Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account

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Abstract

This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions – specifically their normative dimension – while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.

Bibliographical metadata

Original languageEnglish
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2 Oct 2019