Demarcating Contextualism and Contrastivism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper I argue that there is a significant but often overlooked metaphysical distinction to be made between contextualism and contrastivism. The orthodox view is that contrastivism is merely a form of contextualism. This is a mistake. The contextualist view is incompatible with certain naturalist claims about the metaphysical nature of concepts within whichever domain is being investigated, while the contrastivist view is compatible with these claims. So, choosing one view over the other will involve choosing to affirm or deny a significant metaphysical claim. As such, a demarcation ought to be put in place between contextualism and contrastivism.

Bibliographical metadata

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-27
JournalPhilosophy
Early online date10 Jun 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jun 2021