Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of PhilosophyCitation formats

Standard

Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy. / Beebee, Helen.

In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 118, No. 1, 01.04.2018, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Beebee, H 2018, 'Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 118, no. 1, pp. 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aox017

APA

Beebee, H. (2018). Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aox017

Vancouver

Beebee H. Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2018 Apr 1;118(1):1-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aox017

Author

Beebee, Helen. / Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2018 ; Vol. 118, No. 1. pp. 1-24.

Bibtex

@article{d0b16e9bda1e44669899a7a4047ec20c,
title = "Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy",
abstract = "I define ‘philosophical scepticism’ as the view that philosophers do not and cannot know many of the substantive philosophical claims that they make or implicitly assume. I argue for philosophical scepticism via the ‘methodology challenge’ and the ‘disagreement challenge’. I claim that the right response to philosophical scepticism is to abandon the view that philosophy aims at knowledge, and (borrowing from David Lewis) to replace it with a more modest aim: that of finding ‘equilibria’ that ‘can withstand examination’. Finally, I consider what our attitude to our own philosophical theses should be.",
author = "Helen Beebee",
year = "2018",
month = "4",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/arisoc/aox017",
language = "English",
volume = "118",
pages = "1--24",
journal = "Aristotelian Society Proceedings",
issn = "0066-7374",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

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AU - Beebee, Helen

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N2 - I define ‘philosophical scepticism’ as the view that philosophers do not and cannot know many of the substantive philosophical claims that they make or implicitly assume. I argue for philosophical scepticism via the ‘methodology challenge’ and the ‘disagreement challenge’. I claim that the right response to philosophical scepticism is to abandon the view that philosophy aims at knowledge, and (borrowing from David Lewis) to replace it with a more modest aim: that of finding ‘equilibria’ that ‘can withstand examination’. Finally, I consider what our attitude to our own philosophical theses should be.

AB - I define ‘philosophical scepticism’ as the view that philosophers do not and cannot know many of the substantive philosophical claims that they make or implicitly assume. I argue for philosophical scepticism via the ‘methodology challenge’ and the ‘disagreement challenge’. I claim that the right response to philosophical scepticism is to abandon the view that philosophy aims at knowledge, and (borrowing from David Lewis) to replace it with a more modest aim: that of finding ‘equilibria’ that ‘can withstand examination’. Finally, I consider what our attitude to our own philosophical theses should be.

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DO - 10.1093/arisoc/aox017

M3 - Article

VL - 118

SP - 1

EP - 24

JO - Aristotelian Society Proceedings

T2 - Aristotelian Society Proceedings

JF - Aristotelian Society Proceedings

SN - 0066-7374

IS - 1

ER -