In this thesis, I examine financial reporting issues in the Chinese context, with a particular focus on the effect of political forces. The thesis consists of three essays.In the first essay, I examine whether the earnings properties and share price anticipation of earnings of Chinese firms changed following the mandatory adoption of Chinese IFRS in 2007. Using a set of IFRS "early adopters" as a control group, I find that the earnings persistence and other measures of earnings properties, among the treatment group of firms adopting Chinese IFRS in 2007, do not change significantly. However, I do find that share price anticipation of earnings improves for the treatment group relative to the control group, consistent with the improved transparency associated with Chinese IFRS adoption making it easier for investors to forecast future earnings. Particularly, I find that the improvement in the share price anticipation of earnings is confined to firms that are not state controlled or subsidized, and so largely rely on capital markets to supply most of their financial needs.In the second essay, I examine the value relevance of government subsidies for Chinese listed companies. My exploration of the valuation consequences of state support is structured around three questions. First, are the government subsidies received by Chinese listed companies value relevant? Second, does the value relevance of government subsidies depend on the purpose for which the subsidies are used? Third, does the value relevance of government subsidies depend on the channel through which the subsidies are granted? I motivate these research questions through interviews of accountants, managers, academics and government officials. Through large sample analyses, I confirm that subsidies are positively related to firm value, but less so for distressed firms and subsidies granted through non-tax channels. My study contributes to the understanding of a Chinese-style capitalism that is driving China towards becoming the largest economy in the World.In the third and final essay, I examine whether state subsidies influence the voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures of Chinese listed firms. Focusing on Chinese manufacturing industries for the period 2006-2009, I find that a well established model of CSR disclosures that was designed for Western companies produces similar results in China. I then go on to exploit the additional unique institutional features of China that have material implications for disclosure choice over and above the variables that commonly figure in Western models. In particular, I focus on the influence of state subsidies on the CSR disclosure choices of Chinese firms, taking care to distinguish between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state owned enterprises (NSOEs). I find that state subsidies do (do not) significantly affect the CSR disclosure choices of NSOEs (SOEs). I also find a significant difference between the influence of tax-based subsidies and non-tax based subsidies on NSOEs. My findings are consistent with the political cost hypothesis that firms receiving state subsidies, especially those not under state control, are pressured to disclose CSR activities due to political cost concerns associated with public demand as well as government scrutiny.