Broadcasting Agitainment:Citation formats

Standard

Broadcasting Agitainment: A New Media Strategy of Putin's Third Presidency. / Tolz, Vera; Teper, Yuri.

In: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, 09.04.2018, p. 213-227.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Tolz, Vera ; Teper, Yuri. / Broadcasting Agitainment: A New Media Strategy of Putin's Third Presidency. In: Post-Soviet Affairs. 2018 ; Vol. 34, No. 4. pp. 213-227.

Bibtex

@article{1887e584edff4084b29f3c0254e9fbcc,
title = "Broadcasting Agitainment:: A New Media Strategy of Putin's Third Presidency",
abstract = "This article argues that accounts of the Russian media system that tend to view the time from Vladimir Putin{\textquoteright}s rise to power in 2000 as a single homogenous period do not capture major qualitative shifts in state-controlled media strategies and in the nature of ideological messages disseminated by the media. By analyzing the output of Russia{\textquoteright}s two main television channels, Pervyi Kanal and Rossiya-1, during Putin{\textquoteright}s third presidential term we identify a range of distinctly new features that amount to a new media strategy. In particular, the amount of coverage of political issues has increased significantly through the replacement of infotainment with what we term agitainment—an ideologically inflected political coverage that, through adapting specific global media formats to local needs, is packaged in a way that is able to appeal to less engaged and even sceptical viewers. Our findings challenge existing literature on neo-authoritarian media systems. They show that when struggling for control over the public agenda, neo-authoritarian regimes start employing extensive and intensive ideological messaging, rather than preferring a largely de-politicized content. In the Russian context, despite the tightening of political control over the media, particularly following the annexation of Crimea, the new strategy paradoxically has strengthened the constitutive role played by the state-controlled broadcasters in the articulation of official discourse. ",
keywords = "Putin{\textquoteright}s third presidential term, Russian media system, agitainment, neo-authoritarian regime",
author = "Vera Tolz and Yuri Teper",
note = "Funding Information: This article emanates from two research projects: “Mediating Post – Soviet Difference: An Analysis of Russian Television Representations of Inter – Ethnic Cohesion Issues,” which was funded by the UK{\textquoteright}s Arts and Humanities Research Council [project code AH/HO18964/1]; and “Reframing Russia: From Cold War to Information War?,” which is funded by the UK{\textquoteright}s Arts and Humanities Research Council [project code AH/P00508X/1]. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, {\textcopyright} 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2018",
month = apr,
day = "9",
doi = "10.1080/1060586X.2018.1459023",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
pages = "213--227",
journal = "Post-Soviet Affairs",
issn = "1060-586X",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Broadcasting Agitainment:

T2 - A New Media Strategy of Putin's Third Presidency

AU - Tolz, Vera

AU - Teper, Yuri

N1 - Funding Information: This article emanates from two research projects: “Mediating Post – Soviet Difference: An Analysis of Russian Television Representations of Inter – Ethnic Cohesion Issues,” which was funded by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council [project code AH/HO18964/1]; and “Reframing Russia: From Cold War to Information War?,” which is funded by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council [project code AH/P00508X/1]. Publisher Copyright: © 2018, © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2018/4/9

Y1 - 2018/4/9

N2 - This article argues that accounts of the Russian media system that tend to view the time from Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000 as a single homogenous period do not capture major qualitative shifts in state-controlled media strategies and in the nature of ideological messages disseminated by the media. By analyzing the output of Russia’s two main television channels, Pervyi Kanal and Rossiya-1, during Putin’s third presidential term we identify a range of distinctly new features that amount to a new media strategy. In particular, the amount of coverage of political issues has increased significantly through the replacement of infotainment with what we term agitainment—an ideologically inflected political coverage that, through adapting specific global media formats to local needs, is packaged in a way that is able to appeal to less engaged and even sceptical viewers. Our findings challenge existing literature on neo-authoritarian media systems. They show that when struggling for control over the public agenda, neo-authoritarian regimes start employing extensive and intensive ideological messaging, rather than preferring a largely de-politicized content. In the Russian context, despite the tightening of political control over the media, particularly following the annexation of Crimea, the new strategy paradoxically has strengthened the constitutive role played by the state-controlled broadcasters in the articulation of official discourse.

AB - This article argues that accounts of the Russian media system that tend to view the time from Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000 as a single homogenous period do not capture major qualitative shifts in state-controlled media strategies and in the nature of ideological messages disseminated by the media. By analyzing the output of Russia’s two main television channels, Pervyi Kanal and Rossiya-1, during Putin’s third presidential term we identify a range of distinctly new features that amount to a new media strategy. In particular, the amount of coverage of political issues has increased significantly through the replacement of infotainment with what we term agitainment—an ideologically inflected political coverage that, through adapting specific global media formats to local needs, is packaged in a way that is able to appeal to less engaged and even sceptical viewers. Our findings challenge existing literature on neo-authoritarian media systems. They show that when struggling for control over the public agenda, neo-authoritarian regimes start employing extensive and intensive ideological messaging, rather than preferring a largely de-politicized content. In the Russian context, despite the tightening of political control over the media, particularly following the annexation of Crimea, the new strategy paradoxically has strengthened the constitutive role played by the state-controlled broadcasters in the articulation of official discourse.

KW - Putin’s third presidential term

KW - Russian media system

KW - agitainment

KW - neo-authoritarian regime

U2 - 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1459023

DO - 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1459023

M3 - Article

VL - 34

SP - 213

EP - 227

JO - Post-Soviet Affairs

JF - Post-Soviet Affairs

SN - 1060-586X

IS - 4

ER -