Data brokers co-opetitionCitation formats

Standard

Data brokers co-opetition. / Gu, Yiquan; Madio, Leonardo; Reggiani, Carlo.

In: Oxford Economic Papers, 12.09.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Gu, Y, Madio, L & Reggiani, C 2021, 'Data brokers co-opetition', Oxford Economic Papers. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab042

APA

Gu, Y., Madio, L., & Reggiani, C. (2021). Data brokers co-opetition. Oxford Economic Papers. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab042

Vancouver

Gu Y, Madio L, Reggiani C. Data brokers co-opetition. Oxford Economic Papers. 2021 Sep 12. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab042

Author

Gu, Yiquan ; Madio, Leonardo ; Reggiani, Carlo. / Data brokers co-opetition. In: Oxford Economic Papers. 2021.

Bibtex

@article{8fb8b2611a5f42c5a9c4dc932200f1f1,
title = "Data brokers co-opetition",
abstract = "Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a {\textquoteleft}co-opetition{\textquoteright} game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are {\textquoteleft}sub-additive{\textquoteright} with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are {\textquoteleft}super-additive{\textquoteright}, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.",
author = "Yiquan Gu and Leonardo Madio and Carlo Reggiani",
year = "2021",
month = sep,
day = "12",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab042",
language = "English",
journal = "Oxford Economic Papers",
issn = "0030-7653",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Data brokers co-opetition

AU - Gu, Yiquan

AU - Madio, Leonardo

AU - Reggiani, Carlo

PY - 2021/9/12

Y1 - 2021/9/12

N2 - Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a ‘co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are ‘sub-additive’ with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are ‘super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.

AB - Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a ‘co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are ‘sub-additive’ with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are ‘super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab042

DO - https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpab042

M3 - Article

JO - Oxford Economic Papers

JF - Oxford Economic Papers

SN - 0030-7653

ER -