De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's HumeanismCitation formats

Standard

De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism. / Beebee, Helen; MacBride, Fraser.

A Companion to David Lewis. ed. / Loewer B; J. Schaffer. Oxford : John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2015. p. 220-236 (Blackwell companions to philosophy).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingOther chapter contribution

Harvard

Beebee, H & MacBride, F 2015, De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism. in L B & J Schaffer (eds), A Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell companions to philosophy, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Oxford, pp. 220-236. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118398593.ch14

APA

Beebee, H., & MacBride, F. (2015). De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism. In L. B, & J. Schaffer (Eds.), A Companion to David Lewis (pp. 220-236). (Blackwell companions to philosophy). Oxford: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118398593.ch14

Vancouver

Beebee H, MacBride F. De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism. In B L, Schaffer J, editors, A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2015. p. 220-236. (Blackwell companions to philosophy). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118398593.ch14

Author

Beebee, Helen ; MacBride, Fraser. / De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism. A Companion to David Lewis. editor / Loewer B ; J. Schaffer. Oxford : John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2015. pp. 220-236 (Blackwell companions to philosophy).

Bibtex

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title = "De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism",
abstract = "Modality is standardly thought to come in two varieties: de dicto and de re. De re modality concerns the attribution of modal features to things or individuals, and enshrines a commitment to Aristotelian essentialism. This chapter considers how David Lewis's conception of de re modality fits into his overall metaphysics. The hypothesis is that the driving force behind his metaphysics in general, and his adherence to counterpart theory in particular, is the distinctly Humean thought that necessary connections between distinct existences are literally unintelligible. Lewis's appeal to counterpart theory in his account of truthmakers is explicitly aimed at delivering a truthmaker principle that eschews necessary connections. Lewis's attitude towards several well-rehearsed debates in contemporary ontology and the reasons underlying that attitude closely mirror Hume's incendiary verdict on {"}divinity and school metaphysics.{"} Finally, de re modality is connected with his adherence to the doctrine of {"}Humean supervenience{"}.",
author = "Helen Beebee and Fraser MacBride",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1002/9781118398593.ch14",
language = "English",
series = "Blackwell companions to philosophy",
publisher = "John Wiley & Sons Ltd",
pages = "220--236",
editor = "Loewer B and J. Schaffer",
booktitle = "A Companion to David Lewis",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism

AU - Beebee, Helen

AU - MacBride, Fraser

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Modality is standardly thought to come in two varieties: de dicto and de re. De re modality concerns the attribution of modal features to things or individuals, and enshrines a commitment to Aristotelian essentialism. This chapter considers how David Lewis's conception of de re modality fits into his overall metaphysics. The hypothesis is that the driving force behind his metaphysics in general, and his adherence to counterpart theory in particular, is the distinctly Humean thought that necessary connections between distinct existences are literally unintelligible. Lewis's appeal to counterpart theory in his account of truthmakers is explicitly aimed at delivering a truthmaker principle that eschews necessary connections. Lewis's attitude towards several well-rehearsed debates in contemporary ontology and the reasons underlying that attitude closely mirror Hume's incendiary verdict on "divinity and school metaphysics." Finally, de re modality is connected with his adherence to the doctrine of "Humean supervenience".

AB - Modality is standardly thought to come in two varieties: de dicto and de re. De re modality concerns the attribution of modal features to things or individuals, and enshrines a commitment to Aristotelian essentialism. This chapter considers how David Lewis's conception of de re modality fits into his overall metaphysics. The hypothesis is that the driving force behind his metaphysics in general, and his adherence to counterpart theory in particular, is the distinctly Humean thought that necessary connections between distinct existences are literally unintelligible. Lewis's appeal to counterpart theory in his account of truthmakers is explicitly aimed at delivering a truthmaker principle that eschews necessary connections. Lewis's attitude towards several well-rehearsed debates in contemporary ontology and the reasons underlying that attitude closely mirror Hume's incendiary verdict on "divinity and school metaphysics." Finally, de re modality is connected with his adherence to the doctrine of "Humean supervenience".

U2 - 10.1002/9781118398593.ch14

DO - 10.1002/9781118398593.ch14

M3 - Other chapter contribution

T3 - Blackwell companions to philosophy

SP - 220

EP - 236

BT - A Companion to David Lewis

A2 - B, Loewer

A2 - Schaffer, J.

PB - John Wiley & Sons Ltd

CY - Oxford

ER -