The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficenceCitation formats

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The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficence. / Bennett, Rebecca.

In: Bioethics, Vol. 23, No. 5, 06.2009, p. 265-273.

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Bennett, Rebecca. / The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficence. In: Bioethics. 2009 ; Vol. 23, No. 5. pp. 265-273.

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@article{05937f26c5464106809abb76ec4efe84,
title = "The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficence",
abstract = "The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected.",
keywords = "Disability, Discrimination, Eugenics, Impersonal harm, Procreative beneficence, Reproductive autonomy, Screening",
author = "Rebecca Bennett",
year = "2009",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00655.x",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "265--273",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "John Wiley & Sons Ltd",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficence

AU - Bennett, Rebecca

PY - 2009/6

Y1 - 2009/6

N2 - The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected.

AB - The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected.

KW - Disability

KW - Discrimination

KW - Eugenics

KW - Impersonal harm

KW - Procreative beneficence

KW - Reproductive autonomy

KW - Screening

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00655.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00655.x

M3 - Article

VL - 23

SP - 265

EP - 273

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

IS - 5

ER -