Foreign Bodies: Neighbours, Strangers, Monsters

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This issue of the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* has its origins in a 2016-2019 teaching and research collaboration, Connecting Collections, driven by the extraordinary early modern European art and cultural collections of the Universities of Manchester and Melbourne and backed by an initiative of the vice-chancellors of the two institutions to enhance institutional links. The Connecting Collections project brought together a bi-national team of researchers, from early career and senior scholars, to support and promote original work on the collections of the two institutions and cities.

In initial explorations of the collections, a major question that emerged was how such early modern images and objects constructed the foreign, the exotic, the other. The theme ‘Foreign Bodies’ was thus chosen for as a focus for the collaborative work. Two workshops were held involving participants from the UK and Australia: one in Manchester in July 2017 hosted by The John Rylands Library and the Whitworth, both part of the University of Manchester, and Chetham’s Library; and one in Melbourne in April 2018 hosted by the University of Melbourne, the National Gallery of Victoria, and the State Library of Victoria. These workshops gave rise to ongoing discussions around the notion of the foreign amongst the project participants: the present issue of the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* is the first of two print publications to come out of these conversations. It features the work of the United Kingdom participants and focuses on questions prompted by the Manchester collections. The second will be a special issue of *Parergon*, the journal of the Australian and New Zealand Association for Medieval and Early Modern Studies, to be published in 2020 with a focus on research inspired by the Melbourne collections.
The choice of ‘Foreign Bodies’ as a research theme may seem particularly apt at a time when the uncertainties associated with Brexit and concerns about the status of UK and Australian nationals who support IS (Islamic State) have put ideas about what constitutes ‘foreign’ status and citizenship into sharp focus. Defining foreignness is a major contemporary issue, but also one that has been discussed in various contexts and under numerous guises for many centuries, as people thought about those things which drew them together and those which separated them from others. Notions of the foreign are always shaped by contextual expectations of correct appearance, dress, manners, and behaviour; they are subtended by real or perceived exception to prevailing norms or conventions, and as such can be radically historically and socially contingent.¹ The purpose of what follows here is to lay out both some forms and some difficulties in such acts of definition, ones that each contributor to this volume has also had to address. The particular focus will be on changing legal ideas of foreignness, and closely connected aspects of the relationship between the foreign and monstrosity, and the foreign and salvation, both of which were reflected in legislation. Legal definitions can serve as guides both to practice and to larger underlying social norms - those who were not subject to, who denied being subject to, or who were refused permission to subject themselves to a particular polity can tell us a great deal about the ways in which people sought to establish literal and metaphorical borders to guarantee their wellbeing and prosperity, and about how they determined who was, and was not, part of a particular group.

As a good introduction to the difficulties of legal determinations of foreignness in the early modern age, we may take a passage by the Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), a founding figure in what is now called international law:

[T]he law says […] that independent allies are foreign to us [...] [O]ld grammarians teach that a foreigner is one whom we speak of as belonging to a foreign nation, to
an alien land, as coming from another people. Virgil [says] that every land which is free and not beneath our sceptre is foreign. Those who are not subjects are foreigners. A foreigner is a resident alien, not a citizen.

Gentili was himself a religious refugee and a foreigner in an adopted land. He had trained at the University of Perugia before moving to England in 1580, fleeing religious persecution. He served as Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford from 1587 until his death, the first non-English holder of the chair. In the last years of his life, Gentili also served as Advocate to the Spanish Embassy, which was attempting to resolve a series of disputes about trade at sea and piracy; in the 1580s he had worked on the legal proceedings following a Spanish-backed plot to assassinate Queen Elizabeth I. In a series of influential works, Gentili explored notions of nations, sovereignty, and foreign power; yet when faced with the need to define a foreigner, he offered only a series of general statements from earlier authorities, some of these tautologies.

At the root of any designation of foreignness is basic, physical exteriority – the fact of being on the other side of a door. Etymologically, as the Oxford English Dictionary notes, the modern English ‘foreign’ derives via Old French from the Latin foranus, which comes in turn from foras and fores, or door. In English usage the word first appears as ‘ferren’ or ‘foreyne’ in the thirteenth century with this sense of something outside. From the fourteenth century, it came more normally to denote something outside of one’s own land; the German Ausländer retains this idea. Yet the older meaning did not immediately disappear: Chaucer used a noun form, foreyne, in the Legend of Good Women, as a shortened form of chambre foreyne, meaning ‘room outside’ - the outhouse, in modern terms. In Latinate languages, terms like étranger, straniero, extranjero are more commonly used, all related to the English term strange; this is derived in turn from the Latin extraneus, meaning, again, exterior to something else. This usage can also be found in Middle English: in The Canterbury Tales
(verse 2718), warriors who come from the East in ‘The Knight’s Tale’ are called ‘the straunge lordes’.

In medieval and early-modern Europe, a foreigner could be defined both descriptively, by lived behaviour, and proscriptively, through written law. Legal systems in Europe developed largely from glosses and comments on Roman roots, known through a compilation of writers and edicts brought together at the order of the Emperor Justinian and issued from 529 to 534. This work, the Corpus Juris Civilis, was conceived in three parts: an introductory book known as the Institutes; a compilation of statutes called the Codex, and the largest section, a compendium of jurists’ writings called the Digest. Well into the early modern period, the contents were known and interpreted mostly through the work of later scholars and sources. As a compendium, the Corpus presented sometimes contradictory rulings and teachings that needed to be reconciled with each other and with actual practice, and the full text of the Digest was only rediscovered in the eleventh century in any case. From that point, however, there were several series of influential glosses and commentaries, produced for teaching by scholars seeking to resolve apparent contradictions and to parse essential points. The first great monument of this work was the so-called Glossa ordinaria, produced by the Bologna jurist Accursio around 1230. More enduring was the work of Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1313-1357), active in Perugia, who produced a commentary on the whole Corpus except the Institutes. Such legal codes might refer to aliens, strangers and denizens, placing restrictions upon them, but they did not always define these categories, leaving room for enormous variation.

Yet custom – the set of shared social norms of long-standing, or the ‘way we do things’ for those concerned – also had real legal weight in medieval Europe. Because Roman law had recognized both lex, or written legislation, and customary law, consuetudo, a foreigner could be legally defined as someone who dressed in different clothes, ate different
things, who spoke a different language, or who worshipped a different religion - whether or not that was because the person in question actually came from somewhere else.

Most fundamentally, being perceived as inside or outside a community or polity defined the terms of access to privileges and rights. In this sense, a foreigner was someone who did not hold a citizen’s rights and duties, typically vested in physical residence, guild or trade membership, and often also in ownership of property. Sometimes - but by no means always – local birth was also required. The increasing policing of such persons is a hallmark of the later Middle Ages. As immigration into cities increased, protectionist laws were enacted to ensure that existing city-dwellers – literally citizens, those of the city- prospered over incomers.\(^7\) New arrivals were judged in terms of their perceived ability to contribute to trade within the city and to assimilate to its norms. In 1327, an ordinance issued by Charles IV of France listed three categories of foreigners, defined entirely in terms of commercial activity: merchants who pursued large-scale trade, based at the fairs of Champagne and Nîmes; those who had married local women and were active as shopkeepers and artisans; and Italian moneylenders, ordered to leave the kingdom if they would not settle in one of the towns of the commercial fairs.\(^8\) In early-modern Spain, the distinction between Spaniards and foreigners grew from such differentiations at local levels, made between immigrants judged willing to take on the rights and duties of membership in the community, and those who were not.\(^9\) Tomislav Raukar has argued that marginal groups in Dalmatia were categorized by city governors in highly self-interested terms: those who ‘fitted into the commune’s development with their economic or social activity’ \((\text{forenses})\) and were therefore desirable in the society as eventual citizens \((\text{cives})\); and ‘travellers in general \((\text{viatores})\), pilgrims, and vagrants, which the cities tried to direct away from their territories, allowing them access only up to their borders’.\(^{10}\)
Just as today, the categories were often more labile for those who were rich or had desirable skills or assets. Some ‘foreigners’ were something like today’s affluent ex-pats - not fully of the community, but still contributing to it and entitled to certain privileges and protections. In Parma, anyone owning a house or willing to build a house worth 100 L was a citizen, as long as he had committed no crime; in Pisa, on the other hand, a citizen was required to pay all taxes and requested loans, to be in residence at least nine months of the year, and to do no agricultural work. He or his father had to have been born in the city or surrounding *contado* and to have lived in Pisa for 25 years, although by 1319 this last requirement would be reduced to only 3 years instead.\(^\text{11}\) In German cities, a property-owner born outside the walls, and thus classified as a foreigner, was required to assume citizenship to move into the city, but had to renounce it again on leaving.\(^\text{12}\)

Yet such protectionism also meant that resident foreigners in many places were the most disenfranchised; and the term ‘foreign’ might be used to indicate this status of economic outsiderhood rather than any birth status or class of rights. In London around 1400, many people were referred to as *forinsecus* — foreigners or strangers — in civic and guild records, even though they came from England and sometimes even from London itself.\(^\text{13}\) The term was economic: in both the *Canterbury Tales* and *Piers Plowman* (eg C.VI.361–75) foreigners were the poor, marginal, and disenfranchised figures who performed menial tasks or casual labour, including porters, water carriers, and hucksters. The idea has not entirely disappeared: *forain* survives in modern French as slightly archaic adjective in a number of phrases, but in the noun form, a *forain* is a carny, someone associated with a traveling fair.

Definitions set by trade or economic activity made the foreignness of women a special case. In most cities of early-modern Germany, for instance, there was little distinction made between male and female rights, obligations and duties of citizenships.\(^\text{14}\) But foreign women who lived within the city’s walls had to obtain special permission to do so, and as the
numbers of citizens increased many cities tightened control over requirements to obtain these licenses.\textsuperscript{15} Protectionist worries about marriage for immigration purposes are not new: a further and related aim was to prevent female citizens from marrying out. In 1557, the Strasbourg city council forbade citizens’ widows or daughters to marry foreigners without express permission; those who did so would be exiled from the city. In 1613, there were further restrictions: the male foreigner had to become a citizen before the couple could become engaged.\textsuperscript{16} In Frankfurt, 1614 regulations decreed that a woman marrying a foreigner lost her own citizenship and was forced to leave the city; nine years later, this had been extended to include male citizens, with the legislation making the case in moralizing and xenophobic terms about custom and behaviour:

It has been discovered in the case of citizens’ sons and widowers, that many of them marry foreign, property-less, and even slovenly suspicious female persons and then bring them in and that these persons receive citizenship through this marriage: when the husband dies they then marry someone similar [ie. a male foreigner] and to the city and the common good are brought all kinds of problems and difficulties.\textsuperscript{17}

As nations centralized from the sixteenth century, and as religious divisions became more intense and violent, shared allegiance to a ruler rather than localized economic status grew more dominant as a measure of belonging. This is seen very strongly in \textit{Ancien régime} France, which was an early leader in this development: being subject to the king and from the territory he ruled would come to define the French citizen. The legal scholar Jean Bacquet (ob. 1597) defined a foreigner precisely as ‘any person not born in the kingdom, country, lands, and seigneuries of the obedience of the French king’.\textsuperscript{18} Tamar Herzog argues for a similar development in Britain: with the consolidation of state structures in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, emphasis on birth gave way to emphasis on allegiance.\textsuperscript{19} As early
as 1427, a law in London decreed that only those under allegiance to the English king could be freemen of the city; from the seventeenth century onward, the ability to inherit also came to depend on allegiance to the crown. Similarly, the French Chancellor Henri François d'Aguesseau (1668-1751) wrote that the legal and moral status of French citizens were defined in opposition to those who were not: ‘in defining the term “foreigner” we will know the full limits of the “native resident”’. 20

The sixteenth century brought two great challenges and extensions to the legal definitions of foreignness: the encounter with the peoples of the Americas, with the associated rise of the Atlantic passage and enslavement of Africans, and the advent of Protestant religions. Custom and allegiance continued to offer practical categories: in 1590, for instance, the Jesuit missionary José de Acosta would group the peoples of the Americas into a hierarchy with the civilized and city-dwelling Incas and Aztecs at the top; and at the bottom those ‘who have neither laws nor king nor fixed dwellings, but go in herds like wild animals and savages’. 21 Pope Paul III, faced with issues surrounding the ‘newly discovered’ people of the Americas, issued the bull Sublimis Deus on 9 June 1537 in which he declared that ‘the Indians are truly men and that they are not only capable of understanding the Catholic faith but, according to our information, they desire exceedingly to receive it’. 22 Yet the concept of natural law, inherited from Roman models, became the dominant legal and philosophical tool for integrating – and enslaving - New World peoples into existing legal frameworks. 23

An influential passage in the Digest had defined three distinct kinds of law: civil law, natural law, and the law of nations (ius gentium). These were loosely and variously defined, including in the Codex itself, and the second and third terms were often used interchangeably. Natural law was common to all living creatures; ius gentium was common to all humankind, and civil law was the law of a particular group or place. 24 At heart, as Mark C. Murphy
writes: ‘Natural law jurisprudence most fundamentally asserts that it is of the essence of law to bind in reason; natural law political philosophy most fundamentally asserts that what makes law bind is its role with respect to the common good of the political community.’

Human laws, the *ius gentium*, were the mode for this binding. In the later Middle Ages, as thinkers like Thomas Aquinas sought to work through the ideas of Aristotle and to harmonize them with Christian thinking, the concept of natural law gained greater and greater importance, and it would be at the heart of sixteenth-century attempts, especially at the University of Salamanca, to account for the legal position of Spain in relation to the peoples of the Americas.

Thus it was contrary to natural law to kill, but certain infractions could justify aggression or war as a necessary act. But if it was contrary to natural law to kill, it was just to enslave captured enemies instead of killing them. Or, if certain behaviours were inherently contrary to natural law – cannibalism, for instance – it could be argued that it was just to intervene against those who practiced it to save potential victims. Such people were foreign to humanity as a whole, and their rulers were tyrants who could legitimately be deposed. In 1595, Phillip II declared that the indigenous peoples of what is now Brazil were by law free citizens of Spain as his subjects – allegiance to the king defined them. It was not race or custom that made foreignness, however foreign such peoples appeared in customary terms. In practice, however, any Indians who refused to convert to Christianity and to submit to the system in place whereby they owed work to the settlers or the Jesuit missions could be considered rebels to the Crown and contrary to nature – and subject to enslavement as enemies of a just war. The Spanish jurists restricted the argument about right through natural law to native Americans, but by the mid-century it was being extended to European rulers who oppressed their own subjects because of religious difference – the early arguments for what the twenty-first century calls ‘regime change’ based on humanitarian grounds.
Natural law arguments would be used to underpin the foreignness of both newfound peoples and of religious dissenters in Europe itself.

France took a different path. As early as 1315, King Louis X had noted that all human beings were free according to natural law. He pointed out that France, the land of the Franks, meant the land of the free and enfranchised; he therefore declared that those held in servitude who came into France could apply for liberty. Sixteenth-century jurists would extend this principle to create a juridical argument that no slavery could be legal on French soil. Yet as the French colonial empire grew, this protection was not extended to French colonies, with race mobilized as the justification for the distinction. In 1685 Louis XIV issued the Code noir, setting out terms and conditions for colonial slavery – explicitly identified as enslavement of black persons, although he also expelled all Jewish residents, made foreign and excluded by religion. By the end of the seventeenth century, there were significant numbers of slaves being brought into France by their colonial ‘masters’, and a series of legal measures were put in place to allow this. As individual cases were brought for enfranchisement, the cases of the masters hinged on the idea that black Africans, as people from torrid climates, were inherently in need of masters to guide them – a concept that can be traced back to Aristotle, but that medieval and sixteenth-century jurists had largely rejected. In 1759, for instance, a young man from Pondicherry in southern India sought to be emancipated from a Frenchman who had bought him there as a child. His lawyers stressed his physical differences from black Africans and the case was ultimately successful, although a raft of legislation followed trying to stop non-whites from entering France at all.

In these French cases, we see foreignness defined no longer as an economic label, a divergence from shared language or custom, or a lack of allegiance to a polity or faith. Here otherness is made into an inherent property of the body itself, visible as an external condition. Such people were shut out because their features diverged from the sanctioned European
norm, assimilating them in whole or in part to the early-modern category of the monstrous, which was used not only to disenfranchise but also to dehumanise and to exclude.

Monsters were, almost by definition, foreign in the sense that they were ‘other’. They were disquieting, then as now, their very strangeness a comment on the continuously moving divide between normal and abnormal. The monstrous races of medieval Europe were foreign both because they were believed to live beyond the sea in faraway lands, and because of their strange habits and/or physical features (fig. 1). Travellers’ tales of the Middle Ages and early modern period frequently contained descriptions of the monsters that they had encountered. As John Block Friedman has pointed out, these monsters were often considered as such only because their appearance and behaviour was different from that of their European describers. Pliny (d. 79) in his *Natural History*, when recounting the various tribes of North Africa, placed monsters, such as the Blemmyae who had no heads and whose facial features were in their chests, together with those who were distinguished only by their behaviour, such as the sexually promiscuous but physically unremarkable Garamantes. Appearance was an indication of the qualities inherent within a creature; human, monstrous, or otherwise. It could show sinfulness, evil, warlike qualities, greed, or sexual deviancy. As we have seen with Aristotle’s arguments about Africans, from the classical period onwards such qualities were believed to be affected by the climate, the stars and the planets. Giovanni Battista Della Porta’s *De humana physiognomia* (1586), one of the best known of many books on the occult science of physiognomy, used comparisons between the features of men and animals in order to draw conclusions about character, something also believed to date back to Aristotle. Della Porta reflected positively on his own appearance, but was capable of using the comparison with animals in order to make a personal attack, as he did with the classical scholar and poet Angelo Poliziano (1454-1494). As Maria Loh and Bronwen Wilson have argued, Renaissance portraits had less to do with likeness than with
conveying information about the subject. In the case of Poliziano, the comparison with a rhinoceros served to show that he was narrow-minded and opinionated. He was placed outside the human race by association. Yet this was not always a bad thing. Those whose facial characteristics were associated with the lion were considered to be strong and courageous but, on the negative side, were also inclined to anger.

Just as Della Porta’s comparison of the facial features of men with those of animals could be used both negatively and positively, so the monstrous gave rise to diverse interpretations. Differences in the human form could be emphasised and exaggerated in order to make a point about religious belief. The thirteenth- or fourteenth-century Gesta Romanorum contains a section on monsters, ‘De mirabilis mundi’, in which we are told that those with long ears listen to the word of God and that headless monsters were symbols of humility. In these instances, monsters were used to provide a lesson and their features interpreted accordingly. Women who became monstrous through excessive hair growth were also interpreted in religious terms through their appearance. Those with beards were believed to be in the grip of the sin of pride, monstrous in that they were taking over a character that was foreign to them, a male character.

Monstrosity was part of the stereotypical representation of other religions. During the Middle Ages and beyond, Jews were often shown with coarsened and ugly features, which physically differentiated them from Christians - foreigners who are shown as easily picked out by their appearance. Jews were thus elided with the foreign, the evil, and the monstrous. The different forms of the monstrous were directly related to the possibility of salvation and thus to the foreign countries of the afterlife. Salvation was also closely linked to the idea of the foreign on earth. In Chapter 8 of Book 16 of the Civitas Dei, Saint Augustine (d. 430) had asked ‘Whether monstrous races of man are derived from the stock of Adam or Noah’s sons?’ Basing himself on Genesis 9:19, which stated that ‘These are the three sons of
Noah: and of them was the whole earth overspread,’ Augustine argued that the Antipodes could not be inhabited by humans since it would have been impossible for the descendants of Adam and Eve to have travelled to the other side of the world. So-called monsters nearer at hand, despite their strange appearance, could be considered as part of the human race and thus capable of salvation.\textsuperscript{47} Thus Paul III determined that Americans were human, but this inclusive attitude was later seriously undermined. The debates about the ‘newly discovered’ peoples of the Americas demonstrate how even those who had human form could be considered as sub- or non-human.\textsuperscript{48} Once removed from the protection of being Noah’s descendants, it was possible to commit atrocities on those considered monstrous.

Medical discourse was a major area for discussion and definition of the human monstrous. Monsters were, according to the French physician Ambrose Paré in his \textit{On Monsters and Marvels} (1575):

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things that appear outside of the course of Nature (and are usually signs of some forthcoming misfortune) such as a child who is born with one arm, another who will have two heads, and additional members over and above the ordinary. Marvels are things which happen that are completely against nature as when a woman will give birth to a serpent, or to a dog, or some other thing that is totally against Nature [.]\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}
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Such creatures were the object of medical interest and were also believed to be portents. Two of the major publications on monsters between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth century – Paré’s \textit{Des monstres et prodiges} (\textit{On Monsters and Marvels}), and Ulisse Aldrovandi’s \textit{Historia Monstrorum} (1642) – were written by a medical doctor and the first professor of natural sciences at the University of Bologna, respectively. Both discussed conjoined twins. Aldrovandi, for example, showed an example of one white and one black – Ethiopian - twin (fig. 2). Both also included an image of the famous monster of Ravenna, said to have presaged the sack of that city in 1512 by the forces of the Holy League and
France, and believed to have been the offspring of a nun and a friar. Although it was described and represented in different ways, it was clearly something that was born ‘against nature’ with bat wings, a horn on its head, and an eagle’s foot. Its monstrosity was both the result of sin, the union of two people who had vowed celibacy, and a harbinger of disaster.

The legal status of such children as things or persons exercised some jurists, including for instance whether they could inherit. At the end of the seventeenth century Jean Domat distinguished between those who could be accorded legal personhood and those who could not:

Monsters that do not have human form are not considered to be persons, nor are they counted as the children of those who give birth to them. But those that have the essentials of human form and just have something extra or something missing count like other children.

Conversely, those who did not have a normal human appearance could be collected and displayed in various ways as objects of curiosity and inquiry. For those whose physical attributes placed them outside social norms, putting themselves on show or being put on show was an obvious way to earn their living. At the end of the sixteenth century Giovanni Battista Cavalieri provided engravings of two monstrous creatures in his Opera nela quale vi e molti Mostri de tutte le parti del mondo antichi e moderni con le dechiarationi a ciascheduno sino al prese[n]te Anno 1585 (Rome 1585). According to the captions, they could be seen in Rome in 1585. One was a young girl without legs (fig. 3). She is depicted on top of a table that has been covered with a cloth. She wears what appears to be fashionable or, at least, relatively expensive clothing. We can see a ruff at her neck and wrists. Her overdress is fastened at the front with frogging. She shows her ‘monstrosity’ to the viewer by holding back the edges of her overdress as though she is pulling back curtains. This reveals
the stumps of her legs, which exist only to the tops of her thighs. Her shift appears to have been raised to allow us to see her belly. Cavalieri’s caption tells us:

One can see this monstrous young girl in Rome in this very year of 1585, and [she] is about eight years old and has a most beautiful face and beautifully formed figure, and she is without legs, and without thighs.52

The girl is an object of interest because she is, at the same time, a beautiful and finely dressed human and a deformed monster willing to reveal both her difference and her private parts to the world. Cavalieri’s publication places her with prints of strange monsters from foreign lands such as an Ethiopian sciopod with its one large foot sheltering it from the heat of the sun, frightening portents of disaster, and other abnormal births, such as conjoined twins. All are monstrous and all are, in some way, foreign either in a geographical sense or in the sense of existing outside the accepted parameters of the normal.

As we have seen with the girl without legs in Cavalieri’s engraving, the use of clothing could be used to draw attention to the monstrous. Conversely, monstrous foreignness could be ameliorated through dress. The Gonsalus family were fascinating because of their hypertrichosis and were included in Ulisse Aldrovandi’s Monstrorum Historia. In Agostino Caracci’s Hairy Harry, Mad Peter, and Tiny Amon (circa 1596, oil on canvas, 101*134 cm, Naples, Museo di Capodimonte), Arrigo (Harry) Gonsalus is shown, through lack of ‘civilised’ clothing, to have an affinity to the animals which surround him.53 Images of his father Petrus play on the tension between his hypertrichosis and his civilised European dress. Joris Hoefnagel’s Animalia rationalia et insecta (ignis) (1575-1582) shows Petrus together with his wife, who did not have hypertrichosis (fig. 4). We see his hairy face but from the neck down he appears well-dressed and unexceptional. That his wife stands behind him with her right hand on his shoulder further indicates his ‘normal’ humanity. Yet he and his family are placed in a series of books on animals and are, as Christiane Hertel has pointed out, the
only ‘rational animals’ to be included. Several texts accompany the image one of which, on the verso of the title page and written in the first person, stresses Petrus’s erudition and comments on what made him accepted. He had been brought to France as a wild foreigner from the Canary Islands. It was a place in the French royal household and the education which he received there which changed him from a wild, hairy, monstrous foreigner to member of French society. Clothing helped to indicate this change. It also helped to indicate ownership and, therefore, to move Petrus from his original position as a wild man of the Canary Islands who did not acknowledge to power of the French monarchy to a French subject, standing in metonymically for the Canary Islands as a whole.

The monstrous was – and is - a space outside everyday experience where ideas about character and physical appearance could be explored. The category still has a strong hold on the contemporary imagination. Films such as X-Men (2000) play on the idea of mutants as frightening others, placed at risk of being forced to reveal publicly their capacities if a proposed ‘Mutant Registration Act’ becomes US law. The threatened subjection to legal categorisation is seen in the film as a way of separating those with mutant powers from the rest of the citizens of the United States, and of withdrawing some of their civil liberties. The film opens with a flashback of a young Eric Lehnsherr (later known as Magneto) using his ability to create magnetic fields to bend metal gates as he and his parents are forced into Auschwitz. The mutant ‘monstrosity’ of Lehnsherr as he tries to save the lives of his family is thereby linked with the capacity of humans to commit monstrous atrocities: the Nazi designation of Jews as dangerous and foreign, the attempted extermination of them in World War 2, and the proposed expulsion of mutant children from schools in the film’s present. The audience is guided to a consideration of the meaning of monstrosity connecting it with human actions, religious intolerance, and fear of the unknown rather than strange or frightening physical forms or powers. It is, of course, not coincidental that Lehnsherr is Jewish.
The articles in this issue address ideas about ‘foreign bodies’ in different ways; through peoples of foreign lands, by a consideration of those considered ‘other’ because of their religion or because of physical or social differences, through the ways in which the foreign was presented in print, and by means of the uses of clothes to change and define those who wore them. Debra Strickland’s article focuses on those who were defined as ‘foreign’ in Hartman Schedel’s illustrated world history, the Liber Chonicarum (1493). She argues that showing so many different persons as foreign to European Christian society – Jews, Saracens, monstrous races - contributed to the success of the publication. Danielle Gravon’s ‘Candy is now Flanders’ takes travel and cartography at the beginning of the seventeenth century as its starting point in order to question the ways in which maps were used to position foreign lands and peoples. Helen Pierce is concerned with the ways in which religion could be viewed as foreign and detrimental to the political stability of England. Her article interrogates the frontispiece of John Nalson’s An Impartial Collection of the Great Affairs of State (1682-1683). Ed Wouk’s article considers a set of prints representing European artists and brought together, accompanied by handwritten English text, in an early eighteenth-century volume from the Spencer Collection in the John Rylands Library. Elizabeth Currie and Cordelia Warr use clothing as a way to interrogate the body. Currie sees clothing as a type of foreign body capable of making significant changes to the individual wearing it. Her article explores the role of clothing within debates about preventative medicine and healthy living in early modern England and Italy. Warr looks at the use of liturgical gloves, arguing that their use by those of the rank of bishop and above facilitated the performance of a public religious identity that marked the difference of the body of the wearer from the mundane and the everyday. Together, these essays take a range of approaches and cover material from the fifteenth into the eighteenth century.
The research for ‘Foreign Bodies’ would not have been possible without the help and support of many people and institutions. We would like to thank the Universities of Manchester and Melbourne for their generous funding which enabled the workshops to take place. With reference to the Manchester-based part of the project, we would particularly like to thank: Fergus Wilde, Senior Librarian at Chetham’s Library; Uthra Rajgopal and Zoë Lanceley, Assistant Curators of Textiles and Wallpaper at the Whitworth; Donna Sherman, Special Collections Librarian at the University of Manchester Library; and, at the John Rylands Library, Stella Halkyard, formerly Joint Head of Special Collections and Visual Collections Manager; John Hodgson, Joint Head of Special Collections and Manuscripts and Archives Manager; and Julianne Simpson, Rare Books and Maps Manager. Colleagues at the Centre for Heritage Imaging and Collection Care at the John Rylands Library have been unfailingly helpful, patient and generous with their time as we made requests for the images used in this issue of the Bulletin. At the Whitworth, we would like to thank John Kirkpatrick for supplying images and arranging photography. We are grateful to Chetham’s Library, the Whitworth, and the John Rylands Library for waiving permission fees and for allowing access to their collections and files. Danielle Gravon and Dr Anne Kirkham from the Department of Art History and Cultural Practices at the University of Manchester helped to organise the Manchester workshop. We would also like to thank Maria Hayward (University of Southampton), Rose Marie San Juan (University College London), and Jenny Spinks (University of Melbourne) who attended the Manchester workshop, and whose input into group discussions helped shape our thinking about foreign bodies.
Images

   [https://luna.manchester.ac.uk/luna/servlet/detail/Manchester~91~1~419700~157023:Monsters?qvq=q:schedel&mi=27&trs=37]

   [https://luna.manchester.ac.uk/luna/servlet/detail/Manchester~91~1~424562~190205:Feotus-bicorpor-complicatus-Aethio?qvq=q:aldrovandi&mi=8&trs=9]

   [https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1570192&partId=1&people=129768&peoA=129768-2-60&page=1]


[https://www.nga.gov/collection/art-object-page.69680.html]


4 Anderson, Roman Law Essentials, pp. 111-12. It is notable that canon law, which regulated matters such as marriage governed by the Church, also adopted Roman law except where it clashed directly with religious precepts, with a first great treatment, Gratian’s Decretum, in the 1140s.


10 Tomislav Raukar, ‘Komunalna društva u Dalmaciji u XIV st.’ (Communal societies in Dalmatia during the 14th century), *Historijski zbornik*, 33-34 (1980-81), 139-209.


17 Wiesner, ‘Political, Economic, and Legal Structures,’ p. 227, quoting Frankfurt Ver, vol. II, no. 57 (July 31, 1623),

18 Peter Sahlins, ‘Fictions of a Catholic France: The Naturalization of Foreigners, 1685-1787,’ *Representations*, 47, Special Issue: National Cultures before Nationalism (1994), 85-110. At stake was the more technical legal distinction between *regnicole* and *aubain*, terms which mirrored the more generally used citizen and a foreigner (*citoyen* and *étranger*).


42 della Porta, Della Humana Physiognomia, liber primus, pp. 20-22.

43 Wittkower, ‘Marvels of the East’.


46 For a discussion of the perceived link between the nose, the Jew and the idea of the foreign between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, see Sander L. Gilman, ‘By a nose: on the construction of “foreign bodies”’, Social Epistemology, 13:1 (1999), 49-58.

Patricia Seed, “‘Are these not also men?’: The Indians’ humanity and capacity for Spanish Civilisation’, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 25:3 (1993), 629-52.


Giovanni Battista Cavalieri, *Opera nela quale vi e molti Mostri de tutte le parti del mondo antichi e moderni con le dechiarationi a ciascheduno sina al prese[n]te Anno 1585* (Rome 1585): ‘Questa monstruosa fanciulla se vede il presente anno 1585 in Roma et e de sta de otto anni in circa et e di faccia bellissima et formosa de corpo, et e senza gambe et senza coscie.’


