Relations and truthmaking IICitation formats

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Relations and truthmaking II. / Macbride, F.

In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 111, No. 1, 01.04.2011, p. 161-179.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Macbride, F 2011, 'Relations and truthmaking II', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 111, no. 1, pp. 161-179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x

APA

Macbride, F. (2011). Relations and truthmaking II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(1), 161-179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x

Vancouver

Macbride F. Relations and truthmaking II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2011 Apr 1;111(1):161-179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x

Author

Macbride, F. / Relations and truthmaking II. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2011 ; Vol. 111, No. 1. pp. 161-179.

Bibtex

@article{2bbe5d9cf2ca4da980f24d8f3c49ebc1,
title = "Relations and truthmaking II",
abstract = "Can Bradley's Regress be Solved by positing relational tropes as truthmakers? No, no more than Russell's Paradox can be solved by positing Fregean extensions. To call a trope relational is to pack into its essence the relating function it is supposed to perform but without explaining what Bradley's Regress calls into question, viz. the capacity of relations to relate. This problem has been masked from view by the (questionable) assumption that the only genuine ontological problems that can be intelligibly raised are those that can be answered by providing a schedule of truthmakers.",
author = "F. Macbride",
year = "2011",
month = "4",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x",
language = "English",
volume = "111",
pages = "161--179",
journal = "Aristotelian Society Proceedings",
issn = "0066-7374",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Relations and truthmaking II

AU - Macbride, F.

PY - 2011/4/1

Y1 - 2011/4/1

N2 - Can Bradley's Regress be Solved by positing relational tropes as truthmakers? No, no more than Russell's Paradox can be solved by positing Fregean extensions. To call a trope relational is to pack into its essence the relating function it is supposed to perform but without explaining what Bradley's Regress calls into question, viz. the capacity of relations to relate. This problem has been masked from view by the (questionable) assumption that the only genuine ontological problems that can be intelligibly raised are those that can be answered by providing a schedule of truthmakers.

AB - Can Bradley's Regress be Solved by positing relational tropes as truthmakers? No, no more than Russell's Paradox can be solved by positing Fregean extensions. To call a trope relational is to pack into its essence the relating function it is supposed to perform but without explaining what Bradley's Regress calls into question, viz. the capacity of relations to relate. This problem has been masked from view by the (questionable) assumption that the only genuine ontological problems that can be intelligibly raised are those that can be answered by providing a schedule of truthmakers.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x

M3 - Article

VL - 111

SP - 161

EP - 179

JO - Aristotelian Society Proceedings

JF - Aristotelian Society Proceedings

SN - 0066-7374

IS - 1

ER -