This thesis presents three essays on corporate governance, which contribute to the literature by examining the following issues: Do State-owned enterprises have worse governance? Evidence from Brazil; Do cross-listed companies have better governance? Evidence from Brazil; and Does the governance of banks differ from nonfinancial firms? Evidence from Brazil. In the first essay, we analyse the governance practices of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and compare them with those of privately-owned enterprises (POE). Our findings document that SOEs have better governance than POEs. Our results reject the common assumption that SOEs have worse governance than POEs. The second essay evaluates the governance of Brazilian companies that list shares abroad. We document that cross-listed companies adopt better governance than local peers, but the evidence is stronger for firms traded over the counter rather than on US stock exchanges. We also show that Brazilian cross-listings on US stock exchanges, which are required to adopt high regulation standards, do not improve governance practices. The final essay examines the governance practices of Brazilian banks. Our findings show that the overall quality of governance is similar for banks and non-financial enterprises. We show that banks have better practices regarding board of directors, more concentrated ownership and fewer shareholders rights compared to non-financial firms. Furthermore, our evidence on bank governance has not changed significantly since the 2008 crisis.