The ultimate ownership of Western European corporationsCitation formats

  • Authors:
  • Mara Faccio
  • Larry H P Lang

Standard

The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. / Faccio, Mara; Lang, Larry H P.

In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2002, p. 365-395.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Faccio, M & Lang, LHP 2002, 'The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 365-395. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0

APA

Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3), 365-395. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0

Vancouver

Faccio M, Lang LHP. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 2002;65(3):365-395. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0

Author

Faccio, Mara ; Lang, Larry H P. / The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. In: Journal of Financial Economics. 2002 ; Vol. 65, No. 3. pp. 365-395.

Bibtex

@article{25f08313ab34414a9e664c39df655343,
title = "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations",
abstract = "We analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. Typically firms are widely held (36.93%) or family controlled (44.29%). Widely held firms are more important in the UK and Ireland, family controlled firms in continental Europe. Financial and large firms are more likely widely held, while non-financial and small firms are more likely family controlled. State control is important for larger firms in certain countries. Dual class shares and pyramids enhance the control of the largest shareholders, but overall there are significant discrepancies between ownership and control in only a few countries. {\textcopyright} 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Corporate governance, Ownership structure",
author = "Mara Faccio and Lang, {Larry H P}",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0",
language = "English",
volume = "65",
pages = "365--395",
journal = "Journal of Financial Economics",
issn = "0304-405X",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations

AU - Faccio, Mara

AU - Lang, Larry H P

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - We analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. Typically firms are widely held (36.93%) or family controlled (44.29%). Widely held firms are more important in the UK and Ireland, family controlled firms in continental Europe. Financial and large firms are more likely widely held, while non-financial and small firms are more likely family controlled. State control is important for larger firms in certain countries. Dual class shares and pyramids enhance the control of the largest shareholders, but overall there are significant discrepancies between ownership and control in only a few countries. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - We analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. Typically firms are widely held (36.93%) or family controlled (44.29%). Widely held firms are more important in the UK and Ireland, family controlled firms in continental Europe. Financial and large firms are more likely widely held, while non-financial and small firms are more likely family controlled. State control is important for larger firms in certain countries. Dual class shares and pyramids enhance the control of the largest shareholders, but overall there are significant discrepancies between ownership and control in only a few countries. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Ownership structure

U2 - 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0

DO - 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0

M3 - Article

VL - 65

SP - 365

EP - 395

JO - Journal of Financial Economics

JF - Journal of Financial Economics

SN - 0304-405X

IS - 3

ER -