Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I define ‘philosophical scepticism’ as the view that philosophers do not and cannot know many of the substantive philosophical claims that they make or implicitly assume. I argue for philosophical scepticism via the ‘methodology challenge’ and the ‘disagreement challenge’. I claim that the right response to philosophical scepticism is to abandon the view that philosophy aims at knowledge, and (borrowing from David Lewis) to replace it with a more modest aim: that of finding ‘equilibria’ that ‘can withstand examination’. Finally, I consider what our attitude to our own philosophical theses should be.

Bibliographical metadata

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-24
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Volume118
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2018