Genealogies software (Irving 2016: 424).

Efforts towards representational justice have been amply discussed in section 2.2 from the viewpoint of political correctness, where the proliferation of pronouns was illustrated to be a potentially inadequate strategy of contestation, mainly because it knows no conceivable end. A similar impossibility to ultimately achieve a desirable situation is clearly illustrated in the usage of terms such as LGBT+ and trans*, where the principle of extended inclusion becomes part of the acronym itself. In the end, the potential lines across which identities can be differentiated, and the effort to grant equal footing to each of the resulting categories, divides the aggregated community into at least as many variants as there are individuals perceived to take part in it. On the other hand, the argument may well be that the ultimate point is not to carve out a space for each separate identity, but to completely eradicate the structures against which the categorizations are initially erected. Once heteronormative binaries are overcome, the argument would run, all are equal, and there is more need to stress each and every component. As long as ‘sexual deviants’ are oppressed, however, highlighting that there is an alternative remains crucial. This activist view of the usage of acronyms such as those discussed above gains force though the inclusion of allies in the list. Allies can take any position in the spectra of sex and gender, suggesting that the community is founded not on the principle of identifying with an under-represented social group, but on the principle of fighting for the rights of these groups. This would make LGBT first and foremost a political designation, differentiated from oppressed communities such
as the Kurds and Alevis not only in terms of the aspect of identity foregrounded, but also in terms of the perceived degree of engagement.

| 1 | NGOs, towards small-scale distributed community-led organization, which has a clear shared value base. Composed of prominent activists, community organizations and some political parties—less. |
| 2 | Neighborhoods, workplaces, unions, and community organizations, not just every few years and instead, the municipal administration hired community organizers who informed the residents about the needs. |
| 3 | Issued environmental protection, local community organizations push for neighbors’ concerns. |
| 4 | Applied by grassroots-based unions and community organizations, the dismantling of these rights took place. |
| 5 | Build a vast network of workplace and community-based organizing committees that make a general and local politics, moving to workplace and community organizing to build popular power. There play this role. One group, involved in community organizing, was active on Facebook not coming. |

Figure 5.6: community concordance (9/152 | +organiz* complete)
65 (1, 4), 45 (2), 143 (3, 8), 57 (5), 39 (6), 128 (7), 157 (9)

Community, in this sense, strongly suggests involvement, and this sentiment is most strongly expressed in the corpus with reference to organization. ‘Small-scale distributed community-led organization’ is said to arise from a shared value base (Figure 5.6, line 1). Community organization is associated with activism, and brought in alliance with neighbourhoods, workplaces, and unions (lines 2 and 3). Workplace and community-based organizing is presented as a means to build popular power (line 8). In all these usages, community organization carries the sense of a grassroots, bottom-up process of resistance and emancipation (line 5). This sense of community, in contrast to the means of identification discussed above, is not based on any specific characteristic – except perhaps one’s presence in the particular locale discussed.

| 1 | Bringing everyone’s responsibility. Every member of the community becomes a leader. The slow transformation of self-managed democratically by all members of the community. For the Jacobin left, eternally agile and free not as laborers but as owners—as members of a community which aso labors.” Just a year be |
| 2 | I self-managed democratically by all members of the community. Today’s movements are once again grassroots councils that empower every member of the community regardless of ethnicity, gender or |

Figure 5.7: member**+[3]community concordance (complete)
50 (1), 59 (2-4), 164 (3)
Equally lacking in designations of identity, a recurrent phrase in the corpus is *every/all member(s) of the/a community* (Figure 5.7). The phrase is used particularly to celebrate the idea, touched upon in section 4.3, of a non-discriminatory, fully inclusive political association, as in *directly democratic councils that empower every member of the community regardless of ethnicity, gender or religion* (line 5). The concordance lines also make reference to the complete eradication of hierarchy: *Every member of the community becomes a leader* (line 1). This erasure of distinctions which only leaves intact the category of membership is in terms of writing the opposite of the practice of listing discussed before, but as the reference to listing practices in line 5 illustrates the motivation is ultimately the same: to guarantee that *the community* is representative of every individual that takes part in it.

The ideal of *small-scale* and *grassroots-based* (Figure 5.6, lines 1 and 5) community organization is associated, even verbally, with ‘organic, pre-modern, small-scale bonding’ (Buzan and González-Peláez 2005: 33). While related in aspirations, the inclusive sense of community constructed in Figure 5.7 is more than a nostalgic reference to an imaginary past, it is also attuned to the principled progression of a developing democracy. Highly hierarchical societies come with clear designations of authority and individual function, comparable to the distribution of roles within a human body. The metaphor of the *body politic* has for centuries captured this correspondence. Yet it may be said that, due to its egalitarian and transformative aspirations, ‘democratic society is instituted as a society without a body, as a society which undermines the representation of an organic totality’ (Lefort 1988: 18). Democracy, that is, intrinsically demands the erosion of the structures it generates, only to become ever more amorphous and indistinct. If ‘every member of the community becomes a leader’, the body politic bears no crown nor base, and ceases, as such, to be. The question of community thus ultimately returns one to the question of the nature and purpose of organic development, and therefore to the complementary question of immunity: at which point does inclusiveness entail erasure? This is the question forcefully rejected by phrases such as *every member*, and the question that engenders the ever expanding list and its collapse, symbolised first by the acronym, then by the abstraction of a mere principle through token characters such as + and *. 

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5.2 Politics

5.2.1 Prefigurative Politics

In the late 1970s, as mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, Boggs proposed the continuity of a ‘prefigurative tradition, which begins with the nineteenth century anarchists and includes the syndicalists, council communists, and the New Left’ (Boggs 1977: 100). He uses prefigurative to denote ‘the embodiment within the ongoing political practice of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture and human experience that are the ultimate goal’ (ibid.). The statement is often taken to be the first formal definition of prefigurative politics. The concept was taken up by Breines, who, in a discussion of the New Left, describes prefigurative politics as ‘essentially antiorganizational’ and ‘antihierchical’, with ‘participatory democracy’ being a central feature (Breines 1980: 421). Today, as already discussed, the prefigurative paradigm has gained currency in the study of contemporary social movements. Flesher Fominaya (2014: 183), for instance, has argued that ‘prefigurative action’ is a common element in movements such as 15-M or Occupy, which were central to the ‘global wave’ of protest characterising the beginnings of the present decade. It is therefore unsurprising that in ROAR, a magazine that was inspired by these protests, and which documents their development as well as aftermath, prefigurative is the most significant collocate of politics (Figure 5.8b).
As discussed in section 2.1.1, definitions and applications of prefigurative politics have in recent decades multiplied up to the point where prefiguration might be considered a mere ‘conceptual touchstone’ encompassing ‘widely divergent meanings’ (Cornish et al. 2016: 115, 118). Despite the proliferation of potential meanings, ‘it often seems to be taken for granted that prefiguration implies an acceptance of democratic norms’ (Teivainen 2016: 25). Gordon explains, in this respect, the intertwined circulation, common since the early uses of the term by Boggs (1977) and Breines (1980), of ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ definitions of prefigurative politics (Gordon 2018: 527-28). A formal definition, ‘limited to the mere correspondences between goals and practices’, in principle allows for associations with all sorts of endeavours across the political spectrum, while a substantive definition imposes a ‘value-content’ (ibid.: 527). In the concordance lines, we find that this familiar mixture of substantive and formal approaches still governs the discourse on prefigurative politics (Figure 5.9).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Army and horizontalism, of direct action and prefigurative politics, of consensus decision-making. FOR AND AGAINST PREFIGURATIVE POLITICS The vexatious reality of the applicatios of colonialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Identity politics and declare the failure of prefigurative politics as such. The latter is a term which</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sticky (indeed, suspiciously eagerly) declare prefigurative politics and its associated concerns with the position in the ambient debate between &quot;pro Figurative politics&quot; and its more formalist, party-oriented politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Work of horizontal movements focusing on prefigurative politics, direct democracy and autonomous self-organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>And hierarchy; in the understanding of prefigurative politics—that is that we must live the values in our movement that we want to achieve in a new society'. Line 8.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.9: *figurative+politics concordance (complete)
53 (1), 78 (2-6), 163 (7), 164 (8)

Purely formal, for instance, is the definition of ‘pre-figurative politics’ as meaning ‘that we must live the values in our movement that we want to achieve in a new society’ (line 8). Further extracting the co-text to the concordance line, however, sees this notion embedded with ‘directly democratic organizing’ and ‘sensitivity to matters of domination and hierarchy’. In an article drawing parallels between Latin-American and European social movements, we find described in similar terms ‘a network of horizontal movements focusing on prefigurative politics, direct democracy and autonomous self-organization’ (line 7). In an article on Occupy, finally, another related list is produced: ‘autonomy and horizontalism’ are grouped with ‘direct action’, ‘prefigurative politics’ and ‘consensus decision-making’ (line 1). According to the author, these intertwined practices ‘helped reinvigorate that long-lost hope that there is an alternative, that another world is possible’. We thus find a recurrent mantra consisting of autonomy-focused and participatory structures, beginning and ending with the slogan-sourced injunction that the world can and should be changed.

The remaining five concordance lines in Figure 5.9 all stem from one article, which takes a slightly different approach. As the capitalised subheading FOR AND AGAINST PREFIGURATIVE POLITICS indicates, the article is open to praise as well as critique concerning the concept of prefigurative politics, and in the end, the authors do not seek to make a judgement on the preference for either a prefigurative or a party-oriented approach (lines 2 and 6). Interestingly, they ascribe potential criticism of prefiguration to its difficulties in overcoming systemic oppression, reproducing the list of racism, sexism, homophobia and ableism which, in variant forms, governed the previous discussion of community (line 4 and...
This list is indicative of a concern with identity politics, a term which the authors distance themselves from, and with reason (line 3).

Like political correctness, identity politics has a highly volatile connotation which tends to suggest dismissal. Furthermore, various social actors involved in the struggle against oppression display very different opinions on the strategic desirability of mobilising along the lines of identity categories such as race and gender, the main risk being that ‘if the identity claims are pushed too far, what follows is the inevitable fragmentation of [a] movement into self-assertive and closed sects’ (Melucci 1996: 188). A more traditional approach to enacting social change that purportedly ensures homogeneity of purpose would retain its focus on the Marxist class struggle, yet arguably today ‘class struggle is just one species of identity politics’ (Laclau 2000: 203). As discussed with respect to community, the fundamental issue remains whether ‘social empowerment’ depends upon ‘[transcending] difference’ or rather upon highlighting ‘intragroup differences’ for the purpose of providing more accurate analyses of dominance relations (Crenshaw 1991: 1242).

Intersectionality, identity politics, and political correctness, then, all serve to combat perceived harm to the identities of oppressed social groups, and their categories of analysis clearly permeate the corpus, yet the terms themselves are remarkably absent from it. Political correctness does not occur at all, identity politics only twice, including the bracketed usage discussed above. Intersectionality, finally, is sceptically treated as something to give ‘superficial lip-service to’, or as a practice of ‘box ticking’ (Figure 5.10, lines 3 and 5). There are, however, more neutral usages to be found in the corpus, and attempts to salvage the
concept from connotative damnation, such as the proposition towards ‘an intersectionality not of identities, but of struggles’ (lines 2 and 4).

Whether or not the intersectional framework is foregrounded, the explicit association between a critique of prefigurative politics and the concerns of racism, sexism, homophobia and ableism in the corpus suggests that prefiguration in principle should at least address these issues (Figure 5.9, line 4). As touched upon in section 4.3, a concern for oppression along identity categories severely complicates the organisational horizontalism of prefigurative politics. The prefigurative promise of not reproducing inequalities comes to stand in direct relation to the amount of inequalities perceived, and thus the bar for the horizontalist paradigm is continually raised. Prefiguration may be said to have originated from a resistance to ‘formalist, party-oriented’ endeavours, and would therefore be steeped in experimentation (Figure 5.9, line 6). When confronted with the myriad of social divisions involved in human interaction, however, dedication to horizontalist practice according to the principle of a means-ends equivalence demands elaborate behavioural monitoring, and inevitably leads to a ‘preoccupation with how practices are performed’ (Yates 2015: 4-13). The invocation to ‘be the change you want to see in the world’, mentioned in line five’s (Figure 5.9) broader co-text, then turns from liberating into excessively demanding and increasingly formalist.
Expanding the search to variants of prefiguration in general, one finds confirmation of this pattern that leads from an extension of the sites of application to a reversal of the initial motivation (Figure 5.11). Prefiguration is said to equal the realization of the goals of politics in the here and now (line 13). There is the familiar mention of autonomous movements seeking to prefigure a better world (line 8), with prefiguration considered as characteristic of self-organization and involving experiments (lines 9 and 14). The main concern is creating an inclusive politics, reliant on critical dialogue and engagement that makes existing exclusions visible (lines 17-18). A better world will arise through the dissemination of prefigurative spaces or microcosms of wider change, and ultimately future institutions will refuse to reproduce the authoritarian features of the state (lines 1, 6, 8, and 15). The shift to an institutional vocabulary is subtle but remarkable in a discourse focused on autonomy and experimentation. This shift recurs in an article arguing for a prefigurative practice of social movement research (line 2). Above, the same article introduced the opposition to formalist...
politics, but in its conceptualisation of *prefigurative* research this distinction is ultimately fully collapsed (line 3). In line 4, the authors present a deeply paradoxical thesis – and one may note in the *university-to-come* the contemporary spread of a linguistic structure discussed in section 4.1.3:

If the university-to-come is one that self-consciously seeks to create the resources and cultivate the subjects of liberation, how can we, today, let this future institution inform our conduct, in the name of creating the sort of world where it might one day exist?

The argument, supposedly in favour of liberation, demands adherence to the principles of an imaginary educational institution to determine one’s present conduct. Autonomy becomes administration, and there is a suggestion of self-sacrifice to be read here. If, today, one engages in correct thought and action, the future will be free. The enactment of social change in the here and now turns into a liturgical performance in function of future salvation. One finds here, once again, the complex correspondence between foreshadowing and fulfilment resulting in a reversal of the timeline, a process ultimately summarised in the concordance line equating prefiguration with reflection (line 7). The conflation of prefiguration and reflection, as well as the intrusion of an institutional vocabulary in the prefigurative imagination, ultimately clarify the insistence of contemporary social movements not just on the adjustment of the current state of affairs, but on the creation of another world. The prefigurative imagination does not so much imagine a causal transition, but rather a battle between two parallel conceptions of reality, one giving rise to the corrupt structures of the present, and one founded on the moral superiority of a higher calling. It would be an omission not to return here to the patristic tradition, in which the concept of prefiguration first saw the light of day. As discussed in section 1.1.2, St. Augustine presents the moral universe as divided into an Earthly City, in which ‘princes are as much mastered by the lust for mastery as the nations which they subdue are by them’, and a Heavenly one, in which ‘all serve one another in charity’ (Augustine 1998: 632). The cities’ opposition between vertical and horizontal relations is inspired by two competing desires: ‘the earthly by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love of God extending to contempt of self’ (ibid.). In navigating participation between these two realms, adherents of prefigurative politics display both tendencies, as the self-centred
struggle for autonomy and liberation transitions into a longing for subjection to a higher authority intimated by an ever-expanding normative conception of justice. The God towards whom one should be oriented is at present barely more than an incognito force or spirit, demanding intervention in the name of creating. The name of its primary adversary, however, the force that corrupted the earthly sphere, has since long been revealed: capital. The following section will focus, then, on the oppositional character of politics in ROAR, and further explore the creation of an alternative world.

5.2.2 A New Anti-Capitalist Politics

Anti-, at 149 occurrences, is a particularly productive prefix in the corpus (e.g. Figure 5.12). It combines with dozens of nouns to create a broad oppositional framework. Some recurrent terms, such as anti-democratic, serve to level accusations (line 8), but the great majority of terms containing anti serve to identify the stance of the authors or of social actors that are presented in a generally positive light. ‘Anti-fascist’, for instance, collocates most often with ‘fronts’ and ‘coalitions’ (lines 2-4). In no uncertain terms, the author responsible for these usages states that ‘[his] point is that there is ample opportunity – even a need – to construct anti-fascist coalitions’ (line 2, left co-text). At 23 occurrences, however, the most frequent oppositional identification is that of anti-capitalist. Next to prefigurative and electoral, anti-capitalist is also the most significant collocate of politics in the corpus (Figure 5.8b).
By placing themselves in opposition to capitalism, the authors inscribe themselves in the political tradition of the *left*, which at 10 occurrences is also a common collocate of *politics* in the corpus (Figure 5.8a). Indeed, the left can be characterised as ‘a set of transformative theories and practices that, in the course of the past 150 years, has resisted the expansion of capitalism and the economic social, political, and cultural relations it has generated’ (De Sousa Santos 2009: 44). This definition posits a direct connection between economic, social, political and cultural phenomena, all of which comply with the capitalist logic of expansion. This rather broad view signals a difficulty with defining the proper reach of the concept of ‘capitalism’ itself. The term was ‘originally coined and used by critics’, which complicates the process of locating clear and concise statements regarding the term’s scope and denotation, as well as the purpose of the system it represents (Clarke 2005: 23).

The most influential critic of capitalism has undoubtedly been Marx. As discussed in section 1.1.2, Marx’s analysis arguably ‘[breaks] human history down into four stages’ (Bod 2013: 255). He outlines the subsequent stages of primitive communal society, slavery, and feudalism, the development of which ultimately gives rise to capitalism, which is the mode of production characterised by bourgeois ownership of the means of production (ibid.). The final stage, ‘socialism and communism’ would abolish such ‘private ownership of the means of production’, and can only be realised through a proletarian revolution (ibid.). The revolution is necessitated by an ever more pronounced class struggle, with capitalism continually intensifying ‘the contradiction between the exploiting and the exploited classes’ (Mao 1967: 47). The central issue with capitalism would indeed be the particular mechanism of exploitation at the core of its development. The incentive for the capitalist, owner of the means of production, would be to extract as much surplus value as possible from the workers’ ‘capacity to labor’ (Clarke 2005: 23). Not only for the sake of personal profit, but also in order to keep the labourer dependent on wages for his or her subsistence, the profits produced by the proletarian are to be re-invested in capital rather than returned to the worker, while the competitive nature of capitalism furthers technological innovations that in the end do not serve the workers, but drive them further into submission. A tendency towards gaining private profit and wage labour, however, also existed in the pre-capitalist modes of production, and it can be argued that a system is capitalist ‘only when the system gives priority to the *endless* accumulation of capital’, meaning that procuring capital
becomes an end in itself that demands a degree of ideological compliance (Wallerstein 2015: 57).

Communism, the great historical rival to capitalist domination, has proven theoretically resilient but has, to put it mildly, not achieved particularly rewarding results in practice. Consequently, capitalism is currently presented as ‘the system to which there is no effective alternative’ (Clarke 2005: 23). The ‘spread of capitalist market relations’ to form a ‘world market system’ has furthermore closely allied capitalism with the projects of globalisation and modernity (Clarke 2005: 23, Nederveen Pieterse 1994: 161). It has been argued, in this sense, ‘that the world is becoming more uniform and standardised, through a technological, commercial and cultural synchronisation emanating from the West’ (Nederveen Pieterse 1994: 161). Seemingly eternally in its late stage, capitalism would, through its firm grip on the principles of planetary exchange, have realised ‘the totalitarian domination of the commodity category over social relations’ (Deranty 2003: 36). The perceived value of any entity thus becomes determined by its market value, and ultimately it is money, – ‘that into which all commodities dissolve themselves; that which dissolves itself into all commodities’, – which functions as ‘the universal equivalent’ by which global relations are determined (Marx 1993: 142). Some see in the sheer force of finance that characterizes contemporary society a return to feudal conditions, in which oppressors gained wealth ‘by threat or force’, given that it can currently be posited that ‘money and power have become effectively the same thing’ (Graeber 2013: 79, 301). This perception of the increased brutality of financial domination, however, has continued to produce cracks in public complacency, and especially since the global financial crisis of 2008, we have seen ‘the revitalization of a wide spectrum of leftist theorizing’ (Gardiner 2017: 29).
This is the context in which the emergence of ROAR Magazine as a forum for political intervention is to be properly understood. As pointed out before, ROAR’s About page states that the publication was founded ‘in 2011 to provide theoretically informed analysis of the global financial crisis and the popular mobilizations that emerged in its wake’ (emphasis added). The phrase global financial crisis occurs no fewer than eleven times in the corpus, making it the most common trigram containing global. The adjective global itself is remarkably frequent, at 252 occurrences. In line with the contextual clarifications above, global capitalism, global capital, and global economy form frequent collocations throughout the articles considered (Figure 5.13). The adjective is mostly used to stress the complete market-based integration of the various corners of the world as we know it, and to highlight the unbounded scope of the system’s cyclical conjunction of climax and crisis. In the highly common collocation global South, however, the adjective seemingly serves to introduce a distinction and an orientation rather than a suggestion of full-scale saturation. Yet, global South is an idiomatic construction that geographically does not fully correspond to the
cardinal directions, but rather to a perception of industrial development. This indicates that, in the final analysis, market relations are of such representational force that they override relations of observable spatiality.

Further high-frequency collocates of global include democracy and struggle, terms suggestive of ROAR’s self-positioning at the frontlines of the global struggle for real democracy. One finds here a tension between the financial as the mechanism of oppression and the political as the sphere of resistance, because for the movements that spurred the magazine’s inception as well as for ROAR itself, the point of departure is exactly the lamentable current condition in which these two realms have come to be completely interdependent. The most significant collocate (for all measures except Log-Log) of global in the corpus, bankocracy, highlights this assimilation, which is to be defeated by any means possible (Figure 5.14, lines 3 and 4). An extended line 2 identifies the problem with financial domination in the political sphere:

the global bankocracy is content to quietly operate in the background, shaping the conditions of possibility under which everyone else – states, firms and households – is forced to secure their continued existence.

The global dominance of capital, then, although surreptitiously, constrains potential alternatives to its further development. From this perspective, the main goal of resistance would not be to integrally overthrow the system, but rather ‘the emerging anti-capitalist politics’ is ‘to think in terms of building power and cultivating the social creativity, collective imagination and democratic aspirations of society as such’ (Figure 5.15, lines 3 and 5). These phrases are put forward in an article written by the editor and published in the first printed
issue of ROAR, and once again there are clear echoes of the journal’s taglines which centre around the radical imagination.

The question presenting itself, then, is how ROAR seeks to produce changes in consciousness that at least make it possible to conceive of alternatives to global capitalism. A first answer one can find in the reach of ROAR’s coverage itself. The magazine’s ‘About’ page provides a timeline of key moments covered by the publication. Starting with the euro crisis, the timeline further mentions the Arab spring, anti-austerity protests, the Occupy movement, Gezi & Brazil, the Rojava revolution, Black Lives Matter, the Greek referendum, and the refugee crisis, to end with Trump and Brexit. Once again, we find a list of phenomena that are rather difficult to connect on the basis of any distinctive criterion. In ROAR, however, all these historical episodes are integrated under the banner of an unfolding crisis that is ultimately founded in capitalist contradictions. The affordances of the internet as a medium allow for this process of initial aggregation and eventual integration. In order to relate the various phenomena discussed, it is enough to present them in an aesthetically homogeneous environment, and to provide analyses that, despite their various differences, make consistent reference to the perceived common cause of capitalist injustice. The framework of oppression and resistance makes it feasible to present a global struggle for real democracy against global capitalism – simply dubbed the revolution on the About page – by interpreting every act of local resistance as part of a larger oppositional development. Through its publishing practices, the magazine itself makes this connection between struggles, at least representationally, a reality. As in the analysis of community, we
eventually see the presentation of a universal struggle between good and evil unfold. Two worlds are placed in opposition – one malevolent, determined in the shadows but highly pervasive in every area of daily life, and one suppressed but subsisting and struggling to unfold through the cracks of this shadow realm that thrives on the creation of crisis upon crisis.

It is not coincidental, in this regard, that ROAR abounds in spatial metaphors giving form to the opposition between the two worlds imagined. It should be conceded at this point that all ‘[abstract] concepts are largely metaphorical’, and that the ‘mind is inherently embodied’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 3). Consequently, ‘our pervasive experience of motion through space is the basis for a vast metaphor system by which we understand events, causes, and purposive action’ (ibid.: 194). We are, in this context, only to think of common lexical items such as social movement to see that it would be impossible to speak of politics without recourse to the spatial imaginary. Yet the specifics of the spatial vocabulary employed in ROAR remain enlightening. The collocation under capitalism, for instance, is used seven times in the corpus (Figure 5.16, lines 6-12). Another term frequently co-occurring with under is neoliberalism, which is associated with insecurity of life and invasion (lines 13 and 17-19).
Furthering this suggestion of military confrontation, one finds the collocations under attack, under threat, and under siege (lines 1-5, 20-26). Using the phrase, under capitalism thus seems to suggest the inevitability of confrontation, and therefore the necessity of mobilisation. Capitalism is not merely a system that can be evaluated from a distance, but a force that is actively waging war on life itself. In contrast to this rhetoric of confrontation, however, one finds the equally common spatial metaphor beyond capitalism, as in the twice used clause a world beyond capitalism, which is connected, in the concordance lines, to the
potential power of the imagination (Figure 5.17, lines 2 and 6). Once again, there is a tension already intimated in the magazine’s taglines, which seeks to integrate the radical imagination with the front-lines of [a] global struggle. The friction between a militant and a seemingly much more evasive stance can be resolved through the admonition that concrete resistance to full-scale world domination is only feasible with the aid of a full-blown alternative that, at least in thought, constitutes an equally substantial set of relations.

The phrase under capitalism also suggests friction between a force arising from the base and one descending from the top, which we find in phrases such as ‘the emerging anti-capitalist politics’ and revolution ‘from below’ (Figure 5.15, lines 3-5). In the same vein, the phrase ‘bottom-up politics’ occurs twice in the corpus. A more colourful instantiation of the same dynamic is found in the common phrase grassroots movement(s), which occurs 18 times. Such formulations fit in with the prefigurative commonplace of building a new world in the shell of the old, suggesting that, despite their all-pervasiveness, the power structures in place are detached from the global networks that in principle fall under their control, and thus leave room for contestation from beneath the foliage. Radical politics, one of the most frequent structures containing politics in the corpus (Figure 5.8a), also comes to fall within this metaphorical realm: what changes at base must have changed at the base.
Lastly, we find interesting uses of spatial metaphor surrounding the overall most frequent content-word collocation containing politics, namely electoral politics (Figure 5.8a). Electoral politics is generally evaluated negatively in the corpus (Figure 5.18). The practice is on the receiving end of a deep and healthy mistrust, participating in it feels like an abusive relationship, and, in its triteness and alleged opposition to real democracy, it is deserving of a fiery indictment (lines 4-5, 13-14, 18). In terms of spatial imagery, there is the danger of getting sucked into the discourse of electoral politics, which goes hand in hand with the danger of incorporation of movements into the dominant political order (line 16, expanded). One can prosaically enter, or more dynamically make the leap into electoral politics (lines 2-3). Electoral politics is once characterised as an established route (line 9), but mostly, one can conclude, it constitutes a bounded realm that is best avoided. As such, electoral politics can be thought of as a field, but is primarily represented as a sphere, from which one can move forward, or which one can contest by building popular power from below (lines 10-12).
Once again, we find a tension between the *beyond* and the *against*, presented here within the same article. The blending of these visions seems once more to rest upon the accusation that the criticised practice of electing representatives is all-encompassing but simultaneously fictional, unreal, as in *the shallow theatrics of electoral politics* (line 8). The *sphere of electoral politics*, to be abandoned by the *new anti-capitalist politics*, is a place of performance without substance. The radical imagination, its counterpart, is as yet a place of substance without performance, and at the meeting points of these two realms lie *the front-lines of the global struggle for real democracy*.

### 5.3 Democracy

#### 5.3.1 Representative Democracy

*Democracy* is a very frequent term in the corpus. At 666 occurrences, it takes up the 42nd position in the frequency list, right before *new, what* and *these*. To the immediate left of *democracy*, we find a broad number of adjectives, the most frequent of which are, in that order, *direct, real, participatory, representative,* and *radical* (Figure 5.19). Together, these five modifiers account for more than a third of democracy’s immediate lefthand collocates. As the mosaic representation suggests, they in fact occur even more often with *democracy* than one can infer from a perusal of its immediate left collocates, as they often combine with each other to form combinations or lists of characteristics (Figure 5.20).
We thus have a list of adjectives that tend to co-characterise democracy in a shared effort to pin down the type of democracy under consideration. The adjectives in question do not only share an environment, they also seem to share a semantic core, as the concordance lines in which they co-occur do not enumerate variant forms of democracy. Instead, they identify interchangeable or at least necessarily co-occurring characteristics of what is conceived as a single coherent idea of democracy. A ‘real democracy’ is said to be ‘direct and participatory’, which would also make it ‘radical’ (lines 1 and 3). The phrase direct and representative...
democracy, however, deviates from this uniform pattern, as it introduces opposition rather than combination. Two models, a Hellenic direct one and a Roman representative one, are set up against each other. Thus, representative shares a grammatical space with direct, participatory, real, and radical, but is located outside of the compatible set these terms constitute. This explains why, despite its high frequency, representative tends not to co-occur with its modifying counterparts. It is clear from the concordance lines that the direct model is preferred. While some may argue it should be ‘postponed’, the aspiration is towards ‘direct and participatory democracy’, a goal worth ‘campaigning for and struggling for’ (lines 2 and 4). Its alleged opposite, representative democracy, consequently receives harsh treatment in the corpus (Figure 5.21). The concordance lines in Figure 5.21 deal with a variety of specific perceived failures of the representative system, often tied to local conditions, but together present a fairly coherent critique of the representative paradigm as a whole.
look like? Camilla Hansen As representative democracy sinks into crisis, we need to go back to discharged by reference to representative democracy, has been the dominant one in the Western Confederation differs from representative democracy because it is based on recallable delegates beyond the voice: the crisis of representative democracy Jerome Roos Voting is meaningless when making a dream. A dream called representative democracy. A dream we’ve all been taught to believe in, considered for debate in representative democracy remains limited to policy — and a very narrow one. The bottom line is that representative democracy institutionally stifles political participation. Now talk about personalities. Representative democracy has long since ceased to be about corporate power as flows. Representative democracy, which is bound by the territoriality of the fact, the current form of representative democracy in Western societies itself is increasingly being called ‘elective autocracy’ than to a representative democracy. In the process, important political decisions taken by the DAA is a system of representative democracy, the MGRK system continues to exist and the promise of doing away with representative democracy and substituting it with autonomous institutional aims of doing away with representative democracy and constituting self-managed political contexts that India has depended on representative democracy, in which power is held by a minority that suffers from the lesser degree) that plague representative democracy at higher levels, including elite capture and its dynamics go well beyond the representative democracy approach adopted by countries like India. Then the inadequacy of modern representative democracy. Vast areas of real power are completely eluding the farcical nature of representative democracy. NOSTALGIA-DRIVEN MODERNIZATION is a given the token nature of representative democracy, the state is not something that can simply be legislated. Market and representative democracy. Undoubtedly many honest and committed politicians and seriously challenging representative democracy as a system of governance and the politics be drawn: the rejection of representative democracy as a system of governance and of the portion of institutional politics, of representative democracy, and of the party as an organizational force for direct democracy instead of representative democracy, and helps point a way to achieving that democracy instead of representative democracy, and helps point a way to achieving that public within the paradigm of ‘representative democracy’ — the electoral system symbiotic with, a re, wedded to claims of a representative democracy’ within a parliamentary system? Such that Roman,” that is, direct and representative democracy. Bookchin sees his form of neo-anarchism

Figure 5.21: representative+democracy concordance (complete)

39 (1-3), 52 (4), 54 (5), 55 (6-11), 80 (12), 132 (13), 135 (14), 140 (15-16), 148 (17-19), 155 (20-22), 158 (23), 163 (24-26), 164 (27), 170 (28-29), 172 (30)

Representative democracy, so argue the authors in the corpus, if they are taken to voice particular instantiations of a more general sentiment that allows for a synthetic, encompassing reading, has severe limitations. It does not allow for structural, fundamental debates, but only leaves room for discussion at the level of policy, and on top of that only a very narrow range of policies can be scrutinised (line 8). As such, the system institutionally stifles political participation (line 9). To the extent that popular participation is limited, power is held by a minority, an elite that constitutes, in fact, an elective autocracy (lines 13,
17, and 18). Consequently, vast areas of power remain out of reach of democratic control, which indicates the inadequacy and farcical or token nature of the representative paradigm (lines 20-22). The reason for the perceived farcical, perhaps insincere nature of the electoral, parliamentary system is that institutional politics is limited by its association with the territoriality of the nation state and the predatory capitalist market (lines 11, 23, 26, and 28-29). As a system of governance, representative democracy is thus a system within systems, all too heavily dependent upon the machinations of forces beyond its control (lines 24-25). Representative democracy must therefore sink ever deeper into crisis, as the electoral principle increasingly meets with denunciation and rejection (lines 1, 3, 6 and 19). Alternatives raised include autonomous institutions and self-managed political communities (lines 15 and 16).

A further extension of the outline of representative democracy sketched is in the concordance lines above by drawing on the representative paradigm’s association with capitalism and the parliamentary system. Capitalist democracy is said to display a flawed structure, and its representative institutions are consequently facing a profound legitimation crisis (lines 2 and 3). The farcical sausage factory called parliamentary democracy looks tired and shaken (lines 1, 6 and 9). In response, the concordance lines document a demand to either force the limits of the system from within, or pursue a rupture with the current state of affairs altogether (lines 7 and 8). The adjectives capitalist, electoral, parliamentary and representative, then, share an association as intimate as that between direct, participatory,
radical and real. Two opposite adjectival frameworks are constructed, intricate in themselves and incompatible with each other. Subverting the common usage of the term democracy is partly grounded in a desire for purification. In the concordance, one finds a plea for real democracy and total liberation as against the subverted nature of representative capitalist democracy (line 4). The essence of democracy, that is, has been corrupted and defiled. This viewpoint, like the notion that representative democracy is a farce, must ultimately rest on an etymological appeal insisting that we need to go back to democracy in its original meaning as rule of the people (Figure 5.21, line 1). The term democracy is reclaimed rather than abandoned, in the conviction that representative democracy is not only inadequate, but also inaccurate, both unjust and untrue, and thus false in every sense.

This conflation of inadequacy and falsehood further entrenches the divide between the two adjectival paradigms, which come to constitute, once again, not just two competing worldviews but two competing worlds: the deceived may believe they are witnessing a democracy, but it is, in fact, not really there. The concept of democracy, in order to be able to harbour this unfolding struggle, undergoes a fundamental semantic split in line with the two competing orders of reality, which must gain clarity through listing ever more correspondent characteristics that are deemed either proper or degenerate. As a result, to ensure the transparency of their position on the right side of history, the authors are bound to consistently and amply contextualise their usage of democracy. Fixity of expression develops into ritualised language use demanding the recital of the mantra direct, participatory, radical and real. The ultimate purpose of this recital is to break the spell of false consciousness that leads one to believe in the reality of representative democracy, which is, in the end, no more than ‘a dream’ (Figure 5.21, line 7).

The tension in ROAR between positive and negative evaluations of the capacity to imagine was discussed in the section on community, and now resurfaces with regards to democracy. To condemn representative democracy on the basis of its alleged status as a dream seems strangely out of step in a journal that takes pride in fomenting the radical imagination. The term dream does not only evoke illusion, it also brings to mind expressions of aspiration and hope. In fact, in the same sequence that serves to condemn the dream of representative democracy, the conventional qualities of beauty and power are ascribed to the dream
(Figure 5.23, lines 4 and 5). The lines presented are all from an article written by ROAR editor Jerome Roos (2012), titled Beyond the Vote: The crisis of representative democracy, and this specific article accounts for 6 of the 33 instances of dream in the corpus. The concordance lines generated clearly spill over into each other, as they all form part of a single textual sequence.

The sequence is written in the past tense and employs the pronouns *we* and *you* (lines 1, 3 and 4). It documents a process of awakening, universal yet addressed to the individual reader. The awakening concerns the realisation that the paradigm of ‘representative democracy’ is to be rejected. It is implied that at one point the addressee and his undefined companions were vehemently in favour of the representative system, to the extent that sharing its beauty could equal waging war in its name: *we were quite literally willing to bomb it into people’s heads* (lines 4 and 5). Yet ultimately responsibility for such practices does not lie with the individual addressed, but with an unidentified subject. Representative democracy is ‘an idea we’ve all been taught to believe in; an idea, planted inside our heads like a cunning inception’ (line 1). *Cunning inception* is a heavily idiosyncratic formulation, and in this context can be taken to mean *fundamental deception*. At the very root of our political consciousness lies a lie. In the beginning, we were deceived. Ever since, we have been manipulated by outside forces that have kept us in a state of hallucination. The consensus was a conspiracy. At the point where the dream reveals these nightmarish qualities, the demand to wake up arises (line 6).

The sequence discussed forms part of the introduction to the article in question (Roos 2012). At the very end of this article, the author returns to the metaphor of awakening, or
revelation. He quotes ‘one of the coordinators of the popular assembly at Syntagma Square’ as saying: ‘I was sleeping. And I have to wake up’ (ibid.). The speaking subject finds him- or herself still in between the separate realms; no longer sleeping but not yet awake. He expresses the desire to fully cut ties with his old perceptive condition: ‘once you are awake, you cannot go back to sleep again. That is my hope’ (ibid.). The speaker longs to enter the world of direct democracy and leave the sphere of representative politics, never to return. The author of the article is not a native English speaker, and presumably the person quoted is not either. We do not know how many translation procedures have taken place to render this transmission. Yet from a phraseological perspective, a more idiomatic expression would have been: ‘That is my dream’.

5.3.2 Real Democracy

The preponderance of real as a modifier of democracy in the corpus has three main causes. The first cause, as discussed in section 5.3.1, is the adjectival alliance between real, participatory, radical, and direct. The second cause is the occurrence of the collocation in ROAR’s recurrent self-description as ‘providing grassroots perspectives from the front-lines of the global struggle for real democracy’, which often makes it into an article’s textual body. Lastly, the frequent co-occurrence of real and democracy in the corpus results from the terms’ combination in slogans employed by the social movements ROAR reports on, particularly Real Democracy Now. In this context, a number of instantiations of the type real represent not the English but the correspondent Spanish adjective. (Figure 5.24).

1* The ICAD. He is now a part of Democracia Real Ya — or DRY, for those in the know, pronounce Spanish Tomalaplaza we say ”Democracia Real Ya True global democracy now!” Today we call it DRY, where is the main assembly in Madrid, to be joined by many involved, such as Democracia Real Ya (Dry, or Real Democracy Now) and other pl"o (Youth Without a Future), Democracia Real Ya (DRY, or Real Democracy Now) and other pl  

Figure 5.24: real+ya concordance (complete)  
47 (1), 126 (2-3), 149 (4)

Firstly, the movement Democracia Real Ya is characterized as something one can or cannot be a part of, and its abbreviation is provided, albeit playfully, is provided for those in the
know (line 1). The line’s further co-text documents the personal experiences of a young protester. In the other lines, *Democracia Real Ya* is approached from a more impersonal point of view, and the stress is not on its internal dynamics but on its significance as a movement among movements. Connections are firstly made with Anonymous, Juventud Sin Futuro, and other platforms involved in the 15-M protests. Here, the connection is one based upon a concrete alliance between movement actors. Another list produced in the concordance lines is performative: *Democracia Real Ya* is connected to assemblies in Boston, Buenos Aires and Sao Paolo in a sequence that lists groups supporting a manifesto (the text in question) (line 3, right co-text). Published by *ROAR* Collective (2011), the text is entitled *15-O Manifesto: humanity united for global democracy*. The authors of the manifesto state that they have consulted groups in ‘countries such as Britain, Egypt, Tunisia, Germany, Spain, the US, Palestine, Israel, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Argentina, India and Australia’, and they seek to actively integrate protest movements under the banner of ‘global democracy’ (*ROAR* Collective 2011). This leads to the interesting translation of ‘Democracia Real Ya’ as ‘True global democracy now!’ (Figure 5.24, line 2). In the immediately preceding co-text, the Zapatista slogan ‘¡Ya basta! Aquí el pueblo manda y el gobierno obedece’ is translated as ‘Enough! Here the people command and global institutions obey!’.

Global in its aspirations, the manifesto is global in its grievances. It opposes itself to undemocratic ‘international institutions such as the IMF, the UN Security Council, global markets and international banks’, the combination of which the authors have decided to call ‘our global Mubarak, our global Assad’ (*ROAR* Collective 2011). What defines the preferred ‘democratic global institutions’ is not further explored, as ‘not everyone completely agrees on a definition’ (ibid.). Global democracy, then, is to be ‘[left] as a principle’ (ibid.). Remarkably, in these declarations of equivalence, more deference is shown to the sublime and indescribable first principle of global democracy than to the particular struggles of peoples in conflict, who seemingly come to appear, through the textual effort towards their integration, as interchangeable. As in the previous sections, one witnesses the division of the universe along the lines of oppressor and oppressed, the infinite listing that supports it, and the ultimate erasure of distinctions as the list collapses under the pressure of the desire to contain by renaming. Furthermore, the incapacity to formulate an outline of the envisaged goal of global democracy is presented as an inclusive gesture towards differences.
of opinion. Yet respecting this sacred indefiniteness demands conformity to the prohibition to define, and at the same time presents its conundrum as self-evident. One thus returns to a highly conventionalised in-group practice of movement rhetoric, produced by and for those in the know.

The translation Real Democracy Now occurs thirteen times in the corpus. The phrase is placed in its Spanish context of origin, and is said to function as both a slogan and a demand (lines 1, 2, 3 and 13). Furthermore, the demand is said to have been ‘directly enacted in practice (in the assemblies)’ (line 1). Indeed, the relevant protests were primarily ‘a critique of the failings of representative democracy’, and at meetings held to decide on the direction of the movement the discussion was guided by the principles of ‘deliberative and participatory democracy’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 37, 184). Prefigurative in purpose and reflective in practice, protesters thus submitted to the principle outlined on their banners, which becomes both a declaration of intent and a feature of identity. One becomes, as mentioned before, a part of Real Democracy Now. More than just a part, there is the possibility of gaining some degree of recognisable features and functions, as in the case of ‘the people’, ‘the social media wizzkids’, ‘a spokesman’, and ‘a visible head’ (lines 4, 6, 8 and 10).
10). Through these descriptions, which all form part of the same article (Elola 2011), a microcosm with a social structure of its own is being outlined, the principal actors of which are further identified by name (lines 5 and 10). Within the article, which documents the rise of the 15-M movement, this level of detail is not only maintained with regard to movement actors, but also concerning the temporal development of the event in which they participate: At ‘8:00’, eight sharp, a draft ‘Manifesto’ is approved by the assembly (line 9).

Humbly, the leader of the movement is ‘sitting on the floor’ (line 10). The article specifies that a police force is present, suggesting potential confrontation and persecution (Elola 2011). Yet despite the threat, ‘people are being added, and added, and added’, eventually saturating the Puerta del Sol with 6,000 souls (ibid.). ‘Magic Tuesday’, the author dubs the day of growing numbers, indicating his astonishment that ‘nothing had been prepared. Fed by social networks, a spontaneous demonstration bloomed into existence’ (ibid.). The suggestion of mysterious union among the people, the rhetorical repetitions, and the seemingly reporting yet omniscient and historicising voice all contribute to the same picture: this is not just a perspective on a protest, this is the grounding of a founding myth. From the moment it is founded, the myth is transmitted. It spreads as it speaks. An onlooker become participant ‘listened to the people of Real Democracy Now and recognized his own voice’ (line 8). Instant revelation leads to immediate conversion. Myths, however, seldom reach us directly, and while the article was written by the Spanish reporter Joseba Elola for El País, it appears in ROAR in a translation by Jerome Roos, the editor whose rhetoric of the dream we encountered earlier.

In the present article, dream occurs with a similar high frequency and density, but in a very different textual environment (Figure 5.26). The dream is here presented as an unequivocal
cause for celebration, because of its insertion into the domain of the real and the true. This dream does not constitute the deception, but rather the salvation of the multitude. It seems that metaphorical field of sleep and wakefulness is fully flexible in its connotations, and can seamlessly shift between figurations of subjection and liberation. In addition to providing a positive instantiation of the radical imagination, the article presents a perspective that is fully in line with that of ROAR Magazine. The author considers a protest to be the beginning of a revolution, connects a local event to the national domain, and even to ‘the world’ in general (line 4). In support of this tendency, the hashtag used highlights the need for further dissemination (line 4). The gospel must be spread, and through importing this text, ROAR not only fulfils its preordained task in the development of the revolution, but also firmly situates itself within the canonical transmission of the new world. Indeed, confident in future canonicity, the translator presents the article on ROAR’s website as ‘translated into English for the first time here’ (Elola 2011).

5.4 Closing Remarks
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Michael Cronin (2013: 3) has proclaimed that ‘our present age, which is often referred to as the information age with its corollary, the knowledge society, should more properly be termed the translation age’. His argument is based on the equation of convertibility and translatability, through the lens of which he interprets the observation that any piece of information, in any modality, is convertible into the language of binary code (ibid.). In more concrete terms, he also discusses ‘the constant move towards the automation of translation, and the ubiquitous presence of online translation options’ (ibid.: 56). In the digital age, indeed, the possibility of translation is an evident expectation. As a result, the need for human, preconceived translation actually to take place is diminished in equal measure. Search engines translate the pages they present to the seeker. Review websites automatically present content in what they guess, beyond reasonable doubt, to be the visitor’s native language. Information, in general, circulates unhindered by temporal and spatial distance. If, ‘[in] Marx’s view, capitalism itself was the engine of the annihilation of time and space’ (Solnit 1990: 15), the internet has certainly consolidated capitalism’s reign. Everything takes place everywhere, if only there is a perceiver willing to lend an eye or an
ear. This perceiver will receive communication on demand, in a language which he masters. The boundaries that, in this respect, still govern the difference between convertibility and actual conversion constitute a reason to assume the increasing dominance of image over word in the virtual sphere. Yet more important for our purposes is that while the preceding statements could all be heavily glossed, the core message is that translation, and by extension language itself, is bound to manifest itself as an afterthought once convertibility is guaranteed.

In such an environment, to actively translate and disseminate eyewitness reports will increasingly become a statement. ROAR, in its aspiration towards global coverage, obviously does not question the annihilation of time and space, nor the language in which a particular event is communicated. As stated, of 100 articles in the corpus, only 3 are translations, yet the regions and timespan commented on cover the whole globe and the full historical repertoire. It is no coincidence, then, that in the previous analysis a translated article turned out to be foundational to the self-realisation of ROAR Magazine. When there is no need to translate, there is a motivation to do so. Moreover, in the analysis of the corpus, observed patterns were often seen to relate directly to the journal’s taglines and its statements on the About page. Cross-article patterns indicate either a strong editorial presence or a well-guarded conformity of thought. This means that translation introduces a risk. We encountered this risk in the conflicting vocabulary of the dream. While this particular metaphor could easily host conflicting usages, broad-scale subversion of the journal’s metaphorical foundations would do harm to its development. The question that asserts itself is why the risk of disintegration was worth taking. What makes the text 15-M movement shakes the system (El 15-M sacude el sistema), written by Joseba Elola in May 2011 and translated, within three days, by ROAR’s principal editor, foundational?

In the analysis I argued that the foundational qualities lay, among other things, with a mythological tone. Yet one can be more specific here. In the Gospel according to Matthew, Jesus is followed by a large crowd to a remote place. Come evening, the multitude is short of food. Jesus does not send the people away, but miraculously manages to share out five loaves of bread and two fishes amongst ‘five thousand men, beside women and children’ (Matthew 1997: 21). After the meal, Jesus ‘went up into a mountain apart to pray’ (ibid.). Or, as the article in the corpus has it, ‘Fabio Gándara, the visible head of Real Democracy Now,
checks his messages sitting on the floor, in the shade’ (Elola 2011). On the square, there are six thousand people. Somehow ‘housewives arrive with full shopping carts. A restaurant owner brings pots full of stew’ (ibid.). The inception of 15-M, one reads, ‘was magical because nothing had been prepared. Fed by social networks, a spontaneous demonstration bloomed into existence’ (ibid.).

Fed by social networks, in the light of the above, can ultimately be interpreted both literally and metaphorically. In the Biblical case too, the miraculous distribution of food fulfils both functions. The feeding of the five thousand foreshadows the breaking of the bread at the last Supper, which in turn foreshadows the breaking of the body on the cross. Auerbach, as discussed in Chapter 1, defines the patristic concept of prefigurative interpretation as ‘a connection between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfils the first’ (Auerbach 1984: 53). The dynamic between sacrifice and sustenance, a guiding thread throughout the Biblical narrative, is the primary provider of such corresponding events in the Christian imagination, and in the anthropological field it stretches further back into the recesses of human prehistory. Freud (1938: 207), for instance, paraphrasing the work of Robertson Smith, believes animal sacrifice to be ‘older than the use of fire and the knowledge of agriculture’. The sacrificial meal was meant, it is argued, as a shared moment between a deity and its subjects. As such ‘the sacrificial eating gave direct expression to the fact that the god and his worshippers are communicants, thus confirming all their other relations’ (ibid.). Taunting the old political idols while establishing communication with the one true deity, the protesters at the Puerta del Sol gather round an effigy of Carlos III: ‘[under] his egregious statue, a revolt was being cooked’ (Elola 2011). The article, translated and incorporated into ROAR by its editor, far from damaging the structure of the whole by destabilising its metaphorical frame of reference, provides the magazine with a fundamental trope of the revolutionary imagination, the trope of the apparition and the sharing of food.

Prefigurative language use is aimed at the creation of a transformative discourse that foreshadows the inauguration of an alternative social order. Communication, however, is by its nature a conventionalised and imitative activity. The endeavour to depart from the repertoire while maintaining the capacity to intervene in the state of affairs thus radically restricts the horizon of possibilities. Imitation creates more possibilities than creativity
imparts. The attempt to verbalise a radically inclusive community that ensures representational justice, whether it concerns the LGBT community or the coming community freed of the evils of sexism, racism, homophobia and xenophobia, is eventually confronted with ‘the etcetera of the list’ (Eco 2009: 81). What remains is pure principle, symbolised by an acronym, an asterisk, or an empty class containing every member. As seen in relation to politics, the egalitarian aspirations of the horizontalist paradigm may eventually subject its adherents to conducting themselves in full compliance with the absent commandments of a future institution. Finally, the ideal of real democracy, demanding openness towards competing experiments in its name, is eventually embedded in the sacrificial paradigm of divine communication. The analysis has shown, in short, that the will to produce an alternative without closing down the possibility of further transformations has to continually embattle its own reversal into a demand for complete conformity. In the corpus, however, the ultimate source of authority that produces this demand is not directly identified, and adherence to an undeclared principle suggests performance in a predetermined pattern. This pattern, however, is the foundation of the prefigurative paradigm – it constitutes prophecy, thus declares revelation.
6 CONCLUSION

6.1 Past Poetics

A crucifix consists of a bare cross and a *corpus*, the technical term for a replica of Jesus’ suffering body. This unit of meaning has spread along with the Christian faith, and up until quite recently, most buildings in the Catholic world would have a crucifix affixed above many a doorframe, with a shrivelling palm branch behind it. Depending on where the door granted passage to, the sign could inspire terror, consolation, familiarity, estrangement, devotion, cynicism, damnation or blessing. The reality of the picture remained one of a tortured man in agony, but the enormous range of meanings generated by the simple combination of cross and body went well beyond this referential relation. The hammer and the sickle, in the Communist world, functioned similarly. The unity of the peasantry and the proletariat, first thus symbolised by the Soviets, came to hover over a depiction of the world as a globe in many a flag and emblem. A badge bearing the symbol is worn by and resonates deeply with people who might have never seen a sickle making its way through a field. The relation between proletarians and intellectuals has always been a point of contention within communist theory and practice. Modifying the received symbol slightly, the last remaining communist state, the People’s Republic of North Korea, added a calligraphy pen between the two workers’ tools, thus integrating the work of the mind in the symbol, and simultaneously producing a self-conscious representation of the state as, in essence, a work of art. The Christian and Marxist symbols illustrate the height of typological force. They harbour the power to merge the real and ideal, present and future, means and ends. They are, strictly speaking, independent of context, able to be invoked and reiterated for a variety of purposes, in a variety of conditions, without having to be, in essence, structurally modified. That is to say, they are unconditionally translatable, and their prefigurative force governs the figural correspondence between prophecy and salvation. They are, however, not eternal. Human concerns shift, and where just decades ago a cross would secure many a door’s passage, today the cross is replaced with an arrow, and in bold: *Fire exit*.

Prefiguration, as discussed in Chapter 1, has been called upon twice in the history of signification: the first time during the Sack of Rome and the threat this political fact presented to a Christian faith that was aiming to conquer the realm of the spirit; and the
second time during the pending implosion of the communist ideology. At both these historical junctures, the power monopoly over reality was in grave disarray. The explicit call for a prefigurative politics indicates the fundamental absence of a patterning device that imbues the world with sense and continuity. Prefigurative politics is, indeed, a logical outgrowth of anarchist conditions: no one has so great a need for an all-encompassing, intrinsic lawfulness to the world as the anarchist. If today proponents of prefigurative politics call for anarchist experimentation, one might legitimately ask whether they are voicing a desire or identifying a state of affairs which is, ultimately, the cause of trouble rather than a potential solution. It has been argued in this respect that the fragmentation and fluidity of identities, often celebrated in the activist cultural sphere, is in essence a sign of the final renunciation of politics, and the complete submission before capital. Commerce benefits in times of confusion – searching often equals shopping – and those calling for an increase in multiplicity and heterogeneity ‘do not seem to have noticed that difference, diversity and destabilization are the dernier cri of the transnational corporations’ (Eagleton 2003: xvi). Many continue to advocate celebrations of ‘the entire post-structuralist project of questioning master-narratives, challenging definitive truths, and exploring relativity in meaning’ (von Flotow 1991: 80). However, a functional master-narrative does not allow for decades of questioning, and so many definitive truths equal so many derelict strawmen.

Early on in Specters of Marx, Derrida (1994: 16) sceptically marvels at the resurgence after the fall of the Berlin Wall of ‘the eschatological themes of the “end of history,” of the “end of Marxism,” of the “end of philosophy,” of the “ends of man,” of the “last man” and so forth’, arguing that in the 1950s these themes had already started to form a hackneyed ‘canon of the modern apocalypse’ inspired by the likes of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger (Derrida 1994). That is to say, the master-narrative of the end of the grand-narratives has philosophically long exhausted itself. The ‘canon of the modern apocalypse’ to a certain extent shapes the corpus explored in Chapter 4. The authors most referenced in the corpus, excluding the authors of the works that constitute the corpus itself, are Marx (2628 times), Freud (536), Heidegger (295), Engels (263), Lenin (249) and Hegel (203). Given the constitution of the corpus, the weight of Marx is unsurprising. Marx’s relation to the other authors can be concisely clarified by calling upon Blanchot’s (1986: 18-19) identification of the three voices of Marx, namely the philosophical, the political and the
scientific. These voices strongly intersect, and so do the possible relations they engender, but a few general statements can be made.

The political voice of Marx finds expression in the revolutionary relationship with Lenin, which was discussed in section 1.1.3. The scientific voice is shared by Freud and Marx both of whom, in search of deeper strata of truth, brought scientific skepticism to bear on the rituals of daily life. Marx’s philosophical voice was touched upon in section 2.1.2, where the relationship with Hegel’s dialectic was explored. The line running from Heraclitus to Hegel is present in Heidegger’s thought as well, but more importantly, Heidegger and Marx illustrate a curious divergence in the workings of historical judgement. Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party. In this respect, some have argued that it is never possible to ‘relate to Heidegger’s philosophy “naively,”’ that is, without taking into consideration the philosopher’s odious political allegiances’ (Wolin 1988: 135). A certain fascism, it is argued, resides in Heidegger’s thought, and it should be handled with caution. Curiously, in many contexts one is encouraged to relate to Marx naively, to dissociate him from a series of historical developments that stand in a direct relation to his philosophical output. There are exceptions. In Poland, it is now forbidden by law to propagate ‘Nazi, communist, fascist or other totalitarian symbolism’ (SolidNet 2019). As in the case of the shifting transgender vocabulary discussed in section 2.2.3, proponents and opponents of such laws both lay claim to a guardianship over freedom of expression and a protective role against hate speech. The declaration of equivalence between fascism and communism, in part a countermeasure against a growing nostalgia for communist rule, is heavily debated within Poland. Globally, flirtation with Soviet symbolism is widely accepted, while Nazi nostalgia unequivocally receives harsh treatment. In short, fascism bears the mark of an excess, while communism, despite its excesses, continues to present itself as a potential foundation. Blanchot (1988: 18), writing during the 1968 uprisings, recognises in Marx’s three voices ‘a plurality of demands, to which since Marx everyone who speaks or writes cannot fail to feel subjected’. The clash of voices generates a productive, if arguably distorted, message, obliging readers of Marx’s texts ‘to submit themselves to ceaseless recasting’ (ibid.: 19).

Detached from the canon of the modern apocalypse, Marx, recast and in new company, appears prominently in the ROAR Magazine corpus. At 47 occurrences, he is the 4th most mentioned person, only preceded by Trump (60), Öcalan (72) and Bookchin (115). Bookchin
was an American ‘libertarian socialist and political theorist’ who came to lament ‘the failures of the revolutionary projects of both Marxism and contemporary anarchism’ (Gerber and Brincat 2018:3). He produced an alternative, large body of work outlining guidelines for social change; this body of work is faithfully reproduced in various articles in *ROAR Magazine* (e.g. Biehl 2015, Finley 2017). Bookchin’s appearance in the corpus is intimately connected with the presence of Öcalan, ‘the founder of the proscribed Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish freedom movement’ (Hunt 2017:1-2). Like Bookchin, Öcalan became ‘disaffected’ with the ‘Marxist-Leninist [legacy]’, which had heavily informed the PKK at its inception (ibid.: 3-4). Öcalan found renewed hope for liberation through a ‘close reading of Bookchin’s philosophy of social ecology’, and his conversion would deeply affect the workings of the Kurdish freedom movement (ibid.: 4). In the de facto autonomous region of Rojava in northern Syria, Bookchin and Öcalan’s principles of social ecology and ‘democratic confederalism’ are currently implemented on a large scale (Gerber and Brincat 2018:21; Hunt 2017: 1). *ROAR Magazine* presents itself as a journal that contributes to concrete struggles for real democracy by offering theoretical interventions. The Kurdish struggle provides the magazine with an almost perfect illustration of its own statement of purpose, as it moves from theory to practice, and from protest to revolution. Furthermore, the political developments in Rojava are manifestly anti-capitalist, which strengthens *ROAR’s* historical timeline, in which a global wave of revolutions continues to contest global financial domination. The position of Trump within this narrative is that of a scapegoat, a character who comes to signify all the ills and ailments of today’s society. In contrast to Marx, Bookchin and Öcalan, he is heavily criticised, but never quoted.

As can be derived from the departure from orthodox Marxism evident in the trajectory of Bookchin and Öcalan, Marx’s position in the *ROAR Magazine* corpus is ambivalent. One extensive quote, the original context of which was discussed in section 1.1.1, envelops the tensions involved (Roos 2015, emphasis added):

> Most importantly, the reinvented left will have to abandon its longing for a romanticized past and be boldly forward-looking in its perspective. To paraphrase Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the social revolution of the 21st century cannot take its poetry from the past but only from the future: “it must let the dead bury their dead in order to arrive at its own content.” Only by
forgetting its native tongue, Marx noted, can the social revolution appropriate a new language and begin to articulate the nature of its struggle on its own terms.

In the article, the sentence in bold occurs both within the text and as a banner. The quote is thus treated as central to the article it derives from. The article, in turn, is central to the magazine, as it is written by the journal editor as part of the first print issue. The author speaks of paraphrase rather than quotation because, strictly speaking, Marx spoke of the nineteenth rather than twenty-first century, but the rest of the formulation is identical to the English translation of the original statement made by Marx. The final part of the reference, placed between quotation marks, has a history of its own. Marx was referencing Jesus in this quote, as represented in the New Testament: ‘And Jesus said unto him, Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou and preach the kingdom of God’ (Luke 1997: 88). Roos thus inscribes himself in an ancient tradition of gospel proclamation, and paradoxically does so in a statement subscribing to the view that one should look forwards, not backwards, in terms of the language – or ‘poetry’ – of revolution. The article continues as follows (Roos 2015):

We are all familiar with the poetry of the past: historical hymns still recount the glorious promises of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the withering away of the state, the leading role of the vanguard party, and countless other state-communist clichés long due for an ignominious burial. Lest we forget, Lenin’s corpse has been lying in state for almost a century now – it is high time to give the old man a final resting place! The social revolution of the 21st century will be anti-authoritarian and radically democratic, or it will not be a revolution.

In defiance of chronology, this passage invokes Marx to bury Lenin. Marx is presented as a legitimate source of inspiration and authority, while Lenin’s heritage receives ironic treatment. The tension between the call for a radically new revelation, and the invocation of a series of ancient prophetic statements and frameworks of political mediation, recurs across ROAR’s output, as in the following series of quotations from a different article (Taylor 2014):

As Joost Jongerden and Ahmed Akkaya write, “Bookchin’s work differentiates between two ideas of politics, the Hellenic model and the Roman,” that is, direct and
representative democracy. Bookchin sees his form of neo-anarchism as a practical revival of the ancient Athenian revolution. The “Athens model exists as a counter-and under-ground current, finding expression in the Paris Commune of 1871, the councils (soviets) in the spring-time of the revolution in Russia in 1917, and the Spanish Revolution in 1936.”

In section 5.3.1, the distinction between direct and representative democracy was shown, initially with reference to this quote, to be fundamental to the overall viewpoint expressed in the ROAR Magazine corpus. The passage further recalls, through partial overlap, Boggs’s (1977: 100) seminal declaration of ‘what might be called the prefigurative tradition, which begins with the nineteenth century anarchists and includes the syndicalists, council communists, and the New Left’. The counter and under-ground current furthermore invokes Augustine’s model of two worlds competing for the hearts of men, which in this case gives rise to what might be called, in defiance of common spatial metaphorics, a subterranean heavenly realm and a clandestine translatio imperium. Finally, the primacy of the Hellenic model supports a certain claim to truth in the very language used. It is necessary to refer to the Athens model because, through procedures of appropriation and co-optation, it may seem that political opponents have ‘taken over our language, our ideals’ (Dean 2009: 10). Consequently, ‘we’ve lost a capacity to say what we want, even to know what we want’ (ibid.) The horizon of possibility, one might say, is always subject to linguistic relativity. What cannot be said cannot be thought, and thus cannot be enacted. A break with the status quo, ‘a radical revolution’, requires that ‘people not only “realize their old (emancipatory, etc.) dreams” rather, they have to reinvent their very modes of dreaming’ (Žižek 2008: 196). Here, we find, in the ambivalent rhetoric of the dream, an ambition common to both corpora analysed in this study. Political discourse, it seems, is perennially in need of a radical imagination, of an attempt to perceive beyond the sensory, and thus to pick up on an ‘insistent and possibly still unheard demand’ (Nancy 1991: 22).

Corpus linguistic theory, in search of what can be considered a unit of meaning, and having discovered the inadequacy of the word in this regard, came to tentatively equate ‘the boundary of the lexical item’ with the extended principle of ‘semantic prosody’ (Sinclair 2004: 34). Semantic prosody ‘expresses something close to the ‘function’ of the item – it shows how the rest of the item is to be interpreted functionally. Without it, the string of
In other words, semantic prosody can be related to ‘illocutionary force’, as it indicates ‘the communicative function of the whole unit’ (Stubbs 2009: 124-125). In section 3.3, caution was expressed about imposing such strict boundaries, but the pragmatic approach to sequences of lexical items proves informative at this point. Across both corpora, significant phrases often consisted of oddly repetitive elements (e.g. *democratization of democracy*) or contained notional modifiers that seemingly fail to specify the concept under consideration (e.g. *real democracy*). The primary communicative function of such strings is to effect a multi-layered process of *reappropriation*. The terms *politics*, *community*, and *democracy* are identified as not correctly corresponding to the referent in question. Linguistic modification may bring this conflict to the foreground, and in doing so reveal a series of contradictions. Pleonastic constructions are most effective in this regard, as they suggest that, in the final analysis, a particular concept does not correspond to itself.

In this regard, the post-Marx corpus has revealed a concerted effort to maintain the contradictions identified. *Politics* and *the police* refer to nothing if not to each other. They harbour the potential for each other’s manifestation, and erasing either side of the opposition can only result in the impossibility of a rupture in the state of the situation. *Potentia* and *potestas* operate symbiotically, and if a community is to retain its capacity for agency, it has to acknowledge its tendency to generate structures that diminish this capacity. In the corpus, the figure of paradox serves to frustrate a runaway dialectical procedure that always threatens to neutralise the process of reappropriation by making dissent a figure of orthodoxy. The *ROAR Magazine* corpus operates differently. Conceptual contradictions are made manifest with the explicit aim of promoting one side of the equation. If politics is seen as all too dominated by capital, a true politics must be *anti-capitalist*. If *community* has become intertwined with nationalism, a true community must be completely independent of statist structures. In the post-Marx corpus, it is consequently taboo to define, while in the *ROAR Magazine* corpus, definition is paramount. The results, however, are often similar, as illustrated by the preponderance of either neologisms or lists. *Archi-politics, meta-politics* and *para-politics*, attempts to erase the space for political intervention on the philosophical level, find a concrete counterpart in *electoral, capitalist or parliamentary* politics, the latter being attempts to arrest the reach of various expressions of dissent.
Both corpora thus aim to stretch a number of conceptual horizons by identifying current constraints on the political imaginary. Yet, the distinction between balancing contradictions or interpreting them as a site of struggle has a further differentiating effect. Whereas, in both corpora, one finds attempts to facilitate the prophetic reclamation of political discourse, the post-Marx corpus makes every effort to suspend the ultimate revelation called for. If, for instance, the figure of the *citizen* is to be liberated from the bonds of sovereignty, he might be called a *nomadic citizen*, a *co-citizen*, a *diasporic citizen*, or a citizen that *crosses borders*. Yet where does one apply for nomadic citizenship? Dissociated from its institutional substance, the concept of *citizenship* itself is, to some extent, beyond reach. A similar fate awaited the concepts of *politics*, *community* and *democracy* in chapter 4: the only way to cleanse them is to exile them, thus reinforcing their status as conditions of existence, but sacrificing their direct applicability. The *ROAR Magazine* corpus aims at acceleration rather than suspension, and the difference is best illustrated with regard to the phrase *to come*, as discussed in sections 4.1.3 and 5.2.1. In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida (1994: 81-82) proposes:

> to speak of a democracy to come, not of a future democracy... not even of a regulating idea... To this extent, the effectivity or actuality of the democratic promise, like that of the communist promise, will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated.

In contrast, in an article from the *ROAR Magazine* corpus, Haiven and Khasnabish (2014) argue that:

> in a better, post-capitalist future, the university as it currently exists will have no place... The task of imagining the university-to-come is an important one, and discussing it can stimulate the radical imagination in important ways. But for now we can only understand its contours through dialectic negation. The university-to-come would, of course, be free, financially, politically and spiritually. It would be open to all. It would not have specific disciplinary courses of study to be completed in four years by disenfranchised, indebted youth, but allow for a fluid passage of people in and out of learning and teaching at different moments in their life...It is from this
hazy mirage (a mirage whose contours we can only make out through our struggles here and now) that we can draw inspiration for a notion of prefigurative research. If the university-to-come is one that self-consciously seeks to create the resources and cultivate the subjects of liberation, how can we, today, let this future institution inform our conduct, in the name of creating the sort of world where it might one day exist?

As discussed in section 5.2.1, the affix to come initially fulfils a similar function in both texts – to explicate a conceptual dissociation that facilitates thinking of either democracy or university as prophetic placeholders rather than exhausted paradigms. Yet, rather quickly, the university-to-come turns into an institution that regulates conduct through thought-reform. This institution is a figure of radical political correctness, as it imposes values and principles that are expected to inaugurate a broad societal transformation. Its primary function is that of anticipation. The democracy to come, in contrast, is invoked to avert the function of anticipation. We encounter, in opposition, the call for a future institution, and a renouncement of any call for a future democracy. The university-to-come is a regulating idea, which democracy to come aims, explicitly, not to be. The democracy to come must remain a promise, while the university-to-come, dependent upon a notion of prefigurative research, aims, one day, to be revealed. The university-to-come, in short, arguably presents a swift transition from anarchy to authoritarianism. There are rules to be followed in the name of freedom.

The lexical item to come, as discussed before, has come to serve as a modifier generating a set of particular units of meaning. Its force stems from a conjuncture of the triplet etymology, metaphor and translation, processes that carry conceptual clusters across space and time, and that therefore provide infinite resources for conceptual contestation, as at each stage they have come to serve a certain vision and a certain truth that awaits resuscitation. Politics is of the polis, democracy is of the demos, community is of the commons. All safeguard the existence of a people as a political subject. At the same time, etymology is a figure of genealogy in the sense that tracing origins can only come to confound the notion of origin itself. Etymology is the name of a process, not a substance, and the same goes for metaphor and translation. Centuries of trial and error in identifying the process that mediates between source and target have given rise to an endless
accumulation of models of figuration and equivalence, all productive, yet non exhaustive. The difficulty in circumscribing procedures of metaphor and translation is that, for these textual operations, means and ends cannot be separated. The item to come harbours the potential of change sought for by proponents of a semiotic prefigurative politics, and if the transparency of its opacity threatens to diminish, hyphens are introduced to hold together the incongruous unit of meaning. If etymology, metaphor and translation provide the arsenal of resources for a prefigurative politics of the sign, punctuation, as illustrated with reference to the use of hyphens and scare quotes, provides its strategic repertoire. There is, in short, a typography of typology, one which makes explicit the mobilisation of lexical co-occurrence. The phenomenon of collocation guides one to less formalised but equally informative attempts at consolidating instances of reconceptualisation. In search of collocational phenomena, a corpus-assisted approach makes use of electronic tools to explore large datasets from a quantitative as well as qualitative viewpoint. The tools indicate the location of ongoing lexical and conceptual struggles. The interpretation of the static textual patterns, however, needs to be confronted with the dynamic cultural patterns shaping their particular function in the textual body studied.

Having returned to the question of patterns, a number of reflections are due. In Chapter 1, I proposed a broad pattern of figural correspondence between prophecy and salvation, in which prefiguration can fulfil particular functions, among which is embodying the call for a new instantiation of the pattern. I furthermore invoked a pattern of revolutionary activity that draws connections between waves of protests and revolutions as seen in 1848, 1968 and 2011. In chapter 2, I discussed patterns of linguistic contestation and of principles and values of speech. These broad paradigms I sought to illustrate by analysing two sets of data from a different time span, with different ambitions, and drawn from different types of media. The data were illustrated to be determined, in part, by the conditions I brought to bear on them, but they are not necessarily representative of anything but themselves. Online activist publications are not restricted to ROAR Magazine, and ROAR Magazine is not restricted to the ROAR Magazine corpus. 10 publications cannot capture 40 years of late Marxian writing. The limitations of the study, in this regard, constitute avenues for further research. Evidently, all the various phenomena that made an appearance in my analysis, from Soviet cinema to semantic prosody, are embedded in fields of study that require and
receive continued attention. Specific to this thesis, however, is the methodological case made for the heavily contextualised study of small corpora, and the theoretical focus on prefiguration as a semiotic category. The Genealogies of Knowledge corpus holds an ever expanding set of texts drawn from internet outlets across the political spectrum, as well as a growing number of foundational texts in the Western philosophical canon. A primary extension of the current study could involve comparative analyses between a larger number of subcorpora, focusing on the same cluster of concepts, potentially enriched by related concepts such as citizen and capitalism, which have proven essential to the analysis above. Further study could draw on different linguistic heritages, historical contexts and conditions of textual transmission. Such an engagement would contribute, from a corpus-based perspective, to the still underexplored intersection of conceptual history, social history and translation practice (Richter 2012). As regards prefiguration, the primary task would be to reflect on how the tensions and heritages governing the concept, for instance the thin line between anarchy and authoritarianism discussed above, further inform academic and activist writing.

6.2 Another World is Imminent

In section 2.1.1, Stalin’s historical materialism and its claim to scientific status was illustrated with regard to his search for the main principle governing social change. Before settling upon the mode of production as the major factor propelling history, Stalin (2013: 27-31) considers and rejects two other potential candidates, namely population density and geographical environment. Chakrabarty (2009: 204) argues that ‘Stalin’s passage captures an assumption perhaps common to historians of the mid-twentieth century: man’s environment did change but changed so slowly as to make the history of man’s relation to his environment almost timeless’. Cronin (2017: 9), discussing the same stretch of text, picks up on Stalin’s ‘distinction between natural history and human history’ and declares it defunct. Both Chakrabarty and Cronin’s remarks appear in discussions of the Anthropocene, a name and notion that dates back to Soviet research of the 1920s (Foster 2016: 393), but is usually attributed to Crutzen and Stoermer (2000: 17), who employed it to capture the ‘still growing impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere’. The Anthropocene follows upon the Holocene, which was preceded by ‘the last ice age or the Pleistocene’ (Chakrabarty
The Holocene, an epoch commencing approximately ten millennia ago, was relatively warm and stable, and its inception was coterminous ‘with what we today think of as the institutions of civilization – the beginnings of agriculture, the founding of cities, the rise of the religions we know’ and ‘the invention of writing’ (ibid.). Consequently, the Holocene can be said to encompass the period from the Agrarian to the Industrial Revolution, and the Anthropocene may be argued to have started with the massive exploitation of the earth’s resources in the production of energy from fossil fuel. Digging for fossil fuel has scarred the earth, and burning it has altered the atmosphere. Of course, every organism affects, in some way, the environment which it traverses, but the Anthropocene captures the moment, in line with the laws of dialectics, when ‘changes in degree’ became ‘changes in kind’ (Haraway 2015: 159). The four elements illustrative of the ongoing ‘qualitative change’ resulting from a ‘quantitative expansion’ are ‘population growth, consumption of resources, carbon gas emissions, and the mass extinction of species’ (Žižek 2011: 327).

Stalin’s rigid division between population density, geographical environment and the mode of production is thus severely complicated. All have come to inform a broader movement of change in which a number of distinctions are systematically collapsed, and, importantly, the prospects are not good. One could well imagine humanity having accidentally altered the earth for the better, but climate change is currently ‘threatening to throw the entire planet into drought, floods, chaos, starvation, and war’ (Graeber 2013: 288). The Anthropocene thus identifies the moment at which the scope of human agency came to encompass the entire earth, yet at the same time the potential of human agency is dwarfed by the apocalyptic prospects revealed. It is not the case that no one saw what was coming. During ‘the late eighteenth century, industrial pollution darkened the atmosphere in spite of neo-Hippocratic environmental medicine’s focus on air’, and despite early fearful predictions, heavy ‘deforestation continued’ (Fressoz 2015: 81). The capitalist mode of production, which relies upon continued economic growth, is thus deeply intertwined with the announcement of the Anthropocene, which has also been termed Capitalocene to foreground this relation (Haraway 2015). In section 1.1.1, an episode was recounted in which the French government pledged the state forests to the central bank during the nineteenth century in return for loans. Such historical events have recently become
foreboding rather than anecdotal. The approaching closure of the dialectic between nature and civilization under the expansion of the capitalist paradigm has provoked, broadly speaking, two demands for thought-reform in the humanities and social sciences. On the one hand, the prospect of a planetary cataclysm inspires the sense that ‘it is no longer tenable to conceive of humans as a species apart’ (Cronin 2017: 9). A shared fate requires that one think of humanity ‘as one species among many in relationships of increasingly acute interdependency’ (ibid.). On the other hand, it is argued that one should speak of the Oliganthropocene rather than the Anthropocene, because ‘humans have indeed become the principal agents of change on this planet’, but ‘most humans are actually the victims of these changes rather than their agents’ (Gemenne 2015: 168). That is to say, if climate change is a consequence of capitalism, the divide is between those who aim to retain the political primacy of class divisions, and those who prefer a species-based view in which human interrelation becomes secondary to the relation between humanity as a whole and its environment.

Climate change has become a major political factor in recent years, as its consequences have become impossible to ignore. Today, sudden ‘natural disasters’ and gradual ‘environmental changes’ have become ‘a major driver’ of ‘migration and displacement on the planet’ – refugees are currently more likely to have left their home in response to a hostile habitat than because of ‘violence and persecutions’ (Gemenne 2015: 169). Policy debates in various countries have become heavily polarised around issues such as renewable energy. In the United States, Trump’s campaign promises to heavily invest in a dwindling coal industry are exemplary of the social implications that accompany the decision of whether or not to pay heed to the warning signs of the Anthropocene. Confrontations between denialists and alarmists, as opposed factions have come to identify each other, are often less informed by the melting of the ice caps than by larger sets of beliefs concerning government and corporate control, the predictive power of scientific evidence, and the negotiation of a new meta-narrative about human destiny. The environment has thus recently entered the arena of institutional politics, but declarations of the political significance of human impact on the flora and fauna of the earth have long played a major role in social movement activity. Along with the great acceleration of industry after the Second World War, ‘the environmental struggle from the 1950s on
commenced with the protests led by scientists over atmospheric nuclear testing, and then extended into such areas as pesticides and more general ecological concerns’ (Foster 2016: 394). Currently, major ‘extra-institutional green movements’ include the originally French Degrowth movement and the initially British phenomenon of Transition Towns (Semal 2015: 96). Such movements are essentially concerned with downscaling. Their aims are to produce and consume less and locally, so as to provide a grassroots response to the catastrophe to come. The communities involved aim to prefigure a non-capitalist mode of production through a process of withdrawal from the global marketspace.

The growing green conscience of the reformist left has been the subject of scathing critiques. While it seems today commonplace to ‘admit that capitalism will outperform its competitors under almost any imaginable circumstances’, this ‘very admission’ is turned ‘into a new kind of curse (“we never wanted growth anyway, it just spells alienation, besides, haven’t you heard that the polar bears are drowning…?”) (Land 2011: 623). In this regard, it may be said that ‘perhaps there will always be a fashionable anti-capitalism, but each will become unfashionable, while capitalism – becoming ever more tightly identified with its own self-surpassing – will always, inevitably, be the latest thing’ (ibid.: 324). Statements to the effect that it is manifestly impossible to operate outside of capitalism have fed into the development of accelerationism, a movement of thought ‘that experiments with the possibility of speeding up and intensifying capitalist relations and ways of living, exacerbating its dissolutions and its velocities, until something breaks’ (Moreno 2012). Beyond technological developments, one may well think here of the complicity of proponents of diversity and heterogeneity in the capitalist dissolution of the social sphere, as mentioned in section 6.1. The accelerationist picks up on such procedures, and aims to aid their development to the point of implosion. The competing desires to either accelerate or resist were discussed in section 2.1, with reference to dialectical aesthetic experiments such as those of Surrealism, and the drive for acceleration has always been an undercurrent of Marxist salvation history. As mentioned in section 2.1.2, Mao (1967: 42-43) believed the task of the communist to be ‘to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution’. In the context of the 1848 global wave of revolutions, section 1.1.1 touched upon the following observation by Marx (2001: 40-41): ‘The eruption
of the general discontent was finally accelerated and the mood for revolt ripened by two economic world events. The potato blight and the crop failures of 1845 and 1846 increased the general ferment among the people’. In this quote, a certain contentment in disaster accompanies the celebration of revolution. In the Marxist paradigm, each social catastrophe announces the people’s ultimate liberation: ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win’ (Marx and Engels 2015: 52).

A variant on the closing statement of the Communist Manifesto ends the manifesto of the social movement Extinction Rebellion, which came to prominence in the spring of 2019: ‘We have everything to lose and a new world to gain’ (Extinction Rebellion 2019a). Contrary to the communist statement of necessity, the variant produced by Extinction Rebellion involves the identification of a turning point: either we lose, or we win. In any case, the time to act is now, as indicated by the hourglass that has come to be the movement’s main symbol. The mystery of the Church Father, the translator and the Marxist – as discussed in section 1.1.4: why does a predetermined history require imperatives? – is no longer in force. Imperatives are now required to steer away from a course that, with each passing day, threatens to become more dangerously predetermined. Extinction Rebellion responds to the Anthropocene breakdown of the climate, and aims to hold the government to account. The manifesto quoted is officially entitled A Declaration of International Non-Violent Rebellion Against the World’s Governments for Criminal Inaction on the Ecological Crisis. The main demands of the movement are ‘that the Government must tell the truth about how deadly our situation is’, and that ‘greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors are reduced to net zero by 2025’ (ibid.). A further aim seeks to work towards these demands by creating ‘regional, national and international assemblies based upon more robust forms of participatory democracy’ (ibid.). Such people’s assemblies, the Extinction Rebellion Citizens Assemblies Working Group (2019: 17) states, are inspired by ‘many grassroots-led movements, ranging from the Chartists, Suffragettes, the US Civil Rights Movement and more recently Occupy, the Arab Spring and the Gilets Jaunes’. The movement is manifestly nonviolent and highly principled in its opposition to any form of prejudice: ‘we enthusiastically encourage national and regional autonomy to reflect the beautiful diversity of all our cultures – our arts, religions, and politics’ (Extinction Rebellion 2019a).
Clearly, there are many continuities between the prefigurative movements discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and the *Extinction Rebellion* movement which forms part of a new wave of global uprisings that is still ongoing. However, whereas the anarchist element in prefigurative experiments has consistently informed efforts towards autonomy from statist structures, *Extinction Rebellion* (2019a), although accusing its executives, reserves a major role for the government, which is asked to ‘work alongside the media to communicate the urgency for change including what individuals and communities need to do’. Externally, distrust in representation and truth seems to have been completely reversed in the demands of the climate activists. Internally, on the other hand, as illustrated by the reliance on assemblies, distrust against representation is driven to its extreme. The movement advocates for *sortition*, meaning that ‘participants of the assemblies are selected randomly so that they reflect the diversity of ordinary members of society and cannot be interfered with by anti-democratic forces as is the case in elections’ (ibid.). The movement thus reverts to a conception of democracy as it functioned in Ancient Greece. As Socrates is supposed to have said: ‘democracy comes into being, I imagine, when the poor have won, and they kill some of the others, exile some, and give those who are left an equal share in the polity and ruling offices, and for the most part, the ruling positions in it are determined by lot’ (Plato 2007: 255). Sortition involves investing a great amount of faith in the aleatory dice-box of chance. Authority is handed to the universe, and it is this ultimate submission to forces beyond human control that mediates the proposal of co-operation between grassroots and government: ‘Why are we allowing our rulers to send us to an early grave? Do we want to live or not? If we do not respond, do we deserve to live?’ (Extinction Rebellion 2019a). Beyond the dynamics between activist and institutional efforts, an all-encompassing moral entity is granted the right to pass judgement.

*Extinction Rebellion*, in short, operates between *dies irae* and *deus ex machina*. God’s wrath is upon us, and only divine intervention can save us. The movement’s scope is international, but it mainly operates in the United Kingdom. In April 2019, activists occupied Oxford Circus in London, gathering around a pink yacht called Berta Cáceres, after a murdered Honduran climate activist. The name of the boat bestows the honours of martyrdom. The boat itself is reminiscent of the Biblical tale of the great deluge, Augustine’s interpretation of which was discussed in section 1.1.2. Extinction Rebellion (2019b) states: ‘The air we breathe, the
water we drink, the earth we plant in, the food we eat, and the beauty and diversity of
nature that nourishes our psychological well-being, all are being corrupted and
compromised by the political and economic systems that promote and support our modern,
consumer-focused lifestyles’. In Genesis (1997: 3), one reads: ‘And God looked upon the
earth, and, behold, it was corrupt’. Floods followed, and everything on earth contaminated
by corruption was drowned to death. On the boat in London, like a password protecting
entry, the slogan Tell the truth. If not, do we deserve to live?

Freud (1938: 30) documents the production of rain ‘by magic means’ in a Japanese tribe,
who ‘fit out a big bowl with sails and oars as if it were a ship, which is then dragged about
the village gardens’. Effigies of the ark will invite the rains. This is not to suggest that if
environmental catastrophe happens, Extinction Rebellion will be responsible for it. It is to
suggest that the message proclaimed by the movement gains force with every confirmation
of its apocalyptic vision, a situation which cannot fail to bestow a certain accelerationist
impatience for disaster to happen. The symbolic gesture of the boat is performative, and
the horizon of possibilities will only be opened at the point where its catastrophic closure is
confirmed to be inevitable. As discussed before, the demand for the truth is, in the first
place, directed at the government. What is requested is a declaration of crisis. Declaring a
state of emergency is a common tactic for governments to suspend all laws guarding the
safety and dignity of their respective populations. Once again, only an act of faith can inspire
the belief that revelation will lead to salvation, rather than to a renewed paradigm of
mediating icons and principles that provide security in return for submission. By all
indication aware of such concerns, Extinction Rebellion’s communication foregrounds the
importance of human rights and retains the centrality of democracy, politics and community
as conditions of existence for a flourishing humanity in the world to come. The tensions
between anarchy and authoritarianism which mark a moral universe, and the accompanying
negotiation of various conceptual oppositions that characterised the corpora analysed in
Chapters 4 and 5, seem to reach a certain conclusion in the current global wave of protests,
whose comparison to the waves of 1968 and 2011 will have to await the test of time.

For the time being, a final reflection on the historical element of this thesis is in order. I have,
at various points, stated that the paradigm of prefiguration, as explored in this study, was
called upon twice in the history of signification. Yet in between these invocations the term
did not disappear from the vocabulary. A significant use of the term occurs in the work of Hayden White, who observed that ‘the same event can serve as a different kind of element of many different historical stories, depending on the role it is assigned in a specific motific characterisation of the set to which it belongs’, and consequently set out to explicate a multifaceted poetics of historiography (White 1973: 7). Prefiguration, for White, involves the level ‘at which historians, consciously or not, make assumptions on the nature of the reality, the nature of causality, the nature of human behaviour etcetera’ (Paul 2004: 4). White’s tropology can in many ways be related to the principles of typology that inform the preceding analysis, but at this point it suffices to point out, in terms of the assumptions made, that I have neither aimed in the above discussion to pass judgement on the correctness of various political interventions, nor have I sought to provide resolutions for the dilemmas involved. Rather, this document has approached the call for and enactment of another possible world from the perspective, as mentioned above, of a simultaneous dies irae and deus ex machina. In short, prefiguration and conceptual change have been made to meet at an intersection from which it is hard to depart, the crossroads of gospel and tragedy.
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## APPENDICES

Appendix I: contents of the post-Marx corpus

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5 In both appendices, file numbers refer to the identifiers in the *Genealogies of Knowledge* corpus. Full file numbers consist of the element *mod* (for files in the modern English corpus) or *int* (for files in the English internet corpus) followed by a numerical string of six characters. *Specters of Marx*, for instance, is thus stored in the corpus as *mod000005*. 
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