Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknessesCitation formats

  • External authors:
  • Yan Feng
  • Paula Lorgelly
  • Marina Rodes Sanches
  • Luigi Siciliani

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Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses. / Feng, Yan; Kristensen, Søren Rud; Lorgelly, Paula; Meacock, Rachel; Rodes Sanches, Marina; Siciliani, Luigi; Sutton, Matt.

In: Health Policy, 17.07.2019.

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Author

Feng, Yan ; Kristensen, Søren Rud ; Lorgelly, Paula ; Meacock, Rachel ; Rodes Sanches, Marina ; Siciliani, Luigi ; Sutton, Matt. / Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses. In: Health Policy. 2019.

Bibtex

@article{8410727324b8496db5dd0451311e476b,
title = "Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses",
abstract = "Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in: the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised – structure, process and/or outcome – and how they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care.",
author = "Yan Feng and Kristensen, {S{\o}ren Rud} and Paula Lorgelly and Rachel Meacock and {Rodes Sanches}, Marina and Luigi Siciliani and Matt Sutton",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
day = "17",
doi = "10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.07.007",
language = "English",
journal = "Health Policy",
issn = "0168-8510",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses

AU - Feng, Yan

AU - Kristensen, Søren Rud

AU - Lorgelly, Paula

AU - Meacock, Rachel

AU - Rodes Sanches, Marina

AU - Siciliani, Luigi

AU - Sutton, Matt

PY - 2019/7/17

Y1 - 2019/7/17

N2 - Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in: the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised – structure, process and/or outcome – and how they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care.

AB - Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in: the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised – structure, process and/or outcome – and how they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care.

U2 - 10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.07.007

DO - 10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.07.007

M3 - Article

JO - Health Policy

JF - Health Policy

SN - 0168-8510

ER -