Strategic bias in discrete choice experimentsCitation formats

Standard

Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments. / Meginnis, Keila; Burton, Michael; Chan, Ron; Rigby, Daniel.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 0, 102163, 07.09.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Meginnis, K, Burton, M, Chan, R & Rigby, D 2018, 'Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 0, 102163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010

APA

Meginnis, K., Burton, M., Chan, R., & Rigby, D. (2018). Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 0, [102163]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010

Vancouver

Meginnis K, Burton M, Chan R, Rigby D. Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 Sep 7;0. 102163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010

Author

Meginnis, Keila ; Burton, Michael ; Chan, Ron ; Rigby, Daniel. / Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 ; Vol. 0.

Bibtex

@article{f3a8adfc9fa94d749c974d9d1cbacb1f,
title = "Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments",
abstract = "An induced value laboratory experiment is conducted to explore the vulnerability of discrete choice experiments to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. We consider strategic behaviour to arise when an agent: (i) believes the choice experiment will be used to determine a provision decision over a discrete set of alternatives; and (ii) has expectations about the relative likelihood of those alternatives being selected and delivered. In the experiment, agents receive induced values for the discrete set of provisioning alternatives. In treatments where agents receive information that their first best outcome is unlikely to win, we investigate the extent to which their choices change, in a manner consistent with them seeking to deliver their second best outcome in the provisioning decision. We find that 27% of respondents misrepresent their preferences and reveal evidence of strategic bias. We find that this behaviour is sufficient to change inferences about preferred provision at the aggregate level.",
keywords = "Discrete choice experiments, Strategic bias",
author = "Keila Meginnis and Michael Burton and Ron Chan and Daniel Rigby",
year = "2018",
month = sep,
day = "7",
doi = "10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010",
language = "English",
volume = "0",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments

AU - Meginnis, Keila

AU - Burton, Michael

AU - Chan, Ron

AU - Rigby, Daniel

PY - 2018/9/7

Y1 - 2018/9/7

N2 - An induced value laboratory experiment is conducted to explore the vulnerability of discrete choice experiments to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. We consider strategic behaviour to arise when an agent: (i) believes the choice experiment will be used to determine a provision decision over a discrete set of alternatives; and (ii) has expectations about the relative likelihood of those alternatives being selected and delivered. In the experiment, agents receive induced values for the discrete set of provisioning alternatives. In treatments where agents receive information that their first best outcome is unlikely to win, we investigate the extent to which their choices change, in a manner consistent with them seeking to deliver their second best outcome in the provisioning decision. We find that 27% of respondents misrepresent their preferences and reveal evidence of strategic bias. We find that this behaviour is sufficient to change inferences about preferred provision at the aggregate level.

AB - An induced value laboratory experiment is conducted to explore the vulnerability of discrete choice experiments to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. We consider strategic behaviour to arise when an agent: (i) believes the choice experiment will be used to determine a provision decision over a discrete set of alternatives; and (ii) has expectations about the relative likelihood of those alternatives being selected and delivered. In the experiment, agents receive induced values for the discrete set of provisioning alternatives. In treatments where agents receive information that their first best outcome is unlikely to win, we investigate the extent to which their choices change, in a manner consistent with them seeking to deliver their second best outcome in the provisioning decision. We find that 27% of respondents misrepresent their preferences and reveal evidence of strategic bias. We find that this behaviour is sufficient to change inferences about preferred provision at the aggregate level.

KW - Discrete choice experiments

KW - Strategic bias

U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010

M3 - Article

VL - 0

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

SN - 0095-0696

M1 - 102163

ER -