This thesis investigates the impact of financial liberalisation policies on finance-growth relationship and financial crises. Analysis of recent trends and economic performance of financially developed and stable economies raises at least two very important questions that seem to have strong analytical connections. The first question is associated with the link between financial development and economic growth and the second question focuses the possible association between the policies of financial liberalisation and financial vulnerability. In this thesis we aim to shed light on some of the aspects that have gained so much attention from academics and policy makers during the last two decades.First we address whether excessive liberalisation has caused financial development to lose its effectiveness in generating economic growth. We employ a dynamic panel data analysis for 88 countries over the period of 1973 to 2005. Our index for the financial sector liberalisation covers seven aspects: credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, banking regulations and restrictions on capital market. We use a comprehensive financial development indicator constructed through principal component analysis of five different indicators: bank private credit to GDP ratio, liquid liability to GDP ratio, deposit money bank assets to total bank assets ratio, deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio, and bank credit to bank deposit ratio. The results indicate that the positive effect of financial development on long-run growth continues to decline as the financial sector becomes more liberalised. Our results are robust to changes in the financial development indicators and the dis-aggregation of the financial liberalisation index.Second, we examine the possibility for an optimal sequence of financial sector reforms that may reduce an economy's vulnerability to financial crises. We construct a distance measure from the countries that followed a more gradual approach and liberalised their capital account at a later stage. Our analysis shows that the experience of the countries that delayed or followed a very gradual approach for the liberalisation of their capital accounts have high level of implications to those countries that allowed for shock approach or liberalised their capital account before bringing reforms in other sectors.