The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theoryCitation formats

Standard

The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory. / MacBride, Fraser.

Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. ed. / Anne Reboul. Vol. 1 Heidelberg : Springer Nature, 2014. p. 141-158.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingOther chapter contribution

Harvard

MacBride, F 2014, The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory. in A Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. vol. 1, Springer Nature, Heidelberg, pp. 141-158. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04199-510

APA

MacBride, F. (2014). The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory. In A. Reboul (Ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan (Vol. 1, pp. 141-158). Heidelberg: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04199-510

Vancouver

MacBride F. The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory. In Reboul A, editor, Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. Vol. 1. Heidelberg: Springer Nature. 2014. p. 141-158 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04199-510

Author

MacBride, Fraser. / The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. editor / Anne Reboul. Vol. 1 Heidelberg : Springer Nature, 2014. pp. 141-158

Bibtex

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title = "The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory",
abstract = "G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout?s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us.",
author = "Fraser MacBride",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-04199-510",
language = "English",
volume = "1",
pages = "141--158",
editor = "Anne Reboul",
booktitle = "Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
address = "United States",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - The transcendental metaphysic of G. F. Stout: his defence and elaboration of trope theory

AU - MacBride, Fraser

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout?s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us.

AB - G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout?s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-04199-510

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-04199-510

M3 - Other chapter contribution

VL - 1

SP - 141

EP - 158

BT - Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan

A2 - Reboul, Anne

PB - Springer Nature

CY - Heidelberg

ER -