In defence of radical restrictionism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists—as I will call proponents of the strategy—respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema <p> is true iff p. My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.

Bibliographical metadata

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3–25
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume98
Issue number1
Early online date7 Apr 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Related information

Researchers

View all