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Beyond a ‘realistic’ new cosmopolitan ideal in the Irish Context: A non-sovereign politics of solidarity
Aoileann Ní Mhurchú
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Ireland, Email: aoileann.nimhurchu@dcu.ie

Abstract
This paper considers how a new cosmopolitan vision of integration and the integrated society, associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck, has been applied by Bryan Fanning (2009) in the context of the Republic of Ireland. It suggests that there is a need to seriously consider the limitations of how subjectivity is theorised in this model. The paper specifically questions the implied necessity of having to consider how the politics of integration is always dictated in the last instance by the centrality of the nation-state to the demand for solidarity. It instead problematises the associated image which this reproduces of the absolute space of subjectivity given the emphasis on dichotomous categories such as included/excluded, national/non-national, new Irish/old Irish, guest/host. What is suggested is that this model presents a very specific conception of what and where the politics of integration can be; namely as that which must be defined in the last instance in terms of already divisible sovereign autonomous persons or autonomous groups of such persons who need to be bonded with each other. The paper uses the work of Julia Kristeva to suggest how a different politics of solidarity might be envisaged. It is unlike the former politics of solidarity which is based on the question of how to build bonds between those included in and those excluded from Irish society (thus emphasizing the need for ever more integration). This is one which is based on the importance of recognizing the manner in which people are always already bonded to each other and to Irish society in many different ways associated with contingent space, which dominant dichotomous categories of subjectivity cannot account for.

Key words: new cosmopolitanism; politics; integration; subjectivity; space; sovereignty

Introduction
When discussing the question of immigration and the politics of integration in the Republic of Ireland in the twenty-first century, scholarship in this area has most notably focused on the barriers (variably defined as racism, nationalism or as structural impediments) which pose potential problems for the integration of immigrants into Irish society beyond their mere assimilation into an ‘Irish’ way of life (Fanning 2002; Lentin 2004; Lentin and McVeigh 2006; Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative 2008). Credited by MacÉinrí and White (2008: 158) with putting together one of the only “comprehensive general publications” on immigration into Ireland with his 2007 edited collection, Bryan Fanning has argued (2007a and 2007b) that the question of integration in this respect is one which specifically needs to be contextualised in terms of the
structural disjuncture which the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum institutionalised between ‘nationals’ (as those whose inherent belonging is formalised in their status as Irish citizens) and ‘non-nationals’ (whose outsider status is formalised in their lack of Irish citizenship). In his book *New Guests of the Irish Nation* (2009) Fanning has more recently brought together a collection of pieces written by him over the previous seven years exploring the question of the politics of integration in the Republic of Ireland in its various forms. Here Fanning specifically puts forward the theory of ‘new cosmopolitanism’ as the basis for a new politics of integration for the Republic of Ireland. He argues that this model of solidarity is the best insofar as it provides a way of bridging this national/non-national divide by resolving the tension between the limits of national citizenship (particularism) and the possibilities of cosmopolitan solidarity (universalism) which immigration demands. He defines integration as the challenge of finding new possible ways through which those outside the dominant imagined community (“the new guests of the Irish nation”) might become part of a more diverse nation-state, while those already inside (“the Irish”) might be bonded further to it (Fanning 2009: 180). Fanning insists, most significantly, that a new cosmopolitan model of solidarity provides a “realistic conception of the limits of solidarity” insofar as it recognises the need to work with, rather than attempting to bypass, claims to state sovereignty (albeit challenging them from within) (Fanning 2009: 3).

The main reason for focusing on Bryan Fanning’s work here is that it is one of the most comprehensive attempts to ground new cosmopolitan ideas in an Irish context and it uses very powerful arguments associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck to rethink existing conceptions of solidarity on the island of Ireland. *New Guests of the Irish Nation* in which Fanning outlines his understanding of new cosmopolitanism itself builds on two earlier books (a monograph published in 2002 and an edited collection published in 2007) through which Fanning has significantly contributed to theorisations on immigration and social change in the republic of Ireland. In a special issue on integration, such as this issue of *Translocations* which aims to examine the relevance and utility of visions of ‘integration’ and the ‘integrated society’ in Ireland at this particular juncture, it seems only right to explore this work in recognition of its critical contributions to the debate while also considering its limitations and asking how these can be built upon.

This paper argues that Fanning’s work draws on a particular normative philosophical endeavour and as such does not exhaust all current attempts at retheorisations of cosmopolitanism in this respect. The philosophical endeavour which Fanning draws upon through the work of Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck is that which seeks to develop the concept of cosmopolitanism as a resolution between particularity (exclusion) and universality (inclusion) vis-à-vis the state. Existing critiques of this philosophical endeavour have pointed out that it results in the (re)location of subjectivity in the figure of the sovereign, autonomous subject (Baker 2009). They have pointed out that ‘cosmopolitanism’ as tied to this need for a resolution vis-à-vis the state is limited in the way that subjectivity continues to be conceived of as existing ‘in’ absolute space (albeit as often existing simultaneously in various layers of absolute space such as the ‘local’, the ‘global’ and the ‘international’) rather than in terms of different theories of space (for
example, bounded vs. fragmented) (Walker 2003; Vaughan-Williams 2007; Baker 2009; Harvey 2009). The aim of this paper is to consider how these critiques help us explore the Bryan Fanning’s attempt to theorise a new cosmopolitan model of solidarity in the Irish context based similarly upon sovereign, autonomous subjectivity.

What will be suggested is that Fanning’s understanding of the possibilities for integration in an Irish context is limited by the need to envisage this possibility in terms of the absolute spaces of different levels or patterns of integration between autonomous people (for example, between ‘guest’ and ‘host’, ‘old’ and ‘new’ Irish, ‘national’ and ‘non-national’). This ignores the relative spaces through which people coexist as “fragments and linkages differently integrated in different places” (Bateson 1990: 157). What I wish to examine is how the image of subjectivity as autonomous is reproduced in the new cosmopolitan framework presented by Fanning in the manner in which ‘being’ is always already conceptualised as engaging ‘in’ but ultimately being inclusionable or exclusionable (and thus separate in the last instance) ‘from’, ‘political’ community (the state). It is pointed out in this paper that it is necessary to distinguish this understanding of subjectivity in terms of absolute space as a specifically ‘modern’ framing of the question of subjectivity which can be traced back to a moment in history when new lines were drawn in early modern Europe designed to guarantee the separation of a subjective self from the objective natural world and an essence of humanity in (as opposed to ‘of’) time and space (Walker 2003). This was a time when subjects, previously envisaged as communal and political creatures under Aristotle, were constructed as ‘individuals’: as divisible from politics and from each other (Walker 2003: 275). Although this continues to be a dominant framing of subjectivity, this paper will argue that references to the existence of a ‘realistic’ conception regarding the limits of solidarity need to be understood in terms of how they work specifically to erase the aforementioned historical basis of these conceptions, ultimately silencing articulations of subjectivity which cannot be made sense of according to dominant dichotomous framings (such as national/non-national, guest/host, old Irish/new Irish) and the need for their resolution.

The paper is divided into two sections. The first section considers the core assumptions of the model of new cosmopolitanism discussed by Fanning in *New Guests of the Irish Nation* in an attempt to explore the basis for his assertion in the introduction regarding “the limits to empathy and solidarity that need to be treated realistically in debates about integration” (Fanning 2009: 2). Insofar as his theory of ‘new cosmopolitanism’ is based on the work of Habermas and Beck rather than other theorists, the paper discusses the implications of how it is conceptualised by Fanning through a presumed need to have to specifically resolve the tension between universal and particularistic conceptions of statist (sovereign) community in terms of a subject that is at one and the same time individual and specific as well as (potentially) universal and human (Walker 2003). What is pointed out in this paper is that this reproduces an understanding of the politics of solidarity which denies a presence to conceptions of subjectivity which are neither sovereign nor autonomous but articulated in the more uncertain space that is the tension between the universal and the particular, identity and difference. Instead of continuing to assume that increasingly better and therefore ‘more’ integration is needed in respect of the question of immigration across absolute spaces of particularity and universality such as the local and
global or the national and the international, what is asked is whether there is a need to question how current debates about integration in Ireland position people as always already separate from each other; thus ignoring how people can be connected to each other through contingent spaces.

The second part of this paper considers Irish citizen children born to undocumented migrant parents as an example of the type of complex, non-sovereign subjectivity that is denied a presence in the politics of integration proposed by Fanning under the new cosmopolitan model of solidarity he presents. What is argued is that these children present an interesting case from the perspective of the question of solidarity insofar that they do not only fall outside of the dominant dichotomous categories of national and non-national, old Irish and new Irish, citizen and non-citizen, guest and host, but that their experiences also clearly challenge the basis for the idea that we can continue to draw lines in this manner in order to understand how solidarity is or is not experienced in respect of the question of migration. The work of Julia Kristeva is used to suggest finally how a new politics of solidarity might be envisaged as a response to this. What is argued is that her work is allows us to conceptualise a new politics of solidarity which is no longer based on the absolute spatial imaginary of endless dichotomies and the emphasis on the need for their resolution but on recognising how ‘integration’ can be reconceived in terms of fragmentation and ambiguity. This is a politics of solidarity which is based on recognizing the bonds which already exist within society but which are often ignored as they cut across the absolute spaces of people conceptualised as sovereign autonomous individuals.

**Defining a New Politics of Solidarity**

**New Cosmopolitanism and the modern subject: A ‘specific’ as opposed to merely a ‘realistic’ conception of the limits of solidarity**

There is a general interest today in how the question of integration in the Republic of Ireland in the twenty-first century is inextricably linked to the challenge which immigration poses to dominant understandings of solidarity embedded, most obviously, in the concept of what it is to be an ‘Irish’ citizen. Those who are interested in exploring this connection have been very careful to stress that the notion itself of what it is to be Irish in this context is far from uncontested. The question remains, however, as to how exactly to conceptualise a politics of solidarity which can take this position as its starting point. For most, the age old distinction between liberal models of community and communitarian models of community is no longer very useful. On the one hand, attempts to define solidarity in more liberal particularistic terms that emphasise individual right and duty are seen as catering to hegemonic images of what it is to be ‘Irish’ by ignoring dominant power relations between migrant and the host society – see for example responses by those such as Boucher (2008), Lentin (2004) and MCRI (2008) to attempts by the Irish Government to define integration in more individualist terms ‘as a two-way process’ (Interdepartmental Working Group 1999). Similarly, it has been argued that attempts to define solidarity in more universal communitarian terms (for example via the notion of ‘multiculturalism’), are in danger of presenting “a view from nowhere” (Calhoun 2003) or a notion of “racelessness” (Lentin 2004); these have thus been
criticised for imposing a more implicit (but no less dangerous) would-be-dominant understanding of identity to that of the liberal models they set out to challenge.

In *New Guests of the Irish Nation* Bryan Fanning presents the concept of ‘new cosmopolitanism’ as that which reframes the relationship between the universal (humanity) and the particular (citizenship) in such a way so as not to reduce one to the other but to accommodate both in the notion of a cosmopolitan political community in which “ideals have...become transferred into norms of international reciprocity” (Fanning 2009: 147). As such, he implicitly presents an alternative to both the liberal and the communitarian models of solidarity previously mentioned. In considering a new cosmopolitan model of solidarity Fanning focuses specifically on the current extension of rights and entitlements beyond citizenship via trans-national conventions, EU based reciprocal norms and the existence of rights offered by nation states to non-citizens. Instead of equating membership of a community with sameness on one hand or incommensurable difference on the other, Fanning argues that “the theories of modernity that emphasise a capacity for communicative action and reflexivity” offered by those such as Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck “translate into cosmopolitan demands on human reason to see the necessity of reciprocal justice” (Fanning 2009: 147). Fanning argues that a new cosmopolitan politics of integration is based on an understanding regarding “an obligation to be hospitable towards immigrants rooted in a Kantian conception of reason” (Fanning 2009: 147). However, this is one which is not based simply on a Kantian ‘ought’. It is instead based on “a new expression of humanism” (Fanning 2009: 148) which recognises the importance of ‘the right to have the right to be included’ beyond the strictly narrow formal political inclusion of citizenship. New cosmopolitanism, he explains, is a recognition of the resistance to the current state of world affairs “translated politically into the notion of binding trans-national human rights” (Fanning 2009: 148).

In respect of the question of integration, Fanning insists that “the primary goal of any viable integration project should be to close gaps between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’ for the sake of future social cohesion” (Fanning 2009: 3). This is the gap which he argues was crystallised in the Republic of Ireland through the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum when the electorate voted by a majority of four to one (79.2%) to revoke the existing constitutional entitlement to automatic citizenship at birth for the children of ‘non-national’ parents. The problem for Fanning is the manner in which citizenship takes the state as the exclusive reference point of sovereignty and thus for political community. He argues that a case can, on the contrary, be made for reconceptualising participation and rights within, as well as beyond, the statist concept of political community associated with national citizenship. Exploring a similar conception to that of Habermas’ notion of ‘world citizenship’, Fanning discusses the idea of a post-national model of citizenship in the Irish context as an alternative to a statist concept of citizenship, but one which is also conceivably based on “a continuum” (Habermas 1996: 1)

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1 Fanning looks, for example, at how non-citizens are entitled in Ireland to vote and stand in local government elections once they satisfy minimum residency requirements.
2 A ‘non-national’ is defined in Irish legislation under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001, section 2(c) as “a person who is not an Irish citizen”.
515) with state citizenship. He argues that this specifically permits the location of rights on a global or trans-national level rather than only at the level of the state (Fanning 2009: 152). Fanning is insistent, however, that conceptions of solidarity on the island of Ireland will continue to remain wedded to the nation-state (and more specifically to concepts of nationalism) for the foreseeable future. He therefore explicitly associates the basis for “a realistic conception of the limits of solidarity” with the centrality of the role of the nation-state to demands for solidarity (Fanning 2009: 3). For Fanning the strength of such a post-national model of citizenship is to be found in the understanding in both Habermas and Beck’s work that it is not an alternative to a statist concept of citizenship therefore but one which is based on a universal extension of this (most notably explored in the European Union). In their own work Beck and Habermas discuss how this universal extension allows for the resolution of particularity and universality in the notion of “free and equal persons” (Habermas 1996: 496) or “individuals and collectivities” (Beck and Grande 2007: 71) who exercise political participation through the process of being integrated into and having influence in building a ‘European civil society’ (Habermas 2003, 2006; Beck and Grande 2007). What Fanning therefore stresses is the ability of this new cosmopolitan model of solidarity to promote a new politics of integration in the Republic of Ireland by bridging the divide between the particular and the universal, identity and difference - between those who are considered to be part of the dominant imagined community (nationals) and those who are not (non-nationals).

Fanning sees the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum which resulted in the removal of the automatic constitutional entitlement to citizenship at birth as having been a decisive event in narrowing the empirical definition of Irishness and accordingly the basis for solidarity within the state. “The challenge is to come up with ways of binding the Irish to their diverse nation-state as well as integrating the new guests of the nation” (Fanning 2009: 180). New cosmopolitanism is presented as an alternative to the reality of competing communities of ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’, ‘Irish’ and ‘others’ which the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum has promoted. This is insofar as it presents an “inclusive political ideal” by “shift[ing] the focus of debate away from th[is] sort of adversarial ‘zero sum’ game” (Fanning 2009: 147). We are told by Fanning that it moves away from either seeking to suppress or ignore differences and thus away from associating integration with assimilation on one hand or multiculturalism on the other - both of which Fanning argues represent culture as monolithic (Fanning 2009: 159). Instead, in allowing the particular to be reconciled within the universal it facilitates ‘pluralism’ and ‘a politics of recognition’ which involves “taking the cultural identities of others seriously as a basis for mutual understanding” without presupposing what these might be (ibid). Integration from this perspective, Fanning argues, becomes the “pragmatic political engagement with the problems of recognising and addressing the consequences of difference” (ibid).

There are very few other notable attempts to date to discuss the basis for a new cosmopolitan politics of solidarity in Ireland. One of the few other attempts has been by Kuhling and Keohan in *Cosmopolitan Ireland: Globalisation and Quality of Life* (2007). Taken as a whole, this is a book which mostly complements the discussion by Fanning in *New Guests of the Irish Nation* regarding the need for a more normatively robust conception of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an emancipatory concept tied to the work of Jürgen
Habermas and his notion of ‘world citizenship’. It emphasises the need for this in order to counteract superficial neoliberal economic conceptions of the good life which can be shown to have undermined rather than facilitated equality of membership and quality of life within Irish society. *Cosmopolitan Ireland* engages with this idea by distinguishing between an elitist understanding of cosmopolitanism as social distinction which prioritises neoliberal globalisation and that of an emancipatory understanding of cosmopolitanism associated with an egalitarian conception of ‘world citizenship’ which promotes the idea of a “a moral and political framework of universal rights and political consensus” (Kuhling and Keohane 2007: 4). Indirectly however, *Cosmopolitan Ireland* also provides an interesting contrast with the conception of cosmopolitanism put forward in *New Guests of the Irish Nation*. This is insofar as, unlike Fanning, who emphasises the need to think about the notion of a single ‘realistic’ cosmopolitanism concept of solidarity, this book considers the differences which exist within and across so-called emancipatory articulations of cosmopolitanism themselves. The result is that this book, unlike *New Guests of the Irish Nation*, does not attempt to envisage a specific model of cosmopolitanism which is the most realistic but instead can be seen to consider the idea of many different (often competing) streams of ‘cosmopolitanisms’ – associated with Habermas and Beck on one hand but also with Homi Bhabha and Ernesto Laclau, on the other. It is out of these cosmopolitanisms that Kuhling and Keohan eventually suggest several possibilities for radical democratic politics which they believe would be consistent with attempts to “truly ‘cosmopolitanise’ Ireland” (2007: 7). While *Cosmopolitan Ireland* does therefore support Fanning’s attempt to develop a concept of new cosmopolitanism insofar as it too emphasises the significance of the Habermassian attempt to separate ‘identities’ from specific times, places and traditions in order to consider the basis of principles of hybridity and impurity in all conceptions of solidarity (Kuhling and Keohane 2007: 26), this book also highlights the need to recognise that Habermas’s work presents a specific conception of the limits of solidarity which is not without its alternatives.

From this perspective, it becomes important to consider what these alternatives are. What is drawn attention to in this paper is how the notion of subjectivity which Habermas and Beck use is defined in terms of “individuals” and or groups thereof (Habermas 1996: 74, Beck and Grande 2007). Fanning’s use exclusively of this work as the basis for his conception of cosmopolitanism therefore reproduces an understanding of subjectivity in respect of the question of integration which also remains in the last instance tied to this specific time and place of subjectivity. In Habermas and Beck’s work, the ‘subject’ remains located in the (linear) time and (absolute) space of the notion of the (autonomous) ‘individual’ or groups thereof. As such it is tied to the notion of a coherent sovereign subject in the last instance as the *necessary* basis of claims to solidarity. As Harvey (2009) points out, the problem here is that the spatial question has been defined by these authors in terms of rather superficial discussions about how cosmopolitanisation “replaces national-national relations with national-global and global-global relational patterns” (Beck 2006: 96 quoted in Harvey 2009: 87). The result is an assumption about subjectivity in terms of the *layering* of different levels of absolute spaces one on top of the other (such as the local, the global, the international) and an unquestioning acceptance of the Kantian separation of space from time. What is missing is an engagement with the
idea of (absolute) space as a theory in its own right and the question of how this has become integral to modern understandings though which being a ‘subject’ came to be understood in the first place (Harvey 2009b). For example, Fanning discusses how new cosmopolitanism is based on the need to consider how ‘Irishness’ can be conceptualised more inclusively, echoing the question which Habermas and Beck both ask of ‘European-ness’: “Our argument is that we need not less Europe but more – but we need a different, more cosmopolitan Europe” (Beck and Grande 2007:70; See also Habermas 2003 and 2006). This permits him to ask how diversity can become recognised as a solution rather than a problem; to critique the liberal system’s devaluation of diversity and its attempts to eliminate it (Beck and Grande 2007) and finally to discuss alternatives which allow for “a more complex relationship with other persons and polities than those disadvantaging relations that liberal nationalism typically produces” (Fine and Boon 2007: 11). Yet, what it does not do, is allow him to consider how personhood is not always sufficiently (spatially) coherent to be spoken about in this manner.

An alternative way of engaging with the idea of cosmopolitanism would have been to draw on the work of theorists such as Jacques Derrida (1992) who also writes about the notion of a cosmopolitan Europe but who does so specifically by questioning the imminence of ‘Europe’ in relation to the concept of political community as well as in relation to the concept of political subjectivity. Unlike Habermas and Beck, Derrida asks of both political community and political subjectivity “to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name [of Europe(an)] be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?” (Derrida 1992: 5). In so doing Derrida specifically questions whether solidarity must continue to be defined in terms of how people exist vis-à-vis and are therefore in need of being integrated (as autonomous entities) into political community. Drawing on the work of R.B.J Walker would have similarly permitted Fanning to engage directly with the notion that political community and political subjectivity are seen increasingly as interrelated in terms of how both are defined in terms of sovereignty (Walker 2003). Indeed, another option would have been for Fanning to draw on the growing range of theorists who have mounted global critiques of cosmopolitanism as a specifically Western model. This would have required Fanning to engage with the argument that there is a need to consider how the notion itself of ‘Europe’ as a society which can or can not be made more inclusive for the people living there needs to be understood in terms of how it defines the subject through its ability to separate itself from local culture and upbringing; something which has been criticised for being “a trope of secular modernity” as opposed to a timeless truth (Van der Veer 2002: 166). If Fanning had engaged with cosmopolitanism through these other theorists, the point is that he would have had to address the question not only of how to conceive of freedom ‘of’ the self within and across different political systems, but also the question of how important it is to conceive of freedom from the (modern) coherent self (Baker 2009). He would have had to address the question of the specifically modern origins of the notion of a unitary subject (individual or collective) who is presumed coherent enough to be counterposed to a unitary sovereign state and consider how this is often “radically at odds with the multiplicities, fragmentations, overlappings and contingencies of so many contemporary claims to political subjectivity” and the presumed necessity associated with
these of continuing to associate subjectivity with the time and space of the state (Walker 1999a: xii; see also 1999b).

To summarise: in Fanning’s work a cosmopolitan model of solidarity is defined through the challenge itself of finding new possible ways through which those outside the dominant imagined community might be integrated into a more diverse nation-state, while those already inside might be bonded further to it (Fanning 2009: 180). In drawing to the extent that he does on Habermas and Beck (who focus on critiquing the notion of modern liberal community) rather than on other theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Rob Walker or Van der Veer (who also specifically problematise the need to conceptualise cosmopolitanism in terms of the modern subject as that which can be separated ‘from’ political community) Fanning’s conception of new cosmopolitanism does not address, however whether subjectivity must make sense in terms of how it is in the last instance ‘inclusionable’ or ‘exclusionable’ from conceptions of particular and universal political community. Appeals to a ‘realistic’ concept of new cosmopolitanism are appeals to a specific statist understandings of political subjectivity which instead merely presumes the latter. Challenging appeals to ‘necessary’ conceptions of the limits of solidarity results in an interrogation (as opposed to an assumption) of the need to always associate ‘politics’ with the drawing of clear clean lines between inside and outside, particularism and universalism, identity and difference. It results in an interrogation of the understanding that political subjectivity must reside always in the last instance in the figure of a spatially bounded (coherent) subject known as the ‘individual’.

**Beyond the quest for increasingly better integration?**

The manner in which Fanning theorises the concept of ‘new cosmopolitanism’ in his 2009 book is consistent with how he has elsewhere approached the question of immigration and social change in the Irish context. That is to say that he has closely associated the need to rethink the politics of solidarity with the need to rethink how political community itself is defined; the important question being “Integration into what?” (Fanning 2007b: 252). When thinking through this question, Fanning has consistently critiqued the increasingly neoliberal basis for conceptions of solidarity in Ireland and has looked at how solidarity needs to be defined in terms of social inclusion as well as economic and/or strict political inclusion (naturalisation) (Fanning 2007b, 2010). Fanning draws in this regard on the work of John Rawls in emphasizing not only the importance in redefining political community in terms of equality therefore but more specifically in terms of ‘social justice’. Increasingly Fanning has argued that social policy can promote, as well as facilitate the integration of immigrants insofar as it can counteract to some extent the institutional barriers which have been set up through the increasing disparity between rights afforded to ‘citizens’ as against those afforded to ‘non-citizens’ (2007a, 2007b, 2010). Throughout his work Fanning has considered the benefits and problems associated with various approaches to accommodating diversity in societies - from weak to strong forms of multiculturalism, in terms of interculturalism and/or pluralism - discussing how well each facilitates or fails to facilitate the type of ‘integration’ (as opposed to mere assimilation) which he advocates (Fanning 2007b and 2009).
Fanning’s discussions emphasise here the need to remain vigilant about the type of political community approach to integration. They can furthermore be seen to resonate with the majority of academic and civil society interventions in this area. An example of this is a piece written by the former director of the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) entitled ‘An Intercultural Approach to Integration’ (Watt 2006). Watt similarly posits that integration policies in and of themselves need to define the type of societies they are requiring people to integrate into “or risk being superficial or counter productive” (Watt 2006: 156). He also evaluates the merits of the different types of political communitarian approaches to integration which the Irish Government and other EU countries have pursued – these include the assimilationist approach, the multicultural approach and the intercultural approach; the latter which he points out the Irish Government has been pursuing since 2005. The implication in Watt’s piece is that Irish Government immigration policy is taking on board general European best practice integration policy guidelines insofar as it has moved towards defining integration in terms of ‘interculturalism’. This is an approach, which Watt points out, recognises the importance of “mainstreaming” the role of diverse ethnic communities in Irish society rather than simply seeing this as an add on to existing systems (Watt 2006: 156). A piece written by Gerry Boucher several years later is nonetheless extremely critical of Irish Government integration policy despite this move. Boucher describes the approach taken by the Irish Government as ‘laissez faire’, arguing that despite the lip service which the Government paid to having identified the need to include immigrants within national plans and programmes that design notions of community as well as those that target poverty, social exclusion and racism, its strategy remains “characterised more by policy statements than about actual policies made and implemented” (Boucher 2008: 15).

What is consistent across such discussions about integration and the need to move from a multicultural approach (and thus assimilation) toward an intercultural or pluralistic approach in the Irish context, is the manner in which they emphasise the need for ‘better’ integration strategies. These are understood as more inclusive on one hand, while presenting increasingly less onerous demands on those who are being asked to integrate to have to give up or compromise their own cultural traditions. To a large extent, where attempts at integration are defined as problematic, this is attributed to them being mistakenly defined in terms of ‘assimilation’ or the need to think about culture as monolithic. Yet, this emphasis on the need to get integration ‘right’ by focusing always on the question of ‘what do we mean when we say integration?’ contrasts starkly with the question which Breda Gray asks elsewhere. The former results in the call for ever more integration, whereas Gray specifically questions this basic assumption, asking instead whether ‘non-integration’ is indeed always the problem, even when executed ‘correctly’ (Gray 2006). Gray is one of a few writers who has suggested that a politics of solidarity might be based on something other than the constant need for ‘more’ integration. Yet, she is also not alone as a discussion about integration at a conference in Maynooth university recently prompted a similar question: “why integration now?” (Titley et al 2009: 15).³

³ This was specifically a question from the floor cited in an edited version of a roundtable discussion recorded at the ‘Managing Migration’ conference held in the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM) – See Titley et al 2009
When asking whether non-integration is always the problem Breda Gray was focusing specifically on integration policies formulated by the EU and national governments. Her piece is thus a critique of the more blunt and un-nuanced categories of ‘emigrant’ and ‘immigrant’ which these specifically produce. However, I would like to suggest that her observation regarding the need to pay close attention to “the ways in which discourses of integration position the emigrant and immigrant… as always already excluded” (Gray 2006: 121) and thus in need of being bonded to others, is one which can also be applied to some of the more critically sophisticated academic and civil society integration policy proposals such as those discussed above. For, instead of focusing on how to include people better, this question forces us to consider how these discourses of integration continue to be predicated upon the assumption that certain people are always already excluded from politics and from each other in absolute space, in the first place. It permits us to ask whether this discourse ignores the possibility that a politics of solidarity might be facilitated by recognition of how people are often already integrated to each other and to society in contingent spaces.

The point is that work which emphasises the proper or ‘realistic’ limits of solidarity as that which must be dictated in the last instance by the centrality of the nation-state to these demands, continues to define the question of the politics of solidarity in terms of the association of politics with the need to draw lines in the first place: between identity and difference, universality and particularity. The result is absolute spatial representations of subjectivity. What is left unaccounted for are the conditions of solidarity which result from the maintenance of the tension between the general and particular and thus which exist in terms of fragments of integration which are spatially contingent and temporally non-linear. It cannot account for these as they result in linkages not captured by the absolute spatial imaginary through which migration has been conceptualised in terms of the need for ‘inclusion’ and ‘bonding’ across various dichotomies. To explore these alternative fragments of integration, as Pollock et al point out, there is a need for transdisciplinary knowledge which focuses on moments of culture’s in-betweeness as moments which often defy the notion of coherent subjectivity (Pollock et al 2000: 582). Instead of asking how the subject can engage ‘in’ a more inclusive politics of solidarity, they require us asking ourselves how we have come to assume a subject which can be included or excluded ‘from’ politics in the first place (Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999). The next section of this paper will attempt to do so by considering the more ambiguous and decidedly less coherent subjectivity of citizen children born to undocumented migrant parents as an example of the type of subjectivity denied a presence in the new cosmopolitan model of solidarity advocated by Fanning. It then considers the work of Julia Kristeva to suggest how an alternative model of solidarity can be conceptualised which can take account of the contingent spatial bonds which are identified here.

Rethinking the ‘Politics’ of Solidarity outside of the modern subject
I have examined how the new cosmopolitan model of solidarity outlined by Fanning seeks to understand ‘being’ by bringing together conceptions of identity ‘in here’ (Irish) and difference ‘out there’ (immigrant) through ever more integration (which is identified
as the need to counteract exclusion and facilitate bonding). This second section further explores how referring to this as a ‘necessary’ precondition for a conception of solidarity, fails to account for the manner in which inclusion and exclusion can be associated with ambiguous, as well as, sovereign subjectivities. What I consider here is the notion of subjectivities which do not conform to traditional conceptions of inclusion and exclusion insofar as they are neither sovereign nor autonomous and therefore cannot be conceptualised vis-à-vis their relationship with the state. This section attempts, in other words, to think beyond the notion of hyphenated sovereign identities (for example, Polish-Irish, Hungarian-Irish, Irish-African etc.) as the (only) alternative to strictly statist concepts of political community and solidarity, in order to ask after the importance of fragmentary spaces through which solidarities are also lived in every day lives.

The subjectivities which are considered here are those of citizen children born to undocumented parents. It is important to note that they are ones which have therefore never made sense in terms of the categories of ‘national’ (included) or ‘non-national’ (excluded) which Fanning’s conception of new cosmopolitanism seeks to undermine. It is clear that any number of other examples could have been taken of groups that clearly fall outside the dichotomous national/non-national categories: this includes non-EEA spouses of EU nationals, work permit holders and their families and Irish citizens living outside Ireland with no voting rights. However, the point here is not to identify a litany of groups that fall outside of this dichotomy and or other dichotomies. This would suggest the need simply to rethink the types of dichotomies which are being used to think about how solidarity is, or is not, experienced. Rather, this particular group is focused on here because as well as comprising subjectivities which fall outside of this dichotomy these are subjectivities which emphasise the need to rethink the notion of dichotomies and how these posit subjectivities as existing (only) in absolute space and linear time. What I critique here is not the categories themselves of ‘national’ and ‘non-national’. Rather it is the idea that solidarities must be experienced vis-à-vis such coherent categories of self and selves which are juxtaposed to other categories (thus requiring the need for further bonding) of self and selves in absolute spaces which is critiqued here. The alternative introduced is the idea of solidarities which are experienced by way of tensions between categories. These are solidarities which rely on existing bonds between and across such categories and are therefore experienced in contingent spaces. What is looked at in this section is how the latter cut across the notion of self and selves as individuals who supposedly need to be further bonded with each other across dichotomies in the first place.

The additional reality of non-sovereign Political Subjectivity

In the Irish context, citizen children born to undocumented parents have been the focus of much debate with regard to the question of the politics of solidarity in Irish society. This was most notable in respect of the question of automatic entitlement to Irish citizenship at birth which was the central concern of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. Yet theirs is a highly ambiguous subjectivity. For example, Irish citizen children born to undocumented migrant parents are entitled as Irish citizens to live in Ireland with at least one of their parents. For many of these children, however, this entitlement does not necessarily extend to the right to live with their siblings. This is because under the
conditions of the ‘Irish Born Child (IBC)/05’ scheme introduced in 2005, undocumented migrant parents were required to sign a statutory declaration which stated that they understood that were they granted residency in the Republic of Ireland with their Irish citizen child this would not give them or their Irish citizen child any entitlement to reunification with any other family members residing outside the country. These Irish citizen children are therefore in a semi-unusual (although not a unique) situation insofar as unlike other Irish citizen children they are not necessarily entitled to expect to grow up in the same country as their sibling or, sometimes their second parent. Although this means these children are not ‘included’ in traditional understandings of what Irish citizenship entails, however, it does not necessarily follow either that they are therefore ‘excluded’ from understanding of Irish citizenship. These are children who, for example, like all other Irish citizen children are entitled to state funded primary, secondary and third-level education and all normal social welfare benefits. Rather than the citizenship of these children being revoked and them thus being understood as excluded subjects who are positioned outside the dominant political community, their status as citizen is more accurately described as having been, and continuing to be, deferred both spatially and temporally in how it is experienced by them in everyday life.

It is deferred spatially insofar as they do not experience Irish citizenship as individuals but according to the different situations which they find themselves. Theirs is an experience, in other words, which displaces the relationship between people (identity) and place (the individual) which appeals to state sovereignty rely upon and, in doing so, subsequently reproduce. Similarly, this citizenship is not experienced in linear progressive time of the narrative of modern subjectivity. For although these children can be recognised as Irish citizens at particular moments, the ‘time’ of citizenship is discontinuous here; “it is not part of the continuum of past and present” (Bhabha 1994:7). The result is that these children do not experience citizenship as modern subjects who live their lives as either ‘nationals’ or ‘non-nationals’. Rather, these children and their identities constantly move across, within and between political and cultural borders challenging the notion that ‘integration’ can always be discussed in terms of a coherent sovereign subject which can be conceptualised in the first place. In so doing, these children challenge the notion, even in the last instance, of a coherent subject defined in terms of a status of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ which makes sense in relation to how it is positioned vis-à-vis the state.

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4 The ‘Irish Born Child (IBC)/05’ scheme was set up to enable undocumented parents of Irish citizen children born before January 1 2005 who had not already sought entitlement through previous schemes on behalf of their children, to apply for permission to remain living in Ireland due to them having an Irish citizen child. Parents were granted residency permits under this scheme if they were able to show that they had been living in Ireland continuously since the birth of their child and that they had no criminal record. A report by the Children’s Rights Alliance states that as of January 2006 17,917 applications were received under this scheme and 16,693 were granted leave to remain. Parent(s) granted residency were granted it for two years initially (Children’s Rights Alliance 2006).

5 A report by the Coalition Against the Deportation of Irish Children argues that lone parentage is for many families “a direct result” of the family reunification policies which people were required to adhere to in order to gain IBC 05 status (CADIC 2007: 28)
Fanning touches on the experiences of such children in three chapters of *New Guests of the Irish Nation*. In the first of these (‘Migrant Children and Institutional Neglect’) he explores the experiences of these children as part of the more general category of ‘migrant children’, focusing specifically on their neglect by the Irish state and thus on their status as ‘outsiders’. In doing so Fanning avoids confronting the thorny issue of how Irish citizens born to undocumented migrant parents are not children who are defined primarily by their status as ‘outsiders’ (i.e. as migrants), but people who are constantly defined against political and cultural borders and therefore exist within much less coherent (dominant) understandings of what it is to be ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ given that these are Irish citizens and thus Irish subjects but also those deprived of that subjectivity in many important ways.

In two other chapters (‘Hospitality, Solidarity and Memory’ and ‘The Citizenship Referendum’, the latter co-authored with Fidèle Mutwarasibo) the question of the importance of considering Irish citizen children born to undocumented parents in their own right in relation to the question of the politics of subjectivity is more directly touched upon. Unfortunately, despite a general recognition that such children should be at the centre of the analysis of the Supreme Court challenge in 2003 to the 1990 Fajyjoni case and the Irish Citizenship Referendum proposal in 2004, most of the discussion about these two events focuses on the marginalised status of the immigrant parents of these children. Rather than focusing on these children themselves, what is emphasised is the question of how these parents have been at a disadvantage in how they have been treated by the Irish state due to having been born outside of the state. In the chapter written by Fanning and Mutwarasibo the authors identify a tendency during the referendum in 2004 by the general population to map understandings regarding immigrants onto that of their children. However, the irony is that apart from some attempts by them to problematise these stereotypes, their work attests to the difficulty of engaging with these debates on any other terms than precisely that of continuing to map the marginalised (yet coherent) subjectivity of the immigrant parents on to that of their Irish citizen children in respect of all future understandings of such events. The presumption here appears to be that all solidarity must be conceptualised in terms of coherent subjectivities, as opposed to a recognition of the need to (re)engage with some solidarities on their own (non-sovereign) terms. Although the essence of politics is no longer associated exclusively with the state in the new cosmopolitan model of citizenship advocated by Fanning, what this arguably demonstrates is that the where engagement with notion of solidarity is still dictated by this idea of needing to be tied in the last instance to the state, the statist imaginary of sovereignty and autonomy continues to dictate how political subjectivity is understood and can be talked about.

A study entitled *Tell Me About Yourself* presents a tentative alternative to this treatment of the question of Irish citizen children born to undocumented migrant parents. This is a study conducted between 2006 and 2009 which explores the experiences of migrant children and youth in Ireland. Although also focusing on the category of ‘migrant children’ in general and not Irish citizen children born to undocumented migrant parents specifically, this study appears to do so with an appreciation of the intersection between patterns of mobility and what White and Gilmartin (2008: 391) refer to as the “space-
identity nexus”. This can be seen in the working paper which was produced in 2008 by
the authors which describes the way in which the children’s lives which they explore
“were filled with different meaning-filled connections to different spaces and places” (Ní
Laoire et al. 2008: 5). In choosing to focus on how the notion of ‘space’ in all its facets is
undermined by patterns of mobility engendered by migration, this study presents an
alternative focus. Unlike that of Fanning’s work which is based on defining a new
cosmopolitan model of solidarity by continuing to tie the ‘space’ of subjectivity in
the last instance to the notion of a sovereign, autonomous being, this study can be seen to
tentatively question the necessary association of identity and the location of that identity
in a coherent subject (conceptualised as ‘individual’). Instead, these authors emphasise
the manner in which the basis for, and relationship between identity (status) and place
(the subject) is often contradictory and unstable. For example, it focuses on how status as
‘migrant’ and status as ‘child’ produce very different experiences against, as opposed to
in terms of the image of a coherent subject (Ní Laoire et al. 2009: 99). In doing so this
study hints at how we might go beyond simply considering how migration has redrawn
the map of what it is to be ‘Irish’ (the space of political community), to that of asking
how it has also redrawn the map of what it is to be ‘more generally (the space of political
subjectivity). This is insofar as it emphasises how migration has undermined the idea of
having to understand ‘being’ as associated with an ability to be included in and thus as
always already separate from ‘political’ community (the state) in the first place.

A politics of solidarity based on the notion of in-between space

The study by Ní Laoire et al essentially suggests that a ‘realistic’ conception of solidarity
defined in terms of adhering to a sovereign understanding of political subjectivity which
exists in absolute dichotomous spaces ends up ignoring an alternative ‘political’ reality
which is non-sovereign subjectivity which exists in in-between or contingent spaces.
With this in mind, I would like to consider how we might conceptualise a politics of
solidarity which can take account of this alternative non-sovereign political reality. To do
so I turn to the work of Julia Kristeva which, unlike that of Beck or Habermas, does not
start with the question of how we might establish a bond between individuals or groups
thereof but instead asks us to question how we have come to assume we are separate in
the first place (Edkins 2005). It instigates a discussion about solidarity which is no longer
defined in terms of statist imaginary of sovereignty and autonomy which prioritises the
question of how people (as individuals) can be further bonded to each other through a
negotiation of identity and difference. It is rather one which seeks to consider the manner
in which difference presents itself as “the condition of our being with others” (Kristeva,
1991: 192). This is to conceive of difference as the condition of solidarity rather than as
something which solidarity is required to overcome.

In her work Julia Kristeva has focused not only on the question of how we have come to
understand ‘being’, but she has more specifically challenged the existing political
horizons according to which this question is normally answered:

I…saw a humanity that asks not to be included or excluded from universalism,
but encourages us to consider different ways to be or to signify (Kristeva 1996:
261)
In order to achieve this, Kristeva has not simply forgone a conception of a unified subject in favour of a subject in process but she has gone a step further by introducing the Freudian register of psychic representation on top of the level of conscious representation. Other authors have tended to focus on the concepts of strangeness, Other and otherness in terms of how these concepts merely disturb understandings of the dual nature of modern subjectivity as divided between particularism (citizenship) on one hand and universalism (humanity) on the other. In so doing so their work subsequently reinforces this in a different manner via a different dichotomy. Kristeva however has been able to focus on the notions of strangeness, Other and otherness can be understood to permeate both the notion of ‘citizenship’ and that of ‘humanity’ and in so doing, to in themselves destroy the basis for this distinction in the first place. An example of this is her exploration in *Strangers to Ourselves* (1991) of the notion of ‘foreignness’ as this relates to the subconscious and thus as that which is within the specific self but not in a tangible way which can be defined in terms of a ‘particular’ self. Nor, as that which has a definable ‘outside’ of itself which can be articulated as a ‘universal’ self in opposition to this. Having done this, foreignness begins to form the basis of an alternative conception of subjectivity in Kristeva’s work which cannot be articulated in the resolution of the process of drawing lines between inside and outside, particular and universal, identity and difference, national and non-national, but appears as that which is articulated and just as quickly rearticulated anew in the tension or border-space which is constitutive of, and constituted by, these very limits. As Kristeva herself explains, the result is that “foreignness is within us: we are own foreigners, we are divided” (1991: 181) in the notion of a coherent ‘self’ as opposed to of, and by way of, coherent ‘selves’.

I would like to suggest that Julia Kristeva’s work shows how we can still think in terms of ‘politics’ and ‘political’ subjectivity (that we must do so) even when its form and shape is determined by it’s lack of form and shape; even when political subjectivity is determined by its ambiguity as opposed to its coherency. It presents a way of thinking about being political even when political subjectivity is determined by its difficulty in being categorised in terms of the boundaries which normally present as lines drawn between inclusion and exclusion, between them and us. This is because in her work she presents a way of considering how the question of political identity and community can be conceptualised without using (this includes attempting to neutralise) binary oppositions and the notions of absolute exclusion and spatial distinctions between here and there, us and them which these assume and accordingly reproduce. There is no longer a need to think about the basis of solidarity in Irish society as being between subjects conceptualised as existing in absolute spaces (of inclusion and identity) vis-à-vis other absolute spaces (of exclusion and difference). Instead it is possible through her work to begin to imagine patterns of community and diversity that transcend the lines inscribed by modern subjectivities which reproduce only sovereign (spatially coherent) notions of ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Walker 2003) through dichotomies. These are patterns of community and identity that are rather based on ambiguous fragments and inconsistent linkages often retrospectively reproduced between and across the absolute space permitted by dichotomies such as national/non-national, Irish/non-Irish, citizen/migrant.
Kristeva’s work in this manner ties into broader international debates on the increasing difficulty of defining migration through an inclusion/exclusion framework (see, for example, Squire 2009) as well as those which are taking place nationally in Ireland. For example, during the ‘Managing Migration’ conference roundtable discussion held in Maynooth in 2009, Robin Hanan, CEO of the Irish Refugee Council pointed out that the current debate on integration is insufficient insofar as it only focuses on identities that can be clearly delineated in time and space. He argued that it ignores the solidarities produced through everyday interaction which are not part of this sovereign space:

I think that the first thing to bear in mind is that the debate itself is very artificial. It’s based on the idea that….someone from India only has two available cultural identities, Indian and Irish. We know that person may have identities and allegiances in terms of culture and interests and in terms of their work and so on (quoted in Titley et al 2009: 13)

The problem, as Mary Catherine Bateson (1990) points out elsewhere is that these additional solidarities take place, for example, through improvisational and ambiguous communication rather than through sovereign political boundaries; this is something that most attempts to reconceptualise a new cosmopolitan model of solidarity fail to take into account. The implication is that there is a need to try to think the notion of a ‘cosmopolitan’ politics of solidarity beyond (while continuing to recognise the very powerful nature of) sovereign space.

In shifting away from the assumption regarding the need to think politics in terms of coherency to promoting the importance of ambiguity in respect of how solidarity is experienced, Kristeva’s work permits us to consider how we might draw out the more fragmentary ways in which people are linked together in discussions about solidarity – this includes through legal irregularities which bring people together through work, leisure activities and education while preventing them from becoming recognised as ‘individual’ members of a political community. No doubt many people will find fault with the discussion in this paper as there is no real basis in this new concept of solidarity for a general understanding of the meaning of ‘cosmopolitanism’. Rather this is left as something tied “to an openness to connections” (Walker 2003: 284) which are only defined in the particular contexts in which they emerge. Yet, following Harvey (2009: 97), what is pointed out is that this lack of definition is important in itself. This is insofar as it “bring us back to a located and embodied ‘actually existing’ understanding of the concept of solidarity as this has been theorised via the notion of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the first place which precisely permits us to be able to tease out different understandings of space which are necessary in order to continue to build upon the concept of cosmopolitanism in the future.

**Conclusion**

A certain kind of logic teaches us a law of the excluded middle: an object may be here or there, but not in both places at once; something may be X or not-X, but not somewhere in between; a predication can be only true or false…What the new
archives, geographies, and practices of different historical cosmopolitanisms might reveal is precisely a cultural illogic for modernity that makes perfectly good non-modern sense. (Pollock et al 2000: 588)

In *New Guests of the Irish Nation* Bryan Fanning does not argue that a new cosmopolitan model of solidarity based on the work of Habermas and Beck necessarily leads to a better politics. That is to say, he does not simply accept this as a panacea for exclusion in its various guises. Instead he is quick to outline his reservations as to how exactly it will work. Nonetheless Fanning does insist that this theory of new cosmopolitanism adheres to a ‘necessary’ way of conceptualising a new politics of solidarity insofar as it ensures that the state can (continue to) successfully deal with the challenge of immigration to dominant conceptions and ideals of solidarity, while ensuring a fairer society. For Fanning the question of the politics of integration must be understood in terms of how “[c]osmopolitan hospitality will be practiced by nation-states or not at all” (2009: 149).

Yet, this paper has sought specifically to question this understanding regarding the limit of what and where politics can be in relation to the question of solidarity. In similar vein to the above observation by Pollock et al, it has sought to suggest that ‘politics’ and thus political subjectivity can be conceptualised outside as well as within the image of what modernity tells us political subjectivity must be: which is sovereign (coherent) and autonomous (situated vis-à-vis its relationship with the state).

The main argument made in this paper is that there is a need, in debates about integration in the Irish context, to specifically challenge references to an overriding ‘realistic’ conception of the limits of solidarity, as that which must be dictated in the last instance by the centrality of the nation-state to the demand for solidarity. We have seen how this reproduces the assumption that politics must be defined in terms of an ability to draw lines and always find a resolution between identity and difference, universalism and particularism in the image of the modern subject (the individual). It has been pointed out that to do this is to fail to see those instances in which subjectivity is articulated, on the contrary, in a non-modern way through the maintenance of this tension - the point at which inclusion and exclusion clash - rather than in a possible resolution of this. Having looked at citizen children born to undocumented migrant parents as an example of the type of non-modern subjectivity which is ignored in this particular cosmopolitan model of solidarity and which can be used to undermine the assumption that we must think in terms of dichotomies and their resolution, the paper considered the work of Julia Kristeva to suggest how a different politics of solidarity might be envisaged. This is not based primarily on the question of how to build bonds between those included in and those excluded from Irish society (thus emphasizing the need for ever more integration) but instead on the importance of recognizing the manner in which people are always already bonded to each other and Irish society in many ways associated with contingent space that dominant dichotomous categories of subjectivity cannot account for. The aim here in using Kristeva’s work is not to suggest that a new politics of solidarity should be redefined in terms of fragmentary space at the expense of absolute space, but that it should be based on permitting explorations of solidarity in terms of both; this is something which is currently not possible when it is presumed that solidarity must be defined in the last instance in terms of the modern territorial sovereign state.
References


